The Peculiar Case of Putin’s Prolonged Presidency: Resiliency and Trust in

Authoritarian Russia

by Sabrina L. Leuenberger
PS 172 – SBD

Submitted on 08 June 2022

Introduction

Authoritarian leadership often leads to uprisings and an overthrown leader.

Yet in Russia, President Vladimir Putin remains immune to this. In 2020, the
executive passed a law that enables him to hold the presidential seat for two
additional six-year terms. This effectively grants the president almost infinite control
over the Russian Federation. The peculiar phenomenon is rooted in Russia’s political
structure that weakens the Duma (legislative body) and strengthens the executive
power (the president). Putin’s prolonged presidency also gains support from his
advocacy to restore a semblance of Russia’s Soviet period, beloved by constituents
for its “glory years''. The exercise of authoritarian power only proves to cement the
president’s seat in office and trust from the Russian people.

The Rise of Vladimir Putin

Two major factors contributed to one man’s journey from a KGB 1 officer to the
leader of Russia. These came in the form of collapses: one of the Soviet Union, and
the other of Boris Yeltsin’s presidential career.

First, the fall of the Soviet Union deepened the necessity for a leadership
under Vladimir Putin. The collapse of the communist regime brought about economic
recessions and hardship for the Russian people. Basic infrastructure was collapsing,
salaries were delayed, and the oligarchs treated the country’s “most prized assets”
as their personal property (Bullough, 2014). Apart from financial despair, Russia’s
strong image was harmed by suffering defeat in the Chechnya war, a place whose
population was smaller than Russia’s military. More significantly, it was Vladimir
Putin, the president-to-be who witnessed the detrimental effects of the Soviet
Union’s collapse. As a young KGB officer at the time, Putin was “shocked” and
“humiliated” to have experienced the fall of one of the most powerful empires in the
world (Walker, 2022). It was the ill-emotions stirred within the president-to-be that led
him to unite the people in a joint effort to keep Russia a “first-tier” nation (Walker,
2022). In other words, lead the people in restoring the country’s powerful image and
prosperous nature.

1
The Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti or Committee for State Security, foreign intelligence
and domestic security agency of the Soviet Union.
 Second, the fall of the first post-Soviet president catapulted Putin into
presidency. Before Vladimir Putin ever assumed power, another leader attempted to
restore Russia back to its glory days. He went by the name of Boris Yeltsin and was
a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Yet, between the country’s
economic despair and the Russian people’s yearning for life during the Soviet era,
Yeltsin faced many issues that he could not find effective solutions to. His presidency
was “messy, corrupt, and tainted by a decade-long economic depression” which
resulted in low approval ratings from the public (Schrad, 2022). Consequently, the
lack of public support for the president and his governance shifted public preference
for the authoritarian Valdimir Putin (Matovski, 2018). Unlike his predecessor, Putin
provided the public with stability and policy consistency by gradual, rather than
erratic, changes in governance (McCauley et.al, 2022). Additionally, support for the
national leader was further solidified by the Russian people’s disappointment with
the economy’s collapse under Yeltsin.

At this point in history, Putin emerged as the savior of the Russia, a leader
that vowed to bring back the glory days that were once enjoyed by the people during
the Soviet era. This restorative aim became a frequent theme in Putin’s campaign
and overall leadership, banking on public nostalgia for a time when citizens lived
peacefully and prosperously, and Russia was a well-respected power in the global
arena (Bullough, 2014). After the disastrous post-Communist decline, the Russian
people were motivated by the “desire to restore and maintain order and stability” that
they previously enjoyed (Matovski, 2018). In response to this, Putin was determined
to stir emotions of pride amongst the citizens for having been the “winners” during
the Soviet era (Walker, 2022). This tactic aimed to position Putin as the leader that
was capable enough to return the country to its former glory, influence and power
(Saine, 2022). However, it is worth noting that the president did not aim to restore
the Soviet Union per se, but rather that Russia be treated as the great power it once
was (Saine, 2022).

Given the conditions surrounding his entrance into presidency, Putin assumed
the persona of a leader the people yearned for: a strong man that could save them
from crisis. In fact, it was the president himself that justified his conservative political
regime on the basis of bringing stability to a country with a turbulent past (Odynova,
2021). The Russian people shared the same sentiment and were swayed by Putin’s
image as a “calm, no-nonsense” leader that could still knew how to act tough
(Walker, 2022). It was this hypermasculine image of strength, supplemented by
engagement in strenuous physical activities and sport, that presented Putin as an all-
knowing authority to the public (Saine, 2022). Justifying his capabilities as the strong
leader that the Russian people needed and deserved.

However, this is not to say that Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian rule was
completely dismissive of the people and their opinions. In fact, it was the opposite.
The president’s autocratic power centered on crafting an image of competency
rather than the threat of violence and was derived from mass persuasion instead of
mass repression (Schrad, 2022). Contrary to classical theorizing, Putin’s
authoritarian leadership was indirectly constrained by the will of the people.

Apart from the Soviet Union’s collapse, the demise of his predecessor, the
necessity for a strong leadership, and a restorative aim, Putin secured power
through using his authority to extend his presidential term. This was primarily
achieved by a constitutional amendment in 2020 that would add two additional terms
to his presidency (The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, 2022). A law that prevents
Putin from having to step down after his fourth term in 2024 and may even grant him
the presidential seat until 2036 (Odynova, 2021). Contrary to popular belief, Putin
received overwhelming support in this decision with nearly 78% of eligible Russian
voters approving of the constitutional amendment (Neuman, 2020). Moreover, apart
from the Parliament’s agreeance with the new law, it was Putin himself that insisted
that the people also give their approval in order to “give the changes legitimacy”
(Neuman, 2020).

Strong President, Weak Duma

Although the Russian constitution is a primary reason for the numerous

powers that the president enjoys, Putin also owes his extensive authority to the
conditions set by his homeland’s geographical location. As a country that shares
borders with an estimated 16 countries (i.e,. Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, etc.),
Russia has always been vulnerable to external aggression and threats from its
neighbors. Hence, the need for a strong state, leader, and political system that would
be able to protect the country.
 In order for a strong president to prosper, the political structure needed to
make the necessary adjustments that were conducive to a powerful executive even if
this entailed the harsh weakening of other government arms. As such, political power
in Russia is highly centralized in the executive branch of Russian politics (Hancock
et.al, 2003). Particularly, in the hands of a powerful president and his government. In
order to understand this power concentration, the political structure must first be
familiarized with.

The Russian political system functions as a federation whereby a central

government exists yet powers are granted to local or territorial units of governance
(Bilinksi & Newton, 2021). Given the vast size of Russia, power is supposedly
dispersed across national government units. Yet in practice, true power is wielded by
the office of the President of the Federation or the “single most powerful seat in
Russia” (Bilinski & Newton, 2021).

As a political system operating on the idea that it is a federation, Russia has a

Federal Assembly which is composed of the State Duma (the lower house) and the
Federation Council (the upper house). The imbalance of power is already observed
in the shorter term of office (of 5 years) that the Duma is granted compared to the
president.

However, the lower house still exercises some power in other regards such as
in the choice of the prime minister. The Duma has powers of last resorts whereby
they are authorized to make influential decisions (e.g., the rejection of a prime
minister nominee) on the prime ministerial nomination that the president is obliged to
abide by (Hancock et.al, 2003). Furthermore, it is the lower house that is entitled to
motion for a vote of no confidence in the government as a whole if they deem
necessary. Yet, to the dismay of the Duma, neither of these powers are likely to be
employed in usual circumstances (Hancock et.al, 2003).

Apart from the limited powers of the lower house, the president secures his
power by crafting a power vertical in the political system. In doing so, power
originates from above which then empowers the president to manipulate those below
him. This is primarily observed in Putin’s weakening of the Federal Assembly
through the establishment of pro-presidential parliamentary majorities in the State
Duma and the removal of powerful regional leaders from the upper house.
 Both houses in the Federal Assembly are affected by Putin’s power vertical.
The State Duma is more or less composed of the president’s “yes-men” due to the
establishment of pro-presidential parliamentary majorities in the form of a
presidential coalition among 4 political parties. Moreover, the right to dissolve the
Duma is reserved for the president. The Federation Council, on the other hand, is
more directly weakened through Putin’s enacted law which enables him to remove
threats. The threats in question refer to powerful leaders from the upper house. This
is rationalized by the fact that having a powerful Federation Council defeats the
purpose of having a powerful president.

In an effort to strengthen the president in his authorities and entitlements, the

Russian constitution outlines an extensive list of powers that the executive may
invoke. As such, Putin assumes the role of the “guarantor of the Constitution of the
Russian Federation, of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen”
and therefore “shall adopt measures to protect the sovereignty of the Russian
Federation, its independence and state integrity” (Art. 80-2). Given the crucial task at
hand, the constitution equips the president with all the powers necessary to carry out
his responsibilities. These include extensive powers of appointment in which the
president can appoint the prime minister and other members of the government
recommended by the prime minister as well as the appointment of judges (i.e., in the
Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, etc.). However, it is worth noting that the
constitution also indicates that these appointments must be made “with the consent
of the Duma” (Hancock et.al, 2003).

Supplementary to these powers of appointment is the unrestricted authority to

issue decrees, edicts, and directives. Most significantly, the president may dissolve
the parliament or suspend its operations in specified circumstances that they deem
necessary (Hancock et.al, 2003). Hence, the description of Russia’s political system
as having a strong president but a weak Duma.

Apart from the confluence of aspects in the political structure of Russia,

Putin’s presidential strength, and consequently the weakness of the Duma, is also
attributable to the electoral process that occurs.

Despite the presence of free elections, Hancock and his co-authors (2003)
raise some skepticism about whether or not his actually empowers the Russian
people in a way that could “consider Russia a democracy”. This is largely due to the
domination of the executive authority over the political process and the influence of
the media on elections, often reflecting the view of the few oligarchs (Hancock et.al,
2003).

Yet, in the discussion of the Duma’s weakness, it was the domination of the
executive and his political party that kept the lower house on a very short leash. In
the composition of the State Duma, half of its seats are directly elected by Russian
voters who make a selection from one of 14 parties (Mirovalev, 2021). However,
given the looming power of Vladimir Putin and his political party, only four of these
parties actually play an active role in the electoral process. This is illustrated by the
strategic coalition of the one and truly powerful United Russia and a so-called trio of
“systemic opposition” parties whose presence is merely to maintain the illusion of
political plurality (Mirovalev, 2021).

Russian People’s Support

Although the resiliency of Putin’s presidency has much to do with the post-
Soviet circumstances in Russia, other major causes for his prolonged stay in power
is the Russian political culture and the people’s trust in the government.

First, the people of Russia yearned for the return of a system of rule of law
and the hierarchical power that proved effective during the Soviet Union era. As
such, citizens desired a national leader who first and foremost had a “strong hand” in
leading the people (Sedov, 2007). A desire that, fortunately enough for president
Putin, was satisfied by his image as a young, energetic, and athletic individual.
Similarly, a strong guiding hand was deemed necessary by the Russian people who
resented their country’s lost power, respect, and prestige (Sedov, 2007). Further
emphasized by a strong sentiment of taking revenge on the Kisti and Durdzuks (the
people of Chechnya) that defeated and humiliated Russia in the first Chechen war.

Putin’s presidency then, aimed to fulfill the Russian people’s desires. Both to
bring the country closer to the restorative goal of the Soviet era’s glory days and to
further cement his seat in power. As such, his leadership emphasized traditional
Russian principles of government such as love for one’s country and the greatness
of Russia itself (Hancock et.al, 2003). Similarly, Putin reiterated the virtues of statism
and social solidarity. The former referring to the consistent strength of the Russian
state and its institutions whereas the latter emphasizes the importance of
cooperation rather than individualism (Hancock et.al, 2003).

Second, Vladimir Putin’s resilient leadership is partially due to the

overwhelming trust of the Russian people in the government. In May 2022, the
Statista Research Department (2022) recorded over 80% approval from Russians of
the activities of their president, Vladimir Putin. In a more interesting turn of events,
this Russian president garnered even higher levels of popularity among the Russian
people during the invasion of Ukraine. These statistics are comparable to a time
when president Putin showed brute force in the seize of Crimea and the invasion of
Russian-speaking separatists over parts of eastern Ukraine (Hobson, 2022).

This trend of approval ratings suggests that the Russian people especially
appreciate when their president demonstrates characteristics of the strongman he
promised to be. Further solidifying their trust in an executive that is capable of
“getting what he wants, for the good of the country”.

However, a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of Putin’s presidency

would not be done effectively without raising some doubt on the matter. As such, it is
suggested that the overwhelming approval and trust of the people in the government
is merely the result of restrictive media that is pro-president.

In Russia, independent media outlets are scarce and those that diverge from
government policy are shutdown (Hobson, 2022). Furthermore, foreign media and
social media suffer severe restrictions and sanctions especially if they deviate from
official statements. As such, the non-plurality of sources leads to the dissemination
of information from a sole manufacturer: the president. Likening the Russian
people’s trust to an analogy of wearing clothes and trusting the manufacturer, former
longtime Russian TV host Stanislav Kucher explains that Russians “wear” ideas
because they trust the manufacturer aka “Putin and his propaganda machine” (CNN,
2022).

Given the restrictive measures of the Russian government on communication

and journalism, such as a penalty of up to 15 years imprisonment for the spread of
“fake news” on the Ukraine invasion, there are scarce information sources that
Russians can turn to for an alternative opinion (Ghaffary, 2021). Even the state-run
media presents the war with Ukraine as a “special military operation” that aims to
reunite with a “brotherly country” that has been led astray by the Western countries
(Nechepurenko, 2022). If there is any accuracy to this representation of how Putin’s
administration and decisions are presented to the Russian people, it is no wonder
that they place their full trust in him.

In the same vein, polls and surveys that supposedly report overwhelming trust
in Putin’s leadership may not be totally accurate. Although people see the value of
surveys as a useful tool in providing social information, many observers are still
skeptical about its accuracy. They theorize that the polls in Russia do not report a
true narrative of the public opinion because many people respond with the answers
they believe to be socially acceptable (Nechepurenko, 2022). In the context of
Russia, socially acceptable refers to sentiments that are in favor of the president and
the his administration.

Furthermore, it is unlikely that a Russian citizen would answer a telephone

survey verbally expressing their distrust in the Communist party or the president
(CNN, 2022). Overall, despite the soaring indicators of the Russian people’s trust in
the government, there are still some nuances that have yet to be accounted for.

Conclusion

Vladimir Putin’s prolonged presidency and virtually infinite power is attributed

to the political structure of a weakened Duma (along with constitutional amendments
for extended office), a longing for the restoration of Russia’s “glory days” during the
Soviet system, and a political culture that is strongly supportive of this.

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