Forensic Engineering Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers

Forensic Engineering 165 May 2012 Issue FE2

Volume 165 Issue FE2 Pages 63–75 http://dx.doi.org/10.1680/feng.10.00001
Forensic engineering and collapse Paper 1000001
Received 11/06/2011 Accepted 20/10/2011
databases Keywords: failures/risk & probability analysis/safety and
Breysse hazards

ice | proceedings ICE Publishing: All rights reserved

Forensic engineering and

collapse databases
Denys Breysse PhD
Professor of Civil Engineering, Civil and Environmental Engineering
Department, Université de Bordeaux, Bordeaux, France

Collapses in civil engineering are not uncommon. Some cases become known worldwide but, in many cases, the
details only reach the limited audience of the client and companies directly involved. In these latter situations, after
in-depth analysis of the disaster, useful information could have been obtained and shared. Collapses of structures can
result from many factors (loading, material, organisation, lack of maintenance, etc.) but analysis of failures can always
identify lessons for improved practice. Forensic engineering based on post-mortem analysis aims to understand the
reason for failures in order to learn useful lessons. At the present time, however, forensic engineering is still an
unknown concept for many French engineers. This paper demonstrates from general considerations, with a few
examples, what can be gained from collating ‘collapse experiences’ on a more formal basis. Three famous French cases
of collapse are analysed. The use of organised feedback and databases for risk management in civil engineering
projects, for teaching and for improving the quality of work is explained.

1. Introduction is the name of a new field of engineering that consists of post-

The principal area in which construction engineers are learning
from experience is seismic collapse. After a significant earth-
quake, groups of experts analyse failures to understand what
could have been improved (in building codes, building practice,
etc.) to reduce the consequences of such hazards. By observing
damaged structures and grouping them according to various
criteria, they also develop fragility/vulnerability curves
(Rossetto and Elnashai, 2003) that can be used to help
decision-making when evaluating designs. However, earth-
quakes are not the only field in which analyses of collapse can
provide useful information. Collapses or warning incidents in
civil engineering are not uncommon. While some cases are
famous worldwide (such as the Tacoma and Palau Bridge
failures, Heathrow and Roissy airport collapses and the Hyatt
Regency footbridge disaster), most events are only known to a
limited audience – the client and the company directly involved.
This is unfortunate as useful information can be obtained and
disseminated after in-depth analysis of what happened.
Collapses of structures can result from many factors (e.g. loading,
material, defective organisation or maintenance) but analysis can
always bring useful lessons for improving practice. They cannot
be considered just an ‘act of God’ since rational reasons can
always be found. These often relate to the sociological,
contractual and economical context of when and where failures
occur. Public reaction to such collapses varies between countries
and, in any given country, can change with time.
Some efforts have recently been made to gather and analyse
data on collapses on a more formal basis. Forensic engineering
mortem analysis in order to understand the reason for the
collapse and learn useful lessons (Delatte, 2000). This paper
demonstrates from general considerations, with a few exam-
ples, what can be gained from collating ‘collapse experiences’
on a more formal basis. The main difficulties of such work are
described. The knowledge drawn from these databases would
be useful for risk management in civil engineering projects, for
teaching and, more widely, for improving the quality of civil
engineering work.
2. Civil engineering structural failures as a
source of knowledge
In construction, explanations for failure often focus on
material properties or loading: failure happens when the load
produces more severe effects than a material can bear, without
forgetting possible deterioration over time (Breysse, 2009a).
However, while this ‘mechanical logic’ can explain the fracture,
human factors at any stage (design, building or service) also
need to be considered (Breysse, 2003). Human error can come
from bad decisions, insufficient knowledge, or understanding
or communication problems. Accidents can also be the result
of risks that are consciously considered to be acceptably low
(in one case out of four), either because elimination of the risk
is technically impossible or economically not acceptable
(Schneider, 1997).
When a failure occurs, one wonders about its ‘acceptability’. Is
it acceptable that building collapses frequently happen in
Egypt (partial data sampling led to the identification of 18 such
collapses between 2000 and 2009, resulting in 154 victims

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(fatalities))? Is it acceptable that urban tunnelling work can
induce so much damage in a neighbourhood? Is it acceptable
that within a time period of 2 years, two collapses with striking
similarities occurred in Moscow (Transvaal Park with 28
victims and Yasenovo market with 60 victims)? To answer
these questions the technical, economical and social contexts
must all be considered.
Case studies of past failures make it possible to identify causes
(certain, probable or possible), analyse them and draw some
conclusions (Bordes, 2005). These conclusions enrich collective
expertise. Feedback qualifies the data gathering process in
order to learn lessons after an unforeseen (and often dramatic)
event. Feedback can be qualitative or quantitative, based on
case studies or on statistics of similar failures. A detailed case
study requires both a high level of expertise and extensive
means (laboratory tests, numerical simulations, etc.). It is also
used when some judicial/legal dimensions appear (i.e. when the
question of responsibility arises). The development of this
dimension, mainly in Anglo-Saxon countries, gave birth to
‘forensic engineering’ (Carper, 2007). Forensic engineering can
be seen as comparable to medico-legal analysis: it is a (post-
mortem) retro-analysis after a failure, going back to its root
causes, in order to rebuild the logical chain of causes and
consequences that finally resulted in the collapse. This is
important for courts considering the allocation of responsi-
bility, but is of greater importance for adding to engineering
knowledge.
A classic case is the Hyatt Regency footbridge collapse in
Kansas City in 1981, resulting in 114 fatalities and more than
200 injuries when a suspended walkway suddenly fell on people
who were dancing in the hotel atrium. The investigation
showed that the cause was the connections between beams and
the metallic bars that supported them. The drawing had been
modified (without checking) during the building stage, leading
to double the stress value of that in the initial design. Lack of
coordination between the project partners was critical in the
failure (Moncarz and Taylor, 2000).
An engineer starting to investigate a failure is now able to
consult forensic academic journals and conferences (Rens
et al., 2000), but France has until recently remained outside the
field of development of forensic engineering: it was not until
April 2011 that a conference on the topic was held in Paris
(Breysse et al., 2011).
3. Three major French cases of structural
collapse and lessons learned
France is not devoid of structural collapses. The most famous
in France is the sudden failure of Malpasset dam on 2
December 1959 in the town of Fréjus, causing 423 fatalities. It
is known worldwide as one of the most devastating collapses in
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the Western world in modern times. The subsequent investiga-
tions (Roubault, 1970) led to a general improvement in dam
management strategies. The design could not be faulted on the
then state-of-the-art as, at that time, there was a lack of
knowledge of the risks induced by high pore pressures in the
fractured rocks below the dam. Because the failure and its
consequences were comprehensively documented, further
analysis is still possible, for instance for calibrating flooding
models after a sudden dam collapse. Other significant collapses
include
& the Auguste Perret Meteor tunnel collapse, in Paris, on 14
February 2003
& the roof collapse at Roissy airport terminal E on 23 May
2004 (four fatalities)
& the Saint-Etienne River Bridge collapse, on La Réunion
Island, in the Indian Ocean, on 25 February 2007.
These three failures were technically analysed by experts
nominated by the Ministry of Transport and the experts’
reports were made public (albeit briefly and then withdrawn in
the Roissy airport case). A summary of the context and
technical aspects of each case is now given, from which some
general considerations are derived.
3.1 Auguste Perret Meteor tunnel collapse
During the night, a sinkhole opened on the building site of the
Meteor line in the centre of Paris. The sinkhole originated at a
site where a large underground station was being built. At the
surface, it caused the sudden collapse of ground between
several school buildings (Figure 1). Fortunately, the collapse
occurred during the winter holidays when the school was
closed. The authorities, however, had to face ‘local psychosis’
about what possible consequences the collapse could have
brought.
Figure 1. Sinkhole at Auguste Perret school (after Dubois and Rat,
2003)
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Three investigations were simultaneously initiated by the
Ministry of Public Works, the Administrative Court and the
client (RATP, the transportation authority in Paris). The
information given in the following is mainly drawn from the
report written for the Ministry (Dubois and Rat, 2003).
The underground station was a 145 m long and 14?5 m wide
hall, 9–10 m below the surface. This depth was necessary in
order to avoid the plastic swelling Sparnacian clays. A typical
cross-section (Figure 2) shows that the tunnel was dug into
limestone, with a cover depth in that layer of about 6?40 m. It
is situated in a complex environment with many old limestone
quarries that had been backfilled. The upper part of the
limestone comprises layers of highly contrasting properties.
Mechanical property results from on-site and laboratory tests
revealed a high variability (modulus of 850 MPa on plate tests
for the lower part of the limestone and 25–90 MPa in
pressuremeter tests on borings), while laboratory tests were
performed only on the ‘good’ layers, thus introducing a
sampling bias. The post-failure report noted that it is difficult
to get representative parameters in such a heterogeneous
formation, but that more relevant information could have been
derived after a careful analysis of the available data. For
instance, boring records showed that the thickness of high-
strength layers was regularly less than 50 cm. In addition, the
limestone was considered homogeneous and uncracked, but
Boring Pressuremeters
0.00 m MT122 SP3
Fillings
E = 26 MPa
3.35
9.76 m
Upper
limestone
E > 90 MPa
Maintenance
14.00
10.41 m
hall of the station
Lower
limestone
21.70
Plastic
clays
Figure 2. Cross-section in the area of collapse (after Dubois and
Rat, 2003)
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was fractured with an orientation roughly along the tunnel
axis, thus playing an unfavourable role. Post-failure on-site
tests revealed a high anisotropy with a 350% difference
between the modulus in orthogonal directions because of these
fractures.
During excavation, a light support was designed combining
shotcrete, bolts and trusses spaced at 1 m intervals. However,
during the work, the contractor suggested, on the basis of
additional two-dimensional (2D) finite-element computations,
using only bolts and shotcrete. His view was that this was
sufficient to ensure vault stability and to avoid the fall of rock
blocks. The client accepted these changes, while requesting a
thicker shotcrete layer.
The procedure used was alternatively digging two half tubes,
separated by a central pile. There was no full-time geotechni-
cian on site during the work. The forensic analysis was based
on pictures of the excavation wall, daily reports, reports of
weekly meetings between the client and the contractor, and
convergence and settlement measurements. The reports docu-
mented ‘bad soil conditions’ from September 2002 and many
local rock falls that had been mitigated using a denser bolting
mesh. During excavation of the hall, surface settlements locally
reached 30 mm, compared with the calculated and accepted
value of 10 mm; however, even if the stakeholders were aware
of the possible consequences for the existing buildings, these
settlements had not been retro-analysed in terms of ground
properties.
The collapse happened in an area were the excavation had been
stopped for 2 months and were the settlements were stabilised.
Some minor work was undertaken in the lower part of the
cross-section. This possibly induced vibrations that could have
been a trigger for the collapse. All observations confirmed that
the coarse limestone above the tunnel did not have the
properties it was assumed to have. It appears that, because
of its layered structure, the vaulting effect was not efficient,
preventing the transfer of loads on the sides of the cavity. The
dissymmetry of the excavation process could have induced
bending and the existing cracks could have induced disconti-
nuity. The shotcrete layer was not rigid enough to create the
vault effect.
As a conclusion, while the under-designed support system and
the condition of the limestone layer can be considered the
causes of the collapse, human components must also be
considered. Organisational deficiencies before and during the
work were identified, including
& the fact that the limestone was considered homogeneous
when it actually consisted of highly heterogeneous and
cracked layers
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& the fact that the design of the support system was modified
without careful checks (the report highlighted an ‘excessive
confidence in inadequate calculations’)
& the fact that neither the bad soil conditions encountered
during excavation nor the unpredicted settlements were
considered to necessitate an update of the prior site model.
3.2 Roissy airport terminal 2E roof collapse
The fatal collapse, 30 months after completion, of the
concourse building at Roissy Charles de Gaulle international
airport is well known. A substantial factor was the architec-
tural character of the building. Even though only 4% of the
650 m long concourse structure was affected by the collapse
(Figure 3), the impact was not limited to the four fatalities: it
also affected the client (development at Roissy airport was
delayed), the architect (Paul Andreu), the main operator (Air
France, user of the concourse) and the whole profession of
French structural engineers. Many possible explanations arose
in the very first days, most being based on hypotheses about
deficiencies in structural behaviour, missing reinforcements or
defective foundations.
The French government set up an administrative committee to
investigate the technical causes of the collapse, without
interfering in judicial investigations. The committee’s report
was released on 15 February 2005 (Berthier, 2005).
The bearing structure is made of arches (span 26?2 m)
assembling horizontal and vertical concrete panels, with steel
stiffening struts anchored in concrete. At their feet, the arches
are stabilised by a longitudinal beam and lie on a series of piles.
The longitudinal regularity of the structure is disturbed by
many local singularities (e.g. openings linking to pedestrian
access tunnels and holes for ducts in the longitudinal beam).
The collapsed section is a very particular area with significant
Figure 3. The collapsed structure
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dissymmetry because it has three openings on one side
(Figure 4).
Fortunately, the collapse occurred very early on a Sunday
morning, at a time when very few people were in the area, thus
explaining the limited number of fatalities. The external
temperature was 4?1 ˚C; 90 minutes before the collapse, a piece
of concrete had fallen from the roof and a safety perimeter had
been installed. All possible causes for the final collapse were
investigated by the committee and it was shown that
& the concrete and steel initial properties were as expected
& the support structure behaved satisfactorily (some problems
encountered with the design of the head of piles during
building had been correctly remedied)
& there was no significant settlement and that the soil
properties had been correctly anticipated.
The technical explanation for the collapse pointed towards
structural causes. Numerical simulations were performed that
confirmed the sudden character of collapse, which was also
confirmed by eye witnesses. The following main elements were
noted.
& The overall structure was very flexible. High deformations
could be induced either by permanent loading or by climatic
and variable loading. This flexibility had even increased
because of cracking in some parts, which developed very
early on, probably because of insufficient or badly located
reinforcement.
& The 2D analysis performed during the studies was not
detailed enough to understand what could happen when the
real geometry was accounted for with high 3D effects due to
singularities, for example those due to links with foot-
bridges (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. 3D finite-element analysis of the shell, showing the
influence of singularities (Berthier, 2005)
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& The structure lacked redundancy and was not able to
transfer loads in the case of local deficiency.
& The longitudinal beam stabilising the arches was not strong
enough.
& Steel struts were anchored in concrete panels with metallic
plates, at a depth that induced high local tensile punching
shear stresses in the concrete.
The main initial cause of the sudden collapse was linked to
punching of the concrete panels by the struts. It was probably
facilitated by prior and gradual weakening of the concrete
under permanent and varying loads. Concrete creep induced a
progressive development of local internal stresses while thermal
cycles increased the local cracking of panels. The overall
strength of the structure thus progressively decreased until a
trigger event occurred. The spalling and fall of a small chunk of
concrete on the internal face of the arch was the first sign. The
lack of redundancy of the whole structure explains why this
local event had a rapid and global consequence: the shell,
already cracked, was fully penetrated by some struts, inducing
bending failure of an arch component.
However, the committee considered that the event also
revealed ‘organisational failure’ and suggested some changes
so as to prevent future collapses (Berthier, 2005).
& The structure, although complex, had been designed and
controlled more like a ‘usual building’ than like a bridge or
a dam. The committee suggested that such structures merit
verification of the design by an independent body, not just
reliance on contractor analysis and models. Regular
inspections of the structure should also be carried out to
check construction.
& Regarding the construction project itself, it was noted that
the designer was not independent from the client. The
committee recommended that a formal contract be agreed
between all stakeholders for all phases of a project.
& The design studies and structural checks suffered many
deficiencies. The committee pointed out, first, that such
studies must be detailed enough and with a sufficient budget
planned for them and, second, that sufficient means must be
dedicated to control in order to correctly manage the
complexity of such a project.
Finally, the committee suggested that all professional experts
meet in order to influence possible evolution of practice
(including regulation and contracts) in this field. The Roissy
collapse was a seminal event for French engineering compa-
nies, who decided to initiate collective research in the field of
project risk management in civil engineering. This field had
largely been ignored until Roissy, and a research project
(ANR-GERMA) was founded in 2008 with the aim of editing
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guidelines and improving professional practice. This project is
in progress and reports are expected soon.
3.3 The Saint-Etienne River Bridge collapse, La
Réunion Island
The road that connects the two cities of Saint-Louis and Saint-
Pierre on the south-west coast of La Réunion Island is a crucial
axis of communication with daily traffic of 54 000 vehicles
without any possible detour. The crossing of the Saint-Etienne
River includes two 520 m long bridges (Figure 5). The
upstream bridge is a prestressed concrete box girder bridge,
built in 1977 on masonry piers erected in 1937–1938. The
bridge located downstream was a prestressed concrete box
girder bridge made of ten continuous spans, built in 1992–1993
on the old piers of a railway bridge dating from approximately
1880.
In February 2007, a flood affected the Saint-Etienne River
during cyclone Gamede. The seventh pier of the downstream
bridge was swept away by the river flood, resulting in the
complete ruin of the bridge. The whole deck was found
fractured in many elements at the bottom of the river bed and
all the piers were broken at variable heights except for only one
(pier 4), which was cracked but still upright. Fortunately, the
‘twin’ bridge located further upstream (see Figure 5) did not
show any damage. At the time of the event, the flooding of the
river had not reached its maximum value: the flow was
estimated to be 1000 m3/s at the time of the collapse, compared
with an estimated value of 2000 m3/s two days later. This flow
is not very unusual, corresponding to a return period of about
5 years. With the piers of the bridge having supported many
other cyclonic events since 1880, experts thus had to explain
why the collapse happened in such ‘mundane’ circumstances.
Figure 5. The two bridges on the Saint-Etienne river (Binet, 2007)
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Periodic inspections previously carried out on the bridge had
not revealed any critical defect either on the deck or on the pier
shafts (made of basalt masonry and covered by a concrete cap
beam). On the other hand, the piers (with heights ranging from
7 to 13 m) had long been recognised as vulnerable to scour
because they were only based superficially on supporting soils
that had never been the subject of precise geotechnical
investigation, thus leading to uncertainties concerning exact
stability conditions of the piers (Binet, 2011).
The Ministry of Public Works initiated a technical assessment
because of the strategic importance of the bridge and the
catastrophic collapse. The report stated that the collapse was
due to scour at pier 7, followed by the collapse of the two
adjacent spans, which then induced the progressive collapse of
all other spans in a series mechanism. The other piers were
unable to support the horizontal pulling force induced by the
consecutive collapses due to their old masonry and/or defective
foundations (Binet et al., 2008), as illustrated in Figure 6.
The vulnerability of pier 7 was not judged critical at the time of
deck building (in 1993) but became so due to a combination of
two phenomena: deepening of the river bed due to excess
gravel extraction and lateral movements of the river channels.
After a previous flood in 2002 (cyclone Dina) certain piers were
considered for immediate protection, but pier 7, located rather
far away from the principal channel was not among them.
Gravel extraction downstream had then been prohibited by the
public authorities but the awareness that upstream extractions
also had an impact on the bridge came later, and the
effectiveness of police measures against illicit exploitation
was insufficient to restore the normal situation of a balanced
longitudinal average profile of the river. It was also clear that,
at the time of the collapse, pier 7 was in the main channel
(because of fluctuations of the river channels), but the level of
priority of its protection had not been updated.
Figure 6. Collapse of pier 2 and adjacent spans (Binet, 2007)
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In parallel with these general considerations, an analysis of the
position and state of bridge debris, supplemented by calcula-
tions, was carried out to try to understand the mechanism of
the collapse and draw conclusions for the design of new
bridges. Analysis of the debris showed that almost all the piers
collapsed by being drawn towards pier 7. During its fall to the
ground, the part of the deck between piers 6 and 8 pulled the
remainder of the deck horizontally. The sections of the deck
located between piers 6 and 8 moved towards pier 7, with a
displacement of about 1 m on the pier 6/8 supports. Such a
displacement induced a significant horizontal force at the top
of these piers by friction or blocking. Since the unreinforced
masonry piers were not able to resist the horizontal force
exerted at their top by the displacement of the deck, they
fractured and rocked (Binet et al., 2008).
The report stated that structures with important social and
economical stakes would merit a specific process management,
with regular updating of their vulnerability, particularly after
each important event. This reassessment should be the subject
of a pre-established procedure defining the nature of observa-
tions to be made and should include the obligation of a formal
decision by a person in charge at a suitable level on actions to
be enforced. This decision process must also apply to the
reassessment/rebuilding/reopening of structures that have been
damaged by a climatic event, because such events can recur.
4. A continuous improvement process
The three presented cases provided the opportunity to develop
a new approach for such problems. French public authorities
chose to make public the technical elements collected by
experts and conclusions, despite responsibility or confidenti-
ality constraints. Even if each case remains specific, it is easy to
understand that lessons can be learnt from each case and from
similar cases that have occurred around the world.
4.1 The forensic dance
The learning process after failures and catastrophic events has
been theorised by Duffey (2005). Figure 7 illustrates how
forensic engineering can be seen as participating in a whole
process: the ‘forensic dance’ (Wood, 2008). The four possible
uses of failure analysis are
& legal matters and responsibility
& research and improvement of knowledge
& education and learning
& improvement of standards and practices.
4.2 Improvement of knowledge
Case studies have a long history in the Anglo-Saxon world and
gave birth to rich specific literature. They are of value to
practitioners not only because they enrich technical expertise,
but also because they draw attention to ethical or juridical
Forensic Engineering
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Better standards Design
and regulation
Changing standards
Banning And practices
(asbestos,etc.)
Research (cost) Investigation
needs
(cost)
Conflict
Figure 7. Forensic dance (after Wood, 2008)
matters. Many civil engineering students have seen movie
footage of the Tacoma Bridge collapse of 1942. It remains the
most famous case of a new phenomenon being discovered due
to a failure: aero-elastic coupling (‘Von Karman whirls’) was
only fully understood many years after the event. Other
failures that have led to significant gains in knowledge include
the following.
& Several catastrophic steel bridge failures in the 1970s
occurred before major research programmes enabled
design codes to be developed to cover loading conditions
and the buckling of slender steel elements in box girders in
final design and progressive building stages.
& London’s Millennium Bridge and its sister, Solferino Bridge
in Paris, both with low lateral stiffness and inherent
damping, experienced discomforting vibrations that
revealed hitherto little known mechanical coupling phe-
nomena between pedestrians and a structure.
& The sudden failure of a metallic bar in Uster swimming pool
(Switzerland, 1985) initiated the consideration of stress
corrosion when the atmosphere contains a high concentra-
tion of chlorides and use of the correct grade of stainless
steel.
4.3 Improvement in practice
Failure analysis can also help to improve professional practice,
as illustrated by the following examples.
The sudden failure (fortunately without dramatic conse-
quences) of Ynys-y-Gwas Bridge in Wales in 1985 revealed
that the metallic cables of the prestressed structure were highly
corroded due to water and road salt penetrating the joints. The
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Contract
Building process
Education Use
Maintenance
Failure
failure had not been anticipated and the passage of many years
was necessary before UK authorities accepted the use of post-
tensioned concrete bridges, with additional requirements
regarding design and building.
Over the last 20 years, urban tunnels have provoked many
failures with, in some cases, dramatic consequences at the
surface for people and existing structures (e.g. Heathrow and
Munich in 1994, Taegu in South Korea in 2000, Meteor in
Paris in 2003, Nicoll highway in Singapore in 2004, Lane Cove
in Sydney in 2005 and Köln in 2009) either because the boring/
digging techniques were not well tested or because the risks
were not correctly considered (Breysse, 2010). These accidents
led insurers to ask for safety improvements and risk mitigation,
or insurance cover would be withdrawn. A collective change in
design and construction practice was necessary and this led to
the publication of several texts that better define ‘good
practice’ (e.g. ITIG, 2006).
4.4 Improvement in standards
Some failure events, often because of their high impact on the
general public or on political leaders, have resulted in substantial
research programmes and improvements in standards and
regulations. This was the case for seismic standards (the first
version of French standards followed the Orleansville–El
Asnam earthquake in 1954), fire safety in European tunnels
after dramatic accidents like that of the Mont Blanc tunnel in
1999 and, more recently, for pedestrian footbridges.
Concepts such as the importance of ‘structural robustness’,
which gives a structure some safety against localised failure,
were highlighted by the Ronan Point collapse in London in
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1967. At Ronan Point, a localised gas pipe burst on one of the
highest floors of the residential building and caused the cascade
collapse of the lower floors, showing the poor design of
prefabricated connections. This was also the case in a famous
storm that devastated France in December 1999 when steel
towers supporting electric cables collapsed in series because of
the destabilising effect induced by the collapse of the first
tower.
This concept was given more emphasis after the horrific
collapse of the World Trade Center in 2001, which led to an
additional requirement for engineers to prevent total collapse
even after an explosion. In all these cases, the priority is to
reduce the vulnerability of the structure and to ensure that a
level of safety is maintained (avoiding total and sudden
collapse) even in an accident situation.
4.5 Knowledge build-up and education
Teaching on the basis of lessons learned from past failures can
be very efficient. Failures or accidents can be used
& at a statistical level, since repeated occurrence
sometimes enables identification of laws and
quantification of occurrence probability
& at a qualitative level when a case is strong enough to
draw conclusions that cannot be forgotten
& at an intermediate level when apparently isolated
cases reveal, after thorough analysis, some generality that
makes it possible to go from particular to wider
conclusions with practical applications.
Delatte (2000) developed a case study database for learning
purposes. For each case, the (unique or multiple) cause(s) for
failure were identified and discussed, and the cases were thus
grouped into categories according to their causes. This concept
needs to be developed in many fields – roof collapse due to
snow overload, instability collapse (such as buckling), dis-
orders induced by tunnel work and accidents in temporary
work being a few examples.
5. Added value of failure databases and
possible developments
5.1 What can be learnt from databases
The development of failure databases facilitates organisation
of information, recording it for the future and disseminating it
worldwide. Databases have particular value in identifying
factors that give rise to disproportionate risk that only
becomes clear from the analysis of larger scale data as distinct
from individual cases.
The reporting system developed in the UK under the auspices
of Scoss (Standing committee for structural safety) spreads
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useful data while keeping facts confidential and offers a very
attractive way to add value to feedback. The Cross
(Confidential reporting on structural safety) process was
developed to reduce the number of accidents (or near-
accidents) involving structures and to improve reliability
throughout their service life. Cross involves getting feedback
from professionals (through confidential reports) and writing
reports when needed, in order to influence practice. All reports
are analysed by independent experts and, after deletion of
information in order to guarantee anonymity, they are
published. If facts emerge because similarities appear between
different reports, in-depth research programmes can be
developed.
Another database – not limited to civil engineering fields – is
being developed in Japan by Hatamura et al. (2003) (http://
www.shippai.jst.go.jp). The main question Hatamura asks is ‘is
it possible to develop useful and consistent models for failure,
from the analysis of unique cases, since they can be many but
also remain specific?’. The issue of bridging the gap between a
descriptive and naturalistic approach to case studies and a
generic approach has no easy answers. It is, however, the basis
of any scientific approach – being able to find invariants,
logical causalities, etc. upon which (deterministic or statistical)
rules will be identified.
Hatamura et al. (2003) has chosen to develop a three-step
logical model as in a fault-tree analysis – causes/actions/
consequences – in the form of three mandalas (in Buddhism,
mandalas symbolise the world in its totality). Each mandala
corresponds to a two-level classification and makes it possible,
for each individual case, to identify a pattern and thus a group
of cases to which it belongs. For instance, the mandala of
causes (Figure 8) contains ten classes at the first level of detail
and 27 classes at the second level. These classes are defined
according to the fact that the cause mainly comes from an
individual, an organisation, the societal context or that nobody
can be considered responsible (unknown or unpredictable
events).
This approach is too general to have direct application, but it
does provide a framework that can be applied to specific types
of structures (dams, bridges, tunnels, etc.) or situations. It will
thus be possible to consider more detail and obtain more
fundamental conclusions, both for statistical analysis of the
failure processes and for practical risk management.
Several other examples of files or databases exist, such as those
developed by Bailey et al. (2001) focusing on safety analysis of
bridges, Xu and Zhang (2009) devoted to modelling breaches
and floods on dams and Delatte (2000), which contains a very
limited number of in-depth analysed cases for teaching
Forensic Engineering Forensic engineering and
Volume 165 Issue FE2 collapse databases
Breysse

Individual is responsible Lacked prior research No one to blame

Lacked environment study
Misread situation
Misrecognition Lacked virtual exercise
Lacked
Wrong understanding analysis Environment changed
Economy changed
Narrow view
Misjudgement Change of
Ignored documents condition Lacked rights research

Poor communication Ignored Poor organisation

procedure Root Poor
Bad health cause of planning Poor strategy
failure
Lacked precaution
Careless Different culture
Bad
Poor understanding value Bad corporate culture
Ignored tradition Ignorance Bad Poor safety awareness
operation
Lacked knowledge Inflexible operation
Unknown Poor management
Abnormal
Discovery Poor staff Organisation is responsible
No one is responsible

Figure 8. Mandala of causes (after Hatamuras et al. 2003)

purposes. Other groups are also gathering information taking
an historical perspective, or focussing on a type of structure.
5.2 The start of forensic engineering in France
Forensic engineering in France does not have a long history. A
research group devoted to risk management in civil engineering
(MR-GenCi) was founded by the author in 2003 (http://www.
mrgenci.u-bordeaux1.fr/) and now more than 20 partners
(authorities, research teams, insurers) are involved in risk and
safety issues. However, there is still no collective effort devoted
to the gathering and analysis of failure or near-failure data.
The civil engineering profession, as a whole, is just beginning to
consider these issues and the reluctance to share and spread
information about problems and failures remains a significant
hurdle. Information is often said to be confidential, which is
sometimes true because of judicial matters.
French engineers and civil engineering students are not used to
considering failure events. It therefore seems important to open
up a new perspective by showing the value of a failure
database, with all possible improvements discussed in Section
4. Since no common failure database exists at the moment, the
following considerations are based on a first initiative
promoted by the author.
A prototype database is being developed from various sources
such as technical reports on case studies, existing databases
and information from the internet. The database presently
contains more than 650 cases. Tables 1 and 2 provide some
rough statistics about the cases for the period 2007–2010. The
high number of cases from Asia is mainly due to contributions
from China and India, where 38 and 49 failures have caused
about 650 and 450 fatalities respectively. It can be seen that the
statistical distribution between geographical areas or types of
structures is relatively stable across the years. However, several
weaknesses due to the data gathering process must be noted.
& One important source of data is the internet and press
releases. The problem here is not so much the reliability of
data as the often limited amount of technical data. The
quality of information in the database is thus very
heterogeneous.

Europe America Asia Africa Oceania Total

2007 8 17 20 6 — 51
2008 11 15 20 7 — 53
2009 20 22 48 9 1 100
2010 17 34 49 12 3 115

Table 1. Number of cases in the prototype database according to

geographical origin

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Buildings Bridgesa Roofs, domes Damsb Tunnels Other Total

2007 13 17 2 3 3 13 51
2008 20 15 2 3 2 11 53
2009 28 39 8 7 8 10 100
2010 40 26 12 15 12 10 115

a
Including footbridges
b
Including dykes and tailing dams

Table 2. Number of cases in the prototype database according to

type of structure

& The collection process consists mostly of continuous demolition works. For the first category of failures in service,
monitoring of news events (plus contacts with experts and Figure 9 shows statistics regarding the primary cause of failure
specific attention paid to ‘historical cases’). The conse- so far as it can be identified from the available data. The
quence of this is that the sampling process does not offer the numbers are, however, only indicative because, in many cases,
guarantee of representative sampling; for example, the failure resulted from a combination of excessive load and a
higher number of events for 2009 and 2010 is probably due given material condition, and lack of maintenance or defective
to increased reporting and research effort rather than to a design can also contribute to such a collapse. The graph shows
multiplication of failures. Another bias is due to sources: that in more than half of the cases, failure was due to excessive
English and French language sources are noted whereas loading either because of a climatic origin (like excessive wind
others are disregarded or ignored. or river surge) or traffic consequences (overloading or impact).
& Other choices can have consequences on sample representa- The ‘climatic’ category covers mainly flooding while ‘material’
tiveness, since a given flood or earthquake can cause the mainly covers problems of fatigue and ageing (corrosion,
collapse of many structures. In such cases, the choice is to creep, decay, etc.). Even if the statistics are only indicative, the
select only a few of those structures for the database. large variety of causes can be noted and this is particularly
valuable for teaching purposes.
For these reasons, the prototype database cannot yet be
considered as a reliable research tool but rather a demonstra- Another illustrative result is the creation of F–N curves, which
tive tool of what could be achieved once the organisational represent the annual probability of death after a structural
problems of collecting comprehensive reliable data are collapse (also called fatal accident rate (FAR)) as a function of
identified and solved.
1 10 100 1000
The database contains 223 cases of bridge failures, of which
5 10-8
169 were failures during service, 47 were failures during
construction and 7 were unexpected failures during repair or

40
35
Number of cases

30
F 5 10-9
25
20
15 Buidings
10 Dams
5 Bridges
0 Tunnels
ic

ad

ct

cs

re

us

n
ia

5 10-10
ig

w
at

pa

is
Fi
er

ni

rio
rlo

no
es
lim

al
ch
Im

at

N
va
ve

nd
D

nk
M
C

te

s-
O

Va

U
eo

er
G

th
O

Figure 10. F–N curves for four types of structures, from 276 events
Figure 9. Primary causes of failure for bridges in service in the prototype database

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Forensic Engineering
Volume 165 Issue FE2
1 10
5 10-7
F 5 10-8
Buidings
Dams
Bridges
Tunnels
5 10-9
Figure 11. F–N curves for four types of structures, from 276 events
in the prototype database assuming effective exposure ratios
the magnitude of the event (number of fatalities). The
probability value for each fatality number F is calculated by
dividing the cumulated number of victims due to events with at
least F victims by the number of years and the population at risk.
Such F–N curves are known to provide data (and guidelines for
decisions) regarding the acceptability of risk levels.
Figures 10 and 11 are built from events documented in the
prototype database, in which 473 events that resulted in 276
fatalities were selected for the period 1991–2010. The events
were classified into building failures (including roof and dome
collapses), bridge and footbridge failures, dam and tailing dam
failures, and tunnel failures. For these four types of events, the
number of documented events with fatalities is respectively
159, 74, 23 and 20. Figure 10 assumes that all the population is
equally at risk full-time. Figure 11 is a variant accounting for
an average exposure rate (the population at risk is not the
whole population or it is not at risk full-time). In this case, one
must assume a multiplying factor, to consider the effective
exposure ratio, which is respectively equal to 1, 0?1, 0?05 and
0?01 for the four types of structures. When comparing the two
figures, it can be seen that the result is very different since the
more dangerous structures in the first case (buildings) are the
safest in the second. Of course, assumptions on the effective
exposure ratio have a large influence on the results and must be
improved in further analysis.
Because of the prototype character of the database, these
results are only illustrative. One can, however, check that the
magnitude of the probability F, between 1?061028 and
5?061028, is typical for such sources of risk (Breysse,
2009b): a value of 1027 corresponds to about 6–7 fatalities
Forensic engineering and
collapse databases
Breysse
100 1000
N
each year for a reference at-risk population of 65 million
inhabitants such as in France.
Such curves can help regulators compare the real ‘safety level’
of different contexts (different countries or types of structures)
or compare performance (feedback) to safety objectives.
Further analyses are already possible, such as comparing the
level of risk between various types of countries or for certain
situations (e.g. during erection). In this case, the issue of
building safety overlaps that of building project risks, and a
database would be useful in understanding how collapses are
related to procurement conditions, supervision arrangements
or the local context (Morand et al., 2011).
6. Conclusions
Despite recent changes initiated by the public authorities and
research teams, forensic engineering is still in its infancy in
France. The interest of engineers and building companies in
risk management issues is increasing, although some reluctance
to share information remains. A first research project (Morand
et al., 2011) is devoted to preparing guidelines for better
managing risk in complex construction projects. The develop-
ment of forensic engineering practices and a failure database
will represent a wide field of progress.
Independent of cultural and psychological dimensions, one
main limit for the development of approaches based on
feedback is the data gathering process. It is thus important
to consider issues such as the data collection process (the type
of data to gather, validation process, etc.), organisation of the
database, access for specialists and/or the general public,
property and confidentiality (Breysse and Harouimi, 2007).
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Volume 165 Issue FE2
The process developed by Scoss could serve as a model and
common decision-making and collective efforts between all
parties (authorities, professionals, teachers) are possible and
would be fruitful.
A first step has been made with the creation of a committee of
risk management in building projects under the common
auspices of AFGC (French association of civil engineering)
and GIS MRGenCi (scientific group for risk management in
civil engineering). This committee aims to prepare guidelines
on methods and practices for better managing these risks. One
of its tasks has been, in relation with insurers, to discuss the
development of databases.
Acknowledgements
Thanks go to Jennifer Henry for her improvements to the
manuscript. The author also acknowledges Prof. Jonathan
Wood for his continuous and useful support.
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