4th Recitation Pre Employment

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 141221-36, March 07, 2002 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FRANCISCO
HERNANDEZ (AT LARGE), KARL REICHL, AND YOLANDA GUTIERREZ
DE REICHL, ACCUSED.
KARL REICHL AND YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE REICHL, ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Batangas City in
Criminal Case Nos. 6428, 6429, 6430, 6431, 6432, 6433, 6434, 6435, 6436, 6437, 6438,
6439, 6528, 6529, 6530 and 6531 finding accused-appellants, Spouses Karl Reichl and
Yolanda Gutierrez de Reichl guilty of five (5) counts of estafa and one (1) count of
syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment.[1]
In April 1993, eight (8) informations for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment
and eight (8) informations for estafa were filed against accused-appellants, spouses Karl
and Yolanda Reichl, together with Francisco Hernandez. Only the Reichl spouses were
tried and convicted by the trial court as Francisco Hernandez remained at large.
The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of private complainants; a
certification from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) that
Francisco Hernandez, Karl Reichl and Yolanda Gutierrez Reichl in their personal
capacities were neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for
overseas employment;[2] the receipts for the payment made by private complainants; and
two documents signed by the Reichl spouses where they admitted that they promised to
secure Austrian tourist visas for private complainants and that they would return all the
expenses incurred by them if they are not able to leave by March 24, 1993, [3] and where
Karl Reichl pledged to refund to private complainants the total sum of P1,388,924.00
representing the amounts they paid for the processing of their papers.[4]
Private complainant Narcisa Hernandez, a teacher, was first to testify for the prosecution.
She stated that Francisco Hernandez introduced her to the spouses Karl and Yolanda
Reichl at the residence of a certain Hilarion Matira at Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City.
At the time, she also saw the other applicants Melanie Bautista, Estela Manalo, Edwin
Coleng, Anicel Umahon, Analiza Perez and Maricel Matira. Karl and Yolanda Reichl
told Narcisa that they could find her a job as domestic helper in Italy. They, however,
required her to pay the amount of P150,000.00 for the processing of her papers and travel
documents. She paid the fee in three installments. She paid the first installment of
P50,000.00 on July 14, 1992, the second installment of P25,000.00 on August 6, 1992
and the third in the amount of P75,000.00 on December 27, 1992. She gave the money to
Francisco Hernandez in the presence of the Reichl spouses at Matira's residence.
Francisco Hernandez issued a receipt for the first and second installment [5] but not for the
third. Narcisa was scheduled to leave on December 17, 1992 but was not able to do so.
Karl Reichl explained that she would get her transit visa to Italy in Austria, but she could
not yet leave for Austria because the hotels were fully booked at that time because of the
Christmas season. Narcisa's departure was again scheduled on January 5, 1993, but it
still did not push through. Narcisa stated that they went to Manila several times
supposedly to obtain a visa from the Austrian Embassy and Karl Reichl assured her that
she would be able to leave once she gets her visa. The accused set the departure of
Narcisa and that of the other applicants several times but these proved to be empty
promises. In March 1993, the applicants met with the three accused at the residence of
private complainant Charito Balmes and asked them to refund the payment if they could
not send them abroad. The meeting resulted in an agreement which was reduced into
writing and signed by Karl Reichl. Mr. Reichl promised to ensure private complainants'
departure by April, otherwise, they would return their payment.[6]
Private complainant Leonora Perez also gave the following testimony: In July 1992, her
sister, Analiza Perez, introduced her to Francisco Hernandez at their residence in Dolor
Subdivision, Batangas City. Francisco Hernandez convinced her to apply for a job in
Italy. When she accepted the offer, Francisco Hernandez told her to prepare P150,000.00
for the processing of her papers. In August 1992, Leonora, together with her sister and
Francisco Hernandez, went to Ramada Hotel in Manila to meet with Karl and Yolanda
Reichl. At said meeting, Leonora handed her payment of P50,000.00 to Yolanda Reichl.
Yolanda assured her that she would be able to work in Italy. Francisco Hernandez and
the Reichl spouses told Leonora to wait for about three weeks before she could leave.
After three weeks, Francisco Hernandez invited Leonora and the other applicants to the
house of Hilarion Matira in Batangas City to discuss some matters. Francisco Hernandez
informed the applicants that their departure would be postponed to December 17, 1992.
December 17 came and the applicants were still unable to leave as it was allegedly a
holiday. Yolanda and Karl Reichl nonetheless assured Leonora of employment as
domestic helper in Italy with a monthly salary of $1,000.00. Francisco Hernandez and
the Reichl spouses promised the applicants that they would leave for Italy on January 5,
1993. Some time in January 1993, Francisco Hernandez went to the residence of
Leonora and collected the sum of P50,000.00 purportedly for the plane fare. Francisco
issued a receipt for the payment. When the applicants were not able to leave on the
designated date, Francisco Hernandez and the spouses again made another promise.
Tired of the recruiters' unfulfilled promises, the applicants decided to withdraw their
application. However, Karl Reichl constantly assured them that they would land a job in
Italy because he had connections in Vienna. The promised employment, however, never
materialized. Thus, Karl Reichl signed a document stating that he would refund the
payment made by the applicants plus interest and other expenses. The document was
executed and signed at the house of one of the applicants, Charito Balmes, at P. Zamora
St., Batangas City.[7]
Janet Perez, Leonora's sister, corroborated the latter's testimony that she paid a total
amount of P100,000.00 to the three accused.[8]
Private complainant Charito Balmes told a similar story when she testified before the
court. She said that Francisco Hernandez convinced her to apply for the job of domestic
helper in Italy and required her to pay a fee of P150,000.00. He also asked her to prepare
her passport and other papers to be used to secure a visa. On November 25, 1992, she
gave P25,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez. They proceeded to Kumintang Ibaba,
Batangas City and Francisco Hernandez introduced her to his business partners, spouses
Karl and Yolanda Reichl. Francisco Hernandez turned over the payment to the spouses
so that they could secure a visa for her. The Reichl spouses promised her an overseas
job. They said she and the other applicants would leave on December 17, 1992. On
December 11, 1992, Charito paid the amount of P70,300.00 to Francisco Hernandez in
the presence of the Reichls. Francisco Hernandez again handed the money to the
spouses. On February 16, 1993, Charito paid P20,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez who
delivered the same to the spouses. Francisco Hernandez did not issue a receipt for the
payment made by Charito because he told her that he would not betray her trust. Like the
other applicants, Charito was not able to leave the country despite the numerous promises
made by the accused. They gave various excuses for their failure to depart, until finally
the Reichls told the applicants that Karl Reichl had so many business transactions in the
Philippines that they would not be able to send them abroad and that they would refund
their payment instead. Hence, they executed an agreement which was signed by Karl
Reichl and stating that they would return the amounts paid by the applicants. The
accused, however, did not comply with their obligation.[9]
Mrs. Elemenita Bautista, the mother of private complainant Melanie Bautista, also took
the witness stand. She stated that in May 1992, Melanie applied for an overseas job
through Francisco Hernandez. Francisco Hernandez told her to prepare P150,000.00 to
be used for the processing of her papers and plane ticket. On June 26, 1992, Melanie
made the initial payment of P50,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez who was then
accompanied by Karl and Yolanda Reichl.[10] Upon receipt of the payment, Francisco
Hernandez gave the money to Yolanda Reichl. Melanie made two other payments: one
on August 6, 1992 in the amount of P25,000.00,[11] and another on January 3, 1993 in the
amount of P51,000.00.[12] Three receipts were issued for the payments.[13]
Rustico Manalo, the husband of private complainant Estela Abel de Manalo, testified that
his wife applied for the job of domestic helper abroad. In June 1992, Francisco
Hernandez introduced them to Karl and Yolanda Reichl who were allegedly sending
workers to Italy. Rustico and his wife prepared all the relevant documents, i.e., passport,
police clearance and marriage contract, and paid a total placement fee of P130,000.00.
[14]
They paid P50,000.00 on June 5, 1992, P25,000.00 on August 8, 1992, and
P55,000.00 on January 3, 1993. The payments were made at the house of Hilarion
Matira and were received by Francisco Hernandez who, in turn, remitted them to the
Reichl spouses. Francisco Hernandez issued a receipt for the payment. The Reichls
promised to take care of Estela's papers and to secure a job for her abroad. The Reichls
vowed to return the payment if they fail on their promise. As with the other applicants,
Estela was also not able to leave the country.[15]
The defense interposed denial and alibi.
Accused-appellant Karl Reichl, an Austrian citizen, claimed that he entered the

Philippines on July 29, 1992. Prior to this date, he was in various places in Europe. He
came to the country on July 29, 1992 to explore business opportunities in connection with
the import and export of beer and sugar. He also planned to establish a tourist spot
somewhere in Batangas. Upon his arrival, he and his wife, Yolanda Reichl, stayed at the
Manila Intercontinental Hotel. On August 3, 1992, they moved to Manila Midtown
Hotel. They stayed there until August 26, 1992. After they left Manila Midtown Hotel,
they went to another hotel in Quezon City. Karl Reichl returned to Vienna on September
19, 1992.[16]
Mr. Reichl stated that he first met Francisco Hernandez through a certain Jimmy Pineda
around August 1992 at Manila Midtown Hotel. Francisco Hernandez was allegedly
looking for a European equipment to be used for the quarrying operation of his friend.
Before accepting the deal, he made some research on the background of the intended
business. Realizing that said business would not be viable, Karl Reichl advised Francisco
Hernandez to instead look for a second-hand equipment from Taiwan or Japan. He never
saw Francisco Hernandez again until he left for Vienna in September 1992. [17]
Karl Reichl returned to the Philippines on October 21, 1992. Francisco Hernandez
allegedly approached him and sought his help in securing Austrian visas purportedly for
his relatives. Karl Reichl refused and told him that he was planning to stay permanently
in the Philippines. On one occasion, Francisco Hernandez invited him to an excursion at
Sombrero Island. Francisco Hernandez told him that he would also bring some of his
relatives with him and he would introduce him to them. There he met Narcisa Hernandez
and Leonora Perez. Leonora Perez, together with Francisco Hernandez, later went to see
Mr. Reichl at the house of his in-laws at No. 4 Buenafe Road, Batangas City and asked
him if he could help her obtain an Austrian visa. Karl Reichl, however, was firm on his
refusal.[18]
In his testimony before the trial court, Karl Reichl denied any knowledge about Francisco
Hernandez's recruitment activities. He said that Francisco Hernandez merely told him
that he wanted to help his relatives go to Europe. He further denied that he promised
private complainants that he would give them overseas employment.[19] As regards the
document where Mr. Reichl undertook to pay P1,388,924.00 to private complainants, he
claimed that he signed said document under duress. Francisco Hernandez allegedly told
him that private complainants would harm him and his family if he refused to sign it. He
signed the document as he felt he had no other option.[20]
Yolanda Gutierrez de Reichl corroborated the testimony of her husband and denied the
charges against her. She claimed that she was in Manila on the dates alleged in the
various informations, thus, she could not have committed the acts charged therein.
Yolanda Reichl further stated that she did not know of any reason why private
complainants filed these cases against her and her husband. She said that several persons
were harassing her and pressuring her to pay private complainants the sum of at least
P50,000.00.[21]
After assessing the evidence presented by the parties, the trial court rendered a decision
convicting accused-appellants of one (1) count of illegal recruitment in large scale and
six (6) counts of estafa. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused spouses KARL
REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ REICHL -
1. NOT GUILTY of the crime of syndicated and large-scale illegal

recruitment as charged in the above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6435,
6437 and 6529;
2. NOT GUILTY of the crime of estafa as charged in the above-mentioned

Criminal Cases Nos. 6434, 6436 and 6528;
3. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of syndicated and large-

scale illegal recruitment, as charged, in the above-mentioned Criminal
Cases Nos. 6429, 6431, 6433, 6439 and 6531;
4. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as charged, in the

above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6428, 6430, 6432, 6438 and 6530.
The Court hereby imposes upon the accused-spouses KARL REICHL and YOLANDA
GUTIERREZ REICHL the following sentences:
1. For the 5 offenses, collectively, of syndicated and large-scale illegal

recruitment in Criminal Cases Nos. 6429, 6431, 6433, 6438 and 6531, to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);
2. In Criminal Case No. 6428, there being no mitigating or aggravating

circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence of Six (6) Years of
prision correctional, as minimum to Sixteen (16) Years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Narcisa
Hernandez in the amount of P150,000.00;

circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision
correctional as minimum to eleven (11) years of prision mayor, as
maximum and to indemnify the complainant Leonora Perez in the amount
of P100,000.00;

correctional as minimum to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum and to indemnify the complainant Melanie Bautista in the
amount of P150,000.00;

correctional as minimum to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum and to indemnify the complainant Estela Abel de Manalo in the
amount of P130,000.00;

circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years or prision
correctional as minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum and to indemnify the complainant Charito Balmes in the amount
of P121,300.00; and
7. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.”
Accused-appellants appealed from the decision of the trial court. They raise the
following errors:
“1. The trial court erred in finding accused-appellant Karl Reichl guilty of the crimes of estafa
and illegal recruitment committed by syndicate and in large scale based on the evidence
presented by the prosecution which miserably failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

2. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of illegal recruitment
on a large scale by cummulating five separate cases of illegal recruitment each filed by a
single private complainant.

3. The trial court erred in rendering as a matter of course an automatic guilty verdict against
accused-appellant for the crime of estafa after a guilty verdict in a separate crime for illegal
recruitment. It is submitted that conviction in the latter crime does not ipso facto result in
conviction in the former.”[22]
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Article 38 of the Labor Code defines illegal recruitment as "any recruitment activities,
including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of (the Labor Code), to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority." The term "recruitment and
placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, including referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not, provided that
any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to
two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.[23] The law
imposes a higher penalty when the illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in
large scale as they are considered an offense involving economic sabotage. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any
unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme. It is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. [24]
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellants engaged in activities that fall within the definition of recruitment and
placement under the Labor Code. The evidence on record shows that they promised
overseas employment to private complainants and required them to prepare the necessary
documents and to pay the placement fee, although they did not have any license to do so.
There is illegal recruitment when one who does not possess the necessary authority or
license gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad.[25]
Accused-appellants assert that they merely undertook to secure Austrian visas for private
complainants, which act did not constitute illegal recruitment. They cite the document
marked at Exhibit "J" stating that they promised to obtain Austrian tourist visas for
private complainants. We are not convinced. Private complainants Narcisa Hernandez,
Leonora Perez and Charito Balmes categorically stated that Karl and Yolanda Reichl told
them that they would provide them overseas employment and promised them that they
would be able to leave the country on a specified date. We do not see any reason to
doubt the truthfulness of their testimony. The defense has not shown any ill motive for
these witnesses to falsely testify against accused-appellants if it were not true that they
met with the Reichl spouses and the latter represented themselves to have the capacity to
secure gainful employment for them abroad. The minor lapses in the testimony of these
witnesses pointed out by accused-appellants in their brief do not impair their credibility,
especially since they corroborate each other on the material points, i.e., that they met with
the three accused several times, that the three accused promised to give them overseas
employment, and that they paid the corresponding placement fee but were not able to
leave the country. It has been held that truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to
give error-free testimonies considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human
memory.[26] Moreover, it was shown that Karl Reichl signed a document marked as
Exhibit "C" where he promised to refund the payments given by private complainants for
the processing of their papers. We are not inclined to believe Mr. Reichl's claim that he
was forced by Francisco Hernandez to sign said document. There is no showing, whether
in his testimony or in that of his wife, that private complainants threatened to harm them
if he did not sign the document. Mr. Reichl is an educated man and it cannot be said that
he did not understand the contents of the paper he was signing. When he affixed his
signature thereon, he in effect acknowledged his obligation to ensure the departure of
private complainants and to provide them gainful employment abroad. Such obligation
arose from the promise of overseas placement made by him and his co-accused to private
complainants. The admission made by accused-appellants in Exhibit "J" that they
promised to obtain Austrian visas for private complainants does not negate the fact that
they also promised to procure for them overseas employment. In fact, in Exhibit "J",
accused-appellants admitted that each of the private complainants paid the amount of
P50,000.00. However, in Exhibit "C", which was executed on a later date, accused-
appellants promised to refund to each complainant an amount exceeding P150,000.00.
This is an acknowledgment that accused-appellants received payments from the
complainants not only for securing visas but also for their placement abroad.
Accused-appellants' defense of denial and alibi fail to impress us. The acts of recruitment
were committed from June 1992 until January 1993 in Batangas City. Karl Reichl was in
Manila from July 29, 1992 until September 19, 1992, and then he returned to the
Philippines and stayed in Batangas from October 21, 1992. Yolanda Reichl, on the other
hand, claimed that he was in Manila on the dates alleged in the various informations. It is
of judicial notice that Batangas City is only a few hours’ drive from Manila. Thus, even
if the spouses were staying in Manila, it does not prevent them from going to Batangas to
engage in their recruitment business. Furthermore, it appears that the three accused
worked as a team and they conspired and cooperated with each other in recruiting
domestic helpers purportedly to be sent to Italy. Francisco Hernandez introduced Karl
and Yolanda Reichl to the job applicants as his business partners. Karl and Yolanda
Reichl themselves gave assurances to private complainants that they would seek
employment for them in Italy. Francisco Hernandez remitted the payments given by the
applicants to the Reichl spouses and the latter undertook to process the applicants' papers.
There being conspiracy, each of the accused shall be equally liable for the acts of his co-
accused even if he himself did not personally take part in its execution.
Accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellants of

illegal recruitment in large scale by cummulating the individual informations filed by
private complainants. The eight informations for illegal recruitment are worded as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 6429
“That on or about July 14, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop,
Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-
licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any
other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale
recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and
promising for a fee to one Narcisa Autor de Hernandez and to more than three other
persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Narcisa Autor de Hernandez
relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which
acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.”
“That on or about July 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Dolor
Subdivision, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor
holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other
authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and
placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee
to one Leonora Perez y Atienza and to more than three other persons, job placement
abroad, by reason of which said Leonora Perez y Atienza relying on these
misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a
violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.”
“That on or about June 26, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop,
promising for a fee to one Melanie Bautista y Dolor and to more than three other persons,
job placement abroad, by reason of which said Melanie Bautista y Dolor relying on these
misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts
constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.”
“That on or about July 12, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop,
promising for a fee to one Annaliza Perez y Atienza and to more than three other persons,
job placement abroad, by reason of which said Annaliza Perez y Atienza relying on these
misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY
Contrary to Law.
“That on or about August 15, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop,
promising for a fee to one Edwin Coling y Coling and to more than three other persons,
job placement abroad, by reason of which said Edwin Coling y Coling relying on these
misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
Contrary to Law.”
“That on or about June 5, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop,
promising for a fee to one Estela Abel de Manalo and to more than three other persons,
job placement abroad, by reason of which said Estela Abel de Manalo relying on these
misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
Contrary to Law.”
“That on or about July 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Brgy. Sta. Rita
Karsada, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of
authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized
government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and
placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee
to one Anicel Umahon y Delgado and to more than three other persons, job placement
abroad, by reason of which said Anicel Umahon y Delgado relying on these
misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
Contrary to Law.”
“That on or about November 25, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at No.
40 P. Zamora Street, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
promising for a fee to one Charito Balmes y Cantos and to more than three other persons,
job placement abroad, by reason of which said Charito Balmes y Cantos relying on these
misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY ONE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P121,300.00), Philippine Currency, to said
accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.”
We note that each information was filed by only one complainant. We agree with
accused-appellants that they could not be convicted for illegal recruitment committed in
large scale based on several informations filed by only one complainant. The Court held
in People vs. Reyes:[27]
“x x x When the Labor Code speaks of illegal recruitment ‘committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group,’ it must be understood as referring to the number
of complainants in each case who are complainants therein, otherwise, prosecutions for
single crimes of illegal recruitment can be cummulated to make out a case of large scale
illegal recruitment. In other words, a conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must
be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether
individually or as a group.”[28]
This, however, does not serve to lower the penalty imposed upon accused-appellants.
The charge was not only for illegal recruitment committed in large scale but also for
illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed
by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction,
enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph of Article 38 of the Labor Code. It
has been shown that Karl Reichl, Yolanda Reichl and Francisco Hernandez conspired
with each other in convincing private complainants to apply for an overseas job and
giving them the guaranty that they would be hired as domestic helpers in Italy although
they were not licensed to do so. Thus, we hold that accused-appellants should be held
liable for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate which is also punishable by life
imprisonment and a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) under Article 39
of the Labor Code.
Finally, we hold that the prosecution also proved the guilt of accused-appellants for the
crime of estafa. A person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be
convicted of estafa under Art. 315 (2) of the Revised Penal Code provided the elements
of estafa are present. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code is
committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name, or falsely
pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. The offended party must have relied
on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the accused-appellant and as a
result thereof, the offended party suffered damages.[29] It has been proved in this case that
accused-appellants represented themselves to private complainants to have the capacity to
send domestic helpers to Italy, although they did not have any authority or license. It is
by this representation that they induced private complainants to pay a placement fee of
P150,000.00. Such act clearly constitutes estafa under Article 315 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is

hereby AFFIRMED.
Cost against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. HADJA
JARMA LALLI Y PURIH, RONNIE ARINGOY Y MASION, AND NESTOR
RELAMPAGOS (AT LARGE), ACCUSED.
HADJA JARMA LALLI Y PURIH AND RONNIE ARINGOY Y MASION,

ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a consolidated criminal case filed against the accused-appellants for the crimes of
Illegal Recruitment (Criminal Case No. 21930) and Trafficking in Persons (Criminal
Case No. 21908).
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, in its Decision dated 29 November
2005 (RTC Decision),[1] found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate, and
sentenced each of the accused to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment plus payment of
fines and damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) in Cagayan de Oro, in its
Decision dated 26 February 2010 (CA Decision),[2] affirmed in toto the RTC Decision.
The accused-appellants appealed to this Court by filing a Notice of Appeal [3] in
accordance with Section 3(c), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
The Facts
The findings of fact of the RTC, which were affirmed in toto by the CA, are as follows:
In the evening of June 3, 2005, while Lolita Sagadsad Plando, 23 years old, single, was in
Tumaga, Zamboanga City on her way to the house of her grandfather, she met Ronnie
Masion Aringoy and Rachel Aringoy Cañete. Ronnie greeted Lolita, "Oy, it's good you
are here" ("oy, maayo kay dia ka"). Rachel asked Lolita if she is interested to work in
Malaysia. x x x Lolita was interested so she gave her cellphone number to Ronnie. After
their conversation, Lolita proceeded to her grandfather's house.
xxx
On June 4, 2005, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Lolita received a text message
from Ronnie Aringoy inviting her to go to the latter's house. At 7:30 in the morning, they
met at Tumaga on the road near the place where they had a conversation the night before.
Ronnie brought Lolita to the house of his sister in Tumaga. Lolita inquired what job is
available in Malaysia. Ronnie told her that she will work as a restaurant entertainer. All
that is needed is a passport. She will be paid 500 Malaysian ringgits which is equivalent
to P7,000.00 pesos in Philippine currency. Lolita told Ronnie that she does not have a
passport. Ronnie said that they will look for a passport so she could leave immediately.
Lolita informed him that her younger sister, Marife Plando, has a passport. Ronnie chided
her for not telling him immediately. He told Lolita that she will leave for Malaysia on
June 6, 2005 and they will go to Hadja Jarma Lalli who will bring her to Malaysia.
Ronnie sent a text message to Lalli but the latter replied that she was not in her house.
She was at the city proper.
On June 5, 2005, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, Ronnie Aringoy and Rachel
Aringoy Cañete arrived on board a tricycle driven by Ronnie at the house where Lolita
was staying at Southcom Village. Ronnie asked if Lolita already had a passport. Lolita
said that she will borrow her sister's passport. Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita went to
Buenavista where Lolita's other sister, Gina Plando was staying. Her sister Marife Plando
was there at that time. Lolita asked Marife to let her use Marife's passport. Marife refused
but Lolita got the passport. Marife cried. Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita proceeded to
Tumaga. Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita went to the house of Hadja Jarma Lalli just two
hundred meters away from the house of Ronnie in Tumaga. Ronnie introduced Lolita to
Hadja Jarma, saying "Ji, she is also interested in going to Malaysia." Lolita handed a
passport to Hadja Jarma telling her that it belongs to her sister Marife Plando. Hadja
Jarma told her it is not a problem because they have a connection with the DFA
(Department of Foreign Affairs) and Marife's picture in the passport will be substituted
with Lolita's picture. Nestor Relampagos arrived driving an owner-type jeep. Hadja
Jarma introduced Nestor to Lolita as their financier who will accompany them to
Malaysia. x x x Lolita noticed three other women in Hadja Jarma's house. They were
Honey, about 20 years old; Michele, 19 years old, and another woman who is about 28
years old. The women said that they are from Ipil, Sibugay Province. Ronnie told Lolita
that she will have many companions going to Malaysia to work. They will leave the next
day, June 6, and will meet at the wharf at 2:30 in the afternoon.
On June 6, 2005, Lolita went to Zamboanga City wharf at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon
bringing a bag containing her make-up and powder. She met at the wharf Hadja Jarma
Lalli, Ronnie Aringoy, Honey and Michele. Ronnie gave to Lolita her boat ticket for the
vessel M/V Mary Joy bound for Sandakan, Malaysia; a passport in the name of Marife
Plando but with Lolita's picture on it, and P1,000.00 in cash. Hadja Jarma, Lolita, Honey,
Michele and two other women boarded the boat M/V Mary Joy bound for Sandakan.
Ronnie Aringoy did not go with them. He did not board the boat. x x x After the boat
sailed, Hadja Jarma Lalli and Nestor Relampagos approached Lolita and her companions.
Nestor told them that they will have a good job in Malaysia as restaurant entertainers.
They will serve food to customers. They will not be harmed.
M/V Mary Joy arrived at the port of Sandakan, Malaysia at 10:00 o'clock in the morning
of June 7, 2005. After passing through the immigration office, Hadja Jarma Lalli, Nestor
Relampagos, Lolita, Honey, Michele and two other women boarded a van for Kota
Kinabalu. x x x At the hotel, Nestor Relampagos introduced to Lolita and her companions
a Chinese Malay called "Boss" as their employer. After looking at the women, "Boss"
brought Lolita, Honey, Diane and Lorraine to a restaurant near the hotel. Diane and
Lorraine were also on baord M/V Mary Joy when it left the port of Zamboanga for
Sandakan on June 6, 2005. When they were already at the restaurant, a Filipina woman
working there said that the place is a prostitution den and the women there are used as
prostitutes. Lolita and her companions went back to the hotel. They told Hadja Jarma and
Nestor that they do not like to work as prostitutes. x x x After about five minutes, another
person called "boss" arrived. x x x [T]hey were fetched by a van at about 7:00 o'clock in
the evening and brought to Pipen Club owned by "Boss Awa", a Malaysian. At the club,
they were told that they owe the club 2,000 ringgits each as payment for the amount
given by the club to Hadja Jarma Lalli and Nestor Relampagos. They will pay for the said
amount by entertaining customers. The customers will pay 300 ringgits for short time
services of which 50 ringgits will go to the entertainer, and 500 ringgits for over night
service of which 100 ringgits will be given to the entertainer. Pipen Club is a big club in a
two-storey building. There were about 100 women working in the club, many of them
were Filipina women.
Lolita Plando was forced to work as entertainer at Pipen Club. She started working at
8:30 in the evening of June 14, 2005. She was given the number 60 which was pinned on
her. That night, she had her first customer who selected her among the other women at
the club. He was a very big man, about 32 years old, a Chinese-Malay who looked like a
wrestler. The man paid for short time service at the counter. Lolita was given by the
cashier a small pink paper. She was instructed to keep it. A small yellow paper is given to
the entertainer for overnight services. The customer brought Lolita to a hotel. She did not
like to go with him but a "boss" at the club told her that she could not do anything. At the
hotel, the man poked a gun at Lolita and instructed her to undress. She refused. The man
boxed her on the side of her body. She could not bear the pain. The man undressed her
and had sexual intercourse with her. He had sexual intercourse with her every fifteen
minutes or four times in one hour. When the customer went inside the comfort room,
Lolita put on her clothes and left. The customer followed her and wanted to bring her
back to the hotel but Lolita refused. At about 1:00 o'clock in the morning of June 15,
2005, Lolita was chosen by another customer, a tall dark man, about 40 years old. The
customer paid for an overnight service at the counter and brought Lolita to Mariner Hotel
which is far from Pipen Club. At the hotel, the man told Lolita to undress. When she
refused, the man brought her to the comfort room and bumped her head on the wall.
Lolita felt dizzy. The man opened the shower and said that both of them will take a bath.
Lolita's clothes got wet. She was crying. The man undressed her and had sexual
intercourse with her. They stayed at the hotel until 11:00 o'clock in the morning of June
15, 2005. The customer used Lolita many times. He had sexual intercourse with her every
hour.
Lolita worked at Pipen Club from June 14 to July 8, 2005. Every night, a customer used
her. She had at least one customer or more a night, and at most, she had around five
customers a night. They all had sexual intercourse with her. On July 9, 2005, Lolita was
able to contact by cellphone at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning her sister Janet Plando
who is staying at Sipangkot Felda x x x. Janet is married to Said Abubakar, an Indonesian
national who is working as a driver in the factory. x x x Lolita told Janet that she is in
Labuan, Malaysia and beg Janet to save her because she was sold as a prostitute. Janet
told Lolita to wait because her husband will go to Pipen Club to fetch Lolita at 9:00
o'clock that evening of that day. x x x She told Janet to instruct her husband to ask for
No. 60 at Pipen Club. x x x At 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Lolita was told by Daddy
Richard, one of the bosses at the club, that a customer requested for No. 60. The man was
seated at one of the tables. Lolita approached the man and said, "good evening." The man
asked her is she is the sister of Janet Plando. Lolita replied that she is, and asked the man
if he is the husband of her sister. He said, "yes." The man had already paid at the counter.
He stood up and left the place. Lolita got her wallet and followed him. x x x Lolita told
her sister about her ordeal. She stayed at her sister's house until July 22, 2005. On July
21, 2005 at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, a policeman went to her sisters house and asked
if there is a woman staying in the house without a passport. Her sister told the policeman
that she will send Lolita home on July 22. At dawn on July 22, Lolita and her brother-in-
law took a taxi from Sipangkot Felda to Mananamblas where Lolita will board a
speedboat to Sibuto, Tawi-Tawi. x x x
Upon arrival in Zamboanga City on July 24, 2005, Lolita went directly to the house of
her eldest sister Alejandra Plando Maywila at Sta. Catalina, Zamboanga City. She left her
things at her sister's house and immediately went to the sister of Ronnie Aringoy in
Tumaga. Ronnie was not there. She asked Russel, niece of Ronnie, to call for the latter.
Ronnie arrived and said to her, "so you are here, you arrived already." He said he is not
involved in what happened to her. Lolita asked Ronnie to accompany her to the house of
Nestor Relampagos because she has something to get from him. Ronnie refused. He told
Lolita not to let them know that she had already arrived from Malaysia.
Lolita was advised to file a complaint with the police regarding her ordeal in Malaysia.
On August 2, 2005, at past 9:00 o'clock in the morning, Lolita Plando went to
Zamboanga Police Office at Gov. Lim Avenue to file her complaint. x x x
In her Counter-Affidavit (Exh. "1"; "1-A"-Lalli), Hadja Jarma Lalli admitted that she met
Lolita Plando on June 6, 2005 on board M/V Mary Joy while the said vessel was at sea
on its way to Sandakan, Malaysia. The meeting was purely coincidental. By coincidence
also, Hadja Jarma, Nestor Relampagos and Lolita Plando boarded the same van for Kota
Kinabalu, Malaysia. Upon arrival, they parted ways. They did not see each other anymore
at Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. She did not know what happened to them. She went to Kota
Kinabalu to visit his son-in-law. She denied having recruited Lolita Plando for
employment abroad (Exh. "1"; "1-A"). x x x
In his Counter-Affidavit (Exh. "1"-Aringoy), Ronnie Aringoy affirmed that he personally

knows Lolita Plando since she was a teenager and he knows for a fact that her name is
Cristine and not Marife "as she purports it to appear." Sometime in the first week of June
2005, Lolita borrowed P1,000.00 from Ronnie because she wanted to go to Malaysia to
work as a guest relation officer (GRO). Ronnie lent her P1,000.00. He told her that he
knows "a certain Hadja Jarma Lalli, distant neighbor, who frequents to Malaysia and with
whom she can ask pertinent information on job opportunities." The entries in Philippine
Passport No. MM401136 issued to Hadja Jarma Lalli on January 29, 2004 (Exh. "2"; "2-
A" to "2-Q") showed that she traveled to Malaysia no less than nine (9) times within the
period from March 2004 to June 2005.
xxx
Nora Mae Adling, ticketing clerk of Aleson Shipping Lines, owner of the vessel M/V
Mary Joy 2 plying Zamboanga City to Sandakan, Malaysia route and of M/V Kristel Jane
3, testified that Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to Sandakan, not
only for herself but also for other women passengers.
xxx
Ronnie Aringoy submitted the Affidavit of his witness Rachel Cañete (Exh. "2") and the
Joint Affidavits of witnesses Mercedita Salazar and Estrella Galgan. Rachel Canete
declared that Lolita Plando whom she knows as Cristine Plando worked as a GRO (guest
relation officer) and massage attendant at Magic 2 Videoke and Massage Parlor, that
Lolita Plando has four children sired by different men; and that she knows for a fact that
Lolita Plando has been going to and from Malaysia to work in bars. When she testified in
court, Rachel did not present other evidence to substantiate her allegations. Mercedita
Salazar and Estrella Galgan declared in their Joint Affidavit that Lolita Plando who is
known to them as Marife Plando was their co-worker as massage attendant and GRO
(guest relation officer) at Magic 2 Massage Parlor and Karaoke bar where she used the
names Gina Plando and Cristine Plando. She worked in the said establishment for nine
months from February to October 2002. She has four children from four different men.
No other evidence was submitted in court to prove their assertions.[4]
The Decision of the Trial Court
The Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision on 29 November 2005, with its
dispositive portion declaring:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused HADJA JARMA LALLI y PURIH and
RONNIE ARINGOY y MASION GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case
No. 21908 of the Crime of Trafficking in Persons defined in Section 3(a) and penalized
under Section 10(c) in relation to Sections 4(a) and 6(c) of Republic Act No. 9208 known
as the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" and in Criminal Case No. 21930 of the
crime of Illegal Recruitment defined in Section 6 and penalized under Section 7(b) of
Republic Act No. 8042 known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995" and SENTENCES each of said accused:
1. In Criminal Case No. 21908, to suffer the penalty of LIFE

IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P2,000,000.00 pesos;
2. In Criminal Case No. 21930, to suffer the penalty of LIFE

IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 pesos;
3. To pay the offended party Lolita Plando y Sagadsad, jointly and severally,
the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and
4. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The trial court did not find credible the denials of the accused-appellants over the candid,
positive and convincing testimony of complainant Lolita Plando (Lolita). The accused,
likewise, tried to prove that Lolita was a Guest Relations Officer (GRO) in the
Philippines with four children fathered by four different men. However, the trial court
found these allegations irrelevant and immaterial to the criminal prosecution. These
circumstances, even if true, would not exempt or mitigate the criminal liability of the
accused. The trial court found that the accused, without a POEA license, conspired in
recruiting Lolita and trafficking her as a prostitute, resulting in crimes committed by a
syndicate.[6] The trial court did not pronounce the liability of accused-at-large Nestor
Relampagos (Relampagos) because jurisdiction was not acquired over his person.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On 26 February 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC Decision and found
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment
and Trafficking in Persons.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
in affirming in toto the RTC Decision.
The Ruling of this Court
We dismiss the appeal for lack of merit.
We modify and increase the payment of damages in the crime of Trafficking in Persons
from P50,000 to P500,000 for moral damages and P50,000 to P100,000 for exemplary
damages.
Grounds for Appeal
In his Appeal Brief,[7] Ronnie Aringoy (Aringoy) admits that he referred Lolita to a

certain Hadja Jarma Lalli (Lalli), Aringoy's neighbor who frequents Malaysia and from
whom Lolita could ask pertinent information on job opportunities.[8] Aringoy claims that
he learned later that Lolita left for Malaysia.[9] He denies knowing Relampagos to whom
Lolita paid P28,000 as placement fee for finding her work in Malaysia.[10]
Aringoy presented three witnesses: his niece Rachel Aringoy Cañete (Rachel), Mercedita
Salazar (Mercedita), and Estrella Galgan (Estrella). In her testimony, Rachel declared
that: (1) Lolita is a GRO and Massage Attendant at Magic 2 Videoke and Massage
Parlor; (2) Lolita has four children sired by different men; and (3) Lolita has been
travelling to Malaysia to work in bars. Mercedita and Estrella, on the other hand, declared
in their testimonies that Lolita was their co-worker as Massage Attendant and GRO in
Magic 2 Massage Parlor and Karaoke Bar from February to October 2002. [11]
Aringoy assailed the credibility of Lolita's testimony because of inconsistencies with

regard to: (1) Lolita's grandfather's status and name; (2) the persons (Ronnie and Rachel)
who approached Lolita to talk about the job opportunity in Malaysia; (3) certain
statements in Lolita's testimony that were not alleged in her Sworn Statement; (4)
payment of placement fee of ?28,000; and (5) names of the other female recruits who
were with Lolita in the boat going to Sandakan and Kota Kinabalu.[12] Aringoy likewise
claims that he was never included in the initial complaint filed by Lolita, and Lolita's
statements about her meetings with him, Lalli and Relampagos on 3, 4, 5 and 6 June 2005
were not corroborated by any witness.[13]
On the other hand, in her Appeal Brief,[14] Lalli claims that she simply met Lolita on 6
June 2005 on board the ship M/V Mary Joy bound for Sandakan, Malaysia.[15] Lalli
denies having met Lolita prior to their meeting on board M/V Mary Joy.[16] Lalli claims
she was going to Malaysia to visit her daughter and son-in-law who was a Malaysian
national.[17] Lalli further claims that she only spoke to Lolita aboard the ship for idle
conversation to pass away the time.[18] In this conversation, she learned that Lolita was
with a party of girls accompanied by Relampagos, and the latter was bringing them to
Malaysia to work as sales ladies.[19] Lalli admits that Lolita, Relampagos and the other
girls rode in Lalli's van in Sandakan, driven by a friend of Lalli's son-in-law.[20] They all
rode together because Relampagos talked to the van driver, requesting if he and his party
of girls could board the van and pay their fare when they reach the city proper of Kota
Kinabalu.[21] Lalli boarded the van with Lolita, Relampagos and their companions.
[22]
Upon reaching her destination, Lalli got off the van, leaving Lolita, Relampagos and
their other companions to continue their journey towards the city proper of Kota
Kinabalu.[23] After spending several days in Malaysia with her daughter and son-in-law,
Lalli went to Brunei to visit a cousin on 12 June 2005, and headed back to Malaysia on
14 June 2005.[24]
Lalli assails the credibility of Lolita due to inconsistencies in her testimony with regard
to: (1) Lolita not being in Southcom Village on 5 June 2005 at 6:00 p.m., as she claimed,
but in Buenavista Village; and (2) Lolita's claim that Lalli and Relampagos on 12 June
2005 brought the girls to Labuan, when in fact, Lalli was already in Brunei on 12 June
2005, as evidenced by the stamp in her passport.[25]
Credibility of Testimonies
Both Aringoy and Lalli, in their respective Appeal Briefs, assail the testimony of Lolita
due to its alleged inconsistency on immaterial facts, such as the status of Lolita's
grandfather, the name of the village she was in, the date she was brought to Labuan,
Malaysia, and the like. In a long line of cases, the Court has ruled that inconsistencies
pointed out by the accused in the testimony of prosecution witnesses relating to minor
details do not destroy the credibility of witnesses.[26] On the contrary, they indicate that
the witnesses were telling the truth and not previously rehearsed. [27]
The clear material inconsistency in this case, however, lies in the testimonies of accused
Aringoy and Lalli. Aringoy admitted that he referred Lolita to a certain Hadja Jarma
Lalli, his neighbor who frequents Malaysia and with whom Lolita could ask pertinent
information on job opportunities.[28] Lalli, on the other hand, denies having met Lolita
prior to their meeting on board M/V Mary Joy on 6 June 2005,[29] and claims that her
meeting with Lolita was purely coincidental.[30] Lalli admits that, even if she met
Relampagos, Lolita and their companions only on that day on board M/V Mary Joy, she
allowed these people to ride with her in Malaysia using the van driven by the friend of
Lalli's son-in-law.[31] Lastly, Lalli claims that she often goes to Malaysia to visit her
daughter and son-in-law.[32] However, this does not explain why Lalli purchased boat
tickets, not only for herself, but for the other women passengers going to Malaysia.
[33]
From March 2004 to June 2005, Lalli traveled to Malaysia no less than nine (9) times.
[34]
Nora Mae Adling, ticketing clerk of Aleson Shipping Lines, owner of the vessel M/V
Mary Joy 2 plying Zamboanga City to Sandakan, Malaysia route and of M/V Kristel Jane
3, testified in open court that "Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to
Sandakan, not only for herself but also for other women passengers."[35] Clearly, it is not
Lolita's testimony that is materially inconsistent, but the testimonies of Lalli and Aringoy.
Aringoy presented his witnesses Rachel, Mercedita and Estrella to impeach the credibility
of Lolita by alleging that Lolita was a Massage Attendant and GRO in a massage parlor
and videoke bar. His witness Rachel further declared that Lolita, at the young age of 23
years, already had four children sired by four different men, and had been previously
travelling to Malaysia to work in bars. These bare allegations were not supported by any
other evidence. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Lolita previously worked in a
Karaoke Bar and Massage Parlor and that she had four children from different men, such
facts cannot constitute exempting or mitigating circumstances to relieve the accused from
their criminal liabilities. It does not change the fact that the accused recruited Lolita to
work in Malaysia without the requisite POEA license, thus constituting the crime of
illegal recruitment. Worse, the accused deceived her by saying that her work in Malaysia
would be as restaurant entertainer, when in fact, Lolita would be working as a prostitute,
thus, constituting the crime of trafficking.
The facts found by the trial court, as affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, are, as a
general rule, conclusive upon this Court, in the absence of any showing of grave abuse of
discretion.[36] The Court, however, may determine the factual milieu of cases or
controversies under specific circumstances, such as:
(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
(6)
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
(8)
they are based;
when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
(9)
parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and
when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
(10)
and are contradicted by the evidence on record.[37]
In this case, none of these exceptions to the general rule on conclusiveness of facts are
applicable. The Court gives weight and respect to the trial court's findings in criminal
prosecution because the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard
the witnesses in person and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during
the trial.[38] For this reason, the Court adopts the findings of fact of the trial court, as
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, there being no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the lower courts.
Criminal Case No. 21930 (Illegal Recruitment)
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042) defines illegal recruitment, as follows:
[I]llegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contact services, promising
or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by
a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines.
xxx
Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered

an offense involving economic sabotage.
xxx
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three

(3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines, defines "authority" as follows:
"Authority" means a document issued by the Department of Labor authorizing a person
or association to engage in recruitment and placement activities as a private recruitment
entity.
Section 7 of RA 8042 provides for the penalty of illegal recruitment committed by a

syndicate (which constitutes economic sabotage), as follows:
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed
if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined therein.
It is clear that a person or entity engaged in recruitment and placement activities without
the requisite authority from the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), whether
for profit or not, is engaged in illegal recruitment.[39] The Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), an agency under DOLE created by Executive
Order No. 797 to take over the duties of the Overseas Employment Development Board,
issues the authority to recruit under the Labor Code. The commission of illegal
recruitment by three or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another is
deemed committed by a syndicate and constitutes economic sabotage,[40] for which the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than ?500,000 but not more than ?
1,000,000 shall be imposed.[41]
The penalties in Section 7 of RA 8042 have already been amended by Section 6 of

Republic Act No. 10022, and have been increased to a fine of not less than ?2,000,000
but not more than ?5,000,000. However, since the crime was committed in 2005, we shall
apply the penalties in the old law, RA 8042.
In People v. Gallo,[42] the Court enumerated the elements of syndicated illegal

recruitment, to wit:
(1) the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and
placement" defined under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated
under Art. 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage
in recruitment and placement of workers; and
(3) the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another.[43]
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines defines recruitment and placement as
"any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not, provided, that any person or
entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."
Clearly, given the broad definition of recruitment and placement, even the mere act of
referring someone for placement abroad can be considered recruitment. Such act of
referral, in connivance with someone without the requisite authority or POEA license,
constitutes illegal recruitment. In its simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by
persons who, without authority from the government, give the impression that they have
the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes.[44]
In this case, the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, found Lalli, Aringoy and
Relampagos to have conspired and confederated with one another to recruit and place
Lolita for work in Malaysia, without a POEA license. The three elements of syndicated
illegal recruitment are present in this case, in particular: (1) the accused have no valid
license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment
and placement of workers; (2) the accused engaged in this activity of recruitment and
placement by actually recruiting, deploying and transporting Lolita to Malaysia; and (3)
illegal recruitment was committed by three persons (Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos),
conspiring and confederating with one another.
Aringoy claims and admits that he only referred Lolita to Lalli for job opportunities to
Malaysia. Such act of referring, whether for profit or not, in connivance with someone
without a POEA license, is already considered illegal recruitment, given the broad
definition of recruitment and placement in the Labor Code.
Lalli, on the other hand, completely denies any involvement in the recruitment and
placement of Lolita to Malaysia, and claims she only met Lolita for the first time by
coincidence on board the ship M/V Mary Joy. Lalli's denial does not deserve credence
because it completely conflicts with the testimony of Aringoy who claims he referred
Lolita to Lalli who had knowledge of the job opportunities in Malaysia.
The conflicting testimonies of Lalli and Aringoy on material facts give doubt to the truth
and veracity of their stories, and strengthens the credibility of the testimony of Lolita,
despite allegations of irrelevant inconsistencies.
No improper motive could be imputed to Lolita to show that she would falsely testify
against the accused. The absence of evidence as to an improper motive entitles Lolita's
testimony to full faith and credit.[45]
Aringoy claims that no conspiracy existed in illegal recruitment, as he denies even

knowing Relampagos, who is currently at-large. Lalli denies any involvement in the
illegal recruitment, and claims that she only met Relampagos through Lolita on board the
ship M/V Mary Joy on 6 June 2005, and learned that Relampagos was bringing Lolita
and their other girl companions to Malaysia to work as sales ladies.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy "when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it."
In People v. Lago,[46] the Court discussed conspiracy in this wise:
The elements of conspiracy are the following: (1) two or more persons came to an
agreement, (2) the agreement concerned the commission of a felony, and (3) the
execution of the felony was decided upon. Proof of the conspiracy need not be based on
direct evidence, because it may be inferred from the parties' conduct indicating a common
understanding among themselves with respect to the commission of the crime. Neither is
it necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit
agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or objective to be carried out.
The conspiracy may be deduced from the mode or manner in which the crime was
perpetrated; it may also be inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or
common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. [47]
In this case, Lolita would not have been able to go to Malaysia if not for the concerted
efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos. First, it was Aringoy who knew Lolita, since
Aringoy was a neighbor of Lolita's grandfather. It was Aringoy who referred Lolita to
Lalli, a fact clearly admitted by Aringoy. Second, Lolita would not have been able to go
to Malaysia if Lalli had not purchased Lolita's boat ticket to Malaysia. This fact can be
deduced from the testimony of Nora Mae Adling (Nora), ticketing clerk of Aleson
Shipping Lines, owner of the vessel M/V Mary Joy 2 plying Zamboanga City to
Sandakan, Malaysia route and of M/V Kristel Jane 3. Nora testified in open court that
"Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to Sandakan, not only for
herself but also for other women passengers." Lalli's claim that she only goes to Malaysia
to visit her daughter and son-in-law does not explain the fact why she bought the boat
tickets of the other women passengers going to Malaysia. In fact, it appears strange that
Lalli visited Malaysia nine (9) times in a span of one year and three months (March 2004
to June 2005) just to visit her daughter and son-in-law. In Malaysia, it was Relampagos
who introduced Lolita and her companions to a Chinese Malay called "Boss" as their first
employer. When Lolita and her companions went back to the hotel to tell Relampagos
and Lalli that they did not want to work as prostitutes, Relampagos brought Lolita and the
girls on board a van to Sangawan China Labuan, where they stayed in a room for one
night. The next day, they were picked up by a van and brought to Pipen Club, where
Lolita and her companions worked as prostitutes. To date, accused Relampagos is at large
and has not been brought under the jurisdiction of the courts for his crimes.
Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing
oneself in order to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal
proceedings.[48] The unexplained flight of an accused person may as a general rule be
taken into consideration as evidence having a tendency to establish his guilt. [49] Clearly, in
this case, the flight of accused Relampagos, who is still at-large, shows an indication of
guilt in the crimes he has been charged.
It is clear that through the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos, Lolita was
recruited and deployed to Malaysia to work as a prostitute. Such conspiracy among
Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos could be deduced from the manner in which the crime
was perpetrated - each of the accused played a pivotal role in perpetrating the crime of
illegal recruitment, and evinced a joint common purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.
For these reasons, this Court affirms the CA Decision, affirming the RTC Decision,
declaring accused Ronnie Aringoy y Masion and Hadja Jarma Lalli y Purih guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate in Criminal
Case No. 21930, with a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ?500,000 imposed on
each of the accused.
Criminal Case No. 21908 (Trafficking in Persons)
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 (RA 9208), otherwise known as the Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, defines Trafficking in Persons, as follows:
Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or

receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction,
fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of
the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes
at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of RA 9208 enumerates the prohibited acts of Trafficking in Persons, one of

which is:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means,
including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or
apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage.
The crime of Trafficking in Persons is qualified when committed by a syndicate, as
provided in Section 6(c) of RA 9208:
(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed
committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.
Section 10(c) of RA 9208 provides for the penalty of qualified trafficking:
(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00).
The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act is a new law passed last 26 May 2003, designed to
criminalize the act of trafficking in persons for prostitution, sexual exploitation, foced
labor and slavery, among others.
In this case, Aringoy claims that he cannot be convicted of the crime of Trafficking in
Persons because he was not part of the group that transported Lolita from the Philippines
to Malaysia on board the ship M/V Mary Joy. In addition, he presented his niece, Rachel,
as witness to testify that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars. On the
other hand, Lalli denies any involvement in the recruitment and trafficking of Lolita,
claiming she only met Lolita for the first time on board M/V Mary Joy going to Malaysia.
The testimony of Aringoy's niece, Rachel, that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to
work in bars cannot be given credence. Lolita did not even have a passport to go to
Malaysia and had to use her sister's passport when Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos first
recruited her. It is questionable how she could have been travelling to Malaysia
previously without a passport, as Rachel claims. Moreover, even if it is true that Lolita
had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars, the crime of Trafficking in Persons can
exist even with the victim's consent or knowledge under Section 3(a) of RA 9208.
Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only limited to
transportation of victims, but also includes the act of recruitment of victims for
trafficking. In this case, since it has been sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt, as
discussed in Criminal Case No. 21930, that all the three accused (Aringoy, Lalli and
Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one another to illegally recruit Lolita to
become a prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are also guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate under
RA 9208 because the crime of recruitment for prostitution also constitutes trafficking.
When an act or acts violate two or more different laws and constitute two different
offenses, a prosecution under one will not bar a prosecution under the other.[50] The
constitutional right against double jeopardy only applies to risk of punishment twice for
the same offense, or for an act punished by a law and an ordinance.[51] The prohibition on
double jeopardy does not apply to an act or series of acts constituting different offenses.
DAMAGES
Lolita claimed actual damages of P28,000, which she allegedly paid to the accused as
placement fee for the work of restaurant entertainer in Malaysia. The trial court did not
award this amount to Lolita. We agree and affirm the trial court's non-award due to
Lolita's inconsistent statements on the payment of placement fee. In her sworn statement,
Lolita alleged that she paid P28,000 as placement fee to Lalli.[52] On cross-examination,
however, she admitted that she never paid P28,000 to the accused. [53]
We, however, modify and increase the payment of damages in the crime of Trafficking in
Persons from P50,000 to P500,000 as moral damages and P50,000 to P100,000 as
exemplary damages.
The Civil Code describes moral damages in Article 2217:
Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are awarded in addition to the payment of moral
damages, by way of example or correction for the public good, as stated in the Civil
Code:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or

correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
The payment of P500,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary damages for the
crime of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, which states:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this
article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action
mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the

crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be
trafficked as a prostitute without one's consent and to be sexually violated four to five
times a day by different strangers is horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that
Lolita experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation when she was
trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was
aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is likewise
justified.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 February

2010, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City dated 29
November 2005, finding accused Lalli and Aringoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate,
with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. 21908, each of the accused is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P2,000,000;
2. In Criminal Case No. 21930, each of the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P500,000;
3. Each of the accused is ordered to pay the offended party Lolita Plando y Sagadsad,
jointly and severally, the sum of P500,000 as moral damages, and P100,000 as
exemplary damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons; and to pay the costs.
The Court cannot pronounce the liability of accused-at-large Nestor Relampagos as
jurisdiction over his person has not been acquired.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 131656, October 12, 1998 ]
ASIAN CENTER FOR CAREER AND EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM AND
SERVICES, INC. (ACCESS), PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION AND IBNO MEDIALES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner ASIAN CENTER FOR CAREER &

EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM & SERVICES, INC. (ACCESS) seeks to modify the monetary
awards against it in the Decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), dated October 14, 1997, a case for illegal dismissal.
The records disclose that petitioner hired respondent IBNO MEDIALES to work as a
mason in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, with a monthly salary of 1,200 Saudi Riyals (SR). The
term of his contract was two (2) years, from February 28, 1995 until February 28, 1997.
On May 26, 1996, respondent applied with petitioner for vacation leave with pay which
he earned after working for more then a year. His application for leave was granted.
While en route to the Philippines, his co-workers informed him that he has been
dismissed from service. The information turned out to be true.
On June 17, 1996, respondent filed a complaint with the labor arbiter for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, refund of transportation fare, illegal
deductions, non-payment of 13th month pay and salary for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract.
On March 17, 1997, the labor arbiter found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal. [1] The
dispositive portion reads:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
illegality of complainant’s dismissal and ordering the respondent ACCESS and/or
ABDULLAH LELINA to pay the complainant the amount of SR 13,200 representing
complainant’s payment for the unexpired portion of his contract and refund of the
illegality deducted amount less P5,000.00, the legally allowed placement fee.
"Respondent are further ordered to pay attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%)
of the judgment award or the amount of SR 1,320, within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof.
"All other issues are dismissed for lack of merit.
"SO ORDERD." (emphasis supplied)

It is noteworthy, however, that in the body of his decision, the labor arbiter
applied Section 10 R.A. 8042,[2] the law relative to the protection of Filipino overseas-
workers, and computed private respondent’s salary for the unexpired portion of his
contract as follows: SR1,200 x 3 months = SR3,600.
On appeal by petitioner, the NLRC affirmed the factual findings of the labor arbiter but
modified the appealed decision by deleting the order of refund of excessive placement
fee for lack of jurisdiction.[3]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration with respect to the labor arbiter’s award of
SR13,200 in the dispositive portion of the decision, representing respondent’s salary for
the unexpired portion of his contract. invoking Section 10 R.A. 8042. Petitioner urged
that its liability for respondent’s salary is for only three (3) months. Petitioner claimed
that it should pay only SR 3.600 (SR 1,200 x 3 months) for the unexpired portion of
respondent’s employment and SR360 (10% of SR3,600) for attorney’s fees. [4]
The NLRC denied petitioner’s motion. It ruled that R.A. 8042 does not apply as
respondent’s employment which started in February 1995 occurred prior to its
effectivity on July 15, 1995.[5]
Hence, this petition for certiorari.

In the case at bar, petitioner’s illegal dismissal from service is no longer disputed.
Petitioner merely impugns the monetary awards granted by the NLRC to private
respondent. It submits that although the unexpired portion of private respondent’s
employment contract is eight (8) months,[6] it is liable to pay respondent only three (3)
months of his basic salary, pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. 8042, or SR1,200 (monthly
salary) multiplied by 3 months, for a total of SR3,600. Petitioner claims that the NLRC
erred in ruling that as private respondent’s employment started only on February 28,
1995, R.A. 8042, which took effect on July 15, 1995, would not apply to his case.
Petitioner argues that it is not the date of employment but the date of dismissal which
should be considered in determining the applicability of R.A. 8042. Petitioner prays that
the award in the NLRC Decision dated October 14, 1997, be changed to SR3,600 instead
of 13,200 and that the award of attorney’s fees be deleted.
We affirm with modifications.
As a rule, jurisdiction is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the
action.[7] In the case at bar, private respondent’s cause of action did not accrue on the
date of his date of his employment or on February 28, 1995. His cause of action arose
only from the-time he was illegally dismissed by petitioner from service in June 1996,
after his vacation leave expired. It is thus clear that R.A. 8042 which took effect a year
earlier in July 1995 applies to the case at bar.
Under Section 10 of R.A. 8042, a worker dismissed from overseas employment without
just, valid or authorized cause is entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.
In the case at bar, the unexpired portion of private respondent’s employment contract
is eight (8) months. Private respondent should therefore be paid his basic salary
corresponding to three (3) months or a total of SR3,600. [8]
We note that this same computation was made by the labor arbiter in the body of his
decision.[9] Despite said computation in the body of the decision, however, the labor
arbiter awarded higher sum (SR13,200) in the dispositive portion.
The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or the
fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that
the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering
nothing. However, where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so
clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the
decision will prevail.[10]
We find that the labor arbiter’s award of a higher amount in the dispositive portion was
clearly an error for there is nothing in the text of the decision which support the award
of said higher amount. We reiterate that the correct award to private respondent for
the unexpired portion of his employment contract is SR3,600.
We come now to the award of attorney’s fees in favor of private respondent. Article
2208 of the Civil Code allows attorney’s fees to be awarded when its claimant is
compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest by
reason of an unjustified act or omission of the party for whom it is sought. Moreover,
attorney’s fees are recoverable when there is sufficient showing of bad faith. [11] The
Labor Code,[12] on the other hand, fixes the attorney’s fees that may be recovered in an
amount which should not exceed 10% of the total amount of wages awarded.
In the case at bar, petitioner’s bad faith in dismissing private respondent is manifest.
Respondent was made to believe that he would be temporarily leaving Jeddah, Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, for a 30-day vacation leave with pay. However, while on board the
plane back to the Philippines, his co-employees told him that he has been dismissed
from his job as he was given only a one-way plane ticket by petitioner. True enough,
private respondent was not allowed to return to his jobsite in Jeddah after his vacation
leave. Thus, private respondent was compelled to file an action for illegal dismissal with
the labor arbiter and hence entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the public respondent National Labor

Relations Commission, dated October 14, 1997, is AFFIRMED with modifications:
petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent IBNO MEDIALES the peso equivalent of
the amounts of SR3,600 for the unexpired portion of his employment contract, and
SR360 for attorney’s fees. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 76633, October 18, 1988 ]
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR AND
KATHLEEN D. SACO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband.
The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had
no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an
accident in Tokyo, Japan, on March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under
Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner,
as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but
by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance
Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position
papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of
P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.
The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move
for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an
opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its subordinates. This case comes under one
of the exceptions, however, as the questions the petitioner is raising are essentially
questions of law.[1] Moreover, the private respondent herself has not objected to the
petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual procedure would delay
the disposition of the case to her prejudice.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order
No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas
employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen
Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of
the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising
out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including
seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas
Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims for death, disability and other
benefits" arising out of such employment.[2]
The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his
widow is not compensable. What it does urge is that he was not an overseas worker but
a domestic employee and consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with
the Social Security System, subject to appeal to the Employees Compensation
Commission.
We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an
overseas employee of the petitioner at the time he met with the fatal accident in Japan
in 1985.
Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas is defined as
"employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board
vessels plying international waters, covered by valid contract."[3] A contract worker is
described as "any person working or who has worked overseas under a valid
employment contract and shall include seamen" [4] or "any person working overseas or
who has been employed by another which may be a local employer, foreign employer,
principal or partner under a valid employment contract and shall include
seamen."[5] These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he
died while under a contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the
petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country. [6]
It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute
implied or tacit recognition of the nature of Saco's employment at the time of his death
in 1985. The first is its submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing,
formalization and approval in the exercise of its regulatory power over overseas
employment under Executive Order No. 797.[7] The second is its payment[8] of the
contributions mandated by law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for Overseas
Workers, which was created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social and
welfare services to Filipino overseas workers."
Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the private
respondent's signature, described the subject of the burial benefits as "overseas
contract worker Vitaliano Saco."[9] While this receipt is certainly not controlling, it does
indicate, in the light of the petitioner's own previous acts, that the petitioner and the
Fund to which it had made contributions considered Saco to be an overseas employee.
The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees
of the Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are
not considered overseas workers. If this be so, the petitioner should not have found it
necessary to submit its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and
approval or to contribute to the Welfare Fund which is available only to overseas
workers. Moreover, the analogy is hardly appropriate as the employees of the PAL
cannot under the definitions given be considered seamen nor are their appointments
coursed through the POEA.
The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was
made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective
on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both
foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas
employment. A similar contract had earlier been required by the National Seamen
Board and had been sustained in a number of cases by this Court. [10] The petitioner
claims that it had never entered into such a contract with the deceased Saco, but that is
hardly a serious argument. In the first place, it should have done so as required by the
circular, which specifically declared that "all parties to the employment of any Filipino
seamen on board any ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use this employment
contract effective 01 February 1984 and to desist from using any other format of
employment contract effective that date." In the second place, even if it had not done
so, the provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed written into the contract
with Saco as a postulate of the police power of the State. [11]
But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as
violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no
authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with
such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which,
under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive
Order No. 797, reading as follows:
"x x x The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided,
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."
Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as
earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the
same as the format adopted by the POEA.
The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the
substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the
discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative
cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,[12] which annulled Executive Order No. 626, this Court
held:
“We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of
the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall ‘be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.’ (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase ‘may
see fit’ is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden
with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches
in vain for the usual standard the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations
that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none.
Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their
generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can
supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in
their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a ‘roving commission,’ a wide
and sweeping authority that is not ‘canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing,’ in short a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative
powers."
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power, viz., the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is enforce it.[13] Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.[14] Both tests are intended to
prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed
to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of
the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because
of the many instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when
executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they
legally pertain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have
become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that
the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the
exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the
problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions.
These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be
experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it
more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of
Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract
prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of cases without challenge
by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in
requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the
delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the
executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair
and equitable employment practices."
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "public
interest" in People v. Rosenthal,[15] "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR,
[16]
"public convenience and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams,[17] and "simplicity, economy
and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor General,[18] to mention only a few cases. In the
United States, the "sense and experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v.
Industrial Commission,[19] and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States.[20]
It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit
pension of P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was also paid a P1,000.00 funeral
benefit by the Social Security System. In addition, as already observed, she also received
a P5,000.00 burial gratuity from the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers. These
payments will not preclude allowance of the private respondent's claim against the
petitioner because it is specifically reserved in the standard contract of employment for
Filipino seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984, that -
"Section C. Compensation and Benefits. -
"1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer shall
pay his beneficiaries the amount of:

"a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers

"b
P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators and master electricians
.

"c. P130,000.00 for ratings.

"2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be separate and
distinct from, and will be in addition to whatever benefits which the seaman is entitled to
under Philippine laws. x x x.

"3. xxx

"c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the owners shall pay the
beneficiaries of the seaman an amount not exceeding P18,000.00 for burial expenses."
The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No. 22,
issued by the National Seamen Board on July 12, 1976, providing as follows:
"Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional Benefits. -
"All compensation benefits under Title Il, Book Four of the Labor Code of the Philippines
(Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund) shall be granted, in addition to
whatever benefits, gratuities or allowances that the seaman or his beneficiaries may be
entitled to under the employment contract approved by the NSB. If applicable, all
benefits under the Social Security Law and the Philippine Medicare Law shall be enjoyed
by the seaman or his beneficiaries in accordance with such laws."
The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the
working class, consistently with the social justice policy and the specific provisions in the
Constitution calling for the protection of the working class and the promotion of its
interest.
One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close this case. Its argument
that it has been denied due process because the same POEA that issued Memorandum
Circular No. 2 has also sustained and applied it is an uninformed criticism of
administrative law itself. Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the
quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first enables them to promulgate
implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to interpret and
apply such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates
on its own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the Securities and
Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent Office and the
Videogram Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the
Department of Natural Resources and so on ad infinitum on their respective
administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has been accepted as a fact of life of
modern governments and cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the
cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations[21] are observed.
Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are
resolved in favor of the private respondent, in line with the express mandate of the
Labor Code and the principle that those with less in life should have more in law.
When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social
justice, the heavier influence of the latter must be counterbalanced by the sympathy
and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker. This is only fair if he is
to be given the opportunity - and the right - to assert and defend his cause not as a
subordinate but as a peer of management, with which he can negotiate on even plane.
Labor is not a mere employee of capital but its active and equal partner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The

temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 154213, August 23, 2012 ]
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME LTD. AND AGEMAR
MANNING AGENCY, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. ESTANISLAO SURIO,
FREDDIE PALGUIRAN, GRACIANO MORALES, HENRY CASTILLO,
ARISTOTLE ARREOLA, ALEXANDER YGOT, ANRIQUE BATTUNG,
GREGORIO ALDOVINO, NARCISO FRIAS, VICTOR FLORES, SAMUEL
MARCIAL, CARLITO PALGUIRAN, DUQUE VINLUAN, JESUS
MENDEGORIN, NEIL FLORES, ROMEO MANGALIAG, JOE GARFIN AND
SALESTINO SUSA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On appeal is the decision the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on December

21, 2001 affirming the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
declaring itself to be without appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) involving petitioners’ complaint
for disciplinary action against respondents.[1]
Respondents were former crewmembers of MT Seadance, a vessel owned by petitioner

Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. and manned and operated by petitioner Agemar
Manning Agency, Inc. While respondents were still on board the vessel, they
experienced delays in the payment of their wages and in the remittance of allotments,
and were not paid for extra work and extra overtime work. They complained about the
vessel’s inadequate equipment, and about the failure of the petitioners to heed their
repeated requests for the improvement of their working conditions. On December 19,
1993, when MT Seadance docked at the port of Brofjorden, Sweden to discharge oil,
representatives of the International Transport Federation (ITF) boarded the vessel and
found the wages of the respondents to be below the prevailing rates. The ensuing
negotiations between the ITF and the vessel owner on the increase in respondents’
wages resulted in the payment by the vessel owner of wage differentials and the
immediate repatriation of respondents to the Philippines.
Subsequently, on December 23, 1993, the petitioners filed against the newly-repatriated
respondents a complaint for disciplinary action based on breach of discipline and for the
reimbursement of the wage increases in the Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office
of the POEA.
During the pendency of the administrative complaint in the POEA, Republic Act No.
8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) took effect on July 15, 1995.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 vested original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
money claims arising out of employer-employee relationships involving overseas Filipino
workers in the Labor Arbiters, to wit:
Section 10. Money Claims. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the

contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall
have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90)
calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-
employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages.
The jurisdiction over such claims was previously exercised by the POEA under the
POEA Rules and Regulations of 1991 (1991 POEA Rules).
On May 23, 1996, the POEA dismissed the complaint for disciplinary action. Petitioners
received the order of dismissal on July 24, 1996.[2]
Relying on Section 1, Rule V, Book VII of the 1991 POEA Rules, petitioners filed a partial
appeal on August 2, 1996 in the NLRC, still maintaining that respondents should be
administratively sanctioned for their conduct while they were on board MT Seadance.
On March 21, 1997, the NLRC dismissed petitioners’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction,
[3]
thus:
We dismiss the partial appeal.
The Commission has no jurisdiction to review cases decided by the POEA Administrator
involving disciplinary actions. Under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, the Labor Arbiter shall have jurisdiction over money claims involving employer-
employee relationship (sec. 10, R.A. 8042). Said law does not provide that appeals from
decisions arising from complaint for disciplinary action rest in the Commission.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, instant appeal from the Order of May 23, 1996 is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied their motion.
They received the denial on July 8, 1997.[4]
Petitioners then commenced in this Court a special civil action

for certiorari and mandamus. Citing St. Martin Funeral Homes v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[5] however, the Court referred the petition to the CA on
November 25, 1998.
Petitioners contended in their petition that:
THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND/OR GRAVELY ERRED IN

DISMISSING PETITIONERS’ APPEAL AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHEN IT
REFUSED TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF PETITIONERS’ APPEAL DESPITE BEING EMPOWERED
TO DO SO UNDER THE LAW.[6]
On December 21, 2001, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus,

holding that the inclusion and deletion of overseas contract workers from the POEA
blacklist/watchlist were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POEA to the exclusion of
the NLRC, and that the NLRC had no appellate jurisdiction to review the matter, viz:
Section 10 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, provides that:
“Money Claims – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing
of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by
virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment
including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. xxxx
Likewise, the Rules and Regulations implementing RA 8042 reiterate the jurisdiction of
POEA, thus:
“Section 28. Jurisdiction of the POEA. – The POEA shall exercise original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide:
a) All cases, which are administrative in character, involving or arising out of violations
of rules and regulations relating to licensing and registration of recruitment and
employment agencies or entities; and
b) Disciplinary action cases and other special cases, which are administrative in
character, involving employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino migrant
workers.”
Further, Sections 6 and 7 Rule VII, Book VII of the POEA Rules & Regulations (1991)
provide:
“Sec. 6. Disqualification of Contract Workers. Contract workers, including

seamen, against whom have been imposed or with pending obligations imposed upon
them through an order, decision or resolution shall be included in the POEA Blacklist
Workers shall be disqualified from overseas employment unless properly cleared by the
Administration or until their suspension is served or lifted.
Sec. 7. Delisting of the Contract Worker’s Name from the POEA Watchlist. The name of
an overseas worker may be excluded, deleted and removed from the POEA Watchlist
only after disposition of the case by the Administration.”
Thus, it can be concluded from the afore-quoted law and rules that, public respondent
has no jurisdiction to review disciplinary cases decided by [the] POEA involving contract
workers. Clearly, the matter of inclusion and deletion of overseas contract workers in
the POEA Blacklist/Watchlist is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POEA to the
exclusion of the public respondent. Nor has the latter appellate jurisdiction to review
the findings of the POEA involving such cases.
xxx
In fine, we find and so hold, that, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to
the public respondent when it issued the assailed Decision and Order, dated March 21,
1997 and June 13, 1997, respectively, dismissing petitioners’ appeal from the decision of
the POEA.
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition not impressed with merit, the same is hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Issue
Petitioners still appeal, submitting to the Court the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW ON APPEAL CASES

DECIDED BY THE POEA ON MATTERS PERTAINING TO DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AGAINST
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
They contend that both the CA and the NLRC had no basis to rule that the NLRC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal only because Republic Act No. 8042 had not
provided for its retroactive application.
Respondents counter that the appeal should have been filed with the Secretary of Labor
who had exclusive jurisdiction to review cases involving administrative matters decided
by the POEA.
Ruling
The petition for review lacks merit.
Petitioners’ adamant insistence that the NLRC should have appellate authority over the
POEA’s decision in the disciplinary action because their complaint against respondents
was filed in 1993 was unwarranted. Although Republic Act No. 8042, through its Section
10, transferred the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide money
claims involving overseas Filipino workers from the POEA to the Labor Arbiters, the law
did not remove from the POEA the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
all disciplinary action cases and other special cases administrative in character involving
such workers. The obvious intent of Republic Act No. 8042 was to have the POEA focus
its efforts in resolving all administrative matters affecting and involving such workers.
This intent was even expressly recognized in the Omnibus Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 promulgated on
February 29, 1996, viz:
Section 28. Jurisdiction of the POEA. – The POEA shall exercise original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide:
(a) all cases, which are administrative in character, involving or arising out of violations
or rules and regulations relating to licensing and registration of recruitment and
employment agencies or entities; and
(b) disciplinary action cases and other special cases, which are administrative in
character, involving employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino migrant
workers.
Section 29. Venue – The cases mentioned in Section 28(a) of this Rule, may be filed with
the POEA Adjudication Office or the DOLE/POEA regional office of the place where the
complainant applied or was recruited, at the option of the complainant. The office with
which the complaint was first filed shall take cognizance of the case.
Disciplinary action cases and other special cases, as mentioned in the preceding Section,
shall be filed with the POEA Adjudication Office.
It is clear to us, therefore, that the NLRC had no appellate jurisdiction to review the
decision of the POEA in disciplinary cases involving overseas contract workers.
Petitioners’ position that Republic Act No. 8042 should not be applied retroactively to
the review of the POEA’s decision dismissing their complaint against respondents has no
support in jurisprudence. Although, as a rule, all laws are prospective in application
unless the contrary is expressly provided,[8] or unless the law is procedural or curative in
nature,[9] there is no serious question about the retroactive applicability of Republic Act
No. 8042 to the appeal of the POEA’s decision on petitioners’ disciplinary action against
respondents. In a way, Republic Act No. 8042 was a procedural law due to its providing
or omitting guidelines on appeal. A law is procedural, according to De Los Santos v. Vda.
De Mangubat,[10] when it –
[R]efers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in
order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within
the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive
operation of statues — they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in
rules of procedure.
Republic Act No. 8042 applies to petitioners’ complaint by virtue of the case being then
still pending or undetermined at the time of the law’s passage, there being no vested
rights in rules of procedure.[11] They could not validly insist that the reckoning period to
ascertain which law or rule should apply was the time when the disciplinary complaint
was originally filed in the POEA in 1993. Moreover, Republic Act No. 8042 and its
implementing rules and regulations were already in effect when petitioners took their
appeal. A statute that eliminates the right to appeal and considers the judgment
rendered final and unappealable only destroys the right to appeal, but not the right to
prosecute an appeal that has been perfected prior to its passage, for, at that stage, the
right to appeal has already vested and cannot be impaired.[12] Conversely and by
analogy, an appeal that is perfected when a new statute affecting appellate jurisdiction
comes into effect should comply with the provisions of the new law, unless otherwise
provided by the new law. Relevantly, petitioners need to be reminded that the right to
appeal from a decision is a privilege established by positive laws, which, upon
authorizing the taking of the appeal, point out the cases in which it is proper to present
the appeal, the procedure to be observed, and the courts by which the appeal is to be
proceeded with and resolved.[13] This is why we consistently hold that the right to appeal
is statutory in character, and is available only if granted by law or statute. [14]
When Republic Act No. 8042 withheld the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC in respect
of cases decided by the POEA, the appellate jurisdiction was vested in the Secretary of
Labor in accordance with his power of supervision and control under Section 38(1),
Chapter 7, Title II, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, to wit:
Section 38. Definition of Administrative Relationship. – Unless otherwise
expressly stated in the Code or in other laws defining the special relationships of
particular agencies, administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as
follows:
Supervision and Control. – Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct
the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or
modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the
execution of plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the
specific law governing the relationship of particular agencies, the word “control” shall
encompass supervision and control as defined in this paragraph. xxx.
Thus, Section 1, Part VII, Rule V of the 2003 POEA Rules and Regulations specifically
provides, as follows:
Section 1. Jurisdiction. – The Secretary shall have the exclusive and original
jurisdiction to act on appeals or petition for review of disciplinary action cases decided
by the Administration.
In conclusion, we hold that petitioners should have appealed the adverse decision of the
POEA to the Secretary of Labor instead of to the NLRC. Consequently, the CA, being
correct on its conclusions, committed no error in upholding the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on December 21, 2001 by the Court

of Appeals; and ORDER the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 151158, August 17, 2007 ]
JOEL B. DE JESUS, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION AND PACIFIC OCEAN MANNING, INC., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner Joel B. De Jesus appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the
September 28, 2001 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 58241,
and the December 12, 2001 Resolution[2] denying its reconsideration.
On November 20, 1996, De Jesus applied for shipboard employment with respondent
Pacific Ocean Manning, Inc. (POMI), a domestic corporation duly licensed by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to operate as a manning
agency. As a standard operating procedure, POMI directed De Jesus to undergo the pre-
employment medical examination at the Our Lady of Fatima Medical Clinic, its
accredited clinic. On the query pertaining to his medical history, specifically as to
whether he was suffering from or had been told that he had any disease or ailment,
including stomach pain or ulcer, De Jesus answered in the negative. After the
examination, he was reported fit for work.[3]
De Jesus was then hired as 4th Engineer by POMI, for and in behalf of its principal Celtic
Pacific Ship Management Ltd. (Celtic), on board the ocean-going vessel M/V Author on
March 26, 1997. The employment contract[4] stipulated that he would work for a period of
nine (9) months with a monthly salary of US$824.00 and a fixed overtime rate of
US$459.00. De Jesus also signed the Standard Employment Contract Addendum,
[5]
barring alcohol, drugs, and any medication on board without written permission from
the master of the vessel. The use of drugs not prescribed by a medical doctor on board or
ashore was prohibited and considered a fundamental breach of the contract of
employment. It was also provided that any prescribed drug should be kept at the vessel's
hospital, and used only with the approval and supervision of the captain. Any seafarer
taking any medication prescribed by a medical doctor was further required to inform the
company master manning agent or drug and alcohol test collector of this fact.
De Jesus departed from the Philippines on March 28, 1997 and embarked on M/V Author
the following day. Early in his stint on board M/V Author, De Jesus experienced stomach
pains, which became unbearable during the second month of his stay, especially when his
captain required him to work even during meal hours. His condition worsened and he
severely lost weight. Thus, when the ship docked in Hamburg, Germany, De Jesus
requested for medical treatment. The ship captain referred him to Dr. Jan-Gerd H.
Hagelstein. De Jesus was diagnosed to be suffering from relapse of gastric ulcer and was
advised to sign off for thorough diagnostic examination and treatment. He was declared
fit for repatriation.[6]
De Jesus was repatriated to the Philippines on June 19, 1997. Upon his arrival, he went to
POMI and requested financial assistance and medical treatment for his illness. POMI,
however, refused. De Jesus was constrained to seek medical treatment from Bataan
Doctor's Hospital at his own expense. He sought reimbursement from POMI, but again it
was refused because De Jesus allegedly concealed his previous history of ulcer. POMI,
likewise, disallowed De Jesus' claim for unpaid salary, on the ground that the amount had
already been applied to the cost of his repatriation.[7] Thus, De Jesus filed a
complaint[8] for the recovery of unpaid wages, sickwage allowance and medical expenses.
POMI, on the other hand, had a different story. According to POMI, De Jesus committed
misrepresentation when he concealed in his medical history that he suffered from ulcer
two (2) years ago; that he breached his employment contract when he brought on board
his medicines for ulcer without the ship captain's permission; and that De Jesus admitted
having deliberately brought pieces of Cimetidine for fear that his ulcer might recur on
board. POMI posited that De Jesus was validly discharged, and ultimately prayed for the
denial of the claims. [9]
By Decision[10] of August 28, 1998, the Labor Arbiter declared that De Jesus'
misrepresentation cannot be made basis for the denial of his claims. According to the
Labor Arbiter, De Jesus underwent a thorough medical examination before his
deployment and was reported fit to work by POMI's accredited clinic. POMI cannot now
be heard to claim otherwise. Besides, POMI was aware that De Jesus had been
discharged on November 29, 1994 due to illness while on board M/V Oriental Venus. It
was, thus, expected that POMI would conduct, as it, in fact, conducted a thorough
medical examination in determining De Jesus' state of health before his deployment. He
concluded that De Jesus' illness was work-related or at least work-aggravated. He also
ruled that POMI failed to convincingly establish that De Jesus violated his employment
contract.
The Labor Arbiter, thus, disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby entered in favor of complainant
and against the [respondent] ordering the latter, jointly and severally, to pay the sum of
US$2,735.15 as unpaid salaries and medical allowance for 59 days or its present peso
equivalent in the sum of P118,705.51 plus another sum of P5,000.00 as medical benefits
or reimbursement of medical expenses of complainant.
SO ORDERED.[11]
POMI appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), claiming that
there was prima facie abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter in granting the
claims of De Jesus. The NLRC granted the appeal. It found De Jesus guilty of
unauthorized possession of medicines on board M/V Author, justifying his discharge.
Likewise, it denied the claim for medical and sickness allowance, stating that a relapse of
ulcer was not work- related, as the illness already existed when De Jesus applied with
POMI, but the former intentionally concealed it so he could be hired. Such
misrepresentation disqualified De Jesus from claiming employment benefits under the
contract. Finally, the NLRC sustained POMI in applying De Jesus' unpaid salaries to the
cost of his repatriation.[12] Hence, it reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, viz.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Decision appealed from is totally REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one [is]
entered DISMISSING the instant case for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[13]
De Jesus' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Resolution[14] of July 30,
2001, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on petition for certiorari.
In its Decision[15] of September 28, 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC. It
agreed with the NLRC that De Jesus' misrepresentation disqualified him from
employment, benefits and claims. The appellate court added that De Jesus did not
categorically deny the charge of unauthorized possession of Cimetidine, in violation of
the Standard Employment Contract Addendum. The CA concluded that POMI was
justified in discharging him from M/V Author, and the NLRC, thus, acted well within its
discretion in reversing the findings of the Labor Arbiter.
De Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[16] but the Court of Appeals denied it on

December 12, 2001.[17]
Aggrieved by the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, De Jesus comes to this Court
positing these issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER SHALL (sic) BE AWARDED HIS UNPAID

SALARIES, MEDICAL ALLOWANCE AND REIMBURSEMENT OF HIS MEDICAL
EXPENSES.
II
WHETHER PETITIONER SHALL (sic) BEAR THE COST OF HIS REPATRIATION.

[18]
It is a settled rule that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
raised before this Court. Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a re-evaluation
of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its
determination. Firm is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies
with greater force in labor cases.[19] However, factual issues may be considered and
resolved when the findings of facts and conclusions of law of the Labor Arbiter are
inconsistent with those of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals,[20] as in this case.
De Jesus insists on reimbursement for his medical expenses and entitlement to sickness
allowance and his unpaid salaries. POMI, on the other hand, counters that De Jesus
committed misrepresentation and breach of contract. The Labor Arbiter lent credence to
De Jesus' posture and granted his claims, but the NLRC and Court of Appeals reversed
the Arbiter's findings. Thus, a review of the records of the case, with an assessment of the
facts, is necessary.
The evidence shows that De Jesus previously suffered from ulcer but he ticked "NO" in
his medical history. De Jesus, therefore, committed misrepresentation. Nonetheless, he
passed the pre-employment medical examination, was reported fit to work, and was
suffered to work on board M/V Author for more than two (2) months, until his
repatriation on June 19, 1997.
The rule is that an ailment contracted even prior to his employment, does not detract from
the compensability of the disease. It is not required that the employment be the sole factor
in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the
benefits incident thereto. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a
small measure, to the development of the disease.[21]
In this case, POMI failed to rebut De Jesus' claim that he was required to work even
during mealtime and that the meals served on board did not fit the dietary preference of
the Filipinos. Such plight took a toll on De Jesus' health and surely contributed, even in a
slight degree, to the relapse of his illness.
In OSM Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. Dela Cruz,[22] this Court, in granting similar claims,
held:
Labor contracts are impressed with public interest and the provisions of the POEA
Standard Employment Contract must be construed fairly, reasonably and liberally in
favor of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going
vessels. Despite his misrepresentation, Arbit underwent and passed the required pre-
medical examination, was declared fit to work, and was suffered to work by petitioner.
Upon repatriation, he complied with the required post-employment medical examination.
Under the beneficent provisions of the Contract, it is enough that the work has
contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing
about his death. Strict proof of causation is not required.[23]
De Jesus' misrepresentation cannot, therefore, be made basis by POMI for the denial of
his claims under the contract.
Apparently realizing the folly of the denial grounded solely on the employee's
misrepresentation, POMI then asserted that De Jesus breached his employment contract.
It alleged that De Jesus was caught in possession of several pieces of Cimetidine, without
the ship captain's permission, and that therefore, he was discharged for a just cause.
Indeed, possession of medicines on board without the ship captain's permission was a
violation of the Standard Employment Contract Addendum and would entitle POMI to
dismiss the erring crew member but only after compliance with the procedure provided in
the contract.[24] Section 17 of the Revised Standard Employment Terms and Conditions
Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels supplies
the disciplinary procedure against an erring seafarer:
SECTION 17. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES:
The Master shall furnish the seafarer with the following disciplinary procedure against an
erring seafarer:
A. The master shall furnish the seafarer with a written notice containing the
following:
1. Grounds for the charges as listed in Section 31 of this Contract.
2. Date, time and place for a formal investigation of the charges against
the seafarer concerned.
B. The Master or his authorized representative shall conduct the investigation

or hearing, giving the seafarer the opportunity to explain or defend himself
against the charges. An entry on the investigation shall be entered into the
ship's logbook.
C. If after the investigation or hearing, the Master is convinced that imposition

of a penalty is justified, the Master shall issue a written notice of penalty
and the reasons for it to the seafarer, which copies shall be furnished to the
Philippine Agent.
D. Dismissal for just cause may be effected by the master without furnishing
the seafarer with notice of dismissal if doing so will prejudice the safety of
the crew or the vessel. This information shall be entered in the ship's
logbook. The Master shall send a complete report to the manning agency
substantiated by the witnesses, testimonies and any other documents in
support thereof.
In this case, there was no showing that Celtic complied with the foregoing procedure,
thus, casting a serious doubt on the validity of De Jesus' discharge.
Likewise, neither the ship's logbook nor the report sent to POMI as Celtic's manning
agent was presented in the proceedings a quo to establish the breach committed by De
Jesus. The pieces of evidence submitted before the Labor Arbiter in support of De Jesus'
discharge zeroed in on the alleged misrepresentation, which, as mentioned, cannot be a
valid basis for the denial of De Jesus' claims.
Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer
to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause. The case of the employer must
stand or fall on its own merits and not on the weakness of the employee's defense. [25] In
this case, no convincing proof was offered to prove POMI's allegation. All that we have
is its self-serving assertion that De Jesus violated his employment contract. There is no
proof that the prescribed disciplinary procedure was followed. We, therefore, agree with
the Labor Arbiter's finding that POMI utterly failed to establish its claim of valid
dismissal. Accordingly, the NLRC and Court of Appeals erred in reversing the said
finding.
It is clear from the records that De Jesus disembarked for a medical reason. Hence, the
cost of De Jesus' repatriation should be borne by Celtic and POMI, pursuant to the
provisions of Section 20(B)(4) of the Standard Employment Contract:
4. Upon sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment. The
employer shall bear the full cost of repatriation in the event the seafarer is
declared (1) fit for repatriation; or (2) fit to work but the employer is unable
to find employment for the seafarer on board his former vessel or another
vessel of the employer despite earnest efforts.
The cost of repatriation should not be deducted from De Jesus' unpaid salaries of
US$911.00.
Likewise, records show that De Jesus immediately reported to POMI for post-
employment medical examination and treatment, but the latter adamantly refused to
extend him medical assistance. He was constrained to seek medical attention from Bataan
Doctor's Hospital at his own expense. Celtic and POMI should, therefore, reimburse De
Jesus for his medical expenses.
Finally, De Jesus is entitled to his sickness allowance for fifty-nine (59) days from June
19, 1998 until August 16, 1998, when he was declared fit to work. Section 20(B)(3) of
the Contract governs the contractual liability of an employer to pay sickness allowance to
a seafarer who suffered illness or injury during the term of his contract viz.:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
xxxx
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
xxxx
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled
to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to
work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the
company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one
hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment

medical examination by a company-designated physician within three
working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to
do so, in which case a written notice to the agency within the same period is
deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the
mandatory reporting requirement shall result in the forfeiture of his right to
claim the above benefits x x x.
In fine, we affirm the Labor Arbiter's Decision granting De Jesus' claims for unpaid
salary of US$911.00, sickness allowance for fifty-nine (59) days, and reimbursement of
his medical expenses.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. SP. No. 58241, and its Resolution dated December 21, 2001,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated August 28, 1998 of the Labor
Arbiter is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 165389, October 17, 2008 ]
NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS AND A/S VULCANUS OSLO,
PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JOSE
I. ILAGAN, JR. AND CONSTANTINO CO, JR., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the June 21, 2004 Decision[1] and September 14, 2004 Resolution[2] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78870.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Jose I. Ilagan, Jr. and Constantino Co, Jr. (private respondents) were among 21 Filipino
seamen hired by herein petitioner NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. (NFD) to
work on board the chemical tanker M/T Lady Helene, a vessel owned and operated by
petitioner A/S Vulcanus Oslo (Vulcanus), NFD's foreign principal.
On February 11, 1997, while M/T Lady Helene was at Island View Port, Durban, South
Africa, Ship Master Captain Steiner Andersen dismissed the 21 Filipino seamen,
including herein private respondents, from their employment. They were subsequently
repatriated, arriving in the Philippines on February 15, 1997.
On March 3, 1997, NFD filed before the Adjudication Office of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), a disciplinary complaint against the 21 seamen
alleging that they were guilty of mutiny, insubordination, desertion/attempting to desert
the vessel and conspiracy. Subsequently, in an Order[3] dated October 12, 1999, the
POEA Adjudication Office dismissed the disciplinary complaint filed by NFD, ordering
that the names of the 21 seamen be removed from the POEA watchlist.
Meanwhile, on May 6, 1997, private respondents, together with eight (complainants) of

the 21 seamen whose employments were terminated, filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), National Capital Region in Quezon City, a
Complaint[4] for wrongful breach of contract, illegal dismissal and damages against NFD
and Vulcanus, contending that: they were summarily dismissed from their employment
without just and valid cause and in gross violation of the terms of their employment
contracts; they were forcibly disembarked from the vessel; at the time of their discharge,
and up to the filing of their complaint, they had not been paid their accrued salaries,
guaranteed overtime pay and leave pay; for their summary dismissal, forcible
disembarkation and subsequent repatriation, they seek recovery of their unpaid wages and
other benefits as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their Position Paper,[5] NFD and Vulcanus (petitioners) contended: The complainants

were validly and lawfully dismissed from their employment for their acts of "mutiny,
insubordination, desertion/attempting to desert the vessel and conspiracy among
themselves together with the other Filipino seamen in refusing and or failing to join M/T
Lady Helene in its next trip or destination to Mauritius without just and valid cause";
contrary to complainants' claim, they were not forcibly disembarked from the vessel; four
out of the ten complainants had already withdrawn their complaints; out of the remaining
six complainants, five were given the option to return to M/T Lady Helene and rejoin it in
its next trip to Mauritius; the filing of the complaint was merely an afterthought of the
complainants after NFD filed cases for disciplinary action against them; complainants
were not entitled to any of the amounts which they sought to recover, instead, they should
reimburse NFD for the expenses incurred by the latter in connection with their valid
dismissal and subsequent repatriation to the Philippines.
In their Reply to Respondents' Position Paper,[6] complainants averred that no single

specific act of insubordination, desertion or attempt to desert the vessel or refusal to sail
with the vessel was attributed to them; the Filipino crewman who reportedly instigated
the alleged mutiny was among those absolved of any liability by petitioners in exchange
for a waiver or quitclaim which he may have had against the latter; the disciplinary cases
filed against them was a tactical move resorted to by herein petitioners to preempt
complainants from filing a complaint for illegal dismissal; nothing was alleged and no
evidence was presented to prove that complainants were accorded the benefit of due
process before they were terminated from their employment.
In their Rejoinder,[7] private respondents contended that the Affidavit[8] of Anselmo V.

Rodriguez, NFD President and General Manager, contained several attachments proving
the illegal acts of the complainants; that it was an act of desperation on the part of
complainants to put color to the action of NFD in promptly reporting to the POEA the
illegal acts committed by the latter; that, on the contrary, the complaint for illegal
dismissal, which was filed three months after their termination from employment took
place, was the complainants' belated move to serve as a smokescreen for their illegal acts.
On January 30, 1998, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered judgment dismissing the
Complaint on the ground that the complainants were lawfully dismissed for just cause. [9]
Complainants filed an appeal with the NLRC.[10]
On August 30, 2001, the NLRC promulgated a Decision,[11] the dispositive portion of

which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is set aside. The respondents [herein petitioners] are
directed to jointly and severally pay the appellants complainants[herein private
respondents and their companions] their wages for the payment of the unexpired portion
of their respective contracts, and unpaid wages including moral and exemplary damages
of P50,000.00 each and ten percent (10%) attorney's fees of the total amount awarded.
The complaint of Alcesar Baylosis is hereby dismissed in view of the settlement of the
monetary claims effected on July 17, 1997.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Herein petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[13] On April 9, 2002, the
NLRC came up with the herein assailed Resolution[14] which granted petitioners' motion
and reinstated the Decision dated January 30, 1998 of the LA in their favor.
Complainants filed a Motion for Reconsideration[15] but it was denied by the NLRC in its
Order[16] promulgated on June 16, 2003.
Thereafter, five out of the ten original complainants, to wit: Jose I. Ilagan, Jr. (herein
private respondent), Reynaldo G. Digma, Francisco C. Octavio, Constantino D. Co, Jr.
(herein private respondent) and Jesus G. Domingo filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the CA assailing the April 9, 2002 Resolution and the June 16, 2003
Order of the NLRC.[17]
On September 17, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution[18] denying due course to and

dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that only one out of the five
petitioners therein signed the verification and certificate against forum-shopping attached
to the petition without any showing that such petitioner was duly authorized to sign for
and in behalf of the other petitioners.
On October 3, 2002, herein private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Exclude Reynaldo G. Digma, Francisco C. Octavio and Jesus G. Domingo as
petitioners on the ground that the above-named seamen were still abroad by reason of
their employment.[19]
In a Resolution[20] dated October 16, 2003, the CA reinstated the petition insofar as herein
private respondents were concerned.
On June 21, 2004, the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision in favor of private
respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution and
order dated April 9, 2002 and June 16, 2003 of the NLRC are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The NLRC decision dated August 30, 2001 is
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.[21] (Underscoring supplied)
Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[22] but the CA denied it in its
Resolution of September 14, 2004.
Hence, the present petition with the following assignment of errors:

I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN DISREGARDING

THE FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, WHICH FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT

PETITIONERS FAILED TO PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PROVING
THAT RESPONDENTS WERE DISMISSED FOR JUST AND VALID CAUSE.
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PROVES THAT RESPONDENTS WERE GUILTY

OF MUTINY, INSUBORDINATION, DESERTION/ATTEMPTING TO DESERT THE
VESSEL AND CONSPIRACY WITH THE OTHER FILIPINO SEAFARERS IN
REFUSING AND/OR FAILING TO JOIN M/T LADY HELENE IN ITS NEXT TRIP
OR DESTINATION.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

[RESPONDENTS'] TERMINATION WAS EFFECTED WITHOUT DUE PROCESS
OF LAW.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT

[RESPONDENTS'] TERMINATION WAS ATTENDED BY BAD FAITH OR DONE
CONTRARY TO MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS OR PUBLIC POLICY. [23]
The petition has no merit.
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether private respondents'
termination from their employment was valid.
There are two requisites which must be complied with by an employer for a valid
dismissal of employees, to wit: (1) the dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause;
and (2) the employee must be afforded due process, i.e., he must be given opportunity to
be heard and to defend himself.[24]
Anent the first requisite, it is a basic principle that in the dismissal of employees, the
burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid
cause and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal is not justified. [25]
This is in consonance with the guarantee of security of tenure in the Constitution and in
the Labor Code. A dismissed employee is not required to prove his innocence of the
charges leveled against him by his employer.[26] The determination of the existence and
sufficiency of a just cause must be exercised with fairness and in good faith and after
observing due process.[27]
The Court is not persuaded by petitioners' contentions in its first and second assigned
errors that the CA should have accorded respect and finality to the findings of fact and
conclusions of the LA as these are supported by substantial evidence; that petitioners, in
fact, were able to present substantial evidence to prove that private respondents were
guilty of mutiny, insubordination, desertion/attempt to desert their vessel and conspiracy
with the other Filipino seamen in refusing to join said vessel in its next trip.
Factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters
within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even
finality. However, the rule is not without exceptions, one of which is when the findings
of fact of the labor officials on which the conclusion is based are not supported by
substantial evidence.[28] Another exception is when it is perceived that far too much is
concluded, inferred or deduced from bare facts adduced in evidence.[29] Moreover, when
the findings of the LA and the NLRC are inconsistent with that of the CA, as in the
instant case, there is a need to review the records to determine which of them should be
preferred as more conformable to evidentiary facts.[30] The Court finds that the present
case falls under the above-mentioned exceptions.
After a review of the arguments and evidence of the parties, the Court sustains the
findings and conclusions of the CA, the same being in accord with the facts and law of
the case.
The Court agrees with the following findings and conclusion of the CA, to wit:
[Herein petitioners] charged [herein private respondents] for mutiny, insubordination,
desertion and conspiracy in refusing to join the vessel in its next trip. However, except
for the disagreement between Capt. Andersen and Engine Fitter Castillo, when the latter
refused to resume his work in the Engine Room wherein the other Filipino crew sided
with Castillo, there is no proof showing the alleged mutinous and concerted actions of the
[private respondents] against Capt. Andersen. There is also the glaring absence of
corroborative statements of other officers or crew on board attesting that [private
respondents] participated directly or indirectly to any wrong doing, or even intervened in
the quarrel between Andersen and Castillo. The records fail to establish clearly the
commission of any threat, or any serious misconduct which would justify [private
respondents'] dismissal.[31]
which affirmed the earlier finding of the NLRC in its August 30, 2001 Decision, thus:
We also noted that [herein petitioners'] various charges against the [private respondents]
were bereft of factual details showing the alleged mutinous and concerted actions of
herein [private respondents] against the ship captain. The absence of competent evidence
or corroborative statements of other officers or crew on board attesting to the fact that
complainants have participated directly or indirectly, to any wrongdoing or intervened in
the quarrel of the Ship Captain with Fitter Bautista[32] deters us in considering the said
charges with probity.[33]
Moreover, the above-quoted findings of the CA and the NLRC are consistent with the
findings of the POEA in its October 12, 1999 Order dismissing the disciplinary complaint
filed by NFD against herein private respondents and their companions. Pertinent portions
of the POEA Order reads:
Aside from telexes and telefax messages exchanged between complainant NFD
International Manning Agents, Inc. and its principal AS Vulcanus which are all self-
serving in nature, no other proof, such as official logbook extracts, was adduced in
support of the complaint. Had respondents committed the offense charged, this should at
least deserve attention, entry and/or proper documentation in the vessel's logbook/journal.
Inciting mutiny, being a serious offense, and punishable under the "Table of Offense and
Corresponding Administrative Penalties of the Standard Employment Contract
Governing Employment of All Filipino Seamen on Board Ocean Going Vessels" for two
to three year suspension, must be established by clear, strong, and incontrovertible pieces
of evidence. In the absence of substantial evidence, such as in the instant case, the charge
of inciting mutiny/refusal to sail cannot be given credence.[34]
Indeed, there is no record in the logbook or journal of the ship to indicate that the 21
Filipino seamen, including herein private respondents who were terminated from their
employment, threatened to cease and desist from working and to abandon their vessel as
a result of the misunderstanding that happened between the Ship Master and a Filipino
crew member.
Petitioners' claim that private respondents and their fellow Filipino seamen were guilty of
conspiracy in committing mutiny, insubordination, attempting to desert their vessel and
refusing to sail with the vessel is not supported by substantial evidence. Aside from the
communications, through telex messages, sent by representatives of petitioner Vulcanus
and the President and General Manager of NFD, no competent documentary proof was
presented to substantiate the charges against private respondents and the other Filipino
seamen. No record of any hearing or investigation was presented. Moreover, petitioners
did not present the Ship Master or any member of the ship's crew in order to validate or
verify the truth regarding the charge against the 21 Filipino seamen. All that were
presented by petitioners were allegations which they claimed to have gathered from
information provided by the Ship Master that herein private respondents and their fellow
Filipino seamen were guilty of the various acts of which they were accused to have
committed.
Petitioners insist that the findings and conclusions of the LA should be respected.
However, the Court finds that the LA failed to cite substantial evidence to support his
conclusions. It is not enough for the LA to declare in his Decision that "the established
facts of the case, however, reveal that complainant[s] were lawfully dismissed for just
cause"; or that "records show that complainants were discharged from their employment
for committing acts of mutiny, insubordination and desertion and/or attempting to desert
the vessel as well as conspiracy among themselves in refusing to join M/T Lady Helene in
its next trip to Mauritius without just and valid cause x x x" without specifying the
evidence upon which he derived his conclusions.
It is true that the LA cited documents consisting of the following: (1) telex message,
dated February 11, 1997, sent by a certain Marianne D. Hovland whose connection with
or position at Vulcanus was not indicated, informing NFD that there had been no solution
to their problems; and that a Filipino crewman named Castillo has not left the vessel; and
that "some other crew" have communicated their intention to leave if Castillo would
leave;[35] (2) telex message, dated February 11, 1997, from the NFD President and
General Manager addressed to all NFD officers and crew warning them of the possible
consequences, should they decide to leave their vessel to accompany Castillo, and
advising them to refrain from refusing to work and to treat their problem intelligently and
not to involve others;[36] (3) telex message, dated February 12, 1997, from a Captain
Helge Grotle whose position at Vulcanus was also not indicated, informing NFD that the
Ship Master of M/T Lady Helene decided to dismiss its crew for refusal to go to sea with
the vessel, and that according to Grotle, the act of the crew constituted mutiny;[37] (4)
telex message, dated February 12, 1997, from Captain Andersen informing NFD of his
decision to give 14 of the Filipino seamen, which included herein petitioners, the option
to return to the vessel on the ground that these seamen were not involved in the alleged
mutiny;[38] (5) letter from the NFD President and General Manager, dated February 28,
1997, informing the POEA about the dismissal of the 21 Filipino seamen on grounds of
mutiny and conspiracy for their concerted refusal to work and join the vessel in going to
its next destination.[39]
However, these documents, standing alone and uncorroborated by any other competent
evidence, do not constitute substantial proof that herein private respondents are indeed
guilty of mutiny. On the contrary, it proves their innocence. First, the evidence
consisting of the telex messages from supposed representatives of Vulcanus and NFD are
hearsay because they did not come directly from the Ship Master or officer of M/T Lady
Helene. The information contained in these communications were merely based on the
alleged report or message which came from the Ship Master. However, petitioners failed
to present any telex message, testimony or even an affidavit of the Ship Master or any
other crew member or officer of the subject vessel to prove that private respondents and
their companions were guilty of the acts with which they were charged. Second, the telex
message dated February 12, 1997 which came from the Ship Master himself established
that private respondents and 12 of their companions were not guilty of mutiny as, in fact,
they were given the option to return to the vessel if they wished to. Third, the letter-
complaint filed by NFD with the POEA was later found baseless as the POEA, in its
Order dated October 12, 1999, dismissed the complaint of NFD.
Even the NLRC, in its subsequent Resolution dated April 9, 2002, subject of herein
petition, wherein it set aside its August 30, 2001 Decision and reinstated the LA's
Decision, did not cite any specific evidence as basis for adopting the factual findings of
the LA.
The Court also finds that in their pleadings before the LA, the NLRC, the CA and this
Court, petitioners failed to cite any direct and substantial evidence to support their claim
that private respondents and their companions were guilty of mutiny and conspiracy.
Hence, the CA was correct in reinstating the NLRC August 30, 2001 Decision finding
that petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving that the dismissal of private
respondents was for a just and valid cause.
The next question is whether there was compliance with the second requisite of a valid
dismissal which is due process.
The Court does not agree with petitioners' asseverations in their third assigned error that
in dismissing respondents from their employment, the Ship Master simply acted within
his management rights in order to protect the safety of the vessel and its crew, which act,
according to petitioners, is recognized under the provisions of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract.
The minimum requirement of due process in termination proceedings, which must be

complied with even with respect to seamen on board a vessel, consists of notice to the
employees intended to be dismissed and the grant to them of an opportunity to present
their own side on the alleged offense or misconduct, which led to the management's
decision to terminate.[40] To meet the requirements of due process, the employer must
furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination of
employment can be legally effected, i.e., (1) a notice which apprises the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent
notice after due hearing which informs the employee of the employers' decision to
dismiss him.[41]
Petitioner maintains that the Ship Master is allowed to dismiss an erring seafarer without
notice under Section 17, paragraph D of the Revised Standard Employment Terms and
Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going
Vessels[42] issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
Section 17 sets forth the disciplinary procedures against erring seafarers, to wit:
Section 17. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES
The Master shall comply with the following disciplinary procedures against an erring
seafarer:
A. The Master shall furnish the seafarer with a written notice containing
the following:

1. Grounds for the charges as listed in Section 31 of this

Contract.
2. Date, time and place for a formal investigation of the charges
against the seafarer concerned.
B. The Master or his authorized representative shall conduct the investigation
or hearing, giving the seafarer the opportunity to explain or defend himself
against the charges. An entry on the investigation shall be entered into the
ship's logbook.
C. If, after the investigation or hearing, the Master is convinced that

imposition of a penalty is justified, the Master shall issue a written notice of
penalty and the reasons for it to the seafarer, with copies furnished to the
Philippine agent.
D. Dismissal for just cause may be effected by the Master without

furnishing the seafarer with a notice of dismissal if doing so will
prejudice the safety of the crew or the vessel. This information shall be
entered in the ship's logbook. The Master shall send a complete report
to the manning agency substantiated by witnesses, testimonies and any
other documents in support thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Under paragraph D, Section 17 of the Revised Standard Employment Terms and

Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going
Vessels, the Ship Master is excused from furnishing a seafarer with the required notice of
dismissal if doing so will prejudice the safety of the crew and the vessel, as in cases of
mutiny.
Explaining the notice requirements under Section 17, this Court held in Skippers Pacific,
Inc. v. Mira,[43] that :
x x x under Section 17 of what is termed the Standard Format, the "two-notice rule" is
indicated. An erring seaman is given a written notice of the charge against him and is
afforded an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Should sanctions be imposed, then
a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it shall be furnished the erring seafarer. It
is only in the exceptional case of clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew
or vessel that the required notices are dispensed with; but just the same, a complete
report should be sent to the manning agency, supported by substantial evidence of
the findings.[44] (Emphasis supplied)
However, in the instant case, petitioners failed to establish that private respondents and
their companions were guilty of mutiny or that, in any other manner, they posed a clear
and present danger to the vessel and its crew which would have justified the Ship Master
in dispensing with the required notices. Even if the Ship Master was justified in
dispensing with the notice requirements, still, it was essential that his decision to dismiss
the Filipino seamen should have been entered in the ship's logbook; and that a complete
report, substantiated by witnesses, testimonies and any other documents in support
thereof, duly sent to the manning agency. The record of this case is bereft of any such
entry in the ship's logbook or journal and of any report and supporting documents.
Instead, respondents and the other Filipino seamen were verbally ordered to disembark
from the vessel and were repatriated to the Philippines without being given written notice
of the reasons why.
There being no mutiny, petitioners should have complied with Section 17A quoted above.
The records reveal that Section 17A was not complied with by the Ship Master.
Petitioners failed to present evidence to prove that private respondents and their fellow
complainants were served written notices stating the particular acts or omissions
constituting the grounds for their termination. Neither was there evidence to show that
private respondents and their companions were given opportunity to answer the charges
against them.
Thus, the Court sustains the findings of the CA that private respondents and the other
complainants were not given the benefit of procedural due process before they were
terminated from their employment.
Anent the last assigned error. While the Court agrees with petitioners that there is no
evidence to prove that force, violence or intimidation was employed to effect the
disembarkation of the Filipino seamen, the Court still sustains the finding of the CA that
the dismissal of private respondents and their companions was done in bad faith, contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy, arbitrary and oppressive to labor, thus entitling
them to the award of moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages are recoverable
where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an
act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy.[45] On the other hand, exemplary damages are proper when the dismissal
was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner, and public policy requires
that these acts must be suppressed and discouraged.[46] In the instant case, it is undisputed
that respondents and the other Filipino seamen were actually engaged in the performance
of their assigned tasks aboard M/T Lady Helene and were even rendering overtime work
when they were unceremoniously directed to disembark from their vessel. Moreover, the
total absence of any prior written notice of the charges against them, the opportunity to
defend themselves against such charges and a written notice of the subsequent decision of
the Ship Master to terminate their employment establish the arbitrary and oppressive
character of the dismissal from employment of private respondents and their companions.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 21, 2004 and September 14, 2004 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 78870 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 205727, January 18, 2017 ]
RUTCHER T. DAGASDAS, PETITIONER, VS. GRAND PLACEMENT AND
GENERAL SERVICES CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the September 26, 2012

Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 115396, which annulled and set
aside the March 29, 2010[2] and June 2, 2010[3] Resolutions of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC OFW-L-02-000071-10, and concomitantly
reinstated the November 27, 2009 Decision[4] of the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissing the
Complaint for lack of merit.
Also challenged is the January 28, 2013 Resolution[5] denying the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Rutcher T. Dagasdas (Dagasdas).
Factual Antecedents
Grand Placement and General Services Corp. (GPGS) is a licensed recruitment or

placement agency in the Philippines while Saudi Aramco (Aramco) is its counter part in
Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Industrial & Management Technology Methods Co.
Ltd. (ITM) is the principal of GPGS, a company existing in Saudi Arabia.[6]
In November 2007, GPGS, for and on behalf of ITM, employed Dagasdas as Network
Technician. He was to be deployed in Saudi Arabia under a one year contract [7] with a
monthly salary of Saudi Riyal (SR) 5,112.00. Before leaving the Philippines, Dagasdas
underwent skill training[8] and pre departure orientation as Network Technician.
[9]
Nonetheless, his Job Offer[10] indicated that he was accepted by Aramco and ITM for
the position of "Supt" Dagasdas contended that although his position under his contract
was as a Network Technician, he actually applied for and was engaged as a Civil
Engineer considering that his transcript of records,[11] diploma[12] as well as his
curriculum vitae[13] showed that he had a degree in Civil Engineering, and his work
experiences were all related to this field. Purportedly, the position of Network
Technician was only for the purpose of securing a visa for Saudi Arabia because ITM
could not support visa application for Civil Engineers. [14]
On February 8, 2008, Dagasdas arrived in Saudi Arabia.[15] Thereafter, he signed with ITM

a new employment contract[16] which stipulated that the latter contracted him as
Superintendent or in any capacity within the scope of his abilities with salary of
SR5,112.00 and allowance of SR2,045.00 per month. Under this contract, Dagasdas shall
be placed under a three month probationary period; and, this new contract shall cancel
all contracts prior to its date from any source.
On February 11, 2008, Dagasdas reported at ITM's worksite in Khurais, Saudi Arabia.
[17]
There, he was allegedly given tasks suited for a Mechanical Engineer, which were
foreign to the job he applied for and to his work experience. Seeing that he would not
be able to perform well in his work, Dagasdas raised his concern to his Supervisor in the
Mechanical Engineering Department. Consequently, he was transferred to the Civil
Engineering Department, was temporarily given a position as Civil Construction
Engineer, and was issued an identification card good for one month. Dagasdas averred
that on March 9, 2008, he was directed to exit the worksite but Rashid H. Siddiqui
(Siddiqui), the Site Coordinator Manager, advised him to remain in the premises, and
promised to secure him the position he applied for. However, before Dagasdas' case
was investigated, Siddiqui had severed his employment with ITM. [18]
In April 2008, Dagasdas returned to Al-Khobar and stayed at the ITM Office. [19] Later, ITM
gave him a termination notice[20] indicating that his last day of work was on April 30,
2008, and he was dismissed pursuant to clause 17.4.3 of his contract, which provided
that ITM reserved the right to terminate any employee within the three-month
probationary period without need of any notice to the employee. [21]
Before his repatriation, Dagasdas signed a Statement of Quitclaim [22] with Final

Settlement[23] stating that ITM paid him all the salaries and benefits for his services from
February 11, 2008 to April 30, 2008 in the total amount of SR7,156.80, and ITM was
relieved from all financial obligations due to Dagasdas.
On June 24, 2008, Dagasdas returned to the Philippines. [24] Thereafter, he filed an illegal
dismissal case against GPGS, ITM, and Aramco.
Dagasdas accused GPGS, ITM, and Aramco of misrepresentation, which resulted in the
mismatch in the work assigned to him. He contended that such claim was supported by
exchanges of electronic mail (e-mail) establishing that GPGS, ITM, and Aramco were
aware of the job mismatch that had befallen him.[25] He also argued that although he
was engaged as a project employee, he was still entitled to security of tenure for the
duration of his contract. He maintained that GPGS, ITM, and Aramco merely invented
"imaginary cause/s" to terminate him. Thus, he claimed that he was dismissed without
cause and due process of law.[26]
GPGS, ITM, and Aramco countered that Dagasdas was legally dismissed. They explained
that Dagasdas was aware that he was employed as Network Technician but he could not
perform his work in accordance with the standards of his employer. They added that
Dagasdas was informed of his poor performance, and he conformed to his termination
as evidenced by his quitclaim.[27] They also stressed that Dagasdas was only a
probationary employee since he worked for ITM for less than three months. [28]
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
On November 27, 2009, the LA dismissed the case for lack of merit.
The LA pointed out that when Dagasdas signed his new employment contract in Saudi
Arabia, he accepted its stipulations, including the fact that he had to undergo
probationary status. She declared that this new contract was more advantageous for
Dagasdas as his position was upgraded to that of a Superintendent, and he was likewise
given an allowance of SR2,045.00 aside from his salary of SR5,112.00 per month.
According to the LA, for being more favorable, this new contract was not prohibited by
law. She also decreed that Dagasdas fell short of the expected work pe1formance; as
such, his employer dismissed him as part of its management prerogative.
Consequently, Dagasdas appealed to the NLRC.
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
On March 29, 2010, the NLRC issued a Resolution finding Dagasdas' dismissal illegal. The
decretal portion of the NLRC Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and the
respondent[s] are hereby ordered to pay the complainant the salaries corresponding to
the unexpired portion of his contract amounting to SR46,008 (SR5112 x 9 months, or
from May 1, 2008 to January 31, 2009), plus ten percent (10%) thereof as attorney's
fees. The respondents are jointly and severally liable for the judgment awards, which
are payable in Philippine currency converted on the basis of the exchange rate
prevailing at the time of actual payment.
SO ORDERED.[29]
The NLRC stated that Dagasdas, who was a Civil Engineering graduate, was
"recruited on paper" by GPGS as Network Technician but the real understanding
between the parties was to hire him as Superintendent. It held that GPGS erroneously
recruited Dagasdas, and tailed to inform him that he was hired as a "Mechanical
Superintendent" meant for a Mechanical Engineer. It declared that while ITM has the
prerogative to continue the employment of individuals only if they were qualified,
Dagasdas' dismissal amounted to illegal termination since the mismatch between his
qualifications and the job given him was no fault of his.
The NLRC added that Dagasdas should not be made to suffer the consequences of the
miscommunication between GPGS and ITM considering that the government obligates
employment agencies recruiting Filipinos for overseas work to "select only medically
and technically qualified recruits."[30]
On June 2, 2010, the NLRC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of its Resolution
dated March 29, 2010.
Undeterred, GPGS filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA ascribing grave abuse of

discretion on the part of the NLRC in ruling that Dagasdas was illegally dismissed.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On September 26, 2012, the CA set aside the NLRC Resolutions and reinstated the LA
Decision dismissing the case for lack of merit.
The CA could not accede to the conclusion that the real agreement between the parties
was to employ Dagasdas as Superintendent. It stressed that Dagasdas left the
Philippines pursuant to his employment contract indicating that he was to work as a
Network Technician; when he arrived in Saudi Arabia and signed a new contract for the
position of a Superintendent, the agreement was with no participation of GPGS, and
said new contract was only between Dagasdas and ITM. It emphasized that after
commencing work as Superintendent, Dagasdas realized that he could not perform his
tasks, and "[s]eemingly, it was [Dagasdas] himself who voluntarily withdrew from his
assigned work for lack of competence."[31] It faulted the NLRC for failing to consider that
Dagasdas backed out as Superintendent on the excuse that the same required the skills
of a Mechanical Engineer.
In holding that Dagasdas' dismissal was legal, the CA gave credence to Dagasdas'
Statement of Quitclaim and Final Settlement. It ruled that for having voluntarily
accepted money from his employer, Dagasdas accepted his termination and released his
employer from future financial obligations arising from his past employment with it.
On January 28, 2013, the CA denied Dagasdas' Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, Dagasdas filed this Petition raising these grounds:

[1] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT REVERSED THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION.[32]
[2] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED WITH ITS FINDINGS THAT
THE CONTRACT SIGNED BY DAGASDAS IN ALKHOBAR IS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE
LATTER AND THAT IT WAS [H]IS PERSONAL ACT OR DECISION [TO SIGN] THE SAME. [33]
[3] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAULTING THE NLRC
FOR HS FAILURE TO INVALID ARE OR DISCUSS THE FINAL SETTLEMENT AND STATEMENT
OF QUITCLAIM SIGNED BY [DAGASDAS].[34]
Dagasdas reiterates that he was only recruited "on paper" as a Network
Technician but the real agreement between him and his employer was to engage him as
Superintendent in the field of Civil Engineering, he being a Civil Engineering graduate
with vast experience in said field. He stresses that he was terminated because of a
"discipline mismatch" as his employer actually needed a Mechanical (Engineer)
Superintendent, not a Civil Engineer.
In addition, Dagasdas insists that he did not voluntarily back out from his work. If not for
the discipline mismatch, he could have performed his job as was expected of him. He
also denies that the new employment contract he signed while in Saudi Arabia was
more advantageous to him since the basic salary and allowance stipulated therein are
just the same with that in his Job Offer. He argues that the new contract was even
disadvantageous because it was inserted therein that he still had to undergo
probationary status for three months.
Finally, Dagasdas contends that the new contract he signed while in Saudi Arabia was
void because it was not approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA). He also claims that CA should have closely examined his
quitclaim because he only signed it to afford his plane ticket for his repatriation.
On the other hand, GPGS maintains that Dagasdas was fully aware that he applied for
and was accepted as Network Technician. It also stresses that it was Dagasdas hirnself
who decided to accept from ITM a new job offer when he arrived in Saudi Arabia. It
further declares that Dagasdas' quitclaim is valid as there is no showing that he was
compelled to sign it.
Issue
Was Dagasdas validly dismissed from work?
Our Ruling
The Petition is with merit.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. However, this rule allows certain exceptions, including a situation where the
findings of fact of the courts or tribunals below are conflicting. [35] In this case, the CA and
the NLRC arrived at divergent factual findings anent Dagasdas' termination. As such, the
Court deems it necessary to re-examine these findings and determine whether the CA
has sufficient basis to annul the NLRC Decision, and set aside its finding that Dagasdas
was illegally dismissed from work.
Moreover, it is well-settled that employers have the prerogative to impose standards on

the work quantity and quality of their employees and provide measures to ensure
compliance therewith. Non-compliance with work standards may thus be a valid cause
for dismissing an employee. Nonetheless, to ensure that employers will not abuse their
prerogatives, the same is tempered by security of tenure whereby the employees are
guaranteed substantive and procedural due process before they are dismissed from
work.[36]
Security of tenure remains even if employees, particularly the overseas Filipino workers
(OFW), work in a different jurisdiction. Since the employment contracts of OFWs are
perfected in the Philippines, and following the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of
the place where the contract is made), these contracts are governed by our laws,
primarily the Labor Code of the Philippines and its implementing rules and regulations,
[37]
At the same time, our laws generally apply even to employment contracts of OFWs as
our Constitution explicitly provides that the State shall afford full protection to labor,
whether local or overseas.[38] Thus, even if a Filipino is employed abroad, he or she is
entitled to security of tenure, among other constitutional rights. [39]
In this case, prior to his deployment and while still in the Philippines, Dagasdas was
made to sign a POEA-approved contract with GPGS, on behalf of ITM; and, upon arrival
in Saudi Arabia, ITM made him sign a new employment contract. Nonetheless, this new
contract, which was used as basis for dismissing Dagasdas, is void.
First, Dagasdas' new contract is in clear violation of his right to security of tenure.
Under the Labor Code of the Philippines the following are the just causes for dismissing
an employee:
ARTICLE 297. [282] Termination by Employer. - An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the 1ntst reposed in him by his employer
or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative;
and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.[40]

However, per the notice of termination given to Dagasdas, ITM tem1inated him
for violating clause 17.4.3 of his new contract, viz.:
17.4 The Company reserves the right to terminate this agreement without
serving any notice to the Consultant in the following cases:
x x x x x x x x x
17.4.3 If the Consultant is terminated by company or its client within the probation
period of 3 months.[41]
Based on the foregoing, there is no clear justification for the dismissal of
Dagasdas other than the exercise of ITM's right to terminate him within the
probationary period.
While our Civil Code recognizes that parties may stipulate in their contracts such terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient, these terms and conditions must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or policy. [42] The above-cited clause
is contrary to law because as discussed, our Constitution guarantees that employees,
local or overseas, are entitled to security of tenure. To allow employers to reserve a
right to terminate employees without cause is violative of this guarantee of security of
tenure.
Moreover, even assuming that Dagasdas was still a probationary employee when he was
terminated, his dismissal must still be with a valid cause. As regards a probationary
employee, his or her dismissal may be allowed only if there is just cause or such reason
to conclude that the employee fails to qualify as regular employee pursuant to
reasonable standards made known to the employee at the time of engagement. [43]
Here, ITM failed to prove that it informed Dagasdas of any predetermined standards
from which his work will be gauged.[44] In the contract he signed while still in the
Philippines, Dagsadas was employed as Network Technician; on the other hand, his new
contract indicated that he was employed as Superintendent. However, no job
description - or such duties and responsibilities attached to either position - was
adduced in evidence. It thus means that the job for which Dagasdas was hired was not
definite from the beginning.
Indeed, Dagasdas was not sufficiently informed of the work standards for which his
performance will be measured. Even his position based on the job title given him was
not fully explained by his employer. Simply put, ITM failed to show that it set and
communicated work standards for Dagasdas to follow, and on which his efficiency (or
the lack thereof) may be determined.
Second, the new contract was not shown to have been processed through the POEA.
Under our Labor Code, employers hiring OFWs may only do so through entities
authorized by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment. [45] Unless the
employment contract of an OFW is processed through the POEA, the same does not
bind the concerned OFW because if the contract is not reviewed by the POEA, certainly
the State has no means of determining the suitability of foreign laws to our overseas
workers.[46]
This new contract also breached Dagasdas' original contract as it was entered into even
before the expiration of the original contract approved by the POEA. Therefore, it
cannot supersede the original contract; its terms and conditions, induding reserving in
favor of the employer the right to terminate an employee without notice during the
probationary period, are void.[47]
Third, under this new contract, Dagasdas was not afforded procedural due process
when he was dismissed from work.
As cited above, a valid dismissal requires substantive and procedural due process. As
regards the latter, the employer must give the concerned employee at least two notices
before his or her ten11ination. Specifically, the employer must inform the employee of
the cause or causes for his or her termination, and thereafter, the employer's decision
to dismiss him. Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must be accorded the
opportunity to be heard.[48]
Here, no prior notice of purported infraction, and such opportunity to explain on any
accusation against him was given to Dagasdas. He was simply given a notice of
termination. In fact, it appears that ITM intended not to comply with the twin notice
requirement. As above-quoted, under the new contract, ITM reserved in its favor the
right to terminate the contract without serving any notice to Dagasdas in specified
cases, which included such situation where the employer decides to dismiss the
employee within the probationary period. Without doubt, ITM violated the due process
requirement in dismissing an employee.
Lastly, while it is shown that Dagasdas executed a waiver in favor of his employer, the
same does not preclude him from filing this suit.
Generally, the employee's waiver or quitclaim cannot prevent the employee from
demanding benefits to which he or she is entitled, and from filing an illegal dismissal
case. This is because waiver or quitclaim is looked upon with disfavor, and is frowned
upon for being contrary to public policy. Unless it can be established that the person
executing the waiver voluntarily did so, with full understanding of its contents, and with
reasonable and credible consideration, the same is not a valid and binding undertaking.
Moreover, the burden to prove that the waiver or quitclaim was voluntarily executed is
with the employer.[49]
In this case, however, neither did GPGS nor its principal, ITM, successfully discharged its
burden. GPGS and/or ITM failed to show that Dagasdas indeed voluntarily waived his
claims against the employer.
Indeed, even if Dagasdas signed a quitclaim, it does not necessarily follow that he freely
and voluntarily agreed to waive all his claims against his employer. Besides, there was
no reasonable consideration stipulated in said quitclaim considering that it only
determined the actual payment due to Dagasdas from February 11, 2008 to April 30,
2008. Verily, this quitclaim, under the semblance of a final settlement, cannot absolve
GPGS nor ITM from liability arising from the employment contract of Dagasdas. [50]
All told, the dismissal of Dagasdas was without any valid cause and due process of law.
Hence, the NLRC properly ruled that Dagasdas was illegally dismissed. Evidently, it was
an error on the part of the CA to hold that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the NLRC ruled for Dagasdas.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 26, 2012 and
Resolution dated January 28, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 115396
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the March 29, 2010 and June 2, 2010
Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LAC OFW-L-02-000071-
10 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 50734-37, February 20, 1981 ]
WALLEM PHILIPPINES SHIPPING, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE HON.
MINISTER OF LABOR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE
NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD PROPER, JAIME CAUNCA, ANTONIO
CABRERA, EFREN GARCIA, JOSE OJEDA AND RODOLFO PAGWAGAN,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with prayer that the Orders

dated December 19, 1977 and April 3, 1979 of the National Seamen Board (NSB) be
declared null and void.
Private respondents were hired by petitioner sometime in May 1975 to work as seamen
for a period of ten months on board the M/V Woermann Sanaga, a Dutch vessel owned
and operated by petitioner's European principals. While their employment contracts were
still in force, private respondents were dismissed by their employer, petitioner herein, and
were discharged from the ship on charges that they instigated the International Transport
Federation (ITF) to demand the application of worldwide ITF seamen's rates to their
crew. Private respondents were repatriated to the Philippines on October 27, 1975 and
upon their arrival in Manila, they instituted a complaint against petitioner for illegal
dismissal and recovery of wages and other benefits corresponding to the five months'
unexpired period of their shipboard employment contract.
In support of their complaint, private respondents submitted a Joint Affidavit[1] stating

the circumstances surrounding their employment and subsequent repatriation to the
Philippines, material averments of which are herein below reproduced:
"J O I N T A F F I D A V I T
....
"5. That aside from our basic monthly salary, we are entitled to two (2) months vacation
leave, daily subsistence allowance of US$ 8.14 each, daily food allowance of US$ 2.50,
as well as overtime pay which we failed to receive because our Shipboard Employment
Contract was illegally terminated;
6. That while we were in Rotterdam, on or about July 9, 1975, representative of the ITF
boarded our vessel and talked with the Ship's Captain;
7. That the following day, the representatives of the ITF returned and was followed by
Mr. M.S.K. Ogle who is the Company's Administrative Manager, again went to see the
Captain;
8. That at around 7:00 in the evening all the crew members were called in the Mess Hall,
where the ITF representatives informed us that they have just entered into a "Special
Agreement" with the Wallem Shipping Management, Ltd., represented by Mr. M.S.K.
Ogle, Administrative Manager, wherein new salary rates was agreed upon and that we
were going to be paid our salary differentials in view of the new rates;
9. That in the same meeting, Mr, M.S.K. OGLE also spoke where he told that a Special
Agreement has been signed and that we will be receiving new pay rate and enjoined us to
work hard and be good boys;
10. That the same evening we received our salary differentials based on the new rates
negotiated for us by the ITF;
11. That while we were in the Port Dubai, Saudi Arabia, we were not receiving our pay,
since the Ship's Captain refused to implement the worldwide rates and insisted on paying
us the Far East Rate;
12. That the Port Dubai is one that is within the Worldwide rates sphere;

13. That on October 22, 1975, Mr. Greg Nacional, Operation Manager of respondent
corporation, arrived in Dubai, Saudi Arabia and boarded our ship;
14. That on October 23, 1975, Mr. Nacional called all the crew members, including us to
a meeting at the Mess Hall and there he explained that the Company cannot accept the
worldwide rate. The Special Agreement signed by Mr. Ogle in behalf of the Company is
nothing but a scrap of paper. Mr. Jaime Caunca then asked Mr. Nacional, in view of what
he was saying, whether the Company will honor the Special Agreement and Mr. Nacional
answered "Yes". That we must accept the Far East Rates which was put to a vote. Only
two voted for accepting the Far East Rates;
15. That immediately thereafter Mr. Nacional left us;
16. That same evening, Mr. Nacional returned and threatened that he has received a cable
from the Home Office that if we do not accept the Far East Rate, our services will be
terminated and there will be a change in crew;
17. That when Mr. Nacional left, we talked amongst ourselves and decided to accept the
Far East Rates;
18. That in the meeting that evening because of the threat we informed Mr. Nacional we
were accepting the Far East Rate and he made us sign a document to that effect;
19. That we the complainants with the exception of Leopoldo Mamaril and Efren Garcia,
were not able to sign as we were at the time on work schedules, and Mr. Nacional did not
bother anymore if we signed or not;

20. That after the meeting Mr. Nacional cabled the Home Office, informing them that we
the complainants with the exception of Messrs. Mamaril and Garcia were not accepting
the Far East Rates;
21. That in the meeting of October 25, 1975, Mr. Nacional signed a document whereby
he promised to give no priority of first preference in "boarding a vessel and that we are
not blacklisted";
22. That in spite of our having accepted the Far East Rate, our services were terminated
and advised us that there was a change in crew;
23. That on October 27, 1975, which was our scheduled flight home, nobody attended us,
not even our clearance for our group travel and consequently we were not able to board
the plane, forcing us to sleep on the floor at the airport in the evening of October 27,
1975;
24. That the following day we went back to the hotel in Dubai which was a two hours
ride from the airport, where we were to await another flight for home via Air France;
25. That we were finally able to leave for home on November 2, 1975 arriving here on
the 3rd of November;
26. That we paid for all excess baggages;
27. That Mr. Nacional left us stranded, since he went ahead on October 27, 1975;

28. That immediately upon arriving in Manila, we went to respondent Company and saw
Mr. Nacional, who informed us that we were not blacklisted, however, Mr. Mckenzie,
Administrative Manager did inform us that we were all blacklisted;
29. That we were asking from the respondent Company our leave pay, which they refused
to give, if we did not agree to a US$100.00 deduction;
30. That with the exception of Messrs. Jaime Caunca, Amado Manansala and Antonio
Cabrera, we received our leave pay with the US$100.00 deduction;
31. That in view of the written promise of Mr. Nacional in Dubai last October 23, 1975 to
give us priority and preference in boarding a vessel and that we were not blacklisted we
have on several occasions approached him regarding his promise, which up to the present
he has refused to honor.
. . . . ."
Answering the complaint, petitioner countered that when the vessel was in London,
private respondents together with the other crew insisted on worldwide ITF rate as per
special agreement; that said employees threatened the ship authorities that unless they
agreed to the increased wages the vessel would not be able to leave port or would have
been picketed and/or boycotted and declared a hot ship by the ITF; that the Master of the
ship was left with no alternative but to agree; that upon the vessel's arrival at the Asian
port of Dubai, on October 22, 1975, a representative of petitioner went on board the ship
and requested the crew together with private respondents to desist from insisting
worldwide ITF rate and instead accept the Far East rate; that said respondents refused to
accept Far East ITF rates while the rest of the Filipino crew members accepted the Far
East rates; that private respondents were replaced at the expense of petitioner and it was
prayed that respondents be required to comply with their obligations under the contract
by requiring them to pay their repatriation expenses and all other incidental expenses
incurred by the master and crew of the vessel.
After the hearing on the merits, the Hearing Officer of the Secretariat rendered a
decision[2] on March 14, 1977 finding private respondents to have violated their contract
of employment when they accepted salary rates different from their contract verified and
approved by the National Seamen Board. As to the issue raised by private respondents
that the original contract has been novated, it was held that:
"....
For novation to be a valid defense, it is a legal requirement that all the parties to the
contract should give their consent. In the instant case only the complainants and
respondents gave their consent. The National Seamen Board had no participation in the
alleged novation of the previously approved employment contract. It would have been
different if the consent of the National Seamen Board was first secured before the alleged
novation of the approved contract was undertaken, hence, the defense of novation is not
in order.
. . ."
The Hearing Officer likewise ruled that petitioner violated the contract when its
representative signed the Special Agreement and he signed the same at his own risk and
must bear the consequence of such act, and since both parties are in pari delicto, the
complaint and counterclaim were dismissed for lack of merit but petitioner was ordered
to pay respondents Caunca and Cabrera their respective leave pay for the period that they
have served M/V Woermann Sanaga plus attorney's fees.
Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration with the Board which modified the
decision of the Secretariat in an Order[3] of December 19, 1977 and ruled that petitioner
is liable for breach of contract when it ordered the dismissal of private respondents and
their subsequent repatriation before the expiration of their respective employment
contracts. The Chairman of the Board stressed that "where the contract is for a definite
period, the captain and the crew members may not be discharged until after the contract
shall have been performed" citing the case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Ogilvie, et
al. (104 Phil. 748). He directed petitioner to pay private respondents the unexpired
portion of their contracts and their leave pay, less the an amount they received as
differentials by virtue of the special agreements en-tered in Rotterdam, and ten percent of
the total amounts recovered as attorney's fees.
Petitioner sought clarification and reconsideration of the said order and asked for a
confrontation with private respondents to determine the specific adjudications to be
made. A series of conference were con-ducted by the Board. It was claimed by petitioner
that it did not have in its possession the records necessary to determine the exact amount
of the judgment since the records were in the sole custody of the captain of the ship and
demanded that private respondents produce the needed records. On this score, counsel for
respondents manifested that to require the master of the ship to produce the records
would result to undue delay in the disposition of the case to the detriment of his clients,
some of whom are still unemployed.
Under the circumstances, the Board was left with no alternative native but to issue an
Order dated April 3, 1979[4] fixing the amount due private respondents at their three (3)
months' salary equivalent without qualifications or deduction. Hence, the instant petition
before Us alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent official as
Chairman of the Board, in issuing said order which allegedly nullified the findings of the
Secretariat and premised adjudication on imaginary conditions which were never taken
up with full evidence in the course of hearing on the merits.
The whole controversy is centered around the liability of petitioner when it ordered the
dismissal of herein private respondents before the expiration of their respective
employment contracts.
In its Order of December 19, 1977[5] the Board, thru its Chairman, Minister Blas F. Ople,
held that there is no showing that the seamen conspired with the ITF in coercing the ship
authorities to grant salary increases, and the Special Agreement was signed only by
petitioner and the ITF without any participation from the respondents who, accordingly,
may not be charged as they were, by the Secretariat, with violation of their employment
contract. The Board likewise stressed that the crew members may not be discharged until
after the expiration of the contract which is for a definite period, and where the crew
members are discharged without just cause before the contract shall have been performed,
they shall be entitled to collect from the owner or agent of the vessel their unpaid salaries
for the period they were engaged to render the services, applying the case of Madrigal
Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Jesus Oglivie, et al.[6]
The findings and conclusion of the Board should be sustained. As already intimated
above, there is no logic in the statement made by the Secretariat's Hearing Officer that the
private respondents are liable for breach of their employment contracts for accepting
salaries higher than their contracted rates. Said respondents are not signatories to the
Special Agreement, nor was there any showing that they instigated the execution thereof.
Respondents should not be blamed for accepting higher salaries since it is but human for
them to grab every opportunity which would improve their working conditions and
earning capacity. It is a basic right of all workingmen to seek greater benefits not only for
themselves but for their families as well, and this can be achieved through collective
bargaining or with the assistance of trade unions. The Constitution itself guarantees the
promotion of social welfare and protection to labor. It is therefore the Hearing Officer
that gravely erred in disallowing the payment of the unexpired portion of the seamen's
respective contracts of employment.
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents were justified because the latter
threatened the ship authorities in acceding to their demands, and this constitutes serious
misconduct as contemplated by the Labor Code. This contention is not well-taken. The
records fail to establish clearly the commission of any threat. But even if there had been
such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured because it is but natural for
them to employ some means of pressing their demands for petitioner, who refused to
abide with the terms of the Special Agreement, to honor and respect the same. They were
only acting in the exercise of their rights, and to deprive them of their freedom of
expression is contrary to law and public policy. There is no serious misconduct to speak
of in the case at bar which would justify respondents' dismissal just because of their
firmness in their demand for the fulfilment by petitioner of its obligation it entered into
without any coercion, specially on the part of private respondents.
On the other hand, it is petitioner who is guilty of breach of contract when they dismissed
the respondents without just cause and prior to the expiration of the employment
contracts. As the records clearly show, petitioner voluntarily entered into the Special
Agreement with ITF and by virtue thereof the crew men were actually given their salary
differentials in view of the new rates. It cannot be said that it was because of respondent's
fault that petitioner made a sudden turn-about and refused to honor the special agreement.
In brief, We declare petitioner guilty of breach of contract and should therefore be made
to comply with the directives contained in the disputed Orders of December 19, 1977 and
April 3, 1979.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated March 14, 1977 of the Hearing
Officer is SET ASIDE and the Orders dated December 19, 1977 and April 3, 1979 of the
National Seamen Board are AFFIRMED in toto. This decision is immediately executory.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 109808, March 01, 1995 ]
ESALYN CHAVEZ, PETITIONER, VS. HON. EDNA BONTO-PEREZ, HON.
ROGELIO T. RAYALA, HON. DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA, HON. JOSE N.
SARMIENTO, CENTRUM PROMOTIONS & PLACEMENT
CORPORATION, JOSE A. AZUCENA, JR., AND TIMES SURETY &
INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
Puno, J.:
One of the anguished cries in our society today is that while our laws appear to
protect the poor, their interpretation is sometimes anti-poor. In the case at bench,
petitioner, a poor, uncounselled entertainment dancer signed a contract with her
Japanese employer calling for a monthly salary of One Thousand Five Hundred U.S.
Dollars (US$1,500) but later had to sign an immoral side agreement reducing her salary
below the minimum standard set by the POEA. Petitioner invoked the law to collect her
salary differentials, but incredibly found public respondents straining the seams of our
law to disfavor her. There is no greater disappointment to the poor like petitioner than
to discover the ugly reality behind the beautiful rhetoric of laws. We will not allow this
travesty.
This is a petition for certiorari to review the Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) [1], dated December 29, 1992, which affirmed the Decision of public
respondent Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Administrator Jose N.
Sarmiento, dated February 17, 1992, dismissing petitioner's complaint for unpaid
salaries amounting to Six Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$6,000.00).
The facts are undisputed.
On December 1, 1988, petitioner, an entertainment dancer, entered into a standard

employment contract for overseas Filipino artists and entertainers with Planning Japan
Co., Ltd., [2] through its Philippine representative, private respondent Centrum
Placement & Promotions Corporation. The contract had a duration of two (2) to six (6)
months, and petitioner was to be paid a monthly compensation of One Thousand Five
Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500.00). On December 5, 1988, the POEA approved the
contract. Subsequently, petitioner executed the following side agreement with her
Japanese employer through her local manager, Jaz Talents Promotion:
"Date: Dec. 10, 1988
"SUBJECT: Salary Deduction
MANAGERIAL COMMISSION
"DATE OF DEPARTURE:
"ATTENTION: MR. IWATA
I, ESALYN CHAVEZ, DANCER, do hereby with my own free will and voluntarily have the
honor to authorize your good office to please deduct the amount of TWO HUNDRED
FIFTY DOLLARS ($250) from my contracted monthly salary of SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY
DOLLARS ($750) as monthly commission for my Manager, Mr. Jose A. Azucena, Jr.
"That, my monthly salary (net) is FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($500).
(sgd. by petitioner)" [3]
On December 16, 1988, petitioner left for Osaka, Japan, where she worked for six (6)
months, until June 10, 1989. She came back to the Philippines on June 14, 1989.
Petitioner instituted the case at bench for underpayment of wages with the POEA on
February 21, 1991. She prayed for the payment of Six Thousand U.S. Dollars
(US$6,000.00), representing the unpaid portion of her basic salary for six months.
Charged in the case were private respondent Centrum Promotions and Placement
Corporation, the Philippine representative of Planning Japan, Co., Inc., its insurer, Times
Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., and Jaz Talents Promotion.
The complaint was dismissed by public respondent POEA Administrator on February 17,
1992. He ratiocinated, inter alia:
"xxx Apparently and from all indications, complainant (referring to petitioner

herein) was satisfied and did not have any complaint (about) anything regarding her
employment in Japan until after almost two (2) years (when) she filed the instant
complaint on February 21, 1991. The records show that after signing the Standard
Employment Contract on December 1, 1988, she entered into a side agreement with the
Japanese employer thru her local manager, Jaz Talents Promotion consenting to a
monthly salary of US$750.00 which she affirmed during the conference of May 21, 1991.
Respondent agency had no knowledge nor participation in the said agreement such that
it could not be faulted for violation of the Standard Employment Contract regarding the
stipulated salary. We cannot take cognizance of such violation when one of the principal
party (sic) thereto opted to receive a salary different from what has been stipulated in
their contract, especially so if the other contracting party did not consent/participate in
such arrangement. Complainant (petitioner) cannot now demand from respondent
agency to pay her the salary based (on) the processed Employment Contract for she is
now considered in bad faith and hence, estopped from claiming thereto thru her own
act of consenting and agreeing to receive a salary not in accordance with her contract of
employment. Moreover, her self-imposed silence for a long period of time worked to
her own disadvantage as she allowed laches to prevail which barred respondent from
doing something at the outset. Normally, if a person's right (is) violated, she/he would
immediately react to protect her/his rights which is not true in the case at bar.
"The term laches has been defined as one's negligence or failure to assert his right in
due time or within reasonable time from the accrual of his cause of action, thus, leading,
another party to believe that there is nothing wrong with his own claim. This resulted in
placing the negligent party in estoppel to assert or enforce his right. xxx Likewise, the
Supreme Court in one case held that not only is inaction within reasonable time to
enforce a right the basic premise that underlies a valid defense of laches but such
inaction evinces implied consent or acquiescence to the violation of the right. xxx
"Under the prevailing circumstances of this case, it is outside the regulatory powers of
the Administration to rule on the liability of respondent Jan Talents Promotions, if any,
(it) not being a licensed private agency but a promotion which trains entertainers for
abroad.
“xxx xxx xxx” (Citations omitted.)
On appeal, the NLRC upheld the Decision, thus:
"We fail to see any conspiracy that the complainant (petitioner herein) imputes
to the respondents. She has, to put it bluntly, not established and/or laid the basis for
Us to arrive at a conclusion that the respondents have been and should be held liable
for her claims.
"The way We see it, the records do not at all indicate any connection between
respondents Centrum Promotion & Placement Corporation and Jaz Talents Promotion.
"There is, therefore, no merit in the appeal. Hence, We affirmed." [4]

Dissatisfied with the NLRC's Decision, petitioner instituted the present petition, alleging
that public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in finding: that she is guilty
of laches; that she entered into a side contract on December 10, 1988 for the reduction
of her basic salary to Seven Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$750.00) which superseded,
nullified and invalidated the standard employment contract she entered into on
December 1, 1988; and that Planning Japan Co., Ltd. and private respondents are not
solidarily liable to her for Six Thousand US Dollars (US$6,000.00) in unpaid wages. [5]
The petition is meritorious.
Firstly, we hold that the managerial commission agreement executed by petitioner to

authorize her Japanese employer to deduct Two Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$250.00)
from her monthly basic salary is void because it is against our existing laws, morals and
public policy. It cannot supersede the standard employment contract of December 1,
1988 approved by the POEA with the following stipulation appended thereto:
"It is understood that the terms and conditions stated in this Employment
Contract are in conformance with the Standard Employment Contract for Entertainers
prescribed by the POEA under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1986. Any
alterations or changes made in any part of this contract without prior approval by the
POEA shall be null and void"; [6] (Emphasis supplied.)
The stipulation is in line with the provisions of Rule II, Book V and Section 2(f), Rule I,
Book VI of the 1991 Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, thus:
"Book V, Rule II
"Section 1. Employment Standards. The Administration shall determine, formulate and

review employment standards in accordance with the market development and welfare
objectives of the overseas employment program and the prevailing market conditions.
"Section 2. Minimum Provisions for Contract. The following shall be considered the
minimum requirements for contracts of employment:
"a. Guaranteed wages for regular working hours and overtime pay for services rendered
beyond regular working hours in accordance with the standards established by the
Administration;
"xxx xxx xxx
"Section 3. Standard Employment Contract. The Administration shall undertake

development and/or periodic review of region, country and skills specific employment
contracts for landbased workers and conduct regular review of standard employment
contracts (SEC) for seafarers. These contracts shall provide for minimum employment
standards herein enumerated under Section 2, of this Rule and shall recognize the
prevailing labor and social legislations at the site of employment and international
conventions. The SEC shall set the minimum terms and conditions of employment. All
employers and principals shall adopt the SEC in connection with the hiring of workers
without prejudice to their adoption of other terms and conditions of employment over
and above the minimum standards of the Administration." (Emphasis supplied.)
and
"BOOK VI, RULE I
"Section 2. Grounds for suspension/cancellation of license.
"xxx xxx xxx
"f. Substituting or altering employment contracts and other documents approved and
verified by the Administration from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up
to and including the period of expiration of the same without the Administration's
approval.
“xxx xxx xxx” (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the basic salary of One Thousand Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500.00)
guaranteed to petitioner under the parties’ standard employment contract is in
accordance with the minimum employment standards with respect to wages set by the
POEA. Thus, the side agreement which reduced petitioner's basic wage to Seven
Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$750.00) and void for violating the POEA's minimum
employment standards, and for not having been approved by the POEA. Indeed, this
side agreement is a scheme all too frequently resorted to by unscrupulous employers
against our helpless overseas workers who are compelled to agree to satisfy their basic
economic needs.
Secondly. The doctrine of laches or "stale demands" cannot be applied to petitioner.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier, [7] thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned or declined to assert it. [8] It is not concerned with mere lapse of
time; the fact of delay, standing alone, is insufficient to constitute laches. [9]
The doctrine of laches is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims, and is principally a question of the
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. [10] There
is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches; each case is to be determined
according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its application is
controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to
perpetrate fraud and injustice. [11]
In the case at bench, petitioner filed her claim well within the three-year prescriptive
period for the filing of money claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor Code. [12] For
this reason, we hold the doctrine of laches inapplicable to petitioner. As we ruled
in Imperial Victory Shipping Agency v. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 (1991):
“xxx Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts
are basically, courts of law not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist
the enforcement of an existing legal right. We have ruled in Arsenal v. Intermediate
Appellate Court xxx that it is a long standing principle that equity follows the law. Courts
exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion
to disregard them. In Zabat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals xxx, this Court was more emphatic in
upholding the rules of procedure. We said therein:
"As for equity, which has been aptly described as a ‘justice outside legality,’ this is
applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case,
judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive
rules being present here, they should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments
based only on equity.’
"Thus, where the claim was filed within the three-year statutory period, recovery
therefore cannot be barred by laches. Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches
earlier than the expiration of time limited for the commencement of actions at law.
“xxx xxx xxx”
(Italics supplied. Citations omitted.)
Thirdly, private respondents Centrum and Times as well as Planning Japan Co., Ltd. —
the agency's foreign principal — are solidarily liable to petitioner for her unpaid wages.
This is in accordance with stipulation 13.7 of the parties’ standard employment contract
which provides:
13.7 The Employer (in this case, Planning Japan Co., Ltd.) and its locally (sic)
agent/promoter/representative (private respondent Centrum Promotions & Placement
Corporation) shall be jointly and severally responsible for the proper implementation of the
terms and conditions in this Contract." [13] (Emphasis supplied.)
This solidary liability also arises from the provisions of Section 10(a)(2), Rule V, Book I of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, thus:
"Section 10. Requirement before recruitment. — Before recruiting any worker,

the private employment agency shall submit to the Bureau the following documents:
a) A formal appointment or agency contract executed by a foreign-based employer in

favor of the license holder to recruit and hire personnel for the former xxx. Such formal
appointment or recruitment agreement shall contain the following provisions, among
others:
“xxx xxx xxx
"2. Power of the agency to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the principal or
foreign based employer for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and the
contracts of employment."
"xxx xxx xxx"

(Italics supplied.)
Our overseas workers constitute an exploited class. Most of them come from the
poorest sector of our society. They are thoroughly disadvantaged. Their profile shows
they live in suffocating slums, trapped in an environment of crime. Hardly literate and in
ill health, their only hope lies in jobs they can hardly find in our country. Their
unfortunate circumstance makes them easy prey to avaricious employers. They will
climb mountains, cross the seas, endure slave treatment in foreign lands just to survive.
Out of despondence, they will work under sub-human conditions and accept salaries
below the minimum. The least we can do is to protect them with our laws in our land.
Regretfully, respondent public officials who should sympathize with the working class
appear to have a different orientation.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of respondent POEA

Administrator and NLRC Commissioners in POEA Case No. Adj. 91-02-199 (ER),
respectively dated February 17 and December 29, 1992, and the Resolution of the NLRC,
dated March 23, 1993, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are held
jointly and severally liable to petitioner for the payment of SIX THOUSAND US DOLLARS
(US$6,000.00) in unpaid wages. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Bidin, Regalado, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

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FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. Nos. 141221-36, March 07, 2002 ]

KARL REICHL AND YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE REICHL, ACCUSED-

The defense interposed denial and alibi.

Accused-appellant Karl Reichl, an Austrian citizen, claimed that he entered the

1. NOT GUILTY of the crime of syndicated and large-scale illegal

2. NOT GUILTY of the crime of estafa as charged in the above-mentioned

3. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of syndicated and large-

4. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as charged, in the

1. For the 5 offenses, collectively, of syndicated and large-scale illegal

2. In Criminal Case No. 6428, there being no mitigating or aggravating

3. In Criminal Case No. 6430, there being no mitigating or aggravating

4. In Criminal Case No. 6432, there being no mitigating or aggravating

5. In Criminal Case No. 6438, there being no mitigating or aggravating

6. In Criminal Case No. 6530, there being no mitigating or aggravating

7. To pay the costs.

Accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellants of

Criminal Case No. 6431

Criminal Case No. 6433

Criminal Case No. 6435

Criminal Case No. 6437

Criminal Case No. 6439

Criminal Case No. 6529

Criminal Case No. 6531

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is

Cost against appellants.

HADJA JARMA LALLI Y PURIH AND RONNIE ARINGOY Y MASION,

In his Counter-Affidavit (Exh. "1"-Aringoy), Ronnie Aringoy affirmed that he personally

The Decision of the Trial Court

1. In Criminal Case No. 21908, to suffer the penalty of LIFE

2. In Criminal Case No. 21930, to suffer the penalty of LIFE

4. To pay the costs.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The Ruling of this Court

We dismiss the appeal for lack of merit.

Grounds for Appeal

In his Appeal Brief,[7] Ronnie Aringoy (Aringoy) admits that he referred Lolita to a

Aringoy assailed the credibility of Lolita's testimony because of inconsistencies with

(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

Criminal Case No. 21930 (Illegal Recruitment)

Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three

Section 7 of RA 8042 provides for the penalty of illegal recruitment committed by a

The penalties in Section 7 of RA 8042 have already been amended by Section 6 of

In People v. Gallo,[42] the Court enumerated the elements of syndicated illegal

Aringoy claims that no conspiracy existed in illegal recruitment, as he denies even

In People v. Lago,[46] the Court discussed conspiracy in this wise:

Criminal Case No. 21908 (Trafficking in Persons)

Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or

Section 4 of RA 9208 enumerates the prohibited acts of Trafficking in Persons, one of

Section 10(c) of RA 9208 provides for the penalty of qualified trafficking:

The Civil Code describes moral damages in Article 2217:

Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or

The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 February

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner ASIAN CENTER FOR CAREER &

"All other issues are dismissed for lack of merit.