SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 155336. November 25, 2004]

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

(CHREA) Represented by its President, MARCIAL A. SANCHEZ,
JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, respondent.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Can the Commission on Human Rights lawfully implement an upgrading and

reclassification of personnel positions without the prior approval of the Department of
Budget and Management?
Before this Court is a petition for review filed by petitioner Commission on Human
Rights Employees Association (CHREA) challenging the Decision [1] dated 29 November
2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 affirming the
Resolutions[2] dated 16 December 1999 and 09 June 2000 of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), which sustained the validity of the upgrading and reclassification of
certain personnel positions in the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) despite the
disapproval thereof by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Also
assailed is the resolution dated 11 September 2002 of the Court of Appeals denying the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
The antecedent facts which spawned the present controversy are as follows:
On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known
as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable
to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article XXXIII
covers the appropriations of the CHR. These special provisions state:

1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding and

within the limits of their respective appropriations as authorized in this Act, the
Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are authorized to
formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices, to
fix and determine the salaries, allowances, and other benefits of their personnel, and
whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in their personal services
itemization including, but not limited to, the transfer of item or creation of new
positions in their respective offices: PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose
positions are affected by such reorganization or adjustments shall be granted
retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance with existing laws, which shall
be payable from any unexpended balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their
respective offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the implementation hereof shall be
in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under
compensation standardization laws.

2. Use of Savings. The Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal

autonomy are hereby authorized to use savings in their respective appropriations for:
(a) printing and/or publication of decisions, resolutions, and training information
materials; (b) repair, maintenance and improvement of central and regional offices,
facilities and equipment; (c) purchase of books, journals, periodicals and equipment;
(d) necessary expenses for the employment of temporary, contractual and casual
employees; (e) payment of extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses, commutable
representation and transportation allowances, and fringe benefits for their officials and
employees as may be authorized by law; and (f) other official purposes, subject to
accounting and auditing rules and regulations. (Emphases supplied)

On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR, through its then Chairperson
Aurora P. Navarette-Recia and Commissioners Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Mercedes V.
Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo, and Jorge R. Coquia, promulgated Resolution No. A98-
047 on 04 September 1998, adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among
selected positions in the Commission, to wit:

WHEREAS, the General Appropriations Act, FY 1998, R.A. No. 8522 has provided
special provisions applicable to all Constitutional Offices enjoying Fiscal Autonomy,
particularly on organizational structures and authorizes the same to formulate and
implement the organizational structures of their respective offices to fix and determine
the salaries, allowances and other benefits of their personnel and whenever public
interest so requires, make adjustments in the personnel services itemization including,
but not limited to, the transfer of item or creation of new positions in their respective
offices: PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions are affected by
such reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and
separation pay in accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from any
unexpanded balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their respective offices;

WHEREAS, the Commission on Human Rights is a member of the Constitutional

Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) and on July 24, 1998, CFAG passed an approved
Joint Resolution No. 49 adopting internal rules implementing the special provisions
heretoforth mentioned;

NOW THEREFORE, the Commission by virtue of its fiscal autonomy hereby

approves and authorizes the upgrading and augmentation of the commensurate
amount generated from savings under Personal Services to support the
implementation of this resolution effective Calendar Year 1998;

Let the Human Resources Development Division (HRDD) prepare the necessary
Notice of Salary Adjustment and other appropriate documents to implement this
resolution; . . . .[3](Emphasis supplied)

Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of ten

additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for
the Caraga Regional Office, four Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five
Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners.  [4]
On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055 [5] providing for the
upgrading or raising of salary grades of the following positions in the Commission:
Position Salary Grade
Number Total Salary
of Requirements
Title
Positions
  From To From To  
12 Attorney VI Director IV 26 28 P229,104.00
(In the
Regional Field
Offices)
4 Director III 27 28 38,928.00
Director IV
1 24 28 36,744.00
Financial & Director IV
Management
Officer II
1 18 24 51,756.00
Budget Budget
Officer III Officer IV
1 18 24 51,756.00
Accountant Chief
III Accountant
1 18 24 51,756.00
Cashier III Cashier V
1 24 28 36,744.00[6]
Information Director IV
Officer V

It, likewise, provided for the creation and upgrading of the following positions:

A. Creation
 Position Title Salary Grade Total Salary
Number of
Requirements
Positions
4 15 684,780.00
Security Officer II
(Coterminous)

B. Upgrading

Number of Position Title Salary Grade Total Salary

Positions Requirements
  From To From To  
1 Attorney V Director IV 25 28 P28,092.00
2 Security 11 15 57,456.00
Security
Officer I
Officer II
        ------------------
 
Total 3       P 85,548.00[7]
 

To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution,
authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under
Personnel Services.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998, the CHR collapsed
the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing
modification. Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one
Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting Clerk II. [8]
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM
with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the
request on the following justification:

Based on the evaluations made the request was not favorably considered as it
effectively involved the elevation of the field units from divisions to services.

The present proposal seeks further to upgrade the twelve (12) positions of Attorney
VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28. This would elevate the field units to a bureau or
regional office, a level even higher than the one previously denied.

The request to upgrade the three (3) positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV,
SG-28, in the Central Office in effect would elevate the services to Office and change
the context from support to substantive without actual change in functions.
In the absence of a specific provision of law which may be used as a legal basis to
elevate the level of divisions to a bureau or regional office, and the services to offices,
we reiterate our previous stand denying the upgrading of the twelve (12) positions of
Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director III, SG-27 or Director IV, SG-28, in the Field
Operations Office (FOO) and three (3) Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28 in
the Central Office.

As represented, President Ramos then issued a Memorandum to the DBM Secretary

dated 10 December 1997, directing the latter to increase the number of Plantilla
positions in the CHR both Central and Regional Offices to implement the Philippine
Decade Plan on Human Rights Education, the Philippine Human Rights Plan and
Barangay Rights Actions Center in accordance with existing laws. (Emphasis in the
original)

Pursuant to Section 78 of the General Provisions of the General Appropriations Act

(GAA) FY 1998, no organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be
authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President, thus, the creation of a
Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office cannot be given favorable
recommendation.

Moreover, as provided under Section 2 of RA No. 6758, otherwise known as the

Compensation Standardization Law, the Department of Budget and Management is
directed to establish and administer a unified compensation and position classification
system in the government. The Supreme Court ruled in the case of Victorina Cruz vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119155, dated January 30, 1996, that this Department has
the sole power and discretion to administer the compensation and position
classification system of the National Government.

Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the
authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM.
While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the
organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation
of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the
parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System
established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation
Standardization Law. We therefore reiterate our previous stand on the matter.
[9]
 (Emphases supplied)

In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme,

the CSC-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum dated 29 March 1999,
recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected
owing to the DBMs disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
 Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and file
employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation
of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only
agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of
reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution dated 16
December 1999, and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the
upgrading scheme be censured. The decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the request of Ronnie N. Rosero, Hubert V. Ruiz, Flordeliza A.

Briones, George Q. Dumlao [and], Corazon A. Santos-Tiu, is hereby denied.[10]

CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the
same on 09 June 2000.
Given the cacophony of judgments between the DBM and the CSC, petitioner
CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading,
retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is
within the ambit of CHRs fiscal autonomy. The fallo of the Court of Appeals decision
provides:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is ordered DISMISSED

and the questioned Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 99-2800 dated
December 16, 1999 as well as No. 001354 dated June 9, 2000, are hereby
AFFIRMED. No cost.[11]

Unperturbed, petitioner filed this petition in this Court contending that:

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT UNDER

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ENJOYS
FISCAL AUTONOMY.

B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE

CONSTRUCTION OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 8522 (THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR 1998) DESPITE ITS BEING IN SHARP CONFLICT WITH THE 1987
CONSTITUTION AND THE STATUTE ITSELF.

C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE VALIDITY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
RESOLUTION NOS. 992800 AND 001354 AS WELL AS THAT OF THE
OPINION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN STATING THAT THE
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ENJOYS FISCAL AUTONOMY UNDER
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND THAT THIS FISCAL AUTONOMY INCLUDES
THE ACTION TAKEN BY IT IN COLLAPSING, UPGRADING AND
RECLASSIFICATION OF POSITIONS THEREIN.[12]

The central question we must answer in order to resolve this case is: Can the
Commission on Human Rights validly implement an upgrading, reclassification,
creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior
approval of the Department of Budget and Management?
Petitioner CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-Central Office
both erred in sanctioning the CHRs alleged blanket authority to upgrade, reclassify, and
create positions inasmuch as the approval of the DBM relative to such scheme is still
indispensable. Petitioner bewails that the CSC and the Court of Appeals erroneously
assumed that CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy insofar as financial matters are concerned,
particularly with regard to the upgrading and reclassification of positions therein.
Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no locus standi considering that
there exists no official written record in the Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona
fide organization of its employees nor is there anything in the records to show that its
president, Marcial A. Sanchez, Jr., has the authority to sue the CHR. The CHR
contends that it has the authority to cause the upgrading,
reclassification, plantilla creation, and collapsing scheme sans the approval of the DBM
because it enjoys fiscal autonomy.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments of both parties and an assiduous
scrutiny of the records in the case at bar, it is the Courts opinion that the present petition
is imbued with merit.
On petitioners personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that a
proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury
as a result of the act complained of. [13] Here, petitioner, which consists of rank and file
employees of respondent CHR, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions
benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission resulting to
the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test.
Indeed, the CHRs upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up
the Commissions savings or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for
Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the employees, including those in the
rank and file, are derived.
Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the CSC
when it took cognizance of the CHREAs request to affirm the recommendation of the
CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREAs personality to bring the suit was a non-
issue in the Court of Appeals when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither
should our hands be tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence
that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the court below cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of
fair play, justice, and due process.[14]
We now delve into the main issue of whether or not the approval by the DBM is a
condition precedent to the enactment of an upgrading, reclassification, creation and
collapsing of plantilla positions in the CHR.
Germane to our discussion is Rep. Act No. 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised
Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other
Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, dated 01 July 1989, which provides in
Sections 2 and 4 thereof that it is the DBM that shall establish and administer a unified
Compensation and Position Classification System. Thus:

SEC. 2. Statement of Policy. -- It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide
equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive
differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the
positions. In determining rates of pay, due regard shall be given to, among others,
prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. For this purpose, the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is hereby directed to establish and
administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System, hereinafter
referred to as the System as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended,
that shall be applied for all government entities, as mandated by the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied.)

SEC. 4. Coverage. The Compensation and Position Classification System herein

provided shall apply to all positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis,
now existing or hereafter created in the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations and government financial institutions.

The term government refers to the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial
Branches and the Constitutional Commissions and shall include all, but shall not be
limited to, departments, bureaus, offices, boards, commissions, courts, tribunals,
councils, authorities, administrations, centers, institutes, state colleges and
universities, local government units, and the armed forces. The term government-
owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall include all
corporations and financial institutions owned or controlled by the National
Government, whether such corporations and financial institutions perform
governmental or proprietary functions. (Emphasis supplied.)

The disputation of the Court of Appeals that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of
the Salary Standardization Law is flawed considering that the coverage thereof, as
defined above, encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.
 This power to administer is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by
the Court of Appeals. The word to administer means to control or regulate in behalf of
others; to direct or superintend the execution, application or conduct of; and to manage
or conduct public affairs, as to administer the government of the state.[15]
The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only
in law, but in jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of Philippine Retirement Authority
(PRA) v. Jesusito L. Buag,[16] this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Reynato Puno,
ruled that compensation, allowances, and other benefits received by PRA officials and
employees without the requisite approval or authority of the DBM
are unauthorized and irregular. In the words of the Court

Despite the power granted to the Board of Directors of PRA to establish and fix a
compensation and benefits scheme for its employees, the same is subject to the review
of the Department of Budget and Management. However, in view of the express
powers granted to PRA under its charter, the extent of the review authority of the
Department of Budget and Management is limited. As stated in Intia, the task of the
Department of Budget and Management is simply to review the compensation and
benefits plan of the government agency or entity concerned and determine if the same
complies with the prescribed policies and guidelines issued in this regard. The role of
the Department of Budget and Management is supervisorial in nature, its main duty
being to ascertain that the proposed compensation, benefits and other incentives to be
given to PRA officials and employees adhere to the policies and guidelines issued in
accordance with applicable laws.

In Victorina Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[17] we held that the DBM has the sole power
and discretion to administer the compensation and position classification system of the
national government.
In Intia, Jr. v. Commission on Audit,[18] the Court held that although the charter [19] of
the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) grants it the power to fix the compensation and
benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverage of the rules and
regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification Office, by virtue of Section
6 of P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system established by the PPC is, nonetheless,
subject to the review of the DBM. This Court intoned:

It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting
the compensation structure of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the
DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and deprive the latter of its
discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBMs function is merely to ensure that the action
taken by the Board of Directors complies with the requirements of the law,
specifically, that PPCs compensation system conforms as closely as possible with that
provided for under R.A. No. 6758. (Emphasis supplied.)
 As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of
the DBM must first be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or
upgrading of positions in government. This is consonant to the mandate of the DBM
under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:

SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The Department of Budget and Management shall
assist the President in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget,
preparation, execution and control of the National Budget, preparation and
maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of
more economy and efficiency in the management of government
operations, administration of compensation and position classification systems,
assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative
proposals having budgetary or organizational implications. (Emphasis supplied.)

Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading,
reclassification, and creation of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its
finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.
Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve
the proposed reclassification of positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM
requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped from now claiming that the nod
of approval it has previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity.
The Court of Appeals incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central
Office that the CHR is a constitutional commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.
[20]

Palpably, the Court of Appeals Decision was based on the mistaken premise that
the CHR belongs to the species of constitutional commissions. But, Article IX of the
Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions
with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy. Thus:

Sec. 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, in Chapter 5, Sections 24 and 26 of
Book II on Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional commissions shall
include only the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit, which are granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In
contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to the
other bodies including the CHR. Thus:
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall
be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and
the Commission on Audit.

SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal

autonomy. The approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly
released.

SEC. 29. Other Bodies. There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office

of the Ombudsman, a Commission on Human Rights, and independent central
monetary authority, and a national police commission. Likewise, as provided in the
Constitution, Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agency.
(Emphasis ours.)

From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that
the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-
repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one
person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium
facit cessare tacitum what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.[21]
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal
autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and
limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize
funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch
its needs may require from time to time. [22] In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,
[23]
 it is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman,
which enjoy fiscal autonomy. Thus, in Bengzon,[24] we explained:

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections,
and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to
allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates
of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation
and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be
provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their
functions.

...

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional
offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to
fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but
especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of
powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the
interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, [the] Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant
reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease
to be a meaningless provision. (Emphasis supplied.)

Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional
Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal
autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by membership.
We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited
under the heading of the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those offices
to which the special provision to formulate and implement organizational structures
apply, but merely states its coverage to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices
enjoying fiscal autonomy. In contrast, the Special Provision Applicable to the Judiciary
under Article XXVIII of the General Appropriations Act of 1998 specifically mentions that
such special provision applies to the judiciary and had categorically authorized the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court to formulate and implement the organizational structure of
the Judiciary, to wit:

1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding and

within the limits of their respective appropriations authorized in this Act, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court is authorized to formulate and implement organizational
structure of the Judiciary, to fix and determine the salaries, allowances, and other
benefits of their personnel, and whenever public interest so requires, make
adjustments in the personal services itemization including, but not limited to, the
transfer of item or creation of new positions in the Judiciary; PROVIDED, That
officers and employees whose positions are affected by such reorganization or
adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance
with existing law, which shall be payable from any unexpended balance of, or savings
in the appropriations of their respective offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the
implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other
benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws. (Emphasis supplied.)

All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not
included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative
fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the
stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government
offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. We are of the
same mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thus-
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the
authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM.
While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the
organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation of
their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the
parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System
established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation
Standardization Law.[25] (Emphasis supplied.)

The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision
of Rep. Act No. 8522 that the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary
rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation standardization
laws.[26]
Indeed, the law upon which respondent heavily anchors its case upon has expressly
provided that any form of adjustment in the organizational structure must be within the
parameters of the Salary Standardization Law.
The Salary Standardization Law has gained impetus in addressing one of the basic
causes of discontent of many civil servants. [27] For this purpose, Congress has
delegated to the DBM the power to administer the Salary Standardization Law and to
ensure that the spirit behind it is observed. This power is part of the system of checks
and balances or system of restraints in our government. The DBMs exercise of such
authority is not in itself an arrogation inasmuch as it is pursuant to the paramount law of
the land, the Salary Standardization Law and the Administrative Code.
In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization
Law of providing equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay
upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification
requirements of the positions, the DBM, in the case under review, made a
determination, after a thorough evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading
scheme proposed by the CHR lacks legal rationalization.
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions of the General
Appropriations Act FY 1998, which the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its
reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that no organizational unit or changes in key
positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President . Here,
the DBM discerned that there is no law authorizing the creation of a Finance
Management Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHRs proposal to
upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and four positions
of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the DBM denied the
same as this would change the context from support to substantive without actual
change in functions.
This view of the DBM, as the laws designated body to implement and administer a
unified compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative
government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect
and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v.
Court of Appeals,[28] we echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of
such agencies.
To be sure, considering his expertise on matters affecting the nations coffers, the
Secretary of the DBM, as the Presidents alter ego, knows from where he speaks
inasmuch as he has the front seat view of the adverse effects of an unwarranted
upgrading or creation of positions in the CHR in particular and in the entire government
in general.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision dated 29 November 2001 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 and its Resolution dated 11 September
2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling dated 29 March 1999 of the
Civil Service Commision-National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The Commission on
Human Rights Resolution No. A98-047 dated 04 September 1998, Resolution No. A98-
055 dated 19 October 1998 and Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998
without the approval of the Department of Budget and Management are disallowed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Acting C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 36-50; Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Andres
B. Reyes, Jr. and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring.
[2]
 Id. at 37.
[3]
 Id. at 51-52.
[4]
 Id. at 53-56.
[5]
 Id. at 54.
[6]
 Id.
[7]
 Id. at 55.
[8]
 Id. at 57.
[9]
 Id. at 62-63.
[10]
 Id. at 37.
[11]
 Id. at 47.
[12]
 Id. at 19-20.
[13]
 Cruz, Philippine Political Law 243 (1996 ed.), citing Ex Parte Lewitt, 303 U.S. 633.
[14]
 EASCO v. LTFRB, G.R. No. 149717, 07 October 2003, 413 SCRA 75.
[15]
 Philippine Law Dictionary 21 (2nd ed.), citing Caw v. Benedicto, 63 OG 3393; 8 C.A.R. (2s) 814.
[16]
 G.R. No. 143784, 05 February 2003, 397 SCRA 27, 35.
[17]
 G.R. No. 119155, 30 January 1996, 252 SCRA599.
[18]
 G.R. No. 131529, 30 April 1999, 306 SCRA 593, 609.
[19]
 Rep. Act No. 7354 (1992).
[20]
 Rollo, p. 46.
[21]
 Canet v. Decena, G.R. No. 155344, 20 January 2004, 420 SCRA 388.
[22]
 Blaquera v. Alcala, G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, 112056 and 119597, 11 September 1998, 295
SCRA 366.
[23]
 Id.; Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133.
[24]
 Id.
[25]
 Rollo, p. 63.
[26]
 Article XXXIII, Rep. Act No. 8522, Special Provisions Applicable to all Constitutional Offices Enjoying
Fiscal Autonomy.
[27]
 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, p. 243 (1996 Ed).
[28]
 G.R. No. 113079, 20 April 2001, 357 SCRA 30, citing Nestle v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86738, 13
November 1991, 203 SCRA 504.