Between Impunity and Accountability English

Briefing Paper
Transitional Justice
Between
I m pun it y An d Accoun t a bilit y
A comparative overview of transitional justice processes

in two post-Conflict South Asian Countries: Nepal and Afghanistan
December 10, 2008

National day of the Victims in Afghanistan
© AIHRC
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1da837/
Between
Impunity And Accountability
A comparative overview of transitional justice processes in two

post-Conflict South Asian Countries: Nepal and Afghanistan
Written by: Abdul Jalil Benish, Afghanistan

Co-Authors:
Bhanu Bhakta Acharya, Nepal
Niamatullah Ibrahimi, Afghanistan
December 10, 2008

National day of the Victims in Afghanistan
www.watchafghanistan.org
Afghanistan Watch Briefing Paper, December 10, 2008 page
CONTENTS PAGE
1. INTRODUCTION 4
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 6
3. COMMENCEMENT OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PROCESS 9
4. ROLE OF STATES 11
5. ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY 13
6. ROLE OF PERPETRATORS 16
7. ROLE OF THE PEOPLE AND VICTIMS 18
8. CONCLUSION 19
9. APPENDIXES 22
South Asia Map
Country Profiles: Nepal and Afghanistan
Acronyms
About The Afghanistan Watch
Authors And Acknowledgements
page
Afghanistan Watch Briefing Paper, December 10, 2008
1. INTRODUCTION
Transitional justice is a response to systematic or widespread violations of human

rights. It seeks recognition for the victims and to promote possibilities for peace,
reconciliation and democracy. Transitional justice is not a special form of justice but
justice adapted to societies transforming themselves after a period of pervasive human
rights abuse. In some cases, these transformations happen suddenly; in others, they may
take place over many decades1.
Transitional justice generally refers to a range of approaches that states may use to
address past human rights wrongs and includes both judicial and non-judicial
components. They include series of actions or policies and their resulting institutions,
which may be enacted at a point of political transition from violence and repression to
societal stability. Transitional justice is informed by a society s desire to rebuild social
trust, repair a fractured justice system, and build solid foundations for a democratic
system of governance. The core value of transitional justice is the notion of justice: not
necessarily criminal justice, but other forms of justice as well. This notion and the
political transformation, such as regime change or transition from conflict, are thus
meant to contribute toward a more peaceful, certain and democratic future for post-
conflict societies2.
The term transitional justice has recently received greater attention by both academics
and policymakers. It has also generated interest in the fields of political and legal
discourse, especially in transitional societies. In periods of political transitions, from
authoritarian, dictatorial regimes or from civil conflicts to a democracy, transitional
justice has often provided opportunities for such societies to reflect on the root causes
of war and violence and address past human rights abuses, mass atrocities, or other
forms of severe trauma in order to facilitate a smooth transition into a more democratic
or peaceful future3.
This approach emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s, mainly in response to
political changes in Latin America and Eastern Europe and to demands in these
regions for justice. At the time, human rights activists and others wanted to address the
systematic abuses by former regimes but without endangering the political
transformations that were underway. Since these changes were popularly called
transitions to democracy, people began calling this new multidisciplinary field
transitional justice.
Normally, a transitional justice process includes the following initiatives4:
Criminal prosecutions. They are judicial investigations of those responsible for

human rights violations. Prosecutors frequently emphasize investigations of the big
fish : suspects considered most responsible for massive or systematic crimes.
1
For more detail, please visit http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/
2
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transitional_justice
3
ibid.
4
www.ictj.org/en/tj
Truth commissions. These commissions of inquiry have the primary purposes of

investigating and reporting on key periods of recent past abuse. They are often
official state bodies that make recommendations to remedy such abuse and to prevent
its recurrence.
Reparations programs. They are state-sponsored initiatives that help repair the
material and moral damages of past abuse. They typically distribute a mix of material
and symbolic benefits to victims, benefits which may include financial compensation
and official apologies.
Security system reform. These efforts seek to transform the military, police, judiciary
and other related state institutions from instruments of repression and corruption into
instruments of public service and integrity.
Memorialization efforts. They include museums and memorials that preserve public
memory of the victims and raise moral and historical consciousness about past
abuses, in order to build a bulwark against its recurrence.
As the field has expanded and diversified, transitional justice has gained an important
foundation in international law5. Part of the legal basis for transitional justice is the
1988 decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of Velásquez
Rodríguez v. Honduras, in which the Inter-American Court found that all states have
four fundamental obligations in the area of human rights. These are:
- To take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations;

- To conduct a serious investigation of violations when they occur;
- To impose suitable sanctions on those responsible for the violations; and
- To ensure reparation for the victims of the violations.
Those principles have been explicitly affirmed by later decisions by the court and
endorsed in decisions by the European Court of Human Rights and by UN treaty body
decisions such as the Human Rights Committee. The 1998 creation of the International
Criminal Court was also significant, as the Court s statute enshrines state obligations of
vital importance to the fight against impunity and respect for victims rights.
5
Louis Bickford; Macmillan Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity USA, (2004), vol.
3, pp. 1045-1047.
page
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In addition to natural and geographical congruencies, Nepal and Afghanistan have

many similarities in their political processes, ideological struggles, socio-economic
structures, sources of conflicts and patterns of power struggles. Nepal has recently
experienced a decade-long conflict led by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
against the Government in the name of People's Struggle starting from 1996 and ending
in 2006. Afghanistan has experienced a series of political upheavals covering a period
of 23-30 years: fall of monarchism in 1972 by a coup led by Daoud Khan, the
communist coup in 1978, the victory of Mujahedin in 1992 and most recently the
horrors of the Taliban rule between 1996 and 2001. After 7 years of US-led
international intervention, the country is still experiencing an increasingly bloody
conflict as the Taliban launched a renewed war against the US-backed Afghan
government and its international supporters.
Afghanistan throughout its political history has witnessed inhuman crimes, torture,
politically motivated land grabbing and redistribution by those in power, oppression
and massacres, but in the last one-hundred years the most serious crisis that engulfed
the country was commenced by April coup of 1978 that brought into power the
People s Democratic Party, the major pro-Soviet communist party of Afghanistan, until
1992 when the regime was overthrown as a result of 14 years of rebellion and Western-
backed jihad, or holy war. Under the rule of the Mujahedin (1992-1996) the country,
particularly the capital Kabul, became the centre of a bloody civil war and of massive
human rights violations. In response to the chaos and widespread lawlessness, the
Taliban rose from the south of the country with the slogan of peace and stability.
Occupying Kabul in 1996, the movement became another major warring faction that
involved itself in some of the worst cases of human rights violations and bloodsheds
until its downfall in late 2001. Discussions of transitional justice in the country are so
far concentrating on this period of 23 years, during which massive human rights abuses
were perpetrated by all parties involved. 6
Following the collapse of the monarchy and Daoud s republic, the country was
subject to conflicting Islamic and communist ideologies under three different regimes
under the communists, the Mujahedin and the Taliban. During these periods, the
country experienced and underwent the worst crises and human tragedies. Under the
slogans of establishing a truly proletariat system, the communists took the lives of
thousands of people. The Jehadi commanders, each one, insisting on the Islamic models
forged and invented by themselves, sacrificed thousands of other Muslims for their
individual, party and ethnic interests. Finally, the Taliban rose, as they claimed, to carry
out the divine virtues guided by Islamic teachings and during their several years of
ruling, they also massacred thousands of people. Large scale crimes were committed on
the basis of ideological and ethnic differences. Generally speaking, the 23 years of
6
For more information about the Afghanistan s conflict please see:
Rashid, Ahmed, (2002) Taleban, Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia , I.B Tauris
Publishers, London
Rubin, Barnett, R. (1995), The Fragmentation of Afghanistan , Yale University Press
Giustozzi, Antonio, (2000), War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan: 1978-1992 , Hurst London
crisis in the country was either inspired by extremist Islamic and communist ideologies
or by ethno-political interests. 7
Following the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 the Afghan military-political
parties in collaboration with the international community signed an agreement in Bonn,
which laid the foundation for a new political process in the country. By signing the
agreement, Afghanistan entered an apparently post-conflict stage. Two years after the
Bonn agreement, for the first time in the political history of Afghanistan and based on
the new constitution, the people of Afghanistan were given the opportunity to choose
their rulers.
Nepal holds class, ethnic, religious and ideological differences similar to those in
Afghanistan. Aristocratism, extreme poverty, tyrannical and corrupt rule, extortion of
peoples' properties by power holders, religious dogmas and ultra-communist ideologies
have been part of the country s social altercations and political confrontations.
As a mountainous country Nepal experienced different monarchic rules for more

than two thousand years, mainly the Gopal, Mahispal, Kirat, Lichchhawi, Malla and
Shah Dynasties. The latter ruled for 238 years, up to 13 generation of kings, and was
demolished recently as the country was announced a Federal Democratic Republic on
28 May 2008. Prior to this landmark, Nepal has suffered of various eons of political
upheavals like the Rana Regime, the Panchayati system, etc. Prime Ministers of the
Rana clan ruled the country for 104 years (circa 1847-1951), paying no attention to the
people's concerns; it was a period of gross human rights violations, extreme injustices,
and a multitude of humanitarian crimes. Under the leadership of the Nepali Congress
party, people set off an armed struggle against the despotic rulers, which ended a period
of injustice in Nepal in 1951. However, the parliamentary system and multiparty
democracy did not last long and King Mahendra imposed despotic rules under the guise
of Panchayati democracy which darkened the country for 3 decades (1961-1990).
Numerous human rights violations occurred, especially targeting to pro-democratic
people and groups. The period lasted until 1990 when with the people's movement a
multi-party democracy was restored.
The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) waged a people's war from 1996
after its 40-point demand was unfulfilled by the then government. Widespread poverty
and inattention by the ruling powers to the living conditions of the poor have been a
hotbed for the formation of communist parties such as the Maoists in Nepal. The 10-
year crisis in this country between the Government and CPN-M has taken place under
the title of "confrontation of the aristocrats and the poor", and has been nurtured by a
history of discriminations and religious and ethnic conflicts.8
The so-called "people's war" mainly took place in the poor-population-dwelling

regions and rural areas between the government forces and People Liberation Army of
7
There are no reliable figures of the number of people killed during these periods. The rough estimates
vary between 5 hundred thousand to 2 million people killed and millions forced to flee the country or
become internally displaced. The number of people killed in Kabul only during the civil war under the
Mujahdin is estimated to be around 50,000 thousand people.
8
Five Years of NHRC, Published by NHRC Nepal, 2006,
page
CPN-M. The said party found most of its supporters from the poor and rural
areas in which poverty and deprivation squeezed the life, through the slogans of
fighting poverty and eliminating classing differences. Those areas were the main
powerbase of the Maoist Party. Maoists' skirmish with the government continued till
2006, lasting for a period of 10 years. Finally, the CPN-Maoist with seven major
political parties reached a 12-point agreement with the government. Then, they
launched a series of peaceful protests which forced an end to the King s direct rule
starting on February 1, 2005. This is called the People Movement-2, which comprised
of a 19-day long general strike and peaceful mass demonstration.
Eventually, the Government of Seven Party Alliance and the CPN-M signed a
peace agreement called the "Comprehensive Peace Agreement", which brought an end
to the decade-long conflict in the country. An Interim Parliament was established as per
the new constitution and commenced its work on January 2007 and the CPN-M was
formally included within the frame of the Government of Nepal in April 2007.
Constituent Assembly elections was held successfully in April 2008 and the Nepalis for
the first time experienced electoral politics to elect their rulers. Contrary to most
expectations, the CPN-M turned out to be largest party in the elections, winning 220
representatives (120 members from direct election and 100 from proportional election)
in Nepal's Constituent Assembly out of 601 members.
Even though the CPN-M could not claim a majority in the Parliament, being the
largest political party it leads the coalition Government and has undertaken the leading
responsibility of crafting the new constitution. The other two major political parties
Nepal Congress Party (NC) that undertook the premiership for a long period after the
People's Movement-1990, and the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist and
Leninist) had the leading opposition role. In August 2008 the leader of the CPN-M
Puspa Kamal Dahal aka "Prachanda" was elected as the Prime Minister in Nepal.
Henceforth the monarchical system was effectively put to an end and the country is
declared as the Federal Republic of Nepal.
3. COMMENCEMENT OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PROCESS
The volume and extent of atrocities in Nepal are in no way comparable to that of
Afghanistan. The total number of people killed during the 10-year crisis in Nepal is
estimated to be 13,2469; while 970 persons are estimated to have disappeared during the
entire period of the conflict10 (671 from the government s side and 299 from the CPN-
M). In Nepal, the fights mostly occurred in the villages far away from the city centers,
whereas in Afghanistan most of the cities, including the capital, were the scenes of
heavy and atrocious crimes against humanity. In terms of duration, the crisis in Nepal
lasted only 10 years as compared to the 23 years of war and instability in Afghanistan.
Despite the officially proclaimed end of the violence in Afghanistan at the Bonn
conference in 2001, thousands of people are still being killed every year.
The debate on transitional justice in Afghanistan was energized by the Afghanistan

Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) publication of the Call for Justice
report in January 2005, which was the result of a country-wide national consultation,
including 6000 afghan citizens. The report showed that 86.8% of the interviewees
demanded justice for the past human rights violations11. Following this, the Afghan
government in collaboration with office of the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA) and AIHRC prepared the Action Plan for Peace, Reconciliation
and Justice, which was officially launched by President Karzai on 10 December 2006.12
AIHRC
Dr. Sima Samar, head of AIHRC is Submitting the report of Call for Justice to the
president Hamdi Karzai, 29,01,2005.
As compared to Afghanistan, it appears that there has been greater determination

and commitment for transitional justice in Nepal. Perhaps, the most striking difference
and better prospect for the process of transitional justice in Nepal lies in the fact that it
is included in the peace agreement signed between the Communist Party of Nepal-
Maoist (CPN-M) and the Government of Nepal (GON) in November 2006. According
9
This statistics is based on the report of Home Ministry of Nepal
10
For detail, see Annual Report of NHRC Nepal 2007/08, pages 13-14.
11
http://aihrc.org.af
12
The Action Plan and the Call for Justice report are available at the AIHRC website:
http://aihrc.org.af/reports_eng.htm
page
to this agreement, which put an end to war in Nepal, both parties from the
beginning bound themselves to be responsive and responsible to the crimes they
committed, and officially accepted that sustainable peace can not be attained without
justice.
PM Girija Prasad Koirala and CPN-M Chairperson Prachanda exchanging the Peace
Agreement 14 November 21, 2006
There were no references in Afghanistan s Bonn Agreement to the question of

transitional justice and ways of dealing with past crimes. Conversely, in this agreement
some of the suspects were admired as war heroes. No article was added in the
agreement to bind the Afghan Government or the international community to deal with
the issues related to transitional justice. That kind inattention to the crimes against and
suffering of the Afghan people was the first step towards establishing a new system and
new Afghanistan. Since then, the Afghan government has disregarded the transitional
justice as its obligation and has evaded responsibility for implementing transitional
justice, in spite of the voices of millions of victims of war. The absence of any clear
provision in the Bonn Agreement to bind the conflicting parties responsible is believed
to be a major obstacle in the process of transitional justice in Afghanistan.
Transition Compared in Nepal and Afghanistan

Features of Conflict Nepal Afghanistan
Conflict Between CPN-M and Government Several Political Groups
Duration 10 years (1996-2006) 23 years (1978-2001)
Place of conflict Mostly in the country side The Country side and the cities
People Killed 13,246 hundreds of thousands
People Disappeared 970 hundreds of thousands
Peace Agreement held 21 November 2006 5 December 2001
Peace Agreement Comprehensive Peace "Bonn Agreement" It is brief and
Agreement (CPA). It is more has no provisions of TJ.
descriptive and has
Provisions of TJ.
Situation after Peace Situation improving, Situation yet to improve; many
Agreement political killings are limited. have lost their lives annually.
Structure of Yesteryears conflicting Predominated by the former
Government parties are in the Mujahedin and Afghan
government. technocrats educated in the West.
4. ROLE OF STATES
The state, being the only legislative and executive power in a country, is obliged to
protect and fulfill the rights of citizens more than any other institutions. In transitional
justice, implementation of justice is part of the substantial and basic obligations of a
state. Thus, the way states approach the transitional justice and deal with it greatly
determines the successes and failures of the process.
In Nepal, during the period of the interim coalition government (after 2007), the
former warring parties SPA and CPN-M were in the government together; while after
the elections held on 10 April 2008, the CPN-M has the leading position in the
coalition government which is led by Prachanda the CPN-M leader. Hence, the
accused forces of yesteryears human rights violations are, today, in the government
themselves. In Afghanistan, there has been no accusation of involvement in past human
rights violations against the President and there is no official charges against his
government. However, many of the officials appointed in the high-ranking posts in the
government are considered implicated in crimes against humanity committed in the last
three decades in Afghanistan. 13
On the occasion of the victims' Memorial Day which coincides with the day of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 2006, President Karzai shed tears as he was
watching a documentary of war victims14. Exactly one year later on 8 December 2007
he admitted the inability and weakness of his government in trying the suspects of the
past crimes and said: "The government is not able to put on trial the war criminals and
human-rights violators in Afghanistan".15 This expression of President Karzai explains
a lot about the transitional justice process in Afghanistan and the position of the
government. It is a matter of debate whether his government is really unable to
implement the transitional justice; but President Karzai seeks to distract the public
minds, especially those of the victims, by shedding tears and invoking the weakness
and inability of his government. Deterioration of the security situation, as a result of an
intensification of Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents' attacks in Afghanistan, or power
wielded by political forces implicated in past atrocities within or outside the
government and the alleged support they receive from foreign countries, are often used
as justifications for the inability of Karzai's government16.
Very importantly, it should not be overlooked that President Karzai is presiding

over an elected and legitimate government and enjoying the political, military and
financial assistance of the international community. Would it not be better for President
Karzai to hold himself accountable for not taking a single step towards transitional
13
Human Right Watch s report, December 11, 2006:
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2005/07/05/afghanistan-bring-war-criminals-justice
14
Only shedding tears is not Enough, December 23, 2006 Abdul Jalil Benish,
http://www.afghanlinks.org/NewsletterArchive.htm
15
BBC website: http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/story/2007/12/071209_k-a-afghan-human-
rights.shtml
16
Transitional Justice in Afghanistan; End or New Beginning, February 20, 2007, Abdul Jalil Benish,
http://www.salsalweekly.blogfa.com
page
justice during the past seven years and to admit his personal inability or
unwillingness to revitalize the process? Can he be blamed for the power and authority
given to the perpetrators of human rights violations? Clearly the lack of progress in the
transitional justice process is related to the inabilities and weaknesses of the ruling
government, which in turn results from the dependency of the ruling team on temporary
political interests and short-term political alliances with forces that are inimical towards
human rights and accountability for the past.
The only activities this government has in its record are the preparation of the
Action Plan and a few symbolic measures in the way of its implementation. Keeping in
view that the President is preparing for re-elections in another year; no serious change
in the government policy in relation to the transitional justice process in Afghanistan is
expected. The President has proven in the past that he will not hesitate to make deals
with the political and former military forces implicated in past injustices to achieve his
short-term political objectives. Reluctance of the President and his team to support the
transitional justice process is clearly noticeable. Human Rights advocates and the
Afghan people have been disappointed.
Nepal experienced a very short period of transition in comparison to other conflict

infected countries like Afghanistan. Previously warring parties are in the government or
in the parliament. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement is well written and political
leaders profess their commitment to press freedom, democracy and human rights in
speeches and documents. However, in absence of real and sufficient political will, the
implementation of those commitments has proven difficult. Victims of the conflict have
not received compensation yet, despite commitments made by all political parties;
internally displaced persons (IDPs) have not been able to return their ancestral places
from where they were forcefully displaced by the conflicting forces; properties seized
illegally are yet to be returned; the status of disappeared persons has not yet been made
public; commissions have not been formed as per the peace agreement; and the PLA
integration with the National Army has not yet been done.
NHRC, one of the constitutional bodies mandated to monitor the "Comprehensive

Peace Agreement" M, has reported on the involvement of both parties in the incidents
of human rights violations17. It has also reported that the whereabouts of the
disappeared and abducted people have not been publicized as per the 60 days time
duration fixed in the CPA18. In the same way, the agreement on land mines and strayed
explosives, their storage and sharing of information on their locations within thirty days
and cooperation in identifying and defusing them within sixty days, is yet to be
implemented. As a result people are being killed as well as injured as a result of
explosions of mines and other hidden devices. The agreement with regard to return the
internally displaced people (IDPs) and seized properties by the Maoist is not being
implemented despite the fact that the CPN-M leads the present coalition government
17
Annual Report of NHRC Nepal 2007/08, pages 13-14.
18
CPA 5.2.3. says- "Prepare the details of the disappeared persons or those killed in the conflict with
their real name, surname and residential address and publicize it within 60 days from the day of signing
this agreement and inform the family members of concerned persons."
after CA election19. Moreover, NHRC has received several complaints about illegal
properties seizures and forced displacement even during the current period.
Although there was the agreement to form a high level Truth and Reconciliation
Commission in order to document serious violations of human rights and humanitarian
laws during the armed conflict period and construct an environment of reconciliation in
the society, the Commission is yet to be formed; so is the plight of the National
Commission on Peace and Rehabilitation20. Formation of those commissions can be the
mousetraps for former perpetrators, who grossly violated human rights and are
currently part of the government. By deferring the formation of the commissions,
transitional justice is being denied and a culture of impunity is being instituted.
5. ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
There is perhaps no greater difference in the transitional justice process of these

two countries than in the scale of activities and the roles played by civil society
organizations. It appears that there is greater interest, commitment and involvement of
the civil society in the process in Nepal, as compared to Afghanistan. Nepal has vibrant
civil society which led the people's movement in 2006 successfully and become a
watchdog of present political scenario21.
Conversely, in Afghanistan, there are very few civil society organizations with a
strong focus and long-term interest in the question of past accountability. Their
composition and approach towards transitional justice is often influenced by the social,
political and ethnic background of their founders. Secondly, these organizations appear
to lack the sufficient knowledge and capacity as well as coordination and a strategic
view towards the process of transitional justice. So far, the AIHRC remains the main
advocate of accountability for the past and its Call for Justice report remains the key
document reflecting the views of Afghan citizens on the issue. But in the face of strong
pressures and threats by the suspects and strongmen, the AIHRC appears to have scaled
down its activities.
19
CPA 5.2.8 says- "Both parties express the commitment to allow without any political prejudice the
people displaced due to the armed conflict to return back voluntarily to their respective ancestral or
former residence, reconstruct the infrastructure destroyed during the conflict and rehabilitate and
socialize the displaced people into the society."
20 CPA 5.2.5 says- "Both parties agree to form a high level Truth and Reconciliation Commission on
mutual understanding to conduct investigation about those who were involved in gross violation of
human rights at the time of the conflict and those who committed crime against humanity and to create
the situation of reconciliation in the society."
21
For detail visit http://www.nepalcivilsociety.org/
page
Major Activities undertaken on Transitional Justice in Nepal and Afghanistan

SN Afghanistan Nepal
1 Release of the Call for Justice report by the UNMIN was invited to negotiate the
AIHRC, January 29, 2005 peace process in 2006.
2 Drafting and Official Launch of the Action Inclusion of transitional justice in the
Plan for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation of CPA between SPA and CPN-M on 21
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, November 2006
December 10, 2006.
3 Declaration of 10 December as the Official Government Announced the
Memorial Day by the Afghan Government, Compensation and Support for the
December 10, 2005. Victims of the Conflict (2008 Budget)
4 Commemoration of the Afshar Massacre by Regular monitoring of Peace Process by
the Victims and Civil Society Organizations OHCHR and NHRC Nepal
February 16, 2007.
5 Two small demonstrations by the victims and Additional works done by various INGOs
civil society organizations in Kabul, 2005 and NGOs in Nepal like ICTJ, and many
and 2006. others (between 2006-08)
6 Conference on Truth and Reconciliation by Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007 was
the AIHRC, UNAMA and EUSR Office in made and promulgated on the basis of
Kabul, December 13, 2005. CPA
7 Conference on the role of the civil society in Draft Acts of TRC and PRC
truth seeking by the ICTJ, OSI and Human commissions were prepared to widely
Rights and Civil Society Network, March 25, consulted (2007)
2008.
Since commencement of the transitional justice process in Afghanistan, AIHRC

has gone through some serious and open confrontations with the suspects, including
some government officials and Jehadi parties. Perhaps, without exaggeration it can be
said that all that the people of Afghanistan know about the transitional justice process
have been some verbal confrontations and quarrels between the strongmen and AIHRC
reflected on the media and press. On one occasion the Mujahadin reacted to the
transitional justice process by mobilizing thousands of people, many of whom were
bussed into the city from neighboring provinces, to defend their roles as heroes of the
war. During this gathering they accused the protagonists of transitional justice as
enemies of the country.22 This however does not mean that the AIHRC activities are so
extensive or successful. For the process to take a real meaning for the victims of war
and human rights violations, there is a need for much greater effort by all parties: the
AIHRC, the Afghanistan government and the civil society organizations.
Like many aspects of the Afghan society, its civil society organizations are
struggling to recover from years of war and conflict. One of their major challenges is to
overcome the divides and socio-political fragmentation caused by years of war and
instability. After collapse of Taliban regime in 2001 billions of dollars of foreign aid
for reconstruction and humanitarian purposes were channeled into the country.
22
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/story/2007/02/070223_ay_kabul-demo-photo.shtml
Hundreds of new NGOs were registered to become implementation partners in several

areas. These NGOs came to be known as the sole civil society representatives, at the
expense of indigenous organizations that were unable to apply for foreign funds. The
range of their activities extended from pure humanitarian to construction and delivery
of services. Therefore, the public perception of civil society has been shaped by the
wealthy and resourceful NGOs being run by one or two English-speaking persons and
project proposal writers. In fact, some of these NGOs are companies that are operating
for profits. An interviewed NGO worker said: The NGO I work for has been led by a
person for the past 5 years. During this period, he has bought four houses in four major
cities of the country. He had no house before he became director of this NGO. 23
Nearly seven years has passed and this perception of civil society organizations in
Afghan society still exists: civil society activities and organizations can be found only
in lavish hotels, white-color cars and comfortable parts of the cities. No trace of them in
remote and poor areas. There is a wide gap between civil society organizations and the
masses. A small number of civil society organizations have taken genuine interests in
the process of transitional justice, but security concerns, lack of sufficient financial
supports and a discouraging political environment have limited the scope of their work
and activities.
This kind of approach to the civil society in Nepal is lesser noticeable, even though
many NGOs are also not transparent in their expenses and are involved in report-
writing only. However, there are allegations of political bias against some of the
Nepalese NGOs. Most political parties have opened human rights related NGOs, which
publish reports and public releases when the party indicates them to do so. Although
the discourse of human rights is politicized everywhere; here human rights are being
used for political and individual gain. There are however NGOs that have done very
beneficial work in the cities and remote areas in the field of literacy and education,
poverty reduction and employment, development, and transitional and social justice.
Overall civil society in Nepal is much more outstanding and vibrant and there are very
few NGOs which work on the basis of religious, regional, ethnic or linguistic
prejudices. Whereas in Afghanistan, as soon as you enter the gate of an NGO, you can
tell whether it is a Tajik, Pashtun or Hazara organization.
Impartiality of civil societies is an issue. In Afghanistan, it's very hard to find a

civil organization that abides by the rules of impartiality in a political process. This
could be seen in the process of providing civic education in the previous Parliamentary
Election in Afghanistan. An interviewed NGO worker said most of these institutions
ran some activities for the campaign of specific candidates, rather than performing their
responsibility of raising the awareness of the people.24
23
Writer s interview, Kabul, July 2008
24
The writer s interview, Kabul, October 2008
page
6. ROLE OF PERPETRATORS
When there is talk of transitional justice or implementation of justice for the past
injustice during the war and crises, in fact it is talk about injustice and inhuman acts
that have been committed in the past by some persons or parties against a number of
other persons and parties without any legal reasons. In the debate on transitional justice
one party is those people whose rights have been violated and have been subjected to
crimes, injustices and humiliations, and the other party is those who have committed
these acts and are known as criminals. In the transitional justice process, in fact there is
confrontation between the victims and the suspects. Government, civil society
organizations and the international community have important roles to play, but the
main debate lies between the perpetrators and the victims.
Unlike the victims, suspects of the past crimes in Afghanistan act more assertively
and in great coordination. Perhaps attempts of suspects to ensure acquittal for the
crimes they have committed are a natural issue in every part of the world. But the case
of Afghanistan differs from most other post-war countries from the point that suspects
and strongmen still have high authorities in the decision making processes. In some
cases they even determine the viewpoints and positions of the government in regard to
transitional justice process. Their strong participation in power has caused transitional
justice to be diverted, the executive role of the government has become weak and the
victims are afraid to come on the scene to demand compensation/their rights. The
international community is concerned that a stronger push for justice may jeopardize
the fragile political arrangement and stability. As a school teacher in Kabul, who has
lost his wife and two children in Kabul civil war, says: "Justice can't be restored
through deceiving and playing tricks on the people. I am not only disappointed about
how justice has not been done in relation to past crimes, but I am also afraid that the
Afghan government will allow the criminals to repeat their past commit inhuman acts
and impose them on us once again "25.
The Call for Justice report explains that 90% of the people demanded removal of
the suspects and human-rights violators from government posts26. Based on this, the
second key action of the Action Plan for Peace, Reconciliation and Justice calls for
establishment of credible and responsive government institutions free from criminals
and human rights violators . But the wishes of the people and this Action Plan which is
based on their opinions have been disregarded by the government and the international
community. Removal of the suspects and strongmen from senior government positions,
which is pre-requisite for other components of the Action Plan, has been dealt with by
the government with entire indifference and inattention. In only a few cases has a
senior governmental official been removed from his position due to accusations of
human rights violation27.
25
Writer's interview, Kabul, April 2008
26
http://www.aihrc.org.af/rep_Eng_29_01_05.htm
27
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/story/2004/07/040706_mj-afg-warlords.shtml and also you
can find some information in this link:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/story/2004/07/040706_mj-afg-warlords.shtml
During the Bonn conference, which is hailed as the beginning of the post-conflict
period, many of the Afghan participants were human-rights violators. From the
beginning power was shared among the people who were involved and implicated in
human rights abuses. After the establishment of the Interim and Transitional
Administrations and the Elected Government, this fabric in the power mechanism
remained unchanged. In some cases when President Karzai himself, the United Nations
or the international community made efforts to remove senior governmental officials
who were accused of human rights violation from their posts, or to design new
mechanisms, this proved ineffective and the suspects and strongmen continued to keep
their power within the government. It has to be admitted that none of these efforts were
followed up firmly by the government of President Karzai. It has however continuously
sought not to hurt the feelings of the victims, the United Nations and the human rights
advocates, by pretending to them that the government would like to remove the
suspects from their governmental posts, but that the conditions are not conducive and
that the government is not able to do this work.
As a matter of fact, the government in most cases had dealt with the suspects and
strongmen on the basis of short-term political expediencies rather than on the basis of
the justice-based strategic program that the Action Plan encompasses, to which the
government has committed itself. Deterioration of the security situation and
intensification of terrorist activities after the 2004 has given the government a better
pretext to justify its failures in this regard. "Fragility of the security situation",
"pursuing transitional justice is not in our national interests" and "foreign countries
back the suspects" are some sentences that continuously surface on official statements
in order to hide its failures and the strongmen-backing policies behind them28.
The failure of the government to remove suspects and strongmen from power and
government posts, not only stopped all progress in the transitional justice process, but
has also allowed suspects, now clothed in the legal robe of the elected government, to
continue to commit human rights violations and to oppress the people and victims using
the government address and channel. Tthe government of Afghanistan is not an
implementer of justice, but stands accused of continued human rights violations. The
government has also hampered investigations of mass killings, by not disclosing
information about the perpetrators and complicating the issue of unearthing burial sites.
The case in Nepal is to some extent different. First, the suspects of crimes in Nepal
are largely limited to two parties (CPN-M and SPA government). Secondly, the
belligerent factions/parties admit their involvement in past crimes and have held
themselves responsible for what they have done. The fact that the issue of past crimes
has been included in the agreement signifies this point. Like in Afghanistan, the
Maoists and government forces in Nepal seek to put into oblivion and to downplay the
transitional justice process and there is no firm political will to implement a transitional
justice program. Many terms and conditions of the CPA have not been implemented
yet, despite clear deadlines. But what makes Nepal different from Afghanistan is that
28
Only Shedding Tears is not Enough, December 23, 2006 Abdul Jalil Benish,
http://www.afghanlinks.org/NewsletterArchive.htm
page
the suspects are not actively trying to sabotage the process or to intimidate
and threaten the victims and civil society organizations campaigning for justice and
accountability.
7. ROLE OF THE PEOPLE AND VICTIMS
In any transitional justice process it is the victims and the people that should be
empowered to make the ultimate decisions. The ways they look at the past crimes and
their participation in the process determine the direction and the success or failure of
any such process.
In Afghanistan, victims are the most inactive elements in the transitional justice
process. To date, no pressure and expression of opinion or social mobilization by the
victims that could have left impact on the effectiveness or fruition of the process has
been seen. Since the beginning of the state-building exercise (Bonn Agreement), no
representation of the victims was made, and the United Nations and international
community as well as the belligerent parties have ignored this reality. Independent
participation of the people and victims in this conference, besides the belligerent
parties, was not counted important even for the United Nations that was presiding over
the conference. After commencement of Interim and Transitional Governments no
particular activity or mechanism was foreseen by the Afghan government and
international community to represent the viewpoints of the victims in the decision-
making processes. The report "Call for Justice" prepared by the AIHRC was the first
document prepared and published based on consultation with a number of war victims.
However, the victims and people did not have any direct role in the preparation of the
Action Plan, and the Call for Justice was treated as expression of the views of the
people. Even so, the Action Plan was considered a positive step by the people and
human rights advocates and was welcomed as such.
Afghanistan Watch
Commemoration of Afshar Massacre, February 16, 2006
Perhaps, the lack of interest on the part of civil society in the transitional justice
process, the power held by the perpetrators, the fear injected into the population and the
lack of governance and international interest are the reasons for the inaction and
passivity of the victims. This silence and passivity of the victims has played a major
role in retarding the transitional justice process in Afghanistan. The one or two
instances where victims took a stand have had a lot of impact and were considerably
welcomed. One of the examples was the anniversary of the Afshar massacre on
February 16, 2007 which took place almost simultaneously with the gathering of the
suspects in Kabul Stadium on February 22, 200729 and the declaration of the impunity
bill of the criminals in Parliament on June 31, 200730 Another point is the lack of
cooperation, coordination and initiative on the part of the Afghan civil society
organizations with the victims. Undeniably, civil society organizations have an
important role in social mobilization. They can help the people as sources of
information and mobilization and by supporting the people in the process of filing suits
and transitional justice process.
Afghanistan Watch
National Council of Victims of Nepal, February 2008
The case in Nepal is different. During one year and several months after the end of
the war and the signing of the agreement between the two parties to the conflict, the
participation and seriousness of the victims in supporting justice related to past crimes
has been remarkable and admirable. OHCHR and NHRC have been mandated to
monitor the implementation of the CPA terms and conditions. In March 2007 the
National Council of Victims was established in the capital of Nepal. The Council
includes representatives of all victims groups, elected through a relatively transparent
mechanism, and has the support of the civil society organizations in the country. The
Council is supposed to participate in the process, with the support of civil society, as an
active element and main party, and to urge the government to seriously follow up
transitional justice process and to answer to their demands.
8. CONCLUSION
Like all post-conflict societies, both Nepal and Afghanistan are facing enormous
challenges in their transition to democratic, peaceful and just societies. Years of war,
violence and instability have left deep wounds in the social, political, economic and
29
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/story/2007/02/070223_ay_kabul-demo-photo.shtml
and also you can find some information here:
http://74.125.95.132/search?q=cache:v8seziblBLoJ:www.afghanlinks.org/NEWSLETTERS2007./Afgha
n%2520Links%25208%2520-1-3-07.pdf+Jalil+Benish&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=uk
30
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/story/2007/01/070131_s-parliament-amnesty.shtml
page
cultural fabrics of these countries. Old social tensions and rifts

characteristics of these multi-ethnic societies were reopened, intensified and politically
exploited as ideological and political groups tried to establish social bases and claim
political and ideological legitimacy in their bids for power and supremacy. As a result,
the two countries face the daunting challenges of rebuilding social trust, healing the
wounds of war, violence and massive human rights violations and finding common
ground and roots in their painful histories, in order to break with the past and
consolidate the fragile peace, stability and recently built-democratic structures.
However, transitional justice processes in these two countries have confronted a

familiar dilemma: the alleged contradiction between peace and justice. The dilemma
arises when the peace mediators and international community try to bring the warring
factions to agree to some kind of post-conflict political process and power sharing
mechanism. The difficulty emerges on how the warring factions can be held
accountable for the past crimes and at the same time be convinced to be part of the
peace processes. While the importance of transitional justice in successful transitions of
societies from war to peace is being universally acknowledged, there has been a great
level of apprehension on the part of the international community to promote
accountability for the past in periods of transition.
In both Nepal and Afghanistan the warring factions had to be included and their
political aspirations taken into account for the peace processes to be launched. In both
countries, the post-conflict administrations were dominated by the political and military
forces that were rooted in the years of war, atrocities and human rights violations. In
contrast to the Nepalese CPA, the Afghanistan Bonn Agreement fails to hold the
warring factions accountable for their past. Furthermore, it hails the victors of 2001
peace agreement as heroes and legitimizes their role as resistance and anti-occupation
forces. Apprehension towards transitional justice at the Bonn Conference displayed
insufficient resolve and determination for past accountability. Consequently, both
countries are suffering from a prevailing culture of impunity for past crimes which have
further complicated the task of promoting rule of law and human rights in the so-called
post-conflict periods. The vivid acknowledgement of President Karzai of his inability
to promote justice is a clear indication of such attitudes towards transitional justice.
Despite the importance attached to past accountability in the CPA, many of its
provisions regarding the establishment of the Peace and Rehabilitation and Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions, disclosure of the whereabouts of disappeared people and
the release of the illegally confiscated properties are yet to be implemented.
The Nepalese civil society appears to be playing a more significant role as

compared to their counterparts in Afghanistan in promoting accountability and justice.
However, the civil societies in both countries are not exceptions. They are part of their
societies and need time to recover from the years of war and play more assertive and
central role in promoting justice and accountability. The relatively longer period of
conflicts in Afghanistan has deeply affected the civil society in the country. It needs to
make more efforts to find a common voice and assert itself as a force to be reckoned
with within the complicated landscape of the country.
However, for the transitional justice process to take a real meaning in these two
countries there need to be much greater level of political will and commitment and
greater space for the civil society. The Afghan experience has shown that in the
absence of sufficient and consistent international commitment and pressure, the
government has not hesitated to sacrifice the question of accountability for short-term
political expediencies. The international community can play a greater role by engaging
and involving civil society organizations and exerting more pressure on the
governments, if transitional justice is to become a priority agenda for the political elites
and organization of both countries.
The last, but not the least, is the role and aspirations of the victims in both
countries. As the article has shown, despite centrality of the victims in any transitional
justice process, the victims remain neglected. The political leadership particularly in
Afghanistan has shown a consistent tendency to compromise demands for justice and
accountability for short-sighted political alliances. Under the prevailing uncertain and
fragmented political landscape, the victims have been unable to collectively voice their
demands for justice and emerge as a vigorous pressure group on the politicians and the
international community. The Nepalese NCV can be a good step in the right direction
and probably a model for transitional justice advocates in Afghanistan.
page
Appendix A
SOUTH ASIA MAP
Appendix B
COUNTRY PROFILES
A. NEPAL
A landlocked country in South Asia,

Nepal is bordered by the China to the
north and by India to the south, east and
west. The Himalaya mountain range
runs across Nepal's northern side from
east to west, and eight of the world's ten
highest mountains, including the highest,
Mount Everest, are within its territory.
Historically, Nepal had many small

kingdoms and the modern state was
formed with the Unification of Nepal by King Prithvi Narayan Shah on December 21,
1768. Prior to 2006, known a kingdom, Nepal is now a federal democratic republic. Its
recent history has involved struggles for democratic government with periods of direct
monarchic rule. On December 28, 2007, the Interim Parliament passed a bill and
declared Nepal to be a Federal Democratic Republic. From 1996 until 2006, Nepal
suffered from a Civil War between government forces and the Communist Party of
Nepal (Maoist).
Nepal is a multi-cultural, multi-linguistic and multi religious country. Nepal, relatively

a small country, has a diverse landscape, ranging from the humid Terai plains in the
south to the mountainous Himalayas in the north, which makes it a major tourist
destination. Hinduism is practiced by a huge majority of the people, but the country
also has a strong Buddhist tradition; Lumbini, the birthplace of Buddha Siddhartha
Gautama is located in the Terai, one of the three regions of Nepal. The capital
Kathmandu is the largest city in the country. The official language is Nepali and the
state currency is the Nepalese Rupee (NPR). Nepal's flag is the only national flag in the
world that is non-quadrilateral in shape.
B. AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan, or officially the Islamic Republic of

Afghanistan, is a landlocked country that is located
approximately in the center of Asia. It is variously
designated as geographically located within Central
Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. It has
religious, ethno-linguistic, and geographic links
with most of its neighboring states. It is bordered by
Pakistan in the south and east, Iran in the west,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the
north, and China in the far northeast. The name
page
Afghanistan means the "Land of Afghans."
Afghanistan is a culturally mixed nation, a crossroads between the East and the West,
and has been an ancient focal point of trade and migration. It has an important geo-
strategic location, connecting South, Central and Southwest Asia. During its long
history, the land has seen various invaders and conquerors, while on the other hand,
local entities invaded the surrounding vast regions to form their own empires. Ahmad
Shah Durrani created the Durrani Empire in 1747, with its capital at Kandahar.
Subsequently, the capital was shifted to Kabul and most of its territories ceded to
former neighboring countries. In the late 19th century, Afghanistan became a buffer
state in "The Great Game" played between the British Indian Empire and Russian
Empire. On August 19, 1919, following the third Anglo-Afghan war, the country
regained full independence from the United Kingdom over its foreign affairs.
Since the late 1970s Afghanistan has suffered continuous and brutal civil war, which
included foreign interventions in the form of the 1979 Soviet invasion and the recent
2001 U.S.-led invasion that toppled the Taliban government. In late 2001 the United
Nations Security Council authorized the creation of an International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF). This force is composed of NATO troops that are involved in
assisting the government of President Hamid Karzai in establishing the writ of law as
well as rebuilding key infrastructures in the nation. In 2005, the United States and
Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement committing both nations to a
long-term relationship. In the meantime, multi-billion US dollars have also been
provided by the international community for the reconstruction of the country.
Appendix C
ACRONYMS
AIHRC Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
CA Constituent Assembly Election
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPN-M Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
CPN-UML Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist and Leninist)
GON Government of Nepal
IDP Internally Displaced Person
ICTJ International Center for Transitional Justice
NC Nepali Congress Party
NCV National Council of Victims (Nepal)
NHRC National Human Rights Commission, Nepal
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights
SAARC South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (Member
states are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives,
Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka)
SPA Seven Party Alliance
TJ Transitional Justice
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNMIN United Nation Mission to Nepal
page
Appendix D
ABOUT AFGHANISTAN WATCH
The Afghanistan Watch is an independent, non-governmental and non-political
organization registered with the Ministry of National Economy of the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan. It envisions a democratic, peaceful, tolerant and just society in which
all citizens have equal opportunities to realize their human potentials.
Its mission is to undertake activities that will promote peace, justice, and a culture of
mutual tolerance and respect for human rights in Afghanistan. As its core values the
organization is strongly committed to democracy, justice, human rights, sustainable and
balanced social and economic development of the country and impartiality,
independence and professionalism as guiding principles of its activities.
Advisory Board
Dr. Sari Kouvo is currently engaged as Senior Program Fellow at the International
Centre for Transitional Justice. Her previous positions include Human Rights and Rule
of Law Advisor to the European Union Special Representative for Afghanistan,
researcher on Afghanistan at Amnesty International and researcher and lecturer within
the Department of Law at Gothenburg University. She has also been a visiting scholar
at the Nato Defence College (Italy), the Australian National University (Australia) and
the Abo Academy University (Finland).
Obaid Adnan Nejati, holds B.A. in Political Economy of Development, Georgetown
University and M.A. in Administration Planning and Social Policy from Harvard
University. Mr. Nejati has worked extensively both in academia and in the corporate
world. He is currently Director of Professional Development Institute at the American
University of Afghanistan. He has developed this Institute into a center for advanced
professional training and specialized learning at the expert level to help meet the
training and education needs of Afghanistan s growing professional community and
civil society. He has contributed towards achieving the nation building, human
resources development, and civil society development objectives of the International
Community in Afghanistan by making the institute an effective and efficient vehicle in
implementing the UN and the US mandated capacity building efforts in Afghanistan.
Prior to joining The American University of Afghanistan, he worked at Sony
Electronics, in San Diego, California, in Regional Image Validation and Product
Development. He has also worked at Harvard University, where he spent over five
years as the Data Network Coordinator at the Murray Research Center, a major data
archive center focusing on research development in longitudinal data analysis.
Martine van Bijlert has served as Political Adviser to the European Union s Special
Representative for Afghanistan since May 2004 and has concurrently worked as an
independent consultant on Afghanistan since August 2007, providing political analysis
in the fields of governance and institution building, insurgency and tribal politics, and
democratisation in (post-)conflict societies. Previous experience includes work for a
humanitarian NGO in Kabul, during the Taliban regime.
For more information and to order publications, contact Afghanistan Watch at:
First house on the left hand, Omer Jan Kandahri Masque Street, Char Rahi Poli Sorkh, Kabul,
Afghanistan. Tel: +93 (0)799 21 55 77, 799 30 14 34 Website: www.watchafghanistan.org
E-mail: Afghanistan_watch@yahoo.com
Appendix E
AUTHORS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Abdul Jalil Benish, Director of the Afghanistan Watch, is the main author of this
paper and his work was supplemented by contributions from Bhanu Bhakta Acharya
from Nepal and Niamatullah Ibrahimi from Afghanistan. Mr. Acharya is
Communication and Promotion Officer of the National Human Rights Commission of
Nepal. Mr. Ibrahimi is a researcher for the Crisis States Research Centre of the London
School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) in Kabul. He is also a member of the
Afghanistan Watch.
The author wishes to thank International Centre for Transitional Justice Offices in
both Afghanistan and Nepal for facilitating my visit to Nepal. He also appreciates
Marianne Olesen for facilitating his meetings Nepalese friends and introducing a
significant number of human rights activists and experts in Katmandu. Many thanks
also to Martine van Bijlert for proof reading this paper and also to other member of the
Advisory Board of Afghanistan Watch for their useful comments.
This document was created with Win2PDF available at http://www.daneprairie.com.
The unregistered version of Win2PDF is for evaluation or non-commercial use only.

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Briefing Paper

A comparative overview of transitional justice processes

December 10, 2008

A comparative overview of transitional justice processes in two

Written by: Abdul Jalil Benish, Afghanistan

December 10, 2008

3. COMMENCEMENT OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PROCESS 9

5. ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY 13

7. ROLE OF THE PEOPLE AND VICTIMS 18

Transitional justice is a response to systematic or widespread violations of human

Normally, a transitional justice process includes the following initiatives4:

Criminal prosecutions. They are judicial investigations of those responsible for

Truth commissions. These commissions of inquiry have the primary purposes of

- To take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations;

In addition to natural and geographical congruencies, Nepal and Afghanistan have

As a mountainous country Nepal experienced different monarchic rules for more

The so-called "people's war" mainly took place in the poor-population-dwelling

3. COMMENCEMENT OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PROCESS

The debate on transitional justice in Afghanistan was energized by the Afghanistan

As compared to Afghanistan, it appears that there has been greater determination

There were no references in Afghanistan s Bonn Agreement to the question of

Transition Compared in Nepal and Afghanistan

Very importantly, it should not be overlooked that President Karzai is presiding

Nepal experienced a very short period of transition in comparison to other conflict

NHRC, one of the constitutional bodies mandated to monitor the "Comprehensive

5. ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

There is perhaps no greater difference in the transitional justice process of these

Major Activities undertaken on Transitional Justice in Nepal and Afghanistan

Since commencement of the transitional justice process in Afghanistan, AIHRC

Hundreds of new NGOs were registered to become implementation partners in several

Impartiality of civil societies is an issue. In Afghanistan, it's very hard to find a

7. ROLE OF THE PEOPLE AND VICTIMS

Commemoration of Afshar Massacre, February 16, 2006

National Council of Victims of Nepal, February 2008

cultural fabrics of these countries. Old social tensions and rifts

However, transitional justice processes in these two countries have confronted a

The Nepalese civil society appears to be playing a more significant role as

A landlocked country in South Asia,

Historically, Nepal had many small

Nepal is a multi-cultural, multi-linguistic and multi religious country. Nepal, relatively

Afghanistan, or officially the Islamic Republic of

Afghanistan means the "Land of Afghans."

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