Anim. Behav.

, 1985, 33, 985-992

Was 'The Expression of the Emotions' a misleading phrase?

R O B E R T A. H I N D E
Medical Research Council Unit on the Development and Integration of Behaviour, Madingley, Cambridge,
CB3 8AA, U.K.

Abstract. The title of Darwin's book implies that emotional behaviour is a direct expression of a relatively
simple internal state. However data from both animals and humans indicate that neither emotional 'states'
nor emotional behaviour can be considered independently of the factors that give rise to them, and may
involve complex affective-cognitive interactions. Furthermore such 'expression of emotion' often involves
processes of negotiation between two or more individuals. It is suggested that an attempt to grasp the
nettle of the difficulty of defining 'emotion' may aid understanding of the processes involved, and facilitate
liaison between studies of signal movements in animals and human emotions.

Darwin's (1872) The Expression of the Emotions in
Man and Animals, though long neglected, is now
properly regarded as one of the starting points for
modern behaviour studies. His use of a compara-
tive approach to throw light on the ontogenetic and
phylogenetic origins of expressive movements fore-
shadowed much of the later work of Tinbergen
(e.g. 1952) and Lorenz (e.g. 1981). However, whilst
Darwin discussed data from both animals and
humans, ethologists have avoided the term 'emo-
tion' because of its subjective overtones. Although
perhaps necessary over a certain period in the
development of ethology, this has had the unfor-
tunate effect of reducing conceptual interchanges
between students of animal and human behaviour.
Recent work on both sides has raised new possibili-
ties for a rapprochement, but at the same time
suggests that the phrase 'the expression of the
emotions' has often pointed research in a wrong
direction. The phrase carries the implication that
the behaviour Darwin studied involved simply the
expression of an internal state, and distracts atten-
tion from the crucial question of the nature of
'emotion'.
General agreement on a definition of emotion
has indeed been hard to find, but it is argued here
that this difficulty of definition is intrinsic to the
nature of the problem. On the one hand it is useful,
and perhaps essential, to distinguish between the
different ways in which the term emotion and its
derivatives are used in research. On the other, such
distinctions may obscure essential aspects of what
we are attempting to study. But understandingjust
why definition is difficult may help us to come to
terms with the problems that emotion poses for
students of behaviour. This paper, therefore, con-
siders first the ways in which the concept of
emotion has been used in research and then their
shortcomings. Following Darwin's lead, it is
assumed that human emotional behaviour and
animal signal movements have something in com-
mon, and evidence concerning both will be consi-
dered.
C O N C E P T S OF E M O T I O N
The phenomena of emotion are often categorized
into its motor aspects (emotional expression), its
state aspects (usually expressed with ultimate phy-
siological referents) and its subjective aspects. This,
however, omits the important issue of emotional
input. Partly for that reason it can be more useful to
categorize the uses of the term emotion and its
derivatives according to whether they are used as
input (independent), intervening or output (depen-
dent) variables (Hinde 1972a). In this section
distinctions resulting from such an approach are
considered briefly: later it is argued that the causal
sequence implied by such a trichotomy is over-sim-
ple.
Emotion as Input
Terms such as 'emotional stimuli' or emotional
deprivation' normally refer to a category of input.
It is of course important to be clear whether the
Category is defined in terms of the nature of the
input, or in terms of the resulting state of the
respondent. Thus Radke-Yarrow & Zahn-Waxler
(personal communication) make a clear distinction
between the emotional stimuli children receive

985
986 Animal Behaviour, 33, 3
from depressed versus normal mothers, and the
consequences of experiencing such stimuli for the
children's development and regulation of their own
relationships. In either case, of course, there is a
real difficulty in distinguishingbetween what is and
what is not emotional.
Emotion as State
Emotion is perhaps most usually seen as a state
intervening between stimulus and response. This is
in keeping with Darwin's usage. A number of
further distinctions are important here.
(1) Motive, state or trait? The supposed internal
state may be thought of as closely associated with a
particular type of behaviour and as lasting only so
long as that behaviour, or it may refer to a state of
longer duration (mood) involving a proneness to
respond in particular ways; or it may refer to more
permanent characteristics of an individual. This is a
facet of the state-trait continuum as discussed by
Allen & Potkay (1981).
(2) Intervening variable or hypothetical con-
struct? Emotion may be used as an intervening
variable, carrying no physiological implications.
Its usefulness then depends on the number of
dependent variables associated with it, and on the
strength of the correlations between them (cf.
Miller 1959). Alternatively, it may be used as a
hypothetical construct, with implications about
physiological mechanisms, such as the brain-stem
reticular system (e.g. M oruzzi 1969), limbic system
(MacLean 1958) or autonomic nervous system
(Mandler 1975).
(3) Mode of action? Emotion may be thought of
as (a) energizing behaviour directly, as when anger
is spoken of as instigating aggressive responses (e.g.
Berkowitz 1962); or (b) as a reinforcing event, as
when fear refers to an acquired drive, in the sense
that an individual will learn responses that reduce
it; or (c) as a goal or positive incentive (which may
also be a reinforcer); or (d) as a modulator or
disrupter of behaviour, especially when extreme
(e.g. Leeper 1948).
(4) Specific or general? Emotion as an internal
state may be seen as related to many or all types of
behaviour, as in activation theories (e.g. Schlosberg
1954; Duffy 1962) or as specific to one or more
limited groups of behaviour patterns.
(5) Subjective experience? An emotional state
may or may not be regarded as associated with
subjective experience in general or with particular
types of subjective experience. If it is, it may be
limited to intense experiences (e.g. Moruzzi 1969)
or to those inherently connected with a form of
action, as opposed to more general feelings of
sadness, pleasure or distress (Bowlby 1969). Furth-
ermore, the subjective feelings may be regarded as
mere epiphenomena, or as influencing or in-
fluenced by behaviour: here innumerable logical
traps await the unwary (e.g. Ryle 1949; Schwartz
1982).
Emotion as Output
Emotion also often refers to a form of behaviour,
to the output of a system. The terms 'emotional
behaviour' and 'emotional expression' are of
course always used in this way. They refer espe-
cially to movements occurring in conditions of
excitement, danger, joy, etc. Both the somatic and
the autonomic nervous system are usually in-
volved. The movement may or may not have been
adapted for a signal function.
Such a usage would be more valuable if there
were a category of behaviour termed 'emotional'
that could be clearly distinguished from non-emo-
tional behaviour. Unfortunately that is not the
case: some authors have used emotional behaviour
as virtually co-extensive with motivated behaviour
(e.g. Bindra 1959; Plutchik 1962). In addition,
experimental psychologists have used 'conditioned
emotional response' to refer to the interruption or
diminution of ongoing behaviour as the result of an
intruding stimulus (Estes & Skinner 1941). How-
ever too much must not be made of this issue: at the
extreme, many examples of emotional behaviour
would be universally recognized as such, and
emotional behaviour is by no means unique
amongst biological and psychological categories in
being clouded by borderline cases.
General
There can surely be no dispute that such distinc-
tions can be useful: we must be clear-headed about
what we mean by emotion. The problems on which
we focus will differ according to our concept of
emotion. Thus in the study of development, treat-
ment of emotion as a dependent variable would be
in keeping with a discussion of the development of
emotional expression; emotion as an intervening
variable might concern the differentiation of emo-
tions or the development of the emotional charac-
 Hinde. Expression of the emotions?
teristics of individuals; and the study of emotion as
an independent variable might concern the in-
fluence of maternal depression on a child.
At the same time, however, the cause-effect
sequence too easily implied by the independent-
intervening~tependentvariable trichotomy carries
a danger of distorting nature. In the following
pages it is emphasized that emotion as a state is far
from unitary and thus of limited value as an
intervening variable (or hypothetical construct),
that understanding of emotion as input or emotion
as output cannot be separated from emotion as
state, and that it is more profitable to think in terms
of causal loops than chains. It is convenient to
consider the question of motivational state first.
C H A I N S OR L O O P S ?
What Sort of a State?
It is often convenient to distinguish between
emotions or affects as driving forces, and cogni-
tions as embracing the processes that modulate
their expression (cf. Piaget & Inhelder 1966, cited in
D6carie 1978). However it is now apparent from
studies of both child and adult human subjects that
emotion and cognition are closely interwoven (e.g.
Piaget & Inhelder 1958; Schachter & Singer 1962;
Candland et al. 1977; Plutchik 1980; Ekman 1981):
we shall see later that a similar conclusion is
emerging from studies of animal behaviour. It is
also implicit in current neuro-psychological theory:
for instance Bindra (1976) writes in terms of a
central motive state, generated by both physiologi-
cal and perceived environmental factors, which in
turn renders certain stimuli more salient by affect-
ing their central representations (see also Arnold
1970). Thus we must remember both that cogni-
tions (in so far as they can be conceptualized
independently of emotions) affect emotions, and
also that emotions (in so far as they can be
conceptualized independently of cognitions) affect
cognitions (e.g. Zajonc 1980). If it is useful to
distinguish between them, it is essential to think in
terms of a continuing cognitive-emotion interac-
tion (e.g. Candland 1977).
This issue is crucial for the study of emotions in
development, for it implies that there are multiple
ways in which experience may affect the emotions
or emotional development, and multiple ways in
which the emotions may affect experience. It may
well be that all that matters about the emotional
987
expressions of human newborns can be embraced
by the view that they reflect complex and changing
organismic states and communicate messages to
others (Emde et al. 1978), but with cognitive
development the issue soon becomes greatly com-
plicated. First, experience may affect either the
propensity to show emotional behaviour in general
or to show particular kinds of emotional beha-
viour. Second, learning may affect the appraisal of
the situation which evokes the emotion in the first
instance, or modulate emotional expression to fit
the requirements of the situation or culture, or
affect attempts to cope with the source of the
emotion (Ekman, personal communication). This
learning includes the acquisition of such elemen-
tary capacities as object permanence and anticipa-
tion, indicated for instance by the appearance of
surprise (Charlesworth 1969) or laughter before the
mother's reappearance in a peek-a-boo game
(Sroufe & Waters 1976; Emde et al. 1978). It also
involves more complex capacities, such as those
involved in the development of the self-concept and
the capacity to empathize with others (e.g. Hoff-
man 1976; Lewis et al. 1978). As D6carie (1978) has
emphasized, the development of emotion and
cognition are inextricably interwoven.
Thus, if emotion is used to refer to an internal
state, that state is a far from simple one, and
includes also the effects of, or expectations about,
the external situation. It is often not profitable to
consider emotional states independently of the
factors that gave rise to them.
How Can Emotional Input be Specified?
In considering emotion as an independent vari-
able, the first issue is related to the old problem of
'what is a stimulus?' (Verplanck 1954). Is emotional
input to be assessed in terms that relate ultimately
to physical characteristics of the input, or in terms
of the response of the individual? Individuals
respond differently to the same input, so what is an
emotional event for one may not be so for another.
Indeed the emotional salience of a stimulus or
stimulation may depend on the individual's current
emotional state. Thus emotional stimuli can be
defined only by reference both to the external event
and to the respondent.
A closely related issue is that the elicitation of an
emotional state or emotional behaviour often
depends on relations between aspects of the exter-
nal situation and aspects of the internal state. Thus
988 Animal Behaviour, 33, 3
the elicitation of much emotional behaviour is
often described as involving an interrupting event,
or a discrepancy between a perceived state of
affairs and that which was desired or expected (e.g.
Mandler 1975). The ethologist's interpretation of
many signal movements as based on conflicting
motivations (see below) could be reinterpreted in
similar terms. Thus the impact of a potentially
emotional stimulus may depend on the nature
and/or previous experience of the individual con-
cerned, or on the simultaneous elicitation of incom-
patible courses of action.
In the same vein, the 'chronic emotional condi-
tions', to use Radke-Yarrow & Zahn-Waxler's
term (personal communication), to which a child is
exposed, may depend on the characteristics of the
child and/or the child's relationship with the
caregiver and others about him. For instance, in a
study of pre-school children and their mothers
Hinde & Stevenson-Hinde (in press) found that
mothers who scored highly on a self-report ques-
tionnaire assessing various mood items, tended in
an independent set of observations to show more
'physical friendliness' to daughters than did
mothers with low scores, but this was not the case
for sons. The correlations between physical frien-
dliness and the maternal mood items depression,
anxiety and outward irritability were 0.53
(P<0.05), 0.72 (P<0.01) and 0'51 (P<0-05) for
daughters, but -0.26, - 0 . 0 6 and 0.06 for sons.
Apparently expression of the mother's emotional
state differs between mother-daughter and moth-
er-son relationships.
In humans the chronic emotional conditions to
which a child is exposed may also depend in part on
the expectations of the family members concerned.
Thus the home relationships of 50-month-old
children assessed as shy, differed according to their
sex: whereas shy girls tended to have easy mother-
child relationships, shy boys tended to have rather
tense ones (Simpson & Stevenson-Hinde 1985). By
contrast, girls high on the characteristics active,
irregular, attention span, unmalleable, intense,
moody and assertive showed a greater tendency to
have tense mother-child relationships than did
boys high on those characteristics (Hinde & Steven-
son-Hinde, in press). Apparently mothers respond
to particular temperament characteristics in girls
differently from the way they would respond in
boys. Shy girls are acceptable, shy boys are not, and
the characteristics active, intense, moody, etc. are
seen as even less appropriate in girls than in boys.
Furthermore, the consequences of a given 'emo-
tional environment' on an individual's develop-
ment may depend on other characteristics of that
individual. For example the relations between the
characteristics of rhesus monkey mothers and their
offspring differ according to the infant's sex (Ste-
venson-Hinde et al. 1980a, b).
Finally, the manner in which individuals inter-
pret emotional behaviour of others depends in part
on their own natures. Erode (1980) found that some
human mothers interpret a cry that is intense and
prolonged in the newborn period as indicative of
anger, whilst other mothers believe their babies do
not express anger until they show temper tantrums
at a year old.
Does Emotional Behaviour Express an Emotional
State?
We have seen that emotional states can often not
be considered independently of the external factors
that gave rise to them, and that external emotional
stimuli cannot be considered independently of the
responding individual. What about emotion as the
output: emotional behaviour?
The implication of the title of Darwin's book is
that emotional behaviour is the outward ex-
pression of an emotional state, and that there is a
one-to-one correspondence between the two. Such
a correspondence is assumed by much current work
on emotional behaviour (e.g. Hopf, Herzog &
Ploog, personal communication). But if the inter-
nal state is complex one must ask what it is that the
emotional behaviour expresses? Cross-cultural evi-
dence indicates that emotional expression is inhi-
bited and/or exaggerated to different extents in
different cultures (e.g. Ekman & Friesen 1969; Eibl
Eibesfeldt 1975), and child developmentalists
attempting to measure emotional states have been
impressed by the same problem (Lewis & Michal-
son 1982). Several lines of comparative data also
suggest a certain lability between aspects of the
internal state and behaviour (Hinde, in press).
Firstly, characteristics of an expressive movement
may remain constant even though independent
evidence indicates considerable variation in inter-
nal state. Thus the repetition rate of the bow-coos
of doves is remarkably constant in each species,
and independent of the length of the bow-cooing
bout, the latter presumably indicating motivation
(Morris 1975).
Secondly, the sequelae of the threat postures of
 Hinde: Expression of the emotions?
tits (Parus spp.) change with time of year (Stokes
1962). In so far as those sequelae are indicative of
the state accompanying the expressive movement,
the correspondence between state and movement
would seem to be imprecise.
Thirdly, the occurrence of certain expressive
movements (e.g. threat displays in birds) may be
suppressed or accentuated by behavioural tenden-
cies normally irrelevant to them, e.g. a tendency to
behave sexually (Hinde 1953; Kruijt 1964; Baer-
ends 1975).
Fourthly, in animals, as in man, deception
(Menzel 1971; Ekman 1981) and 'manipulation'
(Dawkins & Krebs 1978) may occur.
Thus the relation between emotional state and
emotional behaviour is by no means simple.
Further evidence along the same lines is presented
in the next section.
Emotional Expression and Interaction
Some of Darwin's discussion of emotional beha-
viour was concerned with threat postures.
Although complex, these have been profitably
interpreted as depending on mutually incompatible
internal tendencies, usually to attack the rival, to
flee and to stay put (e.g. Tinbergen 1952; Baerends
1975). Ethologists have assumed that the internal
state expressed by a given posture can be assessed
from the behaviour that accompanies or follows it,
for instance from the probability of a bird attac-
king or fleeing after posturing (e.g. Moynihan
1955). Now from the point of view of natural
selection, it would not be adaptive for an individual
to communicate to a rival the likelihood that he
would attack or flee. Such signals make sense only
if the threatening individual either is attempting to
bluff, deceive or manipulate the rival (Dawkins &
Krebs 1978), or else is uncertain what to do next,
because what he should do depends in part on the
behaviour of the other (Hinde 1972b, 1981). The
latter hypothesis integrates a number of facts about
animal signals. For instance, some avian threat
postures are frequently followed by fleeing by the
threatening bird, but there seem to be few threat
postures that are regularly followed by attack. This
makes sense if what is being signalled is of the type
'I want to stay put, but if you approach I am likely
to attack' or 'likely to flee'. In the former case, the
recipient of the signal is unlikely to approach, and
so attack by the signaller will follow relatively
infrequently. In the latter case, the recipient will
989
rarely be deterred, and the signaller will usually
flee. Recently empirical support for the view that
the subsequent behaviour of the signaller depends
in part on that of the recipient of the signal has
become available (Bossema & Burgler 1980).
Such considerations suggest the view that emo-
tional behaviour may lie along a continuum from
behaviour that is more or less purely expressive to
behaviour concerned primarily with a process of
negotiation between individuals (Hinde, in press).
In animals, bird song lies nearer the expressive end,
threat postures nearer the negotiation end. In man,
spontaneous and solitary laughter are primarily
expressive, the ingratiating smile primarily nego-
tiating. However most emotional expressions in-
volve both. This has been demonstrated by Zivin
(in press) from data obtained in a situation devised
by Camras (1977). Two children were placed in a
situation in which they had to compete for a
desirable object. If they could see each others'
faces, the plus face, a facial expression often used in
agonistic contexts, often appeared. If an opaque
partition was placed between them, the incidence of
this expression dropped markedly. The decrease
can presumably be ascribed to the fact that negotia-
tion was no longer possible: that it continued at all
is evidence for an expressive element.
As Berscheid's (in press) detailed analysis shows,
the behaviour of the partner in an ongoing relation-
ship often confirms or disrupts expectancies, inter-
rupts ongoing sequences, or arouses conflicting
motivations. Interactions within ongoing relation-
ships thus provide a likely forum for emotional
expression. Use of the term 'negotiation' is in
harmony with this view, emphasizing in addition
that much interaction involves attempts to control
the partner or to adapt one's own behaviour to that
of the partner.
The view that examples of emotional behaviour
lie along a continuum from expression to negotia-
tion is of course closely linked to the concept of
continuing emotion-cognition interaction. The ex-
pressive movement depends on the current internal
state but is coupled with assessments of the other
individual's internal state, which in turn affects the
actor's internal state. Indeed it implies that emo-
tional behaviour may be interpretable not in terms
of a basic unitary emotional state, and not even in
terms of an affective--cognitive interaction within
an individual, but often only in terms of interac-
tions between affective-cognitive states in two
individuals (see Berscheid, in press). Our neat
990 Animal Behaviour, 33, 3
distinction of emotion as either an independent, an
intervening or a dependent variable is clearly in
disarray: all three must be studied simultaneously.
There is of course also a developmental problem
here. The cry of the newborn can presumably be
regarded as purely expressive. But reciprocal inter-
change plays a crucial role in the communicative
exchange even of young infants: for instance, they
become distressed if their normally friendly
mothers remain impassive in a face-to-face interac-
tion (Tronick et al. 1978). The full development of
communicationinvolvingnegotiation requires ulti-
mately sophisticated capacities implying some
appreciation of intentionality and perspective-tak-
ing. In so far as the 2-month-old's smile conveys
'keep it up, I like it', it can be regarded as a step
along that road. It is relevant here that the
emotions best understood by young children are
the 'fundamental' emotions of surprise, anger,
shame, etc., whereas emotions like pride, which
presumably involve a greater cognitive element, are
not understood until later.
A further issue concerns the extent to which an
individual's emotional behaviour affects his own
emotional state. Some would argue that emotional
behaviour depends on the individual's appraisal of
his/her own autonomic arousal. Whilst the impor-
tance of proprioceptive feedback or other conse-
quences of emotional behaviour on the actor is
controversial, Mandler (1975) assumes that the
autonomic activity and its cognitive appraisal each
affect the other during an emotional episode. Here
again there is a developmental problem. Does such
positive feedback operate from birth?
We have seen that emotional states are likely to
be complex, that there may be no simple relation
between an emotional state and its expression, and
that its expression may involve negotiation with
another individual. Furthermore all these consider-
ations apply equally to that other individual:
emotional behaviour in a social situation may
involve negotiation between two individuals, each
one's perceptions of the other's state and predic-
tions about the other's future behaviour influenc-
ing his own state and thus his own emotional
behaviour. It is hardly surprising that the study of
emotions in real life situations poses problems.
CONCLUSION
We started by recognizing the confusion surround-
ing the concept of emotion, and the need for clarity
in the ways in which it is used. One route seemed to
be to distinguish clearly between emotion as an
independent, as an intervening and as a dependent
variable. Even this, however, is fraught with diffi-
culties which are inherent in the behavioural
phenomena themselves. Attempts to relate emo-
tion to one or other part of an emotional stimulus-
emotional state-emotional behaviour sequence
encounter the difficulties that the stimuli cannot be
defined independently of the state, the state is
complex and involves appraisal of the stimulus,
and the emotional behaviour is affected by the state
and by the nature of the recipient, and may itself
affect the state. This is not a council of despair. We
all know that nature is complicated: we must
sharpen our conceptual tools as best we can, and
have faith that in using them to untangle the
complexity we shall see how to fashion better ones.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported by the Medical Research
Council and the Royal Society. The paper was
based on a paper given at a Symposium of the
International Society for the Study of Child De-
velopment, at which Dr Marian Radke-Yarrow
and Dr Siegfried Hopf also presented papers.
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(Received 31 May 1984; revised 30 July 1984; MS.
number: 2549)