Geopolitics & Diplomacy

BRICS, Quad, and India’s Multi-

Alignment Strategy
Written by Shreya Upadhyay July 12, 2022 6 min read

India’s participation in a series of summits—including as part of the Quadrilateral Security

Dialogue (QUAD), Shanghai Corporation Organisation (SCO), Brazil, Russia, India, China
and South Africa (BRICS) summit, G7 meeting, and Commonwealth Summit—exhibits an
internationalist foreign policy. India has worked to engage with the United States, Japan,
Australia, Europe, and Russia, manage ties with China, forge ties with the developing world,
and expand its neighborhood policies.

India’s Minister of External Affairs S Jaishankar’s comments in these forums also illustrate
India’s attempts to remain outside bloc politics and resolute in its intent to practice
strategic autonomy. During GLOBESEC 2022 at Bratislava, Slovakia Jaishankar responded

to a question stating, “I don’t accept that India has to join either the U.S. axis or China axis.
We are one-fifth of the world’s population, fifth or sixth-largest economy in the world…we
are entitled to weigh our own side.” This perspective—an Indo-centric specific multi-
alignment—underscores India’s participation in multiple summits.

A place at the Quad table allows India to counter China’s belligerence and provides a
pathway to a “free, open, and inclusive” Indo-Pacific. SCO and India-US 2+2 dialogues
contribute to India’s external security insight. Separately, forums like BRICS underscore the
perspectives of the developing world, with the objective of reforming the UN to face new
global challenges. India has also begun actively engaging with the British Commonwealth,
once dubbed a colonial hangover, now promoting the economic and strategic interests of
its member countries. Pursuing multi-alignment through multilateral settings works to
strengthen India’s security architecture, to help garner critical votes at the UNSC table,
enable India to identify areas of collaboration with different countries, and raise the
country’s global stature during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Hedging Game

The QUAD was initiated in 2007 with the idea of cooperation and conversation among the
four maritime democracies—India, the United States, Japan and Australia. The Quad’s
journey has not been smooth from its birth and early demise in 2007 to its revival in 2017.
Since 2017, it has morphed into one of the most significant global forums. The Quad
recognizes Indo-Pacific as a strategic concept with security deterrence and political
coordination forming a key component of their raison d’etre.

Pursuing multi-alignment through multilateral settings works to

strengthen India’s security architecture and raise India’s global
stature during the COVID-19 pandemic.

India’s border clashes with China provided a strong incentive to firm up strong ties with
these Indo-Pacific democracies. Yet, the  pandemic led QUAD and QUAD++ countries to
discuss aspects of vaccine research, development, and distribution, climate change
solutions, green infrastructure, and norms in cyber and space domains. The
QUAD countries are offering fellowships in science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics, with an eye on China’s growing Research and Development initiatives.  This
also allows India to showcase itself as a responsible, status quo power in the region.

BRICS began from Goldman Sachs papers involving countries making one-quarter of
global GDP and attempting to foster ties among respective government and business

sectors. When formed, the BRICS nations were expected to dominate the economy by
2050. BRICS members have, however, struggled to implement their visions for trade and
economic structures outside the U.S.-dominated financial system. For India’s regional
leadership aspirations, BRICS still holds value. India’s emerging role in the NDB-BRICS
Bank supports the country’s priority projects relating to clean energy, social safety, public
health, etc. While BRICS might lack the momentum of the Quad, it has more formality and
aims to create economic alternatives for countries in the global south. This reflects a
long-standing foreign-policy goal of New Delhi’s.

Amidst the Ukraine crisis, Russia and China are keen on using BRICS as a counterweight
to U.S.-led institutions and their firmly anti-Russia postures. New Delhi does not wish to
be seen as part of an anti-U.S. bloc, but India’s participation in non-Western groupings
such as the BRICS and the SCO counterbalances its growing presence in the Western-
dominated QUAD and G-7. It also provides alternative structures to Western models and
yardsticks, especially in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war. India’s response to the crisis
has rattled many Western countries, even as the government has gone on to explain that
its decision-making is rooted in its own history of non-alignment and the war’s lack of
direct impact on its national security. India did not support the Western sanctions on
Russia and has continued to buy Russian oil to meet domestic energy demands.

However, as Indian companies have invested more than USD $16 billion in the Russian oil
and gas sector, investments that will have negative implications in case of adhering to
Western sanctions. India’s military dependence on Russia is significant: more than 50
percent of the Indian military’s existing equipment is of Russian origin.

India’s participation in non-Western groupings such as the

BRICS and the SCO compensates for its growing presence in the
Western-dominated QUAD and G-7.

The U.S. administration recognizes India’s multi-alignment strategy and need for issue-
based partnerships despite concerns about its response to the Russian invasion of
Ukraine (President Joe Biden described India’s refusal to condemn Russia as somewhat
“shaky”). India, for its part, has been collaborating closely with the United States in
associations like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, increasing
cooperation in emerging technologies, collaborating in defense, cyber security and counter
terrorism, and also strengthening mutual cooperation on global issues.   

Is Hedging Sustainable?

India’s balancing act to the Russia-Ukraine war has nonetheless caused frustration among
Quad members and Western allies. Western analysts have criticized India in remarks
regarding “defending democracy from authoritarianism.” India has maintained that the war
is outside India’s area of concern, that it is accustomed to the ramifications of war across
the world. U.S.-Russia tensions have brought Moscow and Beijing closer than ever before.
The complete exclusion of Russia from existing markets and financial mechanisms will
accelerate this further. For India, this will bring further challenges as the country aims to
contain Chinese belligerence. 

Despite these developing allegiances, for Indian policymakers, the price to choose one
over the other will be too high. New Delhi neither seeks a fully robust alliance with the
United States nor finds the idea of having the United States as its primary partner useful.
Indian policymakers are also weighing that United States will be forgiving about India’s
neutral stance. India matters to the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy has an important role to play
in constraining China.

It is against this backdrop that a multipolar international order presents India an

opportunity to practice multiple and multi-layered alignments based on economic and
security interests. 

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Image 1: Yuichi Yamazaki via Getty Images

Image 2: Sergio Lima/AFP via Getty Images

Posted in:  BRICS, China, Foreign Policy, India, Indian Foreign Policy, Quad, Russia,
Ukraine, UN, United States