[G.R. No. 15025. March 15, 1920.

In Re: REMIGIA SAGUINSIN, deceased. ARCADIO DEL ROSARIO, Applicant-Appellant, JOSE A. DEL

PRADO, ET AL., Legatees-Appellants, v. RUFINA SAGUINSIN, Opponent-Appellee.

1. WILLS, REQUISITES OF; NECESSITY OF SIGNING LEFT MARGIN OF EACH PAGE OF A WHO; "FOLIOS"
OR "HOJAS," AND PAGE DISTINGUISHED; SECTION 618 OF ACT NO. 190 AS AMMENDED BY ACT No.
2645, INTERPRETED. — Section 618 of Act No. 190 as amended by Act No. 2646 provides that: "No will,
except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or
affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by the
testator’s name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attended and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The testator or
the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used,
upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused
some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the
latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other."

2.— Held: That under the provisions of said law no will shall be valid, except as provided in the preceding
section, unless the testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of
the will shall also sign each and every page of the will on the left margin of each page, in addition to their
signatures at the end of the will; that when the will is written on both sides of the sheet, then and in that case the
testator and witnesses must also sign on the left margin of each page; that the phrase "hojas o folios," used in
the Spanish term of the law, must be interpreted to mean each page of the sheet upon which the will is written,
where it is written on both sides of the same sheet.

FACTS:

There was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for allowance an instrument which the
petitioner calls the will of Remigia Saguinsin. It is a manuscript signed by the alleged testatrix and three
witnesses on October 3, 1918, the conclusion of which says:

"I, the testatrix, sign in the presence of the witnesses this will written by D. Lino Mendoza at my request and
under my direction."— Then follows a signature and then these expressions: "The testatrix signed in our
presence and each of us signed in the presence of the others." "Witness who wrote this will at the request and
under the free and voluntary personal direction of the testatrix herself (Sgd.) Lino Mendoza — "Attesting
witnesses." Then come three signatures.

These three signatures together with that of the alleged testatrix are written also on the left margin of the first
page or folio and on the third page or second folio, but not on the second page or reverse side of the first page
where, as is seen, the manuscript is continued, the second folio not containing anything but the date and the end
of the manuscript.

Under these conditions the instrument was impugned by a sister of the alleged testatrix and after the taking of
the declaration of the authors of the signatures which appear three times and in different parts of the manuscript,
the court declared that the document attached to the record could not be allowed as a will.

Certain persons who allege themselves to be legatees appealed jointly with the lawyer for the petitioner.

And upon considering the case on appeal, this court decides:

That, in conformity with Act No. 2645, amendatory to section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the concluding
part of the will does not express what that law, under pain of nullity, requires. Section 618, as amended, says:

"The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used upon which the will is written." None of these
requirements appear in the attesting clause at the end of the document presented. The second page, i. e., what
is written on the reverse side of the first, engenders the doubt whether what is written thereon was ordered
written by the alleged testatrix or was subsequently added by the same hand that drew the first page and the
date that appears on the third. With this non-fulfillment alone of Act No. 2645 it is impossible to allow the so-
called will which violates said law.
That besides this violation there is another as evident as the preceding. Said Act No. 2645 provides: "The
testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will shall also
sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet."

The English text differs from the Spanish text: the former says only pages (paginas) while the latter puts (hojas).
"Hoja," according to the Diccionano de la Academia, "is with respect to books or notebooks folio." According to
the same dictionary "pagina (page) is each one of the two faces or planes of the leaf of a book or notebook: that
which is written or printed on each page, for example I have read only two pages of this book." Two pages
constitute one leaf. One page represents only one-half of one leaf.

The English text requires that the signature which guarantees the genuineness of the testament shall be placed
on the left hand margin of each page and that each page should be numbered by letter in the upper part this
requirement is entirely lacking on the second page that is, on the reverse side of the first. According to the old
method of paging "folio 1 1/2 y su vto." that is, first folio and the reverse side, should have been stated, and the
second page would then have been included in the citation. By; the failure to comply with this, requisite the law
has been obviously violated. In the English text the word "pages" does not leave any room for doubt and it is
invariably used in the text of the law, whereas in the Spanish text, "hoja" and "pagina" are used indifferently as
may be seen in the following part which says: "El atestiguamiento hara constar el numero de hojas o paginas
utiles en que esta extendido el testamento." This failure to comply with the law also vitiates the will and
invalidates it, as the second page is lacking in authenticity.

This is a defect so radical that there is no way by which what is written on the reverse side of the first folio may
be held valid. It is possible that this document consists of only the two folios numbered 1 and 2, and that on the
reverse side of number 1 nothing may have been written upon the order of the testatrix, the testament ending at
the foot of the first folio with the legacy "To my nephew Catalino Ignacio, P200" (A mi sobrino Catalino Ignacio
doscientos pesos) and from that part then immediately follows folio No. 2 — "Manila a tres de Octubre de mil
novecientos diez y ocho. — Yo la testadora firmo en presencia etc." (Manila, October 3, 1918. — I, the testatrix,
sign in the presence of etc.)

 There is nothing which guarantees all the contents of page 2. The margin of this page is absolutely
blank. There is nothing which gives the assurance that the testatrix ordered the insertion of all the
contents of page 2. It may very well be that it was subsequently added thereby substituting the will of the
testatrix, a result for the prevention of which this manner of authenticity by affixing the signature on each
page and not merely on each folio was provided for by law.

 This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the signatures guaranteeing
authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three pages having been written, the authenticity of
all three of them should be guaranteed with the signatures of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses.
The English text which requires the signing of pages and not merely leaves or folios should prevail. It is
so provided in section 15 of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2711).

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs of this instance against the Appellant.

G.R. No. L-21151; February 25, 1924

In re will of Antonio Vergel de Dios, deceased.

RAMON J. FERNANDEZ, petitioner-appellant, HERMELO VERGEL DE DIOS and SEVERINA
JAVIER, legatees-appellants, vs. FERNANDO VERGEL DE DIOS, ET AL., opponents-appellees.

The question in this case is as to the validity of the document Exhibit A as a will, which was propounded by
Ramon J. Fernandez for probate, and contested by Fernando Vergel de Dios and Francisco, Ricardo and Virgilio
Rustia, the court of First Instance of Manila having denied its probate. The applicant takes this appeal, assigning
error to the action of the lower court in holding the attestation fatally defective and in not finding Act No. 2645
void.

The defects attributed to the will by the contestants are as follows, to wit:
(a) It was not sufficiently proven that the testator knew the contents of the will.
(b) The testator did not sign all the pages of the will.
(c) He did not request anybody to attest the document as his last will.
(d) He did not sign it in the presence of any witness.
 (e) The witnesses did not sign it in the presence of the testator, or of each other, nor with knowledge on
the part of the testator that they were signing his will.
(f) The witnesses did not sign the attestation clause before the death of the testator.
(g) This clause was written after the execution of the dispositive part of the will and was attached to the
will after the death of the testator.
(h) The signatures of the testator on page 3 of Exhibit A are not authentic.

The evidence sufficiently shows that when Attorney Lopez Lizo read the will to the testator, the latter's mind was
perfectly sane and he understood it:

 that he signed all the pages of the will proper, although he did not sign the page containing the attestation
clause;
 that while he did not personally call the witnesses, yet the latter were invited by Attorney Lopez Lizo to act as
such in his presence.

The law does not require that the testator precisely be the person to request the witnesses to attest his will. It
was also sufficiently established in the record, beside being stated in the attestation clause,

 that the testator signed the will in the presence of the three witnesses and that the latter, in turn, signed it
in the presence of the testator and of each other, the testator knowing that the witnesses were signing
his will;
 that the witnesses signed the attestation clause before the death of the testator;
 that this clause, with the names of the witnesses in blank, was prepared before the testator signed the
will, and
 that the sheet containing said clause, just as those of the will proper, was a loose sheet, and that all the
four sheets of which the will Exhibit A was actually composed were kept together and are the very ones
presented in this case; and finally,
 that the signatures of the testator on page 3 of said exhibit are authentic.

It thus appearing from the record that there are no such defects as those mentioned by the opponents, and it
having been proven that the testator executed said will in a language known by him and consciously, freely and
spontaneously, it would seen unnecessary to go further, and the matter might be brought to a close right here,
by holding the will in question valid and allowable to probate, were it not for the fact that the trial court and the
opponents questioned the sufficiency and validity of the attestation clause because the sheet on which it is
written is not numbered, and it is not stated there that the testator signed on the margin of each sheet of the will
in the presence of the three witnesses, or that the latter signed it is the presence of the testator and of each
other, and specially because said attestation clause is not signed by the testator either at the margin or the
bottom thereof.

As to the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation clause, it is true that it does not appeal on the upper
part of the sheet, but it does not appear in its text, the pertinent part of which is copied hereinafter, with the
words, having reference to the number of sheets of the will, underscored, including the page number of the
attestation:

* * * We certify that the foregoing document written in Spanish, a language known by the testator
Antonino Vergel de Dios, consisting of three sheet actually used, correlatively enumerated, besides this
sheet . . . .

If, as stated in this clause, the foregoing document consists of three sheets, besides that of the clause itself,
which is in singular, it is clear that such a sheet of the attestation clause is the fourth and that the
will, including said sheet, has four sheets. This description contained in the clause in question constitutes
substantial compliance with the requirements prescribed by the law regarding the paging. So it was held by this
Court in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), where the sheet containing the attestation, as well as
the preceding one, was also not paged. Furthermore the law, as we shall see later on, does not require that the
sheet containing nothing but the attestation clause, wholly or in part, be numbered or paged. Consequently this
lack of paging on the attestation sheet does not take anything from the validity of the will.

Turning now to the question whether or not in this clause it is stated that the testator signed on the margin of
each sheet of the will, in the presence of the witnesses and the latter in the presence of each other, let us see
what is said in said clause on this point, and to this end its pertinent part is hereinafter transcribed and is as
follows:
 * * * and he (the testator) signed at the bottom of the aforesaid will in our presence and we at his request
did the same in his presence and in that of each other as witnesses to the will, and lastly, the testator, as
well as we, as witnesses, signed in the same manner on the left margin of each sheet.
The underscored phrase "in the same manner" cannot in the instant case mean, and it in fact means nothing,
but that the testator and the witnesses signed on the left margin of each sheet of the will "in the same manner" in
which they signed at the bottom thereof, that is, the testator in the presence of the witnesses and the latter in the
presence of the testator and of each other.

 This phrase in the same manner cannot, in view of the context of the pertinent part, refer to another
thing, and was used here as a suppletory phrase to include everything and avoid the repetition of a long
and difficult one, such as what is meant by it.
 The same section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in order to avoid the repetition of the same long
phrase about the testator having signed in the presence of the witnesses and the latter in the presence
of each other, resorts to a similar expression in the second paragraph and says, "as aforesaid."

Concerning the absolute absence of the signature of the testator from the sheet containing the attestation
clause, this point was already decided in the above cited case of Abangan vs. Abangan, where this court held
that:

The testator's signature is not necessary in the attestation clause because this, as its name implies,
appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator.

In that case of Abangan vs. Abangan it was held that the signature of the testator is not necessary in the
attestation clause, but the theory is not announced that such a clause is unnecessary to the validity to the will.

For this reason such doctrine does not annul the judgment in the case of Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil.,
405), where in effect the doctrine, among others, was laid down that the attestation clause is necessary to the
validity of the will. One of the points on which greatest stress was laid in that case Uy Coque is that the
requirements of the law regarding the number of the pages used, the signing of the will and of each of its pages
by the testator in the presence of three witnesses, and the attestation and signing of the will and of each of its
pages by the witnesses in the presence of each other cannot be proven aliunde but by the attestation clause
itself which must express the compliance of the will with such requirements. But it was not held in that case of
Uy Coque that the signature of the testator was necessary in the attestation clause, nor was such point
discussed there, which was the point at issue in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan, supra.

The appellees, however, argue that such clause in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan begins at the bottom and
on the same sheet in which the testamentary provision terminated, that is to say, the will properly speaking.
Even then if it is intended to commit misrepresentation or fraud, which are the things that with the requirements
of the law for the making and attesting of wills it is intended to avoid, it is just the same that the clause; as in the
case of Abangan vs. Abangan, begins at the bottom of the will properly speaking, as, like the case before us, it is
wholly contained in a separate sheet. The fact is that this separate sheet, containing the attestation clause
wholly or in part, is not signed any place by the testator in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan, as it is not in the
present case.

Section 618 of the code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, contains three paragraphs, of which
the first enumerates in general terms the requirements to be met by a will executed after said Code took effect,
to wit, that the language or dialect in which it is written be known by the testator, that it be signed by the latter or
by another person in the name of the testator by his express direction and in his presence, and that it be attested
and signed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other.

These general rules are amplified in the next two paragraphs as to the special requirements for the execution of
the will by the testator and the signing thereof by the witnesses, with which the second paragraph of the section
deals, and as to the attestation clause treated in the third and last paragraph of said section 618.

For this reason the second paragraph of this section 618 says:
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will,
shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet.

These are the solemnities that must surround the execution of the will properly speaking, without any reference
whatsoever to the attestation clause not treated in this second paragraph. It is in this second paragraph which
deals only with the will (without including the attestation clause), that the signature or name of the testator and
those of the witnesses are mentioned as necessary on the left margin of each and everyone of the sheets of the
will (not of the attestation clause), as well as the paging of said sheet (of the will, and not of the attestation
clause which is not yet spoken of).

Now, are the signatures of the testator and the paging of the will also necessary in the attestation clause?

Let us see the last paragraph of this section 618 of the Code which already deals with the requirements for the
attestation clause. This last paragraph reads thus:

The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the
fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.

As may be seen this last paragraph refers to the contents of the text of the attestation, not the requirements or
signatures thereof outside of its text. It does not require that the attestation be signed by the testator or that the
page or sheet containing it be numbered.

From this analysis of our law now in force it appears:

(1) First. That the will must have an attestation clause as a complement, without which it cannot be probate
and with which only not aliunde (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca , supra) may the requirements to be stated
in its text be proven. The attestation clause must be prepared and signed, as in the instant case, on the
same occasion on which the will is prepared and signed, in such a way that the possibility of fraud, deceit
or suppression of the will or the attestation clause be reduced to a minimum; which possibility always
exists, as experience shows, in spite of the many precautions taken by the legislator to insure the true and
free expression of one's last will.

(2) Second. That the will is distinct and different from the attestation, although both are necessary to the
validity of the will, similar, in our opinion, to a document which is not public so long as it is not
acknowledged before a notary, the document being a distinct and different thing from the
acknowledgment, each of which must comply with different requisites, among which is the signature of the
maker which is necessary in the document but not in the acknowledgment and both things being
necessary to the existence of the public document.

(3) Third. That the will proper must meet the requirements enumerated in the second paragraph of section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(4) Fourth. That the text of the attestation clause must express compliance with the requirements prescribed
for the will.

In the case at bar the attestation clause in question states that the requirements prescribed for the will were
complied with, and this is enough for it, as such attestation clause, to be held as meeting the requirements
prescribed by the law for it.

The fact that in said clause the signature of the testator does not appear does not affect its validity, for, as above
stated, the law does not require that it be signed by the testator.

We find no merit in the assignment of error raising the question as to the validity of Act No. 2645, which is valid.
For the purposes of this decision, it is not necessary to reason out this conclusion, it being sufficient for the
adjudication of this case to hold the first error assigned by the appellants to have been demonstrated.

The foregoing conclusions lead us to hold, as we do here by hold, that the documents Exhibit A, as the last will
and testament of the deceased Antonio Vergel de Dios, meets all the requirements prescribed by the low now in
force and therefore it must be allowed to probate as prayed for by the petitioner.

The judgment appealed from is reversed, and it is ordered that the lower court proceed with the probate of the will Exhibit A in
accordance with law, without express pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
 [G.R. No. L-18979. June 30, 1964.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTA. CELSO ICASIANO, Petitioner-
Appellee, v. NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, Oppositors-Appellants.

1. WILLS; PROBATE; POLICY OF COURT AGAINST UNDUE CURTAILMENT OF TESTAMENTARY PRIVILEGE. —

The precedents cited in the case at bar exemplify the Court’s policy to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in
the probate of a will in order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the
testamentary privilege.

2. HANDWRITING EXPERT MUST HAVE SUFFICIENT STANDARDS OF COMPARISON TO PROVE FORGERY

OF TESTATRIX’S SIGNATURE. — The opinion of a handwriting expert trying to prove forgery of the testatrix’s
signature fails to convince the court, not only because it is directly contradicted by another expert but principally
because of the paucity of the standards used by him (only three other signatures), considering the advanced age of
the testatrix, the evident variability of her signature, and the effect of writing fatigue.

3. VARIANCE IN INK COLOR NOT RELIABLE WHEN WRITINGS AFFIXED TO DIFFERENT KINDS OF PAPER. —
The slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and questioned signatures does not appear reliable,
considering that the standard and challenged writings were affixed to different kinds of paper.

4. FRAUD OF UNDUE INFLUENCE, DIVERSITY OF APPORTIONMENT AND PROHIBITION AGAINST CONTEST

NO EVIDENCE OF. — Neither diversity of apportionment nor prohibition against contest is evidence of fraud or undue
influence in the execution of a will.

5. FRAUD AND UNDUE INFLUENCE ARE REPUGNANT ALLEGATIONS. — Allegation of fraud and undue influence
are mutually repugnant and exclude each other; their joining as grounds for opposing probate shows absence of
definite evidence against the validity of the will.

6. INADVERTENT FAILURE OF AN ATTESTING WITNESS TO AFFIX HIS SIGNATURE TO ONE PAGE OF A WILL
NOT FATAL. — The inadvertent failure of an attesting witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to
the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate.

7. SIGNED CARBON DUPLICATE OF WILL NEEDS NO PUBLICATION. — That the signed carbon duplicate of a will
was produced and admitted without a new publication does not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, already
conferred by the original publication of the petition for probate, where the amended petition did not substantially alter
the first one filed but merely supplemented it by disclosing the existence of said duplicate.

FACTS:

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila admitting to probate the document and its duplicate,
marked as Exhibits "A" and "A-1", as the true last will and testament of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and appointing as
executor Celso Ino, the person named therein as such. This special proceeding was begun on October 2, 1958 by a
petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the original, Exhibit "A" as the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte,
deceased, and for the appointment of petitioner Celso Ino as executor thereof.

The court set the proving of the alleged will for November 8, 1958, and caused notice thereof to be published for three
(3) successive weeks, previous to the time appointed, in the newspaper "Manila Chronicle", and also caused personal
service of copies thereof upon the known heirs.

On October 31, 1958, Natividad Ino, a daughter of the testatrix, filed her opposition; and on November 10, 1958, she
petitioned to have herself appointed as a special administrator, to which proponent objected. Hence, on November 18,
1958, the court issued an order appointing the Philippine Trust Company as special administrator.

On February 18, 1959, Enrique Ino, a son of the testatrix, also filed a manifestation adopting as his own Natividad’s
opposition to the probate of the alleged will.

On March 19, 1959, the petitioner proponent commenced the introduction of his evidence; but on June 1, 1959, he
filed a motion for the admission of an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent left a will
executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he was, on that date, submitting the signed duplicate
(Exhibit "A-1"), which he allegedly found only on or about May 26, 1959. On June 17, 1959, oppositors Natividad Ino
de Gomez and Enrique Ino filed their joint opposition to the admission of the amended and supplemental petition, but
by order of July 20, 1959, the court admitted said petition; and on July 30, 1959, oppositor Natividad Ino filed her
amended opposition. Thereafter, the parties presented their respective evidence, and after several hearings the court
issued the order admitting the will and its duplicate to probate. From this order, the oppositors appealed directly to this
Court, the amount involved being over P200,000.00, on the ground that the same is contrary to law and the evidence.
The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect that Josefa Villacorte died in the City of Manila on
September 12, 1958; that on June 2, 1956, the late Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and testament in
duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa Ino at Pedro Guevara Street, Manila, published before and
attested by three instrumental witnesses, namely; attorneys Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and Dr.
Vinicio B. Diy;
 that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said three instrumental witnesses on the same
date before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong, Notary Public in and for the City of Manila; and
 that the will was actually prepared by attorney Fermin Samson, who was also present during the
execution and signing of the decedent’s last will and testament, together with former Governor Emilio
Rustia of Bulacan, Judge Ramon Ino, and a little girl.

Of the said three instrumental witnesses to the execution of the decedent’s last will and testament attorneys
Torres and Natividad were in the Philippines at the time of the hearing, and both testified as to the due execution
and authenticity of the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom the will was acknowledged by the testatrix
and attesting witnesses, and also attorney Fermin Samson, who actually prepared the document. The latter also
testified upon cross examination that he prepared one original and two copies of Josefa Villacorte’s last will and
testament at his house in Baliuag, Bulacan, but he brought only one original and one signed copy to Manila,
retaining one unsigned copy in Bulacan.

The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously with the filing of the petition
and marked as Exhibit "A", consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it does not
contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three (3) thereof; but the
duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition and marked as Exhibit "A-1" is signed by the
testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.

The testimony presented by the proponents of the will tends to show that the original of the will and its duplicate
were subscribed at the end and on the left margin of each and every page thereof by the testatrix herself and
attested and subscribed by the three mentioned witnesses in the testatrix’s presence and in that of one another
as witnesses (except for the missing signature of attorney Natividad on page three (3) of the original; that pages
of the original and duplicate of said will were duly numbered; that the attestation clause thereof contains all the
facts required by law to be recited therein and is signed by the aforesaid attesting witnesses; that the will is
written in the language known to and spoken by the testatrix; that the attestation clause is in a language also
known to and spoken by the witnesses; that the will was executed on one single occasion in duplicate copies;
and that both the original and the duplicate copy were duly acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Oyengco
Ong of Manila on the same date — June 2, 1956.

Witness Natividad, who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original, admits that he may have
lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was signed in his
presence.

Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of the testatrix in the
duplicate (Exhibit A-1) are not genuine, nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as the original,
and further aver that granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed through mistake and with
undue influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived into adopting as her last will and testament
the wishes of those who will stand to benefit from the provisions of the will, as may be inferred from the facts and
circumstances surrounding the execution of the will and the provisions and dispositions thereof, whereby
proponents- appellees stand to profit from properties held by them as attorneys- in-fact of the deceased and not
enumerated or mentioned therein, while oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for other properties not
mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free
disposal.

We have examined the record and are satisfied, as the trial court was, that the testatrix signed both original and
duplicate copies (Exhibits "A" and "A-1", respectively) of the will spontaneously, on the same occasion, in the
presence of the three attesting witnesses, the notary public who acknowledged the will, and Atty. Samson, who
actually prepared the documents; that the will and its duplicate were executed in Tagalog, a language known to
and spoken by both the testator and the witnesses, and read to and by the testatrix and Atty. Fermin Samson
together before they were actually signed; that the attestation clause is also in a language known to and spoken
by the testatrix and the witnesses.

The opinion of expert for oppositors, Mr. Felipe Logan, that the signatures of the testatrix appealing in the
duplicate original were not written by the same hand, which wrote the signatures in the original will leaves us
unconvinced, not merely because it is directly contradicted by expert Martin Ramos for the proponents, but
principally because of the paucity of the standards used by him to support the conclusion that the differences
between the standard and questioned signatures are beyond the writer’s range of normal scriptural variation.
The expert has, in fact, used as standards only three other signatures of the testatrix besides those affixed to the
original of the testament (Exh. A); and we feel that with so few standards the expert’s opinion that the signatures
in the duplicate could not be those of the testatrix becomes extremely hazardous. This is particularly so since the
comparison charts Nos. 3 and 4 fail to show convincingly that there are radical differences that would justify the
charge of forgery, taking into account the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signatures,
and the effect of writing fatigue, the duplicate being signed right after the original. These factors were not
discussed by the expert.

Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and questioned signatures does not
appear reliable, considering that standard and challenged writings were affixed to different kinds of paper, with
different surfaces and reflecting power. On the whole, therefore, we do not find the testimony of the oppositor’s
expert sufficient to overcome that of the notary and the two instrumental witnesses, Torres and Natividad (Dr.
Diy, being in the United States during the trial, did not testify).

Nor do we find adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more favored than
others is proof of. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the
decedent might as well die intestate. The testamentary disposition that the heirs should not inquire into other
property and that they should respect the distribution made in the will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares
in the free part, do not suffice to prove fraud or undue influence. They appear motivated by the desire to prevent
prolonged litigation which, as shown by ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the estate
being diverted into the hands of non- heirs and speculators. Whether these clauses are valid or not is a matter to
be litigated on another occasion. It is also well to note that, as remarked by the Court of Appeals in Sideco v.
Sideco, 45 Off. Gaz. 168, fraud and undue influence are mutually repugnant and exclude each other; their
joining as grounds for opposing probate shows absence of definite evidence against the validity of the will.

On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a
testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify
denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two
other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the
notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be
so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness
over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament
and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence
on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil v.
Murciano, 88 Phil. 260; 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration) "witnesses may sabotage the
will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause."

That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his
own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every
page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that
no one was aware of the defect at the time.

This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory
requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law,
this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in
the left margin, could nevertheless be probated; and that despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of
the pages of a will, the failure to mark the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect. These
precedents exemplify the Court’s policy to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against
fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege.

The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the duplicate (Exh. A-1)
is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed probate of the original because it lacked one signature in its third
page, it is easily discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma: if the original is defective and
invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate (Exh. A-1), and the same is
probatable. If the original is valid and can be probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be
considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate, Exhibit A-1, serves to prove that the
omission of one signature in the third page of the original testament was inadvertent and not intentional.

That the carbon duplicate, Exhibit A-1, was produced and admitted without a new publication does not affect the
jurisdiction of the probate court, already conferred by the original publication of the petition for probate. The
amended petition did not substantially alter the one first filed, but merely supplemented it by disclosing the
existence of the duplicate, and no showing is made that new interests were involved (the contents of Exhibit A
and A-1 are admittedly identical); and appellants were duly notified of the proposed amendment. It is nowhere
proved or claimed that the amendment deprived the appellants of any substantial right, and we see no error in
admitting the amended petition.
G.R. No. L-1787, August 27, 1948
Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee, vs. GUSTIN LIBORO, oppositor-appellant.

In the Court of First Instance of Batangas the appellant opposed unsuccessfully the probate of what purports to
be the last will and testament (Exhibit A) of Don Sixto Lopez, who died at the age of 83 in Balayan, Batangas, on
March 3, 1947, almost six months after the document in question was executed. In the court below, the present
appellant specified five grounds for his opposition, to wit:
(1) that the deceased never executed the alleged will;
(2) that his signature appearing in said will was a forgery;
(3) that at the time of the execution of the will, he was wanting in testamentary as well as mental capacity due to
advanced age;
(4) that, if he did ever execute said will, it was not executed and attested as required by law, and one of the
alleged instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as such; and it was procured by duress, influence of
fear and threats and undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries instituted
therein, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez, and the herein proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and
(5) that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.

In this instance only one of these objections is reiterated, formulated in these words: "That the court a quo erred
in holding that the document Exhibit "A" was executed in all particulars as required by law." To this objection is
added the alleged error of the court "in allowing the petitioner to introduce evidence that Exhibit "A" was written
in a language known to the decedent after petitioner rested his case and over the vigorous objection of the
oppositor.
The will in question comprises two pages, each of which is written on one side of a separate sheet. The first
sheet is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals. This, the appellant believes, is a fatal defect.

The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is guard against fraud, and to afford means of
preventing the substitution or of defecting the loss of any of its pages.

 In the present case, the omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is
supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than the conventional numerical words or
characters.

 The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents
considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and
second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the testament,
before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page.

 Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the
Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, — all of which, in the
logical order of sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the marker's property.

 Again, as page two contains only the two lines above mentioned, the attestation clause, the mark of the
testator and the signatures of the witnesses, the other sheet can not by any possibility be taken for other
than page one. Abangan vs. Abangan, supra, and Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios, 46 Phil., 922 are
decisive of this issue.

Although not falling within the purview and scope of the first assignment of error, the matter of the credibility of
the witnesses is assailed under this heading. On the merits we do not believe that the appellant's contention
deserves serious consideration. Such contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses as are set
out in the appellant's brief are incidents not all of which every one of the witnesses can be supposed to have
perceived, or to recall in the same order in which they occurred.

Everyday life and the result of investigations made in the field of experimental psychology show that the
contradictions of witnesses generally occur in the details of a certain incident, after a long series of
questioning, and far from being an evidence of falsehood constitute a demonstration of good faith.
Inasmuch as not all those who witness an incident are impressed in like manner, it is but natural that in
relating their impressions they should not agree in the minor details; hence, the contradictions in their
testimony. (People vs. Limbo, 49 Phil., 99.)
The testator affixed his thumbmark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The reason for this was that
the testator was suffering from "partial paralysis." While another in testator's place might have directed someone
else to sign for him, as appellant contends should have been done, there is nothing curious or suspicious in the
fact that the testator chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or
preference. Both ways are good. A statute requiring a will to be "signed" is satisfied if the signature is made by
the testator's mark. (De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 108; 28 R. C. L., 117.)

With reference to the second assignment of error, we do not share the opinion that the trial court communicated
an abuse of discretion in allowing the appellant to offer evidence to prove knowledge of Spanish by the testator,
the language in which the will is drawn, after the petitioner had rested his case and after the opponent had
moved for dismissal of the petition on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It is within the discretion of the
court whether or not to admit further evidence after the party offering the evidence has rested, and this discretion
will not be reviewed except where it has clearly been abused. More, it is within the sound discretion of the court
whether or not it will allow the case to be reopened for the further introduction of evidence after a motion or
request for a nonsuit, or a demurrer to the evidence, and the case may be reopened after the court has
announced its intention as to its ruling on the request, motion, or demurrer, or has granted it or has denied the
same, or after the motion has been granted, if the order has not been written, or entered upon the minutes or
signed.

In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they
are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance
of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the
appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. So, generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is
newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the
evidence is to the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. The omission to present evidence on the
testator's knowledge of Spanish had not been deliberate. It was due to a misapprehension or oversight.

Although alien to the second assignment of error, the appellant impugns the will for its silence on the testator's
understanding of the language used in the testament. There is no statutory requirement that such knowledge be
expressly stated in the will itself. It is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde. This Court so impliedly
ruled in Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil., 781, in which the probate of a will written in Tagalog was ordered although
it did not say that the testator knew that idiom. In fact, there was not even extraneous proof on the subject other
than the fact that the testator resided in a Tagalog region, from which the court said "a presumption arises that
said Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect.

The order of the lower court ordering the probate of the last will and testament of Don Sixto Lopez is affirmed, with costs.

G.R. No. L-36033 November 5, 1982

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF DOROTEA PEREZ,
(deceased): APOLONIO TABOADA, petitioner, vs. HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of Court of First
Instance of Southern Leyte, (Branch III, Maasin), respondent.

This is a petition for review of the orders issued by the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, Branch III, in Special
Proceedings No. R-1713, entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for Probate of the Will of Dorotea Perez, Deceased;
Apolonio Taboada, Petitioner", which denied the probate of the will, the motion for reconsideration and the motion for
appointment of a special administrator.

In the petition for probate filed with the respondent court, the petitioner attached the alleged last will and
testament of the late Dorotea Perez. Written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, the will consists of two pages.
 The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the
page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses.
 The second page which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the end of
the attestation clause by the three (3) attesting witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix.

Since no opposition was filed after the petitioner's compliance with the requirement of publication, the trial court
commissioned the branch clerk of court to receive the petitioner's evidence. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted
his evidence and presented Vicente Timkang, one of the subscribing witnesses to the will, who testified on its
genuineness and due execution.
The trial court, thru then Presiding Judge Ramon C. Pamatian issued the questioned order denying the probate
of the will of Dorotea Perez for want of a formality in its execution. In the same order, the petitioner was also
required to submit the names of the intestate heirs with their corresponding addresses so that they could be
properly notified and could intervene in the summary settlement of the estate.

Instead of complying with the order of the trial court, the petitioner filed a manifestation and/or motion,  ex
parte praying for a thirty-day period within which to deliberate on any step to be taken as a result of the
disallowance of the will. He also asked that the ten-day period required by the court to submit the names of
intestate heirs with their addresses be held in abeyance.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the probate of the will. However, the motion
together with the previous manifestation and/or motion could not be acted upon by the Honorable Ramon C.
Pamatian due to his transfer to his new station at Pasig, Rizal. The said motions or incidents were still pending
resolution when respondent Judge Avelino S. Rosal assumed the position of presiding judge of the respondent
court.

Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a motion for the appointment of special administrator.

Subsequently, the new Judge denied the motion for reconsideration as well as the manifestation and/or motion
filed ex parte. In the same order of denial, the motion for the appointment of special administrator was likewise
denied because of the petitioner's failure to comply with the order requiring him to submit the names of' the
intestate heirs and their addresses.

The petitioner decided to file the present petition.

For the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article 805 of the Civil Code require that the testatrix and all the
three instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the end of the will and in the presence of the testatrix and of
one another?

Article 805 of the Civil Code provides:

Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by
the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested
and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will,
shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the lacier witnesses and signed
the will and the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to the witnesses,
it shall be interpreted to them.

The respondent Judge interprets the above-quoted provision of law to require that, for a notarial will to be valid, it
is not enough that only the testatrix signs at the "end" but an the three subscribing witnesses must also sign at
the same place or at the end, in the presence of the testatrix and of one another because the attesting witnesses
to a will attest not merely the will itself but also the signature of the testator. It is not sufficient compliance to sign
the page, where the end of the will is found, at the left hand margin of that page.

On the other hand, the petitioner maintains that Article 805 of the Civil Code does not make it a condition
precedent or a matter of absolute necessity for the extrinsic validity of the wig that the signatures of the
subscribing witnesses should be specifically located at the end of the wig after the signature of the testatrix. He
contends that it would be absurd that the legislature intended to place so heavy an import on the space or
particular location where the signatures are to be found as long as this space or particular location wherein the
signatures are found is consistent with good faith and the honest frailties of human nature.

We find the petition meritorious.

Undoubtedly, under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be subscribed or signed at its end by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by another person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed Attestation consists in witnessing the
testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are, done which the
statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other
hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for the purpose of Identification
of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v. Hill, 269 SW 2d 911).

Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this case was
subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification.
The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the
genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation
clause.

While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should
be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444,
449).

The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the
law on wills in this project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of
giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to
prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
testator. This objective is in accord with the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a
will"

Parenthetically, Judge Ramon C. Pamatian stated in his questioned order that were not for the defect in the
place of signatures of the witnesses, he would have found the testimony sufficient to establish the validity of the
will.

The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the
instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary
dispositions, especially so when the will was properly Identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be
the same will executed by the testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned
order.

We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages
used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is
discernible from the entire wig that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the
testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the
testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses
signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and
the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that "This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages
including this page".

In Singson v. Florentino, et al. (92 Phil. 161, 164), this Court made the following observations with respect to the
purpose of the requirement that the attestation clause must state the number of pages used:

The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, which
requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the win is written,
which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of
interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property
is intended to be bequeathed. The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to be that the attestation clause
must contain a statement of the number of sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or
is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence
aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the situation is different. While the
attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written, however, the
last part of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages, which circumstance
in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and places it within the realm of similar
cases where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being
defeated by purely technical considerations.

Icasiano v. Icasiano (11 SCRA 422, 429) has the following ruling which applies a similar liberal approach:
 ... Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only (sic) the fact that the testatrix and two other
witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary
public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so
strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness
over whose conduct she had no control where the purpose of the law to guarantee the Identity of the
testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed,
and the evidence on record attests to the fun observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in
Vda. de Gil. Vs. Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration) 'witnesses may
sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby granted. The orders of the respondent court which denied the probate of tile
will, the motion for reconsideration of the denial of probate, and the motion for appointment of a special administrator are set
aside. The respondent court is ordered to allow the probate of the wig and to conduct further proceedings in accordance with
this decision. No pronouncement on costs.

G.R. No. 204793, June 08, 2020

IN Re: PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF CONSUELO SANTIAGO GARCIA

CATALINO TANCHANCO AND RONALDO TANCHANCO vs. NATIVIDAD GARCIA SANTOS

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the June 25, 2012 Decision 2 and
December 4, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89593 which reversed the May 31, 2004
Decision4 of Branch 115 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Spec. Proc. Nos. 97-4243 and 97-4244 denying
the probate of the last will and testament of the decedent, Consuelo Santiago Garcia (Consuelo).

Consuelo was married to Anastacio Garcia (Anastacio) who passed away on August 14, 1985. They had two
daughters, Remedios Garcia Tanchanco (Remedios) and Natividad Garcia Santos (Natividad). Remedios
predeceased Consuelo in 1985 and left behind her children, which included Catalino Tanchanco (Catalino) and
Ronaldo Tanchanco (Ronaldo, collectively Tanchancos).

On April 4, 1997, Consuelo, at 91 years old, passed away 6 leaving behind an estate consisting of several
personal and real properties.

On August 11, 1997, Catalino filed a petition before the RTC of Pasay City to settle the intestate estate of
Consuelo which was docketed as Spec. Proc. Case No. 97-4244 and raffled to Branch 113. Catalino alleged that
the legal heirs of Consuelo are: Catalino, Ricardo, Ronaldo and Carmela, all surnamed Tanchanco (children of
Remedios), and Melissa and Gerard Tanchanco (issues of Rodolfo Tanchanco, Remedios' son who
predeceased her and Consuelo), and Natividad, the remaining living daughter of Consuelo. Catalino additionally
alleged that Consuelo's properties are in the possession of Natividad and her son, Alberto G. Santos (Alberto),
who have been dissipating and misappropriating the said properties. Withal, Catalino prayed (1) for his
appointment as the special administrator of Consuelo's intestate estate and the issuance of letters of
administration in his favor; (2) for a conduct of an inventory of the estate; (3) for Natividad and all other heirs who
are in possession of the estate's properties to surrender the same and to account for the proceeds of all the
sales of Consuelo's assets made during the last years of her life; (4) for all heirs and persons having control of
Consuelo's properties be prohibited from disposing the same without the court's prior approval; (5) for Natividad
to produce Consuelo's alleged will to determine its validity; (6) for Natividad to desist from disposing the
properties of Consuelo's estate; and (7) for other reliefs and remedies

Natividad filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that she already filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and
Testament of Consuelo before Branch 115 of the RTC of Pasay City which was docketed as Spec. Proc. Case
No. 97-4243. Natividad asked that Consuelo's Last Will and Testament, entitled Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya
ni Consuelo Santiago Garcia, be allowed and approved. Moreover, as the named executrix in the will, Natividad
prayed that letters testamentary be issued in her favor.

The Tanchancos filed an Opposition to Natividad's petition for probate alleging that the will's attestation clause
did not state the number of pages and that the will was written in Tagalog, and not the English language usually
used by Consuelo in most of her legal documents. They also pointed out that Consuelo could not have gone to
Makati where the purported will was notarized considering her failing health and the distance of her residence in
Pasay City. Moreover, they alleged that Consuelo's signature was forged. Thus, they prayed for the
disallowance of probate and for the proceedings to be converted into an intestate one.

However, Natividad contended that there was substantial compliance with Article 805 of the Civil Code. Although
the attestation clause did not state the number of pages comprising the will, the same was clearly indicated in
the acknowledgment portion. Furthermore, the Tanchancos' allegations were not supported by
proof. Conversely, the Tanchancos rebutted that the number of pages should be found in the body of the will and
not just in the acknowledgment portion.

Eventually, the two cases (Spec. Proc. Case Nos. 97-4243 and 97-4244) were consolidated before Branch 115
of the RTC of Pasay City. Hearings commenced.

The subject will was witnessed by Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico (Atty. Tantuico), Atty. Ma. Isabel C. Lallana (Atty.
Lallana), and Atty. Aberico T. Paras (Atty. Paras) and notarized by Atty. Nunilo O. Marapao, Jr. (Atty. Marapao).

Atty. Marapao testified that he specifically remembered the will in question because it was his first time to
notarize a will written in Tagalog. He was familiar with the other witnesses and their signatures because they
were his colleagues at Quasha Ancheta Peña and Nolasco (Quasha Law Office) and because he was present
during the signing of the will. He also identified Consuelo's signature as he was present when she signed the
will.

Atty. Marapao averred that he assisted Atty. Lallana in drafting the will. He described Consuelo as very alert and
sane, and not suffering from any ailment at the time. The will was written in Tagalog at the request of Consuelo
although she was conversant in English. Their usual practice during the execution of a will is to ask the testator
some questions to determine whether he or she is of sound mind. If they find everything in order, they would
sign the will and then let the testator sign the same. Subsequently, the will would be notarized.

Atty. Paras identified the signatures of Atty. Lallana and Atty. Tantuico 19 as well as that of Atty.
Marapao.20 Likewise, he affirmed Consuelo's signature in the will as he saw her sign the will. 21 He additionally
confirmed that the attesting witnesses asked Consuelo probing questions to determine her state of mind and
whether she was executing the will voluntarily. 22 To prove her identity, Consuelo showed her residence
certificate and passport.23 Atty. Paras recalled that Consuelo was not accompanied by anyone in the conference
room.

Similarly, Atty. Tantuico affirmed his signature in the will as well as that of Atty. Paras' and Atty. Lallana's as
attesting witnesses, together with the signatures of Consuelo 25 and Atty. Marapao.26 He confirmed that they
propounded questions to Consuelo to determine the soundness of her mind. 27 Consuelo produced her residence
certificate and passport to prove her identity. 28 Consuelo's will was the first will that he encountered written
in Tagalog and he ascertained if Consuelo was comfortable with the said dialect.

Atty. Tantuico stated that Consuelo looked younger than her actual age at the time of the execution of the will
and that she could speak English. Consuelo was alone in the conference room and understood the will that she
signed. Likewise, none of Consuelo's relatives was made a witness to the will.

In her Deposition Upon Written Interrogatories, Atty. Lallana asserted that she was a friend of Consuelo's family.
She confirmed that she drafted the will and was one of the witnesses to its execution. The will was signed and
executed in the conference room of Quasha Law Office with all the witnesses present to observe each other sign
the will. She likewise identified Consuelo's signature in the will as well as those of the other witnesses who were
her co-workers at Quasha Law Office. She had seen Consuelo's signatures in other occasions prior to the
execution of the will.

Atty. Lallana narrated that she met Consuelo at the lobby of Quasha Law Office and accompanied her to the
conference room. She asked Consuelo if the contents of the will reflected the latter's wishes, to which the latter
replied in the affirmative. Afterwards, Atty. Lallana asked the other witnesses to join them in the conference room
for the execution of the will. The witnesses then asked Consuelo about her state of mind and Atty. Marapao
even joked with her regarding her personal circumstances. Atty. Lallana emphasized that the witnesses
conversed with Consuelo in order to determine her mental capacity. Atty. Tantuico asked general questions
regarding the will and after they were satisfied that Consuelo understood the import of the will, they signed the
documents in each other's presence. After signing all the pages of the will, Atty. Marapao asked Consuelo to
swear to the truth of the proceeding then notarized the document.

Atty. Lallana averred that Consuelo possessed full mental faculties during the drafting and execution of the will
as shown by her responses to the questions propounded to her. She was in good physical condition appropriate
for her age. Consuelo arrived at Quasha Law Office unaided and had the physical and mental stamina to sit
through the review and execution of the will.

Atty. Lallana affirmed that the will is in Tagalog, the dialect which Consuelo used to communicate with her. They
purposely used Tagalog to obviate any potential issues or questions regarding Consuelo's ability to understand
the nature and the contents of the will. Atty. Lallana clarified that Consuelo informed her that she (Consuelo) had
already distributed the bulk of her estate between her two daughters and that the properties subject of the will
were the ones left in her control and possession.

In her cross-interrogatories, Atty. Lallana clarified that she drafted the will upon the request of Consuelo whom
she met several times at her (Consuelo's) residence in Pasay City. She always met with Consuelo in private for
the purpose of drafting the will even if there were other relatives present in the same house. Although Consuelo
was accompanied by her maid/companion (alalay) at the lobby of the Quasha Law Office, she was alone with
the attesting witnesses and the notary public during the signing of the will. Consuelo wanted third parties to act
as witnesses because she anticipated some of her grandchildren to oppose the will.

Atty. Lallana stated that Remedios already received her share in the inheritance prior to the execution of the will
and before her demise in 1990. Thus, Atty. Lallana found no reason to collate Consuelo's properties. She
emphasized that she discussed the rules of legitime to Consuelo and that preterition did not occur.

Atty. Lallana asked for the legal opinion of more senior lawyers in drafting the will. She concluded that Consuelo
was very sharp and perceptive.
On the other hand, Ronaldo asserted that he had a close relationship with Consuelo before she was
hospitalized33 and insisted that Consuelo passed away without a will. 34 He contended that it was unusual for
Consuelo to execute a will in Tagalog as she had always used the English language in her
documents35 although she spoke both English and Tagalog.36 He alleged that Consuelo told him that there was
no need to draft a will since the properties would just be divided between her two daughters. 37 He also
mentioned other lawyers, such as Atty. Cornelio Hizon (Atty. Hizon), whom Consuelo previously transacted with
but who were not affiliated with Quasha Law Office.

During the second year of Consuelo's coma, Ronaldo met with Natividad, Alberto, Catalino, Atty. Hizon, and
Lumen Santiago to ascertain if Consuelo executed a will. During the meeting, Natividad informed them that there
was no will.39 Moreover, he alleged that Consuelo cannot walk unaided as early as 10 years before the alleged
execution of the will due to a previous accident. 40 Ronaldo stated that Consuelo was forgetful 41 and bad with
directions and that she needed her security guard or driver and alalay to move around.42 Consuelo was unhappy
before her coma because Natividad sold her properties as well as questioned and restricted her
actions.43 Natividad, by a Special Power of Attorney, transferred properties before and during Consuelo's
coma.44 Consuelo's actions were very dependent on Natividad's approval as the latter supposedly intimidated
the former.45 Natividad only gave Consuelo an allowance and she (Natividad) controlled Consuelo's properties.

Ronaldo asserted that the will was one-sided as most of the properties would be given to Natividad 47 and
contrary to Consuelo's intention to equally distribute the properties between her two daughters. In drafting
contracts, Consuelo is usually assisted by family lawyers or a close member of the family for guidance, and with
the knowledge of the alalay or companions.

Ronaldo conceded that Consuelo's signatures in the will were similar with those in the Deed of Absolute
Sale49 (which Ronaldo claimed is authentic).50 Consuelo was well-versed in Tagalog than English since she was
from Bulacan and only finished Grade 6. 51 Ronaldo knew that Consuelo travelled abroad on April 15, 1986, July
27, 1988, April 9, 1989 and March 9, 1991, or near the time the will was executed. 52 The signatures on
Consuelo's passport and on the will were similar although the signature in the will was "signed brokenly" while in
the passport, "straight."53 Also, Ronaldo acknowledged that in a particular photo dated March 29, 1991,
Consuelo was standing alone and without assistance.

Ronaldo affirmed that a grandson of Consuelo, Jumby or Celso (one of Natividad's sons), was a friend of Atty.
Lallana in college.55 Also, he agreed that he could not have monitored every movement or transaction entered
into by Consuelo and that it was possible that Consuelo did not mention the existence of the will to him.

Ronaldo maintained that Consuelo would always procure her residence certificate from Pasay City. 57 He averred
that Consuelo would constantly ask for an explanation for legal terms which she could not understand. He then
admitted that the Tagalog translation for legal terms were provided in the will.

Emilio Layug, Jr. (Layug), then security aide of Consuelo, denied accompanying Consuelo to Quasha Law Office
in Makati City. He averred that he would only accompany her on special occasions and whenever she decided to
bring him along with her. Consuelo could not leave the house without her companions, Nonita Legazpi and Anita
Lozada, and she could no longer walk alone and needed to use a wheelchair as she was weak. He agreed that
Natividad was Consuelo's favorite daughter. In 1987, Layug always accompanied Consuelo and her alalay.
During the hearing for the appointment of a special administrator, Catalino alleged that he was Consuelo's
favorite and that they had a close relationship. He maintained that Consuelo told him that she did not execute a
will since the inheritance will be divided between her two children. He stated that the will was one-sided even
when Consuelo had always been very fair. Catalino questioned the signature of Consuelo in the will as it
appeared to be "perfect" when it should be crooked since she was already 80 at the time. He added that
Consuelo's documents were all in English and that she never engaged the services of Quasha Law Office
before. Consuelo did not leave the house on her own as she cannot walk alone  and was already very sickly in
1997 and needed an alalay.

Catalino alleged that Natividad, after the burial of Consuelo, looted the things of Consuelo and declared "war"
against the Tanchancos. During a family meeting attended by his nephew, Jet Tanchanco, and the children of
Natividad, he discovered that Natividad supposedly found a will in Consuelo's dresser.

Catalino conceded that the signature in the will is similar to Consuelo's signature.  He likewise agreed that the
signature in the passport was not crooked just like in the purported will, even when he claimed that by that age,
Consuelo's signature should be crooked already. In any case, during his cross-examination, Catalino was
confronted with the inconsistency of the grounds they raised in their opposition to the probate of the will, as they
alleged forgery with respect to Consuelo's signature in the will but at the same time alleged that undue duress
was employed upon Consuelo to execute the will.
Meanwhile, Natividad confirmed that she was in-charge of Consuelo's businesses during the latter's confinement
in the hospital. She had an "and/or" account with Consuelo and she administered Consuelo's properties. In
1987, Consuelo was always accompanied by her alalay and she already needed assistance because she could
not stand on her own. Consuelo was friends with Atty. Lallana who prepared Consuelo's will sometime in 1987.

Alberto, Natividad's son, testified that Ronaldo knew about the status of the shares of stocks which formed part
of the estate as he was privy to the documents. 82 Moreover, he asserted that Consuelo, in 1987 or the same
year the purported will was executed, travelled to the United States. 83 The purported will was found in the
belongings of Consuelo.

In an Order85 dated May 31, 2002, the RTC appointed Catalino as the special administrator and set the bond at
P1 Million. Natividad asked for a reconsideration 86 but it was denied by the RTC in an Order 87 dated February 17,
2003. Hence, on June 5, 2002, Letters of Administration were issued in favor of Catalino.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In a May 31, 2004 Decision, 89 Branch 115 of the RTC of Pasay City found the purported will replete with
aberrations. It noted that two attesting witnesses to the will and the notary public were all associates of a Makati
based law firm which is the counsel of Natividad in the instant case. Nobody among Consuelo's relatives
witnessed the execution of the alleged will. Except for Natividad and her lawyers, no one knew that Consuelo
ever executed a will during her lifetime. Layug testified that they never went to a law office in Makati City. The
trial court found it unusual that an 81-year old sickly woman would go without her bodyguard or  alalay to Makati
City considering that she could no longer walk unaided and had to use a wheelchair.

Moreover, the RTC noted that the will's acknowledgment clause showed that Consuelo's residence was in
Makati City and not in Pasay City where she actually resided most of her life. It found it preposterous that
Consuelo would change her residence from Pasay City to Makati City just for the purpose of drafting a will, and
then return to Pasay City after its execution.

The RTC gave credence to Ronaldo's testimony that Consuelo declared that she had no will and that her
properties would be equally divided between her two children. The RTC deemed it irregular when the purported
will was suddenly produced only after Consuelo's death and not years earlier especially since it was allegedly
executed 10 years before her death. Moreover, the will unconscionably favored Natividad as she was named as
the executrix of the will and most of the properties were disposed in her favor. The trial court ruled that, taken as
a whole, the will is dubious and should not be allowed probate.

Aggrieved, Natividad appealed to the CA.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

the CA, in its assailed June 25, 2012 Decision, 93 held that Article 960 of the Civil Code preferred testacy over
intestacy. Also, according to Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the due execution and authenticity of a
private document such as a will must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written or
by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Additionally, Section 11, Rule 76
provides that if the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses and the notary, if present in the Philippines and
not insane, must be produced and examined during the probate of the will. Deposition must be taken if all or
some of the witnesses are not in the Philippines. Natividad complied with the foregoing by presenting the
testimonies of two attesting witnesses, Atty. Tantuico and Atty. Paras, as well as that of Atty. Marapao who
notarized the will. Deposition upon written interrogatories and cross-interrogatories on the written questions
propounded by the Tanchancos' counsel were made upon Atty. Lallana as the third witness to the will.

The said witnesses admitted signing the will in the presence of each other and Consuelo in a conference room
of Quasha Law Office in Makati City. Atty. Marapao averred that at the time of the execution of the will, Consuelo
was very alert and sane and was not suffering from any physical ailment. Atty. Tantuico asserted that Consuelo
was intelligent enough to read and understand the will that she executed. Atty. Lallana, through her deposition,
identified the signatures on each and every page of Consuelo's will since she was familiar with the signatures of
her former associates and that of Consuelo's given that she was present when the will was signed. Additionally,
Atty. Lallana stated that during the execution of the will, Consuelo possessed full mental faculties, consistently
responded to the questions of the witnesses regarding her personal circumstances, and was of sound mind and
body.

The appellate court held that the positive testimonies of the witnesses established the due execution and
authenticity of the will especially when the Tanchancos could not present proof that the said witnesses are not
credible or competent. It added that the witnesses are all lawyers who are not disqualified from being witnesses
under the law except in cases relating to privileged communication arising from attorney-client relationship.

It noted that in the probate of the will, the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of
the will in that the testator, of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed
by law. It found nothing extraordinary in Natividad's act of submitting the will for probate 10 years from its
execution and after Consuelo's death especially since there is no law which obliges a testator to file a petition for
probate of his or her will during his or her lifetime.

The CA further found that while Consuelo figured in an accident which limited her mobility years before the
execution of the contested will, the Tanchancos failed to substantiate their claim that it was impossible for
Consuelo to move around outside her residence. Moreover, it noted that Consuelo travelled to the United States
on two occasions more than a year before and then seven months after the contested will was executed. Thus, it
was not impossible for Consuelo to travel from her residence in Pasay City to the law office in Makati City.

Moreover, the appellate court held that a comparison of Consuelo's signatures in her 1986, 1988 and 1989
residence certificates and the contested will did not compellingly show that forgery was committed. It ruled that
the Tanchancos failed to establish that Consuelo's signature was forged, considering that they only advanced
their self-serving allegation of fraud. Also, that non-relatives witnessed the execution of the will did not affect its
due execution. It held that "the ruling of the court a quo that a perusal of the will even shows that it
unconscionably favors [Natividad] when the decedent [Consuelo] not only named [Natividad] as executrix of the
will but practically disposes of all the personal properties in her favor including, if not all, the remaining real
properties, already involve [an] inquiry on the will's intrinsic validity which need not be inquired upon by the
probate court." Ergo, the CA held that it is not a rule that an extrinsically valid will is always intrinsically valid and
that the trial court had prematurely ruled that Consuelo's will is also intrinsically invalid.

The CA found that the Tanchancos failed to prove that Consuelo was of unsound mind when she executed the
contested will. Likewise, they only presented self-serving allegations without presenting an expert witness that
an 81-year-old woman does not have the legal testamentary capacity to distribute her properties to her heirs
upon her death. Additionally, it held that no law requires the testator to execute the will in the presence of his or
her heirs and relatives. It similarly ruled that the Tanchancos did not present proof that Consuelo could not
understand Tagalog.

The appellate court noted that while the attestation clause did not state the number of pages comprising the will,
still, it is verifiable by examining the will itself, as the pages were duly numbered and signed by Consuelo and
the instrumental witnesses. Moreover, the acknowledgment portion of the contested will states that "Ang
HULING HABILING ito ay binubuo ng lima (5) na dahon, kasama ang dahong kinaroroonan ng Pagpapatunay at
Pagpapatotoong ito. SAKSI ang aking lagda at panatak pangnotaryo."102 In fine, the appellate court found that
there was substantial compliance with the requirements of Article 805 of the Civil Code. It held that since
Consuelo named Natividad as the executrix of the will, such should be respected unless the appointed executor
is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond in which case the court may appoint another person to
administer the estate.
The CA declared that the will should be allowed probate. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's assailed
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 31 May 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 115, Pasay
City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered allowing the probate of the Huling Habilin
at Pagpapasiya ni Consuelo Santiago Garcia. Petitioner-appellant [Respondent] Natividad Garcia Santos is
hereby appointed executor of the estate pursuant to the Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya of the decedent.

The Tanchancos filed a motion for reconsideration 105 which was denied by the CA in a Resolution 106 dated
December 4, 2012. Discontented, the Tanchancos elevated 107 this case before Us and raised the following
grounds:

A. The CA erred when it allowed the probate of the decedent's will despite the findings of the probate court that
the will was a total fabrication based on the following circumstances: decedent was physically incapable of
executing the will at the alleged date and place of execution thereof; the signature of the decedent in the will is
a forgery; and the purported will is replete with features which lead to an indisputable conclusion that the will
is simulated.
B. The CA erred when it allowed the probate of the decedent's will despite the fact that the will does not conform
to the formalities required by law under article 805 of the civil code.
C. The CA erred when it allowed the probate of the decedent's will despite circumstances alleged by the
petitioners [Tanchancos] that indicate bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and
influence x x x attended the execution of the will, rendering the substantial compliance rule under art. 809 of
the civil code inapplicable.
D. The CA erred when it disregarded the principle that findings of facts and law of the trial court, as a trier of
facts, must be given weight.
E. The CA erred when it appointed Mrs. Santos [Natividad] as executrix, even though Mrs. Santos [Natividad] is
clearly not fit to act as executrix of the estate.

Thus, the main issue in this Petition is whether or not the will should be allowed probate.

The Ruling of the Court: The Petition is unmeritorious.

The Tanchancos argue that the will was a total fabrication given that Consuelo was incapable of executing a will
at the alleged date and place of execution. Consuelo resided in Pasay City and not in Makati City, and her old
age and prior accident limited her mobility and disabled her in that she needed assistance most of the time.
Moreover, Consuelo's bodyguard who was always with her since 1987 averred that she never went to Quasha
Law Office. They question Atty. Lallana's assertion that Consuelo was accompanied at the lobby of Quasha Law
Office by a maid at the time the will was executed since the said companion was never identified or presented as
a witness. They additionally claim that Consuelo's signatures in the will were forged as the signatures therein
were suspiciously neat and inconsistent with a "crooked" signature attributable to imperfections and tremors
which are usually experienced by an 80-year-old.

The Tanchancos add that the will was simulated because they harbored doubts with the law firm that drafted the
will, which is the same counsel of Natividad in the instant case. Moreover, they aver that none of Consuelo's
relatives witnessed the execution of the will. They assert that Consuelo's personal legal counsel was Atty.
Deogracias (and then Atty. Hizon after Atty. Deogracias' death) and not Atty. Lallana, and that Consuelo never
engaged the services of Quasha Law Office during her lifetime. Apart from this, they claim that Consuelo never
executed any legal document in Tagalog and that she had always used the English language. Also, they
maintain that Consuelo secured her residence certificates from Pasay City every calendar year. Yet, in 1987, as
can be gleaned from the acknowledgment portion of the will, her residence certificate was issued in Makati City
where she was not a resident. They then contend that Natividad did not produce Consuelo's residence certificate
for 1987.

The petitioners claim that during her lifetime, Consuelo consistently told her grandchildren that she did not have
a will and that if she decides to make one, she will inform Mr. Ciano Neguidula or her lawyer, Atty. Hizon. In light
of this, while Consuelo was in a coma in 1997, Natividad, the Tanchancos, Atty. Hizon, and Lumen Santiago met
to discuss if Consuelo executed a will and they agreed that she did not. Nonetheless, Nativ idad suddenly
produced the will which was allegedly executed by Consuelo on November 18, 1987. They contend that the will
favored Natividad which was not in line with Consuelo's character as she had always treated her daughters fairly
and equally.

Significantly, the Tanchancos argue that the will is fatally defective because it did not conform to the formalities
required under Article 805 of the Civil Code and the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon
which the will is written. They add that a statement in the acknowledgment clause about the number of pages
cannot be raised to the level of an attestation clause. Thus, the will is null and void. They contend that
substantial compliance as contemplated under Article 809 of the Civil Code is not applicable in this case
because the attendant circumstances indicated bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and
influence in the execution of the will.

The Tanchancos enumerated the following circumstances demonstrating the alleged fraud in the execution of
the will:

5.43.1. It is highly questionable that Decedent, who already has a trusted lawyer, would require the services of
another. More suspicious is the fact that the alleged attesting witnesses were all members of the Quasha Law
Offices who now represent Mrs. Santos [Natividad] in this case. Such testimonies, although not prohibited by
law, are self-serving.

5.43.2. It is also highly questionable, that a Huling Habilin prepared by the Quasha Law Office, would have the
infirmity of lacking the number of pages in the attestation clause as required by law.

5.43.3. It is also highly questionable that Decedent, who was frail and advanced in years would travel all the way
from her home in Pasay City to Makati to execute her last will and testament given that she has always retained
the services of her own attorney, Atty. Hizon in this case, who could have easily prepared the Will and Decedent
could have had the Will acknowledged by a notary public in Pasay City.
5.43.4. It is also highly questionable that the Decedent, given that her signatures found in the residence
certificates issued in the years just before and after the alleged execution of the will were all crooked, suddenly
would have a perfect smooth signature inconsistent with her other recent signatures. Petitioners, who have
personal knowledge of the Decedent's signature, immediately recognized the signature appearing in the
purported Will as a forgery, which fact was correctly noted by the Trial Court.
5.43.5. It is also highly questionable that Decedent who acquired residence certificates from Pasay City in the
years before and after the execution of her final will would acquire a residence certificate in Makati just for the
purpose of executing her will. It should be noted that the 1987 Makati residence certificate was conveniently not
presented in Court by Mrs. Santos [Natividad]. Furthermore, it should be considered that Decedent was a
resident of Pasay and not of Makati at the time of the execution of the will.
5.43.6. It is also highly unlikely that the Decedent, executing documents in English all her life, would suddenly
resort to having her last will executed in Pilipino. Although the use of the national language is highly
commended, the language and form of wills are so technical and precise that it would only be logical for parties
comfortable and knowledgeable in the use of English language to resort to using it.
5.43.7. It is also highly unlikely that during the time the Decedent was in a coma, when Mrs. Santos [Natividad],
Petitioners, Atty. Hizon and Ms. Lumen Santiago met to discuss whether a Will was executed by the
Decedent, Mrs. Santos [Natividad] did not bring up the fact that there indeed was a Will executed by the
Decedent, considering Mrs. Santos [Natividad] was present at the execution of the will, only to produce the
questioned Will after the death of the Decedent. This is proof of evident bad faith on the part of Mrs. Santos
[Natividad], who is bent on receiving more than her just share in the estate of the Decedent.

The Tanchancos insist that the ruling of the trial court should be given weight since it was in the best position to
evaluate the evidence and the witnesses presented before it by both parties. They maintain that Natividad is not
fit to act as executrix given that she dissipated the properties of the estate; is not physically present most of the
time in the Philippines as she stays in San Francisco, California; and is almost 90 years old. Moreover, they aver
that the appointment of the administrator of the estate should be resolved through a full-blown hearing.

Natividad counters that the CA's ruling had legal and factual basis and that the will was executed in accordance
with the required formalities and solemnities, viz.:
The last will and testament was written in Tagalog, a language known to and understood by decedent.
Decedent was born and raised in the province of Bulacan where the dialect is Tagalog. More importantly,
(1)
there was no evidence presented to show that Decedent could not understand Tagalog at the time of the
execution of the will;
(2) The last will and testament was subscribed at the end thereof by Decedent;
The last will and testament was attested and subscribed by three (3) lawyers of Quasha Law Office in the
(3)
presence of Decedent and of one another;
Each and every page of [the] last will and testament was signed by Decedent and three (3) lawyers on
(4)
the left margin;
 All pages of the last will and testament of Decedent were numbered correlatively on the upper part of
(5)
each page;
(6) The last will and testament of Decedent contains an attestation clause;
(7) And finally, the last will and testament of Decedent was acknowledged before a notary public. 115

Natividad avers that the testimonies of the Tanchancos' witnesses who discounted the possibility of Consuelo
travelling to Makati City could not outweigh the positive testimonies of the attesting witnesses to the execution of
the will. She points out that Consuelo even travelled abroad before and after the will was executed. Additionally,
the lawyer-witnesses have no personal interest in the execution of the will; thus, there is no reason for them to
fabricate the same.
Natividad asserts that the Tanchancos failed to prove forgery. She maintains that it is not required that a witness
to the will be a relative of the testator; it was not impossible for Consuelo to engage the services of another
lawyer in the execution of the will; it was not prohibited for the will to be in Tagalog, a dialect known by Consuelo
and which she was comfortable with; it is not entirely impossible that Consuelo obtained a residence certificate
from Makati City for the purpose of executing her will; it was not proved that Consuelo mentioned during her
lifetime that she did not execute any will; the Tanchancos' claim that Consuelo intended to equally divide her
properties between her two children was without merit; and, that the provisions of the will favored Natividad did
not affect its due execution and even bordered on the question of the intrinsic validity of the will which is not
within the purview of the probate court

Natividad insists that the will conforms to the formalities required under Article 805 of the Civil Code since the
trial court and the CA held that the attestation clause substantially complied with the directive of the
aforementioned provision. The acknowledgment portion specifically mentioned that the necessary signatures
were affixed on every page of the will and referred to the number of pages the will was written. She avers that
the execution of the will was not attended by bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue influence and improper
pressure. Furthermore, she asserts that the CA is not precluded from reviewing the factual findings of the trial
court especially when there was a misapprehension of facts and the findings were without factual basis and
grounded on pure speculations. Lastly, she maintains that her appointment as executrix should be followed as
specified in the will.

We now resolve.

Undoubtedly, the RTC and the CA had conflicting findings which would merit the Court's review of the factual
and legal circumstances surrounding the case and serve as an exception to the rule that the Court can only rule
on questions of law in petitions for review on certiorari.

We are inclined to affirm the findings and ruling of the CA as these were based on a careful consideration of the
evidence and supported by prevailing law and jurisprudence. The Court concurs with the CA in holding that the
trial court erred in lending credence to the allegations of the Tanchancos which are bereft of substantiation that
Consuelo's signature was forged or that undue duress was employed in the execution of the will in question.

It is settled that "the law favors testacy over intestacy" and hence, "the probate of the will cannot be dispensed
with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person
to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory." In a similar way, "testate proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose."

The will faithfully complied with the formalities required by law

The main issue which the court must determine in a probate proceeding is the due execution or the extrinsic
validity of the will as provided by Section 1, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court. The probate court cannot inquire into
the intrinsic validity of the will or the disposition of the estate by the testator. Thus, due execution is "whether the
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law" as
mandated by Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself
or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall
also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall
be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator
signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all
the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary
public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.

An examination of Consuelo's will shows that it complied with the formalities required by the law, 126 except that
the attestation clause failed to indicate the total number of pages upon which the will was written. To address
this concern, Natividad enumerated the following attributes of the attestation clause and the will itself, which the
Court affirms:

a. The pages are completely and correlatively numbered using the same typewriting font on all the pages of
the will;
b. All indications point to the fact that the will was typewritten using the same typewriter;
c. There are no erasures or alterations in the will;
d. The notarial acknowledgment states unequivocally or with clarity that the will consists of five (5) pages
including the attestation clause (i.e.[,] the "pagpapatunay") and the notarial acknowledgment itself (i.e.[,] the
"pagpapatotoong ito");
e. All of the pages of the entire will were properly signed on the appropriate portions by the testator and the
instrumental witnesses;
f. All of the signatures of the testator and the instrumental witnesses on all the pages of the will are genuine if
only for the fact that they are identical/similar throughout;
g. The oppositors have not adduced, and in fact waived the presentation of, any kind of evidence to impugn
the authenticity of any of the signatures appearing in the will;
h. The oppositors have not adduced, and in fact waived the presentation of, any kind of evidence tending to
show that the will was allegedly executed by undue influence or any fraudulent or improper/unlawful
means[.]

Notably, the case of Caneda v. Court of Appeals explained that:

x x x [U]nder Article 809, the defects or imperfections must only be with respect to the form of the attestation or
the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfections would not render a will invalid should it be proved
that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. In this regard, however, the manner
of proving the due execution and attestation has been held to be limited to merely an examination of the will
itself without resorting to evidence aliunde, whether oral or written.

The foregoing considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting
witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. In such a
situation, the defect is not only in the form or the language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a
specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. x x x

Furthermore, the rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 x x x presupposes that the defects in the
attestation clause can be cured or supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of matters apparent
therefrom which would provide the data not expressed in the attestation clause or from which it may necessarily
be gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted textual requirements were actually complied
with in the execution of the will. In other words, the defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by
the will itself.

The so-called liberal rule, the Court said in Gil v. Murciano, 'does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it
open the door to serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the
dividing line with precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply
missing details that should appear in the will itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration into its
confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law.
This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results.'

It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omissions which can be supplied by an examination
of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and correspondingly, would
not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be
supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of
the will itself

Moreover, Mitra v. Sablan-Guevarra130 instructs, viz.:

As to whether the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause renders such will
defective, the CA, citing Uy Coque vs. Naves Sioca and In re: Will of Andrada, perceived such omission as a
fatal flaw. In Uy Coque, one of the defects in the will that led to its disallowance is the failure to declare the
number of its pages in the attestation clause. The Court elucidated that the purpose of requiring the number of
pages to be stated in the attestation clause is to make the falsification of a will more difficult. In  In re: Will of
Andrada, the Court deemed the failure to state the number of pages in the attestation clause, fatal. Both
pronouncements were, however, made prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code on August 30, 1950.
Subsequently, in Singson vs. Florentino, the Court adopted a more liberal approach and allowed probate, even if
the number of pages of the will was mentioned in the last part of the body of the will and not in the attestation
clause. This is to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations.

The substantial compliance rule is embodied in the Civil Code as Article 809 thereof, which provides that:

Art. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects
and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is
proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of
Article 805.

In Taboada vs. Rosal, the Court allowed the probate of a will notwithstanding that the number of pages was
stated not in the attestation clause, but in the Acknowledgment. In Azuela vs. CA, the Court ruled that there is
substantial compliance with the requirement, if it is stated elsewhere in the will how many pages it is comprised
of.

What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite the existence of omissions is that such omissions must be
supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence. "However, those
omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation
clause and ultimately, of the will itself."

In the instant case, the attestation clause indisputably omitted to mention the number of pages comprising the
will. Nevertheless, the acknowledgment portion of the will supplied the omission by stating that the will has five
pages, to wit: "Ang HULING HABILING ito ay binubuo ng lima (5) na dahon, kasama ang dahong kinaroroonan
ng Pagpapatunay at Pagpapatotoong ito." Undoubtedly, such substantially complied with Article 809 of the Civil
Code. Mere reading and observation of the will, without resorting to other extrinsic evidence, yields the
conclusion that there are actually five pages even if the said information was not provided in the attestation
clause. In any case, the CA declared that there was substantial compliance with the directives of Article 805 of
the Civil Code.

When the number of pages was provided in the acknowledgment portion instead of the attestation clause, "[t]he
spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with the
substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should
be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the
testator's will."

Lawyers are not disqualified from being witnesses to a will; the subscribing witnesses testified to the due
execution of the will

Article 820 of the Civil Code provides that, "[a]ny person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or
more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will
mentioned in Article 805 of this Code." Here, the attesting witnesses to the will in question are all lawyers
equipped with the aforementioned qualifications. In addition, they are not disqualified from being witnesses
under Article 821133 of the Civil Code, even if they all worked at the same law firm at the time.

 As pointed out by Natividad, these lawyers would not risk their professional licenses by knowingly
signing a document which they knew was forged or executed under duress; moreover, they did not have
anything to gain from the estate when they signed as witnesses. All the same, petitioners did not present
 controverting proof to discredit them or to show that they were disqualified from being witnesses to
Consuelo's will at the time of its execution.

Since the will in this case is contested, Section 11, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court applies, to wit:

SEC. 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested. - If the will is contested, all the
subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if
present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examined, and the death, absence, or insanity
of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of such witnesses are present in the
Philippines but outside the province where the will has been filed, their deposition must be taken. x x x

The lawyer-witnesses unanimously confirmed that the will was duly executed by Consuelo who was of sound
mind and body at the time of signing. The Tanchancos failed to dispute the competency and credibility of these
witnesses; thus, the Court is disposed to give credence to their testimonies that Consuelo executed the will in
accordance with the formalities of the law and with full mental faculties and willingness to do so.
The burden of proof is upon the Tanchancos to show that Consuelo could not have executed the will or that her
signature was forged
It is beyond cavil that Consuelo understood both Tagalog and English. In fact, the Tanchancos failed to disprove
that Consuelo was more comfortable to use the Tagalog dialect in writing the will, given that she was born and
raised in Bulacan where the main dialect is Tagalog. Notably, although wholly written in Tagalog, the will
contained the English equivalent for the other terms which relate to wills and succession.

The Tanchancos, despite their allegation that Consuelo should have employed the services of Atty. Hizon, failed
to present him in court to validate their claim that he was Consuelo's personal legal counsel and bolster their
position that Consuelo could not have engaged the services of Quasha Law Office at all since she purportedly
never had any prior dealings with the said firm. The Tanchancos likewise failed to refute that Atty. Lallana was
actually a family friend. Atty. Lallana stated in her deposition that Consuelo personally discussed the matters
concerning the will with her alone and in private. Atty. Lallana even added that Consuelo knew that the
Tanchancos would oppose the will. This may explain why Consuelo chose another counsel to handle the
execution of her will so that the heirs would not be able object to it or interfere with her choices.

Likewise, the CA found that Consuelo travelled abroad barely months before and after the will was executed. By
inference, such finding demonstrated that she still had the mental and physical capacity to execute a will even if
the law firm is in Makati City. The photographs presented during the hearings showed that Consuelo can still
stand on her own after the will was executed.

About the claim of forgery, the same remains unsubstantiated because the Tanchancos merely surmised that
there were discrepancies in Consuelo's signatures in the Residence Certificates and in the will, and insisted that
the said signatures should not be "perfectly written" and instead should be "crooked" due to Consuelo's age.

Based on the Court's assessment, the signatures in Consuelo's Residence Certificates were similar with her
signature in the contested will. As found by the CA, "[a] close scrutiny of the signatures appearing in the 1986,
1988 and 1989 residence certificates of the decedent and comparing them with the signatures of the testatrix in
the contested Will failed to disclose a convincing, definitive and conclusive showing of forgery. The appealed
decision of the court a quo [RTC] likewise failed to discuss how it came to its conclusion that the will contains
forged signatures of Consuelo which is one of the reasons it was denied probate. Other than the self-serving
allegations of the oppositors-appellees, no evidence was ever presented in court that would indubitably establish
forgery of the decedent's signature in the contested will."

Bare allegations without corroborating proof that Consuelo was under duress in executing the will cannot be
considered

As similarly found by the CA, the Tanchancos did not adduce evidence to corroborate their allegation that
Consuelo declared that she would not execute a last will and testament, other than their self-interested
statements. In addition, they failed to portray that Consuelo did not have the testamentary capacity to execute
the will or that she was suffering from a condition which could have definitively prevented her from doing so.

The Tanchancos did not explain how Consuelo could have been forced into executing the will, as they merely
focused on her alleged physical inability to go to the Quasha Law Office in Makati City. They did not present
witnesses who could prove that she was forced into making the will, or that she signed it against her own wishes
and volition.

The Tanchancos insisted that Consuelo intended to divide her properties equally between her two daughters,
Natividad and Remedios. Yet, based on the testimony of Natividad and the deposition of Atty. Lallana, Consuelo,
during her lifetime, already apportioned the prime properties to her two daughters and retained some properties
for her own use and support. Hence, what properties she had left, Consuelo could dispose of in any way she
desired, as long as the rules on legitime and preterition are observed.

In any case, as earlier stated, inquiring into the intrinsic validity of the will or the manner in which the properties
were apportioned is not within the purview of the probate court. "The court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's
testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the
questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court - at this stage of the
proceedings - is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality
of any devise or legacy therein."

The will should be allowed probate

Considering the foregoing, the will of Consuelo should be allowed probate as it complied with the formalities
required by the law. The Tanchancos failed to prove that the same was executed through force or under duress,
or that the signature of the testator was procured through fraud as provided under Article 839 138 of the Civil Code
and Rule 76, Section 9139 of the Rules of Court.

We agree with the CA that the court should respect the prerogative of the testator to name an executrix (in this
case, Natividad) in her will absent any circumstance which would render the executrix as incompetent, or if she
fails to give the bond requirement or refuses to execute the provisions of the will.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The assailed June 25, 2012 Decision and December
4, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89593 are AFFIRMED.

[G.R. No. L-5826. April 29, 1953.]

Testate estate of the late VICENTE CAGRO. JESUSA CAGRO, Petitioner-Appellee, v. PELAGIO

CAGRO, ET AL., Oppositors-Appellants.

1. WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; LACK OF SIGNATURES OF ATTESTING WITNESSES AT BOTTOM OF

ATTESTATION CLAUSE, IS FATAL DEFECT. — Inasmuch as the signatures of the three witnesses to the will
do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the
witnesses on the left-hand margin, the will is fatally defective. The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the
facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must
necessarily bear their signatures.

This is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Samar, admitting
to probate the will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Laoangan, Pambujan, Samar, on February
14, 1949.

The main objection insisted upon by the appellants is that the will is fatally defective, because its attestation
clause is not signed by the attesting witnesses. There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to
the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by
the witnesses on the left-hand margin.

We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause is "a
memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by the attesting
witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered
as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their
participation.

The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform
substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable,
because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin
of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as
sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the
testator and any or all of the witnesses.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed and the probate of the will in question denied. So ordered with costs against
the petitioner and appellee.

G.R. No. 122880             April 12, 2006

FELIX AZUELA vs. CA, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO

The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo (decedent),
who died on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80. In refusing to give legal recognition to the due execution of this
document, the Court is provided the opportunity to assert a few important doctrinal rules in the execution of
notarial wills, all self-evident in view of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.

A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is
fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally
defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a
mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with
all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.

There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a comprehensive catalog of imperatives for
the proper execution of a notarial will. Full and faithful compliance with all the detailed requisites under Article
805 of the Code leave little room for doubt as to the validity in the due execution of the notarial will. Article 806
likewise imposes another safeguard to the validity of notarial wills — that they be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses. A notarial will executed with indifference to these two codal provisions
opens itself to nagging questions as to its legitimacy.

The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo,
which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent.

The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino, read in full:

HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO

SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN:

AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc, Manila, pitongput siyam (79) na gulang, nasa hustong
pagi-isip, pag-unawa at memoria ay nag-hahayag na ito na ang aking huling habilin at testamento, at binabali wala ko lahat ang
naunang ginawang habilin o testamento:

Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, La Loma sang-ayong sa kaugalian at patakaran ng simbahang
katoliko at ang taga-pag-ingat (Executor) ng habiling ito ay magtatayo ng bantayog upang silbing ala-ala sa akin ng aking pamilya
at kaibigan;

Pangalawa-Aking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng karapatan sa aking pamangkin na si Felix Azuela, na siyang nag-alaga
sa akin sa mahabang panahon, yaong mga bahay na nakatirik sa lote numero 28, Block 24 at nakapangalan sa Pechaten

Korporasyon, ganoon din ibinibigay ko ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay na nakatirik sa inoopahan kong lote, numero 43, Block 24
na pag-aari ng Pechaten Corporation. Ipinagkakaloob kong buong buo ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay at lupa na nasa 500 San
Diego St., Lot 42, Block 24, Sampaloc, Manila kay Felix Azuela at ang pagkakaloob kong ito ay walang pasubali’t at kondiciones;
Pangatlo- Na ninunumbrahan ko si VART PAGUE na siyang nagpapatupad ng huling habiling ito at kagustuhan ko rin na hindi na
kailanman siyang mag-lagak ng piyansiya
.
Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila ika 10 ng Hunyo, 1981.

(Sgd.)
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO (Tagapagmana)

PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI

Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng ____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia E. Igsolo,
tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayon ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng
kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t sa amin, at kami namang mga
saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan
at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon ng kasulatan ito.
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
address: 500 San Diego St.
Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37
Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981.

QUIRINO AGRAVA
address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum
Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365
Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981

LAMBERTO C. LEAÑO
address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7,
Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res.
Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite on Feb. 7, 1981

JUANITO ESTRERA
address: City Court Compound,
City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829
Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981.
Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10  ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.

(Sgd.)
PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA

The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will,
but not at the bottom of the attestation clause.

The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent, namely: petitioner
himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad. Petitioner prayed that the will be
allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart Prague.

The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented herself as the attorney-
in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent. Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is a forgery, and that the
true purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in several court cases filed by oppositor
against petitioner, particularly for forcible entry and usurpation of real property, all centering on petitioner’s right
to occupy the properties of the decedent. It also asserted that contrary to the representations of petitioner, the
decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs, namely her grandchildren, who were then residing
abroad. Per records, it was subsequently alleged that decedent was the widow of Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in
1965, and the mother of a legitimate child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who predeceased her mother by three (3)
months.

Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law.
She pointed out that decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not
properly acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the central matters to this petition.

After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated 10 August 1992. 6 The RTC favorably took
into account the testimony of the three (3) witnesses to the will, Quirino Agrava, Lamberto Leano, and Juanito
Estrada. The RTC also called to fore "the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will
x x x with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes;"  and from this
perspective, rebutted oppositor’s arguments that the will was not properly executed and attested to in
accordance with law.

After a careful examination of the will and consideration of the testimonies of the subscribing and attesting
witnesses, and having in mind the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will, i.e.,
the liberalization of the interpretation of the law on the formal requirements of a will with the end in view of giving
the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, this Court is persuaded to rule that the will in question is
authentic and had been executed by the testatrix in accordance with law.

On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this Court has noted that at the end of the will after the signature of
the testatrix, the following statement is made under the sub-title, "Patunay Ng Mga Saksi":

"Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia N. Igsolo,
tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayong ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa
ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t sa amin, at kami
namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng
nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon ng kasulatan ito."
The aforequoted declaration comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgement and is considered by
this Court as a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.

On the oppositor’s contention that the attestation clause was not signed by the subscribing witnesses at the
bottom thereof, this Court is of the view that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the
second page of the will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof,
substantially satisfies the purpose of identification and attestation of the will.

With regard to the oppositor’s argument that the will was not numbered correlatively in letters placed on upper
part of each page and that the attestation did not state the number of pages thereof, it is worthy to note that the
will is composed of only two pages. The first page contains the entire text of the testamentary dispositions, and
the second page contains the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgement. Such being so, the
defects are not of a serious nature as to invalidate the will. For the same reason, the failure of the testatrix to
affix her signature on the left margin of the second page, which contains only the last portion of the attestation
clause and acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.

As regards the oppositor’s assertion that the signature of the testatrix on the will is a forgery, the testimonies of
the three subscribing witnesses to the will are convincing enough to establish the genuineness of the signature
of the testatrix and the due execution of the will.

The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had substituted his since deceased
mother-in-law, Geralda Castillo. In a Decision dated 17 August 1995, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. 9 The Court of Appeals noted that the attestation
clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of
probate.10

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that "the number of pages used in a
notarial will be stated in the attestation clause" is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible
to what he termed as "the substantial compliance rule." 11

The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, which we replicate in
full.

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself
or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall
also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall
be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator
signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all
the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary
public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.

The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the failure of the attestation clause to state the
number of pages of the will. But an examination of the will itself reveals several more deficiencies.

As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages of the will. 12 There
was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for the insertion of the
number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in; hence, the requisite was left
uncomplied with.
The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the trial court, citing in the process Uy Coque v. Navas
L. Sioca and In re: Will of Andrada. In Uy Coque, the Court noted that among the defects of the will in question
was the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages contained in the will. In ruling that the will
could not be admitted to probate, the Court made the following consideration which remains highly relevant to
this day: "The purpose of requiring the number of sheets to be stated in the attestation clause is obvious;  the
document might easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely change the
testamentary dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement of the total number of sheets
such removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the numbers at the top of the
following sheets or pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is stated in the attestation clause
the falsification of the document will involve the inserting of new pages and the forging of the signatures of the
testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter attended with much greater difficulty."

The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation clause of which failed to state the number of
sheets or pages used. This consideration alone was sufficient for the Court to declare "unanim[ity] upon the
point that the defect pointed out in the attesting clause is fatal." It was further observed that "it cannot be denied
that the x x x requirement affords additional security against the danger that the will may be tampered with; and
as the Legislature has seen fit to prescribe this requirement, it must be considered material."

Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v. Florentino and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal, wherein the Court
allowed probate to the wills concerned therein despite the fact that the attestation clause did not state the
number of pages of the will. Yet the appellate court itself considered the import of these two cases, and made
the following distinction which petitioner is unable to rebut, and which we adopt with approval:

Even a cursory examination of the Will (Exhibit "D"), will readily show that the attestation does not state the
number of pages used upon which the will is written. Hence, the Will is void and undeserving of probate.

We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme Court in "Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et
al., 92 Phil. 161 and Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al., 118 SCRA 195," to the effect that a
will may still be valid even if the attestation does not contain the number of pages used upon which the Will is
written. However, the Decisions of the Supreme Court are not applicable in the aforementioned appeal at bench.
This is so because, in the case of "Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., supra," although the
attestation in the subject Will did not state the number of pages used in the will, however, the same was found in
the last part of the body of the Will:

The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, which requires
that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the will is written, which
requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or
omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be
bequeathed (In re Will of Andrada, 42 Phil. 180; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Gumban vs.
Gorcho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611).

 The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of
the number of sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the
effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a
consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the situation is different. While the attestation
clause does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written, however, the last part
of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages, which circumstance in our
opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and places it within the realm of similar cases
where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being
defeated by purely technical considerations." (page 165-165, supra)

In "Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al." supra, the notarial acknowledgement in the Will states
the number of pages used in the:

We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages
used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that,  in this case, it is
discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the
testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the
testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses
signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and
the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that "this Last Will and Testament consists of two pages
including this page" (pages 200-201, supra)
However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in the will is not stated in any part of the Will. The
will does not even contain any notarial acknowledgment wherein the number of pages of the will should be
stated.21

Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, at a time when the
statutory provision governing the formal requirement of wills was Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Reliance on these cases remains apropos, considering that the requirement that the attestation state the number
of pages of the will is extant from Section 618.

 However, the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950 did put in force a rule of interpretation of the
requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is concerned, that may vary from the
philosophy that governed these two cases. Article 809 of the Civil Code states: "In the absence of bad
faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the
form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the
will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of article 805."

In the same vein, petitioner cites the report of the Civil Code Commission, which stated that "the underlying and
fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the [law] on [wills] in this project consists in the
[liberalization] of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more [freedom] in
[expressing] his last wishes. This objective is in accord with the [modern tendency] in respect to the formalities in
the execution of wills." However, petitioner conveniently omits the qualification offered by the Code Commission
in the very same paragraph he cites from their report, that such liberalization be "but with sufficient safeguards
and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the testator."

Caneda v. Court of Appeals features an extensive discussion made by Justice Regalado, speaking for the Court
on the conflicting views on the manner of interpretation of the legal formalities required in the execution of the
attestation clause in wills. Uy Coque and Andrada are cited therein, along with several other cases, as examples
of the application of the rule of strict construction. 28 However, the Code Commission opted to recommend a
more liberal construction through the "substantial compliance rule" under Article 809. A cautionary note was
struck though by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as to how Article 809 should be applied:

x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will
itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every
page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself
can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely
disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the
presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against
perjury in the probate proceedings.

The Court of Appeals did cite these comments by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in its assailed decision, considering that
the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause is one of the defects which cannot be
simply disregarded. In Caneda itself, the Court refused to allow the probate of a will whose attestation clause
failed to state that the witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator
and of each other, the other omission cited by Justice J.B.L. Reyes which to his estimation cannot be lightly
disregarded.

Caneda suggested: "[I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which can be
supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal
and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those
omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation
clause and ultimately, of the will itself." Thus, a failure by the attestation clause to state that the testator signed
every page can be liberally construed, since that fact can be checked by a visual examination; while a failure by
the attestation clause to state that the witnesses signed in one another’s presence should be considered a fatal
flaw since the attestation is the only textual guarantee of compliance.

The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written remains a fatal
flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which
the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to
prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. The failure to state the number of pages equates with the
absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the
execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is substantial
compliance with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the
situation in Singson and Taboada. However, in this case, there could have been no substantial compliance with
the requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will
itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.

At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply with the formal requirements as
enumerated under Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of the members of the Code Commission in
incorporating Article 805, the fact remains that they saw fit to prescribe substantially the same formal requisites
as enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, convinced that these remained effective
safeguards against the forgery or intercalation of notarial wills. Compliance with these requirements, however
picayune in impression, affords the public a high degree of comfort that the testator himself or herself had
decided to convey property post mortem in the manner established in the will. The transcendent legislative
intent, even as expressed in the cited comments of the Code Commission, is for the fruition of the
testator’s incontestable desires, and not for the indulgent admission of wills to probate.

The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals. However, an examination of the will itself reveals
a couple of even more critical defects that should necessarily lead to its rejection.

For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the
attestation clause which after all consists of their averments before the notary public.

Cagro v. Cagro is material on this point. As in this case, "the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not
appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses
on the left-hand margin." While three (3) Justices considered the signature requirement had been substantially
complied with, a majority of six (6), speaking through Chief Justice Paras, ruled that the attestation clause had
not been duly signed, rendering the will fatally defective.

There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the
attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.

We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause is "a
memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by the attesting
witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered
as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their
participation.

The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform
substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable,
because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin
of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as
sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the
testator and any or all of the witnesses.

The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement
that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the will be "attested and
subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]." The respective intents behind these two classes of signature are
distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the
witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will.

 On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to
the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and
apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if
the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation
clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since the
signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.

The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this case signed the attestation clause itself,
but not the left-hand margin of the page containing such clause. Without diminishing the value of the
instrumental witnesses’ signatures on each and every page, the fact must be noted that it is the attestation
clause which contains the utterances reduced into writing of the testamentary witnesses themselves. It is the
witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The
only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the
attestation clause.

Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental witnesses, as
they failed to sign the attestation clause.

Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition should also hinge. The
requirement under Article 806 that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses" has also not been complied with. The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact
that it had been segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and entrusted into a separate
provision, Article 806. The non-observance of Article 806 in this case is equally as critical as the other cited flaws
in compliance with Article 805, and should be treated as of equivalent import.

In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko
ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila."40 By no manner of contemplation can those
words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in
going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. 41 It involves an extra step
undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to
the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.

It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual language
thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was
subscribed and sworn to by the executor. Ordinarily, the language of the jurat should avow that the document
was subscribed and sworn before the notary public, while in this case, the notary public averred that he himself
"signed and notarized" the document. Possibly though, the word "ninotario" or "notarized" encompasses the
signing of and swearing in of the executors of the document, which in this case would involve the decedent and
the instrumental witnesses.

Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain
invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be "acknowledged", and not merely subscribed
and sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the
instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in
a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free
consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless act. The acknowledgment coerces
the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and
subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury,
thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those
executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator
is of certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will.

It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is under Article 806.  A notarial
will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective,
even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.

There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were not fully satisfied by the will in question. We
need not discuss them at length, as they are no longer material to the disposition of this case. The provision
requires that the testator and the instrumental witnesses sign each and every page of the will on the left margin,
except the last; and that all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
page. In this case, the decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed to sign both pages of the will on the left margin, her
only signature appearing at the so-called "logical end" 44 of the will on its first page. Also, the will itself is not
numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but instead numbered with Arabic numerals. There is a line of
thought that has disabused the notion that these two requirements be construed as mandatory. 45 Taken in
isolation, these omissions, by themselves, may not be sufficient to deny probate to a will. Yet even as these
omissions are not decisive to the adjudication of this case, they need not be dwelt on, though indicative as they
may be of a general lack of due regard for the requirements under Article 805 by whoever executed the will.

All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from makes the probate denial inexorable.

G.R. No. L-32213 November 26, 1973

 AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch
I, Court of First Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents.

Petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the Court First Instance of Cebu allowing the probate of the last
will a testament of the late Valente Z. Cruz. Petitioner-appellant Agapita N. Cruz, the surviving spouse of the
said decease opposed the allowance of the will (Exhibit "E"), alleging the will was executed through fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was execute without the testator having
been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the
supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law. Notwithstanding her objection, the
Court allowed the probate of the said last will and testament Hence this appeal by certiorari which was given due
course.

The only question presented for determination, on which the decision of the case hinges, is whether the
supposed last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit "E") was executed in accordance with law,
particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code, the first requiring at least three credible witnesses to
attest and subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will
before a notary public.

Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Francisco Pañares and
Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the
will was supposed to have been acknowledged. Reduced to simpler terms, the question was attested and
subscribed by at least three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other, considering
that the three attesting witnesses must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the same. As the third
witness is the notary public himself, petitioner argues that the result is that only two witnesses appeared before
the notary public to acknowledge the will.

On the other hand, private respondent-appellee, Manuel B. Lugay, who is the supposed executor of the will,
following the reasoning of the trial court, maintains that there is substantial compliance with the legal
requirement of having at least three attesting witnesses even if the notary public acted as one of them, bolstering
up his stand with 57 American Jurisprudence, p. 227 which, insofar as pertinent, reads as follows:

It is said that there are, practical reasons for upholding a will as against the purely technical reason that
one of the witnesses required by law signed as certifying to an acknowledgment of the testator's signature
under oath rather than as attesting the execution of the instrument.

After weighing the merits of the conflicting claims of the parties, We are inclined to sustain that of the appellant
that the last will and testament in question was not executed in accordance with law. The notary public before
whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot
acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to avow; to own as
genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the
third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in
front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear
before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtain
would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.

Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangement. That function would defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses.
For them he would be interested sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves him and the validity of his
own act. It would place him in inconsistent position and the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to
minimize fraud, would be thwarted.

Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary public may, in addition, act as a witness to the
executive of the document he has notarized. There are others holding that his signing merely as notary in a will
nonetheless makes him a witness thereon. But these authorities do not serve the purpose of the law in this
jurisdiction or are not decisive of the issue herein because the notaries public and witnesses referred to
aforecited cases merely acted as instrumental, subscribing attesting witnesses, and not
as acknowledging witnesses. He the notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also acknowledging
witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 805 of the Civil Code which reads:
 ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will or file another with the office of the Clerk of
Court.

To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one the attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would have
the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of
Article 80 be requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806 which requires that the
testator and the required number of witnesses must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The
result would be, as has been said, that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public for or that purpose.
In the circumstances, the law would not be duly in observed.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the probate of the last will and testament
of Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit "E") is declared not valid and hereby set aside.

G.R. No. 192916               October 11, 2010

MANUEL A. ECHAVEZ vs. DOZEN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU CITY, Respondents.

Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of several lots in Cebu City, which includes Lot No. 1956-A
and Lot No. 1959 (subject lots). On September 7, 1985, Vicente donated the subject lots to petitioner Manuel
Echavez (Manuel) through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.1 Manuel accepted the donation.

In March 1986, Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in favor of Dozen Construction and
Development Corporation (Dozen Corporation). In October 1986, they executed two Deeds of Absolute Sale
over the same properties covered by the previous Contract to Sell.

On November 6, 1986, Vicente died. Emiliano Cabanig, Vicente’s nephew, filed a petition for the settlement of
Vicente’s intestate estate. On the other hand, Manuel filed a petition to approve Vicente’s donation mortis causa
in his favor and an action to annul the contracts of sale Vicente executed in favor of Dozen Corporation. These
cases were jointly heard.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed Manuel’s petition to approve the donation and his action for
annulment of the contracts of sale. 2 The RTC found that the execution of a Contract to Sell in favor of Dozen
Corporation, after Vicente had donated the lots to Manuel, was an equivocal act that revoked the donation. The
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s decision. 3 The CA held that since the donation in favor of Manuel was
a donation mortis causa, compliance with the formalities for the validity of wills should have been observed. The
CA found that the deed of donation did not contain an attestation clause and was therefore void.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari

Manuel claims that the CA should have applied the rule on substantial compliance in the construction of a will to
Vicente’s donation mortis causa. He insists that the strict construction of a will was not warranted in the absence
of any indication of bad faith, fraud, or substitution in the execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. He
argues that the CA ignored the Acknowledgment portion of the deed of donation, which contains the "import and
purpose" of the attestation clause required in the execution of wills. The Acknowledgment reads:

BEFORE ME, Notary Public, this 7th day of September 1985 at Talisay, Cebu, personally appeared VICENTE S.
Echavez with Res. Cert. No. 16866094 issued on April 10, 1985 at [sic] Talisay, Cebu known to me to be the
same person who executed the foregoing instrument of Deed of Donartion Mortis Causa  before the Notary
Public and in the presence of the foregoing three (3) witnesses who signed this instrument before and in the
presence of each other and of the Notary Public and all of them acknowledge to me that the same is their
voluntary act and deed.

THE COURT’S RULING

The CA correctly declared that a donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities prescribed by law for
the validity of wills,4 "otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no effect." 5 Articles 805 and 806 of the
Civil Code should have been applied.
As the CA correctly found, the purported attestation clause embodied in the Acknowledgment portion does not
contain the number of pages on which the deed was written.lavvphilThe exception to this rule in Singson v.
Florentino6 and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal, 7 cannot be applied to the present case, as the facts of this case are not
similar with those of Singson and Taboada. In those cases, the Court found that although the attestation clause
failed to state the number of pages upon which the will was written, the number of pages was stated in one
portion of the will. This is not the factual situation in the present case.

Even granting that the Acknowledgment embodies what the attestation clause requires, we are not prepared to
hold that an attestation clause and an acknowledgment can be merged in one statement.

That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two separate provisions of the Civil
Code (Articles 805 and 806, respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts that serve
different purposes. An acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed, declaring before a competent officer
or court that the deed or act is his own. On the other hand, the attestation of a will refers to the act of the
instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to the execution of the instrument before them and to the manner
of its execution.

Although the witnesses in the present case acknowledged the execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa
before the notary public, this is not the avowal the law requires from the instrumental witnesses to the execution
of a decedent’s will. An attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of Article 805 requires. In the
absence of the required avowal by the witnesses themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in
the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.

Finding no reversible error committed by the CA, the Court hereby DENIES Manuel’s petition for review on certiorari.

GR No. L-26615 (April 30, 1970)

Garcia vs. Vasquez

1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION, WILLS; PROBATE OF WILLS; GROUND FOR DISALLOWANCE; TESTATRIX’S
DEFECTIVE EYESIGHT AS UNABLING HER TO READ THE PROVISIONS OF LATER WILL.— The
declarations in court of the opthalmologist as to the condition of the testatrix’s eyesight fully establish the fact
that her vision remained mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading print; that she was, at the time of
the execution of the second will on December 29, 1960, incapable of reading and could not have read the
provisions of the will supposedly signed by her.

2. IRREGULARITIES IN THE EXECUTION OF THE WILL; CASE AT BAR.— Upon its face, the testamentary
provisions, the attestation clause and acknowledgment were crammed together into a single sheet of paper,
apparently to save on space. Plainly, the testament was not prepared with any regard for the defective vision of
Dña. Gliceria, the typographical errors remained uncorrected thereby indicating that the execution thereof must
have been characterized by haste. It is difficult to understand that so important a document containing the final
disposition of one’s worldly possessions should be embodied in an informal and untidy written instrument; or that
the glaring spelling errors should have escaped her notice if she had actually retained the ability to read the
purported will and had done so.

3. EXECUTION OF WILLS; REQUISITES FOR VALIDITY; ART. 808, NEW CIVIL CODE — READING OF THE
WILL TWICE TO A BLIND TESTATOR; PURPOSE.— The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will
to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself is to make the provisions thereof known to
him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes.

4. NOT COMPLIED WITH IN INSTANT CASE.— Where as in the 1960 will there is nothing in the record to show
that the requisites of Art. 808 of the Civil Code of the Philippines that "if the testator is blind, the will shall be read
to him twice," have not been complied with, the said 1960 will suffer from infirmity that affects its due execution.

5. REMEDIAL LAW; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS; ADMINISTRATORS; GROUNDS

FOR REMOVAL; ACQUISITION OF INTEREST ADVERSE TO THAT OF THE ESTATE MAKES THE
ADMINISTRATOR UNSUITABLE TO DISCHARGE THE TRUST; CASE AT BAR.— Considering that the alleged
deed of sale was executed when Gliceria del Rosario was already practically blind and that the consideration
given seems unconscionably small for the properties, there was likelihood that a case for annulment might be
filed against the estate or heirs of Alfonso Precilla. And the administratrix being the widow and heir of the alleged
transferee, cannot be expected to sue herself in an action to recover property that may turn out to belong to the
estate. This, plus her conduct in securing new copies of the owner’s duplicate of titles without the court’s
knowledge and authority and having the contract bind the land through issuance of new titles in her husband’s
name, cannot but expose her to the charge of unfitness or unsuitability to discharge the trust, justifying her
removal from the administration of the estate.

6. REMEDIAL LAW; NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS; ACTION MUST AFFECT "THE TITLE OR THE RIGHT OF
POSSESSION OF REAL PROPERTY." — On the matter of lis pendens, the provisions of the Rules of Court are
clear: notice of the pendency of an action may be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the province in
which the property is situated, if the action affects "the title or the right of possession of (such) real property."

7. NOT APPLICABLE TO INSTANT CASE.— The issue in controversy here is simply the fitness or unfitness of
said special administratrix to continue holding the trust, it does not involve or affect at all the title to, or
possession of, the properties covered by TCT Nos. 81735, 81736 and 81737. Clearly, the pendency of such
case (L-26615) is not an action that can properly be annotated in the record of the titles to the properties.

FACTS:

G.R. No. L-27200 is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in Sp. Proc. No. 62618)
admitting to probate the alleged last will an, testament of the late Gliceria Avelino del Rosario dated 29
December 1960. G.R. Nos. L-26615 and L-2684 are separate petitions for mandamus filed by certain alleged
heirs of said decedent seeking (1) to compel the probate court to remove Consuelo S. Gonzales-Precilla as
special administratrix of the estate, for conflict of interest, to appoint a new one in her stead; and (2) to order the
Register of Deeds of Manila to annotate notice of lis pendens in TCT Nos. 81735, 81736 ,and 81737, registered
in the name of Alfonso Precilla, married to Consuelo Gonzales y Narciso, and said to be properly belonging to
the estate of the deceased Gliceria A. del Rosario.

Insofar as pertinent to the issues involved herein, the facts of these cases may be stated as follows:

Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried in the City of Manila on 2 September 1965, leaving no descendents,
ascendants, brother or sister. At the time of her death, she was said to be 90 years old more or less, and
possessed of an estate consisting mostly of real properties.

On 17 September 1965, Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de Precilla, a niece of the deceased, petitioned the Court of
First Instance of Manila for probate of the alleged last will and testament of Gliceria A. del Rosario, executed on
29 December 1960, and for her appointment as special administratrix of the latter’s estate, said to be valued at
about P100,000.00, pending the appointment of a regular administrator thereof.

The petition was opposed separately by several groups of alleged heirs: (1) Rev. Fr. Lucio V. Garcia, a legatee
named in an earlier will executed by Gliceria A. del Rosario on 9 June 1956; (2) Jaime Rosario and children,
relatives and legatees in both the 1956 and 1960 wills; Antonio Jesus de Praga and Marta Natividad de Jesus,
wards of the deceased and legatees in the 1956 and 1960 wills; (3) Remedios, Encarnacion, and Eduardo, all
surnamed Narciso; (4) Natividad del Rosario-Sarmiento; (5) Maria Narciso; (6) Pascuala Narciso de Manahan;
(7) Severina, Rosa and Josefa, surnamed Narciso, and Vicente and Delfin, surnamed Mauricio, — the latter five
groups of persons all claiming to be relatives of Doña Gliceria within the fifth civil degree. The oppositions
invariably charged that the instrument executed in 1960 was not intended by the deceased to be her true will;
that the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will was procured through undue and improper pressure
and influence the part of the beneficiaries and/or other persons; that the testatrix did not know the object of her
bounty; that the instrument itself reveals irregularities in its execution, and that the formalities required by law for
such execution have not been complied with.

Oppositor Lucio V. Garcia, who also presented for probate the 1956 will of the deceased, joined the group of Dr.
Jaime Rosario in registering opposition to the appointment of petitioner Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de Precilla
as special administratrix, on the ground that the latter possesses interest adverse to the estate. After the parties
were duly heard, the probate court, in its order of 2 October 1965, granted petitioner’s prayer and appointed her
special administratrix of the estate upon a bond for P30,000.00. The order was premised on the fact the
petitioner was managing the properties belonging to the estate even during the lifetime of the deceased, and to
appoint another person as administrator or co administrator at that stage of the proceeding would only result in
further confusion and difficulties.
On 30 September 1965, oppositors Jaime Rosario, Et. Al. filed with the probate court an urgent motion to require
the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank to report all withdrawals made against the funds of the deceased after 2
September 1965. The court denied this motion on 22 October 1965 for being premature, it being unaware that
such deposit in the name of the deceased existed.

On 14 December 1965, the same sets of oppositors, Dr. Jaime Rosario and children, Antonio Jesus de Praga,
Natividad de Jesus and Fr. Lucio V. Garcia, petitioned the court for the immediate removal of the special
administratrix. It was their claim that the special administratrix and her deceased husband, Alfonso Precilla, 2
had caused Gliceria A. del Rosario to execute a simulated and fraudulent deed of absolute sale dated 10
January 1961 allegedly conveying unto said spouses for the paltry sum of P30,000.00 ownership of 3 parcels of
land and the improvements thereon located on Quiapo and San Nicolas, Manila, with a total assessed value of
P334,050.00. Oppositors contended that since it is the duty of the administrator to protect and conserve the
properties of the estate, and it may become necessary that, an action for the annulment of the deed of sale land
for recovery of the aforementioned parcels of land be filed against the special administratrix, as wife and heir of
Alfonso Precilla, the removal of the said administratrix was imperative.

On 17 December 1965, the same oppositors prayed the court for an order directing the Special Administratrix to
deposit with the Clerk of Court all certificates of title belonging to the estate. It was alleged that on 22 October
1965, or after her appointment, petitioner Consuelo Gonzales Vda. de Precilla, in her capacity as special
administratrix of the estate of the deceased Gliceria A. del Rosario, filed with Branch IV of the Court of First
Instance of Manila a motion for the issuance of new copies of the owner’s duplicates of certain certificates of title
in the name of Gliceria del Rosario, supposedly needed by her "in the preparation of the inventory" of the
properties constituting the estate. The motion having been granted, new copies of the owner’s duplicates of
certificates appearing the name of Gliceria del Rosario (among which were TCT Nos. 66201, 66202 and 66204)
were issued on 15 November 1965. On 8 December 1965, according to the oppositors, the same special
administratrix presented to the Register of Deeds the deed of sale involving properties covered by TCT Nos.
66201, 66202 and 66204 supposedly executed by Gliceria del Rosario on 10 January 1961 in favor of Alfonso
Precilla, and, in consequence, said certificates of title were cancelled and new certificates (Nos. 81735, 81736
and 81737) were issued in the name of Alfonso Precilla, married to Consuelo S. Gonzales y Narciso.

On 25 August 1966, the Court issued an order admitting to probate the 1960 will of Gliceria A. del Rosario
(Exhibit "D"). In declaring the due execution of the will, the probate court took note that no evidence had been
presented to establish that the testatrix was not of sound mind when the will was executed; that the fact that she
had prepared an earlier will did not, prevent her from executing another one thereafter; that the fact that the
1956 will consisted of 12 pages whereas the 1960 testament was contained in one page does not render the
latter invalid; that, the erasures and alterations in the instrument were insignificant to warrant rejection; that the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the instrumental witnesses which were noted by the oppositors are even
indicative of their truthfulness. The probate court, also considering that petitioner had already shown capacity to
administer the properties of the estate and that from the provisions of the will she stands as the person most
concerned and interested therein, appointed said petitioner regular administratrix with a bond for P50,000.00.
From this order all the oppositors appealed, the case being docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-27200.

Then, on 13 September 1966, the probate court resolved the oppositors’ motion of 14 December 1965 for the
removal of the then special administratrix, as follows:

"It would seem that the main purpose of the motion to remove the special administratrix and to appoint another
one in her stead, is in order that an action may be filed against the special administratrix for the annulment of the
deed of sale executed by the decedent on January 10, 1961. Under existing documents, the properties sold
pursuant to the said deed of absolute sale no longer forms part of the estate. The alleged conflict of interest is
accordingly not between different claimants of the same estate. If it is desired by the movants that an action be
filed by them to annul the aforesaid deed absolute sale, it is not necessary that the special administratrix be
removed and that another one be appointed to file such action. Such a course of action would only produce
confusion and difficulties in the settlement of the estate. The movants may file the aforesaid proceedings,
preferably in an independent action, to secure the nullity of the deed of absolute even without leave of this
court:"

As regard the motion of 17 December 1965 asking for the deposit in court of the titles in the name of the
decedent, the same was also denied, for the reason that if the movants were referring to the old titles, they could
no longer be produced, and if they meant the new duplicate copies thereof that were issued at the instance of
the special administratrix, there would be no necessity therefor, because they were already cancelled and other
certificates were issued in the name of Alfonso Precilla. This order precipitated the oppositors’ filing in this Court
of a petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-26615, Rev. Fr. Lucio V. Garcia, Et. Al. v. Hon. Judge Conrado M.
Vasquez, Et. Al.), which was given due course on 6 October 1966.
On 15 December 1965, with that motion for removal pending in the court, the oppositors requested the Register
of Deeds of Manila to annotate a notice of lis pendens in the records of TCT Nos. 81735, 81736, and 81737 in
the name of Alfonso Precilla. And when said official refused to do so, they applied to the probate court (in Sp.
Proc. No. 62618) for an order to compel the Register of Deeds to annotate a lis pendens notice in the
aforementioned titles contending that the matter of removal and appointment of the administratrix, involving TCT
Nos. 81735, 81736, and 81737, was already before the Supreme Court. Upon denial of this motion on 12
November 1966, oppositors filed another mandamus action, this time against the probate court and the Register
of Deeds. The case was docketed and given due course in this Court as G.R. No. L-26864.

Foremost of the questions to be determined here concerns the correctness of the order allowing the probate of
the 1960 will.

The records of the probate proceeding fully establish the fact that the testatrix, Gliceria A. del Rosario, during her
lifetime, executed two wills: one on 9 June 1956 consisting of 12 pages and written in Spanish, a language that
she knew and spoke, witnessed by Messrs. Antonio Cabrera, Jesus Y. Ayala and Valentin Marquez, and
acknowledged before notary public Jose Ayala; and another dated 29 December 1960, consisting of 1 page and
written in Tagalog, witnessed by Messrs. Vicente Rosales, Francisco Decena, and Francisco Lopez and
acknowledged before notary public Remigio M. Tividad.

Called to testify on the due execution of the 1960 will, instrumental witnesses Decena, Lopez and Rosales
uniformly declared that they were individually requested by Alfonso Precilla (the late husband of petitioner
special administratrix) to witness the execution of the last will of Doña Gliceria A. del Rosario; that they arrived at
the house of the old lady at No. 2074 Azcarraga, Manila, one after the other, in the afternoon of 29 December
1960; that the testatrix at the time was apparently of clear and sound mind, although she was being aided by
Precilla when she walked; that the will, which was already prepared, was first read "silently" by the testatrix
herself before she signed it; that he three witnesses thereafter signed the will in the presence of the testatrix and
the notary public and of one another. There is also testimony that after the testatrix and the witnesses to the will
acknowledged the instrument to be their voluntary act and deed, the notary public asked for their respective
residence certificates which were handed to him by Alfonso Precilla, clipped together; 5 that after comparing
them with the numbers already written on the will, the notary public filled in the blanks in the instrument with the
date, 29 January 1960, before he affixed his signature and seal thereto. 6 They also testified that on that
occasion no pressure or influence has been exerted by any person upon the testatrix to execute the will.

Of course, the interest and active participation of Alfonso Precilla in the signing of this 1960 will are evident from
the records. The will appeared to have been prepared by one who is not conversant with the spelling of Tagalog
words, and it has been shown that Alfonso Precilla is a Cebuano who speaks Tagalog with a Visayan accent.
The witnesses to the will, two of whom are fellow Visayans, admitted their relationship or closeness to Precilla.
It was Precilla who instructed them to go to the house of Gliceria del Rosario on 29 December 1960 to witness
an important document, and who took their residence certificates from them a few days before the will was
signed. Precilla had met the notary public and witnesses Rosales and Lopez at the door of the residence of the
old woman; he ushered them to the room at the second floor where the signing of the document took place; 1
then he fetched witness Decena from the latter’s haberdashery shop a few doors away and brought him to, the
house the testatrix. And when the will was actually executed Precilla was present.

The oppositors-appellants in the present case, however, challenging the correctness of the probate court’s
ruling, maintain that on 29 December 1960 the eyesight of Gliceria del Rosario was so poor and defective that
she could not have read the provisions of the will, contrary to the testimonies of witnesses Decena, Lopez and
Rosales.

On this point, we find the declarations in court of Dr. Jesus V. Tamesis very material and illuminating. Said
ophthalmologist, whose expertise was admitted by both parties, testified, among other things, that when Doña
Gliceria del Rosario saw him for consultation on 11 March 1960 he found her left eye to have cataract (opaque
lens), and that it was "above normal in pressure", denoting a possible glaucoma, a disease that leads to
blindness As to the conditions of her right eye, Dr. Tamesis declared:

"Q But is there anything here in the entry appearing in the other documents Exhibits 3-B, 3-C and 3-D from which you could inform
the court as to the condition of the vision of the patient as to the right eve?

"A Under date of August 30, 1960, is the record of refraction. that is setting of glass by myself which showed that the right eye with
my prescription of glasses had a vision of 2 over 60 (20/60) and for the left eye with her correction 20 over 300 (20/300).

"Q In layman’s language, Doctor, what is the significance of that notation that the right had a degree of 20 over 60 (20/60)?
"A It meant that eye at least would be able to recognize objects or persons at a minimum distance of twenty feet.

"Q But would that grade enable the patient to read print?

"A Apparently that is only a record for distance vision, for distance sight, not for near

The records also show that although Dr. Tamesis operated of the left eye of the decedent at the Lourdes
Hospital on 8 August 1960; as of 23 August 1960, inspite of the glasses her vision was only "counting fingers," at
five feet. The cross-examination of the doctor further elicited the following responses:

"Q After she was discharged from the hospital you prescribed lenses for her, or glasses?

"A After her discharge from the hospital, she was coming to my clinic for further examination and then sometime later
glasses were prescribed.

"Q And the glasses prescribed by you enabled her to read, Doctor?

"A As far as my record is concerned, with the glasses for the left eye which I prescribed — the eye which I operated — she
could see only forms but not read. That is on the left eye.

"Q How about the right eye?

"A The same, although the vision on the right eye is even better than the left eye."

Then, confronted with a medical certificate (Exhibit H) issued by him on 29 November 1965 certifying that
Gliceria del Rosario was provided with aphakic lenses and "had been under medical supervision up to 1963 with
apparently good vision", the doctor had this to say:

"Q When yon said that she had apparently good vision you mean that she was able to read?

"A No, not necessarily, only able to go around, take care of herself and see. This I can tell you, this report was made on pure
recollections and I recall she was using her glasses although I recall also that we have to give her medicines to improve her
vision, some medicines to improve her identification some more.

"Q What about the vision in the right eve, was that corrected by the glasses?

"A Yes, with the new prescription which I issued on 80 August 1960. It is in the clinical record.

"Q The vision in the right eye was corrected?

"A Yes That is the vision for distant objects

The foregoing testimony of the ophthalmologist who treated the deceased and, therefore, has first hand
knowledge of the actual condition of her eyesight from August, 1960 up to 1963, fully establish the fact that
notwithstanding the operation and removal of the cataract in her left eye and her being fitted with aphakic lens
(used by cataract patients), her vision remained mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading print.
Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that with the condition of her eyesight in August, 1960, and there is no
evidence that it had improved by 29 December 1960, Gliceria del Rosario was incapable f reading, and could not
have read the provisions of the will supposedly signed by her on 29 December 1960. It is worth noting that the
instrumental witnesses stated that she read the instrument "silently". which is a conclusion and not a fact.

Against the background of defective eyesight of the alleged testatrix, the appearance of the will, Exhibit "D",
acquires striking significance. Upon its face, the testamentary provisions, the attestation clause and
acknowledgment were crammed together into a single sheet of paper, to much so that the words had to be
written very close on the top, bottom and two sides of the paper, leaving no margin whatsoever; the word "and"
had to be written by the symbol" &", apparently to save on space. Plainly, the testament was not prepared with
any regard for the defective vision of Doña Gliceria. Further, typographical errors like "HULINH" for "HULING"
(last), "Alfonsa" ;or "Alfonso", "MERCRDRS" for MERCEDES", "instrumental" for "Instrumental", and
"acknowledged" for "acknowledge’’, remained uncorrected, thereby indicating that execution thereof must have
been characterized by haste.

 It is difficult to understand that so important a document containing the final disposition of one’s worldly
possessions should be embodied in an informal and untidily written instrument; or that the glaring
spelling errors should have escaped her notice if she had actually retained the ability to read the
purported will and had done so. The record is thus convincing that the supposed testatrix could not have
 physically read or understood the alleged testament, Exhibit "D", and that its admission to probate was
erroneous and should be reversed.

That Doña Gliceria should be able to greet her guests on her birthday, arrange flowers and attend to kitchen
tasks shortly prior to the alleged execution of the testament Exhibit "D", as appears from the photographs,
Exhibits "E" to "E-1", in no way proves; that she was able to read a closely typed page, since the acts shown do
not require vision at close range. It must be remembered that with the natural lenses removed, her eyes had lost
the power of adjustment to near vision, the substituted glass lenses being rigid and uncontrollable by her.
Neither is the signing of checks (Exhibits "G" to "G-3") by her indicative of ability to see at normal reading
distances.

 Writing or signing of one’s name, when sufficiently practiced, becomes automatic, so that one need only
to have a rough indication of the place where the signature is to be affixed in order to be able to write it.
Indeed, a close examination of the checks, amplified in the photograph, Exhibit "O", et seq., reinforces
the contention of oppositors that the alleged testatrix could not see at normal reading distance: the
signatures in the checks are written far above the printed base, lines, and the names of the payees as
well as the amounts written do not appear to be in the handwriting of the alleged testatrix, being in a
much firmer and more fluid hand than hers.

Thus, for all intents and purpose of the rules on probate, the deceased Gliceria del Rosario was, as appellant
oppositors contend, not unlike a blind testator, and the due execution of her will would have required observance
of the provisions of Article 808 of the Civil Code.

ART. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses,
and again, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged.

The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the
will himself (as when he is illiterate), 18 is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able
to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. That the aim of the law is to insure that the dispositions of
the will are properly communicated to and understood by the handicapped testator, thus making them truly
reflective of his desire, is evidenced by the requirement that the will should be read to the latter, not only once
but twice, by two different persons, and that the witnesses have to act within the range of his (the testator’s)
other senses.

In connection with the will here in question, there is nothing in the records to show that the above requisites have
been complied with. Clearly, as already stated, the 1960 will sought to be probated suffers from infirmity that
affects its due execution.

We also find merit in the complaint of oppositors Lucio V. Garcia, Et Al., against the denial by the probate court
of their petition for the removal of Consuelo Gonzales Vda. de Precilla as special administratrix of the estate of
the deceased Doña Gliceria (Petition, G.R. No. L-26615, Annex "B").

The oppositors’ petition was based allegedly on the existence in the special administratrix of an interest adverse
to that of the estate. It was their contention that through fraud her husband had caused the deceased Gliceria
del Rosario to execute a deed of sale, dated 10 January 1961, by virtue of which the latter purportedly conveyed
unto said Alfonso D. Precilla, married to Consuelo Gonzales y Narciso, the ownership of 3 parcels of land and
the improvements thereon, assessed at P334,050.00, for the sum of P30,000.00.

In denying the petition, the probate court, in its order of 13 September 1966 (Annex "P", Petition) reasoned out
that since the properties were already sold no longer form part of the estate. The conflict of interest would not be
between the estate and third parties, but among the different claimants of said properties, in which case,
according to the court, the participation of the special administratrix in the action for annulment that may be
brought would not be necessary.

The error in this line of reasoning lies in the fact that what was being questioned was precisely the validity of the
conveyance or sale of the properties. In short, if proper, the action for annulment would have to be undertaken
on behalf of the estate by the special administratrix, affecting as it does the property or rights of the deceased.
For the rule is that only where there is no special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
may the legal heirs commence an action arising out of a right belonging to their ancestor.

There is no doubt that to settle the question of the due execution and validity of the deed of sale, an ordinary and
separate action would have to be instituted, the matter not falling within the competence of the probate court. 22
Considering the facts then before it, i.e., the alleged deed of sale having been executed by Gliceria del Rosario
on 10 January 1961, when she was already practically blind; and that the consideration of P30,000.00 seems to
be unconscionably small for properties with a total assessed value of P334,050.00, there was likelihood that a
case for annulment might indeed be filed against the estate or heirs of Alfonso Precilla. And the administratrix,
being the widow and heir of the alleged transferee, cannot be expected to sue herself in an action to recover
property that may turn out to belong to the estate.

 Not only this, but the conduct of the special administratrix in securing new copies of the owner’s
duplicates of TCT Nos. 66201, 66202, and 66204, without the court’s knowledge or authority, and on the
pretext that she needed them in the preparation of the inventory of the estate, when she must have
already known by then that the properties covered therein were already "conveyed" to her husband by
the deceased, being the latter’s successor, and having the contract bind the land through issuance of
new titles in her husband’s name cannot but expose her to the charge of unfitness or unsuitableness to
discharge the trust, justifying her removal from the administration of the estate.

With respect to the orders of the court a quo denying (1) the oppositors’ motion to require the Hongkong and
Shanghai Bank to report all withdrawals made against the funds of the deceased after 2 September 1965 and
(2) the motion for annotation of a lis pendens notice on TCT Nos. 81735, 81736 and 81737, the same are to be
affirmed.

The probate court pointed out in its order of 22 October 1965 (Annex "H") that it could not have taken action on
the complaint against the alleged withdrawals from the bank deposits of the deceased, because as of that time
the court had not yet been apprised that such deposits exist. Furthermore, as explained by the special
administratrix in her pleading of 30 October 1965, the withdrawals referred to by the oppositors could be those
covered by checks issued in the name of Gliceria del Rosario during her lifetime but cleared only after her death.
That explanation, which not only appears plausible but has not been rebutted by the petitioners-oppositors,
negates any charge of grave abuse in connection with the issuance of the order here in question.

On the matter of lis pendens (G.R. No. L-26864), the provisions of the Rules of Court are clear: notice of the
pendency of an action may be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the province in which the property
is situated, if the action affects "the title or the right of possession of (such) real property." 23 In the case at bar,
the pending action which oppositors seek to annotate in the records of TCT Nos. 81735, 81736, and 81737 is
the mandamus proceeding filed in this Court (G.R. No. L-26615).

As previously discussed in this opinion, however, that case is concerned merely with the correctness of the
denial by the probate court of the motion for the removal of Consuelo Gonzales Vda. de Precilla as special
administratrix of the estate of the late Gliceria del Rosario. In short, the issue in controversy there is simply the
fitness or unfitness of said special administratrix to continue holding the trust; it does not involve or affect at all
the title to, or possession of, the properties covered by said TCT Nos. 81735, 81736 and 81737. Clearly, the
pendency of such case (L-26615) is not an action that can properly be annotated in the record of the titles to the
properties.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the order of the court below allowing to probate the alleged 1960 will of Gliceria
A. del Rosario is hereby reversed and set aside. The petition in G.R. No. L-26615 being meritorious, the appealed
order is set aside and the court below is ordered to remove the administratrix, Consuelo Gonzales Vda. de Precilla,
and appoint one of the heirs intestate of the deceased Doña Gliceria Avelino del Rosario as special administrator for
the purpose of instituting action on behalf of her estate to recover the properties allegedly sold by her to the late
Alfonso D. Precilla. And in Case G.R. No. L-26864, petition is dismissed. No costs.

[G.R. No. 74695. September 14, 1993.]

In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Deceased Brigido Alvarado,

CESAR ALVARADO, Petitioner, v. HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA.
ROSARIO QUETULIO LOSA and HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO, Associate Justices, Intermediate
Appellate Court, First Division (Civil Cases), and BAYANI MA. RINO, Respondents.

1. CIVIL LAW; PROBATE OF WILL; ART. 808, NEW CIVIL CODE; SCOPE OF THE TERM "BLINDNESS." —
The following pronouncement in Garcia v. Vasquez provides an insight into the scope of the term "blindness" as
used in Art. 808, to wit: "The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or
incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so
that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes . . ." Clear from the foregoing is that
Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are "incapable of
reading the(ir) will(s)." Since Brigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on
the separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision, there can be no other
course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art.
808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted
the will and codicil did so conformably with his instructions.

2. WILL MUST BE READ TWICE; PURPOSE. — Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido
Alvarado, the will shall be read twice; once, by one of the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public
before whom the will was acknowledged. The purpose is to make known to the incapacitated testator the
contents of the document before signing and to give him an opportunity to object if anything is contrary to his
instructions.

3. SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE THEREWITH, ACCEPTABLE; REASON. — This Court has held in a number
of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the
reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all
kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary
privilege. The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict
compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal
imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account,
may only defeat the testator’s will.

4. CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator’s will and codicil aloud in the
presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto,
the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did
the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the
contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the
contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution was not the first time that Brigido had
affirmed the truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that
Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even
prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator’s residence precisely for the purpose of securing
his conformity to the draft.

FACTS:

Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated 11 April 1986 1 of the First Civil Cases Division of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Order dated 27 June 1983 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting to probate the last will and testament 3 with codicil 4 of the
late Brigido Alvarado.

On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein
he disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at
the time awaiting probate before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and by private respondent who were
present at the execution, the testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent,
as the lawyer who drafted the eight-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the
three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter four followed the reading with their own respective
copies previously furnished them.

Meanwhile, Brigido’s holographic will was subsequently admitted to probate on 9 December 1977. On the 29th
day of the same month, a codicil entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa
Huling Habilin na May Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado" was executed changing some dispositions
in the notarial will to generate cash for the testator’s eye operation. Brigido was then suffering from glaucoma.
But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the testator
did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his
presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the
notary public who followed the reading using their own copies.

A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator’s death on 3 January 1979 by
private respondent as executor with the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Siniloan, Laguna.
Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition on the following grounds: that the will sought to be probated was not
executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapacitated to
make a will at the time of its execution due to senility and old age; that the will was executed under duress, or
influence of fear or threats; that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiary who stands to get the lion’s share of the testator’s estate; and lastly, that the signature of the testator
was procured by fraud or trick.

When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate the grounds relied upon in the Opposition, a Probate Order
was issued on 27 June 1983 from which an appeal was made to respondent court. The main thrust of the appeal
was that the deceased was blind within the meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil
attached thereto were executed; that since the reading required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code was admittedly not
complied with, probate of the deceased’s last will and codicil should have been denied.

On 11 April 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision under review with the following findings: that
Brigido Alvarado was not blind at the time his last will and codicil were executed; that assuming his blindness,
the reading requirement of Art. 808 was substantially complied with when both documents were read aloud to
the testator with each of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public following the reading with their
respective copies of the instruments. The appellate court then concluded that although Art. 808 was not followed
to the letter, there was substantial compliance since its purpose of making known to the testator the contents of
the drafted will was served.

The issues now before us can be stated thus: Was Brigido Alvarado blind for purposes of Art. 808 at the time his
"Huling Habilin" and its codicil were executed? If so, was the double-reading requirement of said article complied
with?

Regarding the first issue, there is no dispute on the following facts: Brigido Alvarado was not totally blind at the
time the will and codicil were executed. However, his vision on both eyes was only of "counting fingers at three
(3) feet" by reason of the glaucoma which he had been suffering from for several years and even prior to his first
consultation with an eye specialist on 14 December 1977.

The point of dispute is whether the foregoing circumstances would qualify Brigido as a "blind" testator under Art.
808 which reads:

"Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing, witnesses,
and again, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged."

Petitioner contends that although his father was not totally blind when the will and codicil were executed, he can
be so considered within the scope of the term as it is used in Art. 808. To support his stand, petitioner presented
before the trial court a medical certificate issued by Dr. Salvador R. Salceda, Director of the Institute of
Opthalmology (Philippine Eye Research Institute), the contents of which were interpreted in layman’s terms by
Dr. Ruperto Roasa, whose expertise was admitted by private Respondent. Dr. Roasa explained that although
the testator could visualize fingers at three (3) feet, he could no longer read either printed or handwritten matters
as of 14 December 1977, the day of his first consultation.

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, contrary to the medical testimony, held that the testator could still read
on the day the will and the codicil were executed but chose not to do so because of "poor eyesight." Since the
testator was still capable of reading at that time, the court a quo concluded that Art. 808 need not be complied
with.

We agree with petitioner in this respect.

Regardless of respondent’s staunch contention that the testator was still capable of reading at the time his will
and codicil were prepared, the fact remains and this was testified to by his witnesses, that Brigido did not do so
because of his "poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision making it necessary for private respondent to do the actual
reading for him.

The following pronouncement in Garcia v. Vasquez 13 provides an insight into the scope of the term "blindness"
as used in Art. 808, to wit:

"The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the
will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to
object if they are not in accordance with his wishes . . ."

Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason
or another, are "incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." Since Brigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final
drafts of his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or
"blurred" vision, there can be no other course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the
scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of
ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so conformably with his instructions.
Hence, to consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential that we ascertain whether
Art. 808 had been complied with.

Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be read twice; once, by one of
the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public before whom the will was acknowledged. The
purpose is to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the document before signing and to give
him an opportunity to object if anything is contrary to his instructions.

That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. Instead of the notary public and an instrumental witness, it
was the lawyer (private respondent) who drafted the eight-paged will and the five-paged codicil who read the
same aloud to the testator, and read them only once, not twice as Art. 808 requires.

Private respondent however insists that there was substantial compliance and that the single reading suffices for
purposes of the law. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that the only valid compliance is a strict compliance
or compliance to the letter and since it is admitted that neither the notary public nor an instrumental witness read
the contents of the will and codicil to Brigido, probate of the latter’s will and codicil should have been disallowed.

We sustain private respondent’s stand and necessarily, the petition must be denied.

This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of
the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended
to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to
destroy the testamentary privilege.

In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator’s will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his
three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon
being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and
acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the
will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with
respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth
and authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado
already acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to 5
November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator’s residence precisely for the purpose of securing his
conformity to the draft.

Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the documents on 5 November and 29 December 1977. The
notary public and the three instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit silently. Afterwards,
Atty. Nonia de la Pena (the notary public) and Dr. Crescente O. Evidente (one of the three instrumental
witnesses and the testator’s physician) asked the testator whether the contents of the documents were of his
own free will. Brigido answered in the affirmative. With four persons following the reading word for word with
their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him
(those which he affirmed were in accordance with his instructions), were the terms actually appearing on the
typewritten documents. This is especially true when we consider the fact that the three instrumental witnesses
were persons known to the testator, one being his physician (Dr. Evidente) and another (Potenciano C.
Ranieses) being known to him since childhood.

The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with
the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections
should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only
defeat the testator’s will.

As a final word to convince petitioner of the propriety of the trial court’s Probate Order and its affirmance by the
Court of Appeals, we quote the following pronouncement in Abangan v. Abangan, to wit:

"The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud,
to avoid the substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws
on the subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand,
also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the
right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the
testator’s will, must be disregarded"

Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and unmistakable terms in his "Huling Habilin" and the
codicil attached thereto. We are unwilling to cast these aside for the mere reason that a legal requirement
intended for his protection was not followed strictly when such compliance had been rendered unnecessary by
the fact that the purpose of the law, i.e., to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the draft of
his will, had already been accomplished. To reiterate, substantial compliance suffices where the purpose has
been served.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 11 April 1986 is
AFFIRMED. Considering the length of time that this case has remained pending, this decision is immediately executory.
Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. L-27440 December 24, 1927

JOSE VILLAFLOR, petitioner-appellant, vs. DEOGRACIAS TOBIAS, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.

This is an appeal from the judgment denying a petition for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by
one Gregoria Villaflor who died in the municipality of Santo Domingo, Province of Ilocos Sur on October 7, 1925.
The petition was presented by Jose Villaflor, one of the testamentary heirs of the deceased. Pilar Villaflor,
Deogracias Tobias, and several others whose names do not appear in the record, contested the will upon the
following grounds:

(1) That it was not signed by the alleged testatrix personally though she was able to do so at the time of the
execution of the document;
(2) that said testatrix did not authorize any one to sign the alleged will in her name;
(3) that both before and after the execution of the document, Gregoria Villaflor signed various documents by
thumb marks;
(4) that although it is true that the testatrix requested that the will be prepared, she nevertheless refused to sign it
because it was contrary to her desires and instructions;
(5) that subsequent to the date upon which the alleged will was executed, Gregoria Villaflor on several occasions
stated that it was not her testament;
(6) that the alleged will was not executed or signed in conformity of the law.

After a careful examination of all the evidence of record, this court is of opinion that it has been sufficiently
proved that Claro Lazo, the person who is alleged to have written the name of the testatrix in her behalf and by
her express direction, subscribed the name and surname of the testatrix and signed the will in question without
Rufino D. Soliven, one of the attesting witnesses, signed it; and lastly, when Rufino D. Soliven signed the will the
witness Vicente Tacderas was not present.

Besides the foregoing defect, which the court believes fatal, it also finds that the will in question, marked Exhibit
B of the applicant, was typewritten on eight catalan sheets, one separated from the others; that the attestation
clause was written on a separate sheet, marked page 9, when said clause could not have been written totally or
partially on page 8, since one-half of this latter page is blank.lawphi1.net

In the opinion of the court, all this circumstances tend to make the authenticity and due execution of the will in
question very doubtful and suspicious. And if the testimony of the witnesses for the opposition should be taken
into account as well as the circumstance that the testatrix Gregoria Villaflor has neither signed or subscribed the
alleged will, notwithstanding the fact that it has been proven in the record, that on July 12, 1923, the day in which
it is alleged that said will was executed, the testatrix was, in good and sound health, although she could not walk
on her own feet inasmuch as she was then suffering from rheumatism or partial paralysis of the lower
extremities, and that on July 27, and May 25, 1923, the testatrix Gregoria Villaflor used to mark with her thumb, if
she did not sign, the document she executed, as it was proven during the trials by Exhibit 1 and 2 of the
opponents, the doubt and suspicion which this court entertains in regard to the authenticity of the will in question,
becomes a certainty that said testament is false.

We are reluctant to set aside the findings of the court below but they are, in our opinion, so clearly without
sufficient support in the record that we are constrained to reject them. The will in question is dated July 12, 1923,
and was prepared by a lawyer, Eustaquio Gallardo, and as far as appearances go, was executed in strict
compliance with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the execution of wills. The
testatrix's name was signed by one Claro Lazo, a clerk in the office of municipal treasurer of Santo Domingo,
and the attesting witnesses were Vicente Tacderas, municipal president, Rufino D. Soliven, chief of police, and
Mariano Pizarro, municipal treasurer, all of the town of Santo Domingo. The finding of the court below that the
witness Soliven was not present when Claro Lazo signed the name of testatrix and when Vicente Tacderas
signed as witness, is based on the fact that, in testifying in this case, Claro Lazo upon being asked to enumerate
the names of the persons present at the time of signing of the document, omitted the name of Soliven. But it
appears from the transcript of the testimony that he afterwards corrected his original statement and testified that
Soliven, as well as the other witnesses to the will, was present while all of the signatures were fixed. This is in
harmony with the testimony of all of the instrumental witnesses and is undoubtfully true; there is, indeed, nothing
strange or unusual in a mistake such as that made by Lazo. It may be noted that it is not disputed that the lawyer
Gallardo was present during the whole proceeding and as he appears to have possessed full knowledge of the
formal requirements for the execution of the will, it is highly improbable that he would have allowed the will in
question to be signed without the presence of a testatrix and of all the witnesses.

That the attestation clause of the will is written on a separate page and not on the last page of the body of the
document is, in our opinion, a matter of minor importance and is explained by the fact that if the clause had been
written on the eight page of the will in direction continuation of the body thereof, there would have been sufficient
space on that page for the signatures of the witnesses to the clause. It is also to be observed that all of the
pages, including that upon which the attestation clause is written, bear the signatures of all the witnesses and
that there is no question whatever as to the genuineness of said signatures.

The fact that the name of the testatrix was written by another person, and that she did not sign by thumb mark, is
easily explained and is evidently due to an attempt on the part of the lawyer Gallardo to comply strictly with the
following clause in the Spanish text of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure: "Excepto en el caso a que se
refiere el articulo anterior, no sera valido para la transmision de bienes muebles e inmuebles, ni los gravara y
afectara, ningun testamento a menos que este escrito y que haya sido firmado por el testador, o que lleve el
nombre de este, escrito por otra persona en su presencia y bajo su direccion expresa, . . . ." The making of a
finger mark is not "escribir" and it may be noted that Gallardo apparently is a good Spanish scholar, that it does
not appear that he knows the English language;. and that he therefore probably used the Spanish text of the
Code.

There is some testimony on the part of the contestants to the effect that the testatrix on various occasions,
subsequent to the execution of the will, had stated that it was not in conformity with her instructions and that it
was not her will. Assuming that such statements were made, we can give them but little importance. The
testatrix was an old woman and might have well made the statements by way of justification in conversation with
persons who considered themselves wronged by the provisions of her will, but expressions of that kind cannot,
of course, work the revocation of the document. The testatrix lived for over two years after the will was made and
had ample opportunity to make another will if she was dissatisfied with the first.

For the reasons stated the appealed judgment is hereby reversed and it is ordered that the document in question be
admitted to probate as the last will and testament of the deceased Gregoria Villaflor. No costs will be allowed. So ordered.