IN THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF AMPHISSA

UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF AMPHISSA

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. /2017

_______________________________________________________

STATE OF PALLAKA

(APPELLANT)

V.

MICHAEL

(RESPONDENT)

MEMORIAL FOR RESPONDENTS

1
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

[A]. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................. 4

[B]. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................... 5

I. CONSTITUTIONOFAMPHISSA..................................................................................... 5

II. LIST OF STATUTES ....................................................................................................... 5

III. LIST OF CASES ................................................................................................................5

IV. LIST OF BOOKS.............................................................................................................. 7

V. LIST OF JOURNAL ........................................................................................................ 7

VI. LIST OF INTERNET SOURCES..................................................................................... 7

[C]. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .................................................................................... 9

[D]. STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................. 10

[E]. ISSSUES RAISED .............................................................................................................. 12

I. WHETHER SUFFICIENT GROUND OF LEGAL SANITY EXISTS SO AS TO

EXONERATE THE ACCUSED FROM LIABILITY OF MURDER?

2
II. WHETHER THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF LEGAL INSANITY ON THE PART OF
DEFENCE IS AT PAR WITH BURDEN OF PROOF ON PART OF PROSECUTION

[F]. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS .......................................................................................... 13

[G]. PLEADINGS ADVANCED .............................................................................................. 14

[H]. PRAYER FOR RELIEF .................................................................................................... 32

3
[A]. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

S.No ABBREVIATION EXPANSION

1. ¶/¶¶ Paragraph/Paragraphs

2. A.C Law Reports : Appeal Cases

3. AIR All India Reporter

4. All ER All England Law Reports

5. ANR Another

6. BC British Columbia
7. Bom Bombay
8. CA Civil Appeal
9. Cal Calcutta
10. Cri Criminal

11. CriLJ Criminal Law Journal

12. CrPC Criminal Procedure Code
13. E.R. England Reports
14. Fed Federal
15. Guj Gujarat
16. Hon‟ble Honorable

15. ILR Indian Law Reports

16. IPC Indian Penal Code
17. Ltd. Limited
18. M.P.L.J Madhya Pradesh Law Journal
19. MANU Manupatra
20 ORS Others

4
 21. Pat. Patna
22. QBD Queen‟s Bench Division

23. SC Supreme Court

24. SCR Supreme Court Reports

[B]. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

I. CONSTITUTION OF AMPHISSA

II. LIST OF STATUTES

• The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973

• The Indian Evidence Act,1872

• The Indian Penal Code,1860

III. LIST OF CASES

INDIAN CASES

S.NO Case Title Citation

1. Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana 1976 Cr LJ 203 (SC)

2. Guru Singh v. State of Rajasthan 2001 Cr LJ 487 (SC)

3. Jai Lal v. Delhi Administration AIR 1969 SC

5
 4. K.Anbazaghan v. Superintendent of police

AIR 2004 SC 524

5. Kamla Singh v. State AIR 1955 Pat. 209

6. Narain v. State 1953 Cr LJ 1610

7. Paramjeet Singh v. State MANU/DE/0244/2013

8. Queen Empress v. Kader Nasyer Shah (1896) ILR 23 Cal 604

9. Rambharose v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1974 M.P.L.J. 406

10. Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration AIR 1976 SC 294

11. State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra and anr AIR 1996 SC 2766

12. Sukhram v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1989 SC 772

13. T. N. Lakshmaiah v. State of Karnataka (2002) 1 SCC 219

14. Yusuf v. State of U.P. 1973 Cr. LJ 1220

FOREIGN CASES

6
 S.No. Case Title Citation

1. Queen v. McNaughten 8 Eng. Rep. 718

[1843]
2. State v. Andrea Yates 171 S.w.3d 215

3. The State v. Andrea Sneiderman 862 F. ed 1541 (Fe d.

Cir.
2012)

IV. LIST OF BOOKS

S.NO. TITLE

1. K. I. VIBHUTE, PSA PILLAI'S CRIMINAL ED., LEXIS NEXIS

LAW (10TH BUTTERWORTHS,2008).

2. MODI‟S, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND TOXICOLOGY ED., LEXIS

(23RD NEXIS

BUTTERWORTHS, 2006)
3. RATANLAL AND DHIRAJLAL, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE (30TH EDITION,
WADHWA AND

COMPANY, 1896)

V. LIST OF JOURNAL

1. Insanity defense work group, American Psychiatric Association Statement on Insanity

Defense

VI. LIST OF INTERNET SOURCES

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1. Hallucinations and Delusions – How to respond Canadian Mental Health Association,
http://www.cmha.ca/hallucinationsand delusions-howtorespond.pdf.

2. Malcom Mckenzie Park, The strange case of Andrea Yates and Dr Park Dietz, Dec 2008,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papaers.cfm?abstract_id=365241.

8
 [C]. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Appellant has approached the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of Amphissa under the Article 136
of the Constitution of Amphissa. The Appellant most humbly and respectfully submits to the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Supreme Court of Amphissa.

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 [D]. STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. The Democratic Republic of Amphissa is situated in Asian Subcontinent. The Laws of

Amphissa are in Pari-materia with the Laws of India.

2. On dated 25th feb.2008, Michael, were married according to their religious rituals. Their
marital life was going smoothly. On some occasions they used to have few verbal quarrels with
each other but they reconciled soon after the verbal fight.

3. Two years after the marriage Jenny gave birth to a baby girl on 4th September 2010. The girl
was named as Jennifer. After few months of the birth of Jennifer, Michael started behaving in
a rude way and he usually becomes violent on every petty issue without any reason. Jenny took
her husband Michael to the doctor Alfered (DW1), who was a psychiatrist. The doctor advised
Michael to have control over anger and to take certain medicines. The doctor diagnosed him to
be suffering from first stage of Bipolar Mood Disorder (Bipolar disorder, also known as manic-
depressive illness, is a brain disorder that causes unusual shifts in mood, energy, activity levels,
and the ability to carry out day-to-day tasks.

4. On dated 5th December 2010 at 11am, loud noise of fighting, crying and shouting was
coming from the house of Michael. On hearing the cry Daniel (PW3) who was neighbour of
Michael went in the house of Michael and found Jenny lying unconscious on the floor pooled
in blood with various injuries on her body. At that time Daniel saw Michael hiding a 7 inch
Iron Axe in the garden.

5. Thereafter Daniel called the police and Jenny was taken to government hospital whereby she
was treated by Dr. Andrew (PW2). Michael was arrested by police on the same day and was
kept in police custody.

6. On 6th December, 2010 Jenny’s statement was recorded by Jaison (PW1) SHO of Flemingo
Police Station. In her statement she told to the police that on 5th December at 10 am Michael

10
came home and started fighting with her in a violent way and when she resisted Michael
attacked him with axe kept in the garden. On 8th December Jenny died because of the injury in
her lower abdomen which proved fatal.

7. On the basis of the statement of Daniel and the dying declaration of Jenny FIR was lodged
against Michael vide. 733/2010 in Flemingo police station. Michael was prosecuted under
Section 302 of IPC for the murder of Jenny. During interrogation Michael stated that he was
unconscious at the time when Jenny was attacked. He told to police that when he regained his
consciousness he found Jenny lying on the floor and axe in his hand. He told to the police that
he did not know from where the axe came and he also stated that he did not know how Jenny
died.

8. The case (State of Pallaka vs. Michael) was tried by the Session Court vide Session Trial No-
57/2011.

9. On 3rd September 2014 Michael was found guilty of intentional murder of Jenny and
convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to 10 years Rigorous Imprisonment.

10. The accused feeling aggrieved by the said judgment preferred an appeal before the High
Court of Pallaka on dated 9th October 2014 vide Criminal Appeal No. 875/2014. The High
Court relying on the version of the doctor treating the accused for Bipolar Mood Disorder
found that the accused at the time of committing crime was suffering from both legal and
medical insanity and accordingly the Court acquitted the accused from the charge of murder on
dated 5th September 2016.

State of Pallaka preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court of Amphissa against the order of
acquittal by the High Court of Pallaka on 17th of November 2016.

The case of State of Pallaka vs. Michael is listed before the Divisional Bench of Supreme Court
of Amphissa for final hearing on 10th Jan.2017.

HENCE THE PRESENT MATTER RESTS BEFORE THIS HONORABLE COURT.

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 [E] ISSUES RAISED

I. Whether sufficient ground of legal insanity exists so as to exonerate the accused from
liability of murder.

II. Whether the burden of proof of legal insanity on the part of Defence is at par with burden
of proof on part of Prosecution.

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 [F]. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

I. Whether sufficient ground of legal insanity exists so as to exonerate the

accused from liability of murder.

It is humbly submitted before The Hon’ble Court that there is sufficient ground of
legal insanity as to exonerate the accused from liability of murder. The fact the
appellant had past history of fits of insanity and after he returned home, he was
getting insane again, later his act of being behaving insanely after the incident is
enough to satisfy section 84 of IPC

II. Whether the burden of proof of legal insanity on the part of Defence is at par
with burden of proof on part of Prosecution.

It is humbly submitted before The Hon’ble Court That the Prosecution has failed to
prove the case beyond reasonable doubt which is enough to set aside this appeal.

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 [G] PLEADINGS ADVANCED

I. WHETHER SUFFICIENT GROUND OF LEGAL INSANITY EXISTS SO AS TO

EXONERATE THE ACCUSED FROM THE LIABILITY OF MURDER?

1. Black‟s Law Dictionary defines insanity as “A legal concept that an accused is not criminally
responsible if, at the time of committing the act, the person was laboring under such a defect
of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act done or
if the act was known, to not have known that what was done was wrong1”.

2. Every man is presumed to be sane. This presumption does not apply to a man whose is
governed by Sec.84 of IPC.

3. Under Section 84 of Indian Penal Code2 a person is exonerated from liability for doing an
act on the ground of unsoundness of mind if he, at the time of doing the act, is either
incapable of knowing,

(1) the nature of the act, or

(2) that he is doing what is either wrongly or contrary to law.

This section is based on the answers given by the House of Lords in famous McNaughten’s
case3

1
Black‟s Law Dictionary, 826 (7th ed. 1998)
2
“Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind,
is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law”.
3
(1843) 10 Cl. & F. 200 : 8 E.R. 718

14
 AT THE TIME OF DOING THE ACT

4. The crucial time for deciding whether the benefit of this section should be given or not is the
material time when the offence takes place. If at that moment a man is found to be laboring
under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature of the act he was doing or that, even
if he knew it, he did not know it was either wrong or contrary to law then this section must
be applied.

15
5. The relevant circumstances, like behaviour of the accused before the commission of the
offence and his behaviour after the commission of offence should be taken into
consideration4.

6. Experience has shown that different individuals react differently to same or similar
situations. Some may escape from the scene of occurrence, others may not while some may
even walk to the police station to surrender and report about what they have done. Such post
event conduct may be relevant to determine the culpability of the offender in the light of
other evidence on record.

7. Here in the present case appellant was laboring under such unsoundness of mind at the time
when the incident took place.

UNSOUNDNESS OF MIND

8. It is only „unsoundness of mind‟ which naturally impairs the congnitive faculties of the mind
that can form a ground of exemption from criminal responsibility5.

9. The nature and extent of the unsoundness of mind required being such as would make the
offender incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is wrong or
contrary to law6.

10. The fact that the appellant did not ran away after the incident took place shows that he was
suffering from disorder a type of mental illness.

4
Narain v. State, 1953 Cr LJ 1610
5
Queen Empress v. Kader Nasyer Shah (1896) ILR 23 Cal 604
6
Kanbi Kurji Duba v. State AIR 1960 Guj 1

16
 NATURE OF THE ACT, OR WHAT IS WRONG OR CONTRARY TO LAW

11. By nature of the act is meant the physical nature of the act or the normal effects of the act.
A man is properly said to be ignorant of the nature of his act, when he is ignorant of the
properties and operation of the external agencies which he brings into play7.

12. The statement of accused may suggest that he was capable of knowing the nature of his act
that does not suggest that he was capable of knowing that what he was doing was either
wrong or contrary to law8.

13. In this case when we looked for a mens rea for the offence, there is none. There is also no
evidence of any hostility in the family of the appellant. It is difficult to be convinced that the
accused for no reason would so brutally put to death his own wife.

14. Even if the accused was not able to establish conclusively that he was insane at the time he
committed the offence, the evidence placed before the Court by the accused or by the
prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court as regards one or more of
the ingredients of the offence, including mens rea of the accused and in that case the Court
would be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting
on the prosecution was not discharged9.

15. The nature of the incident as it took place in this case shows that the appellant obviously not
in his right mind know what he was doing since he was under a mental illness called Bipolar
Mood Disorder. He did not realize his nature of act or what he was doing is whether right or
wrong. Since he was in state of insanity.

7
Rambharose v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1974 M.P.L.J. 406
8
Kamla Singh v. State AIR 1955 Pat. 209
9
T. N. Lakshmaiah v. State of Karnataka (2002) 1 SCC 219

17
 TEST OF LEGAL INSANITY

16. The test exemption from the conviction and punishment for the crime on the ground of
insanity is the legal test laid down in this section and not the medical test of insanity.

(1) A person is incapable of knowing the nature of the act i.e. the physical act he is doing.

(2) A person is incapable of knowing that he is doing wrong.

(3) A person is incapable of knowing that he is doing what is contrary to law.

17. Legal insanity as distinguished from medical insanity envisaged and covered by Section 84
IPC is narrower and is applicable if the person accused was incapable of knowing the nature
of the act or knowing that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. The proper
question, which is to be asked and answered, whenever a plea under Section 84

is raised, is whether the appellant/accused at the time of doing of the act, was incapable of
knowing the nature of the act or that what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law10.

18. In other words, to establish insanity under Section 84 IPC, it has to be established that the
accused was laboring under such disability, i.e. unsoundness of mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was committing or the act was wrong/contrary to law.
Further, the crucial time for ascertaining insanity is the time when crime was committed i.e.
the time when the act or offence was in fact done. Unsoundness of mind after or before
commission of the offence is not relevant, though may throw light on whether the accused
was unsound when the offence was committed.

19. Failure to prove mens rea or absence of mens rea when mandated and requirement of an
offence, will result in acquittal but this should be distinguished from "insanity" as defined
and granted immunity under Section 84 IPC. These are two separate lines of defences and

10
Paramjeet Singh v. State MANU/DE/0244/2013

18
 require distinct considerations. Normally onus to prove mens rea is on the prosecution and
failure to prove will cause acquittal on merits because no offence is proved to be committed.
Question of "insanity" relates to disease or malfunctioning of mind and the onus is on the
accused.

20. Even if the accused is unable to establish conclusively that he was insane at the time he
committed the offence, but if the evidence produced is sufficient to raise reasonable doubt
in the mind of a judge as regards one or other of necessary ingredients of the offence11.

21. The facts of the case suggests that the appellant was incapable of knowing the nature of his
act, that he is doing wrong, that he is doing which is contrary to law. Hence the appellant
passes the test of insanity.

Whether The Bipolar Mood Disorder (BMD) Can Be Considered As A Defense That May
Excuse The Criminal Liability Of The Accused?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the prime question that has to be
considered by this appellate court in the instant matter is that whether Bipolar Mood
Disorder can be taken as a plea of insanity or unsoundness of mind as defined U/S 84 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860, to evade the criminal liability.

Deficiency Of Will Due To Weak Intellect Of The Accused.

It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that every man is presumed to be
sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the
contrary be proved12, and to establish a defense on ground of unsoundness of mind, it must
be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was labouring

11
Jai Lal v. Delhi Administration AIR 1969 SC
12 State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ahmadulla, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 998; The State v. Durgacharan Barik Alias Duria,
AIR 1963 Ori 33; Sudhakaran v. State of Kerala, (2010) 10 SCC 582 37 Daniel Mcnaughten’s case,
(1843) 8 E.R. 718 : (1843) 10 Cl. Fin. 200. 38 Bhikari v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1.

19
 under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and the
quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong.37

Plea Of Unsoundness Of Mind As A Statutory Defense.

Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 deals with the acts of a person of unsound mind
and mandates interalia—

“Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of
unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing
what is either wrong or contrary to law.”38

It is h13umbly submitted that as to insanity, it has been observed in Halsbury’s Laws of

England,39 that “where it can be shown that a person at the time of his committing or
omitting an act, the commission or omission of which would otherwise be criminal, was
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act or omission or as not to know that what he was doing was
wrong then such a person is not in law responsible for his act.”14

It is also submitted that accused’s duty under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 18060 is
twofold i.e., initially he must establish that at the time of committing the act, he was non
composo mentis— not of sound mind.

In the second place, he must prove that the said unsoundness of mind was of a degree and
nature to fulfil one of the tests as laid down in the aforesaid provision, namely, that by
reason of such unsoundness of mind he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or
that he was doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.15

13 rd Ed. (Simonds), Vol. 10 at p. 287

14 Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1563

15 Digendra v. State, 74 C.W.N. 231 at p. 241

20
 The Accused Is Suffering From Bipolar Mood Disorder.

It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that according to the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual, Bipolar Mood Disorder is characterized by the presence of: two or
more distinct identities or personality states, at least two of which recurrently take control
of the person’s behaviour; an inability to recall important personal information that is too
extensive to be explained by ordinary forgetfulness;

and the lack of any direct connection between the disturbance and the physiological effects
of a substance (e.g., blackouts) or a general medical condition (e.g., complex partial
seizures).16

Precisely, it can be defined as a condition in which a person's identity dissociates, or

fragments, creating additional, distinct identities that exist independently of each other
within the same person.

Interestingly, persons suffering from Bipolar Mood Disorder (DID) adopt one or more
distinct identities which co-exist within one individual. Each personality is distinct from
the other in specific ways. For instance, tone of voice and mannerisms will be distinct, as
well as posture, vocabulary, and everything else we normally think of as marking a
personality.

It is furthermore submitted that presently Biplolar Mood Disorder is listed in DSM-IVTR

as an axis I disorder.17 Evidently it lists four criteria for diagnosing someone with
dissociative identity disorder, as hereinafter mentioned--

1) The first being the presence of two or more distinct "identities or personality states."

2) At least two personalities must take control of the person's identity regularly.

3) The person must exhibit aspects of amnesia—that is, he or she forgets routine personal
information.

16 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS

(American Psychiatric Press, 4th ed., 1994).
17 Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders. 4th ed, text rev. Washington DC: American Psychiatric
Association; 2000.

21
4) And, finally, the condition must not have been caused by "direct physiological effects,"
such as drug abuse or head trauma.

With reference to the facts of the instant matter, it is furthermore submitted that the
accused very well qualifies the test as laid down by the DSM-IV for diagnosing someone
with Bipolar Mood Disorder.

Evidently, the facts in record has disclosed the presence of two distinct identities or
personality states which takes control of the accused identity at regular interval and so also
the accused at the same time has exhibited the aspects of amnesia.

Furthermore, since the aforesaid conditions of the accused have not been caused by any
“direct physiological effects”, hence there exists no ambiguity in question pertaining to the
accused suffering from the Bipolar Mood Disorder.

Respondent’s Case Backed By The Statement Of DW1

It is most humbly submitted that DW1 i.e., the Psychiatrist who examined the accused, has
in his statement, deposited in favour of the Defendant’s case.

The relevant portion of the deposition as aforesaid, has been herein below quoted—

“….when I examined the accused. I found that he is suffering from Bipolar Mood Disorder.
The accused’s mind has created two different personalities. The mind switches between the
two personalities and when it does, the dominating personality dictates the behaviour and
thought process of the accused….”

DW1 in his examination of the accused has also observed that the host personality of the
accused is very calm and normal, whereas the alter in control is violent and volatile.

Facts Precedent, Attendant And Antecedent Must Be Taken Into Consideration.

22
 With reference to the dictum of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Debyabhai Chhaganbhai
Thakkar v. State of Gujarat,18 it is most humbly submitted that when a plea of legal
insanity is set up, the Court has to consider whether at the time of commission of the
offence, the accused, by reason of unsoundness of mind, was incapable of knowing the
nature of the act or that he was doing that was either wrong or contrary to law. The crucial
point of time for ascertaining the state of mind of accused is the time when the offense was
committed. Whether the accused was in such a state of mind as to be entitled to the benefit
of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 can only be established from the
circumstances which preceded, attended and followed the crime.19

Therefore, behaviour antecedent, attendant and subsequent of the event may be relevant in
finding the mental condition of the accused at the time of the commission of the event.20

It is furthermore submitted that the proof of the insanity of the accused at the nick of time
is highly improbable and the same has to be judged from his conduct at the time of
occurrence, previous to the occurrence, and after the occurrence along with other attendant
circumstances.21

Presumption Under The Evidence Act Is Rebuttable.

With specific reference to Kamla Singh v. State,48 it is humbly submitted that the
presumption under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is rebuttable if any fact
sufficient to rebut the presumption has been proved by the defence, and the moment that
presumption is rebutted by the defence and the court is brought to a point where it becomes
doubtful of the fact or when it cannot positively be held that the prisoner was not then of
unsound mind and was capable of knowing the nature of the act alleged against him, the

18 AIR 1955 SC 1563

19 Sarju Merandy v. State of Bihar, (1978) 26 B.L.J.R. 267 at pp. 272-73
20 Kanna Kunnummal Ammed Kova v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1967 Ker. 92 at p.95
21 Tarseem Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1978 J. & K. 53 at p.
58 48 AIR 1955 Pat. 209

23
 onus under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 has to be taken as discharged,
for, by reason of the neutralization of the force of presumption, the prosecution is thrown
back to its original position where it has to discharge its onus beyond reasonable doubt.

It is furthermore submitted that the defence, therefore, has not to prove affirmatively
beyond all reasonable doubt that the person was of unsound mind and that by reason of
unsoundness of mind was incapable of knowing the nature of his act.

In other words, the defence has only to demolish the aforesaid presumption laid down
against the accused under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and not to prove
beyond reasonable doubt, the opposite of that presumption.

Some high profile murder cases

➢ In famous Andrea Yates case in United States a mentally disturbed mother was
convicted of murdering her five children in which defendant found not guilty
by reason of insanity22.
➢ Yet in another case The State v. Andrea Sneiderman16 the person accused of
murdering his co-worker husband in order to marry her told that he was acting
on by the command given by the angel, court held he was mentally ill and
should be put him in mental care.

22
Malcom Mckenzie Park, The strange case of Andrea Yates and Dr Park Dietz, Dec 2008, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papaers.cfm?abstract_id=365241. 16 862 F. ed 1541 (Fed. Cir. 2012)

24
 ➢ The fact that the accused did not try to run away after the incident clearly shows
that he was under mental illness as a result of which with this irresistible
impulse he fatally injured his wife which he did not realize the nature of his act
or its consequences.

Hence it is humbly submitted that the appellant was suffering from insanity at the time of
incident so as to satisfy section 84 of Indian Penal Code.

25
 II. WHETHER THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF LEGAL INSANITY ON THE
PART OF DEFENCE IS AT PAR WITH BURDEN OF PROOF OF
PROSECUTION?

That the Prosecution Has Failed To Prove the Case beyond All Reasonable Doubt.

It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that in all cases of homicide, the
prosecution is required to give satisfactory proof of the corpus delicti, i.e., it must prove that
the deceased was murdered.

1. The prosecution has then to prove that the appellant is the person who murdered the
deceased and no one else.
2. With reference to the instant matter, it is humbly submitted that Dr. Alfred ( Defence
witness1 ) clearly dictates that the accused was being treated for Bipolar Mood Disorder.
3. Furthermore, the circumstances as stated in the facts in record have also failed to establish
any reasonable link between the cause of the death and the act of the accused. It is
furthermore submitted that, in cases of murder, the court has to be satisfied not merely
on the probability, but of a reasonable certainty of the guilt of the accused. Suspicion,
however strong, is not sufficient.
4. The view is based on the theory that the court must always get a true picture of the fracas.
If after distinguishing the chaff from the grain, the essential thread of the prosecution
case is proved, conviction would follow.
5. However, if on the other hand, despite of utmost care and scrutiny, it is difficult to find
out the truth and the defense version cannot be discarded as reasonably true, the accused
is entitled to benefit of doubt. In a criminal trial it is for the prosecution to establish by
true and trustworthy evidence that the appellant has committed the murder of the
deceased. It is not for an accused person to say, much less to establish that someone else
has committed the murder.
6. Howsoever, in the instant matter, the chain of circumstances, is inconsistent with the rule
of criminal jurisprudence which states that the circumstantial evidence must be
consistent, and consistent only with the guilt of the accused, and that if the evidence is

26
 consistent with any other rational explanation, then there is an element of doubt of which
the accused must be given the benefit.

Facts so Established should be Consistent Only With the Hypothesis of Guilt of the
Accused.

It is humbly submitted that it is undisputed that where the prosecution relies on

circumstantial evidence alone to prove the guilt, the facts and circumstances from which
the conclusion of guilt is sought to be drawn must be fully established beyond any
reasonable doubt23, and the facts and circumstances should not be only be consistent with
the guilt of the accused but they must be such in their effect as to be entirely incompatible
with the innocence of the accused 24 and must exclude every reasonable hypothesis,
consistent with his innocence. 25 Such evidence also must show that in all human
probabilities act must have been done by the accused.26

In a case, based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances alleged against the accused
must be conclusively established and the chain of circumstances must be so closely knit
so as to exclude all the reasonable hypothesis of the innocence of the accused. 27 The
evidence must point only to the guilt of the accused and if the evidence leads to two
interpretations, the interpretation in favour of the accused must be given effect to.28

From the evidence considered and scrutinized by the Learned Court below, it can be well
made out that the claim of the evidence is incomplete and is of not such a nature that it
would definitely and unerringly points to the guilt of the accused 29 . At the time of

23 State of UP v. Satish, AIR 2005 SC 1000: 2005 (1) Crimes 146 (SC): (2005) 3 SCC 114
24 Devikadevi wife of Premji Bhai Ruparel v. State of Gujarat and others, 1983 (1) GLR 215; 1983 GLH (NOC)
19
25 Mahadev Sonu Pardhi v. State of Maharastra, 1996 (2) Crimes 87
26 Shiva Sahai v. State of U.P., 1990 Cri LJ (NOC) 15 (All) (DB)
27 State of M.P. v. Satish, 2005 Cri LJ 1428 : AIR 2005 SC 1000 (SC)
28 N. Rajendra Prasad Bhat v. The State of Karnataka, 1996 Cri LJ 257
29 State of Himachal Pradesh and another v. Balbir Singh and another, 2013 Indlaw HP
888 16 AIR 1977 SC 1063

27
 occurrence there was none else than the deceased and the appellant at the scene, and the
manner of occurrence do not concur with the cause of the death.

It has been consistently laid down in cases of Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan16 and
Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of Madhya Pradesh30 that, where a case rests squarely
on the circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the
incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence
of the accused or guilt of any other person.31
The dictum in, Hanumant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh19 is the one, which is widely
accepted and uniformly followed with regards to the said subject. The relevant part of
the aforesaid judgment, laid down by Mahajan, J. has been quoted herein below:

"It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the
circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first
instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a
3233
conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every
hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of
evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within
all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."

It is furthermore submitted that there is not only a grammatical, but a legal distinction,
between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved', as was held by the Court in
Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra20 where the following
observations were made:

30 AIR 1989 SC 1890

31 Shivu and Anr. v. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka & Anr., (2007) 4 SCC 713 2007 Indlaw SC
103 19 AIR 1952 SC 343
32 AIR 2622
33 Cr.LJ 2040 (SC): AIR 2013 SC 1474

28
 "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty
before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and
'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions."

In Prakash v. State of Rajasthan,21 Justice P. Sathasivam (former CJI) has laid down
the following five golden principles of standard of proof required in a case sought to be
established on the basis of circumstantial evidence otherwise said to constitute the
panchsheel of the proof of a cased based on circumstantial evidence:
a) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should
be fully established.34
b) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is guilty.35
c) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.36
d) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be
proved37, and
e) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused
and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the
accused.

BENEFIT OF DOUBT vis-à-vis BURDEN OF PROOF.

It is humbly submitted that the doctrine of burden of proof in the context of insanity may be stated
as follows38:

34 Vikas Ramdas Khairnar Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2005 Indlaw MUM 23

35 Sharad Birdhichand Sardar v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 1984 Indlaw SC 432
36 Krishnan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2008) 15 SCC 430; Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P.
AIR 1990 SC 79
37 Vinita Singh v. State Of Chhattisgarh SLP(CRL) NO. 9858/2013
38
State v. EmercianoLemos, AIR 1970 Goa 1 at p. 6

29
 (1) The prosecution must prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused had
committed the offence with the requisite mens rea; and the burden of proving
that always rest on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial;

(2) There is a rebuttable presumption that the accused was not insane, when he
committed the crime, in the sense laid down by Section 84 of the India Penal
Code, 1860. The accused may rebut it by placing before the Court all the
relevant evidence—oral, documentary or circumstantial but the burden of
proof upon him is no higher than that rests upon a party to civil proceedings;

(3) Even if the accused was not able to establish conclusively that he was insane
at the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the court by
the accused or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind
of the Courts as regards one or more of the ingredient of the offence,
including mensrea of the accused and in that case the Court would be entitled
to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of resting on the
prosecution was not discharged.39

It is humbly submitted that in the instant matter, there is every indication that the
appellant when he committed the alleged crime by reason of unsoundness of mind
was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he was doing was either wrong
or contrary to law.

Prima facie, the burden of establishing plea of insanity is, by virtue of Section 105
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is on the accused. But as pointed out by Subba Rao,
J. (as he then was) in Dahyabhai Chhajanbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat40, the
evidence of that falls short of providing insanity may still raise a reasonable doubt
about the existence of the requisite intention.

If the accused claim the benefit of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 he has
to establish that he was non compus mentis i.e., was not in a position to understand

39
Bhikari v. State of U.P. AIR 1966 SC 11; RoshanLal v. State of M.P. AIR 1971 SC 778; S.W. Mohammed v.
State of Maharastra AIR 1972 SC 2443
40
supra note 9

30
 the nature of his act. But, to establish this, the degree of proof required is not the same
as that required to establish the guilt of the accused i.e., proof beyond all reasonable
doubt. The quantum of proof required is only that which is required in a civil case, a
preponderance of probability on favour of the accused, the normal presumption that
every presumed to be sane is rebutted and the onus shifts to the prosecution, in other
words, the onus of the prosecution to establish the mens rea is not discharged in such
a case.

It is also submitted that the modern rule is not so strict since the case of Woolmington
v. Director of Public Prosecutions 41 in 1935, and it is now established that the
prisoner need no more than to adduce evidence which raises in the minds of the jury
a reasonable doubt as to his insanity.

The facts in record of the instant matter clearly shows that after the incident the
appellant neither tried to run away, nor did he resisted his arrest, which prima facie
demonstrates that he did not have mens rea. Furthermore, he did not even denied his
presence at the date of occurrence where the event took place. Had he even the
slightest guilty mind, he would not have accepted the fact of altercation with the
deceased at the date of occurrence, very well knowing the fact that such a statement
have the effect of incriminating him.

The accused, therefore, is entitled to acquittal of charge levelled against him

Hence it is humbly submitted that the evidence given by the witnesses should be accepted.

41
(1935) A.C. 462

31
 [PRAYER]

Wherefore, in the lights of facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, it is most humbly prayed and implored before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Amphissa,
that it may graciously be pleased:

1. To dismiss the appeal, and

2. To upheld the order of acquittal u/s 302 & 325, passed by the Learned High Court
below and pass an order of acquittal in favour of the appellant, and

3. Pass any other order it deems fit in the interests of justice, equity and good
conscience.

All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.

Place: s/d -

Date: __ / _ / 2017 Moot Counsels For Respondents

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