LI Jinming Chinas Maritime Boundaries SCS

China’s Maritime Boundaries
in the South China Sea
Maritime boundary disputes in the South China have existed for centuries, and
researchers from a variety of countries have analyzed the situation from a great
many points of view. Yet, and despite its status as one of the major countries in
the region, Chinese perspectives have often been absent from the international
literature. This book redresses that balance.
Bringing together scholarship from history and international law, this book
provides a lens through which maritime territorial disputes in the South China
Sea can be interrogated. Not only does it detail the historical and jurisprudential
evidence that support maritime boundaries in the South China Sea for different
stakeholders, but it also clarifies some misconceptions related to China’s nine-dash
lines by referring to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Moreover, the book offers in-depth discussion and observation on the most recent
developments in the South China Sea.
This book is an essential resource for researchers, teachers, and students who
specialize in Southeast Asian Studies, China maritime studies, and the international
law of the sea.
Jinming Li is Professor Emeritus of the Research Center for Southeast Asian

Studies at Xiamen University. He has long been engaged in studies on the history
of China – foreign relations, the history of China’s overseas trade, South China
Sea disputes and the law of the sea. His publications include History of Overseas
Trade in the Ming Dynasty and History of Overseas Trade in Ancient China.
China Perspectives
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Zhang Yunling
Global Studies
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Tuo Cai, Zhenye Liu
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Tuo Cai, Zhenye Liu
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Theories and Issues
Xu Xiujun
Cooperative Development in the South China Sea

Policies, Obstacles and Prospects
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China’s Maritime Boundaries in the South China Sea

Historical and International Law Perspectives
Jinming Li
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China’s Maritime Boundaries
Historical and International Law
Perspectives
Jinming Li
The translation of this book is funded by the Chinese Fund for the Humanities and Social Sciences
(Grant No. 18WZS017)
First published in English 2021

by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
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© 2021 Jinming Li
Translated by LIAO Jing and FU Rongbo
The right of Jinming Li to be identified as author of this work has been
asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
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without intent to infringe.
English Version by permission of Heilongjiang Education Press.
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Contents
List of figures vii

List of tables viii
PART I
Introduction 1
1 Geographical overview of China’s maritime boundaries

in the South China Sea 3
PART II
Chinese historical records of the South China Sea 19
2 The South China Sea in Song-Yuan-Ming-Qing China 21

3 Shitang and Changsha within China’s maritime boundaries
in the South China Sea 37
4 South China Sea in the Measurements of the Four Seas
of the Yuan Dynasty 48
5 Why are Hoang Sa and Truong Sa of Vietnam not Xisha
and Nansha of China? some evidence from historical sources 61
6 China’s development and administration of Xisha and
Nansha Islands 76
PART III
Controversy over the dotted line 87
7 China’s dotted line in the South China Sea: its background

and ramifications 89
vi Contents
8 Legal status of the dotted line in the South China Sea:
historic waters, territory boundary line or an Island
ownership line? 104
9 A critical review of research on the legal status of the
dotted line in the South China Sea 119
PART IV
Mixed reactions to new developments in
contested waters 135
10 China’s struggle for sovereignty over Xisha and Nansha

Islands before and after the Second Sino-Japanese War 137
11 China’s dispute with the Philippines over the Nansha
Islands: an international law perspective 151
12 Sino-French border demarcation disputes and maritime
boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin 165
13 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the South
China Sea disputes 188
14 Latest developments in the South China Sea
and China’s responses 199
15 Current situation in the South China Sea
and Vietnamese policy 209
Index 221
Figures
2.1 A passage in Dao Yi Zhi Lue that mentions “Wanli Shitang” 24

2.2 The General Map of Lands within the Four Seas in Hai Guo
Jian Wen Lu 25
2.3 A paragraph in Hai Yu that mentions “fen shui” 27
2.4 The General Map of Asia in Hai Lu 30
3.1 Passages in Hai Yu that mention “Wanli Shitang”
and “Wanli Changsha” 40
4.1 Principle behind latitude and longitude calculation via
measurement of summer solstice sun shadow lengths 52
4.2 Calculating latitudes via measurement of summer solstice
sun shadow lengths 53
5.1 Map of Vietnam in the preface of Illustrated Geography
of Vietnam 67
5.2 Detailed Map of Dai Nam, early 19th century 69
7.1 The Map of Chinese Domain in the South China Sea 93
7.2 The Map of the Location of the South China Sea Islands 96
12.1 Map of Mong Cai and Zhushan (in Chinese and Vietnamese) 176
Tables
4.1 Summer Solstice Sundial Scenery and Day-Night Lengths

at Six Selected Points 49
4.2 Latitudes Measured at 20 Surveying Points 51
4.3 Longitudes and Latitudes of Six Observation Points 54
Part I
Introduction
1 Geographical overview of
China’s maritime boundaries
Nanhai (南海), also called the South China Sea, refers to the vast expanse of
water stretching from latitude 23°27′ North to 3° South and longitude 99°10′ to
122°10′ East in the southeast of China. It is located between mainland China, the
Indochinese Peninsula, Borneo, Palawan, Luzon, and the Taiwan Island of China,
and surrounded by Sumatra, Bangka, Borneo, Palawan, Mindoro, Luzon, Taiwan
Island, Hainan Island and the Indochinese Peninsula. Spreading 1,380 kilometers
east to west and 2,380 kilometers north to south, it embraces an area of about 3.5
million square kilometers. The South China Sea is an important maritime hub
linking two oceans and three continents. Its strategic significance has been pre-
sented from the following aspects:
1 the South China Sea, as one of the richest fishing grounds around the globe,
has seven of the world’s top 30 fishing nations by annual catch;
2 it has the two dominant ports of Asia: Hong Kong and Singapore;
3 it has one of the most hotly contested island territories in the world—the
Nansha Islands;
4 it has promising offshore oil and gas reserves;
5 it has several Pacific/Indian Ocean choke-points, that is, the Strait of Malacca,
the Singapore Strait, the Sunda Strait and the Lombok Strait;
6 more than 10,000 merchant ships pass through the sea each year. It is one of
the major oceanic routes for crude oil tankers from the Persian Gulf to Asia,
and one of the major east-west oceanic routes for goods from Asia to rest of
the world.1
The South China Sea territory of China in this book refers to the area located
south of the southern end of the Taiwan Strait and the southern shores of Guang-
dong Province (23°N), north of James Shoal (4°N), east of the Natuna Islands
of Indonesia and the southern shores of Vietnam (108°E), west of the coasts of
the Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah, and the Philippine islands of Pala-
wan and Luzon (120°E), including three archipelagos and one submerged bank:
the Xisha Islands, the Nansha Islands, the Dongsha Islands and the Zhongsha
Islands (in English, the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, the Pratas Islands and
4 Introduction
the Macclesfield Bank, respectively) which together constitute the oft-mentioned
“Nanhai Zhudao” (the South China Sea Islands).
Spreading north to south from the Beiwei Tan (North Vereker Bank) around
21°N to Zengmu Ansha (James Shoal) and Yaxi Ansha (Tanjong Payong) around
3°40′N and extending east to west from the Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal)
at 117°50′E to the Wan’an Tan (Vanguard Bank) at 109°30′E, Nanhai Zhudao
consists of over 200 islands, cays, shoals and reefs that scatter across the vast area
south and east of the Hainan Island. It stretches about 900 kilometers along the
latitude and about 1,800 kilometers along the longitude.
1.1 Geographical overview of the Dongsha Islands

The Dongsha Islands, comprised of Dongsha Dao (Pratas Island) and two coral
banks, Beiwei (North Vereker) and Nanwei (South Vereker), is the northernmost
archipelago of Nanhai Zhudao.
Dongsha Dao is located at 20°42′N, 116°43′E, on the western edge of Dongsha
Jiao (Pratas Reef) which encloses a lagoon. The island, flat and sandy, rises in the
northeast and dips in the southwest. It is about 5 kilometers long, 1.5 kilometers
wide and 12 meters above sea level. Its north end is about 140 nautical miles
away from Shantou, its northwest end 120 nautical miles away from Jiazimen, a
port in Guangdong, and its northeast end is 240 nautical miles away from Taiwan.
Lying 170 and 400 nautical miles away from Hong Kong and Manila respec-
tively, the island constitutes a hub to vessels en route between the two cities.
When the Northeast Monsoon blows, the weather is frequently thick and hazy,
and the breakers on the island may not be seen until within 1 nautical mile. On
its west side, there is a deep inlet, which affords shelter to the Chinese fishermen
from Fujian and Guangdong. In the northeast of the island lies a fishing village.
In 1866, an Englishman called Pratas came across a storm on the sea and sought
shelter here. The British therefore named the island after him. The Chinese, how-
ever, have been calling it “Da Dongsha” (Great Dongsha). Both the south and
north sides of the island are connected to the lagoon by a waterway. The southern
waterway is comparatively wider and deeper, navigable by boats with a draft of
under 4.6 meters, and the northern waterway about 2.25 nautical miles north of
the island, though 2.3 meters to 3.7 meters deep in most parts, are rife with coral
heads and some parts can be as shallow as 0.6 meters.
Dongsha Dao is a windy place. It is recorded in the Local Records of Guang-
dong Province compiled and published by Guangdong Provincial Department of
Civil Affairs in 1934: “Every three days a strong wind would attack; with it are
loud noises like the explosion of firecrackers. When wind rises on the island, no
ship within 100 meters could feel it. Hence, the island was nicknamed ‘fengku’
(wind cave) by the seafarers.” Despite the weather, fishermen from Fujian and
Caton have frequented here for the abundant resources and always returned with
ships fully loaded. The number of fishing vessels heading here “exceeds a hun-
dred in an average year, not counting the numerous small boats that come for
fishing or for both fishing and prospecting. Large ships can always make a good
Overview of China’s maritime boundaries 5
profit.” So there was a popular saying among the fishermen then: “To seek for-
tune, go to Dongsha.”2
Nanwei Tan and Beiwei Tan are two submerged coral banks located 45 nauti-
cal miles northwest of Dongsha Dao. Beiwei Tan lies 5 nautical miles away to
the northeast of Nanwei Tan and is comparatively larger. It is 11 nautical miles in
length with a least depth of 64 meters and an average depth of 185 meters. About
334 meters of deep water separate Beiwei from Nanwei, which is 10 nautical
miles in length and has a least depth of 50 meters.
1.2 Major features of the Xisha Islands

The Xisha Islands, lying to the west of the main Hong Kong-Singapore route
between 15°46′N and 17°08′N latitude and 111°11′E and 112°54′E longitude, are
made up of extensive coral islands and reefs. The archipelago is 240 nautical
miles south of Haikou in Hainan, 390 nautical miles southwest of Hong Kong,
240 nautical miles east of the central shores of Vietnam, and 150 nautical miles
southeast of Yulin Port in Hainan.
The Xisha archipelago has two major island groups—Xuande Qundao and
Yongle Qundao (known as the Amphitrite Group and the Crescent Group in
English)—and several small islands and reefs.
Xuande Qundao consists of two parts separated by a deep-water channel about
4 nautical miles wide. The northern portion has two main reefs bisected by Zha-
oshu Pass (Zappe Pass) 0.5 kilometers wide.
The reef on the western side is about 6 kilometers long and 1.75 kilometers
wide. Near its western extremity lies a sandy cay named Xi Sha (West Sand). And
about 2 nautical miles away from the eastern extremity of the reef is an island
called Zhaoshu Dao (Tree Island).
Zhaoshu Dao is situated at 16°59′N, 112°16′E, about 32 nautical miles north-
west of the eastern reef. It is covered with tropical bushes and surrounded by a
white sand beach. The reef base of the island stretches about 1.5 nautical miles
eastward and 4.5 nautical miles westward.
The reef on the eastern side is about 4 kilometers in length, including three
islands and three cays—Bei Dao (North Island), Zhong Dao (Middle Island), Nan
Dao (South Island), Bei Shazhou (North Sand), Zhong Shazhou (Middle Sand)
and Nan Shazhou (South Sand). Bei Dao is located about 2 nautical miles east-
southeast of Zhaoshu Dao across Zhaoshu Pass. A reef extends about 0.5 nautical
miles northwest from Bei Dao and about 4 nautical miles southeast. Zhong Dao
and Nan Dao lie to the south of the reef and are about 0.5 nautical miles and 1
nautical mile away from Bei Dao respectively. The three islands are all covered
with tropical bushes. So are the three cays near the southeast end of the reef.
Zhaoshu Pass is about 0.5 nautical miles wide between the reefs. With a depth
of mere 4.6 meters, it is navigable only by small craft.
The southern portion of Xuande Qundao can be divided into two parts. In the
eastern part is a reef upon which lie Yongxing Dao (Woody Island) and Shi Dao
(Rocky Island); in the western part is a bank, known as Yinli Tan (Iltis Bank).
6 Introduction
Yongxing Dao is located at 16°50′N, 112°20′E, about 9 nautical miles southeast
of Zhaoshu Dao. It is the largest island of the Xuande Qundao. With an elliptical
shape, it is 1,950 meters in length and 1,350 meters in width, covering an area of
about 2.1 square kilometers. The island is covered with tropical shrubs, coconut
trees, papaya trees and the like. It is also surrounded by a white sand beach.
Shi Dao lies about 730 meters northeast of Yongxing Dao. In a slightly circular
shape, the island is 375 meters long and 340 meters wide, covering an area of
about 0.08 square kilometers. With a height of 13.7 meters, it is the highest of the
islands. In its vicinity lies an exposed reef that extends about 0.75 nautical miles
toward the northeast of Yongxing Dao and about 0.4 nautical mile northward. The
reef is about 18.3 meters deep.
Yinli Tan is located about 7 nautical miles southwest of Yongxing Dao. With
depths of 14.6 to 18.3 meters, it is about 3 nautical miles long, 0.5 nautical miles
wide, and is quite steep-to. There is another bank, 21.9 meters deep, lying 4 nauti-
cal miles south of Yongxing Dao.
Yongle Qundao is situated 37 nautical miles southwest of Yongxing Dao. The
island group comprises several islands, reefs and sand islets that form a crescent,
so the Westerners call it the Crescent Group. Its major features include:
Jinyin Dao (16°27′N, 111°31′E), 6.1 meters high and brush-covered, lies at the
western end of a reef which is separated from the southwest horn of the crescent
by a channel about 1.5 nautical miles wide. On the same reef lie several sand cays
that are situated to the east of Jinyin Dao.
Lingyang Jiao (Antelope Reef) constitutes the southwest horn of the cres-
cent. The reef is about 3 nautical miles long, 2 nautical miles wide, and is partly
exposed above water. A sand cay is located on its southeast extremity.
Ganquan Dao (Robert Island) is about 7.9 meters high and lies 0.5 nautical
miles north of Lingyang Jiao. The island is fringed by a reef and covered with
vegetation. The water is 9.1 meters deep where it extends about 0.5 nautical
miles northeast.
Shanhu Dao (Pattle Island), 2.5 nautical miles long, 0.25 nautical miles wide,
about 9.1 meters high, lies about 2 nautical miles northeast of Ganquan Dao. The
island is covered with tropical bushes. A reef surrounding the island extends some
distance southwest and about 1.75 nautical miles northeast. Near the reef about
0.2 nautical miles north of the island, a rock rises above water. And on the other
side there is a clear channel. In the south of the island lies a bight where boats can
land at low tide, but there are rocks close to the shore.
Yin Yu (Observation Bank) forms the northern extremity of Yongle Qundao.
Located about 6 nautical miles northeast of Shanhu Dao, the islet is joined with a
brush-covered sand cay. And a reef surrounding the cay extends about 1 nautical
mile northwest and southeast. There is a detached reef between Yin Yu and the
reef extending toward the northeast of Shanhu Dao. Close to the reef’s southern
end a small reef patch lies 5 meters underwater, and near its northeast end is
another small detached reef. Between this reef and the reef extending towards
the west of Yin Yu there stretches a channel where a small reef patch lies 7.8
meters deep.
Jinqing Dao (Drummond Island), lying about 7.5 nautical miles southeast of
Yin Yu, is 900 meters long, 493 meters wide, about 4.6 meters high and is covered
with tropical bushes. A reef surrounding it extends some distance to its south.
And meanwhile, the reef stretches about 4 nautical miles northeast, then curving
northwest about 4 nautical miles. The area between the island and Yin Yu features
a complex reef-studded sea floor. There are also several sand cays whose height
varies from 0.9 meters to 3.0 meters, some of them covered with shrubs.
Chenhang Dao (Duncan Islands), lying on the southeast horn of the crescent,
is made up of two islets. The island lies about 1.5 nautical miles southwest of
Jinqing Dao across a channel. It is formed by coral reefs joined by a sand spit.
Surrounding the brush-covered island, a reef extends some distance northward
and about 0.5 nautical mile southward.
Apart from the previously mentioned two island groups, other small islands
and reefs include:
Bei Jiao (North Reef) (17°05′N, 111°30′E), whose eastern end is about 41 nau-
tical miles west-northwest of Zhaoshu Dao, stretches about 6 nautical miles west-
ward. Rocks break the surface all around the edge of the reef and breakers on the
reef can be heard at a considerable distance. The reef encloses a lagoon and there
is a passage on the southwest side, allowing only small ships.
Dong Dao (Lincoln Island) (16°40′N, 112°44′E), occupying the eastern corner
of the Xisha Islands, lies on the end of a narrow region that rises from the sea
floor. With varied depths up from 73.2 meters, it extends about 20 nautical miles
toward the northeast of Binmei Tan and Zhanhan Tan. The island is 4.6 meters
high and the depth increases sharply on the northeastern side. It is brush-covered
and fringed by a drying coral reef. The island stretches a short distance southwest,
about 0.3 nautical miles northeast and over 1 nautical mile northwest, reaching
18.3 meters deep.
Gaojian Shi (Pyramid Rock), 5.2 meters high and cone-shaped, lies about
7 nautical miles southwest of Dong Dao. Seen from afar, it could be mistaken for
a junk, so it is also called “Shuangfan (double sails).”
Xidu Tan (Dido Bank), with a depth of 23.8 meters, lies about 12 meters north-
east of Dong Dao. It is a steep-to sand bank.
Zhongjian Dao (Triton Island) (15°47′N, 111°12′E) lies in the southwest of the
Xisha Islands. It is a sand cay about 3 meters high. It sits on a coral reef which
extends about 1 nautical mile northeast and about 0.5 miles in other directions.
The reef is steep-to, with at most 1.8 meters of water over it.
Panshi Yu (Passu Keah) lies about 36 nautical miles northeast of Zhongjian
Dao. It is a sand cay located on the western end of a steep-to reef which extends
about 4 nautical miles eastward.
Huaguang Jiao (Discovery Reef) lies about 8 nautical miles north of Panshi Yu,
with a lagoon inside. The reef is steep-to and on it several rocks lie above water,
one of which is 3.7 meters higher than any other part of the reef. Boats can enter
the lagoon through channels on both the northern and southern sides of the reef,
the narrower channel being the one on the northern side. There are quite a few
channels on the reef.
8 Introduction
Yuzhuo Jiao (Vuladdore Reef) is located about 10 nautical miles northeast of
Huaguang Jiao. The reef is 13 kilometers long, 4 kilometers wide, and is quite
steep-to. It has a few rocks above-water, which submerge at high tide.
Langhua Jiao (Bombay Reef), surrounding a lagoon, lies about 39 nautical
miles east of Panshi Yu and occupies the southeast end of the Xisha Archipelago.
The sea frequently breaks on the reef where there are several rocks awash, four
above-water rocks, and the remains of many old wrecks.
Songtao Tan (Herald Bank) lies about 23 nautical miles southwest of Langhua
Jiao, with a depth of over 235.9 meters.
Binmei Tan (Bremen Bank) lies about 13 nautical miles north of Langhua Jiao,
its southwest end over 12.8 meters in depth.
Zhanhan Tan (Jehangire Bank) lies about 4 nautical miles northeast of Binmei
Tan, consisting of three detached patches with varied depths. The southwest patch
is 27.4 meters deep, the northern patch 14 meters and the southeast one 12.8 meters.
Haiwang Tanor or BeiBian Lang (Neptuna Bank), located to the north of Bin-
mei Tan, consists of two coral patches. Its northeast patch lies about 6.5 meters
southwest of Gaojian Shi and has a depth of 14.6 meters; its southwest patch lies
3 nautical miles farther southwest, with a depth of 18.3 meters. The two patches
are almost invisible. Near their northeast end, the depth exceeds 182.2 meters.
1.3 The Zhongsha Islands

The Zhongsha Islands are situated to the east of the main Hong Kong–Singapore
route, its southwest end about 66 nautical miles east-southeast of Langhua Jiao. It
spans the area roughly between 15°24′N and 16°15′N latitude and 113°40′E and
114°57′E longitude. It is a submerged atoll whose coral rim has a greatest depth
of less than 18.3 meters and a least depth of 11.9 meters at the northeast side of
Biwei Ansha (Pygmy Shoal) on the northeast end. Within the lagoon, there scatter
several banks with depths less than 18.3 meters, the shallowest point being Manbu
Ansha (Walker Shoal), with a depth of 9.2 meters.
Other shoals and reefs include:
Shenhu Ansha (Saint Esprit Shoal) (19°23′N, 113°02′E) lies near the edge of
the Zhongsha Islands, stretching southeast with a depth of less than 182.9 meters.
Its shallowest point is 12.8 meters deep, about 160 nautical miles northeast of the
Xisha Islands and about 35 nautical miles west of the main Hong Kong-Singapore
route.
Xianfa Ansha (Truro Shoal) (16°20′N, 116°44′E) lies about 90 nautical miles
northwest of Huangyan Dao, with a depth of 18.3 meters.
Yitong Ansha (Helen Shoal) (19°12′N, 113°53′E) lies about 53 nautical miles
southeast of Shenhu Ansha, 15 nautical miles east of the main Hong Kong–
Singapore route, and 185 nautical miles and 157 nautical miles southwest of Dong-
sha Dao and Nanwei Tan respectively. The shallowest point is about 11.9 meters, but
surrounding it the depth can reach 182.9 meters. Strong rips have been observed
in the vicinity of Yitong Ansha and deep water is found there. The current usually
sets with the wind.
Huangyan Dao (Scarborough Shoal), also known as Minzhu Jiao (Democ-
racy Reef), is located about 160 nautical miles southeast of the Zhongsha Islands
between latitude 15°08′N and 15°14′N and longitude 117°44′E and 117°48′E.
In 1748, an English ship named Scarborough grounded here, so the Westerners
named it Scarborough Reef. The edge of the island is steep and formed by a nar-
row reef belt enclosing a lagoon. Rocks scatter on the island, standing about 0.3
to 1.5 meters high. Among them, South Rock is the highest, lying on the southeast
extremity of the island. To the north of South Rock runs a channel about 400
meters wide with general depths of 9.1 to 11 meters leading into the lagoon. The
channel is encumbered with reef patches, leaving the entrance quite shallow, with
a depth of mere 2.7 meters.
1.4 The “Dangerous Ground” of the Nansha Islands

The Nansha Islands are located in the south of Nanhai Zhudao between latitude
3°40′N and 11°55′N and longitude 109°30′E and 117°50′E. They stretch over 400
nautical miles east to west and over 500 nautical miles north to south, covering
an area of more than 820,000 square kilometers. The archipelago is comprised of
over 230 islands, reefs and sandbanks. Among them, there are 25 islands exposed
above water, 128 reefs and 77 shoals and cays. The central part of the Nansha
Islands is studded with reefs and sand banks, known as the Dangerous Ground.
Features around this area can be divided into three groups. The eastern group
mainly consists of coral banks, the western group reefs, and the southern group
shoals and sunken reefs. Specific information about the major features will be
provided shortly.
1.4.1 Features West of the Dangerous Ground

Zhenghe Qunjiao (Tizard Bank), 15 nautical miles northeast of Xiaoxian Jiao,
consists of a lagoon bordered by shoals and reefs of irregular depths. There are
islets on two of the reefs and a sand cay on another. Several coral heads with
depths of 50 to 90 meters lie in the lagoon. Fishermen from Hainan Island visit the
islands annually in December and leave at the commencement of the Southwest
Monsoon.
Taiping Dao (Itu Aba Island) (10°23′N, 114°22′E), surrounded by a reef that
extends 0.5 nautical miles outward, lies on the northwest corner of Zhenghe Qun-
jiao. Generally distributed along an ENE-WSW axis, the island is 1,400 meters
long and 460 meters wide, occupying an area of about 0.42 square kilometers,
the largest in the Nansha Islands. A bank more than 5.5 meters deep lies about
0.75 nautical miles southwest of the western extremity of the island’s surround-
ing reef. About 2 nautical miles east of the island lies a reef submerged at high
tide. Between the reef and the island is a channel in whose center lies a bank over
7.3 meters deep. Meanwhile about 3.5 nautical miles east of the reef lies a sand
cay 4.6 meters high near which is another reef extending about 1.5 nautical miles
offshore.
10 Introduction
Hongxiu Dao (Namyit Island) (10°11′N, 114°22′E), on the southern side of
Zhenghe Qunjiao, about 20 nautical miles southwest of Anda Jiao, is 6.1 meters
high and covered with small trees and brush. It lies on a reef which extends about
1 nautical milewestward and 0.35 nautical mile eastward. A small reef with a
depth of 5.5 meters lies about 1 nautical mile northeast of the island and a bank
with a depth of 6.9 meters lies 2 nautical miles in the southwest.
Bolan Jiao (Petley Reef), a steep coral reef, oval-shaped and about 1 nautical
mile long, extends about 5 nautical miles northeast of Zhenghe Qunjiao.
Anda Jiao (Eldad Reef), forming the extern extremity of Zhenghe Qunjiao, lies
about 7 nautical miles southeast of Bolan Jiao. Several big above-water rocks and
plenty of small rocks lie on the reef. The northeast end is relatively narrow and steep-
to with a long raised area stretching about 1 nautical mile. The area extends outward
about 1 nautical mile and its depth keeps increasing until reaching 91.4 meters.
Nanxun Jiao (Gaven Reefs) is comprised of two reefs, the northwest one lying
about 2.5 nautical miles away from the southwest end of Zhenghe Qunjiao and the
southeast one lying about 6 nautical miles west of Hongxiu Dao. Both reefs are
submerged. Some small coral reefs lie in between and one of them is 6.4 meters
deep, located about 0.75 nautical miles northwest of the southeast reef.
Dunqian Shazhou (Sand Cay) lies 6 nautical miles east of Taiping Dao at the
center of a coral reef. The reef has a slightly circular shape and a diameter of about
0.75 nautical miles.
Daoming Qunjiao (Loaita Bank) lies to the north of Zhenghe Qunjiao. The
reef group is steep-to and consists of a lagoon surrounded by shoals and reefs of
irregular depths. In the southern end are reefs and two sand cays, namely, Yangxin
Shazhou and Shuanghuang Shazhou. An island forms its southern extremity,
known as NanyaoDao.
Nanyue Dao (Loaita Island) (10°40′N, 114°25′E.), 1.8 meters high, is covered
with tropical brush. The island is located in the south of Daoming Qunjiao, about
16 nautical miles north of Zhenghe Qunjiao. Fringed by rocks above water, it
extends about 0.5 nautical miles northward and little distance in other directions.
Yangxin Shazhou (Lankiam Cay), 6.5 nautical miles northeast of Nanyue Dao,
is a sand cay located at the center of a reef which extends outward about 0.5 nauti-
cal miles. Two drying reefs lie 3 nautical miles and 4 nautical miles northeast of
the cay.
Shuanghuang Shazhou (Loaita Nan), lying in the southwest corner of Daoming
Qunjiao, is a small sand cay above water in the middle of a coral patch. In its east
is a shoal about 5.4 to 9 meters deep.
Shuangzi Qunjiao (North Danger Reef), a steep-to coral formation located
between 11°23′N and 11°28′N latitude and 114°19′E and 114°25′E longitude, is
about 20 to 28 nautical miles north of Zhongye Dao. Its inner portions are remark-
ably flat with an average depth of less than 36.6 meters. The surrounding reef is
shallow and variable in width, its depths less than 9.1 meters. The reef continues
to extend on its northeast and southwest, the extensions exposed above water at
low tide. In the northwest end lie two small islands—Beizi Dao and Nanzi Dao—
from which Shuangzi Qunjiao derived its name (Shuang means “double”).
Beizi Dao (Northeast Cay) (11°27′N, 114°21′E) is about 2.4 meters high, lying
on a reef that is partly above water and extends about 0.1 to 0.5 nautical miles
offshore.
Nanzi Dao (Southwest Cay) is about 4 meters high, lying about 2 nautical miles
southwest of Beizi Dao. The two cays are separated by a channel that is 9.1 meters
deep and filled with small reefs. A coral reef partly above water surrounds the
cay, extending about 0.05 nautical miles southeast and about 0.3 nautical miles in
other directions.
Lesi Ansha (Lys Shoal) is located between 11°19′N and 11°22′N latitude and
114°35′E and 114°39′E longitude, about 13 nautical miles east-southeast of
Shuangzi Qunjiao. The shoal, enclosing a lagoon, is steep-to and made up of
numerous small reefs with a maximum depth of less than 18.3 meters. Close to its
southwest end lies a small reef 5 meters deep and near its northeast end lie some
others with depths of about 9.1 meters.
Yongdeng Ansha (Trident Shoal), lying about 2 nautical miles north of Lesi
Ansha, is a steep-to coral formation fringed by a number of small reefs. It is less
than 18.3 meters deep, enclosing a deep lagoon. A small drying reef lies north of
it; a second lies east of it, about 4.1 meters deep; and a third lies northwest of it
with a depth of 7.3 meters.
Zhongye Qunijiao (Thitu Island and Reefs) consists of several dangerous
patches upon two coral banks separated by a deep, narrow channel.
Zhongye Dao (Thitu Island) (11°03′N, 114°17′E), 3.3 meters high, lies on the
western end of the two coral banks about 14 nautical miles northeast of Zhubi
Jiao. The island is overgrown with scrub brush. Its top point is about 18.3 meters
high and in the vicinity a reef breaks the surface of water, extending about 0.5
nautical miles northeast.
Zhubi Jiao (Subi Reef) lies about 21 nautical miles northwest of Nanyue Dao.
It dries, surrounds a lagoon, is steep-to, and usually breaks. There is no apparent
entrance into the lagoon.
Reefs Southwest of Zhenghe Qunjiao

Yongshu Jiao (Fiery Cross Reef) lies near the western edge of the Dangerous
Ground, about 27 nautical miles east of Xiaoyao Ansha. The reef is steep-to
and composed of coral patches, several of which dry while others still sub-
merge. Between the patches, the depth reaches over 50 meters. Near the south-
west end of the reef stands a rock about 0.6 meters high and visible above water
at high tide.
Daxian Jiao (Discovery Great Reef) (10°00′N–10°08′N, 113°35′E) lying about
54 nautical miles east-northeast of Yongshu Jiao, is mostly above water. The
reef has several drying rocks on it and an inner lagoon, but there is no apparent
entrance into it. A shoal or a bank 73.2 meters deep is found 10 nautical miles
northeast of the reef.
Xiaoxian Jiao (Discovery Small Reef) is a round, steep-to coral patch lying
about 10 nautical miles east of the southern extremity of Daxian Jiao.
12 Introduction
Fulusi Jiao (Flora Temple Reef) (10°14′N, 113°38′E) lies about 17 nautical
miles west-northwest of the northern extremity of Daxian Jiao. The reef, steep-to
and dangerous, has submerged rocks on its southwest, with depths of 1.8 to 5.5m.
Yinqing Qunjiao (London Reefs) is located to the south of Yongshu Jiao, its
western end about 21 nautical miles northeast of Nanwei Dao. It consists of four
reefs: Xi Jiao, Zhong Jiao, Dong Jiao and Huayang Jiao.
Xi Jiao (West London Reef) is located between 8°49′N and 8°53′N latitude and
112°12′E and 112°17′E longitude, about 21 nautical miles northeast of Nanwei
Dao, forming the western extremity of Yinqing Qunjiao. The reef has several
detached, above-water coral patches around its edges and a sand cay 0.6 meters
high on its east. In the center there are many coral heads, and the depths range
from 11 meters to 18.3 meters. Approach can only be made from the southeast
side, but the numerous coral patches make navigation extremely dangerous.
Zhong Jiao (Central Reef) is small submerged coral reef with a shallow inner
lagoon, lying about 8 nautical miles northeast of Xi Jiao. At the southwest end of
the reef is a sand cay awash in high tide. Unlike Dong Jiao and Xi Jiao, Central
Reef is not always marked by breakers.
Dong Jiao (East Reef) lies about 16 nautical miles east of Xi Jiao, enclosing a
lagoon. It is marked by heavy breakers. One or two above-water rocks lie on its
western end. There is no entrance into the lagoon.
Huayang Jiao (Cauteron Reef) is located about 9 nautical miles east of Dong
Jiao and about 6 nautical miles to the west of the Dangerous Ground. The reef is
awash, steep-to and encloses a lagoon.
Xiaoyao Ansha (Daulle Shoal) (9°28′N, 112°24′E), located about 36 nauti-
cal miles north of Zhong Jiao with a depth of 1,938.5 meters, is part of Yinqing
Qunjiao.
Anbo Shazhou and Nanwei Dao

Anbo Shazhou (Amboyna Cay) (7°53′N, 112°56′E) is 2.4 meters high, located
about 70 nautical miles east of Nanwei Dao and close to the southwest edge of the
Dangerous Ground. The cay comprises two parts. The eastern part is a sand beach,
broken by coral, while the western part is covered with guano and rubble. Coral
ledges which are partly above water and on which the sea breaks heavily at high
tide, extend 0.2 nautical miles offshore.
Yindun Ansha (Stag Shoal) (8°27′N., 112°57′E), lying about 33 nautical miles
north of Anbo Shazhou, consists of several above-water rocks.
Riji Jiao (Ladd Reef), lying about 42 nautical miles north of Nanwei Jiao, is
formed by coral reefs and encloses a lagoon with a white sand bed. The reef is
partly above water and partly awash. There is no way through the lagoon for ships.
Nanwei Dao (Spratly Island), 2.4 meters high, flat, lies about 15 nautical
miles east of Riji Jiao, on the western end of a coral reef 1 nautical mile long
and 0.75 nautical miles wide. The island has a margin of white sand and broken
coral and is surrounded by drying ledges. Flocks of birds can often be seen rest-
ing on it. About 0.75 nautical miles north of the island the water is 6.4 meters
deep. To the northeast, depths of 12.8 to 14.6 meters are found about 0.5 nau-
tical miles off the island. The reef is steep-to and marked by heavy breakers
except in fair weather.
Other reefs and banks

Wan’an Tan (Vanguard Bank) lies about 60 nautical miles southeast of the main
Hong Kong-Singapore route, its southern end about 173 nautical miles north-
northeast of Laut Island. The bank is 16.5 meters deep. Its eastern end lies in posi-
tion 7°30′N, 109°55′E with a depth of 20.1 meters and its southern end extends
about 30 nautical miles northeast.
Xiwei Tan (Prince Consort Bank), 12 nautical miles north-northeast of Wan’an
Tan, is formed by sand and coral. The bank has a depth of 18.3 meters near its
northeast edge and depths of 21.9 to 23.8 meters are found on its western edge.
The shallowest point is at its southern end.
Lizhun Tan (Grainger Bank), with depths of 11 to 14.6 meters, lies about 35
nautical miles northeast of the eastern end of Wan’an Tan. The coral bottom of the
bank is distinctly visible.
Guangya Tan (Prince of Wales Bank) lies about 12 nautical miles north of Liz-
hun Tan. The bank is of coral and its depths are very irregular.
Renjun Tan (Alexandra Bank), lying about 2 nautical miles southeast of Guangya
Tan, has a depth of 5.5 meters on its east over coral bottom that is distinctly visible.
Nanwei Tan (Rifleman Bank) is formed by sand and coral. The bank has many
shallow patches of coral around its edge and a comparatively greater depth at its
center. Pengbo Bao (Bombay Castle), its northern end and shallowest point, lies
in position 7°56′N,111°42′E, about 64 nautical miles east of Renjun Tan. The
shoal has a depth of 3.2 meters and breaks in all but the finest weather. Changjun
Ansha (Johnson Patch), with a depth of 7.3 meters, lies on the western side of
Nanwei Tan; Jindun Ansha (Kingston Shoal), with a depth of 11 meters, lies at the
southern end; and Ao’nan Ansha (Orleana Shoal), with a depth of 8.2 meters, lies
on the eastern end.
Aoyuan Ansha (Owen Shoal) is formed by coral, 6.4 meters deep and about 22
nautical miles northeast of Nanwei Tan.
1.4.2 Features South of the Dangerous Ground
Northern dangers
Nantong Jiao (6°20′N, 113°14′E) lies about 50 nautical miles east-northeast of
Mengyi Ansha. This coral reef is 1.2 to 1.8 meters high and has a depth of 91.4
meters around its edge.
Huanglu Jiao (Royal Charlotte Reef) lies about 42 nautical miles north-
northeast of Nantong Jiao and is nearly rectangular in shape. Several boulders,
0.6 to 1.2 meters high, lie near its southeast side and some rocks, awash, lie on its
northeast side.
14 Introduction
Danwan Jiao (Swallow Reef), lying about 27 nautical miles north-northeast of
Huanglu Jiao, is formed of a belt of coral surrounding a shallow lagoon. At its
eastern part are some rocks 1.5 to 3 meters high; and at its southeast part also lie
some rocks exposed above water.
Xibo Jiao (Ardasier Breakers) is 4.1 meters deep, with its shallowest point in
position 7°57′N, 114°02′E.
Southern dangers
Beikang Ansha (North Luconia Shoals) lies about 100 nautical miles northwest of
Tanjung Baram and 15 to 52 nautical miles north of Nankang Ansha. It consists of
a mass of coral reefs and shoals and no safe passage through is recorded.
Nanping Jiao (Hayes Reef) is a small, steep-to above-water reef lying at the
southern end of Beikang Ansha. The sea breaks heavily on the reef all year around.
Nan’an Jiao (Seahorse Breakers), 3.7 to 11 meters deep and steep-to on the
east, lies about 10 nautical miles north-northwest of Nanping Jiao. Close to its
southern side is a detached coral reef and about 2 nautical miles to its west is an
above-water coral patch upon which the sea breaks heavily.
Mengyi Ansha (Friendship Shoal) (5°57′N, 112°32′E) lies at the northern end
of Beikang Ansha with a depth of 8.2 meters.
Nankang Ansha (South Luconia Shoals), lying north and northeast of Cheng-
ping Jiao, consists of a mass of coral reefs. The broken and steep-to reefs in this
area can be seen from high on the mast.
Haining Jiao (Herald Reef) lies at the southern end of Nankang Ansha and
about 84 nautical miles west-northwest of Tanjung Baram. It is small coral atoll
with a diameter of 0.4 nautical miles. The reef has 5.5 meters of water over it and
is 54.9 meters deep at its center. It is steep-to and hard to recognize.
Qiongtai Jiao (Luconia Breakers) lies about 3.25 nautical miles northeast of
Haining Jiao. The reef is above water and marked by heavy breakers.
Hai’an Jiao (Stigant Reef) (5°02′N, 112°29′E), with a horseshoe shape and
depths of 4.6 to 11 meters, lies about 9 nautical miles west-northwest of Haining
Reef. Near its northwest end is a small reef 4.9 meters deep.
Tanmen Jiao (Richmond Reef) lies about 2.5 nautical miles northeast of Qion-
gtai Jiao. The water is at least 4.9 meters deep around its center. To its north-
northeast and south-southwest is a narrow raised area about 2 nautical miles long.
Yinbo Ansha (Connell Reef), with a least depth of 8.2 meters lies about 6.5
nautical miles northwest of Tanmen Jiao.
Chengping Jiao (Sierra Blanca) is situated about 89 nautical miles west of Tan-
jung Baram. A small exposed sand cay, surrounded by clear water, lies about 25
nautical miles to its south-southwest.
Lidi Ansha (Lydis Shoal) lies about 71 nautical miles west-northwest of Tan-
jung Kidurong. It is a small, 24.7 meter-deep coral shoal with depths of 45.7 to
49.4 meters around its edge.
Baxian Ansha (Parsons Shoal), 23.8 meters deep, and Zengmu Ansha (James
Shoal), 21.9 meters deep, lie respectively about 14 nautical miles east and 16 nautical
miles east-northeast of Lidi Ansha. They are both formed by coral and extend a
little distance offshore. During the Northeast Monsoon, their edges on the east are
marked by breakers.
Yaxi Ansha (Tanjong Payong) consists of two small coral shoals. The southeast
one is 16 meters deep, about 39 nautical miles northwest of Tanjung Kidurong,
and the northwest one is 16.9 meters deep, about 6 nautical miles northwest of
Dongnan Ansha (Sabine Patches).
1.4.3 Features East of the Dangerous Ground

Haima Tan (Seahorse Shoal) is situated to the north of Dangerous Ground and on
the western side of Palawan Passage. Its southern end lies about 67 nautical miles
northwest of Table Cape. Another small shoal 8.2 meters deep lies about 0.75
nautical miles to its north. The shoal has depths of 34.7 to 50.7 meters on the reef
and 11 meters in other places.
Yixin Shi (Madagascar Rock) lies in position 9°27′N, 116°56′E, with its north-
east end about 0.6 meters above water.
Pengbo Ansha (Bombay Shoal) is located on the western side of Palawan Pas-
sage, about 28 nautical miles north-northeast of Jianzhang Jiao. The Shoal consists
of a steep-to reef which completely encloses a lagoon that is 29.3 to 32.9 meters
deep and has a sandy bottom. On the reef are several rocks which dry about 0.6
meters; those in the west and northwest are comparatively more conspicuous.
Jianzhang Jiao (Royal Captain Shoal) is located west of the narrowest por-
tion of Palawan Passage, about 23 nautical miles east-northeast of Banyue Jiao.
The reef is formed by an unbroken coral reef about 0.05 to 0.2 nautical miles
wide. A few drying rocks are found on the reef. Shilong Yan (Observation Rock),
which dries about 0.6 meters, lies on the northern extremity of the reef. The reef
is steep-to around its edge and within 0.05 nautical miles the depth exceeds 182.9
meters. Ships can cross the reef into the lagoon at high tide. Depths of 27.4 to
31.1 meters, sand and coral, are found in the lagoon which is also encumbered
with coral heads.
Banyue Jiao (Half Moon Shoal) lies on the western side of Palawan Passage,
about 60 nautical miles northwest of Cape Buliluyan. The reef is formed by a sub-
merged coral belt. A number of rocks lie on the reef and dry about 0.6 meters. Two
channels, located respectively 0.2 nautical miles and 0.5 nautical miles southeast
of the reef, lead to the lagoon. In the south of the channels, a group of rocks, stand-
ing about 0.6 meters above water, mark the entrance in the near south. Depths
around the entrance are 7.3 to 16.5 meters. The lagoon is 25.6 to 29.3 meters deep,
containing lots of coral heads.
Zhixiang Jiao (Director Reef), whose name is derived from Director, a British
barque that grounded here in 1887, is at 8°28′ North latitude and 115°55′ East
longitude.
Nanle Ansha (Glasgow Shoal) (8°29′N, 115°31′E) is composed of sand and
rocks. The shoal extends about 3 nautical miles to its northeast edge and in some
places it is 6.1 to 9.1 meters above the sea.
16 Introduction
Siling Jiao (Commodore Reef) is located between 8°22′ and 8°24′N latitude
and 115°11′ and 115°17′E longitude. The reef, partly dry sand, has several rocks
6 to 9 meters above water, and heavy breakers all around it.
Duhu Ansha (North Viper Shoal) (8°02′N, 115°23′E) is about 5 nautical miles
wide and has above-water rocks.
1.4.4 Features in the Dangerous Ground

The Dangerous Ground is studded with features that are striking in terms of both
quantity and coverage. So far no exhaustive survey has been carried out. On the
whole, in the western part of this dangerous area are mainly islands; in the central
part are mainly reefs; in the eastern and southern parts are mainly shoals; and the
northern part is completely dominated by banks.
Feixin Dao (Flat Island) (10°49′N, 115°50′E), a flat and sandy islet, lies about
5 nautical miles north of Mahuan Dao. It is about 200 meters long and 40 meters
wide, covering an area of about 0.06 square kilometers.
Mahuan Dao (Nanshan Island) (10°44′N, 115°48′E) is a white sand island
about 580 meters long and covered with coarse grass. A large bank, about 45
meters deep, lies 6 nautical miles southeast of the island. Depths of 12 to 22
meters are found in the south.
Xiyue Dao (West York Island) (11°05′N, 115°02′E) lies to the northwest of
Feixin Dao. The island is about 1,000 meters long and 500 meters wide, cover-
ing an area of about 0.1573 square kilometers. It is covered with brush and sur-
rounded by a white sand beach.
Jinghong Dao (Sin Cowe Island) (9°53′N, 114°20′E), 3.7 meters high and cov-
ering an area of about 0.04 square kilometers, lies about 17 nautical miles south
of Hongxiu Dao. It is covered with brush and frequented by seabirds seeking rest.
Bisheng Jiao (Pearson Reef) is located to the east of Huayang Jiao between
8°56′ and 8°59′N latitude and 113°39′ and 113°44′E longitude. The island is an
atoll about 5 nautical miles long and 1 nautical mile wide. A channel in its south
leads to the lagoon. Two cays lie on the island—one in the northeast, 1.8 meters
high, and the other in the southwest, 0.9 meters high.
Bai Jiao (Barque Canada Reef) lies between 8°04′ and 8°17′N latitude and
113°15′ and 113°23′E longitude. The reef is long and narrow, enclosing an inac-
cessible lagoon that is 2 to 4 meters deep.
Wufang Jiao (Jackson Atoll) lies between 10°27′ and 10°32′N latitude and 115°
42′ and 115°48′E longitude, about 10 nautical miles south of Mahuan Dao. It is a
large circular atoll with a diameter of about 5.7 nautical miles. In its vicinity lie
five reefs, two of which have a circular shape, one in the southeast and the other
in the northwest.
Xian’e Jiao (Alicia Annie Reef) lies between latitudes 9°52′ and 9°56′N and
longitude 115°30′ and 115°35′E, about 27 nautical miles south of Meiji Jiao. The
reef is a small atoll 4 nautical miles long and 2.5 nautical miles wide. Its outer rim
is very steep-to. A white sand cay 1.5 meters high lies on its northern extremity
and several above-water rocks stand in its southeast.
Meiji Jiao (Mischief Reef) lies between 9°52′ and 9°56′N latitude and 115°30′
and 115°35′E longitude, to the southwest of Ren’ai Jiao. The reef is an ellipti-
cal atoll 4.6 nautical miles long and about 2.7 nautical miles wide. It encloses a
lagoon 25 meters deep. There are three entrances to the lagoon: the southwest one
is about 90 meters wide, 280 meters long and 18 meters deep; the southern one on
the eastern side is comparatively narrow, about 18 meters wide; and the western
one is about 36 meters wide, 274 meters long and 18.3 meters deep.
Nanhai Jiao (Mariveles Reef) lies between 7°56′ and 8°00′N latitude and
113°53′ and 113°58′E longitude, about 13 nautical miles southwest of Boji Jiao.
It emerges from water at low tide. The atoll extends about 6 nautical miles in a
general northwest-southeast direction. At its center is a white sand cay with a
height of 1.5 meters, separating the lagoon into two parts. There is no entrance
into the lagoon.
Liumen Jiao (Alison Reef) lies about 12 nautical miles southeast of Bisheng
Jiao. The reef is an atoll 11 nautical miles long and about 4 nautical miles wide
with a deep lagoon. A rock stands about 1 meter above water on the northern side
of the lagoon.
Nanhua Jiao (Cornwallis South Reef), 10 nautical miles southeast of Liumen
Jiao, is an atoll exposed above water at low tide enclosing a lagoon about 9 meters
deep. Several small rocks break the surface of water on the southeast side of the
reef.
Wumie Jiao (Tennent Reef), lying to the east of Nanhua Jiao, is a triangular-
shaped atoll exposed at low tide. It has a lining of white coral around the inside
of the rim.
Xianbin Ansha (Sabina Shoal) (9°42′N, 116°35′E), northeast of the Gongzhen
Jiao, consists of a group of broken banks exposed at low tide. The reef has an
irregular surface as if covered with fish scales. A lagoon lies in its western part,
with depths of 3.7 to 18.3 meters.
Xinyi Jiao (First Thomas Shoal) (9°18′N, 115°52′E), 25 nautical miles east of
Xian’e Jiao, is an elliptical atoll 4 nautical miles long, 2.5 nautical miles wide,
emerging from water at low tide. It encloses a deep lagoon to which there is no
entrance.
Ren’ai Jiao (Second Thomas Shoal) (9°45′N, 115°47′E), 18 nautical miles
southeast of Meiji Jiao, is an atoll 8 nautical miles long, 3 nautical miles wide,
emerging from water at low tide. It encloses a lagoon 27 meters deep.
Haikou Jiao (Northeast Investigator Shoal) (9°11′N, 116°27′E), southeast of
Xinyi Jiao, is a circular atoll 1.4 nautical miles long, 1 nautical mile wide, emerg-
ing from water at low tide. It encloses a lagoon to which there is no entrance.
Yuya Ansha (Investigator Shoal) (8°16′N, 114°33′–114°52′E), 25 nautical
miles southwest of Siling Jiao, is an irregular atoll formation with four sections. In
its west are several rocks exposed above water at low tide and a lagoon 5.5 to 18.3
meters deep. There are three entrances at the northwest, southwest and southeast
end of the shoal. Three small banks lie 11 meters deep at the southeast opening.
Apart from these mentioned, other features within Dangerous Ground include
Niu’e Jiao (Whitsun Reef), Guihan Jiao (Collins Reef), Chigua Jiao (Johnson
18 Introduction
Reef), Hua Jiao (Loveless Reef), Jiyang Jiao (Gent Reef), Nanmen Jiao (Edmund
Reef), Ximen Jiao (Mckennan Reef), Dongmen Jiao (Hughes Reef), Anle Jiao
(Hallet Reef), Changxian Jiao (Holiday Reef), Zhuquan Jiao (Empire Reef),
Zhangxi Jiao (Jones Reef), Qiong Jiao (Lansdowne Reef), Quyuan Jiao (Hig-
gens Reef), Bianshen Jiao (Tetley Reef), Longxia Jiao (Bamford Reef), Ranq-
ing Shazhou (Grierson Reef), Ranqing Dongjiao (Ross Reef), Lusha Jiao (Hopps
Reef), Sanjiao Jiao (Livock Reef), Dayuan Tan (Nares Bank), Nanfang Qiantan
(Southern Bank), Danzhu Shi (Lizzie Webber Reef), Huo’ai Jiao (Irving Reef), Boji
Jiao (Erica Reef), Banlu Jiao (Hardy Reef), Shipanzai (Maralie Reef), Gongzhen
Jiao (Baker Reef), Zhongxiao Tan (Templer Bank), Xianhou Tan (Fairie Queen),
ZiTan (Wood Bank), ZongTan (Brown Bank), Yongshi Tan (Leslie Bank), Elan
Ansha (Lord Aukland Shoal), Hongshi Ansha (Carnatic Shoal), Shenxian Ansha
(Sandy Shoal), Heping Ansha (Third Thomas Shoal), Fan’ai Ansha (Fancy Wreck
Shoal), Jinwu Ansha (South West Shoal), Xiaowei Ansha (North East Shoal), etc.
Notes
1 Coulter, D.Y. (1996). South China Sea Fisheries: Countdown to Calamity. Contempo-
rary Southeast Asia, 4, pp. 371–388.
2 Zhong, J., & Chen, S. (1977). The Dongsha Islands. Beijing: South China Sea Institute
of Oceanology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Part II
Chinese historical records

of the South China Sea
2 The South China Sea in Song-
Yuan-Ming-Qing China
From a historical point of view, the Dongsha, Xisha, Zhongsha and Nansha Islands
in the South China Sea are part of China’s territory, the southernmost end being
James Shoal (Zengmu Ansha) in the Nansha Islands. Related records can date
back to the Song and Yuan Dynasties. In the White Paper issued by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on January 18, 1982, how-
ever, it is stated that “Peking has failed to bring out when the Chinese state began
to take possession of the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes, and how this
state has exercised its sovereignty over them.”1 To refute such a misconception,
this chapter aims to present some historical evidence which further substantiates
China’s claim over the sovereignty of Xisha and Nansha Islands and its exercise
of administration since the Song and Yuan dynasties.
2.1 Records of the South China Sea in the Song and

Yuan Dynasties
In the fifth year of the Chunxi era (1178) of the Southern Song, Zhou Qufei, who
had worked as an assistant sub-prefect in Guilin, Guangxi, wrote in his book Ling
Wai Dai Da (Written Reply from the Region beyond the Five Ridges) that:
The route to China from Sanfoqi (Srivijaya) takes the direction of north-north,
passing Shangxiazhu (上下竺, literally “Higher and Lower Zhu”) and Jiaoy-
ang (交洋, literally “Jiao Ocean”). Those going to Guangzhou would enter
by Tuen Men and those going to Quanzhou would take Jiazi Men. The route
from Shepo (Java) takes a northwest direction and after passing Kalimantan,
continues in a northerly direction until Zhuyu (竺屿, literally “Zhu Islands”).2
The record shows that boats from Srivijaya, a kingdom in the northeast Sumatra, got
to China’s maritime space after passing Shangxiazhu and Jiaoyang, that is to say,
China’s territory in the South China Sea, then adjoined Shangxiazhu and Jiaoyang.
Jiaoyang, short for Jiaozhiyang (交趾洋, literally “Jiaozhi Ocean”), refers to
the northern coast of present-day Vietnam. Shangxiazhu, also called Zhuyu (竺屿,
literally “Zhu Island”), is the same as Dongxizhu (东西竺, literally “East and
West Zhu”) mentioned in Dao Yi Zhi Lue (A Brief Account of Island Barbarians).
22 Historical records of the South China Sea
It is verified by W. W. Rockhill, an American sinologist, that Shangxiazhu is
Pulau Aur (Aur Island) off the southeastern coast of the Malay Peninsula.3 The
Malay word Aur bears the meaning of “bamboo” (竹, pinyin: zhu) and thus Pulau
Aur means “the island of bamboo (竹屿).” The Chinese character “竺” shares the
same meaning and pronunciation (zhu) as “竹” and Zhuyu is therefore deemed
the same island as Pulau Aur.4 This conclusion, however, is unconvincing, since
it was drawn using the literal meanings. It is therefore necessary to refer to the
descriptions of Dongxizhu in Dao Yi Zhi Lue: “having chiefs,” “the land is too
barren to farm,” “relying on Dan’gang (or Danjing) for grain,”“the locals pick
the tenderest part of Yexincao (a plant resembling the rattan in shape), dye it
and weave it into mats to sell to the Chinese.”5 It shows that in Dongxizhu,
there were residents, chiefs and even handmade specialty—mats, which Chinese
would come to purchase. Hence it can be concluded that Dongxizhu was at least
a relatively large tribal residential area. But Pulau Aur is not so. It is located on
the southeastern tip of islands 23 nautical miles northeast of Pulau Tinggi and
to the west of the main route of the South China Sea. On the island there are
luxuriant trees and two steep peaks on the edge, one in the shape of dome in the
south with an altitude of 546.2 meters and the other in the north with an altitude
of 437.1 meters. The island is uninhabited and is merely “a landmark for passing
boats and supplier of fresh water”;6 thus it is by no means the Dongxizhu men-
tioned in Dao Yi Zhi Lue.
So where was Dongxizhu located? In my view, it might be the same place
as Dongxidong (东西董, literally “East and West Dong”) recorded in Yuan Shi
(History of Yuan), and Dongxizhu was actually a misnomer of the latter since the
pronunciations of Zhu and Dong were quite similar in Xiamen dialect (“tiok” for
Zhu and “tong” for Dong). According to Albert Grünwedel, a German sinologist,
Dongdong (East Dong) is Natuna Islands and Xidong (West Dong) is Anambas
Islands.7 But Natuna and Anambas are 194 kilometers apart and do not match
the description in Dao Yi Zhi Lue: “The two towering mountains stand facing
each other, one in the east and the other in the west, just as Mt. Penglai and Mt.
Fangzhang compet[e] to show their uniqueness.” As I see it, Dongzhu (East Zhu)
is North Natuna and Xizhu (West Zhu) South Natuna. Dan’gang (Kuching on
the northwest coast of Borneo), which provided grains for Dongxizhu, is close to
the Natuna Islands, which answers to the description in Dao Yi Zhi Lue. As for
places producing mats, it is recorded in Zhu Fan Zhi (Records of Foreign Nations)
that “mats come from Danrongwuluo and the foreign traders carry them to San-
foqi, Lingyamen and Shepo for trade.”8 The transliteration of Danrongwuluo is
Tanjongpura, the Javanese name for Boni (present-day Brunei), an island on the
southwest coast of Borneo that is quite close to the Natuna. It is also mentioned
in Dao Yi Zhi Lue that Dongxizhu, Zhancheng and Kunlun “are just like the four
legs of a ding (ancient Chinese cauldron standing upon legs), facing each other.”9
Zhancheng (Champa Kingdom) then refers to present-day Phan Rang or Phan
Thiet in southeastern Vietnam while Kunlun is Kunlun Island (Côn Đảo in Viet-
namese) southeast of Vietnam. The two places are indeed facing the South Natuna
and North Natuna as the legs of a ding.
The South China Sea in Song-Yuan-Ming-Qing China 23
Now that the location of Dongxizhu (Shangxizhu) is determined, records
quoted previously from Ling Wai Dai Da can be further explained: boats from
Sanfoqi, a port in Sumatra, took the direction of north-north, passed the Natuna
Islands and Jiaozhi Ocean north of Vietnam and got to China’s sea territory. Those
going to Guangzhou could enter by Tuen Men, close to Hong Kong, and those going
to Quanzhou could take Jiazi Men, near Lufeng; boats from Java took a northwest
direction and after passing Kalimantan, joined boats from Sanfoqi in the route.
The records clearly state the boundary of China’s territory in the South China
Sea: it was bordered on the west by Jiaozhi Ocean and on the south by the Natuna
Islands in Indonesia. Foreign merchants could get to China for trade after passing
the Natuna and Jiaozhi. Hence it can be seen that the western and southern bound-
ary of China’s territory in the South China Sea was clarified early in the Southern
Song period.
It can also be proved by the records in Zhu Fan Zhi, written by Zhao Rukuo,
supervisor of maritime trade in Fujian Circuit, in the first year of Baoqing era
(1225) during the Southern Song. He wrote in the preface “After I was assigned
here, I read the Map of Foreign Nations in my spare time. The map showed Shi-
chuang and Changsha, which people often referred to as hazards, and Jiaoyang
and Zhuyu, regarded as boundaries.”10 Zhao, as a trade official, had to constantly
deal with foreign merchants. To learn more about the outside world, he read the
Map and found there were Shichuang (or Shitang) and Changsha (the South China
Sea islands), which were considered hazards in the sea, and Jiaozhi Ocean and the
Natuna (Zhuyu), the boundaries between Chinese and foreign maritime space. It
is clear that records of China’s territory in the South China Sea were quite com-
mon in the Southern Song. Not only did books contain such descriptions, the map
then also marked the borders.
An envoy from Chola in the southern India, who lived a few centuries ear-
lier than Zhou Qufei and Zhao Rukuo, came to China in the eighth year of the
Dazhongxiangfu era during Song (1015) following the previously described route
from Sanfoqi. It is recorded in Song Shi (History of Song) that: “After arriving
in Sanfoqi, the boats travelled another eighteen days, passing Manshanshuikou,
Mount Tianzhu, and arrived at Mount Bintoulang, from which Xiwangmu Zhong
(literally ‘tomb of Queen Mother of the West’) was a few hundred metres away
in the east.” Mount Tianzhu referred to in the record is Zhuyu, or Shangxiazhu,
namely the Natuna Islands, and Mount Bintoulang, or Panduranga, is located in
present-day Phan Rang near Cam Ranh Bay. That is to say the boats passed the
Natuna and got to Phan Rang, a few hundred meters away from where there was
the Xiwangmu Zhong in the east, which was probably the Nansha Islands within
the South China Sea.
During the Yuan Dynasty, Wang Dayuan “made two voyages to the seas” and
recounted his travels in Dao Yi Zhi Lue (Island Savages) in 1349. In the book,
South China Sea Islands was referred to as Wanli Shitang (literally “ten-thousand
li-rocks”). Following Zhu Xi’s theory that “overseas land is connected to China,”
he wrote, “The base of Shitang originates from Chaozhou. It is tortuous as a
long snake lying in the sea, and across the sea it reaches various states, and it
is popularly called Wanli Shitang. . . . Its veins can all be traced. One such vein
stretches to Java, one to Boni and Gulidimen, and one to Xiyang Xiakunlun.”11
(See Figure 2.1.) Wang marked the boundary of South China Sea Islands but the
question now is where Gulidimen and Xiyang Xiakunlun are.
Gulidimen, or Jilidiwen, according to French sinologist G. E. Gerini, is Timor at
the east end of the Lesser Sunda Islands for its transliteration Gili Timor, in which
Gili means “island.”12 But Gulidimen seemed near Boni, according to Dao Yi Zhi
Lue, while Timor is actually quite far away from Brunei. It can be seen from the
General Map of Lands within the Four Seas in Chen Lunjiong’s Hai Guo Jian Wen
Figure 2.1 A passage in Dao Yi Zhi Lue that mentions “Wanli Shitang”
Lu (Records of Things Heard and Seen in Coastal Countries) that in the northeast
of Kalimantan there was Jiliwen bordering Brunei, which might be a misnomer
of Jilidiwen (see Figure 2.2). In the book, Jiliwen bordered Sulu on the east and
Brunei on the west, and “is thirty-nine geng (one geng equals roughly 10 nautical
miles) away from Luzon and forty-two geng away from Brunei.”13 Thus Jilidiwen
is probably present-day Sabah in Malaysia, for it is quite close to Brunei.
As Brunei formed the division of Eastern and Western Oceans then,14 Xiyang
Xiakunlun (Xiakunlun in the Western Oceans) should refer to the place west of
Brunei. Xia, according to Su Jiqing, bears the meaning of “distant,” and Xiakunlun
“probably refers to the island in the southwest Indian Ocean, that is, present-day
Madagascar, for Kunlun sounds quite similar to Qumr of Jazirat al-Qumr, the Ara-
bic name for Madagascar.”15 But Madagascar is a little too far. In my opinion, xia is
most likely the misreading of jia (fake), which can be interpreted in two ways. One
is that “Kunlun” in Xiakunlun is not the Kunlun Mountains in northwest China,
which was also pointed out in Hai Guo Jian Wen Lu, that “Kunlun does not refer
to the Kunlun Mountains around which the Yellow River flows. In the south of
Qizhouyang (literally “sea of seven islands,” the sea area of the Xisha Islands)
there are two towering mountains, one named Dakunlun (Greater Kunlun) and
the other Xiaokunlun (Lesser Kunlun).”16 The other interpretation is that Kunlun
was transliterated from Condon, the Malay word for “the island of wintermelon”
because it was rich in the melons. Huang Zhong, in his book Hai Yu (Words of the
Figure 2.2 The General Map of Lands within the Four Seas in Hai Guo Jian Wen Lu
Sea), described the island as “abundant in winter melons, whose vine seems merely
one cun (3.33 centimeters) but can extend as long as three or four chi (roughly one
meter). The big ones are so thick that one can barely get his arms around and once
they rot away, the field becomes a quagmire.”17 Therefore, Xiakunlun actually
refers to the Kunlun Island (Con Dao) off the southeast coast of Vietnam. Kunlun
was often bracketed with Xiwangmu in Chinese mythology, and that is why the
envoy from Chola called the Nansha Islands Xiwangmu Zhong.
It is therefore concluded that the scope of South China Sea Islands recorded in Dao
Yi Zhi Lue originated from Chaozhou and stretched as far as Java, Brunei and Sabah,
and Con Dao off the southeast coast of Vietnam. It is indicated that in as early as the
Song and Yuan Dynasties, the boundaries of China’s territory in the South China Sea
were generally delimited: it was bordered on the west by Jiaozhi Ocean in northern
Vietnam, on the southwest by Con Dao in southeast Vietnam, on the south by the
Natuna Islands in Indonesia, and on the southeast by Brunei and Sabah. The region
was quite extensive and thus inferred by Wang Dayuan as “more than ten thousand li.”
2.2 Records of the South China Sea in the Ming and

Qing Dynasties
As China’s seafaring thrived in the Ming and Qing Dynasties, sea voyagers got
to know more about China’s maritime space and thus records in this period about
the maritime boundaries between China and other countries were more specific.
The boundary was referred to as fen shui (division of waters) in Hai Yu (see Fig-
ure 2.3), written by Huang Zhong in the 15th year of the Jiajing era in the Ming
(1536). He wrote that:
Fen shui lies in Wailuo Hai (literally ‘Wailuo Sea’) off Zhancheng where hid-
den shoals act as the threshold. It stretches for hundreds of li and the rolling
billows there makes it quite different from other sea areas. From Ma On Shan
to Jiugang (Palembang in Indonesia), foreigners often take the route east of
fen shui while Chinese take the route west of it. It seems a hazard created by
the nature to separate Chinese and foreigners.18
Wailuo was located in the sea area around central Vietnam and named as it was
the waiyang (open sea) of Zhanbiluo (Cham Islands in Quảng Nam Province).
According to Paul Pelliot, a French sinologist and orientalist, Wailuo was in Lý
Sơn (Cù Lao Ré), or Pulau Canton.19 Wailuo was exceptionally important for
voyagers back at that time for mainly two reasons:
On the one hand, Mount Wailuo was considered the landmark on the sea. It is
recorded in Hai Guo Jian Wen Lu that:
Except for Qizhouyang and Dazhou Island, there is no mountain-like

mark. . . . Only when voyagers see the Mount Wailuo in the surrounding sea
area of Zhanbiluo do they find a guide. If their course is a bit eastward they
will enter Wanli Changsha and Qianli Shitang in China and if it is westward
they might drift into the Gulf of Tonkin in Vietnam.20
Figure 2.3 A paragraph in Hai Yu that mentions “fen shui”
It suggests that voyagers then had to pay great attention to the Mount Wailuo;
otherwise they might easily go astray.
On the other hand, Wailuo was the confluence of the Chinese and foreign routes
on the sea. Ships from China to other countries often sailed in the northeast wind,
taking the route east of Wailuo, which was referred to as dongzhu; ships from
foreign countries back to Hainan often sailed in the southwest wind, taking the
route west of Wailuo, which was referred to as xizhu. In the sixth year of Wanli
era in the Ming dynasty (1578), the translator Wo Wenyuan in Xianluo Guan, a
department for Thai subordinated to the Bureau of Translators, Hanlin Academy,
gave a description of the voyage from China to Xianluo (Siam, now Thailand):
Ships start from Xiangshan County in Guangdong, sail in the north wind and
take the course of Wu (one of the twelve Earthly Branches, meaning south on
the compass). After passing Qizhouyang, it takes ten days to arrive at the dock in
Annam (Annam, now northern Vietnam). Then on the route there is the Mount
Wailuo and it takes eight days to arrive at the dock in Zhancheng. . . . If they sail
with the wind all the way, it takes about forty days to arrive in Xianluo.21
Fishermen in Hainan also described their way back: “From Singapore to

Hainan, we had to go through the islands near Vietnam and pass the Kunlun
Island . . . then we came to Wailuo, an island and mountain, where the currents
were quite strong.”22
The significance of Wailuo in seafaring makes it a natural boundary between
the Chinese and foreign maritime space; thus it was referred to as “a hazard cre-
ated by nature to separate Chinese and foreigners” in Hai Yu. It shows that in the
Ming dynasty, Wailuo off the central Vietnam served as the maritime boundary
between China and Vietnam—that is to say, the eastern boundary of China’s terri-
tory in the South China Sea. In the Qing Dynasty when Taskin, King of Siam sent
an envoy to meet the Qianlong Emperor in court, the envoy wrote in his travel
notes that after passing Wailuo they entered China.23
The two routes were recorded in greater details in the Qing Dynasty. Between
the 47th year and 60th year of the Qianlong era (1782–1795), Xie Qinggao, a
Chinese scholar, made a voyage on a foreign merchant ship. In his book Hai Lu
(Records of the Sea), which was written after his oral account, he recalled that:
Galaba (present-day Jakarta), which is administered by the Dutch, can be

reached either by the neigou route or the waigou route from Guangdong.
After passing the Wanshan Islands, those taking the neigou travel southwest
and reach Qiongzhou (today’s Haikou) and then Annam. When they arrive
at the Kunlun Island, they turn southward and it takes about three days to
reach the Dipen Mountain. Along the voyage, Wanli Changsha is on the east.
Those taking the waigou, after passing the Wanshan Islands, travel south by
west and after about four days reach Hongmao Qian, where submerged cays
stretch hundreds of li and the shallowest area has a depth of only four zhang
and five chi (15 meters). After passing Hongmao Qian, it takes three or four
days to reach Caoxie Shi and another four or five days to Dipen Mountain
where they join the neigou route. Along the waigou route, Wanli Changsha is
on the west. The two routes are separated by the Changsha.24
In the passage, neigou and waigou, similar to xizhu and dongzhu, refer to the
western and eastern routes along Wailuo; Dipen Mountain, or Dipan Mountain,
is Tioman Island off the southeast coast of the Malay Peninsula; Hongmao Qian
refers to the Zhongsha Islands, where submerged cays might get Hongmao Chuan
(European great ships whose draft was quite large) stranded;25 Caoxie Shi is Pulau
Sapatu (9°59′N 109°05′E), the easternmost island of Catwick Islands, which was
named after its shoe-like shape.
That is to say, there were two routes from Guangdong to Jakarta, Indonesia. One
was called neigou and the other waigou. Ships taking the neigou traveled south-
west after passing the Wanshan Islands and went through the Hainan Island and
the surrounding sea areas of central Vietnam to arrive at the Kunlun Island, where
they went southward for three or four days to get to the Tioman Island. When ships
navigated through the surrounding sea areas off central Vietnam, Wanli Changsha
(Xisha Islands) was on the east. Ships taking the waigou traveled south by west
after passing the Wanshan Islands and it took them about four days to get to the
Zhongsha Islands, and another three or four days to reach Pulau Sapatu, and still
another four or five days to the Tioman Island, where they joined the former route.
When those ships navigated through the Zhongsha Islands, Wanli Changsha was
on the west. It is indicated that the two routes separated around the Xisha Islands.
Moreover, the waigou route generally agrees with the route from Singapore to
Guangdong today. The records then, therefore, are quite accurate.
The waigou route was also mentioned in Hai Guo Jian Wen Lu (Records of Things
Heard and Seen in Coastal Countries) by Chen Lunjiong, who wrote that “seafar-
ers from China to Nanyang (literally “Southern Ocean”), having no guidance at sea
except for Wanli Changsha, reached Qizhouyang all through the sea area surround-
ing Changsha. The place is formed by the confluence of qi in the nature to serve as
the boundary.”26 Both the General Map of Asia in Hai Lu (see Figure 2.4) and the
General Map of Lands within the Four Seas marked Qizhouyang as lying between
Qiongzhou and Kunlun Island, with Changsha and Shitang on the east, the former
including the Xisha and Zhongsha Islands. Therefore, the waigou, which went
through the Zhongsha Islands, is referred to in the book as the route to “Qizhouyang
through the sea area surrounding Changsha.” Qizhouyang, stretching from the sea
area of the Xisha Islands south of Hainan Island to the sea area of Kunlun Island
southeast off the Vietnam coast, was quite extensive and continuous, which naturally
served as the boundary between Chinese and foreign maritime space.
In most historical records of the late Qing dynasty, the sea area of the Nansha
Islands is referred to as China’s maritime boundary. One example is Yan Sizong’s
Nan Yang Li Ce (A Brief Examination of Nanyang), which says:
In the Southern Ocean there is Wanli Shitang, which is also called Wanli
Changsha, a place where no one has lived before. Shitang is recognized as the
maritime boundary between China and other countries, to the south of which
is foreign territory and to the east is the sea area around Fujian. Foreign ships
to China often travel eastward on the sea area off China, turn northward into
the sea area around Guangdong at the sight of Taiwan, and pass through the
Wanshan Islands to enter Humen via Macao. Chinese sailors, on the con-
trary, hardly travel on the sea area off China, partly because of Chinese ships’
Figure 2.4 The General Map of Asia in Hai Lu
shallow draft and partly because they lack astronomical knowledge and have
to depend on the color of seabed soil collected through plumb to determine
where they are. To the north of Shitang is Qizhouyang, which foreign sailors
often detour even if steering small boats because of the hidden shoals there.
To the west of Shitang is Baishikou (today’s Singapore Strait).27
Wanli Changsha, or Wanli Shitang, is undoubtedly the Nansha Islands, the

boundaries of which were clearly stated in the record.
Similar records can also be found in Yao Wennan’s Jiang Fang Hai Fang Ce
(Guidance to River and Maritime Defense),which says that “beyond Qiongzhou
and Qizhouyang there is Qianli Shitang and Wanli Changsha, the boundary between
Nanyang and Beiyang.”28 Nanyang in the context is not the term for the coastal
provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Zhejiang but refers to the ocean beyond
the South China Sea, and is used today in China as a term for Southeast Asia.
Likewise, Beiyang does not refer to the coastal areas of Fengtian (today’s Liaon-
ing), Zhili (today’s Hebei) and Shandong in northeast China but the ocean within
China’s territory. It is because China was often called beiguo (literally “country in
the north”) and Chinese beiren (literally “people in the north”) in Southeast Asia,
which was recorded in Zhu Yu’s Ping Zhou Ke Tan (Pingzhou Table Talks): “bei-
ren who go abroad and do not return that year are called zhufan (literally “living
in foreign countries”) whereas foreigners who come to Guangzhou and do not go
back to their countries that year are called zhutang (literally ‘living in China’).”29
Therefore, goods from China were called beiwu (literally “things from the north”).
For example, it is recorded in An Nan Xiao Zhi (A Brief Account of Annam) that
“Annam is rich in herbs but the locals cannot use them. So they send the herbs to
China and get the medicines made from the herbs later, which are called beiyao
(literally ‘medicines from the north’) by the locals.”30 It is indicated that the fact
that Xisha and Nansha Islands were considered the maritime boundary between
China and foreign countries was common in the records then.
Toward the late 19th century, some Chinese officials made it explicit that Xisha
Islands lie within China’s territory in the South China Sea in their travel notes. For
example, Guo Songtao wrote:
In the tenth month of the second year of Guangxu era (1876), we started
from Hongkong . . . by noon on the 24th day, the ship has sailed 831 li (about
230 miles) and reached 17 degrees 30 minutes north of the equator, 200 to
300 li south of Qiongzhou. The sailors called this place the China Sea. The
area was abound with flying fish, which were about a few chi (around 20
inches) in length and could jump a few zhang (about 10 feet) above the sur-
face of the water. Nearby to the left were the Paracel Islands, which produced
sea cucumbers and coral, which was not of very good quality. These islands
belong to China.31
Similar records can be found in the notes written by Zhang Deyi (who traveled
in company with Guo): “24th is sunny, we sailed across a calm sea downwind, and
by noon, we have travelled 831 li and reached 17 degrees 30 minutes north of the
equator. To the left are the Paracel Islands, which belong to China.”32
The records mentioned previously indicate that during the Ming and Qing
dynasties, Wailuo and Qizhouyang, which stretch from the sea area of Xisha
Islands south of Hainan Island to the sea area around Kunlun Island southeast
off Vietnam, have been considered the western boundary of China’s territory in
the South China Sea and the sea area around the Nansha Islands the southern
boundary.
2.3 Exercise of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the South

China Sea Islands in the Qing Dynasty
The waters of the South China Sea were placed under the jurisdiction of the
naval forces of Yazhou (today’s Sanya). It is recorded in Ya Zhou Zhi (Yazhou
Perfectural Gazetteer) that “the extent of the waters that Yazhou Naval Troops
patrol and garrison stretch one thousand li from Dong’ao Port to Wanzhou in the
east to Sigengsha in Changhua in the west. The southern end of their jurisdiction
reaches the sea area of Xianluo and Zhancheng.”33
During the 49th and 51st years of the Kangxi era (1710–1712), Wu Sheng, who
was born in Tong’an, Fujian, patrolled the waters along to Qizhouyang as deputy
commander of the Guangdong Fleet. His tour was recorded in the Tong An Xian
Zhi (Tong’an District Gazetteer), which says:
Wu Sheng, also known as Wu Yuanze, was born in Tong’an, whose original

family name was Huang. . . . He was promoted as captain of the Guang-
dong Fleet and transferred to Qiongzhou. And then he went personally on
an inspection tour, setting out from Qiongya, rounding Tonggu and passing
through Qizhouyang and Sigengsha, covering 3,000 li. These places were
calm and peaceful.34
It is pointed out in a document published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

China on January 30, 1980, that “the Qizhouyang mentioned here refers to the
sea area around the Xisha Islands, whose patrol was the responsibility of the
Guangdong Fleet.”35 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, however, claimed
that “all the names of Qiongya, Tonggu, Sigengsha are names of localities on the
coast of Hainan Islands, while Qizhouyang is a maritime zone lying between
the northeastern coast of Hainan Island and the group of seven islets situated
to the northeast of Hainan. So that was just an inspection tour around Hainan
Island.”36 In fact, the Qizhouyang mentioned in Chinese historical records can
refer to two different places, one situated to the northeastern coast of Hainan
Islands and the other the sea area around the Xisha Islands. The two places
can be easily differentiated through the order of places along the route. It is
recorded in Hai Lu that “voyages to maritime nations often begin in Wanshan,
from where ships sail southwestward, passing Qizhouyang, where seven islets
surface, and then passing through Lingshui, where people onboard can catch
sight of Dahua, Erhua and Dazhou.” The Qizhouyang mentioned here was
clearly the one around the Qizhou Liedao to the north of Lingshui as Dazhou
Island and Lingshui were prior in the route. But the Qizhouyang in Wu’s route
was reached after Tonggu in northeast Hainan and is definitely not the same as
that mentioned in Hai Lu. As for the location of the Qizhouyang in Wu’s route,
the General Map of Lands within the Four Seas marks it between Qiongzhou
and Kunlun to the west of Changsha and Shitang, which covers the sea area of
the Xisha Islands. Guo Songtao’s description of the location of Qizhouyang
matches the map and is more detailed: “at 13 degrees north of the equator after
passing Mount Waleila (Cape Varella), there was a sea area named Qizhouyang
to the southeast coast off Annam.”
That the Qizhouyang in Wu’s route refers to the one in the Xisha Islands can
also be corroborated by the distance. If Wu’s tour was, as claimed in Vietnam’s
White Paper, “just an inspection tour around Hainan Island,” the circuit of the
island is far less than 3,000 li in length. In today’s map, the voyage from Haikou
to Sanya covers a distance of 389 kilometers, that from Sanya to Port of Basuo
213 kilometers and that from Port of Basuo to Haikou 261 kilometers, alto-
gether 863 kilometers, which equals about 1,726 li.37 So the remaining 1,274 li
is most likely the distance of the round voyage from Hainan to the Xisha Islands.
The distance from Sanya to Yongxing Island, for instance, is 330 kilometers
and therefore the round trip covers 660 kilometers, or 1,320 li, which roughly
matches the distance of Wu’s tour. It can thus be concluded that China’s state-
ment that the Qizhouyang Wu Sheng patrolled is the sea area of the Xisha Islands
is correct. Vietnam’s false claim is either because of its lack of knowledge of
China’s history and geography or a deliberate distortion.
Wu Sheng’s patrol also shows that the patrol of the Xisha Islands was the
responsibility of Guangdong Fleet in the early Qing period and that the Qing
government then had been exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction over the area,
which can be further proved by Lê Quý Đôn’s Miscellaneous Records on the
Pacification of the Frontiers. It was hailed as “the most complete and accurate
historical material” among the Vietnamese historians then and “no scholar at
home or abroad could give such a detailed account as Lê Quý Đôn.”38 It is the
very book that says:
the shores of the Hoang Sa Islands are not far from Lien-chou Prefecture in
Hainan Province, China. (For that reason) our ships sometimes meet with
fishing boats from our northern neighbor (China) on the high sea. Ship-mates
from both countries inquire about one another in the midst of the ocean. The
hall officer of sea traffic investigations in Wen-ch’ang District, Ch’iung-chou
Prefecture, is often seen inspecting the area. On one occasion, there was a
report, which said: In the eighteenth year of Ch’ien-lung (1753), ten soldiers
from An Binh Village belonging to the Cat Liem Company, District of Chu-
ong Nghia, Quang Ngai Prefecture, Annam, set out during the seventh month
to go to the Van Ly Truong Sa to collect sea products. Eight of the ten men
went ashore for the collection of products, and two remained on the ship to
watch it. A typhoon soon developed which caused the anchor cord to split,
and the two who remained in the ship were washed into the port of Ch’ing-
lan. After investigation the Chinese officer found the story to be correct and
consequently had the two Vietnamese escorted home to their native village.39
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Saigon government quoted this piece
of record in its White Paper published in May 1975, intending to illustrate that
“the Chinese officer from Wen-ch’ang was not bothered by the fact that the Viet-
namese were intruding into Chinese territorial waters when they went to the Van
Ly Truong Sa.”40 But the result is just the opposite. It only shows that Chinese
people then had been engaged in production activities in the waters around Xisha
Islands, which were under the jurisdiction of Wenchang. The quoted part from the
report further demonstrates that the Qing government exercised the sovereignty
and jurisdiction over its territory in the South China Sea.
In the fourth month of the first year of the Xuantong era (1909), aware of the pos-
sibility that foreign naval powers might further encroach upon China’s territory in the
South China Sea following Nishizawa Yoshizi’s intrusion into the Dongsha Islands,
Zhang Renjun, Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi, sent Wu Jingrong
with more than 170 naval officers and men on an inspection tour of the Xisha Islands
in three warships, the Fubo, the Guangjin and the Chenhang; Li Zhun, captain of the
Guangdong Fleet, was the general commander. They inspected 14 islands and set up
stone tablets engraved with the names of the islands. They hoisted the Yellow Dragon
Flag of the Qing Dynasty by way of reasserting Chinese sovereignty.41
Regarding the inspection tour, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam claimed
that “the blitz landing and pulling out was a violation of Vietnamese sovereignty
and absolutely cannot be regarded as an exercise of Chinese sovereignty.”42 This is,
however, an ill-founded statement. The reality is that the tour lasted nearly one month
from the second day to April 26. They brought goats and buffaloes to the islands that
they set foot upon and drew the maps of the area, which were then submitted to the
Grand Council. Upon returning from the expedition, Li drafted eight recommenda-
tions about the administration and economic development of the Xisha Islands.43
These indicate that rather than a “blitz landing and pulling out,” it was a planned tour,
an exercise of Chinese sovereignty in its own territory. The reassertion of China’s
sovereignty over the Xisha Islands triggered global attention. For example, the China
Sea Pilot, published by Great Britain in 1938, states that “the Paracels, known to the
Chinese as the Hsisha Islands are divided into two main groups, the Amphitrite group
to the east and the Crescent group to the west. They were annexed by the Chinese
government in 1909, and are often visited by junks.”44
In conclusion, the boundaries of China’s territory in the South China Sea were
explicitly delimited in the period from the Song to the Qing dynasty. Jiaozhi
Ocean in northern Vietnam and the Natuna Islands in Indonesia were considered
the western and southern boundaries of China’s territory in the South China Sea.
The South China Sea Islands were quite extensive, originating from Chaozhou,
Guangdong, and stretching as far as Java, Brunei and Sabah, and Con Dao off the
southeast coast of Vietnam. Based on the previously mentioned facts, the bound-
aries of China’s territory in the South China Sea were generally delimited: it was
bordered with Jiaozhi Ocean to the west, Con Dao to the southwest, the Natuna
Islands to the south, and Brunei and Sabah to the southeast. There were another
two boundaries that were seen as the maritime border between China and other
countries: one is Wailuo, the confluence of the Chinese and foreign routes on the
sea, which stretched from the area south of the Hainan Island to Qizhouyang; the
other is the waters of the Nansha Islands to the east of Qizhouyang. The South
China Sea islands and the relevant waters were placed under the jurisdiction of
the Hainan Island in the early Qing Dynasty when officers of the Guangdong
Fleet frequently patrolled the Xisha Islands and exercised China’s sovereignty
and jurisdiction over the area on behalf of the Qing government. In 1909, Li
Zhun, captain of the Guangdong Fleet, led an expedition to the area and reas-
serted China’s sovereignty over the Xisha Islands, which received international
recognition.
Notes
1 Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1983, The Hoang Sa (Para-
cel) and Trương Sa (Spratly) Archipelagos: Vietnamese Territories, Hanoi.
2 Zhou, Q. (1996). Ling Wai Dai Da (Written Reply from the Region beyond the Five
Ridges). Shanghai: Shanghai Far East Publishers.
3 Pelliot, P. (1935). Research on Voyages of Zheng He (C. Feng, Trans.). Beijing: Zhon-
ghua Book Company.
4 Su, J. (1981). Explanatory Notes to Dao Yi Zhi Lue. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
5 Wang, D. (1975). Dao Yi Zhi Lue (Island Savages). Taipei: Student Book Company.
7 Zhang, L. (1947). Seas Routes of Eastern and Western Oceans. Singapore: Nanyang
Book Company.
8 Zhao, R. (1956). Zhu Fan Zhi (Records of Foreign Nations). Beijing: Zhonghua Book
Company.
9 Wang, D. (1975). Dao Yi Zhi Lue (Island Savages). Taipei: Student Book Company.
10 Zhao, R. (1956). Zhu Fan Zhi (Records of Foreign Nations). Beijing: Zhonghua Book
Company.
11 Wang, D. (1975). Dao Yi Zhi Lue (Island Savages). Reprinted in Taipei: Student Book
Company.
12 Pelliot, P. (1935). Research on Voyages of Zheng He (C. Feng, Trans.). Beijing: Zhon-
ghua Book Company.
13 Chen, L. (1975). Hai Guo Jian Wen Lu (Records of Things Heard and Seen in Coastal
Countries). Taipei: Student Book Company.
14 Zhang, X. (1981). Dong Xi Yang Kao (Account of the Eastern and Western Oceans).
Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
17 Huang, Z. (1975). Hai Yu (Words of the Sea). Taipei: Student Book Company.
18 Ibid.
19 Zhang, L. (1947). Seas Routes of Eastern and Western Oceans. Singapore: Nanyang
Book Company.
21 Zhang, H. (Ming). Gu Jin Tu Shu Bian (Compilation of Books Past and Present),
Vol. 59.
22 Han, Z. (1988). Oral Account of Fisherman Meng Quanzhou. In A Collection of His-
torical Materials on the South China Sea Islands. Beijing: The Eastern Publishing Co.,
Ltd.
23 Yao, N., & Xu, Y. (1958). Translation of and Annotations to the Travel Notes of Sia-
mese Envoy to China. In Studies on the History and Geography of the South China Sea
in Ancient Times. Beijing: The Commercial Press.
24 Xie, Q. (1955). Hai Lu (Records of the Sea). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
25 Zheng, G. (1843). Zhou Che Suo Zhi.
27 Yan, S. (Qing). Nan Yang Li Ce (A Brief Examination of Nanyang).
28 Yao, W. Jiang Fang Hai Fang Ce (Guidance to River and Maritime Defence).
29 Zhu, Y. (2007). Ping Zhou Ke Tan (Pingzhou Table Talks). Beijing: Zhonghua Book
Company.
30 Yao, W. An Nan Xiao Zhi (Short Gazetteer of Annam).
31 Guo, S. Shi Xi Ji Cheng (Records of Diplomatic Missions to the West).
32 Zhang, D. Sui Shi Ri Ji (Journal of Diplomatic Missions).
33 Zhong, Y. Ya Zhou Zhi (Yazhou Prefectural Gazeteer).
34 Wu, T. Tong An Xian Zhi (Tong’an District Gazetteer).
35 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (1980). China’s Indisputable Sovereignty over the
Xisha and Nansha Islands. People’s Daily, January 30.
36 Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1983, The Hoang Sa and
Truong Sa Archipelagos and International Law, Hanoi.
37 Sino Maps Press. (1993). Atlas of China. Beijing: Sino Maps Press, p. 23.
38 Thắng, N.Q. (1988). Hoang Sa Trương Sa (Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands). Ho
Chi Minh City: Youth Publishing House.
39 Le Quy Don. Miscellaneous Records on the Pacification of the Frontiers.
40 Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (1975). White Paper on the Hoang
Sa and Truong Sa Islands.
41 Ta Kung Pao. (1933). Li Zhun’s Inspection Tour to the Sea. Ta Kung Pao, August 10.
43 Ta Kung Pao. (1933). Li Zhun’s Records on the Patrol of the Sea. Ta Kung Pao,
August 10.
44 (1938). China Sea Pilot, Vol. 1. London, UK: Hydrographic Department, p. 107.
3 Shitang and Changsha within
China’s maritime boundaries
The South China Sea was referred to as Zhanghai (literally “the rising sea”)
because the water often overflowed. Tradition has it that Ma Yuan, a Chinese
general of the Eastern Han Dynasty, “had accumulated rocks to form the reefs in
order to get to the sea. He arrived in Xiangpu (in today’s Vietnam) through the
reefs and marked it as the southernmost boundary.”1 Later, there were names of
Shitang (rocky reefs) and Changsha (long sand cays) in various Chinese histori-
cal records. For example, it is recorded in A New Account of Guangdong that “in
the sea area beyond the eastern coast of Wanzhou lie Qianli Changsha and Wanli
Shitang, which were created by the Heaven and Earth to prevent the overflow of
Yanhai. Yanhai, because of its tendency to overflow, was also called Zhanghai.”2
Shitang and Changsha, whose meanings and exact locations differ in different
records, were generally referred to as the South China Sea Islands and considered
the maritime boundary between China and other countries. Therefore, exploring
the meanings and scopes of Shitang and Changsha is of significance to determine
China’s territory boundaries in the South China Sea in ancient times.
3.1 The locations of Shitang and Changsha in the Song

and Yuan Dynasties
The earliest record of Shitang and Changsha is found in the second year of Tianxi
era (1018) in the Northern Song period, when the envoy of Zhancheng came to
pay tribute to Emperor Zhenzong. The envoy remarked that “our men who travel
to Guangzhou, if drifting to Shitang halfway, may get lost for a few years. Shitang
is situated about 700 li off the Yazhou coast, submerged for eight to nine chi.”3
The exact location of Shitang, though not mentioned in the remark, was later
detailed in the Record of Qiongguan, which says that:
Jiyang (Yazhou) is a mountainous place, off whose coast lie Wuli, Sumi
and Jilang (in today’s Vietnam). It sits opposite to Zhancheng in the south,
Zhenla (in today’s Cambodia) and Jiaozhi in the west, and Qianli Changsha
and Wanli Shitang in the east, where the sea seems to melt into the sky. Ships
come back and forth and sea birds perching on the shaky masts seem not
frightened as all.4
It is indicated that Shitang was located 700 li off the western coast of Yazhou,
which is today’s Xisha Islands in the South China Sea. It can be corroborated by
the fact that Yongxing Island, the largest of the Xisha Islands, lies 330 kilometers
southeast of Yazhou, and that fishermen of the Hainan Islands still call the Cres-
cent group in Xisha “Shitang.”5
The location of Shitang can be further proved by the route of envoy of Zhenlifu
(today’s Chanthaburi) to China in the ninth year of Jiading era of the Southern
Song period (1216):
It takes those who wanted to go to China 5 days from the country to Bosi-
lan (Persia), and then the Kunlun Yang, and Zhenla, from which it takes a
few days to reach Bindalang, another few days to reach Zhancheng, and still
another 10 days to pass through the sea and arrive at Jiaozhi. To the southeast
of the route there is Shitang, described as Wanli, where the current is swift
and shoals abounds. Ships often sink around here. Then it takes another 5
days to arrive at Qinzhou and Lianzhou.6
Zhancheng is today’s Bình Định Province in Central Vietnam while Jiaozhi is

Jiaozhou in northern Vietnam. Therefore the envoy actually traveled along the
Vietnamese coast, and Shitang that was located to the southeast of it is apparently
the Xisha Islands.
Zhou Qufei also mentioned the locations of Shitang and Changsha in Ling Wai
Dai Da (Answers from Yonder of the Mountains):
The sea area off the southwest coast of the four commanderies in Hainan
is named Jiaozhi Yang, where the turbulent water branches into three: the
southern one flows into the foreign seas, the northern one flows into the sea
area around Guangdong, Fujian and Jiangzhe, and the eastern one flows into
the vast ocean named Dongdayang. In the vast ocean there are Changsha and
Shitang which stretch for ten thousand li. It is where the water is discharged.7
Changsha and Shitang in the so-called Dongdayang (West Pacific) refer to

today’s Zhongsha and Xisha Islands.
The quoted records show that Shitang and Changsha in the Song dynasty refer
to Xisha and Zhongsha Islands within China’s South China Sea territory, which
were described as “Wanli” or stretching for 10,000 li to indicate that the feature
complex covered a large area. Similar records can also be found in the early Yuan
dynasty. One example is the expedition of Yuan generals Shi Bi and Gao Xing to
Java in the twelfth month of the 29th year of Zhiyuan era (1292):“an expedition
of 5,000 people led by Shi Bi set out from Quanzhou. The waves ran high and
the ships pitched violently, leaving soldiers unable to eat for a few days. They
passed through Qizhouyang, Wanli Shitang, and then Jiaozhi and Zhancheng.”8
The Qizhouyang mentioned refers to the one off the northeastern coast of Hainan
Islands. It is recorded in the Record of Qiongzhou that “100 li away from Wen-
chang lie seven mountains in the sea, inside which fresh spring water can be
Shitang and Changsha within China’s boundaries 39
found. Slightly eastward is Wanli Shitang, where ships might encounter hazard-
ous features.”9 The route is the same as the one taken by the envoy from Zhenlifu
except for the direction and Wanli Shitang, which was located to the east of the
route, likewise refers to the Xisha Islands.
Later in the ninth year of Zhizheng era (1349), Wang Dayuan, who had “made two
voyages to the seas” extended the scope of Wanli Shitang to the entire South China
Sea Islands in his book Dao Yi Zhi Lue following Zhu Xi’s theory. He wrote that
The base of Shitang originates from Chaozhou. It is tortuous as a long snake

lying in the sea, and across the sea it reaches various states, and it is popularly
called Wanli Shitang. . . . Its veins can all be traced. One such vein stretches
to Java, one to Boni and Gulidimen, and one to Xiyang Xiakunlun.10
Gulidimen and Xiyang Xiakunlun, whose locations have been explored in the
second chapter, are today’s Sabah in Malaysia and Con Dao off the southeast
coast of Vietnam. Therefore, Wanli Shitang in Wang’s time was quite an exten-
sive area, originating from Chaozhou in Guangdong and stretching as far as Java,
Brunei and Sabah, and Con Dao, which is just about the same as China’s South
China Sea territory today. It is thus indicated that the scope and boundaries of
China’s territory in the South China Sea were quite settled early in the Song and
Yuan dynasties.
3.2 Qianli Shitang and Wanli Changsha in the Ming

and Qing Dynasties
As China’s seafaring thrived in the Ming Dynasty, more ships came to sail through
the South China Sea, and people got to learn more about Shitang and Changtang,
which were once deemed “hazards in the sea.” In the 15th year of the Jiajing era
(1536), Huang Zhong, on the basis of the information he obtained through contact
with seafarers, wrote a book Hai Yu, which classified Wanli Shitang and Wanli
Changsha into “Dangerous Areas” (see Figure 3.1). Huang described as follows:
[Wanli Shitang is located to the east of Wuzhu Yang and Duzhu Yang. The-
weather is often ghastly there. If the steersman carelessly strikes the sub-
merged cays or shoals, hundreds of people onboard would all be dead]; Wanli
Changsha, situated to the southeast of Wanli Shitang, is also quite dangerous.
The whistling wind often raises quite a dust, which can seem like heavy snow
in fair weather. The water in the south is quite shallow and might easily get
ships stranded. These ships, then, have to rely on the southeast wind to get
away.11
Wuzhu Yang refers to the sea area around Wuzhu Zhou situated to the east of
Shangchuan Island in Guangdong, and Duzhu Ynag refers to the sea area around
Dazhou Island, southeast of the Hainan Island. Wanli Shitang, located to the east
of the two areas, covers the Xisha and Zhongsha Islands, where many submerged
Figure 3.1 Passages in Hai Yu that mention “Wanli Shitang” and “Wanli Changsha”
cays and shoals exist. Wanli Changsha, located to the southeast of the former,
refers to the Nansha Islands, which are considered hazards in the sea for it is cov-
ered with reefs, shoals and cays.
Hai Cha Yu Lu (A Record of a Raft on the Sea), which appeared around the
same time with Hai Yu, also mentioned Qianli Shitang. It says that
Qianli Shitang is 700 li away off the coast of Yazhou. It is said that the reefs
are eight to nine chi under the water and ships must avoid the area, or other-
wise they might get aground. Wanli Changdi is located to the south of it. The
current there is quite swift and ships cannot easily get away with it. Foreign
ships used to the area could avoid the dangerous zone and sail quite peace-
fully on the sea.12
The Qiainli Shitang here refers to the Xisha Islands and Wanli Changdi, possibly
another name for Wanli Changsha, is apparently the Nansha Islands.
The records of Wanli Shitang in the Ming dynasty are slightly different from
those in Yuan. Gu Jin Tu Shu Bian (Compilation of Books Past and Present),
which was compiled during the 41st year of Jiajing era to the fifth year of Wanli
era (1562–2577), quoted Wo Wenyuan as saying:
When west wind blows, boats would drift into the East China Sea, where
there is a mountain named Wanli Shitang, stretching from Liuqiu in the East
China Sea to Mount Longya in the South China Sea. Wanli Shitang gets sub-
merged at high tide and rise above water at low tide. Ships drifting around
here hardly get away with it.13
Liuqiu here refers to today’s Taiwan. As for Mount Longya, some thought it is Sin-
gapore and the nearby island, which was called Long Ya Men in documents.14 But
it is not very likely because of the distance. Mount Longya, in my opinion, could
be transliterated as Lingapavata, “Linga means “lingam” in Sanskrit while par-
vata means “mountain.” As lingam serves a representation of the Hindu deity Siva
Bhadresvara, the mountain is also named Lingshan, Dafoling, Mount Dafoling and
Mount Foling. It is situated at Cape Varella at12°53′N latitude and 109°27′E longi-
tude. It is thus concluded that Wanli Shitang in the record stretched from Taiwan to
Cape Varella, covering the Dongsha, Xisha, Zhongsha Islands and the surrounding
sea area. Though it was not as large as the one recorded in the Ming dynasty, it
reflects the western boundary of China’s South China Sea territory then.
Similar record was also found in the Qing dynasty. For example, according to
Hai Guo Jian Wen Lu (Observation on the Overseas Countries) compiled in the
eighth year of the Yongzheng era (1730):
Nan’aoqi, lying to the southeast of Nan’ao, contains flat small islets that are
surrounded by rocks. Beneath those islets grows weed that measures a few
zhang. There is a sandbank about seven geng from Nao’ao that pulls cur-
rents in all directions. Ships must avoid the area and people, once drawn
in, can hardly escape. The northern part of Nan’aoqi is studded with cays,
which stretch about 200 li, or three geng. In the northern extremity lie two
mountains that sit face to face with Shamaqi (today’s South Cape) in Taiwan
across the sea. The area from the south of Nan’aoqi to the sea area surround-
ing Guangdong is called ‘the head of Wanli Changsha’. To the south of it is
an ocean named Changshamen. Further south there again lie many cays that
stretch to Wanzhou near Hainan, which is named Wanli Changsha. The area
from the south of Changsha to Qizhouyang is called Qianli Shitang.15
The Nan’aoqi in Chen’s record is apparently the Dongsha Islands.

It is mentioned in the last chapter that two places bearing the name Qizhouyang
were recorded in ancient Chinese documents. One is the sea area 100 li off the east
coast of Wenchang, where seven mountains rose. The area was “said to be seven
states, which were then overwhelmed by the sea.”16 The other lies to the south of
the Hainan Islands, stretching to Cape Varella. The Qizhouyang in Chen’s record
refers to the latter – that is to say, Qianli Shitang in his record stretched from the
sea area around Wanzhou to Cape Varella, covering Xisha and Zhongsha Islands
and the surrounding sea area.
Yang Fang Shuo Lue (A Brief Introduction to Defense on the Sea), another
important work in the Qing dynasty, also mentioned the two Qizhouyang and
Qianli Shitang. It says:
Qiongzhou is an isolated place in the sea. . . . The sea area 120 li away
from Mount Tonggu contains many hidden shoals and reefs and ships often
avoid the area. Dozens of li to the northeast are situated seven islands,
which are the so-called Mount Qizhouyang. . . . To the south of Qiongzhou
is located Yazhou, around which many islets, cays and shoals exist. Wanli
Changsha stretches from the east of Wanzhou to Nan’ao and Qianli Shi-
tang from the south of Wanzhou to Qizhouyang. The area is quite danger-
ous and those engaged in maritime defence have to pay great attention.17
The Qizhouyang “dozens of li to the northeast” of the Hainan Island refers to the
sea around Qizhou Liedao, while the one in Qianli Shitang is located to the south
of the Hainan Islands, reaching Cape Varella in eastern Vietnam. That is to say, the
scope of Qianli Shitang in the context matches Chen’s record.
To sum up, in the Ming Dynasty, Wanli Changsha referred to the Nansha Islands;
Wanli Shitang, located to the north of Wanli Changsha, referred to the Xisha and
Zhongsha Islands east of Wuzhu Zhou in Guangdong and Dazhou Island in Hainan in
some records while in others, it referred to the sea area stretching from Taiwan to Cape
Varella, covering the Dongsha, Xisha and Zhongsha Islands. In the Qing Dynasty, the
connotation of Shitang and Changsha were slightly changed. Wanli Changsha referred
to the sea area from the east of Wanzhou to Nan’ao, covering the Dongsha Islands;
Shitang, bearing the adjective Qianli, referred to the area from the south of Wanzhou
to Qizhouyang, which stretched to Cape Varella. That is to say, Qianli Shitang covered
the Xisha, Zhongsha Islands and the surrounding sea area. These records generally
reflect the western boundary of China’s South China Sea territory.
3.3 Qianli Shitang and Wanli Changsha as the

maritime boundary
Some of the records in the Qing dynasty referred to the Xisha Islands as Wanli
Changsha and the Nansha Islands as Qianli Shitang. For example, it is recorded
in Hai Lu that “Wanli Changsha is a cay in the sea that extends thousands of li.
It originates from Lingshui and stretches to Caoxie Shi.”18 Lingshui refers to the
area southeast of the Hainan Islands and Caoxie Shi was Pulau Sapatu, 32 nautical
miles south-southeast off the coast of Bình Thuận, a coastal province in eastern
Vietnam. The area roughly matches the one recorded in Hai Guo Jian Wen Lu,
which covered the Xisha Islands and its sea area.
Similar records can also be found in Wang Wentai’s Hong Mao Fan Ying Ji Li
Kao Lue (A Study of England of Red-haired Barbarians), which says that:
Foreign ships that depart from Wanshan travel south for about five days and
reach Hongmao Qian, after passing which, travel south by west for another
five days and arrive at Caoxie Shi, the end of Wanli Changsha. (Wanli Chang-
sha is situated on the northwest of Caoxie Shi, originating from the sea area
around Qiongzhou and stretching for thousands of li. On the southeast of
Caoxie Shi lies Qizhouyang, a large area covered with rocks and shoals.)
After still another seven days, they arrive at Mount Dipen (Tioman Island).
The Chinese seafarers, in order to avoid the dangerous area around Caoxie
Shi, often take another route. Departing from Wanshan, they travel south-
westward, pass Wailuo Mountain, Xinren, Lunai and then travel southward
for about four days to reach Kunlun Mountain. After another five days south-
ward, they can arrive at Mount Dipen, where they join the route of those
foreign seafarers.19
The two routes mentioned previously are the waigou and neigou routes mentioned
in Hai Lu. Caoxie Shi, today’s Pulau Sapatu in the Catwick Islands, was consid-
ered among all seafarers China’s territory.
In Hai Lu, Qianli Shitang was described to be
located to the south of Qizhouyang, which has many hidden shoals and the
current there is swift. If ships run into the area, they might get wrecked. So
ships taking either the waigou or the neigou route must travel southwestward
instead of due south to avoid the danger.20
The Qizhouyang here, as mentioned previously, refers to the one south of the
Hainan Islands and therefore Qianli Shitang that was located to the south of Cape
Varella is precisely the Nansha Islands, which were considered hazards in the sea
because of the shoals and banks there.
More details about the location of Qianli Shitang are revealed in Hai Lu:
Xiao Lusong (Little Luzon, today’s Philippine), was originally named Man-
lila. . . . Qianli Shitang is located to the west of it. . . . Dongsha, cays in the
sea, is called by this name because it is situated to the east of Wanshan. There
are two islets in Dongsha, one in the west and the other in the east. The one
in the west is slightly higher than the other, though the part above water is
merely a few zhang in height. . . . To the due south of Dongsha is Shitang.21
It is indicated that Qianli Shitang was located to the west of Philippines and to the
due south of the Dongsha Islands, which are, apparently, the Nansha Islands. The
record also reflects the eastern boundary of China’s South China Sea territory.
In some records in the later Qing dynasty, Wanli Shitang and Wanli Changsha
were considered the same place. For example, inYan Sizong’s Nan Yang Li Ce, it
is recorded that
In the Southern Ocean there is Wanli Shitang, which is also called Wanli
Changsha, a place where no one has lived before. Shitang is recognized as the
maritime boundary between China and other countries, to the south of which
is foreign territory and to the east is the sea area around Fujian. Foreign ships
to China often travel eastward on the sea area off China, turn northward into
the sea area around Guangdong at the sight of Taiwan, and pass through the
Wanshan Islands to enter Humen via Macao. Chinese sailors, on the contrary,
hardly travel on the sea area off China, partly because of Chinese ships’ shal-
low draft and partly because they lack astronomical knowledge and have
to depend on the color of seabed soil collected through plumb to determine
where they are. To the north of Shitang is Qizhouyang, which foreign sailors
often detour even if steering small boats because of the hidden shoals there.
To the west of Shitang is Baishikou, near which lies a port. . . . More than a
decade ago, the British came and named the place Singapore.22
From the four boundaries mentioned in the record, it is indicated that the Wanli
Shitang, or Wanli Changsha is exactly today’s Nansha Islands, and that the area
was considered the maritime boundaries between China and foreign countries,
which was, in other words, the southern boundary of China’s South China Sea
territory.
In summary, some of the records in the Qing Dynasty referred to the Xisha
Islands as Wanli Changsha and the Nansha Islands as Qianli Shitang, the for-
mer stretching from Lingshui in southeast Hainan to Pulao Sapatu, 32 nautical
miles south-southeast off the coast of Bình Thuận in east Vietnam and the latter,
situated on the due south of Qizhouyang, bordering the Philippines on the east.
These roughly reflect the scope of the Nansha Islands and the eastern boundary of
China’s South China Sea territory. In some records in the late Qing dynasty, Wanli
Changsha was identified with Wanli Shitang, both referring to the Nansha Islands,
which were considered the maritime boundary between China and other coun-
tries, that is to say, the southern boundary of China’s South China Sea territory.
3.4 China as the first country to discover and name the

Xisha and Nansha Islands
Records of Shitang and Changsha in Chinese historical works span a period
of over 800 years, going through the Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties.
During this period, Shitang and Changsha on the whole referred to the Xisha,
Zhongsha and Nansha Islands within China’s South China Sea territory, though
the exact geographical scopes were slightly different. As Shitang and Changsha
were the hazards in the South China Sea, they were often considered navigational
aids in the earlier records. Later, as seafaring thrived, more ships sailed through
the South China Sea and people got to know more about the area. Therefore, loca-
tions and scopes of Shitang and Changsha were more detailed in the records. It
is also then that Shitang and Changsha were deemed as the maritime boundary
between China and other countries, in other words, the boundaries of China’s
South China Sea territory. These historical facts show that China is the first to
have discovered and name the Xisha and Nansha Islands and the first to have
exercised sovereignty over them.
In 1982, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam claimed in its White Paper
that “even if it is true that the Chinese discovered these archipelagoes, that will
not constitute a legal basis for the Chinese claim that they have been under Chi-
nese jurisdiction.”23 Vu Phi Hoang, a Vietnamese scholar, also claimed that “these
names in no way constitute a legal basis and legal value for China’s sovereignty
over Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes.”24 By stressing “legal basis” and
“legal value,” the Vietnamese intended to use the concepts of “effective control”
and “actual possession” in modern international law to deny the historical facts
and claim the two archipelagoes as “terra nullius” so that they could occupy them.
Luu Van Loi, former assistant to North Vietnam’s Foreign Minister and chairman
of the Committee of Border Affairs of Vietnam, wrote in his book that “in quite
a long period, not any one has occupied these islands and features, nor has any
exerted jurisdiction over them. In other words, before Vietnam declared occupa-
tion of the two archipelagoes, they were merely terra nullius.”25 In order to justify
the lack of relevant records in Vietnamese history, he made further explanations in
the ensuing paragraphs: “Wars lost us of some historical records, so it is not sure
when Vietnam took possession of these two archipelagoes. But we will try to find
out the exact time through further research.”26 The explanation, instead, shows
that Vietnam’s claim that China’s territory was terra nullius is just because they
could not prove these archipelagoes were their territory.
It is known that the concepts of “actual possession” and “effective control”
were formed in the latter half of the 19th century. In earlier time from the Age of
Discovery in the late 15th century to the early 18th century, once an explorer dis-
covered a new land or island, they planted a flag and a cross, and naturally became
the occupier. But in the 19th century, many countries proposed that occupation
involve both actual possession and effective control, which later developed into
an international practice. However, it is in the early 11th century that China began
to discover and name the Xisha and Nansha Islands, so it was not likely and not
necessary for the Chinese government to set up administrative organs on those
nearly uninhabited reefs to prove the so-called actual possession and effective
control. By using the international law in the 20th century to dispute the fact the
Xisha and Nansha Islands were China’s territory in the 11th century and claiming
the two archipelagoes, Vietnam was in effect violating the inter-temporal law, a
widely accepted concept in legal theory, international arbitration and in the judg-
ment of international courts. It “requires assessment of an event or interpretation
of the legal effects of a treaty in the light of international law as it existed at the
time of such event or treaty.”27
It is also pointed out in Ian Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law
that
In earlier time, claim to sovereignty through occupation did not require the
exercise of jurisdiction, and occupation did not necessarily signify actual
settlement. But then in the eighteenth century, scholars considered actual
possession a prerequisite for the claim to sovereignty and in the nineteenth
century the proposal was put into practice.28
Therefore, in the 11th century, when China discovered the two archipelagoes,
it was conferred a complete ownership. If the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet-
nam still insists that the geographical names
are designations used by the Chinese in the past to denote geographic features
of foreign countries or to describe navigation routes in these sea areas. They
are in no way of any legal value for the Chinese claim of sovereignty over
these islands.29
It is recommended that they read the remark of Park Choon-ho, a South Korean
expert in international law, in Continental Shelf Issues in the Yellow Sea and the
East China Sea, which says that
In all fairness, it would be more proper to interpret the old records in the con-
text of their times, when there was a relationship of cassalage between China
and the Ryukyu kingdom, instead of weighing them against the rules of mod-
ern international law relating to the acquisition of territory. It should also be
said to be doubtful whether, under the circumstances of the time, China—or
any other state for that matter—was required to make an explicit claim, in
the absence of any possibility of dispute, in order to insure her ownership
of insignificant outlying islets which were entirely useless except as naviga-
tional guides. In the context of the times, therefore, the specific description
of the Ryukyu boundary as given in the old writings and maps does provide
evidentiary support for the argument that the islets were neither res nullius
nor res communis.30
Park’s remark can be applied to the Xisha and Nansha Islands. The Chinese in the
period from the Song and Yuan Dynasties till Ming and Qing discovered the two
island groups, named them, explored the exact locations and geographical scopes,
marked the routes to these places and recorded them all in the writings, which are
“evidentiary support” for China’s claim to sovereignty over these islands. Viet-
nam’s argument in the light of “the legal basis of occupation,” however, is mere
false attribution.
Notes
1 Liu, X. (1937). Record of Jiao County. In Cong Shu Ji Cheng Chu Bian (A Collection
of Books from Collectanea). Shanghai: Commercial Press.
2 Qu, D. (1958). A New Account of Guangdong. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
3 Sheng, Q. (Qing). Illustrated Geography of Vietnam.
4 Wang, X. Exhaustive Description of the Empire.
5 Han, Z. (1984). China’s South China Sea Territory and Its Boundaries Throughout the
History. Southeast Asian Affairs, 1, p. 22.
6 Xu, S. (1957). Song Dynasty Manuscript Compendium, Vol. 197. Beijing: Zhonghua
Book Company.
7 Zhou, Q. (1996). Ling Wai Dai Da, Vol. 1. Reprint. Shanghai: Shanghai Far Estern
Press.
8 History of Yuan.
10 Wang, D. (1975). Dao Yi Zhi Lue (Island Savages). Reprinted in Taipei: Student Book
Company.
11 Huang, Z. (1975). Hai Yu (Words of the Sea). Reprinted in Taipei: Student Book
Company.
12 Gu, J. (Ming). Hai Cha Yu Lu (A Record of a Raft on the Sea).
13 Zhang, H. (Ming). Gu Jin Tu Shu Bian (Compilation of Books Past and Present),
Vol. 59.
14 Han, Z., Lin, J., & Wu, F. (Eds.). (1988). A Collection of Historical Materials on the
South China Sea Islands. Beijing: Oriental Press.
15 Chen, L. (Qing). (1975). Hai Guo Jian Wen Lu (Observation on the Overseas Coun-
tries). Reprint. Taipei: Student Book Company.
17 Xu, J. (Qing). Yang Fang Shuo Lue (A Brief Introduction to Defense on the Sea).
19 Wang, W. (1842). A Study of England of Red-Haired Barbarians.
21 Ibid.
22 Yan, S. (Qing). Nan Yang Li Ce (A Brief Examination of Nanyang).
24 Vu, P.H. (1991). The Two Archipelagos Hoang Sa and Truong Sa, Territories of Viet-
nam’ (in Chinese). Collection, p. 187.
25 Luu, V.L. (1992). Vietnam: Land, Sea and Sky. Beijing: Yiwen Press.
26 Ibid.
27 Ji, G. (1994). Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu Islands and Solutions. Interna-
tional Review, 1, p. 72.
28 Ibid.
30 Park, C. (1972). ‘Continental Shelf Issues in the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea’,
Occasional Paper No. 15, Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island.
4 South China Sea in the
Measurements of the Four Seas of
the Yuan Dynasty
In 1276, Kublai Khan, the founding Emperor of Yuan who overthrew the South-
ern Song Dynasty, ordered the establishment of the Astronomical Bureau and
appointed Xu Heng, Vice Prime Minister of Southern Song, Wang Xun, Fellow of
the Crown Prince, and Guo Shoujing, Vice Director of Hydraulic Department, to
lead the revision of the lunisolar calendar.1 Fourteen inspectors were then sent to
different parts of China to conduct a territory survey. The South China Sea, one of
the six first selected survey points, was essential to the survey work as it is located
at the southern end of the North-South meridian centered on Dadu (today’s Bei-
jing), the capital city of Yuan. On March 27, 1279, Kublai Khan instructed Guo
to measure the sun’s shadows. Guo journeyed a long way starting from Shangdu
(today’s Xilin Gol, Inner Mongolia), through Dadu and Henan Fu (today’s Luoy-
ang, Henan) until reaching the South China Sea.2 While his survey was conducted
within Chinese territory, the measuring point naturally fell in the territory as well,
which is crucial to determining the boundaries of South China Sea in the Yuan
Dynasty.
4.1 Origin and process of the Four-Sea Survey

Kublai Khan ordered a new calendar to be drafted based on Da Ming Calendar,
a Chinese calendar established by Zu Chongzhi (429–500), a prominent Chinese
mathematician and astronomer of the Northern and Southern Dynasties, in order
to apply a unified calendar through areas under his reign. The idea was first pro-
posed by Liu Bingzhong (1216–1274), an adviser to the emperor. His plan had
not been materialized until 1276 when Kublai Khan succeeded in unifying China.
Wang Xun and Guo Shoujing were subsequently ordered to lead a survey team
heading north and south respectively to conduct the observations that would help
formulate a new national calendar.3
Guo believed that the calendar revision must be based on on-site observations
and measurements. In his report to the throne, he wrote that:
During the Kaiyuan Era (713–741) of the Tang Dynasty, astronomer Nan
Gongshuo led surveying efforts at 13 measurement points throughout the
country. Now that Yuan’s territory is even larger than that of Tang, we need
The Four Seas of the Yuan Dynasty 49
to conduct on-site surveys all over the country. Otherwise, we wouldn’t be
able to know the discrepancy of time and magnitude between solar and lunar
eclipses, the length differences of day and night from place to place and the
various positions where the sun, the moon and stars locate in the sky. Given
the limited number of royal astronomers, we can first carry out sundial mea-
surements in two directions, south and north.4
The survey within the territory of Yuan was then approved by Kublai Khan,
and 14 inspectors were dispatched by the Astronomical Bureau to collect data for
a more accurate calendar.
The survey was taken in two phases. In phase one, six measurement points
stretching from south to north were selected, starting from the southernmost
South China Sea where the Polaris was 15 degrees above the horizon (the angle
between the line of sight of the Polaris and the horizon was 15 degrees), and 10
degrees were added to the next five points in turn, with the last one ending at Bei-
hai (along today’s Nizhnyaya Tunguska River in the middle of Siberia) where the
altitude of the Polaris above the horizon was 65 degrees. The lengths of the sun’s
shadows on the summer solstice (also known as midsummer) and the lengths of
days and nights at these six pre-chosen points were measured. The results are
present as follows (see Table 4.1):
Table 4.1 Summer Solstice Sundial Scenery and Day-Night Lengths at Six Selected Points
Location Angle Sun Shadow Day Night Length

between Length on the Length
the Polaris Summer Solstice
and the
Horizon
South China Sea 15 degrees 1.16 chi (shadow 54 ke 46 ke

on the south of
the dial)
Hengyue (near Daluo 25 degrees No shadow, as 56 ke 44 ke
Mountain, Guangdong) the sun shines
directly on the
top of the dial
needle.
Yuetai (in today’s Kaifeng, 35 degrees 1.48 chi 60 ke 40 ke
Henan)
Helin (today’s upper Orhun 45 degrees 3.24 chi 64 ke 36 ke
River in Southwest Ulan
Bator, Mongolia)
Tiele (today’s Angara 55 degrees 5.1 chi 70 ke 30 ke
River in the Western
Baikal River, Russia)
Beihai 65 degrees 6.78 chi 82 ke 18 ke
1 chi (Chinese foot) = 1/3 meters
1 ke = 14.4 minutes
In phase two, the measurement was taken in the four outmost points of dif-
ferent directions – Gaoli (today’s Kaesong, Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea), Qiongya (today’s Hainan Island), Chengdu and Helin. The survey also
involved measurements in central regions like Dongping (in today’s Shan-
dong), Yangcheng (in today’s Dengfeng, Hainan), E’zhou (in Wuhan, Hubei)
and Jizhou (in today’s Ji’an, Jiangxi), the distance between which and Shangdu
was about 5,000 li (2,500 kilometers), so that surveyors were able to record the
discrepancy of data from far and near.5 Data collected are summarized as fol-
lows (see Table 4.2).
The revision of the new calendar was completed by the winter solstice in the
17th year of Yuan (1280). Kublai Khan named the new calendar “Shou Shi Li”
(Time-giving calendar) and ordered its nationwide use as of January 1, 1281.6
Guo Shoujing, who was in charge of the Four-Sea Survey, conducted field inves-
tigation with rather innovative approaches.
He measured sun shadows on the sundial during the day and positions of
southern star at midnight, observed the changes of clouds in the first day of
every lunar month, worked out the varying frequency and speed of the sun’s
and moon’s movement with careful calculation and reasoning, which led to
the Shoushi Calendar.7
Upon its completion, Guo was also appointed as the Imperial Astronomer in rec-
ognition of his achievements.
4.2 Calculation of the longitude and latitude of survey points

Only the first six out of 27 observation points selected in the Four-Sea Survey are
able to present more comprehensive geological data, including summer solstice
shadow lengths and day and night lengths. These data are essential to the calcula-
tion of their latitudes and longitudes. The following is a brief introduction to the
principle under which calculation as such can be made by using summer solstice
shadow lengths (see Figure 4.1).
Survey point O is situated at the center of the horizontal plane or NESW,
P represents the North Celestial Pole (Beichen) while P’, the South Celestial
Pole; the straight line PP’ is the Rotation Axis of diurnal apparent motion of
celestial body, and the equator is the largest circle EQWR perpendicular to the
axis; Z is the zenith while Z’, the nadir, and the meridian circle is the largest
circle ZSZ’N connecting the celestial zenith with North-South points. Thus,
the largest circle RcΩL of the ecliptic (Average Orbits of the Sun and Plan-
ets) is cut at the equator at the dichotomous point: r as the vernal equinox,
Ω as the equinox point, C as the summer solstice point and L as the winter
solstice point, and the ecliptic obliquity θ = 23°27′. Only in areas 23°27′ north
and south to the equator can the sun be seen hanging vertically overhead. The
northern boundary of this range is the Tropic of Cancer and the southern, the
Table 4.2 Latitudes Measured at 20 Surveying Points
Location Angle Location Angle between Location Angle Location Angle

between the the Polaris between the between the
Polaris and and Horizon Polaris and Polaris and
Horizon Horizon Horizon
Shangdu 43°15′ Xijing (today’s 40°15′ Xiliangzhou (today’s 40°5′ Yangzhou (today’s 33°
Datong, Shanxi) Wuwei, Gansu) Yangzhou, Jiangsu)
Beijing (today’s 42°5′ Taiyuan (today’s 38°15′ Dongping (today’s 35°45′ E’zhou (today’s 31°30′
Ningcheng, Taiyuan, Shanxi) Dongping, Wuhan, Hubei)
Inner Mongolia) Shandong)
Yidu (today’s 37°15′ An’xi Fu (today’s 34°35′ Daming (today’s 36° Jizhou (Ji’an, Jiangxi) 26°30′
Yidu, Shandong) Xi’an, Shaanxi) Daaming, Hebei)
Dengzhou (today’s 38°15′ Xingyuan (today’s 33°35′ Nanjing (today’s 34°50′ Leizhou (today’s 20°45′
Penglai, Hanzhong, Kaifeng, Henan) Leizhou,
Shandong) Shaanxi) Guangdong)
Gaoli (today’s 38°15′ Chengdu (today’s 31°35′ Yangcheng (today’s 34°40′ Qiongzhou (today’s 19°45′
Kaesong, Chengdu, Dengfeng, Henan) Haikou, Hainan)
NPRK) Sichuan
The Four Seas of the Yuan Dynasty
51
Figure 4.1 Principle behind latitude and longitude calculation via measurement of summer
solstice sun shadow lengths
Tropic of Capricorn. Therefore, the latitude of point O is the angle between Z

and Q. Assume a sundial is set at point C with its needle parallel to the ZZ’ on
the summer solstice, the projection angle of the midday sun from point C is α
and the ecliptic obliquity is θ, then the latitude of the survey point O is α + θ;
and if the point is within the area between the equator and the Tropic of Cancer,
its latitude is θ – α.
As such, we can work out the latitude of the observation point in the South
China Sea. According to the Four-Sea Survey, on the day of the summer solstice,
the South China Sea’s sun shadow was on the south side of the sundial needle
with the length of 1.16 chi,8 which indicated that the survey point was south to
the Tropic of Cancer. As the sun was on the Tropic of Cancer at midday summer
solstice, it only projected southward when the point was south to the Tropic of
Cancer. We can do the following calculation with the lengths of sun shadow pro-
vided (see Figure 4.2).
AC is the sundial’s needle, 8 chis (around 2.67 meters) long and perpendicular to
the ground. AB is the ray of the sunlight on the Tropic of Cancer, and a projection
Figure 4.2 Calculating latitudes via measurement of summer solstice sun shadow lengths
angle of α is formed with AC. ∠MAN is the angle between the equator and the
Tropic of Cancer. BC is the shadow length, 1.16 chi (0.39 meters) long and θ, the
latitude of South China Sea point.
Tgα = BC/AC = 1.16/8 = 0.145

α=8°15′
θ=∠MAN–α = 23°27′–8°15′ = 15°12′
Therefore, the then location of observation point in the South China Sea can be
identified as latitude 15°12′ N.
As for the calculation of longitude, the day and nighttime differences between
two places. Taking points in the South China Sea and Hengyue recorded in the
Four-Sea Survey for example, the former had a “day length of fifty-four ke,
night length of forty-six ke,” and the latter had a “day length of fifty-six ke, night
length of forty-four ke.” That means the time difference between them was two
ke, and one ke if it is at noon. As one ke was equivalent to the longitude of 3.6°
on today’s map, the longitude of the South China Sea was 3.6° to the east of
Hengyue, which was located on the Daluo Mountains between Guangzhou and
Huizhou (Guangdong), near the Tropic of Cancer. According to the Four-Sea
Survey, “there was no sun shadow on Hengyue on the summer solstice,” namely,
“as the sun was just above the sundial needle, there was no sun shadow at noon.”
This phenomenon could only occur in the area near the Tropic of Cancer. Given
the longitude of Hengyue was about 113.1°E, that of the South China Sea with a
difference of 3.6° should therefore be 116.7°E.
Accordingly, longitudes and latitudes of the first six observation points in the
Four-sea Survey are calculated as follows (see Table 4.3):
Table 4.3 Longitudes and Latitudes of Six Observation Points
Location Angle between Dial Scenery Mid-day Time Estimated Estimated

the Polaris and Difference Latitude Longitude
the Horizon
SCS 15° 1.16 chi 0 15°12′ 116°42′

(south to the needle)
Hengyue 25° No shadow 1ke 23°27′ 113°06′
Yuetai 35° 1.48 chi 2ke 33°56′ 105°54′
Helin 45° 3.24 chi 2ke 45°30′ 98°42′
Tiele 55° 5.1 chi 3ke 55°30′ 87°54′
Beihai 65° 6.78 chi 6ke 63°44′ 66°18′
On January 30, 1980, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a docu-

ment entitled “China’s Indisputable Sovereignty over the Xisha Islands and Nan-
sha Islands.” The document elaborated on the calculation process of the South
China Sea’s latitude:
The latitude of Qiongzhou is 19.75°N; The latitude of Nanhai is 15°N. This

shows that the Nanhai observation point was more than four degrees south
of Qiongzhou observation point on Hainan Island, which is exactly the loca-
tion of the Xisha Islands of today. Owing to technological limitations at that
time, the north latitudes obtained of most of the twenty-seven observation
points showed an error of about one degree as compared with their present
latitudes. Since according to the system of the Yuan dynasty a circumference
was divided into 365.25 degrees instead of 360 degrees as at present, the then
15°N for the Nanhai observation point should actually be 14°47′ N, and dis-
counting the error of about one degree, its location is precisely on the Xisha
Islands of today.9
In response to this, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a

White Paper, stating that:
From what is written in Yuan Shi, one can see clearly that the astronomical
surveys at the twenty-seven points were not made on a “national level” as
Peking said in its document but “in the Four Seas.” That is why these twenty-
seven points included such places lying outside the “Chinese domain” as
Kaoli i.e. Korea, Tiele i.e. a place in Siberia (U.S.S.R.), Peihai (Northern Sea)
i.e. the sea off Siberia and Nanhai i.e, the East Sea.10
In another White Paper, the Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs further stated
that “if these were regarded as a legal basis for China’s sovereignty, this could
lead to Chinese claims on more distant territories, including inside the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea and the USSR.”11
These statements by the Vietnamese authorities show a lack of their knowl-
edge about Chinese history and the ancient Chinese language. Chinese ancients
believed that China was surrounded by seas in the four directions; they applied
the word “four seas” to the entire country, such as the one in Shang Shu Da Yu Mo
(Counsels of the Great Yu): “The teachings of cultural virtue are spread in four
seas.”12 Places like Gaoli, Tiele and Peihai had been incorporated into Chinese
territory since the beginning of Yuan, which explained why they were chosen as
survey points in the national geological mapping. Besides, it is common knowl-
edge that a country’s territory changes over time, and we cannot tailor today’s
territorial boundaries to that of Yuan more than 700 years ago.
Gaoli was conquered by Commander Salita under the order of Ögedeiqaγan
Khan in the third year of Emperor Taizong’s reign of the Mongol Empire (1231).
In the eighth year of Emperor Xianzong’s reign (1258), Cui’s regime in Gaoli was
overthrown by Yuan. However, in the seventh year of the Emperor Zhiyuan’s reign
(1270), the Gaoli royal family completely capitulated to the Yuan by demolishing
the city wall of Ganghwa do Island (in today’s Incheon, ROK) and moving back to
Kaesong city (in today’s DPRK). Afterward, the Yuan Dynasty set up an agency of
patrol and inspection in Kaesong to administer the territory under the supervision
of Daruγači. It is no doubt then that the Korean Peninsula was within the territory
of Yuan and Kaesong was selected as the easternmost point in the Four-Sea Survey.
Tiele, known as Gaonian in the Northern Wei Dynasty and Kangli or Kanglin in
Yuan, was one of the main transportation hubs from Mongolia northwest toward
Golden Horde. Genghis Khan once ordered “Warrior Sübügätäi to conquer Kan-
glin along with ten other tribes.”13 Though it is located in today’s Novokuznetsk
(formerly Stalinsk),14 not far from the origin of the Eastern Branch of the Obi
River, Kangli (Tiele) was within Chinese territory in the Yuan Dynasty.
Peihai, near the Arctic Ocean, was located around the People’s Peak of the Ural
Mountains, the estuary of the Obi River today. People’s Peak, 1,894 meters above
sea level, had the Kara (Dark) Sea to the north. Beihai belonged to Golden Horde
within Yuan’s territory and was chosen as the northernmost survey point in the
Four-Sea Survey.
While Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not deny the fact that the
South China Sea observation point was in the Xisha Islands, it still came up with
some fallacies, saying that “the Xisha archipelago [that] lay within Chinese terri-
tory under the Yuan” is a “distortion of history.”15 Contrarily, it is The History of
Yuan that stated the “territory” of China in the dynasty reaches only Hainan Island
to the southernmost and the Gobi Desert (between today’s China and Mongolia)
to the northernmost.16 Vietnamese scholar Hoang V. P. argues that China’s “ter-
ritory” in the Yuan Dynasty was recorded in The History of Yuan Geographic
Records to have only reached Zhuya, the southernmost tip of China, and the Gobi
Desert, the northernmost. He went on to claim that nowhere in the book were
‘Xisha’ and ‘Nansha’ mentioned.17 These statements are made with none but the
only purpose of labeling the Xisha and Nansha Islands as res nullius (nobody’s
land) so as to “reaffirm” their claim, i.e. “Vietnam had taken control of the two
islands long before they fell within the sovereignty of any country.”18 However,
these were nothing but mere misinterpretation. The true wording in The History
of Yuan Geographic Records is:
The territory stretched across Yinshan (today’s central part of Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region) to the north, reached Liusha (today’s Taklimakan Des-
ert) to the west and Liaodong (today’s East Liaoning Province) to the east,
and ended till Haibiao (today’s Xisha Islands) to the south.19
It is well known that geographic records are documents that describe the history
and jurisdiction of administrative agencies at various levels across a nation, such
as provincial, prefectural, county, etc. While there was no regular residence on the
Xisha and Nansha Islands in the Yuan Dynasty, it was only natural that the Yuan
government did not establish any administrative organ on these small islands
without long-term settlement. Besides, Xisha and Nansha at that time were not
the names of the two islands, which were generally referred to as “Shitang” or
“Changsha.” It is obvious that Vietnamese attempts to impose the so-called effec-
tive occupation of contemporary international law on the territory of the Yuan.
However, just as the renowned Japanese historian Inoue notes, “the attempt of
applying ‘jurisprudence’ to the territory of the ancient Chinese Dynasty in the feu-
dal era, regardless legal or not, is in itself modern imperialism that endeavors to
wipe out history.”20 It is true that rulers of the Yuan more than 700 years ago didn’t
establish administrative agencies on the Xisha and Nansha Islands which can be
presented as evidence of “effective occupation” from the Vietnamese perspective.
However, the fact that the Yuan government chose the South China Sea as the
southernmost point in the Four-Sea Survey provides a sound basis for determining
boundaries of the then South China Sea. This also indicates that the Xisha Islands
were part of Chinese territory at that time and the Yuan government had exercised
sovereignty and jurisdiction over it.
4.3 Locating the South China Sea survey point

Opinions vary on the specific location of the South China Sea survey point. Some
believed it was in Guangzhou, which is apparently unfounded because it has been
clearly stated in The History of Yuan Astronomical Records: “further south to
Hainan Island.” That is, the South China Sea survey point must be situated far
south to Hainan Island. According to Han, the South China Sea point should be
located on Huangyan Dao of Zhongsha Islands within the coordinates of 15°08′ to
15°14′N and 117°44′ to 117°48′E. Also, the South China Sea that lies to the south
of Zhuya was the “watershed” or boundary between China and Champa (today’s
central Vietnam). It is near the Wailuo Mountains (15°N and l09°E).21 While some
claimed that this was speculative in nature and believed that Guo Shoujing had
never reached the Xisha Islands and Huangyan Dao but conducted his survey in
“Linyi” (Vietnamese: Lam Ap）along today’s central coast of Vietnam.22 I label
this argument as “Linyi Theory” and discuss its validity as follows.
The South China Sea point in Guo’s survey was at 15°N latitude,23 but as is
described in the History of Yuan Astronomical Records: “Linyi at 15°N latitude is
the national boundary,” this became the major evidence of the theory.24 Looking
more closely, however, we can tell that the previous description is problematic.
The original record in the History of Yuan was based on Yang Yi Ming (An Epitaph
in praise of Yangyi, an ancient Chinese astronomic instrument) written by Yao Sui
(1238–1313), writer in the Yuan. He wrote: “Linyi at 17°N latitude is the national
boundary,”25 and this apparently contradicts the previous description. But which
one is correct? Book of Tang Astronomical Records wrote that “Linyi is situated
at 17°4′N latitude,” similar to that in Yang Yi Ming. According to The Tong Dian
(volume 188) by Du You (735–812):
In the 5th year of Yonghe of Eastern Jin (349), Fan Fo acceded to the throne
upon death of his father King Fan Wen of Linyi and remained in Rinan (Nhat
Nam). Soon after Guan Sui, Chief of Jiuzhen Prefecture, battled against Fan,
who then fled to Lam Ap. Guan’s troops pursued and reached Linyi in May
of Chinese calendar. A sundial was set up there, which showed the sun shone
from the north of the sundial needle, leaving the shadow to the south of the
needle, with a length of 9.1 cun.
Based on this record, Dai Tongbo calculated that Lam Ap should be situated
at between 17°05′ and 19°35′N,26 the figure worked out by Paul Pelliot (1878–
1945), French sinologist and orientalist, was 17°24′N.27 In a nutshell, Linyi’s lati-
tude was around 17°N, suggesting that the description in Yang Yi Ming by Yao
Sui is correct. As such, it is believed that a mistake might have occurred when
the compiler of History of Yuan was citing from Yang Yi Ming, i.e. changing “17”
to “15”; alternatively, it could be that the compiler of the History of Yuan linked
two unrelated things together by arbitrarily assuming that the South China Sea
at 15° N was Linyi at 17° N mentioned in Yang Yi Ming. However, Yao Sui, the
author of Yang Yi Ming, must have been aware of that fact that the latitude of Linyi
had always been 17° N, given that he was a scholar. It follows that the record of
Linyi’s latitude in the History of Yuan was inaccurate, nor was the argument that
the South China Sea point was in Linyi. Moreover, from the Yuan to Qing Dynas-
ties, the South China Sea point in the Four-sea Survey and sea areas above 15° N
latitude were within the boundaries of the South China Sea. The place known
as Linyi (Champa) on the coast of central Vietnam has had no overlaps with the
South China Sea until today.
Another supporting evidence for the theory holds: “Linyi sea (Lam Ap Sea)
faces the boundary between China and foreign countries, which has been docu-
mented in works of the Ming Dynasty, such as the description of “Yi Yu Hua
Yi (Boundary of China)” in Huang Zhong’s (1507–1566) Hai Yu (Words of
the Sea).28 Thus, Linyi should be the southern border of China and a boundary
between China and foreign countries in ancient times. According to Hai Yu, the
sea area near the Wailuo Mountains in central Vietnam’s Champa was the bound-
ary between the China Sea and the Vietnam Sea. Ships from China to the overseas
usually took the “Dong Zhu (Eastern)” route along the east of Wailuo Sea, while
those returning to Hainan Island sailed through the “Xi Zhu (Western)” route
along the west of Wailuo Sea.29 As Wailuo Sea was situated at the convergence of
the two routes, it became the natural dividing line between Chinese and foreign
seas, a line clearly referred to as the boundary between territorial seas, instead
of land areas. Therefore, the record cannot lead to the interpretation that Linyi is
the southern boundary of China. Besides, Hai Yu was written in the 15th year of
Jiajing’s reign (1536), but Linyi was no longer under the jurisdiction of China as
early as Xuande era in the early Ming Dynasty (1426–1435). Therefore, Huang
Zhong could not have regarded Linyi, a place outside Chinese territory, as the
southern boundary of China.
The Linyi Theory also touched upon the unfavorable political environment for
a survey in Xisha or Guangzhou in spring 1279, when the Yuan army besieged
Zhao Bing of the Southern Song Dynasty at Yamen (today’s Jiangmen, Guang-
dong). It was impossible for the Yuan people to conduct the geological mapping
in the South China Sea while fighting the Song army; thus, Nanhai mentioned
here should refer to a different place rather than the South China Sea.30 How-
ever, this argument is inconsistent with historical facts. Although Zhao Bing was
not defeated in Yamen until February 6, 1279, the war in Guangzhou had ended
after the surrender of General Zhang Zhensun of Southern Song on December 12,
1277.31 It was till March 27, 1279 – by then the message of Zhao Bing’s defeat
had been delivered to Beijing – that Kublai Khan ordered Guo Shoujing to travel
to the South China Sea for the relevant survey. In other words, Kublai Khan did
not move forward with the South China Sea survey until the ongoing Guangzhou
war ended. To prove the possibility of Lam Ap as the survey point, the theory
further emphasized the political background at that time: “Lam Ap was a subor-
dinate country to Yuan, despite the fact that the Yuan army had not yet arrived in
it.”32 This does not match historical facts, either. Although Yuan sent its people
to Champa upon the order of Prime Minister Söghetei as early as 1278 after the
defeat of the Southern Song, and dispatched military officers along with others
in December 1279 to call in the King of Champa to the Yuan imperial court, the
King did not submit himself to the rule of Yuan until February 1280.33 Therefore,
Champa was not a subordinate country of Yuan when Guo Shoujing was entrusted
to the South China Sea in March, 1279.
In summary, the data concerning the South China Sea point recorded by Guo
Shoujing provide an important basis for determination of its exact location. The
South China Sea point, according to previous calculation, is located at 15°12’ N
latitude and 116°42’ E longitude, roughly around the Xisha Islands; In more specific
terms, it is believed to be located on Huangyan Dao (15°08′–15°14′ N, 117°44′–
117°48′’E) of the Zhongsha Islands, with an allowable difference of 1°. While the
Linyi theory argues that Guo’s arrival at Xisha Islands was technically and tem-
porally unlikely, it is based more on speculation rather than evidence. In 1277,
when Jing’ao (today’s Hengqin, Guangdong) was attacked by General Liu Shen
of the Yuan Dynasty, Emperor Duanzong of Southern Song (Zhao Shi) was forced
to flee to Champa via Xienu Gorge (in today’s Zhongshan, Guangdong) by sea.
The emperor’s army further retreated as Liu continued his offensive, arriving in the
Xisha Islands.34 Given this, why wouldn’t Guo be able to reach the same place when
his team enjoyed better timing and conditions than that of Emperor Duanzong?
Notes
1 History of Yuan, Vol. 53.
2 Ibid., Vol. 10.
3 New History of Yuan, Vol. 34.
4 Su, T. (1958). Yuan Wen Lei (Anthology of the Yuan’s Poetry). Beijing: Zhonghua Book
Company, p. 717.
5 Yuan Wen Lei (Anthology of the Yuan’s Poetry). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company,
p. 218.
6 Ibid., p. 108.
7 Ibid., p. 203.
8 See History of Yuan, Vol. 48. Note that the equivalent of chi as a measuring unit used
in the Yuan Dynasty is 0.308m.
9 See www.bannedthought.net/China/MaoEra/Vietnam/China%27sIndisputableSoverei
gnty-1980.pdf (accessd April 21, 2020).
10 Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (1979). Vietnam’s Sovereignty Over
the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes. Hanoi.
11 Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (1975). White Paper on the Hoang
Sa and Truong Sa Islands.
12 The Editorial Committee of “Ci Hai” (1979). Comprehensive Dictionary. Shanghai:
Shanghai Lexicographical Publishing House, p. 1734.
13 A Sequel to Secret History of Yuan, Vol. 1.
14 Han, Z. et al. (Eds.). (1988). A Collection of Historical Materials on the South China
Sea Islands (in Chinese). Beijing: Oriental Press, p. 108.
17 Ibid., p. 193.
18 Ibid., p. 71.
19 History of Yuan, Vol. 48.
20 Kiyoshi, I. (1971). History and Sovereignty Issues of the Diaoyu Islands. Hong Kong:
Seventieth Magazine, p. 44.
22 Zeng, Z. (1990). Textual Research on the South China Sea Survey of Yuan Conducted
in Lam Ap-Guo Shoujing Did Not Reach Zhongsha and Xisha. Journal of Historical
Research, 5, pp. 136–137.
p. 717.
Research, 5, pp. 136–137.
p. 215.
26 Needham, J.T.M. (1975). Science and Civilization in China (in Chinese), Vol. 4. Bei-
jing: Science Publishing House, p. 276.
27 Pelliot, P. (1955). Textual Rresearch on Nautical Routes from Jiaozhi and Canton to
India (in Chinese). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, p. 46.
Research, 5, p. 135.
pp. 558–559.
p. 570.
Sea Islands (in Chinese). Beijing: Oriental Press, pp. 77–78.
5 Why are Hoang Sa and Truong Sa
of Vietnam not Xisha and Nansha
of China?
Some evidence from historical sources
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam put together some so-called histori-
cal data about Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes in the 1979 White Paper,
claiming that they were de facto China’s Xisha and Nansha Islands. Vietnam-
ese authorities then declared their “historic sovereignty” over the islands while
encouraging some literati to repeatedly argue in their favor. For such a claim, the
present chapter presents some counterarguments by probing into the exact loca-
tion of Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes of Vietnam. In doing so, we aim
to uncover the real story concerning the ownership of Xisha Islands and Nansha
Islands of China along with some offshore islands in the central coastal area of
Vietnam.
5.1 Truong Sa are islands and cays in Wailuo Sea

The earliest historical record quoted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet-
nam is Toan Tap Thien Nam Tu Chi Lo Do (Handbook of the South’s Road Maps)
composed by Du Ba between 1630 to 1635 where some events in the 15th century
were noted down. “These events either occurred between 1403 and 1407, when Co
Luy and Quang Ngai were occupied by Vietnam, or in 1471, when the southern
border of China extended to Shibeishan (Fuan).”1 However, there are four routes
in this book, namely Hanoi to Zhancheng (Cham City), Hanoi to Qinzhou, Hanoi
to Liangshan and Hanoi to Yunnan. The detailed records of all castles built by the
Nguyen Dynasty in the 17th century can be found in the book. And some place
names, such as Chunlu (Houlu County today) and Fuchun “富春” (recorded as
Fuchun “浮春” in the book, Hue City today), are place names which had not come
into existence till the 17th century.2 It is thus no wonder that the French sinologist
H. Maspero extrapolated that the book was not completed until the end of the 17th
or the beginning of the 18th century. He stated that the book “was not a book which
can provide convincing materials as any ancient topographical texts would do.”3
However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam quoted a note to the Map
of Quang Ngai from this book:
An elongated sandbank, called Bai Cat Vang, 400 dam long and 20 dam wide,
lies in the middle of the sea facing the coastline between the Dai Chiem port
to Sa Vinh port. Everytime the south wide arose, foreign ships sailing near the
coast were flown off course and ran aground on the sandbank, so were those
sailing on the high sea from the North when there was a Northeastern wind.
Men on board the ships all starved to death and goods were amassed there.
Every year in the last month of winter, the Nguyen princes sent 18 ships there
to recuperate the goods consisting mostly of gold, silver, currencies, arms and
ammunition. It takes one day and a half, from the Dai Chiem port to go there,
and only a day if one embarks at Sa Ky.4
In fact, this note made it clear that the Truong Sa Islands then named as Bai
Cat Vang start from Dai Chiem port (great sea gate in Dai Namg of Quảng Nam
Province today) and end at Sa Vinh port (Shaxiong Sea Gate in Yiping Province
today). The voyage from Dai Chiem port to Sa Vinh port takes one and a half
days, and it takes a day from Sa Ky (a seaport in the southeast of Pingshan County
in Quang Ngai Prefecture). The vessels of Vietnam sailing along the coast were
generally red boats, temple boats or Tiangu boats, which were not only small in
size but also slow in movement. For example, in July of the 34th year of Kangxi
reign (1695), a monk named Dashan Changweng from Guangdong wanted to
return to China from Vietnam. Vietnam officials prepared 40 Tiangu boats for
him. Taking a red boat, Dashan set off from Hoi An Port in the afternoon of the
19th day and arrived at Cham Islands, from where he embarked on another boat,
at the daybreak of the next day.5 The distance from the estuary of Quảng Nam
Province (Cua Dai Nai Cham) to Cham Islands is about 12 kilometers,6 but it took
Dashan more than half a day. The voyage of one and a half day only sails over
30 kilometers at the most. It can be seen that Truong Sa stretches in the direction
parallel to the central coastline of Vietnam. The head of Truong Sa is, compared to
its central part (the voyage of half day, about 10 kilometers), farther from Vietnam
coastline (the voyage of one and a half day, about 30 kilometers) .
Every year when the southwester blows, foreign and Chinese merchant boats
generally sail along the route between the Vietnam coastline and “Truong Sa,”
which is called the “inner route”; when a northeaster blows, they sail along
the route beyond “Truong Sa,” which is called the “outer route.” “Truong Sa”
becomes the natural boundary of these two routes. There are records of these
inner and outer routes in Chinese historical books. For example, Hai Yu written
by Huang Zhong referred to the natural boundary between these two routes as
“fen shui” (literally “division of waters”); the outer route was referred to as “route
east” while the inner route was referred to as “route west.” He wrote: “‘feng shui’
lies in Wailuo Hai (literally ‘Wailuo Sea’) off Zhancheng where hidden shoals
act as the threshold. It stretches for hundreds of dam and the rolling billows there
make it quite different from other sea areas.”7 In other words, the boundary of
inner and outer routes “fenshui” is in Wailuo Sea near Zhancheng. Wailuo refers
to Culao Cham in the sea area around central Vietnam, which is called Pulou Can-
tonese today. And the sea area in which it is located is referred to as Wailuo Sea.
It can be seen that the Truong Sa, which is called “Bai Cat Vang” in the note to
“Map of Quang Ngai,” is actually in Wailuo Sea near Zhancheng. The description
Xisha and Nansha of China 63
in Hai Yu that “hidden shoals are like thresholds and stretch for hundreds of dam”
is consistent with that in the book, namely “with the length of about 400 dam and
the width of about 20 dam, it stands upright in the sea.”
There are probably two reasons why “foreign merchant boats sail across,
regardless of inner or outer route, all ended up in starvation and deaths.”
On the one hand, “Truong Sa” mentioned here was vast in size, dotted with
submerged reefs that could make a voyage around extremely dangerous. In the
34th year of the Kangxi reign (1695), Dashan Changweng, who had been there in
person, described as follows:
In the vast sea, moraines lie across. From the northeast to the southwest,
high moraines stand steeply in the sea and low ones are at the sea level. The
surface is as hard as iron, and boats will turn into broken bits once hit. The
width is over a hundred dam and the length is beyond measurement. Named
as Wangli Changsha, there is no vegetation or population at all. Whenever
wind blows, sea water rises and destroys wherever it reaches. People have no
rice or water and starve to death.8
In the 21st year of the Chenghua reign (1485) of the Ming Dynasty, top super-
visor Lin Rong was on a journey to Zhancheng for title-conferring. With him on
the boat were a thousand soldiers and civilians. The goods on the boat were too
heavy, and the captain was not familiar with the situation of the sea and wanted
to seek a shortcut. However, they “hit the iron-like sand by accident near the
head of Truong Sa Campell. The boat was broken, two envoys were drowned and
nineteen soldiers and civilians died.”9 On the 2nd day of October (lunar calendar)
in the 15th year of the Daoguang reign (1835) of the Qing Dynasty, the scholar
who lived on government grants, Cai Tinglan from Penghu, finished his provin-
cial examination and boarded from Liaoluo in the southeast of Jinmen, hoping to
return to Penghu. On his way, he met a sudden hurricane and floated on the sea
for ten days and nights before arriving at Caiqinxun on the coast of Quang Ngai
Prefecture of Vietnam. Local fishermen were surprised that he had survived from
the hidden reefs and dangerous shallows near Campello. They said that:
He must have been protected by gods, otherwise he could not have sur-
vived! When people arrived on the small island, i.e. Campello Island, flows
from east to west surged fiercely. There was a so extremely narrow stream
that boats can only go through during flood tide. Boats will immediately
sink when hitting a reef. From west to south, boats can arrive at the inner
harbor. As the mast and sail have been lowered, boats cannot go on adverse
currents. From east to west, it is extremely dangerous. There are hidden
reefs and lines everywhere at the bottom of the sea (at the bottom of the
sea, rocks are called reefs and sands are called lines.) Lines are dozens of
dam long with meandering channels. Experienced fishermen are not famil-
iar enough yet. Whenever they encountered a reef, the boat would become
broken bits!10
These records all confirm that “Truong Sa” near Campello was not only vast
but also dangerous. As the cargo of sunken boat mostly ended up here, the king
of Vietnam often sent people to search for and pick up wreckage of sunken boats.
Dashan Changweng wrote: “During the period of the previous king, bandits were
sent to pick up gold and silverware each year.” This also echoes the description in
Map of Quang Ngai: “In the winter, Nguyen Dynasty dispatched eighteen boats
here in every month to take delivery of goods, which were mostly gold, silver,
coins, and blunderbuss bullets.”
On the other hand, the currents around Wailuo Sea rush with great tidal changes.
From the first day to the 15th day of every month, tidewater flowed from east to
west. And from the 16th to the 30th day, it flowed from west to east. Only experi-
enced and aged steering men could sail with great care.11 In the middle of July of
the 34th year of the Kangxi reign (1695), Dashan Changweng wanted to return to
China by sea. The southwester was about to end at that time, and the north wind
gradually began. The water flowed eastward, and the south wind was weak. Being
unable to beat the eastward rapid currents, the boat advanced while retreating
almost equally. They boarded in Campello in the morning of the 20th day and the
wind began to blow in the 30th day. But the wind changed at that night so that
they were blown back to Campello in the next morning.12 All the merchant boats
from various countries learned lessons from the tidal changes of the Wailuo Sea.
If anyone was blown into the sea by accident, it would be impossible for him to
get out until the west wind started. The king of Vietnam took the opportunity to
confiscate their cargo or levy times of tax on them.13
The distance between “Truong Sa” and Vietnam coastline is also confirmed
by Dashan Changweng’s description about his experience of sailing against
the northern wind. Dashan Changweng’s boat set sail from Campello in the
morning of the 30th day, and, after nearly a day, they came near “Truong
Sa,” when they encountered the northern wind at the night. “All the people
on the boat worried about Truong Sa,” he noted. When the boat was blown
back to Campello in the next morning, they drummed to honor the gods, and
celebrated that they survived from the danger of “being swallowed by fish in
Wangli Changsha.” It can be seen that the distance from Campello to “Truong
Sa” takes a one-day voyage. As there is half a day voyage from Hoi An to
Campello, covering the total distance takes one and a half days, which was
the same with the duration noted in “Map of Quang Ngai.” Besides, from the
records in Đại Nam Nhất Thống Chí (Gazetteer of Greater Vietnam), it can be
seen that the distance between “Truong Sa” and Vietnam coastline was really
short. “Truong Sa” was called “Bai Cat Vang” before, which was “Zi Nan”
before Vietnam characters implemented Latinization, meaning “Hoang Sa.”
Đại Nam Nhất Thống Chí (Gazetteer of Greater Vietnam) recorded four neigh-
bors of Quang Ngai Prefecture: “with Hengsha Island (Hoang Sa Island) in the
east, the sea is regarded as a pond; keeping off mountain barbarians in the west,
there is a long barrier; adjacent to Pingding (Tỉnh Bình Định) in the south, Shi-
jin Ridge is the significant hub; neighboring on Quảng Nam Province, the sand
beach is the boundary.”14 It is explained here that Hoang Sa Islands黄沙岛 (横
is the misused character of 黄) was located in the east of Quang Ngai Province,
with the sea in the middle. As the distance was short, the sea was regarded
as a pond. When the Vietnam scholar Vo Long Te was reading the record, he
misinterpreted “the sea” to be an “immortal sea island,” and “pond” to be “city”
and came up with, not unintentionally, the following explanations: “in the east,
Shadao Islands (which is referred to as Hoang Sa Islands) lie horizontally
and connect with the sea as a city”; “in the east, Shadao Islands lie horizontally and
connect with other islands as a city.” Vo Long Te saw this record as an indica-
tion of “the strategic value of the sea islands system on the east of Vietnam
coastline where these unnamed sea islands—though not illustrated—belong
to the Truong Sa archipelagos.”15 However, he completely misunderstood the
original meaning of such phrases to the extent of taking the words too literally
and giving a strained interpretation.
It can therefore be concluded that “Truong Sa” noted in “Map of Quang Ngai”
of Book of the Collection of Four Routes in the South are some small islands and
cays in Wailuo Sea. They are distributed along the direction parallel to the central
coastline of Vietnam. And the scope starts from the great sea gate in Dai Namg
of Quảng Nam Province today (at approximately 16° N latitude) to Shaxiong Sea
Gate in Yiping Province today (at approximately 14°40′ N latitude). Its head is
about the one-and-a-half-day voyage from the great sea gate of Dai Namg (about
30 kilometers), and the middle part is about half a day voyage from the seaport of
Pingshan County (about 10 kilometers). As the currents in Wailuo Sea are rapid
and the tidal changes are great, when the southwester blows every year, merchant
boats from foreign countries to China generally take the “inner” route close to
Vietnam coastline; and when the northeaster blows, merchant boats from China
to foreign countries take the “outer” route far from Vietnam coastline. “Truong
Sa” is the natural boundary between these two routes. The “Truong Sa” has no
association with the Xisha Islands of China, mainly for three reasons: first, the
Xisha Islands of China are far away from Vietnam coastline, the nearest part is
still 120 nautical miles (about 222 kilometers) from Pulou Canton along Vietnam
coastline, and 170 nautical miles (about 315 kilometers) from Dai Namg; second,
the Xisha Islands of China are located between 15°45′ and 17°15′ N latitude, which
is completely different from the description that Truong Sa is located at 14°40°–16° N
latitude; third, the Xisha Islands of China are far from coastline and sporadically
distributed in the sea. The route along which boats sail along the coastline sim-
ply does not exist, let alone does it have a role as the natural boundary between
“inner” and “outer” routes.
5.2 Hoang Sa Islands are small islands in the north of

Lý Sơn Islands
The second piece of historical evidence cited in the White Paper of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam is from Miscellaneous Records on the Pacification
of the Frontiers, which was compiled by Lê Quý Đôn in 1776, when he took the
post of Associated Commander in Hue. In the book, he wrote:
The Village of An Vinh, Binh Son sub-district, Quang Ngai District, lies close
by the sea. Just off the coast to the northeast lie over 130 scattered peaks. If
you sail from the Dai Chiem Port to go there, it takes a voyage of one day or
a few hours and that there are fresh water springs on some islands. On one
island there is a vast and flat golden sandbank about 30 dam long, where the
spring water is crystal clear. The swallows and thousands of other species of
birds there are not frightened by the sight of men.16
What motivated the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to cite these lines
is apparent: by referring to “Hoang Sa Zhu” as the Hoang Sa which is named “Bai
Cat Vang,” they then confused it with the Xisha Islands of China in an attempt
to demonstrate that they have investigated and visited the Xisha Islands as early
as several centuries ago.17 However, as far as our investigation into the specific
location of “Hoang Sa Zhu” is concerned, such an argument is totally unfounded.
The An Yong Society mentioned in that statement is in fact the two neighbor-
hoods called Yongan and Anhai. According to the records of Dai Nam Nhat Thong
Chi (Gazetteer of Greater Vietnam): “Lý Sơn Islands are in the east sea of Ping-
shan County, also known by its local name Cu Lao Re. The islands are hollow,
with dozens of mu in the middle. Residents live in Yongan and Anhai.”18 In other
words, Yongan and Anhai are on the hollow land in the middle of Lý Sơn Islands
surrounded by high mountains. The so-called islands in the northeast are nothing
but some islands near Lý Sơn Islands. This is also be evidenced in Illustrated
Geography of Vietnam compiled during the Qing Dynasty. The book writes:
The village of An Yong Society of Pingshan County is close to the sea. There
are islands in the northeast. Overlapped mountains are over 130 in quantity
(Wailuo Mountain in original note). There is sea among the mountains. It
takes you one day or more to sail across the mountains. There are sweet
springs on the mountains, and there is Hoang Sa Zhu (Ye Zi Tang in original
note) among the islands, about 30 miles in length. The land is flat and vast,
and the water is clear and clean. Merchant boats berth here.19
Obviously, description here is nearly the same with the record in Miscella-
neous Records on the Pacification of the Frontiers. Both mention the same place.
However, this record clearly notes that the islands “over 130 in quantity” in the
northeast of An Yong Society are Wailuo Islands (Lý Sơn Islands), and Hoang Sa
Zhu is Ye Zi Tang. We know that Lý Sơn Islands consist of several islands. The
northern islands are extremely small, the southern islands are narrow, the eastern
islands are large and the western islands are small. The northern islands are Ye
Zi Tang, which is also called Tong Cao Yu.20 It can be seen that the “Hoang Sa
Zhu” mentioned in Miscellaneous Records on the Pacification of the Frontiers are
the small islands in the north of Lý Sơn Islands, which is also called Ye Zi Tang
or Tong Cao Yu. “Map of Vietnam” in the preface of Illustrated Geography of
Vietnam draws Hoang Sa Zhu outside Xinzhou Port near Pingshan of Quang Ngai
Province, which is the location of Lý Sơn Islands (see Figure 5.1). It is completely
irrelevant to the Xisha Islands of China.
Miscellaneous Records on the Pacification of the Frontiers also notes:
In Quang Ngai district, off the coast of An Vinh village, Binh Son subdistrict,
there is an island called Cu Lao Re stretching over 30 dams. The Tu Chinh
settlement, as it is called, has been established here and the people there grow
beans. It takes half a day by boat to get there. Further off, there are Dai Tru-
ong Sa islands where sea products and ship-wrecked cargoes are available to
Figure 5.1 Map of Vietnam in the preface of Illustrated Geography of Vietnam

be collected by the Hoang Sa detachment. It takes three days and nights to
reach there by boat. They are near an area called Bac Hai.21
“Cu Lao Re” here is apparently not the one recorded in Dai Nam Nhat Thong
Chi mentioned previously, which is the common name of Lý Sơn Islands, This
“Cu Lao Re” here is located outside the great sea gate of Yong An Society, stretch-
ing over 30 dam while Lý Sơn Islands commonly known as Cu Lao Re is over
tens of mu (1 mu is around 0.165 acre) in the hollow land in the middle and is the
place of residence of people in Yongan and Anhai. Thus, this “Cu Lao Re” should
be small islands near Lý Sơn Islands. The so-called great Truong Sa Islands out-
side are Truong Sa scattered in Wailuo Sea. It was then in the name of “Bai Cat
Vang,” which is already discussed earlier. Most merchant boats sailing in the inner
and outer routes berthed here, the cargo of sunken boats ended up here, and the
king of Vietnam often sent people to pick up remains of sunken boats here. Hence
the saying that “in the past, there were many seafood and cargoes from sunken
boats. Hoang Sa fleet was established for salvage purpose.” As for “it takes three
days and nights to arrive [at] Truong Sa,” it is mentioned previously that the “pri-
vate small fishing boats” are so slow in movement that they are still near the
Vietnam coastline after traveling three days and nights, only covering a distance
up to dozens of kilometers. Thus, they could never reach the Xisha Islands, which
lie 200 to 300 kilometers away from the Vietnam coastline.
In Vietnamese historical records, Wailuo Islands are often confused with Hoang
Sa Islands scattered in the Wailuo Sea. According to, for example, Dai Nam Nhat
Thong Chi:
Hoang Sa Islands are in the east of Re Islands, and start from Sa Ky coast,
which can be reached in three or four days and nights downwind. Mountains
stand on the islands, over 130 in total. It takes people one day or more to sail
from one mountain to the other. There are Hoang Sa Zhou among the islands,
expanding for thousands of li, with the popular name of Wangli Changsha.
There are wells of sweet springs on the islands. Sea birds gather here without
fear of people. Sea cucumbers, hawksbills, conchs, turtles and other things
are abundant, and cargo of many sunken boats ended here.22
The first three sentences in the record talk about Hoang Sa Islands in the east of
Wailuo Islands while the next four sentences are the same with Miscellaneous
Records on the Pacification of the Frontiers that both talk about Wailuo Islands. The
phrase “there are Hoang Sa Zhou among the islands” actually talks about Hoang Sa
Zhu, which is a small island of Ye Zi Tang in the north of Wailuo Islands. It is about
30 dam in length, which contradicts the description that “it expands for thousands
of dam” and “commonly known as Wangli Changsha.” It can be seen that Dai Nam
Nhat Thong Chi completely confuses Wailuo Islands with Truong Sa Islands, failing
to distinguish Wailuo Islands from Truong Sa Islands scattered in Wailuo Sea. There
are some other midsleading records in Vietnamese historical books. For example, as
Đại Nam Thực lục Chính biên (Prequel of Vietnam Records) notes:
There are over 130 cays outside An Vinh village of Binh Son subdistrict off
the coast of Quang Ngai district. It takes one day or more to sail from one to
the other. With vast range, it expands for thousands of li, widely known as
Wanli Hoang Sa. There are wells of sweet springs on the cays. And the seal
products of sea cucumbers, hawksbills, conchs, and turtles are abundant.23
This paragraph is similar to the record of Miscellaneous Records on the Pacifica-

tion of the Frontiers, describing the condition of Wailuo Islands. However, “over
130 mountains” is modified as “over 130 cays,” three characters of “Hoang Sa
Zhu” or “Hoang Sa Zhou” are omitted, and “Wangli Changsha” is modified as
“Wanli Hoang Sa.” As the records of Vietnamese historical books contradict each
other, both the White Papers of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam today and
relevant articles written by Vietnam scholars are unable to clarify the real location
of the so-called Hoang Sa or Truong Sa.” Such a confusion leads them to unjusti-
fiably associate the two islands with the Xisha and Nansha Islands of China.
The Vietnamese White Papers also contains Đại Nam nhất thống toàn đồ
(Detailed Map of Dai Nam) (see Figure 5.2), claiming that Hoang Sa and Wangli
Changsha (China’s Xisha and Nansha Islands respectively) are part of Vietnamese
territory despite that the origin and drawer of this map remain an issue of debate.
In A Propos des Iles Paracles published by French navigator P. A. Lapicque in
1929, this map was noted to have been selected from Hoàng Việt địa dư chí (Map
of Huangyue) issued in the 14th year of the reign of Mingming (1834). How-
ever, Vietnamese scholar Vo Long Te overlooked the fact by saying that “emperor
Figure 5.2 Detailed Map of Dai Nam, early 19th century

Source: White Paper by The Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1979)24
Mingming only issued the title of ‘Dai Nam’ in 1838.” Until the beginning of
1839, the title of “Dai Nam” was officially used in national official documents
and national history. Thus, he believes that “this map may be the individual or
collective work of ministers in the National History Department which works on
compiling official history and geography books of the Nguyen Dynasty.” Besides,
he also reveals the origin of this map:
actually, this map is a transcript collected by Mr. Zhu Yucui, who was Direc-
tor of the office of Secretary of State being responsible for cultural affairs
and is the Assistant of Vice Prime Minister and Liaison Man of Parliament
being responsible for [the] national development plan, and he kindly offers
it to us.25
Thus, this map is an unofficial transcript with no definite information of its pro-
duction and producer. Such a map drawn by individuals “can be used to judge
the learning and cultivation of the drawer, but it does not amount to adequate
evidence in law.”26
Vietnam scholars boast that this map was “elaborately and accurately drawn.”
They are also convinced that “Wangli Changsha is located opposite to Fuan and
Qinghe Provinces, and some islands are distributed to the south, being vertical to
Toudun (in the south),” and “Hoang Sa is also an island consisting of many small
islands, located opposite to Dai Cham, Da Nang and Haiyun Mountain (under
jurisdiction of Da Nang of Quảng Nam Province today).”27 In brief, “a long strip
named Great Truong Sa or Bai Cat Vang is drawn in the sea area in front of Quang
Ngai.”28 In fact, the drawing style of this “long strip” is not exclusive to Đại Nam
nhất thống toàn đồ. For example, a glance at the map in The Voyage of Captain
John Saris to Japan written by British Captain John Saris in 1613 shows that the
“long strips” are drawn exactly the same way in terms of location and shape. On
the map, Pulou Cham is marked above this “long strip,” Pulou Canton is marked
in the middle, and Polou Cambir is marked below. Thus, this long strip (Hoang Sa
and Wangli Changsha in Dai Nam Yi Tong Quan Tu) includes Cham Islands, Pulo
Canton and Pulou Gambir, which are some small islands and cays distributed in
Wailuo Sea along the direction parallel to the central coastline of Vietnam.
In his The Voyage of Captain John Saris to Japan, John Saris described his
offshore navigation experience in central coastal area of Vietnam and noticed
that there was the Les Lunettes between 16°N and 17°N latitude and between
129°30′E and 130°43′E longitude of Happiness Islands, which are the Xisha
Islands of China. Happiness Islands are Canany Islands in the northwest of Africa
today, located at approximately longitude 18°W. At that time, westerners calcu-
lated longitude with such degree as the meridian line. The longitude above is
roughly between 111°30′E and 112°42′E of Greenwich today. He also noted that
in the southwest of Les Lunettes, there was the old Pracel lying between 128°E
and 129°E longitude and between 16°30′N and 12°N latitude of Happiness Islands
(between 110°E and 111°E longitude of Greenwich today). Its shape is like a foot,
with its thumb pointing to the southwest.29 The so-called old Pracel with the shape
of foot are the long strip with the name of Hoang Sa and Wangli Changsha in the
sea area in front of Quang Ngai, which are drawn in Đại Nam nhất thống toàn đồ.
Specifically, while the Xisha Islands of China, which are located between 15°47′N
and 17°08′N latitude and between 111°10′E and 112°55′E longitude respectively,
the long strip is located between 12°N and 16°30′N latitude and 110°E and 111°E
longitude. The two are totally not the same thing.
5.3 Cat Vang is the coastal “long strip” in central coastal

area of Vietnam
The location and range of Pracel recorded in Western history books change over
time. Before the 1820s, they often call the “long strip” consisting of some small
islands and cays in Wailuo Sea, which are parallel to the central coastline of Viet-
nam, as “Pracel.” It was not until 1817 when British Captains Ross and Moham
investigated Hainan Island and the Xisha Islands of China that the western history
books began to extend the range of “Pracel” and include in it the Xisha Islands of
China. Since the second half of the 19th century, the word “Pracel” was used to
refer to the Xisha Islands of China.30 The changing nature related to the location
and area that the word “Pracel” associates with provides Vietnam with a good
pretext under which the earlier Pracel before the 1820s is confused with the later
Pracel. Such an attempt to confuse the Xisha and Nansha Islands of China with
Hoang Sa and Truong Sa is certainly unfounded. Again, we aim to pinpoint the
exact location of two Vietnamese islands by looking into relevant records in some
Western history books.
The Vietnamese White Papers kept quoting an article written by a French mis-
sionary named Jean Louis Taberd. The article titled “Note on the Geography of
Cochin-China” was published in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal in
1837. According to the article:
Pracel or Paracel is a maze consisting of a group of small islands, rocks

and sand beaches, extending to 11°N latitude and 107°E longitude calculat-
ing from Paris (109°10′E longitude of Greenwich today). Some navigators
have bravely crossed some cays. They are lucky rather than cautious. But
some other people failed. Cochin-China people call these islands Cotuang.
Although there is nothing but rocks and deep sea, causing no advantage but
inconvenience, Emperor Jialong believed that even the smallest land can
expand his territory. In 1816, he solemnly plugged a flag there and occupied
these rocks. I’m afraid that nobody will raise an objection.31
It can be learned from Taberd’s words that this “Pracel” situated at 11°N latitude
and 109°10′E longitude obviously refers to some islands not far from the central
coastline of Vietnam. Cochin-Chinese people call them Cotuang. The Vietnamese
authorities, perhaps not without intention, mistranslated the word “Cotuang” and
confused it with Hoang Sa. In the White Paper published by the Vietnamese Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs in May 1975, this word was translated as “Jin Sa”; and in
the White Book by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
published on January 18, 1982, the same word was translated as “Cat Vang.”32 It
is clear that Vietnamese authorities kept changing the meaning to accommodate
its need. Actually, the island called Cotuang is likely to be Pulou Ceeir Terre,
according to the longitude and latitude marked by Taberd. It is located at 11°14′N
latitude and 108°49′E longitude, with the height of 85 feet (25.9 meters). It is
located about 8 nautical miles in the northeast of Lagan point. There are rocks and
barren lands everywhere on the islands, with only some grasses on the flat part.
Rocks are around the islands, both on the water and under water.33 These situa-
tions of Pulou Ceeir Terre are basically in line with Taberd’s description so that
those rocks occupied by Emperor Jialong in 1816 may be Pulou Ceeir Terre, not
far from Vietnam’s coastline. This argument can also be confirmed in an article
titled “Tales of Cochin-China” written by Frenchman Jean Baptiste Chaigneau in
1820. As the author wrote:
The king of Cochin-China is called Emperor now. It includes the mainland

of Cochin-China, Tokyo, part of Cambodia, some inhabited islands not far
from the coastline, and Pracel Islands consisting of many small uninhabited
islands, shoals and rocks. The Emperor occupied such islands until 1816.34
The situation of “Pracel” is explained here that it consists of some small

islands, shoals and rocks not far from Vietnam’s coastline. And it is just some
small islands, shoals and rocks, including Pulou Ceeir Terre, not far from Viet-
nam’s coastline that Emperor Jialong occupied at that time.
In regard to the specific location of “Pracel,” one can also refer to a map
attached to Latin – Dictionary of Annam Language published by Bishop Taberd
in 1938. The map is named as Annam Da Guo Hua Tu (Map of Annam). Some
islands are drawn in the south sea between N. lat. 11° and 17° and between E.
long. 109°and 110° on the map. The names of these islands are:
普拉塞尔(Paracel), 即 (Seu) 葛鐄 (Cat Vang)

In the coastal areas of Annam opposite to the islands, the place names on the
map are:
顺化 (Hue)
瀚海门，即沱·海港 (Cua Han Seu Touron Portus)
山茶岛，即沱·的山茶半岛 (Hon Son Cha)
大占海口 (Cua Dai Nai Cham)
劬劳占 (Cu Lao Cham)
沙圻 (Sa Ky)
劬劳哩，即广东群岛 (Cu Lao Re Seu Pulo Canton)
大广义海口 (Cua Dai Quang Ngai)
广义营 (Dinh Quanh Ngai)35
It can be inferred from the location of Paracel marked as Cat Vang that it is
indeed located in the sea not far from the central coastal area of Vietnam, and
distributed along the direction parallel to the central coastline of Vietnam. The
range starts from the sea opposite to Hue and ends in Dinh Quanh Ngai. This
“Paracel” is definitely different from “Pracel” exclusively used to refer to the
Xisha Islands of China later. The Xisha Islands of China are located at 15°42′–
17°08′ north latitude and 111°10′–112°55′ east longititude, other than arranged
vertically. Even Vietnam scholars are called to recognize the fact that Western
maps at that time drew “Paracel” in the sea near central Vietnam: “in European
maps at that time, when they drew Paracel, they drew a long sand beach in front
of the central territorial waters of Vietnam.”36
In the 1710s, British Captain Alexander Hamilton described the location of this
“Pracel” more specifically. He noted:
There are several islands on this coast. Those nearest the shore are not dan-
gerous. Pulio-secca de Terra, lies most southerly, and nearest the shore.
It is uninhabited, and looks only like a parcel of scorched rocks, without
either tree, bush, or graft to be seen on it. I passed within a mile of it, and it
lies about a mile from the shore. Pullo-secca de Mare, and all the chain of
islands that stretched from the dangerous shallows of Paracel, are rather to
be accounted rocks than islands. Pullo-cambir lies about 15 leagues off the
shore, near the Paracels. It is uninhabited though pretty large. Pullo-canton
lies near the shore, and so do the islands of Champello, but there are no dan-
gers lie off from them. There are strong currents that run to the southward
in the northeast monsoons, which makes pilots take care to keep near the
Couchin-China coast, for fear of being driven among the Paracels, which are
a dangerous chain of rocks, about 130 leagues long, and about 15 broad, and
have only some islands at each end.37
According to Hamilton, “Pracel” here is obviously located in the sea not far
from Vietnam’s coast. It is near and parallel to some islands in the central coastal
area of Vietnam, such as Campello, Pullo-canton, Pullo-cambir, Pullo-secca de
Mare and Pullo-secca de Terra. Boats can only sail between them. In a nutshell,
this “Pracel” has no association with the Xisha Islands of China at all.
In conclusion, it can therefore be inferred that the White Papers published by
Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs have confused Hoang Sa and Truong Sa
with Xisha and Nansha Islands of China on three aspects: first, distortion of the
original meaning of historical records. For example, the note of “Map of Quang
Ngai” in Book of the Collection of Four Routes in the South clearly states that “Tru-
ong Sa” – also called “Bai Cat Vang” – is located between Cham Sea Gate and Sha-
rong, which is one day and a half voyage away from Cham Gate and half a day’s
voyage away from Sahqi Gate. While it is obvious that this “Truong Sa” refers to
some islands scattered in the central coastal area of Vietnam, some Vietnamese
scholars arbitrarily confused Hoang Sa with Xisha, arguing that “Bai Cat Vang” is
the Vietnamese character “Zi Nan” before Latinization. Without sound justifica-
tion, they associated the latter with “Hoang Sa,” which is how they call the Xisha
Islands of China today. Such practice of distorting historical facts is undoubtedly
clumsy and doomed to fail. Secondly, different places were put under the same
name on the map. For example, Dai Nam Yi Tong Quan Tu calls the “long strip” in
the central coastal area of Vietnam as Hoang Sa and Wangli Changsha, and some
Vietnam scholars linked these two places with “Huangsha” and “Changsha” (the
way they call the Xisha and Nansha Islands of China today). They argued strongly
that the map is “elaborate and accurate” as if they had grasped some “concrete
evidence.” However, the current examination has shown that this long strip is not
connected with the Xisha and Nansha Islands of China in terms of its shape, longi-
tude and latitude. Thirdly, locations and area of the same place name may change
over time, which is largely abused by Vietnam in their favor. For example, “Pracel”
in western history books usually refers to the “long strip” in the central coastal area
of Vietnam before the 1820s. After that, its geographical reach extended north-
ward to include the Xisha Islands of China. And it was exclusively used to refer
to the Xisha Islands of China since the second half of the 19th century. Surpris-
ingly, some Vietnamese scholars seem to have ignored such basic facts. As a con-
sequence, they misinterpreted a large amount of the historical resources related to
“Pracel,” particularly those in Western history books before the 1820s. The fact,
as our examination demonstrates, is that Hoang Sa and Truong Sa of Vietnam can
only be found among islands in the central coastal area of Vietnam and are in no
way associated with the Xisha and Nansha Islands of China.
Notes
1 Vo, L.T. (1975). On the Origin of the Names of the Paracel and Spratly Archipelagos
(in Vietnamese). History and Geography Periodical, no. 29.
2 Tao, W. (1973). Territory of Vietnam in Successive Dynasties. Beijing: The Commer-
cial Press, p. 11.
3 Maspero, H. (1940). Le Protectorat general d’Annam sous les Tang (in Chinese). Bei-
jing: The Commercial Press, p. 62.
4 Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (1979). Vietnam’s Sovereignty Over
the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes. Hanoi.
5 Dashan, C. (1960). A Report of My Journey Abroad, Volume 3 and 4. New Historical
Materials of Quảng Nam in the 17th Century. Taipei: Chinese Book Committee.
6 Pelliot, P. (1955). Textual Research on Nautical Routes from Jiaozhi and Canton to
India (in Chinese). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, p. 52.
7 Huang, Z. (1975). Hai Yu (Words of the Sea).Taipei: Student Book Company.
8 Dashan, C. (1960). A Report of My Journey Abroad, Volume 3. New Historical Materi-
als of Quảng Nam in the 17th Century. Taipei: Chinese Book Committee.
10 Cai, T. (1959). Works about Hainan. Taiwan Literature Collection, No. 42.
12 Dashan, C. (1960). A Report of My Journey Abroad, Volume 4. New Historical Materi-
als of Quảng Nam in the 17th Century. Reprint. Taipei: Chinese Book Committee.
13 Wei, Y. (1852). Collection of Texts on Geography from the Xiao fang hu Studio, Vol. 10.
14 (1941). Dai Nam Nhat Thong Chi (Gazetteer of Greater Vietnam), Vol. 6, Quang Ngai.
Tokyo: Society of Indo-China Studies.
16 Le. Q.D. (1776). Miscellaneous Records on the Pacification of the Frontiers, Vol. 2.
18 (1941). Dai Nam Nhat Thong Chi (Gazetteer of Greater Vietnam), Vol. 6, Quang Ngai.
Tokyo: Society of Indo-China Studies.
19 Sheng, Q. (Qing). Illustrated Geography of Vietnam, Vol. 1, Quang Ngai Province,
renewed version in the 19th year of the Guangxu era.
20 Zhang, L. (1947). Dong xi yang kao zhong zhi zhen lu (Studies on the Courses in the
Eastern and Western Seas). Singapore: Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associa-
tions, p 16.
22 Quoc Su Quan Trieu Nguyen. (1941). Đại Nam Nhất Thống Chí (Gazetteer of Greater
Vietnam), Vol. 6, Quang Ngai. Tokyo: Society of Indo-China Studies.
23 (1848). Đại Nam Thực lục Chính biên (The Main Chapter of the Chronicles of Đại
Nam), Vol. 10.
24 See www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08C01297R000300180007-5.
pdf (accessed April 20, 2020).
26 Sun, D. (1979). Materials of Diaoyutai Islands Published in Ming Pao Monthly. Hong
Kong: Ming Pao Publications, p 116.
27 Nguyễn, Q.T. (1988). Hoang Sa Trương Sa (Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands). Ho
Chi Minh City: Youth Publishing House.
28 Hoang, X.H. (1978). The Paracel Archipelago. In Han Nguyen (Ed.), Special Issues on
Hoang Sa and Truong Sa of History and Geography Periodical, no. 29 (in Chinese).
Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, p. 11.
30 Ibid., pp. 76–77.
31 Louis, J. (1837). Note in the Geography of Coch in China. JRASB, p. 745.
Sea Islands (in Chinese). Beijing: Oriental Press, pp. 13, 75.
33 China Sea Pilot, London, 1938, Vol. 1, p. 222.
34 Hãn, N. (Ed.). (1978). Special Issues on Hoang Sa and Truong Sa of History and
Geography Periodical, no. 29 (in Chinese). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company,
pp. 214–215.
35 Ibid., p. 226.
36 Hoàng, X.H. (1978). The Paracel Archipelago. In Hãn Nguyên (Ed.), Special Issues on
Hoang Sa and Truong Sa of History and Geography Periodical, no. 29 (in Chinese).
37 Hamilton, A. (1811). A New Account of the East Indies. In John Pinkerton (Ed.), A
General Collection in the Best and Most Interesting Voyages and Travels in all Parts
of the World, Vol. VIII. London, p. 482.
6 China’s development and
administration of Xisha and
Nansha Islands
China’s Nansha Islands abound in offshore oil reserves. There had been no ter-
ritorial or maritime delimitation disputes in the region until the 1970s, when a
few Southeast Asian countries started to invade and occupy some reefs of China’s
Nansha Islands, disguising their illegal actions by claiming them as terra nullius.
Carlos P. Romulo, the then Philippine Foreign Secretary, claimed that the occu-
pation of these reefs were justified as they belong to nobody.1 As a rebuttal of
such remarks, this chapter presents new evidence indicative of China’s long-time
development and administration over the Xisha and Nansha Islands.
6.1 Archaeological sites and relics on Xisha

and Nansha Islands
Maritime trade between China and Southeast Asia and India began as early as the
2nd century BCE during Emperor Wu’s reign of the Han (206–220 BCE). Ships at
that time started from Rinan frontier fortress (then southernmost border of China)
or Xuwen or Hepu in the Leizhou Peninsula and sailed across Cochinchine, Siam
(ancient Thailand) and Myanmar before reaching Conjeeveram in east India. On
their return voyage, the fleet traveled through the Indian Ocean along the east coast
of India to Sumatra, and then crossed the Vietnamese China Sea (today’s South
China Sea) to the destination, Xianglin County of Rinan Prefecture. Such frequent
sea voyages enabled Chinese seafarers to first discover and recognize maritime
features of Xisha and Nansha in the South China Sea that fall in the center of the
sea-lane of communications (SLOCs). During the Three Kingdoms Period (220–
280), Kang Tai, military officer in charge of the security of the royal palace and Zhu
Ying, officer in charge of publicity and education, were dispatched by Sun Quan,
King of Wu, on a diplomatic mission to Funan (today’s Cambodia) via the South
China Sea in 226 and 231 respectively. Funan Zhuan (Records of Funan) written
by Kang Tai after his return was a detailed account of their experience as envoys. In
the book, Kang described the island features in the South China Sea: “In Zhanghai
(today’s South China Sea), stood ‘shanhuzhou’ (literally ‘coral reefs and islands’),
below which were rocks where corals grew.”2 It indicates that Chinese people then
had had a certain understanding of the composition of Xisha and Nansha. Besides,
Pei Yuan of the Jin Dynasty (265–420) described in his Guangzhou Ji (Records of
Development and administration of the islands 77
Guangzhou): “Shizhou, in the sea, called Huangshan Ma (literally Mountain). In
the north of the mountain, tide rose once a day while in the south, twice a day.”3
Taiping Dao (Itu Aba Island), the largest feature of Nanhai, was called “Huangshan
Ma or Ling” by Hainanese fishermen, as in local dialect, “Ling” was pronounced
as “Ma,” like “Tong-gu Ling” in Wenchang was also known as “Tong-gu Ma.” On
Nanwei Dao (Spratly Island) to the southwest of Taiping Dao, there is only one tide
in 24 hours, i.e. “single day tide.” All these records show that the Chinese at the
time not only had named main features of Nansha, but also had a profound grasp
of the tide conditions of other islands in the region.
As their understanding of Xisha and Nansha deepened, Chinese people began
to move to the small coral islands, where they then explored and administered,
leaving many sites and relics behind. Among those islands, Ganquan Dao (Rob-
ert Island)of Xisha was a quite livable place with freshwater wells on the island,
where a living site from the Tang (618–907) and Song (960–1279) Dynasties was
found by archaeologists in 1975. Located on the inward-tilted slope of the island,
the ruin enjoyed high elevation and good ventilation. Its stratigraphic accumula-
tion was 35–90 centimeters, where two batches of relics were unearthed, includ-
ing 107 pieces of celadon glazed ceramic wares of the Tang and Song Dynasties,
five pieces of iron knives and chisels, a broken iron pot, many gannet bones,
various conch and clam shells and coal ash left by residents’ cooking at the time.4
Similar residential ruins were also discovered on Taiping Dao. In May 1993,
Wang Hengjie, a professor and archaeologist from Minzu University of China,
discovered a series of residential sites dating back to the Ming and Qing dynasties
on Bei Dao (North Island) of Xisha. These sites, the most functional residential
sites found in the region so far, were sheltered by an awning, with most of doors
south-faced to bring in breeze and ward off a northeaster.5 The discovery of these
sites and relics shows that Chinese people have lived and engaged in production
activities in Xisha and Nansha islands since at least the Tang Dynasty.
Chinese ancestors who lived in Xisha and Nansha islands brought most of their
necessities from China’s mainland, including copper coins cast in various dynas-
ties, many of which were unearthed later on. For instance, five pieces of large
blue-and-white ceramic dishes with colored decoration of the Kangxiera (1662–
1722) were excavated on Yongxing Dao (Woody Island). Measuring around 60
centimeters in caliber, 20 centimeters in bottom diameter, and 0.6–1.4 centimeters
in thickness, the fine and white porcelain dish was a typical product of a Jiangxi
Jingdezhen folk kiln. In addition, in the coral sand on Jinyin Dao (Money Island),
three stacked blue-and-white ceramic dishes with dragon decorations of the early
Qing Dynasty (1616–1912) were dug up. They were all well rounded, with a cali-
ber diameter of 20.2 centimeters, a height of 4 centimeters and a bottom diameter
of 13.5 centimeters. Featured with a white, hard body, the celadon-glazed white
porcelains were also made in Jingdezhen during the reign of Kangxi and Yong-
zheng (1722–1735) of the Qing. These dishes did not have any trace of seawater
immersion; thus, they were highly likely the belongings of Chinese ancestors who
lived on the island at the time.6 Except for ceramics, the discovery of copper
coins was more common. In 1920, some copper coins used in different Chinese
dynasties were excavated with explosives by Japanese fishermen on coral reefs of
Xisha, among which Wang Mang Qian (coins issued by the Xin Dynasty [9–23])
was the oldest with the lowest abundance while Yongle Tongbao (coins issued
by Emperor Zhu Di of the Ming Dynasty [1402–1424]), the latest in the largest
quantity.7 In 1947, Professor Wang Guangwei, a representative of Compilation
Committee for Xisha and Nansha Islands of Guangdong Province, discovered
16 pieces of ancient coins used in various dynasties, including Kaiyuan Tongbao
(cast in 621–975), Huangsong Tongbao (cast in 1039–1053), Hongwu Tongbao
(cast in 1368–1409) and Yongle Tongbao under coral rocks on Shi Dao (Rocky
Island).8 They were all relics left behind by Chinese residents who used to live
on the island.
Chinese merchant ships and fishing boats traveled frequently to and from Xisha
and Nansha islands, some of which unfortunately sank during the voyage, leav-
ing the wreckage and a large number of loaded relics under water. In 1974, fish-
ermen from Qionghai County of Hainan Island discovered on Bei Jiao (North
Reef) of Xisha a Ming Dynasty shipwreck in which they salvaged 403.2 kilo-
grams of copper coins dating from the Han Dynasty through the Ming Dynasty
(1st–17th century) as well as other cultural relics such as copper ingots, bronze
mirrors, bronze sword pins and lead blocks, etc. Some copper coins were stuck to
coral rocks due to the prolonged immersion in the sea, although most words on
them were still discernible. After sorting them out, archaeologists ended up with
149 kilograms (49,684 pieces) of Yongle Tongbao (copper coins) of the Ming,
and 148.5 kilograms (31,022 pieces) of 78 kinds of coins from various dynas-
ties, including the Xin (9–23), Eastern Han(25–220), Western Wei (535–556),
Tang, Former Shu (907–925), Southern Tang (937–975), Later Shu (934–965),
Northern Song, Southern Song (1127–1279), Liao (907–1125), Jin (1115–1234),
Yuan (1271–1368) and Ming Dynasties. There were more than 300 types of coins
with different currency value, chirographic style and decoration.9 Besides, archae-
ologists excavated relics of ancient wrecks on Jinqing Dao (Drummond Island),
Guangjin Dao (Palm Island), Yongxing Dao and Jinyin Dao, among which ceram-
ics of different periods were the most common, from Sui (581–618) through Qing
(except the Southern Dynasty) to the modern times, and they were all produced
in kilns in Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Fujian, Hunan and Guangdong provinces of China.
The location of the relics, the northern, eastern or western sides of reefs, indicated
that most of the wrecks were boats sailing from the southeastern coast of China
to Xisha Islands. Meanwhile, archaeologists also discovered a number of stone
carving relics such as stone lions, stone pillars, stone bearings, stone mills and
stone donor utensils on the reefs. They were all engraved with distinctive Chinese
characteristics in a traditional craft. It is noteworthy that based on its texture and
workmanship, the Song Dynasty inkstone was regarded as a stationery for inter-
nal use on board, an extra piece of evidence showing that it is the wreckage of an
ancient Chinese ship.10
From July 9 to 19 in 1994, Chinese archaeologists discovered a batch of histori-
cal relics on Shi Dao and Bei Dao of Xisha. Unearthed on Shi Dao were embossing
hard potteries of the Qin and Han dynasties, ceramics of the Tang Dynasty, remnant
tiles of the Yuan Dynasty, pottery shards made during the Ming and Qing Dynas-
ties, and Wuzhu Qian made of the Western Han Dynasty. On Bei Dao, similar relics
were found, including plain hard potteries of the Han, caramel glazed ceramic frag-
ments of the Tang, blue-and-white porcelain bowl remnants of the Song, porcelain
fragments of the Yuan, and blue-and-white porcelain of the Ming. The ceramics
unearthed there were either manufactured in official or folk kilns and their process-
ing methods vary from one to another. However, they were all proven to be made
in mainland China and left behind by their users, namely Chinese ancestors who
lived in the South China Sea. The excavation of such cultural relics of the Qin and
Han dynasties found on Xisha and Nansha are by no means accidental; instead,
they demonstrate that the records of the South China Sea during the Qin and Han
Dynasties are not fictitious and that the Chinese ancestors’ activities in the South
China Sea are far more frequent and extensive than have ever been imagined.11
The sites and relics discovered on Xisha and Nansha are true evidence that Chi-
nese people first conducted development and administration on them. Some schol-
ars argued that these archaeological discoveries were “published at the end of 1974
after China’s defeat on the South Vietnamese Army that had occupied Xisha.”12
However, the key point here is that the relics were left behind by the Chinese
through their longtime activities in the South China Sea, and that their authenticity
should not be affected by the time and place of their discoveries. These discoveries,
together with the Chinese historical records, fully justify that fact Chinese people
are the earliest developers and administrators of Xisha and Nansha Islands.
6.2 Ancient temple ruins preserved on Xisha

and Nansha Islands
While developing Xisha and Nansha, Chinese people also brought traditional
Chinese culture over there, especially the worship for the popular folk goddess
Haitian Shenfei (Mazu) and Tu Di Shen (God of the Soil and the Ground). Fisher-
men would build a temple first every time they had set foot on a new island. It is
said that those who first built a temple on an island would be most respected, and
earned the privilege to catch turtles and pick shells. The temple acted as the sym-
bol and commemoration of their maiden voyage to the island.13 These temples
were small and simple in structure. Some were made from bricks and tiles trans-
ported from the mainland, but most of them were piled up with local materials like
coral rocks. Wang Anqing, a fisherman of Dongjiao Township, Wenchang County,
Hainan Island, talked about his experience in 1977:
In Nansha, every island people had lived on had a temple. There were coral-
made temples built by our ancestors on Tie Zhi (Zhongye Dao or Thitu
Island), Hongcao (Xiyue Dao or West York Island), Huangshan Ma (Taip-
ing Dao), Nainuo (Nanzi Dao or Southwest Cay), Luokong (Mahuan Dao or
Nanshan Island), Disan (Nanyue Dao or Loaita Island), Niaozi Zhi (Nanwei
Dao or Spratly Island) and among others. Fishermen often went to temples to
pray for peace and prosperity once they reached an island.14
These temples can be generalized into three types as follows.
The first is Niangniang Miao or Tianfei Miao, namely Mazu Temple, which
usually houses a holy statue. For example, in the temple on the northwest cor-
ner of Chenhang Dao(Duncan Island) of Xisha, there was a statue of Guanyin
(Avalokitesvara) made by the Longquan kiln of the Ming Dynasty and a pair
of blue-and-white ceramic vases of the modern times. Guanyin held akalasa in
both hands, and the paste on her hands and face had worn off. The goddess statue
was called “Sanjiao Po” (literally “woman”) by the name of the island, as fisher-
men called Chenhuang Dao “Sanjiao Dao.” Similarly, the statue in the temple
on Yongxing Dao was called “Mao Zhu Niangniang” by locals as they named
Yongxing Dao as “Mao Dao” or “Mao Zhu.”15 “Mao Zhu Niang-niang” is Mazu
(Chinese sea goddess) on Yongxing Dao. It is said that when fishermen were in
danger at sea, they would recite a Mazu mantra to pray for safety. Also, local leg-
end has it that 108 Hainanese fishermen in the Ming Dynasty lost their lives on
their way back to Xisha and Nansha after fishing. Later on, when fishermen were
hit by strong winds during their voyages, they would pray to the souls of the 108
fishermen for safety, and build temples on the island once they arrived.16 It can
thus be seen that Mazu, along with the 108 late fishermen, became the common
guardian for people living on the island.
The second type is Tudimiao (Temple for God of the Soil). On both Taiping
Dao and Zhongye Dao of Nansha Islands, there was such a temple made of sev-
eral large slabs, about 1 meter high and 0.75 meters wide, and with a stone status
of Tudishen (God of the Soil) sitting in the middle. Despite the erosion of wind
and rain over the years, the statue was discernible in shape. The same kind of
temple was also seen on other islands like Nanwei, Nanyue and Xiyue. The one on
the west side of Nanwei Dao was about 3.33 meters high, with an incense burner
inside but no god statue; a stone-built Tudimiao on Nanyue Dao also worshiped
a stone statue of Tudishen, with a set of coarse ceramic-made tableware that con-
sisted of two wine cups, four rice bowls and a wine pot; another stone-framed
temple on the coast of Xiyue Dao was in serious disrepair, thus the inscriptions
on it were illegible.17 In the jungle on the central part of Hongxiu Dao (Namyit
Island), a Tudimiao worshiped a god statue, with an incense burner inside and a
couple of couplets on both sides of its door, characters on which were still vaguely
discernible. The temple was even visited by Kuomingtang inspectors when they
inspected the island in April 1949.18 The worship form of these Tudimiao was the
same as that of those in the mainland. A plaque written four with Chinese charac-
ters, “You Qiu Bi Ying” (every prayer works), hung on the gate of the temple on
Taiping Dao which were no doubt the relics left behind by the Chinese ancestors
who once lived there.
The third type is Guhun Miao (Lonely Soul Temple), also known as Xiongdi-
gong (Brotherhood Temple). On Yongxing Dao of Xisha, there was a Guhun Miao
built by fishermen of Wenchang, in the style similar to that of those in Chinese
mainland. It was only between 1 and 1.33 meters high, with a pair of couplets on
both sides, which reads “xiong-di-gan-ling-ying” (Brothers are blessed by Mazu)
on the right and “gu-hun-de-en-shen” (Lonely souls receive grace from Mazu) on
the left. In the middle hangs a wooden plaque across which reads “hai-bu-yang-
bo” (No storms on the sea). According to local customs, anyone who set foot on
Yongxing Dao must first go to pray in that temple. The same type of temple was
also found on Bei Dao, Nan Dao (South Island), Zhaoshu Dao (Tree Island), Hewu
Dao, Jinqing Dao, Chenhang Dao, Guangjin Dao, Shanhu Dao (Pattle Island) and
Ganquan Dao and other islands of Xisha. On the gate of a temple on the southwest
corner of Hewu Dao, there was a couple of couplets, “qian-xiang-shuang-fan-
gu-hun-miao, miao-hou-yi-jing-xiong-di-an” (The Lonely Soul Temple faces the
sea, and a well behind it blesses the fishermen). The couplets were written by Mo
Jinglin, a fisherman of Tanmen Port, more than 60 years ago. There were two
wooden god tablets in a temple on Bei Dao, with blurred text on that was clear to
read more than 30 years ago, according to a local fisherman.19
The ruins of these ancient temples in Xisha and Nansha suggest that the reli-
gious beliefs from the Chinese mainland were also extensively practiced in the
South China Sea. They are strong testament to the fact that Chinese people had
developed and managed these islands long before others came. Archaeological
research shows that some of these ancient temples were built in the Ming Dynasty,
while most of them were built in the Qing Dynasty. Meng Quanzhou was an old
fisherman of Wenchang County, Hainan Island, whose family had lived in fisher-
ies since his great-grandfather for more than 200 years. Meng recalled that when
he was 15 years old (1895), he went fishing with his grandfather in Xisha and saw
his grandfather making sacrifices in the ancient temples on Bei Dao and Yongx-
ing Dao, where he was told that the temples were all left by ancient Chinese.20
One generation after another, these ancient temples were not only sites of worship
for local fishermen, but clear evidence that the islands have for long been part of
Chinese territory.
One of the main legal principles Vietnam held to claim sovereignty over
some maritime features in the South China Sea was their historical possession.
Destroying original ancient Chinese temples and building new ones, Vietnamese
authorities made up their own evidence of relics. In 1932, during the French’s
occupation over Yongxing Dao of Xisha, the Vietnamese built a Huangsha
(Sand) Temple and an Annam Tomb on the north side of the island. The style of
the temple was identical to that of the Guhunmiao built by Chinese fishermen
on the opposite side of the island, with a pair of hardly comprehensible Chinese
couplets stuck to its door: “Chun-ye-you-qing-hai-shen-xifeng-yu-nong-yue,
re-d-qi-yi-chun-feng-he-qi- niao-feng-lin” (Fish in the sea play in the reflection
of the moon, birds return to the forest in the spring breeze). Below is the inscrip-
tion that reads “Da-nan-huang-di-bao-da-shi-si-nian-san-yue-chu-yi-ri” (the first
day of March in the 14th year of Emperor Danan).21 Such artificial relics were
meant to support the record of the Vietnamese Emperor who sent people to build
the Huangsha Temple on Huangsha Island in the 16th year of Mingming (1835).
However, the date was mistakenly written as “the 14th year of Baoda (1939),”
which was more than a century later. Moreover, the “Huangsha Island” (Cat
Vang) occupied by Emperor Jialong was Wailuo Mountain (Culao Ray) off the
central coast of Vietnam today, which has no relevance to Xisha Islands of China.
The remains of Huangsha Temple should be somewhere near the Wailuo
Mountain.
Another alternative the Vietnamese authorities tried was to make ill-founded
claims over the god statues in the ancient temples, such as the 1.5-meter-high
stone statue of Tianfei Niangnian Gong on Shanhu Dao of Xisha. During the Japa-
nese occupation, there was no temple on the island except a bamboo fence around
the statue set by local fishermen. However, a Niangniang Miao (Goddess Temple)
was built there between 1947 and 1948 after Japan’s defeat. Measuring 6 meters
long, 4 meters wide and 3 meters high, it looked like a flat-top box, with only one
door facing the sea. Later on, the island was encroached by France and guarded
by some Vietnamese soldiers of the French colonial government. However, they
were afraid of facing up to the statue when they entered the temple to pray. The
stone statue on Shanhu Dao was said to be a relic on a merchant ship sailing from
Chaozhou, Guangdong, to Nanyang (an old name for the Malay Archipelago, the
Malay Peninsula and Indonesia or for Southeast Asia), which sank in the waters
near the island more than a century ago. The wreckage was salvaged from the sur-
rounding sea areas by fishermen of Tanmen Port in the 1920s, including the statue
claimed by the Vietnamese.22 To validate their claim, the Vietnamese authorities
made up quite a few theories, such as “it’s a statue of the Cham that was to be sent
to Dai Namg Museum at the first place, but the French later decided to leave it
on the island”;23 “it might have been built by Vietnamese fishermen”24 and “it’s
similar to the Buddha statue on the Marble Mountain near Dai Namg Port. People
familiar with the situation said that this Niangniang was identical to the one on
Fuguo Island (Phu Quoc).”25 Some of them are even self-conflicting. In fact, it
is nothing unusual about the similarity of the stone statues’ appearance as Mazu
beliefs of China have been widely spread all over the world. Statistics show that
some 1,561 Mazu temples have been built in more than 20 countries and regions
including Hong Kong, Macao, Japan, DPRK, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia,
Myanmar, Brunei, Singapore and Argentina, etc.26 Even if the statue on Shanhu
Daodoes look like those somewhere in Vietnam, which could be the result of the
introduction of Chinese sculpture art of Tianfei Niangniang into Vietnam. The
reason why the Vietnamese made up a story with fabricated evidence was that
they believed Shanhu Dao could naturally be recognized as parts of Cham’s ter-
ritory if the statue was taken as Cham’s. “As the Cham’s territory is incorporated
into the territory of Vietnam, the Vietnamese have naturally become its succes-
sor.”27 Of course, Vietnam’s attempt to obtain sovereignty of the island through
the forgery of cultural relics has been never successful.
However, the Vietnamese endeavor as such indeed shows that the crucial role
these temples play in supporting their claims over Xisha and Nansha. As early
as 1907, Japanese businessman Nishizawa Yoji seized China’s Dongsha Islands
(the Pratas Islands) in the guise of expedition. To safeguard China’s sovereignty,
the Chinese government made representations to the Japanese Consulate in
Guangdong to reaffirm China’s sovereignty over Dongsha by presenting suffi-
cient evidence. Among others, two pieces were about the ancient temple relics
on the islands. One was the report written by Huang Zhongying, captain of the
warship Feiying, who was dispatched by Sa Zhenbing, Guangdong provincial
commander-in-chief. According to the report, old Tianhoumiao (Mazu temple),
built by Chinese fishermen on the islands, were destroyed by Nishizawa upon
his arrival in order to erase traces of Chinese residence. The other was the report
submitted to the Chinese government by Chinese fisherman Liang Yingyuan. In
it is the lines stating that:
In the 32nd year of Guangxu’s reign (1906), a group of Japanese came to

the island and destroyed a local-fishermen-built Dawangmiao (The King’s
Temple), which faced southeast, with three coconut palms behind it. The Jap-
anese have now excavated a pool there for tortoise farming. There was food
and necessities prepared for the arrival of ships near the temple, but nothing
is left now.
Confronted with strong evidence, the Japanese consul had to recognize Dong-
sha Islands as Chinese territory.28 Taking this case as an example, remains of god-
dess temples in Xisha and Nansha are witnesses to the long-standing operations
on them by the Hainanese fishermen. These islands and reefs have for long been
part of Chinese territory and are by no means terra nullius.
6.3 Production activities of Chinese fishermen in Xisha

and Nansha Islands
Chinese fishermen of Hainan Island sailed in groups to Nansha during the fish-
ing season from November to April. They often docked at Taiping Dao, a tradi-
tional resting place, to replenish freshwater and do some repairs to their ships.
They have been relying on the resources of this archipelago since their ances-
tors first came and were able to easily locate the 12 freshwater supplies on the
island. Besides, other remains of Chinese fishermen’s production activities were
left behind in the region. At the western end of Zhongye Dao, several huts were
found between the 1950s and 1960s. Their constructions were the same as that
of those in Chinese mainland, structured with bamboo rafters and a roof made of
broad leaves and soft grass. Traces of human activity inside were probably left
by fishermen who took a nap there. About 12 meters east of the hut, there was
a well with its form and depth similar to that of those on Taiping Dao. The well
water was clear and fresh, with a supply capacity for 30 to 50 people.29 In 1933,
when French colonists illegally occupied the Nine Islets of Nansha Islands, they
found on Taiping Dao a small house made of leaves, a neatly cultivated sweet
potato field and a small temple where there was a teapot for religious worship,
a bamboo chopstick container, and some family memorial tablets of Chinese
fishermen. Inside the hut hung a wooden board, on which there were words
written in Chinese, basically saying the owner is a captain who came here, bur-
ied his food underground and then left.30 Under a big tree on Nanyue Dao, there
was also a thatched cottage with a teapot and a stove with burnt incense sticks
inside.31
Long living in Xisha and Nansha, some fishermen planted coconut palms and
banana trees and grew vegetables and sweet potatoes there during their lifetime
and chose to be buried there after death. According to fisherman Meng Quanzhou,
a native named Chen Hongbai from Shangpo Village of Wenchang County had
lived in Nansha for 18 years and was buried on Shuangzi Qunjiao (North Danger
Reef) after his death. In the 1930s, more than 20 fishermen lived on Zhongye
Dao, Nanyue Dao, Taiping Dao, Shuang Dao (Nailuo), Hongxiu Dao, Jinghong
Dao (Sin Cowe Island), Mahuan Dao and Nanwei Dao of Nansha. Two graves
were found on Beizi Dao (Northeast Cay) and the inscription on them reads
“Wong Wenqin died in the 11th year of Tongzhi (1872)” and “Wu (given name
indecipherable) died in the 13th year of Tongzhi (1874).” On Xiyue Dao, there
were three graves besides coconut palms and other plants grown by Hainanese
fishermen.32
Some foreign publications have also noted activities of Chinese fishermen in
Xisha and Nansha. Among others, China Sea Pilot published by Great Britain and
Asiatic Pilot published by the United States both documented that Chinese fish-
ermen had lived and fished in the South China Sea long ago. Records show that
the British ship Rifleman, when conducting surveys in Nansha in 1867, found on
every island evidence that Hainanese fishermen had lived there and collected tre-
pang and seashells for a living. Some had lived there for many years. Ships from
Hainan visited the islands every year, bringing rice, food and other daily necessi-
ties in exchange for trepang and seashells with the fishermen on the islands. When
the French gunboat Maliciense arrived at Nanwei Dao in 1930, the French also
acknowledged that four Chinese fishermen relying on catching turtles had already
lived there before they set foot on the island. The Chinese there had dug a freshwa-
ter well, planted some coconut palms and banana trees, and grown tomatoes and
other vegetables. What’s more, on Zhongye Dao lived five Hainanese fishermen
who dug a freshwater well that was sufficient for their own use. Besides fishing,
they also planted coconut and banana trees, grew tomatoes, and even exploited
phosphate mines. On Nanzi Dao, there were seven Hainanese residents including
two children, who stockpiled plenty of food and farmed dozens of chickens.33
In 1918, the Lhasa Phosphorite Company of Japan organized an “expedition”
to explore mineral resources in Nansha Islands. Unosuke Ogura, one member
of the expedition, visited the main islands of Beizi Dao, Nanzi Dao, Xiyue Dao,
Zhongye Dao and Taiping Dao and other islands. Upon returning to Japan, Ogura
wrote a book The Storm Island (Ogura, 1940), in which he described his meeting
with three Chinese fishermen on Nanzi Dao who had a rough map of Nansha, and
a compass with 12 points of orientation. The three fishermen told him they lived
on collecting trepang. They also said that large ships from Hainan Island arrived
at the island every November or January to bring back their harvest and take
home the aquatic products obtained. Every March or April other fishermen would
come to replace them.34 The previously mentioned records indicate that by 1867
at the latest, Hainanese fishermen of China had long lived in Nansha, engaging
in various production activities, and contributed greatly to the development and
administration of Xisha and Nansha.
To conclude, Chinese people’s long-time development and administration of
Xisha and Nansha Islands is strong evidence that the islands are by no means
terra nullius. Although these private actions are not sufficient in constituting
evidence of “occupation,” yet as Professor Connell of Oxford University rightly
argues, occupation cannot be achieved without private action. In his book Inter-
national Law, Professor Connell cited the Minguiers and Ecrehos case of 1953 on
the dispute between Britain and France over territorial claims on some islands in
the English Channel, in which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) favored the
British’s “real and permanent settlement” on those islands as an act of claiming its
sovereignty. During the trial, Judge Carneiro even believed that “the presence of a
private person in a certain area of a country may indicate the country’s occupation
of the area.”35 In modern international laws, “occupation” as a means of territorial
acquisition is not fully recognized by law, but in dealing with territorial disputes
between countries, “sometimes the effect of occupation as a means of territorial
change should also be taken into account.”36 Moreover, since the 19th century,
China has been exercising consistent sovereignty over Xisha and Nansha Islands,
“expressing substantive sovereignty ideas with clear or symbolic actions,” mak-
ing effective “occupation,”37 i.e. turning the “Inchoate title” as a result of the
long-term development and administration of Xisha and Nansha Islands by Chi-
nese people into a complete one. Therefore, these territories are not terra nullius,
but an inseparable part of China. Any attempt to invade the islands on the grounds
of terra nullius is a violation of international law and has no legal effect.
Notes
1 Samuel, M.S. (1982). Contest for the South China Sea. New York and London: Methuen &
Co. Methuen, p. 104.
2 Tai Ping Yu Lan (Imperial Readings of the Taiping Era), Vol. 69.
3 ibid.
4 People’s Daily. (1976). Beijing, August 31.
5 Ibid., March 28.
6 Guangdong Museum. (1974). Xisha Cultural Relics—A Survey of Cultural Relics on
Xisha Islands of the SCS. Beijing: Cultural Relics Publishing House, p. 7.
7 Xisha and Nansha Islands Compilation Committee of Guangdong Province. (1947).
Preliminary Research Report on the Sovereignty of Xisha Islands.
8 Yu, S. (1947). Sovereignty of the Nansha Islands belongs to China. Taipei: Central
Daily, February 25.
10 People’s Daily. (1976). Beijing: People’s Daily, August 31.
11 Chen, K., & Lin, R. (1994). New Archaeological Discovery of Xisha Islands. Beijing:
Guangming Daily, September 19.
12 Harrison, S.S. (1997). China, Old and Asia: Conflict Ahead? New York: Columbia
University Press, p. 200.
South China Sea Islands. Beijing: Oriental Press (in Chinese), p. 416.
15 Ibid., p. 415.
16 He, J. (1976). Account of the Ancient Temple Sites on Xisha Islands (in Chinese).
Cultural Relics, 9.
17 Zhang, Z.G. (1975). Nansha Xing (Records on the Patrol of Nansha Islands). Taipei:
Student Book Company, p. 253, pp. 286–287 + p. 280.
18 Chen, Z.B. (1975). The Cruising of the Nationalist Navy to Nansha Islands. Taipei:
Student Book Company, p. 50.
19 He, J. (1976). Account of the Ancient Temple Sites on Xisha Islands (in Chinese).
Cultural Relics, 9.
South China Sea Islands. Beijing: Oriental Press (in Chinese), p. 368.
21 Wu, Z. (1947). The Truth about the Xisha Islands. Sing Tao Daily, January 27, Hong
Kong.
22 Lan, J. (1978). Huangsha and Changsha Islands in the East Vietnam Sea. Investigation
of Huangsha and Changsha Islands, p. 141.
23 Lam, G. (1978). The Paracel and Spratly Archipelagos in the Middle of the East Sea.
In Hãn Nguyên (Ed.), Special Issues on Hoang Sa and Truong Sa of History and Geog-
raphy Periodical, no. 29 (in Chinese). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, p. 141.
24 Sơn, H.Đ. (1978). Let’s Make a Survey of the Paracel Archipelago. In Hãn Nguyên
(Ed.), Special Issues on Hoang Sa and Truong Sa of History and Geography Periodi-
cal, no. 29 (in Chinese). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, p. 295.
25 Trân, T.Đ. (1978). Paracel Islands: The Witnesses. In Hãn Nguyên (Ed.), Special Issues
on Hoang Sa and Truong Sa of History and Geography Periodical, no. 29 (in Chinese).
26 Yang, Y.Z. (1994). Imperial-conferred Titles and Sacrifice to Mazu in the Qing Dynasty.
Historical Achieves, 4.
27 Lam, G. (1978). The Paracel and Spratly Archipelagos in the Middle of the East Sea.
In Hãn Nguyên (Ed.), Special Issues on Hoang Sa and Truong Sa of History and Geog-
raphy Periodical, no. 29 (in Chinese). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, p. 141.
28 Zheng, Z.Y. (1947). A Brief Geographical Record of the South China Sea Islands.
Shanghai: Commercial Press, pp. 72–73.
29 Zhang, Z.G. (1975). Nansha Xing (Records on the Patrol of Nansha Islands). Taipei:
31 Ling, C.S. (1934). Geography of the French-occupied SCS Islands. Local Chronicles,
Vol. 5.
32 Hu, H.Y. (1975). Various Islands in the South Sea Coveted by France and Japan. In
C.S. Ling (Ed.), Current Borderland Issues of China. Taipei: Student Book Company,
p. 169.
33 Ling, C.S. (1934). Geography of the French-occupied SCS Islands. Local Chronicles,
Vol. 5.
35 Connell, D.P.O. (1970). International Law, Vol. 1. London: Stevens & Sons, p. 418.
36 Wang, T.Y. (1984). International Law (in Chinese). Beijing: Law Press China, p. 142.
37 Starke, J.G. (1958). An Introduction to International Law. London: Butterworth & Co.
(Publishers) Ltd.
Part III
Controversy over the

dotted line
7 China’s dotted line in the South
China Sea
Its background and ramifications
China’s dotted line in the South China Sea, also known as the “U-shaped line”
or “nine-dash line,” refers to the U-shaped dotted line marked on the map of
China. Since the line was announced in 1947, the international community at that
time has not raised any objections, and the surrounding Southeast Asian countries
have never raised diplomatic protests, which is equivalent to acquiescence. Many
maps published abroad have also adopted this line, indicating it as a traditional
maritime boundary of China. However, since Taiwan adopted Policy Guidelines
on the South China Sea in 1993, which claimed area within the dotted line as
“historic waters,” there has been considerable international attention. Southeast
Asian countries bordering the South China Sea have also been quick to question
the nature and legal status of the line. In order to understand the historical con-
text in which the line was plotted, this chapter will review and explore its origin,
efficacy and role.
7.1 France’s occupation of nine small islands of the

Nansha Islands in 1933
Since the French government occupied Vietnam as a colony in 1885, it had been
planning occupation of China’s Xisha and Nansha Islands. They forged a so-
called historical fact that during the reigns of Gia Long and Minh Mạng in the
early 19th century, the two emperors had visited Xisha Islands and that Annam
(now part of Vietnam) was under the colonial rule of France, as were the Xisha
Islands.1 Additionally, France voiced doubts about the legitimacy of China’s reas-
sertion of sovereignty over Xisha Islands as a result of a military inspection mis-
sion led by the Commander Li Zhun of the Guangdong navy force of the Qing
Dynasty to the Xisha Islands in 1909. Whenever the inspection team arrived at
an island, they inscribed the name of the island on the rock, built wooden shacks
and erected a mast to hang the imperial flag.2 On March 20, 1930, the Viceroy
of French Indochina in Hanoi wrote a letter to the Paris-based Ministry of the
Colonies, saying that:
The decision of the Kwangtung Council is merely the natural progression

of a series of moves by the authorities of South China to assert their rights
90 Controversy over the dotted line
of sovereignty over the Paracels. Your Ministry has been duly informing
of them at regular intervals. The first and most significant move occurred
in 1909, when an official ceremony marking the taking of possession was
held on the initiative of the Viceroy of the Two Kwangs. It is likely that the
Provincial Council of Kwangtung now claims that its decision is based on
this ceremony. This taking of possession—on which France, the only power
concerned, has never officially made its views known—would be legally
valid only if the Paracels were res nullius at the time. Yet—unlike 1909—
the Chinese themselves have not always feigned certainty of this. Following
the wreck in 1898 of the British vessels Bellona and Huneiji Maru, which
were then looted by Chinese fishermen, the Viceroy of Canton countered
the protests of the Minister of Great Britain in Peking with the retort: “The
Paracels are abandoned islands which are not part of China, they are not
administratively attached to any district of Hainan and no special authority is
responsible for policing them.”3
In response to the French government’s wanton accusations, the envoy of

Republic of China in France issued a formal diplomatic note to France’s Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of on September 29, 1932, stating that:
According to international law and custom, the prime condition for the posses-
sion of an island lying far from the mainland is the first effective occupation,
in other words the nationals who were the first to settle lands, thereby bring-
ing these territories into their country’s possession. The natives of Hainan who
settled in the Paracels, and built houses and fishing boats there to supply their
needs, have done so since the distant past. Indeed, in 1909 the Government of
the former Ch’ing dynasty sent a naval expedition to study conditions in the
islands and to manifest its effective occupation to other nations of the world:
the Chinese flag was raised and was saluted with a round of gunfire on Woody
Island. The French Government made no protest, on that occasion either. In
1908 the question of constructing a lighthouse on one of the islands in the
Paracels for the protection of shipping was a matter of international maritime
importance. The Chinese Government, having received through the maritime
customs service a request from the shipping companies concerned for the con-
struction of a lighthouse, subsequently consented. In April 1930, on the occa-
sion of the Meteorological Conference held in Hong Kong, the French Director
of the Observatories of Indochina, Mr E. Bruzon, and the Director of the Zi-Ka-
Wei Observatory, Reverend Father L. Froc, who both attended the Conference,
suggested to the representative of China that an observatory might be set up in
the Paracels. This proves that not only are the Paracel Islands internationally
recognized as belonging to China, but that the French themselves share this
view. It is difficult for the Chinese Government to verify the case involving the
loss of vessels in the area of the Paracels in 1898, and the subsequent interven-
tion of the British Consul in Hoihow, as stated in the Note of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, since there is no mention of this matter in its records.4
China’s dotted line in the South China Sea 91
The facts listed in the note forced the French government to temporarily aban-
don its ambition to occupy the Xisha Islands and instead turned its target toward
the Nansha Islands. In 1930, the French warship Malicieuse trespassed on Nanwei
Island of the Nansha Islands to conduct a so-called survey. Ignoring Chinese fish-
ermen living on the island, they planted a French flag in secret and left. In April
1933, Chevey, director of the Saigon Institute of Oceanology, led gunboat Alerte
and surveying ship Astrolabe to visit and occupy other islands of the Nansha
Islands.5 The French government issued a communique on September 23, 1930,
declaring its occupation of the Nanshan Islands. In April 1933, France mounted
an official ceremony to mark the occupation. Full details were later reported by
its local official newspaper on July 26, 1933, including the occupation of six
islands. On December 21, 1933, the Governor General of Cochin China Mr. J.
Krautheimer signed a decree that incorporated the Nansha Islands into Ba Ria
of Annam.6 The true motive of France then, as a matter of fact, was to annex the
entire Nansha Islands rather than just the nine islets. This could be seen from the
letter written by its Minister for National Defence (Navy) to the Minister of For-
eign Affairs, in which it said:
You asked me to take possession of the archipelago as soon as possible. How-

ever, this operation needs to be carried out in very fine weather, which is most
likely to occur in the period between the monsoons, in April and September,
but as the atmosphere is sometimes disturbed in these waters by typhoons at
the September period, it is feared that the operation planned cannot be carried
out before April 1933. When I send a copy of this letter to the Commander
of the Navy in Indochina, I shall ask him to arrange for the archipelago to
be taken possession of as soon as he considers the atmospheric conditions
favourable.7
According to The New Geography of China published in 1935, the nine small
features of the Nansha Islands occupied by France are:
1 Nanwei Dao (Spratly Island);

2 Taiping Dao (Itu Aba);
3 Anbo Shazhou (Caye d’Amboine or Amboyna Cay);
4 Beizi Dao (North Danger Northeast Cay);
5 Nanzi Dao (North Danger Southwest Cay);
6 Nanyao Dao (Loaita Island);
7 Zhongye Dao (Thitu Island);
8 Hongxiu Dao (Nam Yet Island);
9 Xiyue Dao (West York Island).8
As the ROC government was poorly acquainted with names and geographi-
cal positions of these islands, it failed to file diplomatic protest at the time when
French occupation occurred. Later, the ROC Foreign Ministry made a protest to
French envoy in China on August 4, 1933, asking for a reply with names and
coordinates of those nine islands specified. The Foreign Ministry of France sent
a telegram through V. K. Wellington Koo, the Chinese ambassador to France,
saying that:
The nine small islands between Annam and the Philippines are treacher-
ous rocks in the way of vital seaways which have resulted in distress to
French vessels passing by. Thus the French occupied them to construct risk-
prevention facilities there. They also showed me the map to demonstrate that
their actions have nothing to do with the Xisha Islands at all.9
Confronted with such a situation, the ROC government deemed it necessary

to print a territorial map of the South China Sea with circumstantial informa-
tion, and to review and approve names of individual islands within the territory
both in Chinese and English. Consequently, the government founded the Com-
mittee of Examining Maps for Land and Water. The committee, in its 25th session
on December 21, 1934, reviewed and approved Chinese and English names of
islands in the South China Sea. In January 1935, the committee printed the first
issue of its journal, in which 132 names of islands, reefs, shoals and banks in the
South China Sea were fully listed, including 28 in the Xisha Islands and 96 in the
Nansha Islands.10 In April 1935, the committee published the South China Sea
Islands Map. The map indicates that the southernmost end of the boundary line
of the South China Sea is set at 4°N latitude. This map was published in 1936 in
New China Construction Atlas edited by geographer Bai Meichu (see Figure 7.1).
In the map the Dongsha, Xisha, Nansha and Tuansha Islands are all marked with
clear maritime borderlines to show that they are part of Chinese territory. The
southernmost territory of China in the South China Sea islands is set at 4°N lati-
tude, and Zengmu Ansha is also included in the line. In the lower right corner of
the map, the mapmaker noted:
The six isles occupied by France in July 1933 together with the Macclesfield
Bank and the Spratly Islands measured afterwards by the Nautical Bureau
of the Marine were the living places of Chinese fishermen. The sovereignty,
of course, belonged to China. In April 1935, the Committee of Examining
Maps for Land and Water issued the South China Sea Islands Map in its
journal. The southern coastal areas extended to the Zengmu Ansha in the
Spratly Islands, which was just at the 4º northern latitude. This was China’s
southernmost coastal boundary in the South China Sea.11
This is the first official map to include maritime borderline in the South China
Sea. It is also the origin of the U-shaped dotted line in today’s Chinese map of the
South China Sea. It came into being against the backdrop of France’s occupation
of nine islets of the Nansha Islands in 1933. The map was drawn to show to the
world China’s territorial waters in the South China Sea and it also served as legal
grounds to protest France’s occupation of nine islets.
Figure 7.1 The Map of Chinese Domain in the South China Sea
Source: New China Construction Atlas (1936), edited by Bai Meichu
7.2 Recapture of the Xisha and Nansha Islands after
the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression
Though the ROC government at the time had lodged strong protest against
France’s occupation of the nine islets, the Nansha Islands were later annexed by
Japan after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. Japan re-named them “Shin-
nan Gunto” and put them under the administration of Kaohsiung on Taiwan. After
the war, the ROC government recovered the Xisha and Nansha Islands following
the recapture of Taiwan on October 25, 1945, according to the terms of the Cairo
Declaration signed by the Republic of China, the United States and the United
Kingdom on December 1, 1943, as well as the Potsdam Proclamation issued by
Republic of China, the United States and the United Kingdom on July 26, 1945.
In the Cairo Declaration the three signatories stated that “it is their purpose that
all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, For-
mosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.”12 The three
powers also declared in the Potsdam Proclamation that “the terms of the Cairo
Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the
islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we
determine.”13
In the autumn of 1946, the ROC government decided to send warships to
recover the Xisha and Nansha Islands. Senior officials from the Ministry of
National Defence, the Ministry of the Interior, the Air Force Command Headquar-
ters, the Logistics Command and other relevant agencies were also designated to
carry out inspections. The Guangdong Provincial Government also sent forces
to join the takeover. Altogether four ships were dispatched, namely Yongxing,
Zhongjian, Taiping and Zhongye. The former two went to the Nansha Islands and
the other two to the Xisha Islands. Yongxing and Zhongjian, led by Yao Ruyu,
landed at Yongxing Island, the main island of the Xisha Islands on November
24, 1946. The Navy erected a monument engraved with “南海屏藩 (Territory of
South China Sea)” on the front in honor of the recapture, hoisted the Chinese flag
and fired cannons to show the accomplishment of the takeover. On December 12,
Taiping and Zhongye, led by Lin Zun, arrived at the main island of the Nansha
Islands, which was named Taiping after the name of the warship which helped
complete the takeover. A monument bearing the inscription of “南沙群岛太平岛
(Taiping Island of Nansha Islands)” was erected at the east end of the island, with
the takeover and flag-raising ceremonies held by the side. After that, they landed
on Zhongye Island, Xiyue Island and Nanwei Island, and a monument was erected
on each of them to proclaim sovereignty over these islands. The Nansha Islands
Administrative Office was also set up on Taiping Island and placed under the
jurisdiction of Guangdong Provincial Government.14
However, recapturing the Xisha Nansha Islands was not a smooth undertak-
ing. Japan’s surrender had created in the South China Sea a power vacuum
for others to fill in. France had an ambition to resume its governance over
Indochina. The Philippines, who just gained its independence from the United
States, attempted to take effective control over the islands. When Japanese
troops gathered at Yulin Port waiting to be repatriated, France occupied sev-
eral features in the Nansha Islands before Chinese troops were sent to take them
over. On July 27, 1946, a ship of unknown nationality invaded maritime areas
of the Nansha Islands but withdrew within a few days after the ROC ordered it
to leave. On October 5, French warship Chevreud occupied Nanwei and Taiping
of the Nansha Islands, erecting a stone monument on the former. Learning that
the Chinese government was determined to recapture Xisha Islands and Nansha
Islands, the French sent its battleship Tonkinois to the Xisha Islands as a sign of
protest. Upon its arrival at Yongxing Island, they found Chinese troops stationed
on the island and had to turn their way to Pattle Island and set up an administrative
center there.15 The Philippines also made its endeavor to occupy Nansha Islands
before China’s full takeover of the Xisha and Nansha Islands. On July 23, 1946,
Quirino, foreign minister of the Philippines, declared that the Philippines intended
to include the Nansha Islands into their national defense space despite the sover-
eignty disputes they had with China over the islands.16
In face of such a complicated situation, the Chinese government took several
steps to safeguard its sovereignty over the South China Sea islands. Firstly, the gov-
ernment modified names of archipelagos according to their geographical locations
in the South China Sea waters, renaming Tuansha and Nansha Islands as Nansha
and Zhongsha Islands respectively. Secondly, on April 14, 1947, the Ministry of the
Interior, after consultation with relevant agencies, arrived at the following decisions:
1 The southernmost end of the South China Sea territory should include
Zengmu Ansha, and this had been widely adopted, before the outbreak of
the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, by government agencies,
school textbooks and other publications. The Ministry of the Interior had also
kept archives as such, which should continue to be valid hereafter.
2 As for promulgating sovereignty of the Xisha Islands and the Nansha Islands,
the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for finalizing names of islands and
archipelagos involved, charting a detailed map for reference and announcing
it to the public across the country. All of these should be reported to the ROC
government and recorded. Prior to that, features in the Xisha Islands and the
Nansha Islands should be garrisoned by the Navy Command Headquarters as
promptly and fully as possible. The announcement of the sovereignty over
the Xisha and Nansha Islands would be made by the Ministry of the Interior
after documents containing renamed islands were submitted to the Central
Government. Before the announcement, the Naval Command should take
over all islands belonging to the archipelagos as soon as possible.
3 Fishing season in the Xisha Islands and the Nansha Islands is fairly short.
The Navy Command Headquarters and Guangdong Provincial Government
would be responsible for protection of fishermen operating there and facilita-
tion in transport and communications.17
To further specify territorial boundaries in the South China Sea, the Ministry of
Interior of the ROC government released The Map of the Location of the South
Figure 7.2 The Map of the Location of the South China Sea Islands
Source: The ROC Government (released in 1947)
China Sea Islands in 1947. On the map, the U-shaped dotted line encircling the
Dongsha, Xisha, Zhongsha and Nansha Islands was drawn. The southernmost end
of the line was set at 4°N latitude (see Figure 7.2). In February 1948, the map was
included into the Atlas of Administrative Areas of the Republic of China published
by the Commercial Press. That is the first official map of the U-shaped dotted line
available to the public.
In summary, the dotted line in the South China Sea came into existence in the
time of foreign invasion of China’s territorial seas. The dotted line took its initial
shape in 1933 when France occupied nine small features of the Nansha Islands.
It is not until the end of the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression that it
was finalized as a precaution against France’s occupation of Pattle Island of Xisha
and some other features of Nansha as well as the Philippines’ attempt to include
the archipelagic groups into its national defense space. The purpose of drawing
such a line is to safeguard China’s territorial sovereignty over the islands of the
South China Sea and to announce to the world the jurisdiction of the Chinese
government in the area. Such actions are absolutely necessary and justifiable as
far as a sovereign state is concerned.
7.3 Treaty of peace with Japan and the ramifications

of the dotted line in the South China Sea
With regard to the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom on post-
war disposition of the Xisha Islands and the Nansha Islands, Kimie Hara, a research
fellow of Centre for International Governance Innovation (Canada), revealed in
his book titled Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: Divided Territories in the
San Francisco System several peace treaty drafts prepared in the US State Depart-
ment, which were collected in the National Archives and Records Administration
in College Park, Maryland. Relevant parts in the book are excerpted as follows:
1 Among early wartime (the Second World War) studies by the US State
Department, document T-324 “Spratly and Other Islands (Shinnan Gunto)”
was prepared on May 25, 1943 for examination by the Territorial Subcom-
mittee. T-324 discussed these islands in terms of geography, strategic con-
siderations, history of Japanese acquisition, claims of the disputants – Japan,
France, and China – and the position of the USA. The following statement
is noteworthy, especially given the Philippines’ post-war claim to the Sprat-
lys: “Shinnan Gunto is definitely beyond the boundary of the Philippines as
established by the treaty of December 10, 1898.”
2 On December 19, 1944, before the Yalta Conference, CAC-301 “Spratly and
Other Islands (Shinnan Gunto)” was prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area
Committee on the Far East. It dealt with the same area as T-324 in roughly
the same terms, though with somewhat more detailed analysis. Transfer to
the Philippines was considered a future possibility, as in T-324, based purely
on security grounds, not on the validity of the Philippines’ territorial claim.
Like T324, CAC-301 carried the sentence, “Shinnan Gunto is beyond the
boundary of the Philippines,” but preceded it by: “The United States has
made no claim to the islands either for itself or for the Philippine islands.”
CAC-301 went further than T-324, concluding by specifically recommending
international management:
It is recommended that the islands, reefs and shoals comprised within

Shinnan Gunto be placed under the projected international organization,
which should designate as administering authority or authorities either
an international mixed commission or a state or states. It is recognized
that the assent of the French Government to this arrangement will be
juridically necessary to eliminate the claim of France to sovereignty over
the principal islands within this area.
3 A separate document, CAC-308, “Paracel Islands,” was prepared for the Para-
cels, and finalized on December 14, 1944. It examined the conflicting claims
of the disputants, France and China (Japan had never laid an official claim
to the Paracels), and clearly recognized China’s claim as of superior histori-
cal validity. CAC-308 concluded with three levels of recommendations –
(A) under the authority of the projected international organization, (B) a
bilateral agreement between China and France and, (C) award to China.
Award to France was not seen as an option.18
As can be seen from the documents listed, the United States did not approve of
the Philippines’ claim to the Nansha Islands and believed that the Nansha Islands
should be outside the boundaries of the Philippines. Also, the United States was
not convinced by the French claim to the Xisha Islands and considered it to be
weak. The United Kingdom held similar views on France’s claims to the Xisha
and Nansha Islands.
A peace treaty brief prepared by the British Foreign Office for a parliamentary
session in November 1951 wrote:
The French themselves have an ill-defined claim to these Islands and His
Majesty’s Government have also laid claim to them though neither Govern-
ment have pursued their claims.19
However, disposition of the Xisha and Nansha Islands was included in the
Treaty of Peace with Japan at French request at the final drafting stage in 1951.
The United States and United Kingdom also agreed to the French request to bring
Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam to the Peace Conference while China’s mainland
and China’s Taiwan were not invited. A telegram sent on August 23, 1951, from
Paris to the Foreign Office in London stated:
The presence of the Associated States of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam at San
Francisco had been secured, and they would sign the Treaty. At San Fran-
cisco the question of reparations owing as a result of the Japanese occupation
during the war would be raised. The rights of France over the Paracel and
Spratley Islands had been safeguarded.20
More seriously, the peace treaty only writes that Japan waives all rights to the
Xisha and Nansha Islands but does not specify that they should be returned to
China. This sowed the seeds of future territorial row, turning disputes between
China and the Japanese and French colonial forces before World War II into island
disputes between China and the newly independent Southeast Asian neighbors
after World War II. Zhou Enlai, the Foreign Minister of People’s Republic of
China, responded in a stern statement that
The draft treaty stipulates that Japan should renounce all right to Nanwei
Island and the Xisha Islands, but does not mention the problem of restoring
sovereignty over them. As a matter of fact, just like the entire Nansha Islands,
Zhongsha Islands and Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands and Nanwei Island
have long been part of China. Although they had been occupied by Japan for
some time during the war of aggression waged by Japanese imperialism, they
were all taken over by the Chinese government following Japan’s surrender.
The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China hereby
declares: whether or not the US-UK joint draft treaty with Japan contains
provisions on this subject and no matter how these provisions are worded, the
inviolable sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China over Nanwei Island
and the Xisha Islands will not be in any way affected.21
The territorial clauses of the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan are very
wide, ranging from the Kurile Islands to Antarctica and from Micronesia to the
Nansha Islands. But since it does not specify which country these archipelagoes
should belong to after Japan’s renunciation, a variety of “unresolved problems”
have remained in the Asia-Pacific region, including the Korean Peninsula divi-
sion, the Cross-Taiwan Strait problem, the sovereignty disputes over Southern
Kuriles (Northern Territories), Tokdo (Takeshima) Island, Diaoyu (Senkaku)
Island, and Nansha Islands. These, together with others such as the Okinawa
problem in relation to the large US military presence in the region, are all sig-
nificant issues continuing to affect security in the Asia-Pacific region to this date.
All these “unresolved problems” result from the Treaty of Peace with Japan, i.e.
“the San Francisco System.” For example, the disputes over the Xisha and Nan-
sha Islands reflect the complexity of post-war international relations in Southeast
Asia, representing a by-product of the regional Cold War and turning out to be
a Cold War frontier transformed from a pre-war colonialism frontier. In draft-
ing the treaty, the United States and United Kingdom were aware how weak the
claims of France and the Philippines were, a pre-war disputant and a post-war
new claimant respectively. However, with the escalation of the Cold War and
development of communism in Asia, it became important for the United States to
ensure that the communist-dominated China would not benefit from the Japanese
territorial disposition. The Acheson Line,22 the US defense line in the Western
Pacific announced in January 1950, stretched as far south as the Philippines. As
with Japan in Northeast Asia, securing the Philippines for the West became US
policy’s primary objective in Southeast Asia. The territorial disposition of the
Treaty of Peace with Japan provided opportunities for competing in the South
China Sea, not only for the Philippines, but also for other new neighboring states,
thus leaving potential “wedges” against China, or preventing a “domino effect.”23
It is acknowledged that today’s territorial disputes in the South China Sea stem
from the Treaty of Peace with Japan and the conflict caused by the Treaty is to
contain communism. Given such a fact, it is observed that the dotted line in the
South China Sea, marked by the Chinese government in 1947, has played a great
role in safeguarding China’s territorial sovereignty in that area, which is elabo-
rated in the following three aspects:
1 The dotted line defines China’s jurisdiction in the South China Sea and shows
the world the historical fact that the Xisha Islands and the Nansha Islands
are part of China’s territory. To some extent, it dismisses the disposition
worded by the Treaty of San Francisco as well. It resonates with the statement
declared by the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of
China on August 15, 1951: whether or not the US-UK joint draft treaty with
Japan contains provisions on this subject and no matter how these provisions
are worded, the inviolable sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China
over Nanwei Island and the Xisha Islands will not be in any way affected. In
fact, on April 28, 1952, a year after the signing of the Treaty of Peace with
Japan, Japan signed a peace treaty with Taiwan authorities of China, con-
firming Japan’s renunciation of Taiwan, Peng-hu, the Nansha Islands and the
Xisha Islands without mentioning China’s ownership of these archipelagos.
Given that it was a bilateral treaty and the Nansha Islands, the Xisha Islands
and Taiwan were all dealt with together in the treaty so this can be interpreted
that both Taiwan and the South China Sea islands are territories of China.24
2 The dotted line formed against a backdrop of foreign forces’ invasion of the
South China Sea islands, specifically when France occupied nine small fea-
tures of the Nansha Islands in 1933, when France occupied Pattle Island of
the Xisha Islands and some features of the Nansha Islands in 1946 and when
the Philippines attempted to include the Nansha Islands in the spectrum of its
national defense. Hence, it is clear to tell that the formation of the dotted line
is to safeguard South China Sea islands from foreign forces’ invasion. Some
Taiwan scholars compare it with the Maginot Line,25 which was built within a
few kilometers of (pre-)Nazi Germany’s border to deter Germany from inva-
sion of French Alsace-Lorraine. Different from the Maginot Line. featuring
a strong smell of gunpowder, the dotted line is of peace without influence on
freedom and safety of ship’s navigation and aircraft’s overflight in that area.26
3 The dotted line has existed for more than half a century, and it is the evidence
of China’s actual jurisdiction over the South China Sea. As T. S. Murty states
in his book Boundaries and Maps: “official maps issued by a State are the
best evidence of that State’s views on its territorial limits.”27 This is echoed
by Keyuan Zou, who argues that:
In the case of remote and sparsely populated areas where continuous
exercise of sovereign power is difficult, a uniform representation of the
boundary on neutral maps can provide sufficient evidence. . . . The line can
help China claim all the islands inside the line, particularly the submerged
banks and shoals. The line is also evidence to help China delimit the mari-
time boundary with other countries in the South China Sea. Thus the Chi-
nese traditional maritime boundary line has considerable importance for
the resolution of the Spratly Islands dispute as well as to the delimitation of
the jurisdictional waters between China and other coastal states. Its exis-
tence certainly favors the Chinese side and the line could be regarded as
a good card in the negotiation game for the Nansha Islands settlement.28
To sum up, the dotted line in the South China Sea came into existence in 1933,
when France occupied nine small features of the Nansha Islands. At that time,
the ROC government deemed it necessary to publish a circumstantial map of the
South China Sea territory so that they could have a good command of names
and geographic locations of those occupied islands and lodge diplomatic pro-
test against the French government. Then the Committee of Examining Maps for
Land and Water was established by the government, which later published the
South China Sea Islands Map China in April 1935, setting the southernmost end
of the South China Sea at 4°N latitude while including Zengmu Ansha within a
maritime boundary line. It is the first time that a maritime boundary line for the
South China Sea appears in an official map of China. It is also the earliest form of
the U-shaped dotted line widely adopted by Chinese maps today. The dotted line
was not finalized until the end of the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggres-
sion, when France continued its occupation of Pattle Island of the Xisha and some
other features of the Nansha Islands and the Philippines attempted to include the
Nansha Islands within their national defense space.
During the Second World War, several peace treaty drafts prepared by the United
States and the United Kingdom acknowledged that China’s claims concerning the
South China Sea islands were at an advantage in historical validity. For one thing,
it was recognized that France’s claim to the Xisha Islands is weak and it is a must
to eliminate France’s claim to sovereignty over the principal islands in the South
China Sea. For another, the statement that “Shinnan Gunto is definitely beyond the
boundary of the Philippines” was repeatedly stressed. But at the final drafting stage
of the Treaty of Peace with Japan in 1951, disposition of the Xisha and Nansha
Islands was included at French request. The United States and the United Kingdom
also agreed to bring allied countries to the conference while Chinese mainland and
Taiwan were not invited. Apart from that, the Treaty only stated Japan’s renuncia-
tion of all rights to the Xisha and Nansha Islands but made no mention of restoring
them to China, sowing seeds for future territorial disputes and border clashes.
Territorial disputes facing the South China Sea today originate from the Treaty
of Peace with Japan, which mirrors the complexity of post-war international rela-
tions in Southeast Asia. These disputes are by-products of the regional cold war,
evolving from the pre-war colonial border clashes to those associated with the
Cold War. The United States and the United Kingdom, in the midst of drafting
treaties, were clear that China enjoyed legitimate advantage in the claim over
the Xisha and Nansha Islands, but they were reluctant to allow communist-led
China to gain benefit from the territorial disposition because of escalation of
the Cold War and development of communism in Asia. On top of that, in Janu-
ary 1950, the United States announced the Acheson Line in the Western Pacific,
which stretched as far south as the Philippines. In this case, they were disinclined
to allow China the ownership of the Nansha Islands for the sake of security of
the Philippines. Thus, they took advantage of the opportunity to set off territo-
rial rivalry among Southeast Asian countries surrounding the South China Sea,
which might leave “wedges” against China and prevent a so-called domino effect
that might be brought about by communism’s further development in Southeast
Asia. The dotted line in the South China Sea came into being in 1947 as a result
of China’s determination to deter foreign forces from invasion. It did play a vital
role in dealing with territorial disputes created by the United States and the United
Kingdom. The dotted line announced to the world the scope of China’s jurisdic-
tion over the South China Sea, demonstrated the historical fact that the South
China Sea islands had long been part of China, challenged territorial disposition
in the Treaty of Peace with Japan and offered strong evidence of China’s actual
jurisdiction over its territorial sea.
Notes
C.S. Ling (Ed.), Current Borderland Issues of China. Taipei: Student Book Company,
p. 171.
2 (1933). Li Zhun’s Patrol of the Sea. Ta Kung Pao, August 10.
3 Chemillier-Gendreau, M. (2000). Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands.
Hague: Brill Nijhoff, p. 166.
4 Ibid., pp. 185–186.
5 Xu, G.S. (1975). Incident of the Nine Islets. In Ling Chunsheng (Ed.), Current Border-
land Issues of China. Taipei: Student Book Co., p. 149.
6 Chemillier-Gendreau, M. (2000). Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands.
Hague: Brill Nijhoff, p. 111.
7 Ibid., p. 227.
8 (1935). New Geographical Records of China. Shanghai: Zhong Hua Book Company,
pp. 44–45.
9 Lu, D.Y. (1975). An Account of the Xisha Islands. In Ling Chunsheng (Ed.), Current
Borderland Issues of China. Taipei: Student Book Co., p. 189.
10 (1935). Journal of Committee of Examining the Water and Land Maps, Vol. 1,
pp. 61–69.
Sea Islands (in Chinese). Beijing: Oriental Press, p 360.
12 See https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/cairo.asp (access on April 15, 2020).
13 See www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=539A9A50A5F8AF9E&s=6197D4
D64A65F694(access on April 15, 2020).
14 Wu, Q.Y. et al. (1991). A Documentary of the Chinese Navy’s Recovery of the Nansha
Islands after the Victory of the Anti-Japanese War. In Nansha Comprehensive Scien-
tific Investigation Team of Chinese Academy of Sciences (Ed.), Archives and Special
Collections of Historical Geography of Nansha (in Chinese). Guangzhou: Sun Yat-sen
University Press, pp. 110–111.
15 Chen, H.Y. (1987). South China Sea Islands Sovereignty Disputes and International
Conflicts. Taipei: Youth Cultural Company, pp. 62–63.
16 Zeng, D.B. (1946). Xinan Islands are Ours. Ta Kung Pao, August 4.
18 Hara, K. (2006). Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: Divided Territories in the San
Francisco System. London: Routledge, pp. 146–147.
19 Ibid., p. 152.
20 Ibid., p. 153.
21 Ibid., p. 154.
22 On January 12, 1950, then US Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered a speech
entitled “Crisis in Asia – An Examination of U.S. Policy.” In the speech, he put forward
a defensive perimeter in the western Pacific to counter military menace from the com-
munism camp. This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then
runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. South Korea and China’s Taiwan are
excluded from the defensive perimeter.
23 The American leadership at the time was keen on a “domino effect.” They thought
that if Vietnam joined the communism camp, the whole Indochina and other Southeast
Asian countries might follow suit. Also see Hara, K. (2006). Cold War Frontiers in the
Asia-Pacific: Divided Territories in the San Francisco System. London: Routledge,
p. 157.
24 Hara, K. (2006). Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: Divided Territories in the San
Francisco System. London: Routledge, pp. 154–155.
25 French military started to work out ways to defend invasion from Germany and Italy
after the First World War. Maginot, the then Minister of National defense, who took
office in 1930, took ten years to build a series of fortifications along their borders
named the “Maginot Line”.
26 Yu, P.K.H. (2003). The Chinese (broken) U-shaped Line in the South China Sea:
Points, Lines, and Zones. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25(3), pp. 409–410.
27 Zou, K.Y. (1999). The Chinese Traditional Maritime Boundary Line in the South China
Sea and Its Legal Consequences for the Resolution of the Dispute over the Spratly
Islands. The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 14(1), p. 49.
28 Ibid., pp. 53–54.
8 Legal status of the dotted line
Historic waters, territory boundary line
or an island ownership line?
As shown on The Map of Location of the South China Sea Islands published in
1947, the dotted line follows the outermost islets and reefs of four island groups in
the South China Sea, namely the Dongsha, Xisha, Zhongsha and Nansha Islands.
The line encompasses all islands, reefs, shoals and cays of the four island groups,
and its southernmost end is located at 4°N latitude. The purpose of of draw-
ing such a line has been to announce to the world China’s geographical scope
and sovereignty over the island groups in the South China Sea. At that time, the
international community did not dispute this, and the Southeast Asian countries
surrounding the South China Sea never raised any diplomatic protests. In recent
years, as the territorial disputes in the South China Sea have continued to inten-
sify, some neighboring Southeast Asian countries have questioned the legal status
of the line, asking whether the waters within the line are historical waters, and
whether the line is a maritime boundary line or an island ownership line. As a
response to these questions, this chapter seeks to discuss the legal status of the
dotted line.
8.1 Debate on historic waters

That the waters within the dotted line are “historic waters” was originally pro-
posed by Taiwan. According to Yann-huei Song and Peter Kien-hong Yu:
About one year after the naval skirmish between the PRC and Vietnam in
1988, the ROC’s MOI established an ad hoc committee to help determine the
basepoints and baselines to be used for measuring the breadth of the ROC’s
territorial seas. At the same time, another ad hoc committee was set up to
help draft the ROC’s laws on the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the
territorial seas. It was these two ad hoc committees that raised the question
of “historic waters” and the legal nature of the U-shaped line, but committee
members were divided over the issue. One group argued that the waters encir-
cled by the “U”-shaped line should be claimed as China’s historic waters. The
reasons given were twofold: first no protests or opposition were issued when
the map became available to the Public in 1948; and second, the claim to the
enclosed waters as historic waters did not violate Article 47 (1) of the 1982
Legal status of the dotted line 105
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). A second
group opposed this position, arguing that China’s historic waters claim could
hardly be justified: The “U”-shaped line was drawn arbitrarily and it was
impossible to locate the line at sea because of the lack of coordinates, caus-
ing difficulties in determining the legal status of the claimed waters. Also, the
concept of “historic waters” was outdated and can hardly be used to support
Taipei’s claim. Moreover, in the preamble of the Guidelines for Policy on the
South China Sea, approved by the Executive Yuan in April 1993, the waters
enclosed by the “U”-shaped line were claimed as Chinese territory, subject
to the jurisdiction of the ROC. Furthermore, in September 1993, a two-day
conference on the South China Sea was held in Taipei and both the Interior
Minister and the Premier, during the opening ceremony, reiterated that the
waters of the South China Sea have long been the ROC’s historic waters.1
In March 1993, the legislative body of Taiwan approved a South China Sea
Policy Guideline. The most important part of the guideline is the preface, whose
second paragraph states:
The South China Sea area within the historic water limit is the maritime area
under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China, in which the ‘Republic of
China’ possesses all rights and interests. The government of the ‘Republic
of China’ is willing to, on the bases of peace and reason, and in accordance
with the principle of safeguarding the sovereignty of the Republic of China,
develop this maritime area.2
In a press briefing, the Chairman of the Research, Development and Evaluation

Commission of the Executive Yuan further clarified the position of the ROC on
the issue. The claim, he pointed out, is based on The Map of the Location of the
South China Sea Islands, published in 1948. In the map, a U-shaped line intended
as an undefined boundary in the maritime area was drawn around the South China
Sea to depict the location of the islands claimed by the ROC. The maritime area
within the U-shaped line, he explained, was the ROC’s historic waters which are
analogous to archipelagic waters under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea, although it does not have the status of internal waters. That is to say,
within the U-shaped line the ROC has, in addition to sovereignty over the islands,
preferential rights in the maritime sphere.3
In 1994, Zhang Jingyu, Minister without Portfolio of the Executive Yuan, elab-
orated on Taiwan’s interpretation concerning historic waters in the South China
Sea, saying that:
The waters enclosed by the U-shaped line in the South China Sea are ROC’s
historic waters and the ROC is entitled to all the rights therein.4
Claiming waters enclosed by the dotted line as “historic waters” triggered

debate in academia. Some scholars argue that there was no authoritative definition
of “historic waters” in any convention. According to the Yearbook of the Interna-
tional Law Commission, published in 1962, the concept of “historic waters”
has its root in the historic fact that States through ages claimed and main-
tained sovereignty over maritime areas which they considered vital to them
without paying much attention to divergent and changing opinions about
what general international law might prescribe with respect to the delimita-
tion of the territorial sea.
Another book entitled Canada’s Arctic Waters in International Law published in

1988 concludes that the doctrine of “historic waters” “developed from that of his-
toric bays which had emerged during the 19th century for the protection of certain
large bays closely linked to the surrounding land area and traditionally considered
by claiming States as part of their national territory.”5 Moreover, The Regime of
Bays in International Law, published in 1964, defines the term “historic waters” as
waters over which the Coastal State, contrary to the generally applicable
rules of international law, clearly, effectively, continuously, and over a sub-
stantial period of time, exercise sovereign rights with the acquiescence of the
community of States.6
Nonetheless, “historic waters,” which are oftentimes deemed as historic bays by

the majority of scholars, are recognized in international law as a legitimate excep-
tion to the rules applicable to territorial sea baselines. They require certain criteria
to be met: first, a littoral state would have to lay and maintain a long-standing
claim of sovereignty over the waters in question; second, the international com-
munity would have to acquiesce to such a claim.7 Some scholars pecified that
“historic waters” are often considered as internal waters in that they are inshore
bays in general terms. But historic waters are not administered by one single man-
ner because sometimes they are regarded as part of a coastal state’s territorial sea
and sometimes a unique form, which is dependent on the way to exercise sover-
eignty and jurisdiction over them. For example, a state that allows foreign vessels
to navigate could barely lay a historic claim of internal water. There might be
another form of historic waters such as archipelagic waters, a new notion indicat-
ing that some historic waters probably have a single or unique form. But the key
to this matter is that whether such a claim of historic waters would affect naviga-
tion freedom and would require exclusive claim over submerged resources there.8
In terms of definitions of “historic water” given earlier, some doubt that whether
waters enclosed by the dotted line are “internal waters.” They argue that, under
the legal regime of “internal waters,” a coastal state exercises full sovereignty
over those waters which lie on the landward side of the baseline from which the
breadth of its territorial sea is measured. Foreign ships enjoy no right of innocent
passage through a state’s internal waters unless granted a privilege by the state.
A state’s lakes, canals, rivers, ports, and harbors have exactly the same status as
“inland waters.” Even if the waters of the South China Sea encompassed by the
dotted line are claimed as “historic waters,” there still remains doubt as to whether
the waters feature the legal status of “internal waters.” First, the ROC government
has never claimed that the waters of the South China Sea enclosed by the dotted
line are “internal waters.” Moreover, foreign vessels, including warships, have
continuously and freely navigated the waters of the South China Sea enclosed
by the line since the map was published by the ROC in 1948. No action by the
ROC has ever been taken to protest foreign vessels’ passage through the enclosed
waters. Considering these two reasons, it seems safe to conclude that the answer
to the question is “no.”9 In addition, some argue that “historic waters” must fea-
ture three elements, namely, effectiveness, passage of time and the attitude of
other states. Effectiveness means that the control exercised over the waters must
be sovereign jurisdiction, and it must in fact be exclusive. Normally a public act,
proclamation or legislation, will be required to exhibit the intention to exercise
sovereignty. The intention may however be inferred from a fact, for example,
where exclusive fisheries have been established. Proof that local fishermen have
in reality fished for a long time but not exclusively will not, however, be sufficient.
Moreover, the sovereignty claimed must be effectively exercised in regulation of
navigation. This means that there must be active and continuous jurisdiction over
the waters. In other words, mere legislative declarations of jurisdiction are insuf-
ficient. Proof, at least to show that navigating and fishing by any foreign vessels
are prohibited in this area, is required.10 However, the exercise of right in the
area by either China’s mainland or China’s Taiwan has been rarely seen since the
promulgation of the line. Even these occasional exercises focused on the islands
within the line rather than on the water areas. The freedom of navigation and
freedom of fishery seem to be unaffected by these exercises. Thus, the question
of whether there is effective control over the area within the line to establish it as
historic waters arises.11
In fact, there was controversy over whether waters within the line are historic
waters among scholars in Taiwan as well. It is said that in 1993 at a roundtable
discussion held at the National Chengchi University, Taipei, the participants were
divided into two groups of divergent views. One group endorsed the idea of his-
toric waters and asserted that the water areas within the line were Chinese historic
waters. The other were rather dubious and cautious, taking the view that it was
difficult to establish such a claim in international law.12 On May 11, 1995, in
response to the statement on the Nansha Islands and the South China Sea issued
by the US Department of State on May 10, 1995, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Taiwan issued a five-point statement on the South China Sea issue. In it, Taipei
reasserted its claim to the waters in the South China Sea encircled by the U-shaped
line as historic waters of the ROC. In response, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson
of Vietnam declared on May 18, 1995, that Taiwan’s claim was ill-founded and
ridiculous. On May 28, 1996, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated that
the historic waters claim in the South China Sea would be maintained unyield-
ingly.13 However, Taiwan withdrew its original position before long. In its draft
Territorial Sea Law, the water areas in the South China Sea were regarded as
“historic waters,” but on the second reading in the Legislative Yuan, such wording
was dropped. “Historic waters” was not mentioned when the Law on the Territo-
rial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the ROC was issued on January 21, 1998,
though it is officially stated that dropping such a reference is not an abandonment
of the official position of Taiwan that the water areas within the line are historic
waters of the ROC.14
Taiwan dropped such a reference that waters within the dotted line are “his-
toric waters,” which provided the pretext for Southeast Asian countries to attack
China in relation to the South China Sea, such as “turning the South China Sea
into a Chinese lake,” “claiming 80 percent of the South China Sea as Chinese
territory,” and so forth. Hamzah, the Director General of the Maritime Institute
of Malaysia, criticized at the Second Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts
in the South China Sea held in Indonesia that it is “frivolous, unreasonable and
illogical” to make a claim to the entire South China Sea in accordance with the
dotted line and that
by no stretch of imagination can the South China Sea be considered by any

nations as its internal waters or historic lake as a basis to assert claim.15
In fact, Taiwan is not the first one who put forward the concept of “historic
water” among neighboring Southeast Asian countries and regions. On July 7,
1982, Vietnam and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea signed an agreement
on “historic waters.” On November 12, 1982, Vietnam promulgated “Terri-
torial Sea Baseline of Vietnam,” stating that “the part of the gulf appertain-
ing to Vietnam constitutes the historic waters and is subjected to the juridical
regime of internal waters of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.”16 Vietnam’s
claims on “historic waters” encountered disapproval from Cambodia and
China. The newly formed Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
denounced the historic waters agreement in a January 10, 1983, statement as
part of Vietnam’s “expansionist and annexationist policy” and reiterated earlier
Democratic Kampuchea statements that all agreements made by the People’s
Republic of Kampuchea are null and void.17 China showed disapproval as well.
Since 1887 neither France nor Vietnam has ever treated the water area of the
Gulf of Tonkin as internal waters, as they both allow foreign vessels to enjoy
the rights deriving from the freedom of the high seas. Besides, on May 12,
1977, Vietnam issued a statement claiming its territorial sea, contiguous zone,
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. It stated that Vietnam has a
territorial sea that is 12 nautical miles measured from the baseline, but the
statement did not mention that the Gulf of Tonkin was claimed to be Vietnam’s
historical bay.18 These facts indicate that the determination of the legal status
of a certain sea area must be discussed and practiced for a long time before
it can be generally recognized. It is purely normal that some of the original
claims were later deemed inappropriate and abandoned. They should not be
used as excuses to attack other countries as such an approach will not lead to
proper settlement of the South China Sea disputes.
8.2 “Historic rights” and “the maritime boundary line”
While Taiwan had dropped its claim that waters enclosed by the dotted line are
“historic waters,” some scholars from China’s mainland and abroad put forward
the notion of “historic rights.” For example, Pan Shiying, a late maritime strate-
gist, once mentioned that “it is absolutely clear that China’s ‘nine-dash boundary
line’ marked in the maritime area of the South China Sea signifies China’s ‘his-
toric ownership’ of the area.”19 Zou Keyuan, professor at the East Asian Institute
of National University of Singapore, also writes in his book Historic Rights in
International Law and in China’s Practice that:
The nonexistence of historic waters in its traditional sense in the South China
Sea does not necessarily mean that there exist no historic rights of any kind. It
is clear from China’s stance that it seeks to enjoy historic privileges of some
kind in the South China Sea. What kind of historic rights or privileges would
China insist upon in the relevant sea areas? The most convincing rights that
China could enjoy are fishing rights. Since from ancient times, Chinese fish-
ers have been fishing in the South China Sea.20
Though the concept “historic rights” is not defined in the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea, it is acknowledged in the Article 15 of the Conven-
tion that
the above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason
of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of
the two States in a way which is at variance therewith.21
The possible implication is that the definition of “historic rights” is in accor-

dance with the international law, which caused some scholars to interpret it in
their own ways. For example, Yehuda Z. Blum reckons that “the term ‘historic
rights’ denotes the possession by a State, over certain land or maritime areas, of
rights that would not normally accrue to it under the general rules of international
law, such rights having been acquired by that State through a process of historical
consolidation.” He also explains that
historic rights are the product of a lengthy process comprising a long series of
acts, omissions and patterns of behaviour which, in their entirety, and through
their cumulative effect, bring such rights into being and consolidate them into
rights valid in international law.22
This view arguably suggests that historic rights have been established after the
existence of the dotted line for more than half a century during which the Chinese
government has kept reiterating its territorial claims to the South China Sea islands
through domestic legislation. This is why the Law on the Exclusive Economic
Zone and the Continental Shelf of the People’s Republic of China adopted on June
26, 1998, states that
the provisions in this Law shall not affect the rights that the People’s Repub-
lic of China has been enjoying ever since the days of the past.23
Although the law didn’t further explain what “the rights” are, it is supposed to
be associated with historic rights within the dotted line. The inclusion of historic
rights into the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf
shows that such rights are not derived from historic waters, and that China no
longer regards the waters within the line as historic waters. This is because his-
toric waters can only be viewed as internal or territorial waters and they cannot be
included in the Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf.
According to Zou:
The provision of China’s EEZ law on historical rights can be understood in a

number of different ways. First, it can be interpreted to mean that the sea area
in question should have the same legal status as areas under the UNCLOS II
(EEZ and continental shelf) regimes. Second, it can be interpreted to mean
that certain sea areas to which China’s historical rights are claimed go beyond
the 200 nautical mile limit. Third, it can be interpreted to mean that the sea
areas to which China’s historical rights apply fall within the 200 nautical mile
limit but will come under an alternative national management regime differ-
ent from the EEZ regime. In this third view, the claimed areas of historical
rights can be treated as quasi-territorial sea, or as historical waters with some
modifications, or as “tempered historic waters.”24
In the meanwhile, some scholars cite suggestions from the 1962 UN Study,
arguing that
at least three factors must be taken into consideration in determining whether

a state has acquired a historic title to a maritime area. These factors are: 1) the
exercise of authority over the area by the state claiming the historic right; 2) the
continuity of this exercise of authority; and 3) the attitude of foreign states.
Based upon the previous arguments, it can be concluded that the general require-
ments for establishing historic title to a specific maritime area include: 1) exer-
cise of authority over the area claimed; 2) continuity of the exercise of authority;
and 3) the attitude of foreign states. In addition to these requirements, the burden
of proof rests on the state which claims historic title to the questioned waters.25
Moreover, another Vietnamese researcher points out that
a long time ago, regional countries pursued their normal activities in the East
Sea without encountering any Chinese impediment and they have never rec-
ognized historical rights of China there.26
The Vietnamese authorities also opposed China’s historic right in the South China
Sea. They stressed that they refused to accept the so-called historic rights claimed
by China. They believed China’s historical claim was beyond the provisions of
the international law and violated Vietnam’s sovereignty and its legal interests in
the maritime area and continental shelf of the South China Sea.27 Thus, it remains
to be reviewed that whether the notion of “historic rights” is applicable to the
maritime area enclosed by the dotted line.
Apart from “historic waters” and “historic rights,” some scholars deem the dot-
ted line as “maritime boundary line.” One example is Chen Degong, a member of
the Institute for Marine Development Strategy of State Oceanic Administration of
the PRC. He points out that
the nine dotted lines may be treated as the boundary, within which the PRC
enjoys the historic rights over the living-and non-living resources found in
the subsoil and sea-bed and the superjacent waters in the sea areas.28
Zhao Lihai, a late professor of Peking University Law School, shares the same
idea, namely “the dotted line is a maritime boundary line to which China has all
along stayed committed in the past decades.”29
Given the historical context where the dotted line came into being, the term
of “maritime boundary line” is arguably valid. In April 1935, the Committee of
Examining Maps for Land and Water of ROC government published the South
China Sea Islands Map, setting the southernmost end of China’s territorial bound-
ary at 4°N latitude while including James Shoal within the scope. This map was
later incorporated in the New China Construction Atlas, published in 1936. As the
mapmakers noted in the lower right corner:
In April 1935, the Committee of Examining Maps for Land and Water issued
the South China Sea Islands Map in its journal. The southern coastal areas
extended to the Zengmu Ansha in the Spratly Islands, which was just at the
4° N latitude. This was China’s southernmost coastal boundary in the South
China Sea.30
This shows that the dotted line was deemed as a maritime boundary line when
it was drawn in 1935.
The Chinese government recaptured the Xisha and Nansha Islands after the War
of Resistance against Japanese Aggression. In April 1947, the ROC Ministry of
the Interior, after consultation with relevant agencies, arrived at the decision that
the territorial delimitation of the South China Sea should follow the practice in
pre-war governmental publications, namely the southernmost end of its territorial
seas should include the James Shoal.31 The Territorial Administration Division of
Ministry of the Interior published The Map of the Location of the South China Sea
Islands, with the dotted line formally marked in the maritime area of the South
China Sea. According to Wang Xiguang, one of the compilers of the map in the
Territorial Administration Division of Ministry of the Interior, the dotted line was
an equidistant line drawn between the outermost features of the South China Sea
islands and coastlines of adjacent countries, abiding by the principle of fairness.32
Therefore, the dotted line no doubt was born as a territorial boundary line.
However, the dotted line fails to function as a territorial boundary line in effect.
Territory refers to land of a nation. But never has China regarded waters enclosed
by the dotted line as its territory. As mentioned before, foreign vessels have been
navigating frequently and freely in the waters enclosed by the line since the pub-
lication of the line in 1947, and China has never lodged any protests against that.
Hence, it is impossibly pragmatic to deem the dotted line as a territorial bound-
ary line. According to Daniel J. Dzurek, a traditional maritime boundary line
determines the sovereignty of archipelagoes rather than the limits of maritime
jurisdiction. Therefore the dotted line cannot be considered a representation of
the Chinese claim to the entire maritime space as it covers around 80 percent of
the South China Sea.33 Indonesian senior diplomat Hasylim Djalal also said that
China’s original claim is conceived to be limited to islands and reefs rather of
the entire maritime area within the line whose legal status and exact location are
unclear due to the lack of its definition and coordinates.34
Besides, some marine laws promulgated by the PRC are noteworthy. For exam-
ple, the 1958 Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on
China’s Territorial Sea stated that:
This provision applies to all territories of the People’s Republic of China

including the Chinese mainland and its coastal islands, as well as Taiwan
and its surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands, the Dongsha Islands, the
Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands, the Nansha Islands and all other islands
belonging to China which are separated from the mainland and its coastal
islands by the high seas.35
The statement that archipelagoes “are separated from the mainland and its
coastal islands by the high seas” implies that China merely has made territorial
claim to the Xisha and Nansha Islands as well as territorial seas within the 12
nautical miles limit of these archipelagoes, excluding claim to waters adjacent to
them.36 Therefore, defining the dotted line as a maritime boundary line is clearly
inconsistent with the facts. Moreover, the Government of the People’s Republic of
China issued a Declaration on the Baseline of the Territorial Sea on May 15, 1996,
announcing some of the baselines of its territorial sea adjacent to the mainland
and those of the territorial sea adjacent to the Xisha Islands. The baselines of the
territorial sea adjacent to the Xisha Islands are composed of 28 base points. Such
an announcement raises doubts: if the dotted line is a maritime boundary line, why
bother to draw another baseline for the Xisha Islands within the boundary line?
For this, some argue that
[t]he publication of the Paracels’ baselines indicates that the PRC did not
consider the traditional line the maritime boundary line in the South China
Sea. Otherwise the Paracels’ baselines are redundant.37
In short, it is inappropriate to regard the dotted line as a boundary line. Although
it was treated as a maritime boundary line when first created, it did not play a role
as such in subsequent practices. Such an argument is apparently against reality.
8.3 The plausibility of “an island ownership line”

Most scholars tend to regard the dotted line as “island ownership line,” that is,
the South China Sea islands in the line belong to Chinese territory. For example,
Gao Zhiguo, director of the China Institute for Marine Affairs of State Oceanic
Administration, argues that “the boundary line on the Chinese map is merely a
line that delineates ownership of islands rather than a maritime boundary in the
conventional sense.” He further writes that
a careful study of Chinese documents reveals that China never has claimed
the entire water column of the South China Sea, but only the islands and their
surrounding waters within the line.38
Taiwanese scholar Peter Kien-hong Yu shares the same opinion, taking the view that
the purpose of drawing the U-shaped line was to show the public that the four large
groups of islands in the South China Sea belong to China.39 Steven Kuan-Tsyh Yu,
another Taiwanese scholar, offers a more detailed analysis. He argues that although
maritime demarcation lines or outer limit lines of every territorial sea under a coun-
try’s jurisdiction are called “boundary lines,” the maritime area within such lines
must be “internal waters” under the full sovereignty of the territorial state. Otherwise,
the name of “boundary line” is unsuitable. The “island ownership line” asserts a
country’s sovereignty over islands, reefs, shoals and banks within it. The legal status
of maritime areas within the line is determined by that of islands or archipelagoes
inside the line, which is irrelevant to the “island ownership line.” The U-shaped line
was drawn to claim that the sovereignty over all islands, reefs, shoals and cays within
the line belong to China, hence the name “an island ownership line.”40
To confirm this view, let’s see how the dotted line is drawn. It is basically
painted along the outer reefs of the islands of the South China Sea, with the North
Vereker Bank of the Dongshan Islands at the northern end, the Skarbolough Shoal
of the Zhongsha Islands and the Seahorse Shoal of the Nansha Islands at the
eastern end, the James Shoal of the Nansha Islands at the Southern end, and the
Vanguard Bank of the Nansha Islands at the western end. That means the dotted
line encompasses all islands of the South China Sea. That is why the first map
bearing this dotted line is entitled The Map of the Location of the South China Sea
Islands. The map was published by the ROC government in 1947 for the purpose
of claiming ownership of the islands within the line. The dotted line is drawn by
using a simple method of geographic shorthand, that is, connecting the outermost
points of the outermost islands and reefs of the archipelago and thereby includ-
ing all the features within this area without having to list them one by one. It is a
technique widely applied globally in the late 19th century and early 20th century,
such as the drawing of Alaskan boundary between the United States and Russia in
1867, Queensland’s annexation of Torres Strait Islands in 1879 and the division of
the Solomon Islands between Britain and Germany, and so forth.41 But all of these
cases deal with the demarcation of features within the limits, excluding all of the
waters. One example is the concept of the Philippines’ treaty limits, which was
defined by a treaty concluded between the United States and Spain on December
10, 1898. The Philippines inherited it from the United States when it gained its
independence on July 4, 1946. The United States issued several statements saying
the Philippines understood what the treaty dealt with are islands or land territory
rather than waters within the special line. Though the border is determined by lati-
tude and longitude of these lines, the United States had no pretensions to include
waters between the islands into any provision of the treaty as far as the large num-
ber of islands is concerned.42 This implies that what the dotted line delimits is the
ownership of islands enclosed by the line exclusive of waters. So it appears to be
acceptable to consider the dotted line as “an island ownership line.”
Statements as well as relevant marine laws issued by the PRC merit attention
too. In 1951, PRC foreign minister Zhou Enlai, in his Statement on the United
States–British Draft Peace Treaty with Japan and the San Francisco Conference,
pointed out that:
As a matter of fact, just like all the Nansha Islands, Zhongsha Islands and
Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands (the Paracel Islands) and Nanwei Island
(Spratly Island) have always been China’s territory.
Since then, statements made by the PRC government or Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, or various marine laws (e.g. the 1958 Declaration of the Government
of the People’s Republic of China on China’s Territorial Sea, the 1992 Law of
the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone)
have repeatedly reaffirmed that China possesses indisputable sovereignty over
the Dongsha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Nansha Islands
and waters adjacent to these Islands. It is apparent that what these statements deal
with is ownership of islands enclosed by the dotted line rather than the entire
waters. As for the notion of “adjacent waters,” senior Indonesian diplomat Djalal
believed that it is difficult to understand its legal meaning without a clear defini-
tion. He said that there is no such concept in the 1982 Convention, which only
defines enclosed seas, archipelagic waters, territorial seas, contiguous zone, EEZ,
continental shelf and high seas. The Convention stipulates that the measurement
of these maritime areas should start from base points or baseline adjacent to the
mainland, but not by arbitrarily drawing them on the sea.43 It seems that Djalal has
misunderstood the concept of “adjacent waters.” The phrase that “islands within
the dotted line and their adjacent waters” stated by China shall refer to relevant
jurisdictional waters delimited for islands encircled by the line according to the
1982 Convention.
Barry Wain, a columnist of the Asian Wall Street Journal with an American
background, wrote in a article titled “Beijing Should Erase the ‘U-Shaped Line’”
that if the U-shaped line merely represents China’s claim to islands, Beijing
should erase it from the map immediately to prevent any reduction or damage to
its claim.44 Such a remark is apparently ill-intentioned. The dotted line has been in
existence for more than half a century since its publication in 1947, which consti-
tutes the historical evidence of China’s jurisdiction in the South China Sea. If the
dotted line, on the grounds that it is limited to show island ownership, should be
erased, why didn’t Mr. Wain urge the Philippines to erase its treaty limits which
function the same way? According to Zou Keyuan, the dotted line on the map,
together with other evidence, can be deemed as support for China’s claim over the
South China Sea. He points out that
the line can help China claim all the islands inside the line, particularly sub-
merged banks and shoals. The line is also evidence to help China delimit the
maritime boundary with other countries in the South China Sea.45
Therefore, no matter how the legal status of the dotted line is to be determined, its
presence on the map can never be deleted, but rather should be defended.
To sum up, it is known that the Taiwan authorities first proposed the idea
of “Chinese historical waters” in 1993, triggering scholarly debate about the
legal status of the dotted line of the South China Sea. Some argue that his-
toric waters are “internal waters.” However, the ROC government has never
claimed waters inside the dotted line as “internal waters” as foreign ships
could navigate freely in the area without any protests ever since the publica-
tion of the map containing the dotted line in 1948. As such, waters enclosed by
the dotted line cannot be “historic waters.” Some other scholars believe that
maritime area has to fulfill three requirements, namely effectiveness, passage
of time and acquiescence of other states to be called “historic waters.” How-
ever, rarely have authorities across the Taiwan Strait exercised sovereignty
over the waters, with navigation freedom and fishing freedom in it totally
unrestricted since the publication of the dotted line. In other words, waters
enclosed by the dotted line are not historic waters due to ineffective control.
Taiwan later dropped “historic waters” from its Law on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone. The academia in China’s mainland insisted on using the
term “historic rights,” which was however also dismissed by countries sur-
rounding the South China Sea due to China’s failure to exercise continuous
jurisdiction over waters within the line.
Some scholars have put forward a third interpretation, regarding it as “a mari-
time boundary line.” Such an opinion is tenable when considering the context in
which the dotted line was drawn; however, it failed to act as a boundary line in
practice afterward. Besides, marine laws issued by the Chinese government (e.g.
the 1958 Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on
China’s Territorial Sea) generally stipulate that archipelagoes enclosed by the dot-
ted line are part of China’s territory while the entire maritime area is not included.
It is therefore less pragmatic to regard the dotted line as a maritime boundary
line. A more acceptable view is to consider the dotted line as “an island owner-
ship line” since it is drawn around the outermost features of the South China
Sea islands. The dotted line is drawn by using a simple method of geographic
shorthand, the purpose of which is to encompass all features within a single line
without having to list them one by one. What the line defines is the ownership of
archipelagoes within it, not the entire waters. What’s more, the PRC has reiterated
repeatedly through its statements and marine laws that China possesses indis-
putable sovereignty over the Dongsha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands, the Xisha
Islands, the Nansha Islands and maritime areas adjacent to them. These state-
ments clearly refer to the ownership of the archipelago instead of all the waters
within the dotted line. Thus it is acceptable to consider the dotted line as line that
delineates island ownership. That said, the value of the dotted line will have to be
recognized regardless of the decision concerning its legal status. The existence
of the dotted line for more than half a century is strong historical evidence of
China’s jurisdiction in the South China Sea, which underpins China’s claim to
the islands within the line in settling maritime boundary disputes with countries
surrounding the South China Sea.
Notes
1 Song, Y.H., & Yu, P.K.H. (1994). China’s Historic Waters’ in the South China Sea: An
Analysis from Taiwan, ROC. American Asian Review, 12(4), pp. 86–88.
2 ‘Policy Guidelines for the South China Sea’, republished in Sun, K.M. (1995). Policy
of the Republic of China towards the South China Sea: Recent Developments. Marine
Policy, 19(5), p. 403.
3 Sun, K.M. (1995). Policy of the Republic of China towards the South China Sea:
Recent Developments. Marine Policy, 19(5), p. 403.
4 Odgaard, L. (2002). Maritime Security between China and Southeast Asia: Conflict
and Cooperation in the Making of Regional Order. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing
Compancy, p. 92.
Analysis from Taiwan, ROC. American Asian Review, 12(4), p. 89.
6 Ibid., p. 92.
7 Kaye, S.B. (2004). Territorial Sea Baselines Along Ice-Covered Coasts: International
Practice and Limits of the Law of the Sea. Ocean Development & International Law,
35(1), p. 90.
8 Valencia, M.J., Van Dyke, J.M., & Ludwig, N.A. (1999). Sharing the Resources of the
South China Sea. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, p. 28.
11 Zou, K.Y. (2001). Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice. Ocean
Development & International Law, 32(2), pp. 161–162.
13 Song, Y.-H. (2002). United States and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: A
Study of Ocean Law and Politics. Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland, p. 142.
15 Zou, K.Y. (2005). Law of the Sea in East Asia: Issues and Prospects. London: Rout-
ledge, p. 53.
16 Chen, H.Y. (1997). Compilation and Translation of the Sea Laws and Treaties of South-
east Asia. Taipei: Center for Southeast Asian Studies of National Chi Nan University,
pp. 244, 248.
17 Farrell, E.C. (1998). The Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Law of the Sea: An
Analysis of Vietnamese Behaviour within the Emerging International Oceans Regime.
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 70.
19 Pan, S.Y. (1996). The Spratlys Archipelago, Oil Politics, International Law (in Chi-
nese). Hong Kong: Hong Kong Economic Herald Press, p. 61.
Development & International Law, 32(2), p. 162.
21 See www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm (accessed
on April 15, 2020).
22 Yehuda, Z.B. (1984). Historic Rights. In R. Bernhardt (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Pub-
lic International Law, Instalment 7, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co.,
pp. 120–121.
23 Wu, S.C. (Ed.). (2001). Collection of Documents Relating to South China Sea Issues
(in Chinese). Haikou: Hainan Publishing House, p. 187.
25 Song, Y.H., & Yu, P.K.H. (1994). China’s Historic Waters in the South China Sea: An
26 Thao, N.H. (1998). China’s Maritime Moves Raise Neighbors’ Hackles. Vietnam Law
and Legal Forum, pp. 21–22.
27 Dispute Regarding the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf
of the People’s Republic of China Which Was Passed on 26 June 1998, UN Law of the
Sea Bulletin 38, 1998, p. 55.
28 Song, Y.-H. (2002). United States and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: A
29 Zhao, L.H. (1996). Research on the Law of the Sea. Beijing: Peking University Press,
p. 38.
31 Ibid., p. 181.
32 Xu, S. (2000). The Connotation of the Dotted Line in the South China Sea (in Chi-
nese). In Proceedings of South China Sea in the 21st Century: Problems and Prospects.
Haikou: Center for South China Sea Studies, p. 80.
33 Odgaard, L. (2002). Maritime Security between China and Southeast Asia: Conflict
and Cooperation in the Making of Regional Order. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing
Compancy, p. 90.
34 Hashym, D. (1995). Spratly Dispute Needs Democratic Settlement. Jakarta Post, Janu-
ary 2, p. 5.
35 National Office of Policy, Law and Regulation, State Oceanic Administration (ed.)
(1988). Collection of the Sea Laws and Regulations of the People’s Republic of China.
Beijing: Ocean Press (in Chinese and English), p. 10.
36 Ning, L. (1996). Baseline for Claims on Territorial Waters. Business Times, June 19,
Singapore, p, 10.
ledge, p. 57.
38 Gao, Z.G. (1994). The South China Sea: From Conflict to Cooperation? Ocean Devel-
opment & International Law, 25(3), p. 346.
40 Yu, S.K.-T. (2001). Legal Nature and Status of the U-Shaped Line and the Inside
Waters in Our South China Sea (in Chinese). In Proceedings of South China Sea in the
21st Century: Problems and Prospects. Haikou: Center for South China Sea Studies,
pp. 427–439.
41 Prescott, V. (1985). The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World. London: Methuen,
p. 235.
42 Kittichaisaree, K. (1987). The Law of the Sea and Maritime Boundary Delimitation in
South-East Asia. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, p. 156.
ary 2, p. 5.
44 Wain, B. (2000). Beijing Should Erase the ‘U-Shaped Line’. The Asian Wallstreet
Journal, May 26, p. 10.
ledge, p. 59.
9 A critical review of research on
the legal status of the dotted line
The U-shaped dotted line in the South China Sea first appeared in 1947, when
the ROC government published The Map of the Location of the South China
Sea Islands. The line encompasses the four island groups, namely Dongsha
Islands, Xisha Islands, Zhongsha Islands and Nansha Islands, with its south-
ernmost end set at around 4°N latitude. The reason why the ROC government
published this line is unclear, but it can be inferred from an official letter it
sent to the Guangdong Provincial Government in which the Xisha and Nansha
Islands were placed under the administration of Guangdong Province.1 Recent
years have witnessed escalation of disputes over the South China Sea. In par-
ticular, since the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea came into
force, some Southeast Asian countries surrounding the South China Sea con-
tinue to question the legal status of the dotted line. Given there has also been
much research has been done in this regard, this chapter seeks to assess different
views from a critical perspective.
9.1 The claim to the enclosed waters as “historic waters”

The claim to the waters enclosed by the dotted line as “historic waters” has sparked
debate in academia. First of all, what is the definition of “historic waters”? The
possibility of finding an authoritative definition of “historical waters” in exist-
ing international convention is almost null. There are, however, a few scholarly
interpretations. L. H. Bouchez, for example, defines the term “historic waters” as
“waters over which the Coastal State, contrary to the generally applicable rules of
international law, clearly, effectively, continuously, and over a substantial period
of time, exercise sovereign rights with the acquiescence of the community of
States.”2 Stuart B. Kaye, an Australian researcher, also says that
historic waters, which are most often considered in the context of the smaller
subset of historic bays, are recognized in international law as a legitimate
exception to the rules applicable to territorial sea baselines. They require
certain criteria to be met: first a littoral state would have to make and main-
tain a long-standing assertion of sovereignty over the waters in question, and
second the international community would have to acquiesce to such claim.3
Taiwanese scholar Steven Kuan-Tsyh Yu basically holds the same view. He
writes that
the legal elements underpinning the concept of historic waters pursuant to

customary international law shall include: on the one hand, the state claim-
ing “historic waters” must exercise long-standing sovereignty over the area
continuously while obtaining the acquiescence of foreign States; the claim-
ant State is responsible to produce evidence in the event of any international
disputes on “historic waters.”4
The previous definitions demonstrate that three elements – namely effectiveness,

passage of time and the attitude of other states – are essential to historic waters
claim. Kuan-Ming Sun elaborates on these three elements in terms of practice:
Effectiveness means that the control exercised over the waters must be sover-
eign jurisdiction and it must in fact be exclusive. Normally a public act, proc-
lamation or legislation, will be required to exhibit the intention to exercise
sovereignty. The intention may however be inferred from a fact, for example,
where exclusive fisheries have been established. Proof that local fishermen
have in fact fished for a long time but not exclusively will not, however, be
sufficient. Nor will the mere regulation of navigation. Moreover, the sover-
eignty claimed must be effectively exercised. This means that there must be
active and continuous assertion of dominion over the waters. In other words,
mere legislative declarations of jurisdiction are insufficient. Proof is required,
at least, of an assertion of power to exclude all foreign vessels from navigat-
ing, as well as from fishing, in the area. As to passage of time, it has been
pointed out that the real question here is the relationship between interested
States and their conduct in respect of the claims. Although, on the face of it,
the longer a situation has endured the greater the legal stability it acquires, the
process of historic consolidation could be as rapid as the time reasonably to
be allowed for interested States to react to a claim. Thus, strictly speaking,
time has no direct legal relevance. This in turn makes the other two elements
the most significant considerations. With respect of the attitude of foreign
States, the essential consideration is toleration on the part of the community
of nations if a historically conditioned exception to the standard regime is to
be established. In practice, this means inaction or lack of protest. To satisfy
this, of course, the acts of claimant States must be notorious enough to give
other States the opportunity to object.5
Secondly, it is the question of whether “historic waters” can be regarded as

“internal waters.” Most scholars hold a positive attitude on this issue. According
to Steven Kuan-Tsyh Yu, analysis of the jurisprudence of the International Court
of Justice shows that “historical waters” are “internal waters” in the presence of
inherent historical rights. Moreover, as the study prepared by the UN Secretariat
displays, it is possible for “historic waters” to be justified as “internal waters” or
Review of research on the dotted line 121
as “part of the territorial sea” because the status in principle depends on what kind
of sovereignty was exercised by the States. If the State allows the innocent pas-
sage of foreign ships through the waters claimed, it could acquire a historic title
to these waters as territorial sea. On the other hand, if foreign ships could enter
the waters without permission of the state, the waters feature the status of internal
waters.6 Mark J. Valencia, a scholar of East-West Center, Hawaii, holds the same
view. He, together with another two researchers, writes in the book Sharing the
Resources of the South China Sea that:
“Historic waters” are usually considered to be, because they are usually near-
shore bays. But historic waters are not governed by one single regime or are
sometimes viewed as part of a coastal nation’s territorial sea or as having a
unique status, depending on how sovereignty and jurisdiction have been exer-
cised over them. A nation that permitted passage by foreign ships, for example,
would have difficulty making a historic claim of internal waters. It may also be
possible to have historic waters with yet another status. For example, the new
concept of archipelagic waters indicates that certain historic waters may have
a unique sui genesis status. The central questions are what limitations such as
historic waters would impose on freedom of navigation and whether it would
constitute an exclusive claim to resources in and under these waters.7
The third question is that whether waters within the dotted line can be con-
sidered to be “historic waters.” Yann-huei Song and Peter Kien-hong Yu hold a
negative view on this. They believe that
Under the legal regime of “internal waters,” a coastal state exercises full sov-
ereignty over those waters which lie on the landward side of the baseline
from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured and foreign ships
enjoy no right of innocent passage through a state’s internal waters, unless
granted by the state as a privilege. A state’s lakes, canals, rivers, ports, and
harbors have exactly the same status as “inland waters.” Should the waters of
the South China Sea encircled by the “U”-shaped line and claimed as China’s
historic waters have the legal status of “internal waters”? First, the ROC gov-
ernment has never claimed the waters of the South China Sea enclosed by the
“U”-shaped line are “internal waters.” Moreover, foreign vessels, including
warships, have continuously and freely navigated the waters of the South
China Sea enclosed by the line since the map was published by the ROC in
1948. No action by the ROC has ever been taken to protest foreign vessels’
passage through the enclosed waters. Considering these two reasons, it seems
safe to conclude that the answer to the question is “no.”8
Steven Kuan-Tsyh Yu also shows his disagreement. He notes that:
In effect, the ROC government did not claim waters encircled by the dotted
line as “historic waters” when it promulgated the Location Map of the South
China Sea Islands in 1947, nor has it in fact exercised sovereignty afterwards.
That means the government has taken no action in denying foreign ships
fishing in the waters, or stopping foreign ships from navigation in the area or
foreign aircrafts from flying over the area. The government has done nothing
to require foreign ships or aircrafts to abide by norms that are distinctive from
the general international law in or over the area, or to take other measures to
exercise sovereignty. The sole actuality indicating exercise of sovereignty
was that when foreign airplanes flew over the area or foreign ships invaded
regional maritime sea under China’s effective jurisdiction, China warned it
off or forced an expulsion. In other words, since Chinese government has
done nothing to exercise sovereignty in reality, it is unnecessary for for-
eign states to react by negative acquiesce or positive protest. Hence, waters
enclosed by the dotted line fail to be claimed as “historic waters.”9
Zou Keyuan holds a similar view. He stresses that:
The exercise of authority in the area by either China’s mainland or China’s

Taiwan has been infrequent since the promulgation of the line. Even these
occasional exercises focused on the islands within the line rather than on
the water areas. The freedom of navigation and freedom of fishery seem
to be unaffected by these exercises. Thus, the question of whether there is
effective control over the area within the line so as to establish it as historic
waters arises. It may be argued that the relative frequency of the exercise of
authority should be considered vis a vis other claimant countries. Yet, there
are still doubts on how China could establish its claim of historic waters in
the South China Sea. Furthermore, as mentioned above, China has refused to
recognize the Gulf of Tonkin as historic waters. It can be questioned, if the
Gulf of Tonkin is not regarded as historic waters, how could the entire South
China Sea become historic waters? Chinese refusal in one area seems to rule
out an assumption or assertion that the water area within the U-shaped line is
China’s historic waters.10
The previously mentioned concerns may have led Taiwan to abandon its claim
that waters within the dotted line are “historic waters.” Nevertheless, such a
phrase was dropped on the second reading of Territorial Sea Law in the Legisla-
tive Yuan despite that it did appear in an earlier draft. In fact, the concept of “his-
toric waters” had not been mentioned before the Law on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone of the ROC was promulgated on January 21, 1998.
9.2 The claim of “historic rights” to enclosed waters

On January 27, 1995, Chinese ocean strategist Pan Shiying published an article
entitled “Rise to Safeguard Blue Territory” in the China Ocean News. He pointed
out that China possessed “historic rights” over all islands and the broad mari-
time areas within the dotted line. Pan further pointed out that the existence of the
“nine-dash line” in the South China Sea had never had any objections from other
countries. China’s claim of “historic waters” preceded the commonly acknowl-
edged modern law of the continental shelf. Modern ocean law cannot therefore
cancel or negate historical laws and international practices.11
Opinions concerning the definition of “historic right” vary. For example,
Yehuda Z. Blum says that
the term “historic rights” denotes the possession by a State, over certain land
or maritime areas, of rights that would not normally accrue to it under the
general rules of international law, such rights having been acquired by that
State through a process of historical consolidation.”
He adds that
historic rights are the product of a lengthy process comprising a long series of
acts, omissions and patterns of behaviour which, in their entirety, and through
their cumulative effect, bring such rights into being and consolidate them into
rights valid in international law.12
Besides, some scholars believe that the regime for historic rights is determined
according to customary international law. Elferink, for example, argues that:
The LOS Convention does not define the legal regime of historic title or his-
toric waters, although it recognizes these regimes in Articles 10(6), 15, and
46 (b). In the Libya/Tunisia Continental Shelf Case, the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) noted that general international law “does not provide for a
single ‘regime’ for ‘historic waters’ or ‘historic bays,’ but only for a particular
regime for each of the concrete, recognized cases of ‘historic waters’ or ‘his-
toric bays.’ The court further noted that this regime is based on acquisition
and occupation, which is distinct from the regime of the continental shelf,
which is based on rights existing ipso facto and ab initio. Furthermore, his-
toric title requires the general acquiescence or recognition by other states.13
However, most scholars choose to equate “historic rights” with “historic

waters.” Yann-huei Song and Peter Kien-hong Yu, for example, state that:
The 1962 UN Study suggested that at least three factors must be taken into
consideration in determining whether a state has acquired a historic title to
a maritime area. These factors are: 1) the exercise of authority over the area
by the state claiming the historic right; 2) the continuity of this exercise of
authority; and 3) the attitude of foreign states. In 1976, Colombia proposed
a draft article to the Second Committee of the UNCLOS III, in which para-
graph 1 reads: A bay shall be regarded as historic only if it satisfies all of the
following requirements: (a) that the State or States which claim it to be such
shall have clearly stated that claim and shall be able to demonstrate that they
have had sole possession of the waters of that bay continuously, peaceably
and for a long time, by mean of acts of sovereignty or jurisdiction in the form
of repeated and continuous official regulations on the passage of ships, fish-
ing and other activities of the nationals or ships of other states; (b) that such
practice is expressly or tacitly accepted by third States, particularly neigh-
bouring States. In addition to these requirements, the burden of proof rests on
the state which claims historic title to the questioned waters.14
American researchers Valencia et al. hold the same opinion. They write that:
To answer the question of what criteria would be used to determine the valid-
ity of a historical title claim, the International Law Commission prepared a
study in 1962. Entitled Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including His-
toric Bays, the study concluded that three factors should be considered in
determining whether a historical claim is valid: (1) the exercise of authority
over the area, (2) the continuity over time of this exercise of authority, and
(3) the attitude of foreign states to the claim. The exercise of authority over
the waters includes the carrying on of activities normally performed by
sovereigns, such as the exclusion or regulation of foreign fishing vessels,
measurement of the seas, placement of beacons or navigational instruments,
and maintenance of ownership through legislation. In addition, if action is
required to assert a nation’s authority, that action must be taken with clear
expression of exclusive rights over the area. It is not clear whether viola-
tors must be forcefully removed, or if vehement protests would be sufficient.
To establish continuity of the exercise of authority, a nation must exhibit
repeated or continued usage over a period of time. “Usage” means a regular
pattern of behavior or repetition of the same or similar activities by the same
persons. The exact length required is not established, and is determined on
a case-by-case basis. The requirement of toleration or acquiescence by for-
eign states does not require formal consent. Inaction is sufficient. Moreover,
acceptance can be conveyed through an absence of challenge to the claim.15
If these views are correct, claims to “historical rights” over the waters within
the dotted line is similar to claims that the waters within the dotted line are “his-
torical waters.” As Yann-huei Song and Peter Kien-hong write:
Since the “ROC” has never continuously exercised sovereignty over the
waters of the South China Sea as internal waters, territorial sea, or archipe-
lagic waters, it is safe to conclude that a historic title has not been established.
The “ROC” has failed to meet the requirements that determine whether a
historic title to a maritime area has been established. Moreover, the “ROC”
government never asserted an official claim to the enclosed waters as historic
waters prior to 1990. Therefore, the states whose interests would be affected
by the claim need not respond nor take action to invalidate the “ROC’”s
claims.16
On the provision of “historic rights” in the Law of the People’s Republic of
China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf adopted on July
26, 1998, Zou Keyuan comments that:
What is most unique in the EEZ Law is its Article 14 which provides that
“[t]he provisions of this Law shall not affect the historic rights enjoyed by
the People’s Republic of China.” It is not usual in national legislation on the
EEZ/continental shelf to make provisions for historic rights as such. It is
not clear what this term exactly refers to because PRC gave no explanations
on this clause during its legislative process. However, it is widely believed
that this provision is related to China’s territorial and maritime claims in the
South China Sea based upon the U-shaped line drawn in the Chinese map
published by the Chinese government in 1947. The legal definition of this
line is still controversial, but generally the line is regarded as a line to indi-
cate the ownership of the islands within it, although the term “historic rights”
goes beyond this. This complex expression indicates China’s dilemma in the
South China Sea. On the one hand, China would like to seek maximum inter-
est in the South China Sea and to enclose the South China Sea by using the
above line as marking the limit of the historic waters of China. On the other
hand, it has to be realized that “historic rights” are not equivalent to “historic
waters” in international law, though the former may carry a broader mean-
ing and even include ‘historic waters’. The Chinese inclusion of ‘historic
rights’ in the EEZ law further indicates that such rights are not the rights
derived from the historic waters. Since they are included in the EEZ law, it
may be assumed that these rights are confined to rights of fisheries where
there is clear historical evidence in the South China Sea favourable to China.
As to other rights to natural resources, they are justifiable only on the basis
of historical evidence acceptable in international law. It should be mentioned
that Article 14 of the PRC law has already been criticized by other countries
concerned. Therefore, China has the responsibility to clarify to the public the
exact meaning of Article 14 of its EEZ and Continental Shelf Law.17
In another article, Zou offers his interpretations of historic rights in the Law on
the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf from three aspects:
First, it can be interpreted to mean that the sea area in question should have the
same legal status as areas under the UNCLOS III (EEZ and continental shelf)
regimes. Second, it can be interpreted to mean that certain sea areas to which
China’s historical rights are claimed go beyond the 200 nautical mile limit.
Third, it can be interpreted to mean that the sea areas to which China’s histori-
cal rights apply fall within the 200 nautical mile limit but will come under an
alternative national management regime different from the EEZ regime. In
this third view, the claimed areas of historical rights can be treated as quasi-
territorial sea, or as historical waters with some modifications, or as “tempered
historic waters.” In the meanwhile, Zou Keyuan put that: Since the concept of
historic rights is not clearly defined in international law, it would be useful if
China were to explain the rationale behind its state practice in these contexts.
With a view to maximizing its maritime interests in the adjacent seas, incorpo-
rating the historic claim in the EEZ law, rather than the Law on the Territorial
Sea, seems to be a wiser choice. There are a number of possible considerations
behind such a choice. First, China is not confident enough that its historic
waters claim to the water areas within the U-shaped line could stand up in
international law, though it has attempted tacitly to enclose such waters as
China’s historic waters. Second, the concept of historic rights is broader than
that of historic waters and includes the latter. Thus it can give China the flex-
ibility of pushing forward its claim from historic rights to historic waters, if
necessary. Finally, we have to be aware that the embodying of the historic
rights in its EEZ/continental shelf law may show that China no longer regards
the waters within the U-shaped line as historic waters, if such waters are only
to be categorized as internal waters or territorial sea.18
Zou further points out that:
Perhaps the Chinese have not seen the distinction between historic rights and
traditional rights or are confused by it. Historic rights is a legal term whose
application depends upon the fulfillment of the preconditions imposed by
international law, while the term traditional rights is a general term denoting
rights existing in history. On the other hand, the perceived excessive claims
put forward by other South China Sea countries, such as the Philippines and
Malaysia, who have claimed some islands in the South China Sea based
upon the 200 nautical mile EEZ rights of the LOS Convention, may have
encouraged China to insist that its South China Sea claim is based upon the
U-shaped line. In China’s view, a claim derived from historic rights may
seem more forceful and valid in law than claims simply based upon the EEZ
concept. Since there are no definitive rules in international law which govern
the status of maritime historic rights, China’s claim is not a violation of inter-
national law. Similarly, since there are no such rules, it is doubtful whether
China’s claim could be established in international law. What is more prob-
lematic is China’s implementation of what it has claimed in the South China
Sea or elsewhere where China may assert historic rights and interests. As
the ICJ once stated, general international law does not provide for a single
“regime” of historic waters or historic bays, but only for a particular regime
for each of several specific, generally recognized cases of historic waters or
historic bays. From this point of view, China’s claim can be regarded as one
of these particular cases, which may stand up in international law as doctrine
evolves over time.19
9.3 The dotted line as “a maritime boundary line”

Some scholars, considering the backdrop that had emerged, argue that the dot-
ted line acts as “a maritime boundary line.” Among others, Zhao Lihai, a late
professor of Peking University Law School, discussed the motivation behind
drawing the dotted line. He writes:
The South China Sea islands have been under the jurisdiction of Guangdong
Provincial Government since 1947, as evidenced in an official letter sent
from the ROC government to Guangdong Provincial Government. The letter
made clear the purpose of determining and publicizing China’s geographic
scope of its claims related to the Xisha and Nansha Islands from the very
beginning. In other words, the dotted line declared China’s sovereignty over
the South China Sea Islands which had been included in its territory since at
least 15th century. Islands and adjacent waters within the line are thus under
China’s jurisdiction and control.20
Similarly, Chen Degong from the Institute for Marine Development Strategy of
State Oceanic Administration of the PRC also points out that the nine-dotted line
could be regarded as maritime boundary, within which the PRC enjoys the his-
toric rights over the living-and non-living resources in the subsoil and seabed and
the superjacent waters in the sea areas.21 Taiwanese scholar Kuen-chen Fu holds
a similar view too. He believes that the U-shaped line was defined in 1947 when
the Truman Proclamations triggered the ocean enclosure movement across the
world during which countries scrambled for more rights over their territorial seas.
The Chinese government’s claim was in fact a response to such a global trend.
According to Fu, the U-shaped “boundary line” shares much of the same naming
and drawing methods with those of China’s land “boundary line” and is almost
equidistant between the South China Sea Islands and coastlines of neighboring
countries. The U-shaped line is a dotted line composed of eleven intermittent seg-
ments, which is enough to prove that when the U-shaped line was drawn at that
time, it was regarded as the “undetermined boundary” of China in this sea area
(similar to Sino-Burmese and Sino-Indian unsettled land borders). In other words,
the U-shaped line reserved flexibility for future negotiations between China and
its neighbouring countries in maritime boundary delimitation.22
However, Fu’s view seems partially problematic. First of all, the dotted line
in the South China Sea came into existence in the time of foreign invasion of
China’s territorial seas. The dotted line took its initial shape in 1933, when France
occupied nine small features of the Nansha Islands. It is not until the end of the
War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression that it was finalized as a precau-
tion against France’s occupation of Pattle Island of Xisha and some other features
of Nansha as well as the Philippines’ attempt to include the archipelagic groups
into its national defense space. The purpose of drawing such a line is to safeguard
China’s territorial sovereignty over the islands of the South China Sea and to
announce to the world the jurisdiction of the Chinese government in the area. It is
not, as Fu says, that the U-shaped line was delineated as a response of the Chinese
government to the Truman Declaration in its attempt to expand the scope of its
maritime territory. There is no doubt that the Truman Proclamation wielded great
influence and paved the way for extended maritime jurisdiction covering the liv-
ing and non-living resources of the continental shelf. Moreover, it also led to the
UN Continental Shelf Convention of 1958, extended fisheries zones of the 1970s
and the EEZ of the 1982 UN Convention. And yet, its influence could have hardly
reached the South China Sea waters in 1947 because, as correctly pointed out by
Prescott and Schofield:
Historically maritime boundaries only began to be significant in the middle

of the 20th century. Prior to that time state jurisdiction rarely extended more
than three nautical miles offshore. As a result, the delimitation of maritime
boundaries between states, confined in scope to such a relatively narrow band
of inshore waters, was infrequently a controversial process and almost exclu-
sively involved delimitation amongst adjacent states.23
As such, the argument that China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea are
necessarily associated with the ocean enclosure movement is rather speculative.
Secondly, the embryonic form of the U-shaped line first appeared on the South
China Sea Islands Map published by the Committee of Examining Maps for Land
and Water in its journal in 1935. It was not until 1947 when the Territorial Admin-
istration Division of Ministry of the Interior of the ROC officially marked the
U-shaped line on The Location Map of the South China Sea Islands. The dotted
line on these two maps shows the locations of the South China Sea islands rather
than acting as a “boundary line.” Basically, the dotted line is drawn around the
outermost islets and reefs, with the North Vereker Bank of the Dongshan Islands at
the northern end, the Skarbolough Shoal of the Zhongsha Islands and the Seahorse
Shoal of the Nansha Islands at the eastern end, the James Shoal of the Nansha
Islands at the Southern end, and the Vanguard Bank of the Nansha Islands at the
western end. The line was drawn by using a simple method of geographic short-
hand, namely connecting the outermost points of the outermost islands and reefs
of the archipelago and thereby including all the features within this area without
having to list them one by one. This means that the U-shaped line is a line denot-
ing ownership of islands rather than territories. As noted earlier, before the 1950s,
the territorial sea of coastal countries was limited to 3 nautical miles and interna-
tional maritime delimitation law only came to development after 1950. The ROC
government could not have taken the lead in drawing a “boundary line” in the
South China Sea. In addition, the saying that “(the dotted line) is almost equidistant
between the South China Sea Islands and coastlines of neighbouring countries” is
by no means convincing in that there are a host of submerged banks or reefs in the
South China Sea islands (James Shoal, Seahorse Shoal and Vanguard Bank are all
ten meters or so under the water). How could an equidistant line be drawn between
these submerged features and coastlines of neighbouring countries?
Thirdly, it is groundless to argue that waters in the South China Sea were
an “undetermined boundary” of China based on the intermittent nature of the
U-shaped line. The reason why the U-shaped line was broken is that according
to the specifications regarding map-making at the time, a land boundary line
should be continuous whereas a maritime bound line should be dashed. Moreover,
territorial delimitation is an act of a sovereign state and must be supported by
delimitation agreement or documents. To speculate that the dotted line is China’s
undetermined boundary in the South China Sea on the basis of its intermittency
is unfounded. It is also untenable to say that China has maintained its flexibility
in its borderline negotiations with neighbouring countries in the future, given that
the possibility for the ROC government to delimit maritime boundaries in the
South China Sea is zero.
However, some scholars do not agree with the “boundary line” argument. They
believe that boundary is necessarily linked with the exclusive territory of a country.
China has never regarded the waters within the dotted line as a national territory.
Since the announcement of the line in 1947, foreign vessels have been able to
navigate freely inside the waters without any protest from China. It is therefore
impractical to consider the dotted line as a maritime boundary line. Steven Kuan-
Tsyh Yu says that although maritime demarcation lines or outer limit lines of every
territorial sea under a country’s jurisdiction are called “boundary lines,” the mari-
time area within such lines must be “internal waters” under the full sovereignty of
the territorial state. Otherwise, the term “boundary lines” is inappropriate.24
In addition, some analysts, after examining marine laws and regulations pro-
mulgated by the PRC, suggest that it is not feasible to claim the dotted line as a
boundary line. For example, Lu Ning, a journalist from Business Times (Singa-
pore), points out that the 1958 Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea mentioned
“high seas” that separate islands in the South China Sea from the mainland and
its coastal islands. This means that China has only made territorial claims to the
Xisha and Nansha Islands and territorial sea within the 12 nautical miles limit
of these archipelagoes.25 In other words, if the dotted line is a “boundary line,”
why would there be “high seas” that separate the archipelagoes within the line
from the mainland and its coastal islands? Similarly, in the 1996 Declaration on
the Baselines of the Territorial Sea, China announced baselines of its territorial
sea adjacent to the mainland and those of the territorial sea adjacent to the Xisha
Islands. The baselines of the territorial sea are linked by 28 base points encircling
the Xisha Islands. Again, if we equate the dotted line with a maritime boundary
line, why should China bother to draw baselines around the Xisha Islands, which
it encompasses? As Keyuan Zou points out,
the publication of the Paracels’ baselines indicates that the PRC did not con-
sider the traditional line the maritime boundary line in the South China Sea.
Otherwise the Paracels’ baselines are redundant.26
9.4 The dotted line as “an island ownership line”

What “an island ownership line” suggests is that the South China Sea Islands
enclosed by the dotted line and waters adjacent to them are in the possession of
China. As Gao Zhiguo states,
the boundary line on the Chinese map is merely a line that delineates owner-
ship of islands rather than a maritime boundary in the conventional sense. A
careful study of Chinese documents reveals that China never has claimed the
entire water column of the South China Sea, but only the islands and their
surrounding waters within the line.27
Steven Kuan-Tsyh Yu holds a similar opinion. He argues that the “island owner-
ship line” asserts a country’s sovereignty over islands, reefs, shoals and banks
within it. The legal status of maritime areas within the line is determined by
that of islands or archipelagoes inside the line, which is irrelevant to the “island
ownership line.” There are a multitude of features scattered in the maritime area
of the South China Sea, and the simplest way is to encompass them with the
“line that delineates ownership of islands” lest territorial sovereignty is jeopar-
dized by any means considering the difficulties in identifying each name of these
islands. Such a technique was already applied in the South China Sea during
the colonial era. For example, it was adopted when America and Mexico signed
a treaty of peace in Paris on December 10, 1898, in which Spain ceded all its
claims to the Philippine Islands to the United States. Other precedents include
the 1887 Sino-French Convention and the division of islands within the Gulf of
Thailand between Cambodia and Vietnam in 1939. Following these examples,
the ROC government delineated the U-shaped line to announce China’s claims
of the sovereignty over all islands, reefs, shoals and cays within it. Therefore,
as Steven Kuan-Tsyh Yu puts it, “it is plain enough that it is ‘a line of islands
ownership.’”28
Finally, some scholars basically agree with such a view. For example, Hasyim
Djala, an Indonesian senior diplomatist, presumes that what China claims was
limited to the features but not the whole maritime area encompassed by the dotted
line which first appeared on a map published by the ROC government in 1947.
He argues that, given the line has neither definition nor coordinates, it is incon-
ceivable that in 1947, when general international law still recognized only three
nautical miles territorial sea limit, that China would claim the entire South China
Sea. He further states that a careful reading of China’s Law on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone promulgated in 1992 confirms such an assumption, despite
the fact that some Chinese researchers seem to imply that China claims waters
adjacent to these islands as well.29
However, Zou Keyuan holds a different view. He argues that
The line can help China claim all the islands inside the line, particularly sub-
merged banks and shoals. The line is also evidence to help China delimit the
maritime boundary with other countries in the South China Sea. Thus the
Chinese traditional maritime boundary line has considerable importance for
the resolution of the Spratly Islands dispute as well as to the delimitation of
the jurisdictional waters between China and other coastal states. Its existence
certainly favors the Chinese side and the line could be regarded as a good
card in the negotiation game for the Spratlys settlement.30
To strengthen his point, Zou Keyuan cites Charles C. Hyde’s view:

A map published by a state, or under its auspices, or purporting to reflect
its position, and which it has been disposed to utilize as a means of publicly
revealing its position, may be fairly accepted as establishing that when issued
it represented what that state deemed the limits of its domain. . . . [W]hen a
series of maps of such a kind, appearing within a few decades, tell the same
story and depict substantially the same limits, the conclusion is justified that
they mark a frontier beyond which the interested state cannot go without
some fresh and definite and respectable process of acquisition.31
Therefore, as Zou points out:
The existence of the line is a fact that must be considered in the settlement
of the Spratly Islands dispute unless it were formally abandoned by China. It
can be argued that this is evidence to show the extent of Chinese jurisdiction
in the South China Sea.32
In conclusion, discussions on the legal status of the dotted line in the South
China Sea in recent years mainly focus four aspects, namely “historic waters,”
“historic rights,” “a maritime boundary line” and “an island ownership line.”
A review of these discussions shows that most researchers believe that waters
enclosed by the dotted line should be claimed as “historic waters.” Despite
that, the Chinese government has never exercised exclusive control over the
waters enclosed by the dotted line and foreign ships have for long enjoyed
the freedom of navigation there, making the argument of “historic waters”
untenable.
As for claims of “historic rights,” researchers seem to generally equate the term
with “historic waters.” They believe that, as the Chinese government has never
exercised sovereignty continuously over the enclosed waters, hence there are no
“historic rights.” Regarding “historic rights” in Chinese government’s Law on the
Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, some say that this shows
China on longer regards waters within the dotted line as historic waters which can
only be applicable to internal waters or territorial sea.
In addition, analysts think that it is inappropriate to regard the dotted line as “a
maritime boundary line” since China has never treated waters within the line as its
territory and lodged no protest against free navigations for foreign vessels in the
area. This is made crystal clear in the 1958 Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea
and the 1996 Declaration on the Baselines of the Territorial Sea.
In fact, the majority view is to regard the dotted line as a line that delineates
ownership of islands. On the one hand, it was drawn against the backdrop that in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries the use of a simple form of geographic short-
hand in delimiting maritime boundaries was popular as such a technique helped
avoid the need to name every features encircled within the line. On the other
hand, the Chinese government has repeatedly reiterated its indisputable sover-
eignty over the South China Sea islands and their adjacent waters through marine
legislation and statements, all of which are targeted at the ownership of islands
within the line rather than the entire waters. It is therefore reasonable and accept-
able to define the dotted line as a line that delineates the ownership of islands in
the South China Sea.
Notes
2 Bouchez, L.J. (1964). The Regime of Bays in Internatonal Law. Hague: Martinus
Nijthoff, p. 281.
3 Kaye, S.B. (2004). Territorial Sea Baselines along Ice-Covered Coasts: International
Practice and Limits of the Law of the Sea. Ocean Development & International Law,
35(1), p. 90.
pp. 427–439.
pp. 427–439.
pp. 427–439.
11 Pan, S.Y. (1995, January 27). China Ocean News.
12 Yehuda, Z.B. (1984). Historic Rights. In R. Bernhardt (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Pub-
lic International Law, Instalment 7. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co.,
pp. 120–121.
13 Elferink, A.G.O. (2001). The Islands in the South China Sea: How Does their Presence
Limit the Extent of the High Seas and the Area and the Maritime Zones of the Mainland
Coasts? Ocean Development & International Law, 32(2), p. 172.
17 Zou, K.Y. (2001). China’s Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf: Develop-
ments, Problems, and Prospects. Marine Policy, 25(1), p. 74.
19 Ibid., p. 183.
p. 37.
21 Song, Y.-h. (2002). United States and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: A
22 Fu, K.-C. (1995). The Legal Status of the SCS and the Possibility of Cross-Strait Co-
operation on Equal Footing. Paper presented at the 1995 Hainan and Nanhai Academic
Symposium, Taipei, October 6–17, 1995 (in Chinese).
23 Prescott, V., & Schofield, C. (2005). The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World.
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 215–217.
pp. 427–439.
25 Ning, L. (1996). Baseline for Claims on Territorial Waters. Business Times, June 19,
Singapore, p. 10.
ledge, p. 57.
27 Gao, Z.G. (1994). The South China Sea: From Conflict to Cooperation? Ocean Devel-
pp. 427–439.
ary 2, p. 5.
30 Wain, B. (2000). Beijing Should Erase the ‘U-Shaped Line’. The Asian Wallstreet
Journal, May 26, p. 10.
ledge, p. 57.
Islands. The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 14(1), pp. 49–50.
Part IV
Mixed reactions to new

developments in contested
waters
10 China’s struggle for sovereignty
over Xisha and Nansha Islands
before and after the Second
Sino-Japanese War
Xisha and Nansha Islands in the South China Sea serve as hubs of transport
between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean and therefore enjoy vital strate-
gic significance. In the early 20th century, Japan and France invaded Xisha and
Nansha for the control and mastery of the South China Sea. In their fight for
sovereignty over these territories, the Chinese authorities and people have made
great sacrifice and endeavors.
10.1 Japan and France’s illegal occupation of Xisha Islands

and Nansha Islands before the Second Sino-Japanese War
In 1907, in response to Japanese government’s campaign of Going Fishing in
the South, Miyazaki and other Japanese of Koyama Prefecture took the chance
to head south and reached Nansha Islands, which were then touted as a fairly
promising fishing ground, after they returned Japan. Since then, a large number of
Japanese fishing boats sailed south to Nansha to conduct fishing activities in the
region. In 1917, Hirata Uchida, Ikeda Kinmo, Komatsu Chongli and a few other
Japanese businessmen organized investigation teams to carry out unauthorized
activities in Xisha and Nansha Islands. The next year, Unosuke Ogura, the vet-
eran Japanese navy commander, was dispatched by Lasha Phosphate Mine Co.,
Ltd., to lead a so-called expedition team sailing for Nansha. The “expedition” was
aimed at “incorporating uninhabited islands into the territory of the Great Japa-
nese Empire.” The Ogura team arrived at five islands of Nansha – Beizi, Nanzi,
Xiyue, Zhongye and Taiping – and set up signs of occupation on Xiyue Dao.
In 1920, advised by Ogura, Soejima Tumba, another Japanese navy com-
mander, rallied a team of 15 members, headed for Nansha to conduct the second
“expedition,” during which the Japanese seized by force four islands of China,
i.e. Nanyue, Hongxiu, Nanwei and Anbo Shazhou (Amboyna Cay). In the same
year, Hitoshi Nakamura, president of Lhasa Phosphate Mines, made an unau-
thorized change to the name of Nansha Islands to “Shinnan Gunto (the Xinnan
Islands).” In 1921, the company began work on facilities such as dormitories,
powder depots, warehouses, meteorological stations, railways, docks, hospitals
and shrines on Taiping Dao, and more than 100 Japanese people migrated to the
island for exploitation of phosphates, which were then shipped back to Japan for
138 New developments in contested waters
sale. The scope of their mining activities extended to Nanzi Dao in 1923. The
Lhasa Phosphate Mines had been operating until 1929, when the international
financial crisis broke out, but by then, the phosphate deposits on Taiping Dao
were depleted. The Japanese who worked on the islands then returned Japan. Rel-
evant statistics reveal that more than 26,000 tons of phosphorite of Nansha were
plundered by the Japanese during the eight-year-period.1
Apart from resources in Nansha, Japan also longed for the phosphate ores of
Xisha. On September 20, 1920, the Japanese Nanxing Industrial Corporation sent
an inquiry to the Saigon Navy Commander of the French colonial government
of South Vietnam to confirm the sovereignty of Xisha. The commander replied,
“there is no information about Xisha in the naval archives. Despite the lack of
relevant records, as far as I know, Xisha Islands do not belong to France.” Such
a response was much anticipated and appreciated by the Japanese side as they
plotted to further mine phosphorite on Yongxing Dao of Xisha.2 In 1921, Ikeda
Clan, Japan’s “Taiwan Monopoly Director,” and others maneuvered Hu Ruin-
ian, a Cantonese businessman, into deceiving the Cantonese government under
the name of Xisha Islands Industrial Corporation which was allowed to under-
take reclamation, mining and fishery in Xisha. In addition, they also obtained a
reclamation certificate from Yaxian County to raise fish in Fushuizhou outside
Changjiang Port. The corporation’s real operator, Japan Nanxing Industrial Cor-
poration, then laid railways on Yongxing Dao, built warehouses, bridges, offices,
dormitories and canteens, and was equipped with wooden boats, ships, trolleys
and rattan baskets for transportation, and hoes and steel sieves for excavation.
Other living facilities were also constructed, ranging from storage tanks, distillers
and wells for drinking water supply, to food storage rooms, pig houses, chicken
houses, fishing boats and vegetable gardens for food supply, to small convenience
stores and clinics. They shipped their illegally mined phosphorite to Osaka, Japan,
where it was processed and sold.3 Under the brutal oppression of the Japanese,
Chinese fishermen who fished nearby were either shot dead or forced to con-
fiscate the aquatic products they caught, which led to strong resistance of the
Chinese fishermen and opposition from the ROC government. Consequently, the
Japanese withdrew from Xisha in the spring of 1928, but the amount of phospho-
rite unlawfully mined by that time had totaled over 100,000 tons.4
After Japan’s withdrawal, the French realized the strategic significance of
Xisha, which locates between Hainan Island and Hoi An Port of Annam and
thereby serves as a gateway to Tokyo Bay. They subsequently published some
articles on a Saigon paper The Opinion calling for stronger control of Xisha.
De Fol, a former senior officer of the French Naval Navigation Committee in
charge of Annam, claimed that “Xisha Islands is of great significance to Viet-
nam under current circumstances. It is impossible to ignore the strategic impor-
tance of Xisha, and that their occupation by a powerful foreign country would
pose a serious threat to the security of Indochina in time of war. Seen as the
extension of Hainan Island, Xisha Islands are surrounded by the sea and boast
many good harbors. A submarine base constructed within the area can block
sea transport from Tokyo Sea to Hoi An, a primary port of Vietnam.” Also, De
The struggle over Xisha and Nansha Islands 139
Fol, Bergeon, former Vice Chairman of the Maritime Committee and Member
of the House of Lords, also published a signed article on The Opinion, twice,
demanding Xisha Islands to be occupied and “annexed to the Federation of
Vietnam.”5 Soon after, the French government began to explore various excuses
for the invasion of Xisha. They looked into the records of the Annam Dynasty
and fabricated evidence that
in the early 19th century, Emperors Jialong and Mingming of the Annam
Dynasty both went to Xisha. Since Annam is now owned by France, Xisha
Islands shall naturally belong to France as well.6
The French government also sent a note to the Chinese Embassy in France in
1933, claiming that Xisha belonged to Annam mainly on two grounds as fol-
lows: (1) Historical records showed that emperors of the Annam Dynasty built
towers and steles on Xisha; (2) Chinese history recorded a crash between British
and Chinese boats near Xisha that led to the sinking of two British ships. Britain
then launched a protest over the incident to the Chinese Qin government. The
Qing government replied that the Qizhou Liedao (a chain of seven islands) were
not Chinese territory, so it was not responsible for the collision. In response to
France’s claim, the Chinese National Government notified its embassy in Paris
and lodged solemn representations to France with three reasons attached: (1) The
latitude and longitude of the islands fell in China’s territorial waters, and their
geographical features were very clear; (2) In the late Qing Dynasty, the govern-
ment organized an expedition led by Li Zhun, admiral of the Guangdong navy,
to Xisha Islands to demonstrate China’s sovereign right; (3) In 1930 when the
Far East Meteorological Conference was held in Hong Kong, both directors of
Annam Meteorological Observatory of France and of Xujiahui Observatory of
Shanghai of China asked Chinese government for permission to set up a meteo-
rological observatory in Xisha. After receiving the reply from the Chinese side,
the French government had to put aside their previous claim over Xisha Islands as
they lacked enough evidence to back it up.7
While plotting to occupy Xisha, France also started its invasion of Nansha. In
1930, the French gunboat Maliciense went to Nanwei Dao for a survey and erected
the French national flag there, ignoring the fact that some Chinese fishermen had
already lived on the island. In April 1933, the artillery ship Alerte and survey ship
Astrolabe, both led by Chevey, director of the Saigon Institute of Oceanography,
shipped into Nansha for extensive activities to establish their occupation of the
islands. Soon after, the French News Agency announced on July 13, 1933, that in
accordance with the provisions of the Public International Law, French gunboat
Maliciense had occupied Spratly Island, the largest of the Nine Islets, since April
13, 1930. But at the time, the French were unable to take over the other eight islets
due to the monsoon. Until April 7– 12, 1933, another two vessels, Astrolabe and
Alerte, completed the occupation of the rest.8 This is the whole story of “Incident
of the Nine Islets.” When the Chinese government was informed of the incident,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to the Chinese Embassy in France on
August 4 requesting that the specific position of the nine islets including names,
latitudes and longitudes. The Embassy replied on August 10 with the following:
Spratly Island 8°39′N, 111°55′L(E)

Amboyna Cay 7°52′N, 112°55′E
Ituaba Island 10°22′N, 114°21′E
Shuang Island 11°29′N, 114°21′E
Loaita Island 10°42′N, 114°25′E
Thitu Island 11°07′N, 114°10′E9
Only six islands out of the nine were listed earlier. In Zhongguo Dili Xinzhi
(New Geographical Records of China) published by Zhong Hua Book Company
in 1935, the geographical location and characteristics of the nine islets were
described in detail,
1 Nanwei Dao, 147, 840 square meters;

2 Taiping Dao, 354,750 square meters;
3 Anbo Shazhou, 15,840 square meters;
4 Beizi Dao, 133,320 square meters;
5 Nanzi Dao, 125,400 square meters;
6 Nanyue Dao, 62,700 square meters;
7 Zhongye Dao, 326,280 square meters;
8 Hongxiu Dao, 75,200 square meters;
9 Xiyue Dao, 147,840 square meters.10
Chinese people had all along taken islands and relevant waters in Nansha as a
ground for living and production, where they engaged in development and admin-
istration activities in various forms. When the French invaded the nine features in
April 1933, they also acknowledged that there were only Chinese fishermen on
them. However, the French government ignored such a fact and occupied Chi-
nese territory, which angered the Chinese government and people at that time.
On July 26, 1933, shortly after this incident, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs made clear through its spokesperson, referring to the relevant islands of
Nansha, that “no other people but Chinese fishermen live on the coral islands
between the Philippines and Annam and these islands are recognized internation-
ally as Chinese territory.” The Chinese government lodged a stern protest to the
French government against its aggression through diplomatic and other chan-
nels.11 The Southwest and Guangdong Provincial governments also protested
to the French authorities and the French Consul in Guangdong over the illegal
occupation respectively.12 In addition to the Chinese government, civil societies
responded with greater vehemence. Non-governmental organizations such as the
Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai, the Farmers’Association of Ninghai County
of Zhejiang Province, the Chamber of Commerce of Shaoxing County and the
Union of the Filature Industry in the Third, Fourth and Sixth Districts of Shang-
hai, various local sections of the Kuomintang Party and patriotic individuals sent
telegrams to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs urging the government to defend
China’s sovereign right over the South China Sea islands.13
As a result of public pressure, the French government finally sent China a
telegram via V. K. Wellington Koo. According to the telegram, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of France recognized that the nine islets between Annam and
the Philippines were rocky islands posing great danger to French ships travel-
ing in the main waterways. It went on to state that the French occupied these
islands only to build necessary risk prevention facilities to protect their ships, but
a map attached clearly contradicts such remarks.14 The real purpose, according to
Japanese authorities, was to build naval bases on the occupied islands. Sawada,
Japan’s representative to France, sent a letter to the French Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on August 21, launching their protest against the French occupation of
the nine islets. In the letter Japanese authorities also claimed that Japan’s Lasha
Phosphate Mine Co., Ltd., exploited natural resources on the islands as early as
1918 and had invested some 1 million Yen in building railways, houses, ports
and other facilities there. The world financial crisis in 1919 forced mining to
shut down and Japanese personnel to leave for home. But the fact that all the
machines marked with the company information remained on site indicated the
Japanese would come back to resume work later. Therefore, the Japanese govern-
ment believes that the nine islets belong to Japan. Meanwhile, news agencies in
Tokyo reported about French acquisition of bases in both Saigon and Guangzhou
Bay capable of hosting 10,000-ton cruisers. They feared that this would make it
possible for the French to build airplane bases and berths for submarines, and
eventually control the South China Sea. This move could cut off the maritime traf-
fic between Singapore and Hong Kong, a stronghold of Britain’s development to
East Asia, and lead to the conflict between British and French forces.15 “The Nine
Islets Incident” made the disputes between various countries on the sovereignty
of the South China Sea islands all the more complicated, from the original dispute
between China and France to that between France and Japan and of the maritime
forces between France, Japan, Britain and the United States. Diplomatic negotia-
tions were then put aside.
10.2 China’s recovery of Xisha and Nansha Islands

after the Second Sino-Japanese War
After the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Japan stepped up its pace
of invading Xisha and Nansha Islands as well as other Chinese territories. After
occupying Hainan Island on February 28, 1939, Japan invaded Xisha and Nansha
Islands on March 1 and 30 consecutively. On April 9, Japanese armies revealed
an announcement in the name of the Governor’s Office of Taiwan, declaring the
occupation of the Xinnan Islands (namely Nansha Islands), Dongsha Islands and
Xisha Islands, which were all placed under the jurisdiction of Kaohsiung County
of Taiwan. As such, Japan was able to use Nansha Islands as a staging post for its
occupation and control during the Second World War. Moreover, Japanese author-
ities hyped the islands as a great investment destination.16
Also, Japan took Taiping Dao, the main feature of Nansha as its operation cen-
ter, and set up Kaiyang Xingfa Corporation and Nanyang Xingfa Coporation to
exploit phosphorus ore and aquatic resources there. Weather stations were built
on Taiping Dao and military bases were constructed on Nanwei Dao, aiming to
better serve Japan’s further aggression. In their attempt to build Nansha into a
base to expand southward and a fishing port for its “Heading South” campaign,
the Japanese drew up a slew of construction plans: (1) to construct 620 meters
of embankment on the south side of Taiping Dao; (2) to build a 2.5-meter-deep
waterway inside the embankment to connect to the sea; (3) to build a 175-meter-
long wharf equipped with warehouses at the berth; (4) to purchase dredging boats,
build aquariums and hire liaison ships. Initiated in 1941, the project was sched-
uled to end in three years with a total budget of 980,000 Yen. However, it didn’t
get off to a smooth start. The 24,400-yen-worth public houses were completely
destroyed in a typhoon. Defeats the Japanese suffered in the war led an end to the
port construction, with only partial work including all warehouses, most of the
embankment and a narrow water channel wide enough for fishing boats going
through finished. By that time, 900,000 Yen had been spent and another 500,000
Yen were needed to complete the whole project. Given the setback in the war,
Japan was not in the position to continue to make the heavy investment. In 1943,
after Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War, American air raids destroyed most of the
buildings on Taiping Dao, including dormitories, warehouses, fish farms, refrig-
eration depots, heavy oil depots, medical rooms, observation platforms, weather
stations, machine gun shelters and forts etc. American troops landed on Taiping
Dao in the year toward the end of the Second World War. On August 10, 1945, the
British Pacific Fleet Commander Bruce Fraser accepted the surrender of the Japa-
nese forces on Nanwei Dao. By this point, Japan’s attempts of occupying China’s
Xisha and Nansha ended in failure.17
After the victory of the Second World War, the Chinese government recovered
Taiwan on October 25, 1945, and officially took over Xisha and Nansha as per the
provisions of the Cairo Declaration jointly signed by China, the United States and
the United Kingdom on December 1, 1943, and in accordance with the Potsdam
Proclamation issued by China, the United States and the United Kingdom on July
26, 1945.
In the autumn of 1946, Chinese authorities sent a naval contingent, along with
officers from the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
the Air Force General Headquarters, the Logistics Department and Guangdong
provincial government, to take over Xisha and Nansha. Two of the four warships,
Taiping and Yongxing, led by Captain Li Zun, moved on to Nansha, while the
other two, guided by Assistant Captain Yao Ruyu, headed to take over Xisha.18
On October 26, 1946, the warships gathered in Shanghai, with 59 government
representatives and officers and soldiers from the Marine Independent Platoon
on board. The fleet set sail at Wusong, Shanghai on October 29 and arrived at
Humen, Guangdong on November 2, where Zhang Rongsheng, chief representa-
tive of Guangzhou, along with commissioners from Guangdong Province respon-
sible for the recovery of Xisha and Nansha and other personnel responsible for
survey, agriculture, fisheries, meteorology and medical treatment got on board.
The voyage continued from Humen on November 6 and reached Yulin, Hainan,
on November 8. After being replenished there, the fleet led by more than ten
Hainanese fishermen headed south for Xisha. However, it was forced back to
Yulin due to strong winds and waves on the way forward. On November 24, 1946,
Yongxing and Zhongjian, led by Yao Ruyu, arrived at Yongxing Dao of Xisha,
where they erected a monument to commemorate the Chinese Navy’s recovery of
Xisha Islands, on the front of which was the Chinese inscription “Nanhai Pingfan
(the South China Sea Protection Barrier).” The soldiers fired salutes and raised
the Chinese flag to celebrate the recovery of Xisha. The other two warships led by
Lin Zun, set sail from Yulin on December 9 and arrived at Chang Dao, the main
island of Nansha, on December 12. To commemorate the warship Taiping that was
assigned to take over the island, Captain Lin renamed the island as Taiping Dao
after the warship. The stone monument of Taiping Dao was set up at the end of
the breakwater on the southwest side of the island, near the main road leading to
the radio station, the original site where the Japanese army built the “monument.”
In addition, another stone monument, “Taiping Dao, Nansha Islands,” as a perma-
nent certificate, was erected at the eastern end of the island. A ceremony was held
beside the monument to proclaim that China resumed sovereignty over Nansha.
Thereafter, stone monuments were subsequently set up on islands of Zhongye,
Xiyue and Nanwei. The Nansha Islands Management Office under jurisdiction of
Guangdong was established on Taiping Dao.19
However, the process of taking over was not plain sailing. After the World
War II, Japanese troops stationed in Nansha were forced to surrender to Chinese
troops at Yulin Port. While they were waiting at Yulin to be sent back to Japan,
the French seized the chance to occupy several features of Nansha before China
sent troops to take them over. On July 27, 1946, a ship of unidentified nationality
invaded Nansha, but withdrew in a few days after being asked to leave as the Chi-
nese Navy Headquarters was about to send warships to take back the islands. On
October 5, 1946, the French warship Chevereud invaded Nanwei Dao and Taiping
Dao, and erected a memorial stone on the latter. Knowing the Chinese govern-
ment’s decision to recover Xisha and Nansha, France made an immediate protest
to China and sent the warship Tokinois to Xisha. When the warship found that
Yongxing Dao was under control of Chinese troops, it then redirected to Shanhu
Dao and set up an administrative center there.20 The Chinese government made
strong protest against such activities while making efforts to fight against further
invasions through diplomatic channels.
On January 19, 1947, Agence France Presse issued a report accusing China
of invading Xisha. In response to this, the Chinese Embassy in France issued a
public announcement stating:
Hainanese fishermen of China reach Xisha Islands every time they go fish-
ing, and the Chinese Navy also land on the islands on a regular basis to
safeguard Chinese territory. In 1909, China Customs planned to build a light-
house on one feature of Xisha to ensure shipping safety. In April 1930, the
International Meteorological Conference held in Hong Kong recommended
that the Chinese government set up a meteorological observatory on one of
the islands.
The announcement also pointed out:
Numerous notes were exchanged between foreign ministries of China and

France from 1932 to 1938. The Chinese government insisted on its absolute
sovereignty over the islands in each and every note, and never recognized the
de facto occupation of the islands by France in the name of King Annam.21
On January 22, 1947, China’s Ministry of Defense issued a statement in the

wake of French aircraft reconnaissance over Xisha and the cruise of French war-
ships to Yongxing Dao. It stated:
China’s sovereignty over Xisha is fully grounded in both historical and

geographical records. After the surrender of Japan in World War II and its
withdrawal from the islands, the Chinese government sent troops to take the
islands over. On the 16th of this month, a French aircraft flew to Yongxing
Dao of Xisha on a reconnaissance mission, and on the 18th, another French
navy warship sailed to the main island. The Chinese army took immediate
action to warn the French warships to depart.22
When the Chinese side learned that the French ship F43 dropped anchor at
Yongxing Dao in an attempt to transport Chinese personnel off the island and
threatened to make a force landing, the Chinese Ministry of Defense told the Chi-
nese officers and soldiers stationed on the island to stay firm and protect the island.
Also, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged strong protest to the French
side.23 On January 21, 1947, the Chinese Foreign Minister held a meeting with
Jacques Meyrier, French Ambassador to China, and solemnly declared that the
sovereignty of Xisha belonged to China and questioned the real intention behind
the French Navy’s actions. Meyrier admitted that the actions of French Navy in
Xisha were not authorized by the French government. Soon after, instead of seek-
ing for negotiation, France ventured to the so-called dispute via international arbi-
tration, which ended up being turned down by the Chinese government.24
To reject the French claim of sovereignty over Xisha Islands, He Fengshan,
Director-General of the Intelligence Department of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of China, made a speech on January 26, 1947. According to the state-
ment, there were two reasons behind the French claim: (1)Vietnam made a claim
for sovereignty over Xisha before World War II, which received no statement of
objection from China; (2) Theft cases involving some foreign ships docked on
Xisha were reported to the Guangdong Provincial Government, but no action was
taken accordingly. In his speech, he clarified that on the first count, the French
colonial government of South Vietnam never issued any official communique
regarding the claim; and on the second, cases involving foreign affairs should be
directed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than the local provincial gov-
ernment. He also reaffirmed China’s sovereignty over Xisha based on sufficient
geographical and historical evidence.25 At a press conference held on January 29,
1947, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of China issued a flat denial of the
claim that “China agreed to the French occupation of Xisha in 1938” and declared
that “China reiterated its position at that time that China’s sovereignty over the
islands was indisputable.”26 As for the landing of French troops on Shanhu Dao of
Xisha on January 28, 1947, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China lodged two
protests with the French Embassy, requiring the immediate withdrawal of French
troops from Shanhu Dao to avoid any unnecessary consequences. The Chinese
Foreign Ministry also solemnly stated that it was impossible for the Chinese gov-
ernment to consider the French claim over Xisha before any withdrawal took
place.27 However, negotiations were suspended due to lack of evidence from the
French government as well as impacts of the ongoing Vietnam War.
10.3 Delimitation of the South China Sea nine-dotted

line and its impact on China’s sovereignty over Xisha
and Nansha Islands
In early 1930s, China’s mapping of its islands was rather loosely conducted, and
many maps then published were copies of outdated ones, some of which even
were foreign versions with Chinese translation only. Such a lack of consistency
made it more difficult for the Chinese government to uphold its sovereignty over
the South China Sea. To address the issue, the Chinese Department of State and
the Navy Department jointly called for the promulgation of Shuilu Ditu Shecha
Tiaoli (Regulations on Reviewing Land and Water Maps) in January 1930. In
1931, officials from the Department of State, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
Navy Department, the Ministry of Education and the Mongolian-Tibetan Com-
mittee were convened to establish the Office of Reviewing Water and Land Maps.
During the meeting, the original version of Land and Water Map Review Regula-
tions was amended and revised. The document came into effect as of September
1931. In May 1933, a second meeting was convened to establish the Committee
of Examining Maps for Land and Water, which came to be operative starting
June 7, 1933.
Since its establishment, the Committee had played a crucial role in safeguarding
China’s sovereignty of Xisha and Nansha. At its 25th meeting held on December
12, 1934, the committee reviewed the Chinese and English names of the islands
of the South China Sea and published the names of 132 features including 28 in
Xisha and 96 in Nansha on the first issue of its journal in January 1935.28 At the
29th meeting held on March 12, 1935, the Committee reached the decision that
Dongsha, Xisha, Nansha and Tuansha Islands must appear on the Map of China
except in collapsible ones, where their locations are too difficult to be covered.
Moreover, the Committee published Zhongguo Nanhai Daoyu Tu (Map of Chi-
nese Islands in the South China Sea) in April 1935.29 In the map, Zengmu Ansha
(James Shoal) at 4°N latitude was marked as the southernmost end of China’s
boundary. In the second picture of Haijiang Nanzhan Houzhi Zhongguo Quantu
(The Map of Chinese Domain in the South China Sea) of Zhonghua Jianshe Xintu
(New China Construction Atlas) published in 1936, Dongsha, Xisha, Nansha and
Tuansha Islands were also marked within China’s national boundaries. The author
added a note to explain the reasons.
In July 1933, France occupied nine of Nansha Islands. After that, the Chinese
government assigned the Hydrographic Office under the Navy Headquarters to
conduct a geographical survey. Results of the survey confirmed that Nansha and
Tuansha were places where Chinese fishermen had long lived and worked, sug-
gesting their status as a natural part of Chinese territory. In April 1935, on the
Map of Chinese Islands in the South China Sea published by the Committee,
the southernmost end of Chinese territory was extended to Zengmu Tan at 4°N
latitude.30 This is the earliest version of the “South China Sea Nine-dotted Line”
(or U-shaped Line) on the map of China, which has proven to be significant for
China’s sovereignty claims over Xisha and Nansha.
The Chinese government resumed sovereignty over Xisha and Nansha after
winning the Second Sino-Japanese War. To determine the scope of sovereignty
and jurisdiction over Xisha and Nansha, the Ministry of the Interior of China
convened representatives from relevant departments for a discussion on April 14,
1947. They reached several consensuses: (1) The southernmost boundary of the
South China Sea should be Zengmu Tan, which was consistent with descriptions
in various publications by government, institutions, schools etc. in pre-war times
and kept in the official archives; (2) The Ministry of the Interior would make
an announcement of China’s resumption of sovereignty over Xisha and Nansha
once they were named. The Navy Command should send troops to station on as
many as islands and reefs in the South China Sea prior to such an announcement;
(3) Assistance would be offered to fishermen traveling to Xisha and Nansha dur-
ing the fishing season in terms of protection and communication. These were
necessary measures taken by the ROC government to safeguard the sovereignty
and jurisdiction over Xisha and Nansha Islands.31 To supply more details about
the scope and sovereignty of Xisha and Nansha, the Ministry of the Interior pub-
lished Nanhai Zhudao Weizhitu (Location Map of the South China Sea Islands)
on which Dongsha, Xisha, Zhongsha and Nansha were marked with intermittent
lines, indicating the islands, reefs and adjacent waters around them were parts of
Chinese territory. Also, the southernmost boundary was also marked at around
4°N latitude. This way of mapping China’s maritime boundary lines in the South
China Sea has been used until now.32
The “Nine-Dotted Line” is a line that delineates the ownership of islands, and
the Chinese government has consistently used it to claim its sovereignty over the
islands instead of waters within the line for decades. The status and jurisdiction of
the South China Sea marine features within the line can be determined in accor-
dance with the relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS).33 This is basically in line with the view of Hasyim Djalal,
former Director of Legal and Treaty Affairs of Indonesian Department of For-
eign Affairs. Djalal wrote in 1979 that “the Chinese territorial claims are limited
towards the islands and the rights related thereto, and not the territorial claims
over the South China Sea as a whole.”34
10.4 Defending seizure of Nansha Islands from the Philippines

Before and after the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Philippines also had an ambi-
tion to occupy the islands of Nansha. As early as 1933, when the French occu-
pied “Nine islets” of Nansha, ex-Senator Isabelo de los Reyes of the Philippines
claimed, with reference to the description in the Treaty of Paris, that these islands
were territories of the Philippines and urged his government to negotiate with
China.35 However, such an argument is untenable as it contradicted the western
boundary of the Philippines stipulated in Article III of the Treaty:
A line running from west to cast along or near the twentieth parallel of north
latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the
one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty seventh
(127th) degree meridian of longitude cast of Greenwich, thence along the
one hundred and twenty seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east
of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes (4°45′)
north latitude, then along the parallel of four degrees and forty five min-
utes (4°45′) north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude
one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes (119°35′) cast of
Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen
degrees and thirty five minutes (119° 35′) cast of Greenwich to the parallel
of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7°4′) north, then along the paral-
lel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7°4′) north to its intersection
with the one hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east
of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th)
degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th)
degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one
hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude cast of Green-
wich to the point of beginning.36
The fact is, Nansha Islands are not within the the previously mentioned ter-
ritorial boundaries as they are beyond 200 nautical miles from the territorial sea
baseline required by the Treaty. This is why Frank Murphy, Governor-General of
the Philippines, didn’t take Reye’s proposal seriously and only forwarded his idea
to Washington.37
After the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Philippines attempted to take posses-
sion of Nansha prior to China’s recovery of these islands. Elpido Quirino, Philip-
pine Foreign Secretary, told a press conference on July 23, 1946, that “Shinnan
Gunto” (the Nansha Islands) should be part of the Philippine territory as they were
essential to its national security.38 Quirino’s statement attracted immediate atten-
tion from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, but no diplomatic move was taken as the
situation didn’t intensify in the end.
In April 1949, Felino Neri, Deputy Foreign Secretary of the Philippines, urged
President Quirino to encourage Philippine fishermen to migrate to Nansha so that
the Philippines were able to claim the islands as their territory in the interest of
national security. President Quirino soon ordered Jose V. Andrada, Flag Officer-in-
Command of the Philippine Navy, to pay a visit to Taiping Dao of Nansha.39 Chen
Zhiping, Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, learned the news from a local
newspaper of Baguio, and immediately reported to the Chinese Foreign Ministry
via telegram, demanding that the Chinese garrison in Nansha to be on alert for any
invasion. Meanwhile, Ambassador Chen also sent a letter to the Philippine Foreign
Ministry, calling for their attention to the severity of this incident while stressing
that Taiping Dao was part of Chinese territory. In his reply, Neri denied the Philip-
pines’ attempt to annex Nansha and insisted that the need for more protection for
Filippino fishermen working in the waters near Itu Aba Island (Taiping Dao). And
yet, Neri admitted that Taiping Dao as part of Chinese territory is well documented
in records.40 The diplomatic tug-of-war ended up with no immediate consequences,
but it did suppress the Philippines’ attempts to annex Nansha for some time to come.
In summary, Xisha and Nansha Islands have been a focus of contention due to
their strategic significance. They were successively occupied by Japan and France
before the Second Sino-Japanese War. The Chinese government made enormous
diplomatic efforts in safeguarding its territorial sovereignty over the Xisha and
Nansha Islands and suppressing ambitions of foreign invasion. After the Second
Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese government continued its commitment to territo-
rial integrity and took further actions to define the scope and status of Xisha and
Nansha Islands. This includes marking the southernmost point of the Nine-Dotted
Line at 4° N latitude and the consistent declaration that the islands within the line
and their adjacent waters are parts of Chinese territory. These actions and measures
prove to have played a positive role in maintaining stability in the South China Sea.
Notes
1 Li, C.F. (1954). A Brief History of Imperialist Aggression on the South China Sea
Islands. Guangming Daily, September 16.
C.S. Ling (ed.), Current Borderland Issues of China. Taipei: Student Book Company,
p. 198.
3 Chen, M.S. (1988). Chronicles of Hainan Island. In Zhenhua Han et al. (Eds.), A Col-
lection of Historical Materials on the South China Sea Islands (in Chinese). Beijing:
Oriental Press, pp. 200–201.
4 Xu, R.H. (1975). Chronicle of Hainan Island. Taipei: Student Book Company,
pp. 19–20.
5 Ling, C. (Ed.). (1975). Current Borderland Issues of China. Taipei: Student Book Co.,
pp. 194+201.
6 Ibid., p. 171.
7 Zheng, Z.Y. (1947). A Brief Geographical Record of the South China Sea Islands.
Shanghai: Commercial Press, pp. 77–78.
8 Xu, G.S. (1975). Incident of the Nine Islets. In L. Chunsheng (ed.), Current Borderland
Issues of China. Taipei: Student Book Co., pp. 149–150.
9 (1933). Name, Longitude and Latitude of the Nine Islets Occupied by France. Shun Po,
August 19.
10 (1935). New Geographical Records of China. Shanghai: Zhong Hua Book Company,
pp. 44–45.
11 (1933). External Protest Against the French Occupation of the Nine Islets.
12 (1933). Shun Po, July 29 & August 2.
Sea Islands (in Chinese). Beijing: Oriental Press, pp. 263–264.
14 Lu, D.Y. (1975). An Account of the Xisha Islands. In Chunsheng Ling (Ed.), Current
Borderland Issues of China. Taipei: Student Book Co., p. 189.
15 Ling, C. (Ed.). (1975). Current Borderland Issues of China. Taipei: Student Book Co.,
pp. 158+160.
Student Book Company, p 13.
17 Li, C.F. (1954). A Brief History of Imperialist Aggression on the South China Sea
Islands. Guangming Daily, September 16.
18 (1948). South China Sea Islands with the Presence of Chinese Navy. Haikou: Hainan
Press, p. 24.
19 Nansha Comprehensive Scientific Investigation Team of Chinese Academy of Sci-
ences (Ed.). (1991). Archives and Special Collections of Historical Geography of Nan-
sha (in Chinese). Guangzhou: Sun Yat-Sen University Press, pp. 110–111.
Conflicts. Taipei: Youth Cultural Company, pp. 62–63.
21 (1947). Guangzhou Paper &Yuehua Daily, January 21.
22 (1947). Vol. 1. Journal of Chinese Navy, p. 11.
23 See Achieves on the French Aggression against Vietnam (July 1945–June 1947). The
Second Chinese Museum of History.
24 Shao, X.Z. (1956). Xisha Islands, China’s Territory. People’s Daily, July 8.
26 Ibid., p. 251.
27 See Achieves on the French Aggression against Vietnam (July 1945–June 1947). The
Second Historical Archives of China.
pp. 61–69.
pp. 79–80.
31 See Measurement of the Sino-British Boundary Tablet in Shatoujiao in the SCS. Guang-
dong Provincial Government Archives.
Sea Islands (in Chinese). Beijing: Oriental Press, p 363.
p. 38.
34 Jenkins, D. (1981). Trouble Over Oil and Waters. Far Eastern Economic Review,
August 7, p. 26.
35 (1933). Shun Po, August 23.
36 Association of International Marine Issue Studies. (1984). Selective Compilation of
Maritime Laws and Treaties of China’s Marine Neighboring Countries. Beijing: China
Ocean Press, pp. 79–80.
37 (1933). Shun Po, August 23.
38 Zeng, D.B. (1946). Xinan Islands are Ours. Ta Kung Pao, August 4.
39 The Philippine Ministry of Foreign Affairs Rewarded its Fishermen to Migrate to Taip-
ing Dao of the Nansha Islands of China, Preparing for the Annexation of Chinese Ter-
ritory in the Future. The Second Historical Archives of China.
40 (1949). Chinese Commercial News, April 13.
11 China’s dispute with the
Philippines over the Nansha
Islands
An international law perspective
The Philippines’ interest in the Nansha Islands began shortly after its indepen-
dence in 1946. But it was not until 1971 when studies showed the waters could
be a storehouse of oil that the Philippine government formally made its claim and
sent a diplomatic note to Taiwan, demanding the withdrawal of Chinese garrison
forces from Taiping Dao. Back in 1968, the Philippines already set up watch-
houses on Nanyue Dao, Zhongye Dao, Beizi Dao, and later successively occupied
eight islands and reefs, including Mahuan Dao, Feixin Dao, Xiyue Dao, Shuan-
ghuang Shazhou and Siling Jiao. On June 11, 1978, President Ferdinand Marcos
of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No.1596, declaring the 33 islands,
cays, sands bars, coral reefs and fishing grounds in the Spratlys which cover an
area of 64,976 square nautical miles “part of the Philippine territory and providing
for their government and administration,” and stating that this move has “legal,
historical, and equitable grounds.”1 In this chapter, the validity of this statement
will be reviewed from both legal and historical perspectives.
11.1 Sovereignty not premised on proximity

The Philippines began to press its claims over the Nansha Islands as early as
the 1940s. In June 1946, Elpidio Quirino, Foreign Secretary of the Philippines,
declared that the country planned to deploy national defense facilities on the Nan-
sha Islands. In April 1949, the Congress of the Philippines deliberated on sover-
eignty over the Nansha Islands, and there was also reports that naval fleets headed
by the chief of the Philippine Navy were sent to survey the Nansha Islands.
On May 13, 1950, an editorial published by the Manila Bulletin stated that the
Philippine government should work with the United States to take urgent offen-
sive measures against the Xisha and Nansha Islands because they are closer to
Palawan compared with China. On May 17, 1950, Philippine President Quirino
declared at a press conference that his country didn’t need to take actions as long
as the Chinese Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) forces retained their control of
the Nansha Islands. However, if the islands fell into the hands of its communist
enemy, the Philippine security would be threatened. He thus created his theory
that the islands should belong to the nearest country according to international
law, namely the Philippines in this case.2
Quirino’s theory is apparently contradictory to international law. On Octo-
ber 12, 1984, the Chamber of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered
its judgment on the location of the maritime boundary between Canada and
the United States in the Gulf of Maine area. Referring to its earlier judgment
on the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the Court stressed that the submarine
areas appertaining to the coastal state were not always those closest to its coasts.
According to the Court:
It is therefore correct to say that international law confers on the coastal State
a legal title to an adjacent continental shelf or to a maritime zone adjacent to
its coasts; it would not be correct to say that international law recognizes the
title conferred on the State by the adjacency of that shelf or that zone, as if the
mere natural fact of adjacency produced legal consequences.3
The Chamber also noted that it amounts to one more unconvincing endeavor
to instill the idea that “equidistance” is a concept endorsed by customary inter-
national law, since the objective is to assert that whatever lies less far from the
coasts of one state than from those of another should automatically appertain to
the former state.4 As shown in these standpoints, the Philippine government’s ille-
gal occupation of China’s Nansha Islands on the grounds of “proximity” is a total
violation of international law and international justice and peace.
The continental shelf dispute between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean Sea
is another good example. Turkey once claimed that the islands off the coast of
Greece and close to the Turkish coast should be ceded to Turkey. But Greece
stated that from an international law perspective, it is unreasonable to put into
practice the theory that an island should belong to the country it is adjacent to. To
prove this, a number of examples were listed. For instance, the Channel Islands
are only 20 nautical miles from France but 85 from Britain; particularly, the Brit-
ish Channel Island of Jersey is merely 14 nautical miles from the Cherbourg
Peninsula of France. The Danish capital of Copenhagen is located on an island
separated from Sweden by a strait whose narrowest point lies in Elsinore, a mere
three nautical miles from Sweden. Bornholm, a Danish island in the Baltic Sea, is
22 nautical miles from Sweden, 60 from Germany, 95 from the Danish island of
Zealand, and 219 from the Jutland Peninsula. But neither Sweden nor Germany
has ever asked for the occupation of the island. To further refute Turkey’s argu-
ment, the Greek government cited more examples. The Faroe Islands are located
240 nautical miles from Scotland, 300 from Iceland and 650 from Denmark, but
they belong to Denmark and no country has ever claimed sovereignty over the
archipelago because of its adjacency. The Aleutian Islands, extending from the
Alaska mainland toward the Kamchatka Peninsula in Russia, belong to the United
States, although their westernmost tip lies 300 nautical miles from Alaska. The
islands of Saint Pierre and Miquelon, though only 12 nautical miles off the coast
of Newfoundland, belong to France.5
These examples cited by Greece are not only the best counterevidence of Tur-
key’s claim, but also a repudiation of the theory weaved by Quirino to cover up
China’s dispute with the Philippines 153
his lust for occupying the Nansha Islands. In fact, some islands of the Philippines
are adjacent to regions of other countries. For example, many islets of the Sulu
Archipelago are merely three to five nautical miles away from the Indonesian
island of Borneo but are ten times the distance from the Philippines. Why are
these islets not under the jurisdiction of Borneo because of their proximity? Like-
wise, the islands of the northern Philippines scattered in the Bashi Channel are in
the vicinity of China’s Taiwan, why do they not belong to Taiwan?
11.2 Cloma’s alleged claim of “discovery and occupation”

The Philippine invasion of China’s Nansha Islands was initiated by Tomas Cloma,
ex-director of the Philippine Maritime Institute in Manila. On March 1, 1956,
Cloma set out on an expedition on the institute’s No. 4 training vessel to the
Nansha Islands, together with a crew of 40 men including eight students of the
Institute. Successively they landed on the nine major islands in the Nansha Group –
Northeast Cay, Southwest Cay, Thitu Island, Loaita Island, West York Island, Itu
Aba Island, Sandy Cay, Namyit Island and Spratly Island. Upon landing on each
island, they erected a wooden sign, claiming that they had discovered and occu-
pied the islands.6 On May 15, Cloma released a so-called Notice to the Whole
World, claiming the “discovery and occupation” of the 33 islands, cays, sands
bars, coral reefs and fishing grounds in the Spratlys which cover an area of 64,976
square nautical miles, and named them Kalayaan (Freedomland). The Philippine
government, however, did not stop Cloma from infringing China’s sovereignty
but declared support for his claimed area. On May 19, Carlos P. Garcia, Vice
President and Foreign Secretary of the Philippines, declared that the Philippines
is closer to these unoccupied and uninhabited islands, so it has the right to claim
them as its territory upon discovering them, and later other countries would
acknowledge the Philippines’ sovereignty over these islands.7 In his response to
Cloma in December, Garcia said that :
Insofar as the Department of Foreign Affairs is concerned, it regards the

islands, islets, coral reefs, shoals and sand cays, comprised within what you
called ‘Freedomland’, with the exclusion of those belonging to the seven-
island group known internationally as the Spratlys, as res nullius, some of
them being newly-risen, others marked in international maps as uncharted
and their existence doubtful, and all of them being unoccupied and uninhab-
ited; which means, in other words, that they are open to economic exploi-
tation and settlement by Filipino nationals who have as much right under
international law as nationals of any other country to carry on such activities,
so long as the exclusive sovereignty of any country over them has not been
established in accordance with the generally accepted international law, or
recognized by the international community of nations.8
In Garcia’s words, no association between the “Freedomland” and the Nansha

Islands is made; instead, they are “marked in international maps as uncharted
and their existence doubtful” and are “unoccupied and uninhabited.” As such, he
proclaimed that Cloma’s “discovery and occupation” is on the grounds of inter-
national law and in accordance with the rights in international law. In fact, the so-
called Freedomland is within the Nansha Islands, which have long been inhabited
by Chinese people and have been an integral part of Chinese territory. The Nansha
Islands have never been res nullius. As is stated in Spratlys: The Dispute in the
South China Sea co-authored by Bob Catley and Makmur Keliat:
It is true that according to international law, a territory can be acquired if it

is res nullius. But the arguments that the Spratlys were res nullius are not
entirely accurate. Before the Philippines occupied some islands of the Sprat-
lys, China, Taiwan and Vietnam indeed had already competed against each
other to be the sovereign rulers over the archipelago. In addition, Taiwan and
Vietnam had occupied parts of the Spratlys, and Taiwan had been garrison-
ing the largest island since 1956. This means that the principle of res nullius
claimed by the Philippines is different from that which has been previously
widely accepted. Effective occupation, as generally accepted, does not nec-
essarily mean that the whole territory should be occupied. It is enough to be
valid if there is a force in the centre to exercise control.9
Chinese fishermen have been living and working in the Nansha Islands since
ancient times, and additionally evidence of habitation by Chinese people can be
seen everywhere on the island. Even Cloma himself wrote about signs of habita-
tion on Itu Aba Island, such as land topped with banana, coconut, palms and even
a few domestic goats.10 These indicate that the Nansha Islands are far from being
a terra nullius, but had been well inhabited. Therefore, Cloma’s “discovery and
occupation” is legally groundless. According to Oppenheim’s International Law,
“The only territory which can be the object of occupation is that which does
not already belong to any State, whether it is uninhabited, or inhabited by persons
whose community is not considered to be a State.”11 The Nansha Islands have
long been Chinese territory and inhabited by Chinese fishermen, as such they
cannot be an “object of occupation.”
Also, as emphasized in Oppenheim’s International Law, “occupation can only
take place by and for a State; it must be a State act, that is, it must be performed in the
service of a State, or it must be acknowledged by a State after its performance.”12 Yet
Cloma’s alleged “occupation” was in the name of an individual and was a purely per-
sonal act. On October 2, 1956, the fourth training vessel of the Philippine Maritime
School led by Felmon Cloma, the brother of Cloma, was intercepted in Northeast
Cay by the Kuomintang in Taiwan. When questioned, Felmon confessed that their
voyage to China’s Nansha Islands was an “individual act” and that to Itu Aba Island a
“personal visit.”13 In his second letter to the Philippine government on May 21, 1956,
Cloma also noted that “the claim was made by citizens of the Philippines,” and not
on behalf of the Government of the Philippines’, because we were not autho-

rized to do so. This will, however, have the consequent effect of the territory
becoming part of the Philippines.14
However, the Philippine government, in an attempt to legitimize the alleged
“occupation,” urged Cloma to execute a Deed of Assignment and Waiver of Rights
on December 4, 1974, to transfer all his claims of the islands to the Philippine
government.15 Between July 15 and 18, 1991 when the Workshop on Managing
Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea was held in Bandung, Indonesia, Jorge
Coquia presented a paper on the Philippines’ position on the South China Sea
issues in which he mentioned that Tomas Cloma irrevocably ceded, transferred
and conveyed in favor of the Republic of the Philippines all rights and interest
over the claimed islands.16 Ironically, in November 1974, Cloma was arrested
by the Philippine police on charges of “endangering the authority of the State.”17
Then, one may ask, how can a criminal who has “endangered the authority of the
State” transfer his ownership of the territory to the Philippine Government? Also,
is the Philippine politicization of the islands ownership consistent with interna-
tional laws? Answers to these questions apparently lie on the Philippine side.
11.3 The fabricated claims of “trusteeship”

The Philippines set out its “trusteeship” claim of the Nansha Islands after the
Peace Treaty with Japan was concluded in the San Francisco Conference in 1951.
According to the Treaty, Japan would renounce all right, title and claim to the
Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands. However, it did not specify any successor
of the Paracels and Spratlys. The Philippine government thus came up with their
own interpretation: the Nansha Islands fell instead under the de facto trustee-
ship of the Allied Powers of the Second World War, and the ownership of which
should be decided by these countries or the United Nations.18 In fact, neither the
Government of the People’s Republic of China nor the Kuomintang authorities in
Taiwan were invited to attend the San Francisco Peace Conference. Back then, the
representative of the Soviet Union proposed an amendment as follows:
Japan recognizes full sovereignty of the Chinese PRC over Manchuria, the
Island of Taiwan (Formosa) with all islands adjacent to it, the Penghu Islands
(Pescadores), the Dongsha Islands (the Pratas Islands), as well as over the
Xisha Islands (the Paracel Islands), the Zhongsha Islands and the Nansha
Islands, including the Spratlys, and renounces all right, title and claim to the
territories named herein.19
However, the delegates rejected the Soviet amendment. At that time, the Chi-
nese government issued a statement in which it says: “the Treaty of Peace with
Japan signed in San Francisco is illegal and invalid and can under no circum-
stances be recognized by the central government of China as China was excluded
from its preparation, formulation and signing.” Also, on August 15, 1951, Foreign
Minister Zhou Enlai pointed out in his Statement on the U.S.-Britain Draft Peace
Treaty with Japan and the San Francisco Conference the following:
The Draft Treaty only provides that Japan should renounce all right to Tai-
wan and the Pescadores as well as to the Kurile Islands, the southern part of
Sakhalin and all islands adjacent to it, without mentioning even one word
about the agreement that Taiwan and the Pescadores be returned to the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China.20
He went on to declare that “China’s inviolable sovereignty over the Nansha

and Xisha Islands would not be affected by the draft peace treaty, regardless of
whether and how it provides for their status.”21 The Philippine government back
then, however, knowingly concocted the so-called trusteeship claim. As a mat-
ter of fact, there is no such thing as the “trusteeship” of the Nansha Islands after
World War II, and the truth is that the Chinese government took over the Nansha
Islands from Japan at the end of the war and has been in charge of the islands
ever since.
More ironically, Philippine President Marcos reneged on his promise and, with-
out the consent of the Allied Powers or the United Nations, issued Presidential
Decree No.1596 on June 11, 1978, declaring that “the 33 islands, cays, shoals and
reefs with an area of 64,976 sq nautical miles as integral part of the Philippines”
and named them the “Kalayaan Island Group.”22 However, as stipulated in the
1935 Philippine Constitution:
The Philippines comprises all the territory ceded to the United States by the
treaty of Paris concluded between the United States and Spain on the tenth
day of December, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, the limits of which are
set forth in Article III of said treaty, together with all the islands embraced in
the treaty concluded at Washington, between the United States and Spain on
the seventh day of November, nineteen hundred, and in the treaty concluded
between the United States and Great Britain on the second day of January,
nineteen hundred and thirty, and all territory over which the present Govern-
ment of the Philippine Islands exercises jurisdiction.23
And according to Article III of the 1898 Treaty of Paris:
Spain ceded to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine
Islands, which comprise the islands situated between the following lines: A
line which runs west to east near the 20th parallel of north latitude across the
centre of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the 118th to the 127th degrees
of longitude east of Greenwich, from here to the width of the 127th degree of
longitude east to parallel 4 degrees 45 minutes of north latitude. From here
following the parallel of north latitude 4 degrees 45 minutes to its intersection
with the meridian of longitude 119 degrees 35 minutes east from Greenwich.
From here following the meridian of 119 degrees 35 minutes east to the paral-
lel of latitude 7 degrees 40 minutes north. From here following the parallel
of 7 degrees 40 minutes north to its intersection with 116 degrees longitude
east. From here along a straight line to the intersection of the tenth parallel of
latitude north with the 118th meridian east, and from here following the 118th
meridian to the point whence began this demarcation.24
The Treaty of Washington signed on November 7, 1900, in addition to reaf-
firming the provisions of the Treaty of Paris, stated that Spain should cede
the islands of Cagayan Sulu and Sibutu and their dependencies to the United
States.25
Under the Philippines Republic Act No. 3046 issued on June 16, 1961, the
easternmost point of the Philippine is at longitude 126°36′E (Pusan Point), the
westernmost point at longitude 116°′55′E (Cay), the southernmost point at 4°24′N
latitude (Frances Reef), and the northernmost point at 21°7′N latitude (Mavulis
Island, northernmost of the Batanes Islands). Obviously, China’s Nansha Islands
are not included in the Philippine territory. Therefore, the Philippines’ declaration
that the Kalayaan Group of Islands are part of the Philippine territory under Presi-
dential Decree No.1596 amounted to an act of invasion.
One of the pretexts stated in the Decree No.1596 for the aggressive attempt
of the Philippines is that “other states have laid claims to some of these areas,
their claims have lapsed by abandonment and can not prevail over that of the
Philippines on legal, historical, and equitable grounds.”26 However, according
to international law, it is only when a territory is really derelict that any state
may acquire it through occupation. Such territory is not derelict as long as the
former possessor is able, and makes efforts, to retake possession.27 After World
War II, the Chinese government took over the Nansha Islands and has since then
been garrisoning on its main island, Taiping Island (Itu Aba Island). Although
the Kuomintang withdrew its garrison from Taiping Island in 1950, the gar-
rison was reestablished in 1956 and has been kept up to this day. This was not
“abandonment.” In 1968 and 1971 (during the Vietnam War), the Philippines
stationed troops on some islands in its vicinity which are encompassed by the
Nansha Group, which was met with strong objection from the Chinese govern-
ment, who reiterated that the alleged “occupation” by the Philippines is null and
void as the Nansha Islands have been part of Chinese territory. In world history,
there is no lack of such cases. For example, in 1639 Santa Lucia, one of the
Antilles Islands, was occupied by England, but in the following year the English
settlers were massacred by the natives. No attempt was made by England to
retake the island, and France, considering it no man’s land, took possession
of it in 1650. In 1664 an English force under Lord Willoughby attacked the
French, drove them into the mountains, and held the island until 1667, when
the English withdrew and the French returned from the mountains. No further
step was made by England to retake the island, but she nevertheless asserted for
many years to come that she had not abandoned it sine spe redeundi, and that,
therefore, France in 1650 had no right to consider it no man’s land.28 Likewise,
the Philippines cannot occupy some of the islands in the Nansha Group on the
grounds that “their claims have lapsed by abandonment.” As early as in 1956,
when Cloma attempted to occupy some of the islands in the Nansha Group, the
Chinese government solemnly declared that “the People’s Republic of China
has indisputable sovereignty over these islands [Nansha Islands] and will never
tolerate the infringement of its sovereignty by any country with any means and
under any excuse.”29
11.4 Disputes over the delimitation of the continental
shelf in western Palawan
Gil S. Fernandez, president of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA)
and former head of the Western Command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(headquartered in Palawan to fortify the defence of the Kalayaan Islands) and a
former commodore of the Philippine Navy, put forth a theory in his paper The
Philippines’ South China Sea Claims:
Geographically, the Kalayaan Island Group lies in the continental shelf of the
Western boundaries of Palawan Province. And if one draws a line halfway
between Southwestern Philippines and the Asia mainland, this continental
shelf west of Palawan still falls to the east of this half way mark. In fact, this
continental shelf is mainly situated within the 200-mile exclusive economic
zone of the Philippines.30
This theory is hugely controversial. For example, as pointed out in Southeast

Asia and the Law of the Sea,
the basis of the Philippine claim is that the Spratlys are closer to its territory
and also lie on its continental shelf, even though the majority of the islands
are more than 250 miles away from the Palawan, and are separated from it by
a trench not far from Palawan’s west coast.31
Also, according to ASEAN and the Law of the Sea, “The Reed Bank dispute
directly raised issues of whether the continental shelves of the islands are part of
the Filipino continental shelf.”32
The South China Sea features a deep basin called the China Sea Basin, with a
continental shelf of varying width and depth. The four island groups in the South
China Sea, as a matter of fact, are formed by seamounts rising from the basin with
peaks above the surface of the ocean. The continental shelf of the basin begins at
the southern tip of Taiwan and extends southwest along the coast of Guangdong.
The entire Hainan Island is on the continental shelf. To the south, the shelf nar-
rows and connects with the Sunda Shelf, which covers the area of western Borneo
and includes the Gulf of Thailand. To the east, it stretches to northern Borneo and
western Palawan. On the northern side of the basin, the continental shelf falls off
sharply, with virtually no continental shelf located west of the Philippine Island of
Luzon. Between Taiwan and the Luzon Island lies the deep Bashi Channel, which
has no continental shelf along it. As the bottom of the basin is extremely uneven,
water depths around islands in the sea area are different. While the water depth
around the Pratas Islands is relatively shallow, around 400 meters, that around the
Zhongsha and Paracel Islands reaches to some 1,000 meters. The Spratly Islands
are located about 230 nautical miles southeast of the Paracel Islands, around
which the ocean depth ranging to some 3,000 meters. In the southern side of the
basin, not far from the outer edge of the continental shelf, the Spratly Trough (also
Borneo Trough or Palawan Trough) extends through the islands off the southwest
coast of Palawan to the northern coast of Borneo, approximately 400 kilometres
long and 2,500 meters deep.33 As discussed, there is a deep trough lying between
western Palawan and China’s Spratly Islands. According to the principle that “the
continental shelf of a state must constitute a natural prolongation of its land terri-
tory,” there is no “continental shelf” in the western boundaries of Palawan Prov-
ince, and the so-called Kalayaan Island Group can’t be on the continental shelf of
western Palawan.
In addition, continental shelf delimitation does not equate to “drawing a line
halfway between Southwestern Philippines and the Asia mainland” as Fernan-
dez suggested. According to the International Court of Justice, whenever a given
submarine area does not constitute a natural extension of the land territory of a
coastal state, even though that area may be closer to it than it is to the territory
of any other state, it cannot be regarded as appertaining to that state.34 China’s
delimitation of the continental shelf is in accordance with the principle of natural
prolongation, namely the criteria for delimitation is the continuation of the conti-
nental shelf into and under the sea instead of the median line, as exemplified by
the delimitation of the continental shelf in the East China Sea. In his book New
Developments in the Law of the Sea, Zhao Lihai points out that
these islands must be taken into account in delineating the continental shelf
in the East China Sea according to the rule that a continental shelf constitutes
a continent and the principle of natural prolongation. It is not simply about
drawing a equidistant line;
and “undoubtedly, given the special geographical conditions of the Okinawa

Trough, drawing an equidistant line in the continental shelf in this area is not
applicable. Instead, it should be divided in line with the principle of natural pro-
longation.”35 An example of maritime delimitation under international maritime
law is the signing of the Agreement between the Government of the Common-
wealth of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia establishing
Certain Seabed Boundaries in the Area of the Timor and Arafura Seas in May
1971. The Treaty established the seabed boundary line in the Timor and Arafura
Seas commencing at the Point of 8°54′ North Latitude, 133°14′ East Longitude,
with the delimitation of the seabed areas west of 133°14′ East. The seabed beneath
the sea area features a steep cleft with a depth of 3,100 meters – Timor Trough,
which divides the seabed. Running parallel to the southern coast of the Timor
Island, it is some 30 nautical miles from the southern shore of Timor and 200 nau-
tical miles from the northern Australian landmass. In the negotiations between the
two sides, Australia favored the principle of natural prolongation, which provides
its seabed territory extending to the thalweg of the Timor Trough. Indonesia, on
the other hand, contended the trough was a dint of little importance in a continu-
ous continental shelf extending beneath Timor so that it may not be taken into
account in drawing the median line of the continental shelf between Timor and
Australia. The then disputed areas is 20,900 square nautical miles. Eventually, the
delimitation was made the way down the southern side of the Trough following
the 200 meter isobath on the continental shelf of Australia. Indonesia received
2,800 square nautical miles of the then disputed areas, while Australia received
18,100 square nautical miles.36
Of course, East Timor became independent on May 20, 2002. Australia has not
recognized Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor since 1999 and has reached a
deal with East Timor on tapping oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea. Therefore,
the 1971 Treaty no longer has its legal force, and is thereby used as a case study
only.
As mentioned earlier, the Philippines ignored the fact that there is a deep trough
between Palawan and China’s Spratly Islands. Obviously, its contention that “the
Kalayaan Island Group lies in the continental shelf of the Western boundaries
of Palawan Province” is against the fundamental principle that the continental
shelf of a state is the natural prolongation of its land territory. Also, its attempt to
delimit the continental shelf with a median line between the southwestern Philip-
pines and the Asian continent is a violation of equity. According to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance
with equitable principles, and taking account of all the relevant circumstances,
in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each party all those parts of the
continental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory into
and under the sea, without encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land
territory of the other.37 This is a fair and the most basic approach to delineating
continental shelf limits.
11.5 Prospects for resolving the Sino-Philippine dispute

over the Nansha Islands
To establish a legal basis for its encroachment on the Nansha Islands, the Philip-
pine government held a closed-door roundtable at the University of the Philip-
pines on December 6, 1991, to review the prospects of the Philippines in resolving
the dispute over the South China Sea. Present at the meeting were some prominent
scientists, government officials and experts on the Philippines.
Regarding maritime boundaries and territorial claims, the following proposals
were put forward:
1 The Philippines should resolve ambiguities in Philippine law and practice

toward a clear-cut, consistent and well-grounded definition of national terri-
tory and maritime boundaries;
2 The Philippines should shelve the ownership issue in favor of exploring
all feasible areas of cooperation with neighbors regarding South China Sea
development;
3 The Philippine government, and other Asian governments, must take the cue
from Asian scientists and scholars and learn to set aside ideological and political
barriers to create an environment of cooperation. This will contribute to a stable
investment climate and help spur further economic dynamism in the region;
4 On the Kalayaan claim, the Philippines demonstrate its commitment to peace
and to follow countries such as Malaysia to only pursue tourism in the region;
5 Establish a credible law-enforcement force, supported by military power,
based in Palawan, to protect the continental shelf against poachers; and take
other necessary measures to improve Philippine capability to enforce claims
and policy decisions.38
The aforesaid proposals show that the Philippines, in order to maintain its
long-term occupation of the Nansha Islands, has been focusing on developing
its military forces on the occupied islands and reefs. The Western Command was
created on May 2, 1976, to “consolidate all units of the Philippine Armed Forces
defending the disputed continental shelf.”39 A small airport was built on Thitu
Island, which is suitable for the take-off and landing of the old-fashioned T-28
Fighter Aircraft and Douglas C-47 Skytrain. In July 1978, the airport runway
was expanded to more than 1,800 meters. In 1979, Vought F-8 Crusaders were
deployed on the island.40 In February 1995, seeing that China had built a platform
topped by four octagonal structures at Mischief Reef, the Philippine President
Ramos ordered strengthening the military force in the Nansha area, and asked the
Philippine Congress to pass a modernization program of 50 billion pesos ($2 bil-
lion) for the Armed Forces of the Philippines.41
Although the Philippines agreed to shelve the issue of ownership concerning
the Nansha Islands and seek joint management, its government has mainly tar-
geted at the sharing of the seabed resources. Peter Payoyo, former professor of the
University of the Philippines College of Law and the director of the University’s
Institute of International Legal Studies, once put it bluntly:
What I am saying is that the joint management concept is an approach which

perhaps could be considered by the Philippine policymakers. The disputes
here involve basically the serious problems of sovereignty involved here,
the question now is not how much we get legally, but how much, in a qual-
ity sense, we benefit. And I think if that is the focus of the question, then we
forget about ownership, we forget about sovereignty. The question is sharing,
cooperation, and trying to get the most out of the resources which are, by
their nature, limited.42
Also, according to Carolina Hernandez, Emeritus Professor of Political Science

at the University of the Philippines:
It may be wise to shelve the ownership issue. The joint cooperation zones
proposed during the Bali conference should be supported by the Philippine
government. After all, territory is only important for its economic and strate-
gic uses. What good is having ownership if you cannot use it? If these goals
can be secured by joint cooperative efforts, and avoid unnecessary, unafford-
able, and costly military expenditures and adventures, in the process, the
Philippines is better off pursuing this road. In a world that has increasingly
become more interdependent and hopefully more benign, cooperation, rather
than confrontation, is the best and wisest policy to adopt.43
However, in an attempt to avoid any sensitive proposals toward oil and gas
exploration, the Philippine government deliberately proposed to promote tourism
in the Kalayaan Island chain as a gesture of its commitment to peaceful solu-
tion. The Philippines also tried to convince the other claimants that the “Kalayaan
Island Group” is vital to the “survival of the Filipino people” in order to win the
support and sympathy of the ASEAN countries.44 Even so, in late July 1991 at
the Second Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea
(Bandung, Indonesia), the Philippine government declared that
nonetheless in the spirit of cooperation, justice and amity with all states and
pursuant to Article 74 and 83 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea of 1982, it manifests its willingness to enter into diplomatic nego-
tiations for the delimination of overlapping areas of the exclusive economic
zones and the continental shelves.45
This is in line with not only the principle of resolving border disputes under inter-
national law but also what China has long advocated. In the 28th ASEAN Min-
isterial Meeting held at Brunei Darussalam on July 30, 1995, Chinese Foreign
Minister Qian Qichen pointed out that China has indisputable sovereignty over
the Nansha Islands, and that all disputes should be resolved by peaceful means on
the basis of the provisions of the international law, including the 1982 UN Con-
vention of the Law of the Sea. Qian’s statement was commended by representa-
tives of various countries, including Ali Alatas, Foreign Minister of Indonesia. A
US official also said that China’s willingness to honor the international law and
the law of the sea renders it possible to settle disputes via diplomatic means, even
though China still claims its sovereignty over the Spratly Islands.46
Doubtless there is a long way to go before an effective settlement of the territo-
rial disputes between China and the Philippines. What remains a common belief
is that the disputes between the two countries over the Nansha Islands will be
resolved peacefully through diplomatic means.
Notes
Ocean Press, p. 75.
2 See A Collection of Documents on Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China,
Vol. 4. Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1958, p. 61.
3 See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgment, I. C.
J. Reports 1984, pp. 294–299.
4 Ibid.
5 Zhao, L. (1987). The Treatment of Islands in the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf—The
Continental Shelf Dispute between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean Sea (in Chinese).
In L. Zhao (Ed.), Theory and Practice of Contemporary Law of the Sea, pp. 165–166.
Student Book Company, pp. 85–86.
7 Fu, K.-C. (1981). Sovereignty and Mineral Deposits in the South China Sea: History
and Law. Taipei: Youth Cultural Corporation, p. 60.
Conflicts. Taipei: Youth Cultural Company, p. 80.
9 Catley, B., & Keliat, M. (1997). Spratlys: The Disputes in the South China Sea. Alder-
shot, UK: Ashgate, pp. 37–38.
11 Jennings, R., & Watts, A. (1996). Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed., Vol. 1. New
York: Longmanp, p. 687.
12 Ibid.
15 Baviera, A.S.P. (Ed.). (1992). The South China Sea Disputes: Philippine Perspectives.
Manila: Philippine-China Development Resource Center and the Philippine Associa-
tion for Chinese Studies, p. 20.
16 Ibid., p. 53.
18 Ibid., p. 85.
19 See Department of State Publication 4392, International Organization and Conference
Series II, Far Eastern 3, Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of
Peace with Japan, San Francisco, California, September 4–8, 1951, Record of Proceed-
ings, p. 119.
20 (1958). People’s Daily, March 26.
21 Ibid.
23 See www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/the-1935-constitution/ (accessed April
16, 2020).
24 See www.doi.gov/oia/about/treaty1898 (accessed April 16, 2020).
25 See www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1900/11/07/the-philippine-claim-to-a-portion-of-
north-borneo-treaty-between-the-kingdom-spain-and-the-united-states-of-
america-for-cession-of-outlying-islands-of-the-philippines-1900/ (accessed April 16,
2020).
26 See www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1978/06/11/presidential-decree-no-1596-s-1978/
(accessed April 16, 2020).
27 Oppenheim, L.F.L. (1996). International Law, 9th ed. London and New York: Long-
mans, pp. 716–718.
28 Ibid.
29 See www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2016-07/13/content_38869762.htm
31 Lee, Y.L. (1980). Southeast Asia and the Law of the Sea. Singapore: Singapore Univer-
sity Press, p. 30.
32 Tangsubkul, P. (1982). ASEAN and the Law of the Sea. Singapore: Institute of South-
east Asian Studies, p. 100.
34 See www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/51/051-19690220-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf (accessed
April 16, 2020).
35 Zhao, L. (1984). New Developments in the Law of the Sea (in Chinese). Peking: Peking
University Press, pp. 63–64.
36 Chen, D. (1988). Modern Inernational Maritime Law (in Chinese). Beijing: China
Social Sciences Press, p. 237.
37 Starke, J.G. (1958). An Introduction to International Law. London: Butterworth & Co.
(Publishers) Ltd.
39 Ibid., p. 20.
41 Tasker, R. (1995, April 6). A Line in the Sand. Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 15.
43 Ibid., p. 56.
44 Ibid., pp. 23–24.
45 Ibid., p. 53.
46 Hiebert, M. (1995, August 10). Comforting Noises. Far Eastern Economic Review,
p. 16.
12 Sino-French border demarcation
disputes and maritime boundary
delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin
The Beibu Gulf, also the Gulf of Tonkin, is a body of water partially enclosed by
northern Vietnam, southern China and China’s Hainan Island. With an average
water depth of 38 meters (the deepest water being less than 90 meters) and a flat
seabed, the gulf encompasses an area of about 44,238 square kilometers (24,000
square nautical miles). It has been shared by both China and Vietnam but has
never been demarcated by the two sides. From November 1885 to June 1887, rep-
resentatives of the two sides conducted joint surveys of the Sino-Vietnamese land
border and the islands in the Gulf of Tonkin. However, due to some constraints
back then, many historical disputes remain to be addressed.
In November 1991, the Interim Agreement on Handling Border Issues between
the People’s Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was
reached, followed by the Agreement on Fundamental Principles to Settle Border
and Territory Controversy in October 1993. During the six years from 1993 to
1999, rounds of government-level negotiations on the delimitation of the Tonkin
Gulf were carried out, the Joint Working Group on the Gulf of Tonkin met many
times, and bilateral expert-level talks on the so-called sea issues (South China
Sea—referred to as East Sea by Vietnam) were initiated. Eventually, on December
30, 1999, with the signing of the Land Border Treaty in Hanoi, the long-standing
dispute over the land border was resolved. At the end of 2000, the two sides final-
ized the Agreement on Fishery Cooperation in the Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu Gulf in
Chinese, and Bac Bo Gulf in Vietnamese) and the Agreement on the Delimitation
of the Territorial Seas, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves in
the Gulf of Tonkin. Given this context, it is necessary to review the history of the
border demarcation disputes between China and France and discuss the issues
regarding maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin.
12.1 The process of boundary demarcation between

China and France
The signing of the Sino-French Treaty of Tientsin on June 9, 1885, paved the way for
the border demarcation between China and France. According to Article 3 of the treaty:
After an interval of six months from the signature of the present treaty, com-
missioners appointed by the High Contracting Parties will go to delineate
the border between China and Tonkin. They will place, wherever there is a
need, boundary markers designed to clearly delineate the line of demarcation.
In the case where they cannot agree among themselves on the placement of
the markers or on the rectifications of detail in the actual frontier of Tonkin
which it may be necessary to make in the common interest of both parties,
they will refer it to their respective governments.1
Here we focus on disputes over the demarcation of the Sino-Vietnamese bor-

der in eastern Guangxi (i.e. extending eastward from the Ping’er Pass to Tun-
cang Mountain), and in the section of Guangdong (the Fangcheng section of the
present-day Sino-Vietnamese border). Back then, the French commission, led by
M. Bourcier Saint-Chaffray, included M. Scherzer, the French consul in Canton,
Dr Paul Neis, Lieutenant-Colonel Tisseyre, Captain Bouinais, and M. Pallu de la
Barrière. The commissioners sent by the Qing government were Chief Minister
of the Court for Dependencies Deng Chengxiu, Governor General of Guangdong
and Guangxi Zhang Zhidong, Governor of Guangdong Ni Wenwei, Governor of
Guangxi Li Bingheng, Tax Circuit Intendant of Guangdong Wang Zhichun and
Expectant Circuit Intendant Li Xingrui.2
Geographically, Tonkin shares a border with three of China’s southwestern
provinces: Guangdong, Guangxi and Yunnan. As the border area is crisscrossed
by mountains and rivers, it is difficult to identify the boundaries. As Taiwanese
historian Guo Tingyi notes:
Some people who have crossed the Sino-Vietnamese border, after trekking
several kilometers in Vietnam, found themselves again on the territory of the
Qing Dynasty. In the border area, some places adjacent to the Qing territory
are claimed as the Vietnamese territory. Some places have their gazetteers
and tax payment records archived in government offices. And in some places,
all the farmlands, houses and tombs are owned by Chinese people.3
Since Vietnam had long been a vassal state of China, little emphasis had been
placed on the delimitation of the border area. Also, the border area was too remote
to attract much attention from the authorities, rendering the delimitation work
more challenging. On the other hand, the French had for several times threatened
to stop the delimitation process. The French troops even captured some places
that remained disputed, bombarding villages and killing Chinese people. All of
these led to a huge chasm and intense conflicts between the two parties over the
delimitation of the border.
The work of demarcation, which began in late 1885 and was completed in 1887,
falls into two phases. The first phase began in November 1885, when commission-
ers of the two sides held negotiations at the Zhennan Pass (now called “Friend-
ship Pass”), a pass near the border between China’s Guangxi and Vietnam’s Lang
Son Provinces. In the spring days in March 1886, when poisonous miasma arose,
the French ambassadors in Peking received a telegram from the French commis-
sioners on having a negotiation with the Zongli Yamen (the office in charge of
foreign affairs in the late Qing dynasty) to suspend the demarcation process. This
Sino-French border demarcation disputes 167
period witnessed the delimitation of the east section of the Guangxi-Vietnam bor-
der, which stretches over 300 miles from the Aidian Pass (or Xima Pass) to the east
and the Ping’er Pass to the west. The second phase started in December 1886 when
the commissioners resumed negotiation in Dongxing City in Guangxi and ended in
June 1887 with the signing of the Sino-French Boundary Convention and the Sino-
French Supplementary Commercial Convention. The result was the drawing of a
borderline on map, which extends from the western regions of Qinzhou to Zhushan
Village in Dongxing in Guangxi, covering the whole province, and to Móng Cái
in northern Vietnam. The three major conflicts between China and France in the
demarcation process will be discussed in the following.
12.1.1 Disputes over “Ou tuo”

The term “Ou tuo 瓯脱” in Chinese refers to a middle ground along the border
between two countries which separates the realm of one from that of the other.
The Qing commissioners, before departing for their mission, received an impe-
rial edict stressing the importance of the Sino-Vietnamese boundary demarca-
tion and the need to establish a middle ground as an “Ou tuo” between the two
states.4 The reasons behind such a thought are two-fold. Strategically, Guangxi
and Vietnam share a border winding over 1,800 li (900 kilometers), along which
there are more than 100 mountain passes. If France were to station troops in
such provinces in northern Vietnam as Lang Son and Cao Bang, the Guangxi
border would be subject to constant threat. Considering this, Guangxi Governor
Li Bingheng proposed to the Qing government that in Lang Son and Cao Bang
an “Ou tuo” could be set up. This area would separate the Qing realm from that
of France, shielding each other from potential border conflicts. Even if a conflict
occurred, it would be much easier to deal with than otherwise.5 The other reason
was convenience. The borderlines marked in the maps offered by the French
emissaries differed from what were stipulated in the official statutes and local
annals offered by the Qing commissioners. If the border was demarcated accord-
ing to the latter, then it would entail more efforts, considerations and disagree-
ments. Therefore, it would be the most desirable to establish an empty area to
avoid bilateral conflicts.6
For the Qing commissioners, they had borne in mind that they must act pru-
dently and do their utmost to gain as much territory as possible. Hearing that the
French Parliament had proposed to give up Tonkin, they thought that it might tilt
the odds in their favor. So they proposed to delimit Ky Lua, situated in the north-
ern bank of the river facing Lang Son into the Qing territory. That is, the region
that stretches from the south of the Ky Cung River in Lang Son to Chuantou Town
(in Yunnan) to the east of Langshan, and Langjia (i.e. Liangjiang Prefecture) to
the west, could be established as an “Ou tuo.” In the view of Zhang Zhidong,
Viceroy of Huguang, Liangguang and Liangjiang,
if Lang Son is obtainable, the area extending to Cao Bang in the west, to
Chuantou Town in the east, and all the way along the northern bank of the Ky
Cung River, can be set up as an “Ou tuo.”7
However, according to Deng Chengxiu, there were towns in “Ou tuo.”
Although it belonged to neither Vietnam nor the Qing Empire, if it was given
away to Vietnam, it would be no better than ceding it to France. Therefore, Deng
proposed to turn the focus on seizing more border areas. After deliberation, Deng
and his peers came to a decision:namely the area north of Lang Son, south of Ky
Luaand from the towns of Luping and Nayang in the east to Qiufeng in the west,
should be divided with rivers as boundaries; the area spanning from Nayang to
Qinzhou Prefecture in the east, to Qiufeng and Bao Lac in the west should be
delimited with mountains as boundaries (if there were no rivers). If the French
agreed to establish an “Ou tuo,” the empty zone would be still under the admin-
istration of the tributary regions, while the French protectorates of Annam and
Tonkin would have no jurisdiction over the area.8 On January 12, 1886, the two
sides held an initial meeting during which the French commissioner M. Bourcier
Saint-Chaffray contended that as the Sino-French Treaty of June 9, 1885, only
provided for the “details” of the modification of the boundary, the area to be
delimited should not extend to Lang Son. Deng disagreed by saying that such a
modification was feasible because in doing so the Qing government would take
merely 1/20 hold of the whole Tonkin. As a result of the disagreement, the nego-
tiation came to a standstill.
Five days later, they resumed talks, during which Bourcier suggested that
according to the 1885 Treaty, the first thing they should do was to place boundary
markers to delineate the actual frontier of Tonkin. This was, however, opposed by
Deng, who insisted that boundary markers could only be placed after the frontier
was modified because setting markers first would render modification impossible.
Failing to convince Deng, Bourcier resorted to the Treaty and suggested to refer
it to their respective governments. Upon returning to Zhennan Pass, Deng sent a
telegram to the imperial court, in which he noted that “it is out of the question to
modify the boundary after the placement of boundary markers” and the French
commissioner Bourcier
tries to entice us with barely inches of border area, and if we agreed, it would
hamper the efforts to secure the passes along the border, which would in turn
plunge us into an extremely unfavorable position in the border delimitation.
We have no choice but to take a firm stand, for fear of any small compromise
that we might later regret.9
However, in later negotiations, the French side insisted that the Qijiang River
in the area was the only way to leave from Lang Son to Cao Bang, and
refused to take Mountain Qi as the boundary. Given the fact that there was
no hope for the frontier modification, and the negotiation might again reach a
stalemate, the Qing delegate decided to delay it and watch how things would
develop.
After receiving the telegram from Bourcier, Georges Cogordan, French ambas-
sador to Peking, sent a diplomatic note to Li Hongzhang, the Trade Minister of
Qin, stating that the Qing government tried to take over a wide expanse of the
border area from Tan An and Hai Ninh to Cao Bang and Bao Lac, which devi-
ated from the meaning of “detail” stipulated in the 1885 Treaty. He also relayed
the standpoint of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs that although the French
Parliament used to deliberate on withdrawing troops from Tonkin, France would
like to make it abundantly clear that it would never cede its control over any part
of Tonkin. Additionally, he stressed in a threatening tone that Bourcier planned to
return to Hanoi due to the long-stagnated negotiation and he himself would go to
imperial court on February 9. Consequently, for fear of provoking a conflict with
the French side, the Qing government issued an order on February 8 demanding
Deng and his peers “resume the negotiation with M. Bourcier as soon as possible
on the delimitation of the originally-agreed boundary line, and that if there is any
slight modification, it shall be made only when bilateral consensus is reached,”
and that “all the proposed modifications on the boundary line are rendered null
and void.”10 As a result, the attempt of the Qing court to establish an empty zone
came to a failure.
12.1.2 Disputes over the modification of the originally

proposed boundary
Pondering over the edict, it occurred to Deng that if the originally intended
boundary was delimited, there would be three difficulties and two negative
effects. Firstly, tens of thousands of residents in the border area had voiced their
unwillingness to change their nationality to Vietnamese. Therefore, demarcat-
ing the original boundary would provoke fear and disturbance. Secondly, with
refugees rushing to the east of Baole (now Bao Lac) and Mu’ma, the roads had
become more congested. Any armed suppression would entail unexpected prob-
lems. Thirdly, as the originally prescribed boundary line meandered through
rugged mountains and precipitous cliffs, most of the boundary was missing. To
complicate matters further, the constant rainy weather in spring rendered it more
difficult for troops to march forward. In terms of the consequences, on the one
hand, the French would be reluctant to delineate a new boundary, which was
unfavorable for the Qing troops to secure the mountain passes along the border;
on the other hand, once the Qing side lost control over the area north of Lang
Son, the French would demand to open border trade through the Zhennan Pass,
which was no different from allowing French access to Guangxi.11 Considering
these, Deng still insisted on using rivers as boundaries in the resumed meeting
on February 13, refusing to make any concessions. When Bourcier asked him to
obey the imperial commands, Deng said, “It’s my duty to follow both the impe-
rial edict and the agreement we have signed. But if I did as you suggested, I shall
be subject to punishment, which I cannot accept.”12 As a result, the negotiation
failed again.
Before the two sides restarted negotiation on February 16, Deng received a
telegram from the Trade Minister of Beiyang which stated that Cogordan had
agreed to set up trade ports in Tonkin. After a discussion with his colleague Li
Bingheng, Deng concluded that they should by any means obtain control over
Wenyuan, a town outside the Zhennan Pass which was expected to be a trade port.
Consequently in the meeting on February 16, the French envoy Charles Dillon
made a small concession, that is, the French would relinquish its control over Hai
Ninh and Bao Lac located respectively to the east and north of Wenyuan to the
Qing court, on the premise that rivers should not be used for the delimitation of
boundaries.13
In the meeting on February 18, Dillon reaffirmed the standpoint that the
French would not give up Tan An and Mu’ma, threatening that if Deng insisted,
they would halt the negotiation or resort to war. Seeing that it was impossible
to persuade Dillion, Deng had no choice but to compromise. Four days later, he
sent Wang Zhichun and Li Xingrui to negotiate with Dillon. Before they set off,
Deng asked them to do their utmost to win control over the fertile land in the
east of Mu’ma, while the barren mountains in the north of Tan Ancould be given
up. However, in the talks with the French side, Li took it upon himself to agree
to the French proposal of expanding the eastern section of the border by 10 li
(5 kilometers). Upon hearing this, Deng was so anxious that he stayed awake
all night. It occurred to him that if the French set up along the border with its
artillery batteries capable of firing a distance of over 5 kilometers, the border
territory of the Qing Dynasty would be well within range of bombardment. The
next morning, Deng ordered He Zheng, a translator, to write a letter to Dillon,
in which he asked Dillon in the tones of Wang and Li that if the proposal of
expanding the western section of the border by 30 li (15 kilometers) and the
eastern by 15 li (7.5 kilometers) was approved by M. Bourcier. In the letter, “10
li” was deliberately replaced with “15 li,” an attempt to overturn what Li had
agreed on.14 However, what was beyond Deng’s expectation was that Dillon
had betrayed his commitment to ceding the control over Hai Ninh, Wenyuan
and Bao Lac to the Qing court. All the efforts of revising the boundary line,
therefore, bore no fruit.
Upon learning this, Li Hongzhang telegraphed an urgent message to Deng
on March 2, asking him to delineate the originally intended boundary first and
conduct a joint on-site border survey with French envoys as soon as possible.
He told Deng that he should take a holistic and long-term view toward this issue
and adapt himself to the changing circumstances for the sake of the greater good.
Two days later, the Qing court issued a decree, demanding the commissioners
led by Deng conduct a field survey with the French counterparts without any
delay.15 Deng, however, asked to return to Longzhou Country in Guangxi for
medical treatment, during which he sent a note to the French delegation without
the permission of the Qing court, suggesting that the field survey be postponed
till late autumn. This greatly irritated the imperial court. On March 8, Deng was
ordered to accomplish the survey of the first and second sections of the border
before spring miasma rose and leave the rest of the sections unsurveyed until
autumn. Meanwhile, Deng was warned that “if there is any excuse for further
delaying the survey, a serious punishment will be unavoidable.”16 Unwilling to
accept the order, Deng sent Li Bingheng to the Zongli Yamen (the government
body in charge of foreign policy) to make explanations. This, on the contrary,
only made matters worse. On March 13, the Qing court issued another decree
ordering a tough punishment of Deng and Li, which stated, “If you continue to
play the old trick of delaying the negotiation, you shall be made to account and
[be] seriously penalized. Don’t you realize the severe consequences for what
you’ve done?”17 Under such acute pressure, Deng eventually followed the order.
The border mapping of the Zhennan Pass section, which lasted from March 20 to
April 13, 1886, was finally completed.
12.1.3 Disputes over Jiangping, Huangzhu and Bach Long Vi

The Qing court agreed on the French proposal of drawing the borderline of the
Guangdong section on a map, a method once used in the delimitation of the Yun-
nan section of the Sino-Vietnamese border. On January 4, 1887, a translator was
sent to the camp of the French to collate the mapping information. However, the
translator found that Dillon had incorporated Jiangping and Huangzhu into the
Vietnamese territory. So upon coming back, he told it to Deng Chengxiu. After
referring to the local annals published in the 12th year (1832) and the 14th year
(1834) of the Daoguang’s Reign, Deng found that, according to the maps in these
annals, the Sino-Vietnamese border began at the mouth of the Gusen River, and
that places such as Jiangping, Huangzhu and Bach Long Vi were all located in the
eastern region of the river, which belonged to the Qing territory. Deng also found
on the chorography of Vietnam that there were no such place names as Jiangping
and Huangzhu in the map of Hai Ninh. Thus, Deng concluded that Jiangping and
Huangzhu were indeed within the Qing territory.18
During the meeting in Mong Cai on January 7, Deng refuted the French attempt
to mark regions such as Jiangping and Bach Long Vi as the French territory,
pointing out that these regions were under the jurisdiction of Longmen County
in Guangdong. When Dillon doubted the reliability of the map provided by the
Qing delegation, Deng rebutted that Dillon’s contention was baseless and that
the map was good evidence for what he was saying. The meeting concluded
with the concession of the French commissioners on further deliberation on the
maps presented by the two sides.19 In the resumed meeting on January 15, 1887,
however, Dillon claimed that Jiangping was within the territory of Annam (cen-
tral region of Vietnam) as recorded in the local annals that “the border extends
between Annam and Jiangping and then into the sea.” Deng replied that as the two
words “Annam” and “Jiangping” were juxtaposed in the sentence, the two places
were divided by the border. Despite different wording, what he said conveyed
the exact meaning of the sentence. Since the two sides had agreed on drawing the
borderline on the map, they should refer to the carefully drawn map, rather
than the sentence, for the delineation. Deng also showed two delicate drawings of
the Sino-Vietnamese border made by the British and the French about ten years
before. The borderline in the drawings extended from Bach Long Vi to Dongxing
in southern Guangxi. Areas on the southwestern side of the line such as Mong Cai
and Hai Ninh belonged to the Vietnamese and that on the other side were within
Guangdong. This was consistent with the map in the local annals. But Dillon
insisted that the two drawings were created by some uneducated people from
France and were thus unconvincing. Hearing this, Deng refuted as follows,
These drawings were open for sale. Those who created the two drawings
could never have foreseen today’s delineation work. How could they draw
the borderline in the favor of us? Besides, they wanted nothing from us, so
why should they make analysis that is helpful to us?
Nonetheless, Dillon argued that those who made the drawings did not receive
orders from the French government, and that only the drawings made by the gov-
ernment were believable. Deng then replied, “Now why should you doubt the
annals compiled by our government?” Though unable to further justify himself,
Dillon refused to accept the fact that such places as Jiangping and Huangzhu
belonged to the Qing Empire.20
In fact, long before the talks, the French had fired at places such as Jiangping
and Huangzhu, even to the vicinity of Sile. After the meeting on January 15,
the French, seeing that the Qing delegation had solid evidence, intensified their
incursion, such as attacking Jiangping and deploying troops in Goudong, Shijiao
and Bach Long Vi. In the negotiation on January 18, Deng warned Dillon that
the French troops should not be stationed in Jiangping, but his words infuriated
Dillon. Deng then rebuked that if the French did so in Jiangping, whose juris-
diction remained unclear, so would the Qing army. Dillon had no choice but to
apologize. Then Dillon showed a map that was drawn in advance, on which the
borderline begins at a river in the south of Dongxing and extends into the sea
in the east and into the inland in the north. As claimed by Dillon, the areas on
the right side of the line belonged to Vietnam, and that on the other side, which
encompass Changshan, Jiangping, Baimu in Bach Long Vi and Longmen, were
ceded to the Qing Empire. Seeing this, Deng challenged him:“[T]his is only your
wishful thinking. Why are you being so stubborn, as we have provided such
sound evidence?” Dillon explained that he did everything on orders, and he had
no choice. But Deng would not budge on this point, insisting on taking the map
in the local annals as the basis for boundary delineation. Dillon then threatened,
“[N]ow neither of us would like to give in. You’ll be blamed and punished any-
way.” “I only do what I believe is the right thing, regardless of interest. Why
trouble yourself to worry about me?” smiled Deng. Having nothing to refute
Deng, Dillon proposed to refer their disagreement on the ownership of Jiangping
to their respective governments.21
But Deng insisted that the French should first withdraw troops from Jiangping
before referring to their governments. Eventually, an agreement based on three
principles was reached. Accordingly, before referring the disputes over Jiangping
to their respective governments, neither side would send troops or officials to
places whose ownership remained undetermined such as Guangdong and Annam,
aside from areas extending from Zhushan to Bach Long Vi. The purpose was to
prevent the French, who had already captured Jiangping, from occupying these
regions.22
The delimitation process was therefore halted. On January 30, a French official
blatantly declared that Jiangping and Bach Long Vi had been incorporated into
the Vietnamese territory. For those who wanted to live in these places, they had to
return as soon as possible and apply for resident permits upon returning. The late-
comers, even if they had resident passes, were not eligible to live in these places,
and would be shot upon sight. Consequently, a plethora of people were displaced
and there was a simmering mood of rebellion.23
On February 3, to stop stragglers from swarming into other places and reassure
the people, Zhang Zhidong ordered forts built and bases fortified in such places as
Sile, and troops stationed in Dongxing. This was seemingly done to prevent upris-
ing, but in fact to deter the French troops.24 Three days later, Zhang telegraphed
to Deng Chenxiu, informing him that the Zongli Yamen had just obtained a map
made by the French in 1881, on which Bach Long Vi was marked as a territory of
the Qing Dynasty. If any disagreement on the ownership of Bach Long Vi arose,
the map could be used as proof.25 Upon receiving the telegram, Deng was more
determined in retaking Jiangping and Bach Long Vi. According to Deng, Jiang-
ping and Bach Long Vi were mutually dependent as goods were all sent by sea to
about 10,000 people in Jiangping via Bach Long Vi. As was shown in the map on
the local annals, areas stretching from Bach Long Vi to Jiangping were all within
the boundary of the Qing territory. With sufficient evidence for the fact that Bach
Long Vi and Jiangping were within the Qing territory, including the map on the
local annals, the two drawings made by the British and the French ten years ago,
and the map made by the French in 1881, Deng made it clear that he would make
no compromise with Dillon.26
On February 28, after days of fierce argument, the French commissioners
were forced to agree on deferring discussions on Bach Long Vi, Jiangping and
Huangzhu and to jointly marking out on a map the borderlines in those undisputed
areas in Guangxi as soon as possible. The delineation of those controversial areas
would be further deliberated until a peaceful solution was reached. Back then,
officials from the Zongli Yamen stressed that “although we agree on delaying
the negotiation on Bach Long Vi, we stand uncompromisingly on retaking the
occupied areas. Issues concerning such areas as Jiangping and Huangzhu shall be
further negotiated in Peking.”27 This therefore laid the foundation for the recovery
of Jiangping, Huangzhu and Bach Long Vi, which was completed on June 16 with
a quid pro quo on opening Longzhou in Guangxi as a trade port. On August 20,
French troops eventually withdrew from Bach Long Vi.
Debating for more than one year, the two sides completed the delineation of
the Guangdong section and the eastern part of the Guangxi section of the Sino-
Vietnamese border. The boundary at the Zhennan Pass is divided into two sec-
tions: the eastern section began at the Zhennan Pass and extended eastward to
the Aidian Pass (or Xima Pass) via the Luo Pass and the Nazhi Pass; the western
section extended westward to the Ping’er Pass via areas such as Bakou and Juan-
cun.28 On March 29, 1887, the envoys of the two sides signed a treaty in Mong Cai
and revised four maps concerning the delineation of Guangdong and Guangxi,
respectively covering areas stretching from Zhushan Village to the Aidian Pass
(or Xima Pass) in Guangxi, from the Ping’er Pass to the Shuikou Pass in Guangxi,
from the Shuikou Pass to areas southwest of Balai in Naling Village in Guangxi,
and from Bailai to Geda Village adjoining Yunnan.29 In western Qinzhou, Guang-
dong, the border area measures about 50 kilometers from south to north and about
150 kilometers from east to west, covering such places as Fenmaoling, Jialong,
Bazhuang and Jialonghe. In southwestern Qinzhou, where Jiangping and Huang-
zhu are located, the border area spans over 20 kilometers from south to north
and 30 kilometers from east to west, covering Sile and Gaoling. In Guangxi, the
eastern section of the boundary at the Zhennan Pass stretches to Mount Paiqian
for more than 25 kilometers. The border area in Longzhou in western Guangxi
stretches about 10 kilometers from the Shuikou Pass to the Fengcun Pass, and
borders Yunnan to the northwest.30 The commissioners led by Deng Chengxiu,
who remained stern and firm in every negotiation with the French counterparts,
successfully accomplished their missions.
12.2 Undelimited maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin

On March 29, 1887, the Qing commissioners and the French counterparts signed
a treaty in Mong Cai and revised maps, indicating that the delimitation of the
Guangxi section of the Sino-Vietnamese border was drawing to an end. However,
during the meeting, the French envoy Dillon presented a map drawn in advance
and said that when referring their disagreement over the ownership of Jiangping
to their respective governments, they should also mention the islands adminis-
tered by Jiangping. He had telegraphed to a French envoy informing him that the
Qing government should agree on ceding islands off the southern coast of Hai
Ninh and Chunlan to Vietnam. Deng replied resolutely that he would propose to
the Qing government that the French should relinquish control over the islands off
the southern coast of Zhushan if that was the case. Hearing this, Dillon was utterly
speechless.31 When Zhang Zhidong heard about this, it occurred to him that if the
Qing government agreed to what the French had demanded, the islands of Jiut-
ousan (Gotho in Vietnamese), which had long been inhabited by Chinese people,
would also fall into the hands of the Vietnamese. On March 30, he telegraphed
Deng that “the islands of Jiutousan must be granted as the Qing territory. . . . In
the following negotiations, the first thing is to determine the sovereignty over
Jiutousan, instead of other islands.” In his subsequent telegram to Zhang Zhidong,
Deng said that Dillon would refuse to give up the islands of Jiutousan since they
did not appear in the maps used in the previous negotiations.
So Zhang sent another telegram to Deng, saying:
The offshore sea dotted with islands should be delimited as either the Viet-
namese or the Qing territory. But in the case of the sea area beyond the off-
shore waters, it seems more appropriate not to draw a maritime boundary.
The vast sea area has never been under the control of Vietnam. Once it was
taken over by Vietnam, the French would gain unlimited access to the territo-
rial sea, intercepting our ships carrying munitions and stores, which would
definitely be to our disadvantage. Therefore I suggest the need for further
deliberation.32
Deng took the advice. In negotiations that followed, he was evasive about the
maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin. On April 17, when the
negotiation was about to conclude, Zhang sent an urgent message to Deng out-
lining “three issues needing to be negotiated,” one of which was that the mari-
time boundary should be used only to delimit the offshore sea interspersed with
islands, rather than the sea area beyond the offshore waters, otherwise the French
would control most of the sea waters.33
Therefore, it can be seen that at that time, the two countries divided only the
coastal islands but not the maritime area in the Gulf of Tonkin, as evidenced by
Article 3 in the Sino-French Boundary Convention of June 26, 1887. In the article,
it was noted that:
Apart from the Guangdong section which has been delimited by the officials
of the two countries responsible for delineating the boundary, all the unde-
limited areas, including the areas east of Mong Cai and northeastern regions,
are under the jurisdiction of the Qing government. As far as the islands in
the sea are concerned, the red line drawn by the officials of the two countries
responsible for delineating the boundary shall be extended southward from
the eastern hill-top of Chagushe (or Wangzhuin Chinese, south of Mong Cai
and southwest of Zhushan Village in Guangxi) and constitutes the dividing
line. The islands lying east of this line shall belong to the Qing government.
The islands of Jiutousan (Gotho in Vietnamese) and other small islands west
of this line shall belong to Vietnam.34
As can be seen in the Treaty, the red line drawn on the attached map was a line
to divide the islands off the coast of Mong Cai (see Figure 12.1).
However, during the Sino-Vietnamese negotiation on the maritime delimitation
in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 15, 1974, the Vietnamese government declared
that the 1887 Sino-French Boundary Convention had established the land and
maritime boundary between Vietnam and China in the Gulf of Tonkin, that is, the
meridian 108º03′08″ east of the Greenwich meridian (i.e. the meridian 105º43′
east of the Paris meridian) was the maritime boundary line in the Gulf. Using
the 1887 Treaty to justify its argument, Vietnam tried to obtain two-thirds of the
water area in the Gulf after delimitation. The Vietnamese claim was immediately
refuted by the Chinese side on the ground that the 1887 Treaty only included
the settlement of the land boundary between the two sides, and that the line of
108º3′13″ east longitude was merely a dividing line of islands in the Gulf. As
such, there had never been a maritime boundary line between the two countries in
the Gulf, and the maritime boundary should be determined through negotiations.35
“If the line of 108º3′13″ east longitude was adopted, Vietnam would occupy
most of the waters of the Gulf. This line is merely about 30 nautical miles off
the coast of China’s Hainan Island but more than 130 nautical miles off the
Figure 12.1 Map of Mong Cai and Zhushan (in Chinese and Vietnamese)
Source: South China Sea Islands Sovereignty Disputes and International Conflicts, edited by Chen
Hurng-yu (1987)
Vietnamese coast, which is undoubtedly unfair and unreasonable.”36 According to

Article 3 of the Statement of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
on the Territorial Sea Baselines of Vietnam issued on November 12, 1982,
the maritime frontier drawn in the gulf between Vietnam and China is defined in
Article 2 of the Convention on the Delimitation of the Frontier between Vietnam
and China signed on June 26, 1887 between France and the Qing Dynasty.37
Following the presentation of a plethora of Chinese historical records that sug-

gest that the maritime delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin was not settled are, let
us take a look at the French argument on the issue. On September 27, 1933, the
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a diplomatic note to the Chinese lega-
tion in Paris, stating that the 1887 Sino-French Convention was only applicable
to Mong Cai in northern Vietnam. According to the note, the Treaty intended to
delimit the boundary between China and Vietnam in Mong Cai; and in terms of
the meridian 105º43′, i.e. the line through the eastern point of the island of Chagu
[Tch’a-Kou or Ouan-chan {Tra-co}], if it was not used to delimit only part of
the maritime zones, it could be applied to the Paracel Islands. If so, most of the
Vietnamese islands and even most Vietnamese territory would fall into the land of
China, which was absolutely impossible.38 There is no doubt that the testimony of
the countries concerned is the most convincing. In retrospect, the demarcation
of the Guangdong section of the Sino-Vietnamese border was map-based. With
regard to the red line or the so-called Line of Tra Co, that was simply a form of
geographical shorthand to avoid the need to name all the islands, and such a tech-
nique was used widely at that time in state practice. As Prescott suggests, such
technique was used by Russia and the United States in 1867; by Britain when it
allowed Queensland to annex the Torres Strait Islands in 1879; by Spain and the
United States in 1898, when they defined the islands of the Philippines; by Britain
and Germany when they divided the Solomon Islands in 1899; and by Britain
and the United States when they distinguished their possession in the Sulu Archi-
pelago in 1930.39 This technique divides only the coastal islands of two parties,
not the maritime area.
As a matter of fact, the Vietnamese knew very well what such a delimitation
meant. On January 31, 1939, Governor General of Indochina Brévié drew a line
in the Gulf of Siam to define the border between the waters of Cambodia and
Cochin-China. This line, later known as the Brévié Line, with the Phu Quoc
Island on its one side, makes a 140 grade angle with the north meridian and tra-
verses between Koh Poulo Wai and the Koh Tang Islands. All the islands north
of this line are administered by Cambodia, but Vietnam claimed its sovereignty
over these islands; likewise, the islands south of this line, including Phu Quoc.
Apparently, this line is an administrative line rather than a land or maritime
boundary. Although Cambodia dropped its claim to Phu Quoc in 1976, it has
for long insisted that the Brévié Line should be the maritime boundary between
the two countries. However, Vietnam refused to accept the Brévié Line as a
boundary and insisted on drawing a line of equidistance between Cambodian
and Vietnamese islands lying north and south of the Brévié Line. If so, Vietnam
would gain an area of sea and seabed measuring at least 860 square nautical
miles.40 This indicates that the Vietnamese were mindful of the signficance of
these lines. In its own practice, however, Vietnam claimed the red line as the
maritime boundary line in the Gulf of Tonkin and rejected the Brévie Line as a
line that could divide the maritime areas between Cambodia and Vietnam. The
reason is apparently that it wanted to gain much more maritime areas than it
deserved.
Additionally, some experts have reviewed the impracticality of delimiting the
maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin in the 1887 Treaty. As pointed out by
Prescott, a renowned Australian specialist in this area, Vietnam had to overcome
four major difficulties in order to sustain its arguments. First, the meridian in
the Treaty has no termini. Second, if the meridian was the maritime boundary it
would mean that Vietnam was not entitled to any territorial waters off the eastern
tip of Tra Co. Third, if this meridian was meant to be a maritime boundary, it
was so far out of character with the prevailing concepts of maritime sovereignty
of the period that it would have been given special mention in the text. Fourth,
there is nothing in the treaty to distinguish the use of this meridian from the use of
straight lines by other colonial powers in other treaties to separate island groups.41
Usually, in the late 19th century, the width of the territorial sea was 3 nautical
miles. Also, the law issued by the French Third Republic (1870–1940) on March 1,
l888, prescribed that the territorial sea of all French colonies, including French
Indochina (Vietnam was part of French Indochina from 1887 to 1954), should be
within 3 nautical miles. Besides, the 1930 Hague Conference on the Codification
of International Law also approved the 3 nautical mile limit. Therefore, the Sino-
French Boundary Convention of June 26, 1887, was not able to delimit maritime
zones beyond 3 nautical miles. As Kittichaisaree observes,
it seems unlikely that this division was intended to allocate to either China
or Vietnam a maritime area of more than 3 nautical miles from the coast,
bearing in mind the 3 nautical miles maximum breadth of the territorial sea
at that time.42
Dr. Zou Keyuan, Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute (EAI),
National University of Singapore, also notes in his Maritime Boundary Delimita-
tion in the Gulf of Tonkin that:
At the time when the freedom of the seas prevailed, it was beyond imagina-
tion that the two countries could divide between themselves a vast gulf like
the Gulf of Tonkin into two respective jurisdictional waters. The prevailing
limit of the territorial sea for a coastal state at that time was out to three nm.
It is impossible that China and Vietnam could have endorsed the modern con-
cepts of the law of the sea to delimit the Gulf of Tonkin. Clearly, therefore,
the 1887 Treaty did not divide the Sino-Vietnamese maritime boundary in the
Gulf of Tonkin.43
In summary, as is revealed in history, boundary demarcation between China

and Vietnam was based on the Sino-French Treaty of June 9, 1885, which only
addressed the delimitation of land borders between China and Tonkin (northern
Vietnam) and never touched upon maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf
of Tonkin. In fact, representatives from both parties had no intention to delimit
the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin, let alone to develop a plan for it.
In addition, the 1887 Sino-French Boundary Convention and the map attached
to the 1894 Sino-French Convention concerning boundary delimitation between
Guangdong and Vietnam only provided for a “red line” through the island of
Tra Co. Accordingly, the islands lying east of the red line belonged to the Qing
government and the islands of Jiutousan (Gotho in Vietnamese) and other small
islands west of which belonged to Vietnam. In a nutshell, the “red line” pre-
scribed in the 1887 Convention was merely a dividing line of the coastal islands
off the coast of Mong Cai, not a line delimiting the maritime areas in the Gulf
of Tonkin. China and Vietnam have never drawn a line of maritime boundary in
the Gulf of Tonkin.
12.3 Maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin
Negotiation on the delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin
was proposed by Vietnam. On December 26, 1973, the Vietnamese (North Viet-
nam) government planned to grant an Italian oil company first access to an area in
the Gulf of Tonkin for oil exploration, and proposed to China to launch bilateral
negotiations on the maritime boundary of the Gulf. On January 18, 1974, China,
while agreeing to hold negotiations with Vietnam, proposed that a rectangular
area in the middle of the Gulf, bounded by the 18º and 20º parallels and the 107º
and 108º meridians, be kept free from any oil exploration by the two sides and a
third country. North Vietnam accepted the terms and suspended its negotiations
with oil companies from Italy, Japan and French. The first round of negotiations
began in Beijing on August 15, 1974, but was halted at the end of November. The
negotiations resumed on October 7, 1977, but no agreement was reached. Later,
the two sides did not resume negotiations until 1993, when they attempted to
resolve the issue again. As of May 1998, ten rounds of talks had been held but no
substantial progress was made. In the following, issues relating to the boundary
delimitation of the Gulf of Tonkin will be discussed.
12.3.1 Historic waters in the Gulf of Tonkin

On August 15, 1974, China and Vietnam held the first round of negotiations in
Beijing, during which Vietnam proposed to treat the Gulf of Tonkin as historical
waters shared by both parties and that the line of 108º3′13″ east longitude was the
maritime boundary line in the Gulf as stipulated in the Sino-French Treaty signed
on June 26, 1887. As such, waters on each side are subject to the juridical regime
of internal waters of each party. Each side should not further propose such issues
as territorial sea and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).44 But the view of treating
the whole Gulf as historic waters was rejected by the Chinese side. Therefore, in
its Statement on the Territorial Sea Baselines of November 12, 1982, Vietnam
made a claim that “the waters in the part of the gulf belonging to Vietnam consti-
tute the historic waters pertaining to the juridical regime of the internal waters of
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.”45 So is the Gulf of Tonkin an area of historic
waters? The definition of historical waters should be factored into consideration
in answering this question. According to Leo J. Bouchez,
historical waters are waters over which the coastal state, contrary to the gen-
erally applicable rules of international law, clearly, effectively, continuously,
and over a substantial period of time, exercises sovereign rights with the
acquiescence of the community of States.46
In Yearbook of the International Law Commission, published in 1962, three con-

ditions need to be met to sustain an historic waters claim: (1) the exercise of the
authority over the area; (2) the continuity over time of this exercise of authority;
and (3) the acquiescence of foreign states to the claim.47 Apparently, the Gulf
of Tonkin fails to fulfill these conditions and should not be claimed as historic
waters. Usually, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a bay could be enclosed
as historic waters when its entrance was less than 6 nautical miles given that the
width of the territorial sea was 3 nautical miles.48 The closing line of the Gulf of
Tonkin is about 150 nautical miles, far exceeding the width limit at that time.
It was impossible for France, Vietnam’s then-protector, to declare the historic
status of the Gulf. In fact, in a note dated December 5, 1983, the French govern-
ment stated that it was “unaware of any title which would substantiate Vietnam’s
historic waters claim.”49 Secondly, Vietnam declared the Gulf of Tonkin as his-
toric waters as recently as 1982 in its Territorial Seas Baseline Statement. But the
North Vietnamese themselves had made no mention of historical waters in their
1964 declaration of a 12-mile territorial sea. Nor had the PRC made any such
claim about the Gulf of Tonkin in its 1958 territorial sea declaration, although
China claimed Chiungchow (now Qiongzhou) or Hainan Strait, between Guang-
dong and Hainan provinces, as internal waters.
Thirdly, China refused to treat the Gulf as historical waters. The Chinese Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs was quick to protest in a November 28, 1982 statement
that no boundary line had been drawn in the Gulf of Tonkin. All these show that
Vietnam has never been entitled to claim the Gulf of Tonkin as historical waters,
and its claim has been consistently rejected by China, which shares part of the
Gulf of Tonkin. Vietnam therefore has no right to treat the Gulf of Tonkin as his-
torical waters.
In addition, the term of “historic waters” is usually applicable to a bay or gulf
owned by a single state. It is difficult for gulfs and bays claimed by more than one
country to be acknowledged as historic waters. According to Oppenheim Inter-
national Law, “all gulfs and bays enclosed by the land of more than one littoral
State, however narrow their entrance may be, are non-territorial. They are parts
of open sea, the marginal belt inside the gulfs and bays excepted.”50 However, a
few exceptions exist in practice. The best known is the Gulf of Fonseca, situated
in Central America. It was affirmed by the Central American Court of Justice in
1917 as “a historic bay possessing the characteristics of a closed sea.”51 Spain
had possessed the Gulf of Fonseca from its discovery in 1522 until 1821, and
this exclusive possession continued throughout the period of the existence of the
successor state, the Federal Republic of Central America. In the beginning of
1839 it was vested in three successor states of the Federal Republic: Nicaragua,
Honduras and El Salvador. The historic status of this gulf remained unchanged as
the territory passed to the successor states. Its historic status was reaffirmed by
the International Court of Justice in 1992.This case opens up the possibility that
if territorial changes occurred along the coast of an existing historic gulf, which
was formerly enclosed by a single state, then the change would not affect its status
as an historic gulf.52 Yet, the situation is different for the Gulf of Tonkin, which
is shared by both China and Vietnam. It would be absurd and illogical if half of
the waters in the Gulf were historic while the other half were not. The Vietnamese
claim that the Gulf of Tonkin should be regarded as historic waters is therefore
groundless.
There are several reasons behind the Vietnamese proposal to treat the Gulf of
Tonkin as historical waters. Geographically, among others, not only “the Gulf of
Tonkin is bounded by China and Vietnam” but it
has long been a fishing ground both to Chinese and Vietnamese fishermen,
and is to the crucial interest of national defense and security and to the devel-
opment of both states.53
This claim stemmed from the Vietnamese interpretation of the 1887 Sino-French
Boundary Convention, in which a baseline was drawn at 108°03′13″ east of Green-
wich in the Gulf of Tonkin, and the waters on each side of the line are subject to
the juridical regime of internal waters of each party. The argument is, however,
against historical facts and unfair. It is consistently rejected by China as nearly
two-thirds of the gulf would be on the Vietnamese side if the line was accepted
as a boundary. Apparently, China would be more than willing to acknowledge
the proposal of historic waters provided that Vietnam agrees to stop distorting
historical facts and comply with the International Law of the Sea in resolving the
disputes regarding the delimitation of the Gulf of Tonkin. Any agreement reached
in such a spirit is believed to reinforce the status of the Gulf as historic waters.
As rightly declared by the Office of the US Department of State, “the Vietnamese
claim to historic waters is questionable because China, which also borders the
Gulf of Tonkin, does not claim the gulf as historic waters and disputes the Viet-
namese claim to the meridional boundary within the Gulf.”54
12.3.2 Role of islands in boundary delimitation

In the Gulf of Tonkin, there are two categories of islands. One is that of the adja-
cent islands along the coasts of China and Vietnam, and the other refers to the
outlying islands in the Gulf. The maritime boundary delimitations are further
complicated by the existence of islands in the disputed area. For the first category,
the islands are most likely to be enclosed within the straight baselines of the two
countries and some of them will be selected to become basepoints. The respec-
tive baselines will no doubt affect the delimitation of the EEZ and the continen-
tal shelf in the Gulf. However, the islands of the second category are critical in
the delimitation of the sea areas in the Gulf of Tonkin, especially Bach Long Vi
Island. This island is approximately 1.6 square kilometers and 53 meters above
sea level, which is proximate to the middle line of the gulf and is 38 nautical miles
from the nearest Vietnamese coast. The status of this island directly impacts the
delimitation of the sea areas in the Gulf of Tonkin. In international practices, three
approaches are generally adopted to solve the disputes concerning such islands in
maritime delimitation.
1 Islands are given full effect as base points in the determination of equidistant
lines. For example, in the 1965 Agreement between Finland and the USSR
Concerning the Boundaries of Sea Areas and of the Continental Shelf in the
Gulf of Finland, the maritime boundary delimitation is based on the equi-
distance principle. The coasts along and the islands in the Gulf of Finland
are used as base points, and all of these islands are given full effect. Other
examples include the Sweden-Norway CSB Agreement (July 24, 1968) and
the Norway-UK CSB Agreement (March 10, 1965).
2 Islands are given partial effect, i.e. such islands are not used as base points in
establishing equidistant lines, and in such cases the relevant islands receive
a territorial sea of no more than 12 nautical miles. The Agreement between
Italy and Yugoslavia Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
of 1968 is a case in point. Considering the fact that the Yugoslav islands
of Pelagruz and Kajola are situated very close to the median line boundary
between the coasts of the two parties, the two islands were respectively given
12-nautical-mile arcs, without moving the median line toward the Italian
coast. Another example can be found in the 1969 Qatar–United Arab Emir-
ates (Abu Dhabi) agreement, in which Daiyina, an island belonging to Abu
Dhabi and near the equidistant boundary between the two adjacent states,
was granted a 12-nautical-mile maritime zone.
3 Islands are given no effect, i.e. draw an equidistant line between the coasts of
both parties, ignoring the existence of islands. For example, in the Agreement
between Italy and Yugoslavia Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental
Shelf of 1968, the islands of both states were not factored into consideration
in the delimitation. Likewise, in the 1985 Libya-Malta decision concerning
the continental shelf delimitation, the Maltese island of Filfla was not taken
into account.
The first approach is certainly favored by Vietnam the most, because Bach Long
Vi Island would be given full weight as a base point and the equidistant line
would be drawn between Bach Long Vi and the much larger Hainan Island.
This would lead to the extension of the line of equidistance in Vietnamese
favor and its claim to an additional 1,700 square nautical miles of maritime
area. However, it would come at a cost of a major shrinkage in the Chinese sea
area, something which the Chinese authorities could never compromise on.55
From a Chinese perspective, the third approach would be ideal as the situa-
tion of Bach Long Vi Island is believed to satisfy “special circumstances” that
disqualify it from being a basepoint in the line of equidistance. This echoes
with the case in June 1971 when South Vietnam and Indonesia had a dispute
over the delimitation of the continental shelf boundaries in the northern part of
Indonesia’s Natuna Islands. Indonesia then demanded a median line between
the Natunas and Vietnam’s Con Dao. The effect was to shift the line consider-
ably in favor of Indonesia. The South Vietnamese, on the contrary, wanted a
median line drawn between the Vietnamese mainland and Indonesia’s Kali-
mantan Island, rather than including distant islands within the archipelago.
To them, these islands constituted “special circumstances” in continental shelf
delimitation, and using them as base-points for the median line was no good
for Vietnam.56
The legal status of Bach Long Vi Island is also specially related to its historical
fact. It is said that this island formerly belonged to China and had been inhabited
by the Chinese for centuries. Before it was transferred to Vietnam in 1957, the
Island had 267 inhabitants, who came from Hainan Island.57 In contrast, accord-
ing to Lưu Văn Lợi, Former Head of the National Boundary Commission of Viet-
nam, after French withdrew its troops from 17°N north and Bach Long Vi Island
in 1955 according to the 1954 Geneva Agreements, Vietnam asked China to take
over Bach Long Vi Island on its behalf as the Vietnamese armies were busy tak-
ing over other places. China did so and handed over the island to North Vietnam’s
government 1957, together with a small warship to serve as a link between the
Island and China.58
Although these events remain to be verified, there is no denying that Bach
Long Vi was once under the jurisdiction of China. If this was factored into con-
sideration, perhaps the island would be given a reasonable legal status, which
would conduce to a peaceful settlement of the dispute over the maritime boundary
delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin.
12.3.3 Natural resources in the Gulf of Tonkin

Natural resources abound in the Gulf of Tonkin. It is one of the principal fishing
grounds for both China and Vietnam, with a multitude of fish stocks and other
aquatic species. There are also plentiful mineral resources, especially oil and gas.
According to the prediction of the China Marine Petroleum Company, the Gulf
area is one of the biggest oil and gas concentrations in the world, having an oil
deposit of about 2.29 billion tons and natural gas deposits of about 1,444 billion
cubic meters. In addition, the Gulf is an important sea route of communication for
Vietnam and China.59
These economic factors will have to impact the delimitation of the Sino-
Vietnamese maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin. As for the management
of the fishing grounds, as the main fishing ground is located on the Vietnamese
side from the middle line in the Gulf of Tonkin, China may defend its traditional
fishing rights in the negotiations on the maritime boundary delimitation by citing
some existing examples in state practice, such as the 1986 France-Italy Agree-
ment on the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundaries in the Area of the Strait of
Bonifacio, the 1984 France-Monaco Maritime Delimitation Agreement, and the
1974 India–Sri Lanka Agreement on the Boundary in Historic Waters between
the Two Countries. In all these agreements, traditional fishing activities of fisher-
men from each state may remain undisturbed as a result of boundary delimitation.
Though it is unclear to what extent the fishery factor would be taken into account,
it should be one of the considerations in the negotiations. Some historical factors
may be also considered in the negotiations. China and Vietnam have signed a
number of agreements regarding fishing operations in the Gulf of Tonkin. In these
agreements, the two parties made some arrangements for cooperation and man-
agement, such as agreed lines for dividing the respective fishing activities in their
coastal sea areas and providing that the fishing vessels from one party could not
enter into such sea areas of the other party without prior permission, but beyond
these coastal areas, fishing vessels from both sides had the right to operate in the
Gulf.60 It is believed that an equitable and reasonable agreement on the delimita-
tion in the Gulf will be reached between China and Vietnam.
To address oil and gas exploitation in the Gulf of Tonkin, joint development
arrangement is expected to be the right solution. It can not only facilitate the
settlement of boundary disputes but also ensure the equitable distribution of the
shared resources. In fact, Vietnam has had successful experiences on joint devel-
opment. For example, it reached an agreement with Malaysia in 1993 on the joint
development of the South China Sea, and in 1994 with Thailand on jointly devel-
oping disputed waters. Likewise, China has always championed the idea of joint
development. This was reaffirmed in 1999 by Zhu Bangzao, Spokesman of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, when he escorted Premier Zhu Rongji on
a state visit to Canada. Thus, there is an atmosphere of goodwill that militates in
favor of joint development, which suggests both sides tend to consider collabora-
tion in developing, either wholly or in part, the Gulf of Tonkin during the process
of boundary delimitation.
12.4 Conclusions
To conclude, the milestones in the process of maritime boundary delimitation in
the Gulf of Tonkin can be summarized as follows. In 1885 after the signing of
the Treaty of Tientsin, the French and the Qing commissioners conducted joint
surveys of the Sino-Vietnamese land border. Later, the commissioners of the two
sides drew a line to divide the islands off the coast of Mong Cai, namely the
“red line” prescribed in the Sino-French Boundary Convention of June 26, 1887,
which was merely a dividing line of the coastal islands in the Gulf of Tonkin, not
a line delimiting the maritime area in the Gulf of Tonkin.
In late 19th century when the freedom of the seas prevailed and the prevailing
limit of the territorial sea for a coastal state was up to 3 nautical miles, it is impos-
sible that China and Vietnam could have endorsed the modern concepts of the law
of the sea to delimit the Gulf of Tonkin. Therefore, China and Vietnam did not
divide the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin. To address issues left over
from history, the two sides had rounds of negotiations over border issues since
1970s, but all ended fruitlessly.
It was not until February 1999, when Vietnamese General Secretary Le Kha
Phieu visited China, that the two sides reached a consensus to sign the land
boundary treaty at the end of 1999 and agreed on a resolution to the delimitation
in the Gulf of Tonkin by the year 2000. On December 30, 1999, China and Viet-
nam officially signed the Land Border Treaty, which resolved the long-standing
border issues between the two countries. At the end of 2000, the two sides signed
the Agreement on the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas in the Gulf of Tokin
and the Agreement on Fishery Cooperation in the Gulf of Tonkin, which greatly
contributed to developing friendly and cooperative relations between the two
countries.
At present, China and Vietnam have agreed on maintaining the existing mecha-
nism for negotiating maritime issues, and to develop a long-term solution through
peaceful talks. Before these issues are resolved, the two sides should seek to
tap more cooperation potentials in such fields as marine environmental protec-
tion, meteorology and hydrology, and disaster mitigation and prevention. Mean-
while, they should refrain from taking any action that may complicate the dispute
settlement process or exacerbate the dispute, or resorting to force, or trying to
pose threats to the other with force. When disagreements arise, they should seek
prompt consultation in a calm manner before finding constructive solutions that
conduce to their relations.
Notes
1 Huang, Y.,Yu, N., & Bao, L. (Eds.). (1935). A Collection of Treaties between China and
Foreign Countries (in Chinese). Shanghai: Commercial Press, p. 89.
2 Kuo, T.-Y. et al. (1959). Records of Negotiations between China and France over Viet-
nam, Vol. 5. Taipei: IMH, Academia Sinica, pp. 3187–3192.
3 Ibid., p. 3601.
4 Ibid., p. 3267.
5 Ibid., p. 2842.
6 Xiao, D.H. & Wu, G.Q. (Eds.). (1990). A Collection of Documents of Frontier Delimi-
tation between China and Tonkin under Deng Chengxiu’s Charge (in Chinese). Xining:
Guangxi People’s Press, p. 4.
7 Ibid., p. 10.
8 Ibid., p. 147.
9 Ibid., p. 149.
10 Ibid., pp. 27–28.
11 Ibid., pp. 28–29.
12 Ibid., p. 154.
13 Ibid., p. 155.
14 Ibid., pp. 32–33.
15 Ibid., pp. 36–37.
16 Ibid., p. 39.
17 Ibid., p. 42.
18 Ibid., p. 58.
19 Ibid., p. 59.
20 Shao, X. et al. (Eds.). (1955). Materials Related to the Sino–French War (in Chinese).
Shanghai: Shanghai Peoples Press, p. 96.
21 Xiao, D.H. & Wu, G.Q. (Eds.). (1990). A Collection of Documents of Frontier Delimi-
Guangxi People’s Press, pp. 61–62.
22 Ibid., pp. 67–68.
23 Ibid., p. 70.
24 Ibid., p. 73.
25 Ibid., p. 77.
26 Ibid., p. 79.
27 Ibid., p. 87.
28 Ibid., p. 44.
29 Ibid., pp. 96–97.
30 Kuo, T.-Y. et al. (1959). Records of Negotiations between China and France over Viet-
nam, Vol. 5. Taipei: IMH, Academia Sinica, p. 3754.
31 Xiao, D.H., & Wu, G.Q. (Eds.). (1990). A Collection of Documents of Frontier Delimi-
Guangxi People’s Press, p. 96.
32 Ibid., pp. 97–98.
33 Shao, X. et al. (Eds.). (1955). Materials Related to the Sino–French War (in Chinese).
Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, p. 112.
34 Wang, T. (1982). A Comprehensive Compilation of Sino-Foreign Treaties and Agree-
ments, Vol. 1 (in Chinese). Beijing: Sanlian Press, p. 513.
35 Liu, W. (1992). Vietnam: Land, Sea and Sky. Beijing: Military Friendship and Culture
Press, pp. 64–65.
36 Han, N. et al. (1998). Diplomacy of Contemporary China. Beijing: Chinese Social Sci-
ences Press, p. 274.
Ocean Press, p. 120.
39 Prescott, V. (1985). The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World. London: Methuen,
p. 225.
41 Prescott, V. (1985). The Mairtime Political Boundaries of the World. London: Methuen,
p. 225.
43 Zou, K. (1999). Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin. Ocean Devel-
Press, p. 65.
45 See https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/58573.pdf (accessed April
17, 2020).
46 Bouchez, L.J. (1964). The Regime of Bays in Internatonal Law. Hague: Martinus
Nijthoff, p. 281.
47 (1962). Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. 2, p. 6.
48 Lauterpacht, H. (1955). Oppenheim’ International Law, 8th ed., Vol. 1. London and
New York: Longmans, p. 505.
49 See www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/publications/
E.87.V.3.pdf (accessed April 17, 2020).
50 Lauterpacht, H. (1955). Oppenheim’ International Law, 8th ed., Vol. 1. London and
New York: Longmans, p. 508.
51 See www.icj-cij.org/en/case/75 (access April 17, 2020).
Press, p. 63.
56 Farrell, E.C. (1998). The Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Law of the Sea. Marti-
nus: Nijhoff Publishers, p. 242.
57 Zou, Keyuan. (1999). Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin. Ocean
58 Liu, W. (1996). The Sino-Vietnam Disputes over Hoang Sa et Truong Sa (in Chinese).
Beijing: Ocean Development Strategy Research Institute of State Oceanic Administra-
tion, p. 56.
60 Ibid., pp. 244–245.
13 UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea and the South China Sea
disputes
Since the first session of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea held
at the United Nations Headquarters in New York in December 1973, 11 sessions
were held over a period of ten years. The United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) was eventually adopted on April 30, 1982, and entered into
force on November 16, 1994. UNCLOS includes a preamble and 17 parts, a total
of 320 articles, nine annexes and a final protocol. The essentials of UNCLOS are:
(1) defining the maximal breadth of territorial sea of each country to be no more
than 12 nautical miles from the baseline, and the territorial sea’s breadth of the
adjoining zone no more than 24 nautical miles from the baseline; (2) each country
is entitled to own an EEZ of no more than 200 nautical miles from the baseline
outside the territorial sea; (3) the continental shelf of the coastal state, including
all of its natural prolongation beyond the territorial sea from its land territory, up
to the outer edge of the continental margin, the EEZ can be extended up to 350
nautical miles; (4) foreign ships and aircrafts enjoy the right of innocent passage
in sea lanes designated by the archipelagic state, etc.
13.1 The EEZs and continental shelves

The 200 nautical miles EEZ stipulated in UNCLOS grants some coastal states the
opportunity to expand their maritime jurisdiction. However, the maritime zone
of each country varies greatly due to geographical differences. One of the most
typical examples is the French Clipperton Island, located in the East Pacific. This
island has a land area of only 1.6 square kilometers, plus a 6-square-kilometer
lagoon, while its EEZ covers an area of almost 432,000 square kilometers. In con-
trast, the Oceanian island country, Western Samoa, encircled by its neighboring
countries, houses a land area of merely 2,935 square kilometers and yet the mari-
time zone covers as many as 134,000 square kilometers.1 This is also prominent
in Southeast Asian countries. For instance, Thailand’s coastline is almost as long
as that of Malaysia, and even longer than Myanmar. However, its concave coast-
line limits its EEZ to an area of only 94,700 square nautical miles, which is much
smaller than Malaysia’s 138,700 and Myanmar’s 148,600 square nautical miles.
Another example is Singapore, an island country surrounded by other ASEAN
countries. Although it owns a land area of 227 square nautical miles, its economic
area only amounts to 100 square nautical miles.2
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 189
Moreover, most countries in Southeast Asia are coastal countries gathering in
shallow maritime zones; thus the 200-nautical-mile EEZ claimed by these coun-
tries will inevitably cause overlap. When Indonesia expands its claimed EEZ from
its archipelago’s straight-line baseline, it will overlap with the EEZs claimed by
Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Vietnam, Papua New Guinea and Australia;
the EEZ announced by Singapore will partially overlap with the EEZ claimed by
Malaysia and Indonesia, and Malaysia’s expansion of its jurisdiction will also
include areas claimed by Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines,
Vietnam and even China. In addition to the issue of demarcation and overlapping
jurisdictions, the expansion of the EEZ will change the legal status of many tradi-
tional deep-sea fisheries as well, from the original high seas to the jurisdiction of
a particular country. This will make Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand the closed
maritime zone; ships cannot enter the high seas unless they pass through the EEZ
of one or two neighboring countries.3 As a result, the original sovereignty dispute
of the South China Sea will inevitably intensify due to the implementation of
UNCLOS. As George Lauriat says:
The signing of the law-of-the-sea (LOS) convention has been variously

described as the beginning of a new era in international law or simply another
example of institutionalised chaos unleashed on the world by developing
nations under the auspices of the United Nations. There is no country in Asia
that is claiming a continental-shelf boundary or has drawn a 200 mile EEZ
which is not in conflict with another nation’s claim. Some conflicts which
would have been unthinkable as late as the 1950s have arisen only because of
the LOS provisions. For example, Indonesia and Vietnam, separated by hun-
dreds of miles of water, now have overlapping claims to the continental shelf
area north of the Natuna islands. Territorial disputes over numerous islands in
the South China Sea have intensified as the LOS moved closer to completion
because conflicts over fishing grounds between nations in Southeast Asia are
overlapping EEZ claims involving oil-bearing seabed substructures.4
Of course, according to the provisions of UNCLOS on the EEZ, the entire

South China Sea may be divided into jurisdictions of many countries. However,
as there are still territorial disputes over these EEZ, so far they have not yet been
divided. In fact, the divisions of EEZs are hard to achieve before relevant mari-
time boundaries are delimited. Although UNCLOS has formulated certain restric-
tions on the settlement of maritime boundary disputes, these provisions are de
facto rarely adhered to; as for the solution, although the provisions of UNCLOS
have partial jurisdiction per se, they focus more on flexibility instead of legal
inevitability. In fact, UNCLOS only recognizes the rights of EEZs, yet there is no
statement on dispute settlement regarding EEZs. This reality means that disputes
over islands are likely to intensify.5
While UNCLOS stipulates that the continental shelf is “all natural prolongations
of the land territory,” it also prescribes that “if the distance from the baseline of
the breadth of the territorial sea to the outer edge of the continental margin is less
than 200 nm, the distance should be extended to 200 nm.” It is implied that the
importance of the “natural prolongation” delimitation on the continental shelf has
been gradually weakened. Some cases of the International Court of Justice demon-
strate that “natural prolongation” is a significant factor in dividing the continental
shelf boundary. For example, in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Case, the
International Court of Justice stressed the importance of “natural prolongation”;
however, in the Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf Case in 1982, the International
Court of Justice argued that “natural prolongation did not have to be sufficient or
even appropriate, it was only used to determine the exact breadth of the continental
shelf between countries.”6 Just as Dr. Kriangsak Kittichaisaree says:
Insofar as seabed areas less than 200 nautical miles from the coast are con-
cerned, and where the distance between the coasts of the parties is less than
400 nm, geographical or geological factors in delimitation which used to give
rise rights to entitlement on the basis of natural prolongation of land territory
are obsolete. . . . Only when the continental margin extends beyond the 200
nautical miles does the “natural prolongation” principle have a role to play.7
In Southeast Asia, the principle of “natural prolongation” may not work because
the distance between the two coasts is within 400 nautical miles, and the 200 nau-
tical mile continental shelf area claimed by one country necessarily conflicts with
the continental shelf of another. However, some countries around the South China
Sea still attempt to expand their jurisdiction on the grounds of “natural prolonga-
tion.” For example, the Philippine claim to the danger zone of the Nansha Islands
in the northern hemisphere is based on grounds of development, proximity, dis-
covery, possession, etc. Additionally, it argues that the Palawan Trough is not a
geological fault, and the northern hemisphere of the danger zone is part of the
Philippine continental shelf in accordance with the theory of continental marginal
extension. That is to say, the continental shelf of the Philippines will extend to
the western part of the danger zone of the Nansha Islands.8 Another example is
Malaysia’s claim to some island reefs in the southern part of the Nansha Islands,
which is based on the island reefs located above the claimed continental shelf in
Malaysia. In 1988, Malaysian Deputy Foreign Minister Abdullah Fadzil Che Wan
said that “these island reefs are under the sovereignty of Malaysia and Malaysia
has reaffirmed its jurisdiction in the past. . . . They are within the continental
shelf of Malaysia.”9 These countries use the extension of the continental shelf
as the basis for the claims of the islands and reefs, which clearly violates the
principles of international law that “land grants sea rights.” For island and reefs
rise above the water surface in the Nansha Islands, the disputes are not associated
with demarcation but rather their sovereignty. Therefore, the claim to sovereignty
based on the principle of “natural prolongation” is not only against international
law but also will further complicate territorial disputes. Moreover, it is indefinite
that the islands claimed by Malaysia are on the extension of its continental shelf
as it is said that none of the disputed islands in the South China Sea is a geographi-
cal extension of the continental shelf of any country in the area. The continental
margin of these islands is often considered to be completely separated from the
Asian continent, the Philippines, Brunei and East Malaysia.10 If so, the validity of
the Malaysian government’s claims is questionable.
13.2 Islands and rocks

Article 121, paragraph 2, of UNCLOS stipulates that islands, like other land terri-
tories, may own territorial seas, contiguous zones, EEZs and continental shelves.
Paragraph 3 also states that “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or an
economic life of their own shall have only a 12 nautical miles have no EEZ or
continental shelf.”11 Therefore, the definition of islands and reefs becomes the
focus of public attention as it will impact the delimitation of maritime boundar-
ies, especially in the South China Sea, which is home to numerous such features.
As observed by Stein Tonnesson, a professor of the Center for Environment and
Development at the University of Oslo:
a key step in paving the way for a solution to the South China Sea disputes is
to decide if any of the small islets in the Spratly and Paracel areas fulfill the
requirements for generating more than a 12 nautical miles territorial sea, and
if the answer is positive, how many. The text of UNCLOS is unclear on this
matter and legal scholars disagree.12
On the distinction between islands and rocks, it is generally believed that the
former is larger than the latter in size. Therefore, some scholars have proposed
to distinguish the two by the area they cover. For example, the US State Depart-
ment’s geographer states in the article Island and Special Circumstance that a rock
has an area of less than 0.001 square miles; a larger area no more than 1 square
mile is considered an islet. An isle is between 1 and 1,000 square miles, while the
area of the “island” is more than 1,000 square miles. However, these criteria have
not been officially adopted in legal documents, probably due to their inflexibility
when applied to changing geographical situations.13 In fact, according to the pro-
visions of UNCLOS, a rock capable of sustaining human habitation or economic
life of their own doesn’t have to be large enough to be entitled to its EEZ or a
continental shelf. Thus, some scholars tend to distinguish between islands and the
rocks by their capabilities to sustain human habitation. Hasjim Djalal, the Indo-
nesian Ambassador, proposed three more specific standards: (1) whether there is
fresh water supply on the island or rocks; (2) whether it is possible to grow food;
(3) whether there are materials to build houses there. If these answers are positive,
it can be seen as an island over which maritime jurisdiction is able to be exercised,
regardless of its size. If the answer is negative, then it does not comply with the
provisions of UNCLOS and can only be entitled to its territorial rights.14
Marius Gjetnes proposed some guidelines for the interpretation of terms in
Article 121(3) of UNCLOS as follows:
First, there seems to be a limitation in the use of the word rock in the sense
that some islands, viz. Jan Mayen, will not need to satisfy Article 121(3)
because of their size. Second, since the word “and” in the early drafts of the
convention text was replaced by “or” in the final text, it seems clear that each
of the “human habitation” and “economic life” criteria are, in themselves,
sufficient and that it is not necessary to satisfy both. Third, neither of these
two requirements needs to be fulfilled in practice; it suffices to pass a test that
proves they can be fulfilled. Fourth, when applying Article 121(3) one should
submit islands to certain tests. The key tests are if it can provide fresh water,
food, and shelter to human inhabitants and if the island possesses sufficient
resources of its own to sustain economic life. Fifth, some sort of outside
support should be allowed in realizing an island’s economic opportunities,
since in most cases this is necessary in order to realize an economic poten-
tial. Sixth, inhabitants such as lighthouse keepers, weather personnel, and
scientific personnel stationed for preservation and scientific purposes can-
not be accepted as proof of sustainable habitation. Seventh, some kinds of
“economic” activity, such as government-paid military occupation or scien-
tific work, navigational aid, and activities that in no way use local resources,
cannot be accepted as proof of economic viability. And eighth, the status of
features may vary over time because the criteria in Article 121(3) will them-
selves be subject to change as new technologies and life conditions emerge.15
Gegetnes further explained:
Because “economic life” and “human habitation” are directly linked to human
activities and developments that may vary over time, it follows that the mean-
ing of Article 121(3) is likely to do the same. Consequently, some features that
would have previously been entitled to extended maritime zones may today
fail the requirements of Article 121(3) and vice á versa. The point may be best
illustrated by imagining a small island in the middle of an ocean where huge
amounts of exploitable hydrocarbon resources are being discovered under
the seabed within that island’s 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. Prior to
the discovery, the feature would fail to pass the economic life requirement in
Article 121(3). However, the new circumstances will, if the natural resources
can be exploited, provide the island with an ability to sustain an economic life
of its own for a long period of time. If, however, there do not exist techniques
to exploit the resource, the island seemingly will be categorized as an Article
121(3) rock because the classification depends upon the circumstances at the
moment of the claim. Paradoxically, the presence of exploitable hydrocarbon
resources within an island’s 12-nautical-mile territorial zone could be help-
ful in meeting the economic life criterion so the island would gain a right to
a full 200-nautical-mile continental shelf and EEZ, and thus in turn become
an economic goldmine. This paradox could be a serious matter in the case of
the Spratlys. If some of the claimant states expect or hope to discover oil in
the immediate vicinity of the islands they claim, then they may hope to gain
a significant extra bonus in the form of a continental shelf and EEZ. In such
a situation they will have no incentive to clarify their maritime zone claims
or resolve disputes over maritime delimitation before the oil has been found.
This danger would have been eliminated if 121(3) had said “and” instead of
“or”; then the economic life requirement would not have been a sufficient
condition for gaining a right to extended maritime zones, and small islands
would have needed to satisfy both the human habitation and economic life
requirement.16
According to Article 121(1) and (3) of UNCLOS, rocks in the South China Sea
can be divided into three types. First, some islands with limited area fully meet the
requirements of rock. Apart from certain reefs in the Xisha and Nansha Islands, the
Huangyan Island seems to fall under this type (such rocks shall not have their own
economic zone and continental shelf, but in principle, they can at least be treated
as low tide highlands and the base point for measuring the width of the EEZ and
the continental shelf). Second, Article 121(3) is applicable to the largest ones in the
Dongsha, Xisha and Nansha Islands due to their size and other characteristics. Such
features mainly include the Taiping, Nanwei and Zhongxing Islands of Nansha and
Dong and Yongxing Islands of Xisha. Third, there are a large number of islands in
Xisha and Nansha that may or may not be covered by Article 121(3). Reefs that
meet the requirements of Article 121(3) can only have limited influence on expand-
ing the marine width of Xisha and Nansha Islands and the demarcation between
the archipelago and mainland coast sovereignty as long as there exist no territorial
disputes. If a rock granted to a certain claimant doesn’t meet the requirements of
islands, its maritime zone in the South China Sea is also extremely limited.17
Besides, there are a large number of low tide highlands in the Xisha and Nansha
Islands, such as Bombay Reef, North Reef and Passu Keah of the Xisha Islands;
the Alison Reef, the Dallas Reef, the Cornwallis South Reef, the Hardy Reef, the
Dongmen Reef, the Riji Reef and the Subi Reef of the Nansha Islands and so
forth. If these low tide highlands are within 12 nautical miles of an island, they
can only be used as part of the baseline for measuring the outer limit of the ter-
ritorial sea. For example, the North Reef of the Xisha Islands, located 12 nautical
miles away from the Xuande and Yongle Islands, has no impact on the extent of
maritime zones. If a low tide highland is located within the territorial sea of a
country, in principle it can only be regarded as a base point by this country for
measuring the extent of its maritime zones, and claims by other countries for
the highlands are impermissible. There are a number of highlands in the South
China Sea that have never been exposed above the water, such as Renjun tan,
Lizhun Tan, Prince Consort Bank, Prince of Wales Bank, Nanwei Bank and Van-
guard Bank in the southwestern part of the Nansha Islands, as well as other banks
which remain underwater near the Nansha or the Xisha Islands. Compared with
the rocks mentioned before, these banks are far less entitled to maritime zones,
especially Owen Shoal and Reed Bank in the Nansha Islands and the Bremen
Bank in the Xisha Islands. It is reported that some of these beaches have been
occupied and built with facilities, which however, cannot change their status as
part of their coastal state’s maritime zone. And such facilities are not entitled to
own any maritime zones except for a safe zone being placed around it.18
Since UNCLOS doesn’t define “islands” and “rocks” on the one hand and fails
to specify “human habitation or its own economic life” on the other, decision on
the jurisdiction over relevant islands and rocks lies with claimants involved. For
the countries surrounding the South China Sea, it is all the more natural that their
claimed islands and rocks have respective EEZs. If that’s the case, there would be
no room for any high seas or maritime zones in the South China Sea, and the EEZs
of these islands and rocks will also overlap with that on the mainland coast in the
South China Sea. For example, the Dongsha Island’s EEZ will have to overlap
with the Philippines’ EEZ and the same is also true for EEZs around the Nansha
Islands and that around the Hainan Island and the Vietnam’s Mainland Coast. As a
result, disputes over the sovereignty and maritime zones in the South China Sea get
more complicated. In fact, even if some or all of these islands do not fall within the
ambit of Article 121(3) of UNCLOS and they are entitled to their own EEZs and
continental shelves, the actual extent of these maritime zones cannot be determined
until the EEZs and the continental shelves of the mainland coast in the South China
Sea are demarcated. It has been analyzed that islands are only eligible for limited
weight in such a demarcation. As American law expert Brice M. Clagett argues,
there seems no doubt that a court, applying existing principles and precedents,
would limit the entitlement of each Spratly and Paracel high-tide elevation to,
at most, a 12 nautical miles belt of territorial sea.19
In another case, some countries surrounding the South China Sea purposefully
sent migrants to islands of Nansha so as to create conditions that show they can
“sustain human habitation.” For example, 90 Filipinos including six fishermen’s
families were recruited by the Philippine government in September 2002 and sent
by a warship of naval forces to the “Hope Island” in the Nansha Islands. They were
told to establish a community there, so they carried a variety of livestock, poultry
and food, planning to stay on the island for three months. As Reyes, the governor
of West Palawan, put it: “their plan is indeed to build a dream community there.
And if it can be built, the next group of migrants will come in succession.”20 Such
means to create artificial conditions by the Philippine government cannot be used
as a basis for asserting rights over the island at all. Brice Clagett provided his
explanations for “human habitation” or “economic life of their own” as follows:
the criterion “sustain human habitation” should be understood as a condition that
the island has an actual habitation (or at least this is possible), the lighthouse care-
givers or defensive army fed by the outside world cannot be counted. “Economic
life of their own” should refer to that rocks themselves or at least the resources in
surrounding waters (such as fishing) are able to offer living conditions for human
beings. It is obviously an abuse of UNCLOS to claim extended maritime zones of
certain rocks at the expense of the interests of other countries by enhancing their
island status defined in Article 121(3).21 All the foregoing discussion suggests that
the ways in which maritime jurisdiction of islands and rocks are defined and the
criteria “sustaining human habitation” or “economic life of their own” are applied
will make a substantial impact on the settlement of maritime delimitation and
sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea.
13.3 Archipelago state and archipelagic waters

UNCLOS specifies such concepts as archipelago baseline and archipelagic waters,
which benefits countries of Indonesia and the Philippines the most. According to
Kriangsak Kittichaisaree:
Under its archipelagic concept, Indonesia uses 196 straight baselines totaling
8,167.6 nautical miles with the average length being 41.67 nautical miles and
the longest one being 124 nm, to enclose 666,000 sq nautical miles of internal
waters. By extending more than 3,000 nautical miles east and west, and 1,300
nautical miles south and north, Indonesia has gained 98,000 sq nm under its
sovereignty. Moreover, the important Indonesian straits of Lombok, Sapoedi,
Sunda, Sumba, Malacca, Karimata Gasper, and Macassar are enclosed by the
straight lines and are regarded as being within the internal waters of Indonesia.22
Similarly, the Philippines has also drawn 80 linear baselines totaling 8,174 nau-
tical miles with the average length being 102.2 nautical miles and the longest
of 140.05 nautical miles, enclosing 148,921.5 square nautical miles of internal
waters in which the Sulu Sea, Surigo Strait, Sibutu Seaway, Barabak Strait, Min-
doro Strait etc. are all included.23
The adoption of archipelagic state concept has dramatically reduced the mari-
time zone of the high seas, especially in the South China Sea. Indonesia is well
aware that its access to more maritime zones comes at a loss of its neighbors’, thus
exerting a huge impact on the redistribution of resources in the region. Indone-
sia is also confronted with the issue of traditional or historic rights of fisheries of
other Southeast Asian countries (including even long distance fishing countries or
regions such as Japan, North Korea and Taiwan), which it had recognized at the first
UN Sea Law Conference in 1958.24 In addition, Indonesia declared that all the sea
between its islands in southern Southeast Asia was its internal waters. This, along
with a breadth of 12 nautical miles territorial sea, put an end to the “freedom of the
sea.” Later, under the political pressure from many countries, Indonesia opened for
“innocent passage” through the archipelagic waters from July 25, 1962. However, it
has objected more than once to allow the use of its straits by certain foreign ships.25
This is also the case in the Philippines. Under Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution
of the Republic of The Philippines, “the waters around, between, and connecting
the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form
part of the internal waters of the Philippines.” It was reaffirmed by the Philip-
pines, upon signing the UNCLOS in 1982, that the
concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of internal waters

under the Constitution of the Philippines and removes straits connecting
these waters with the economic zone or high seas from the rights of foreign
vessels to transit passage for international navigation.26
The Philippine Constitution apparently confused the concepts of archipelagic

and internal waters. Even Raphael P. Lotilla, a law professor at the University of
the Philippines, admitted that:
The principal difference is that the Convention classified as archipelagic

waters those waters classified as internal waters under Philippine law. An
archipelagic state exercises less powers over its archipelagic waters than
those exercised by a state over its internal waters since archipelagic waters
are subject to the right of foreign vessels to archipelagic sea lanes passage
while internal waters are not.27
As a result, the Philippine declaration was objected to by many countries

including Australia, Bulgaria, Belarus, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine and the Soviet
Union whose main concern was about rights of passage through Philippine archi-
pelagic waters. The United States made its protest against the Philippine claim as
early as 1961:
Its purpose is to reduce to Philippine sovereignty large areas of sea which are
regarded by the United States and all other nations as part of the High Seas.
Therefore it considers it necessary to point out that there is no recognition in
international law of any special regime for archipelagoes, and no warrant for
attempting to reduce to national sovereignty large areas of high seas between
the islands of an archipelago, through the device of drawing baselines con-
necting the outermost islands and claiming as internal waters all of the waters
within such baselines.
In January 1986, the United States issued another statement declaring that:
The Government of the United States wishes to observe that, as generally

understood in international law, including that reflected in the 1982 Law
of the Sea Convention, the concept of internal waters differs significantly
from the concept of archipelagic waters. Archipelagic waters are only those
enclosed by properly drawn archipelagic baselines and are subject to the
regimes of innocent passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage. The Govern-
ment of the United States further wishes to point out that straits linking the
high seas or exclusive economic zone with archipelagic waters, as well as
straits within archipelagic waters, are, if part of normal passage routes used
for international navigation or overflight through or over archipelagic waters,
subject to the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage.28
As a response to the massive protests, on October 26, 1988, the Secretary-

General received from the Government of the Philippines a statement concerning
the Australian objection. In the statement, the Philippines declared that it intended
to harmonize its domestic legislation with the UNCLOS provisions. However,
there have been no signs of such a move.29 These events show that the concepts
of archipelagic baselines and archipelagic waters under UNCLOS have enabled
some archipelagic states surrounding the South China Sea to extend their mari-
time jurisdiction, which led to reduced area of high seas and confusion of archi-
pelagic and internal waters. Consequently, there emerged disputes concerning the
rights for foreign vessels to transit passage through archipelagic waters and major
straits.
In summary, although UNCLOS has been accepted by most countries in the
world and considered to be the most important international convention for
marine management and marine resources utilization, it fails to address a few
problems. For example, it only recognizes the right of each coastal state to own
its EEZ and continental shelf without mentioning means whereby disputes arising
from the EEZ and continental shelf division can be resolved; there are no clear
definitions of “islands” and “rocks” and specifications concerning criteria “sus-
tain human habitation or its own economic life”; there also is no clear distinction
between archipelagic waters and internal waters, etc. All these have caused vari-
ous territorial and jurisdictional disputes among countries, especially in the South
China Sea, where original sovereignty disputes could become more complicated.
Solutions to these problems merit further research by international legal special-
ists and call for cooperation among relevant countries.
Notes
1 Buchholz, H.J. (1987). Law of the Sea Zones in the Pacific Ocean. Singapore: Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, p. 14.
3 Ibid., p. 111.
4 Lauriat, G. (1983). Chaos or Cooperation. Far Eastern Economic Review, January 6.
shot, UK: Ashgate, p. 68.
6 Tsamenyi, M., & Herriman, M. (1998). Ocean Energy and the Law of the Sea: The
Need for a Protocol. Ocean Development & International Law, 29(1), 3–19.
8 Valencia, M.J. (1981). Southeast Asian Seas: National Marine Interests, Transnational
Issues, and Marine Regionalism. In L.S. Chia & C. MacAndrews (Eds.), Southeast
Asian Seas: Frontier for Development. Singapore: McGraw Hill, pp. 320–321.
9 (1998). New Straits Times, Februry 25.
10 Cheng, H. (1974). A Matter of Legality. Far Eastern Economic Review, pp. 25–28.
11 See UNCLOS, Article 121(3).
12 Tonnesson, S. (2001). The South China Sea Islands and the Code of Conduct: Introduc-
tion. Ocean Development & Intemational Law, 32(2), pp. 93–95.
14 Townsend-Gault, I. (1998). Preventive Diplomacy and Pro-activity in the South China
Sea. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 20(2), pp. 171–190.
15 Gjetnes, M. (2001). The Spratlys: Are They Rocks or Islands? Ocean Development &
International Law, 32(2), pp. 191–204.
16 Ibid.
17 Elferink, A.G.O. (2001). The Islands in the South China Sea: How Does their Presence
Limit the Extent of the High Seas and the Area and the Maritime Zones of the Mainland
Coasts? Ocean Development & International Law, 32(2), pp. 169–190.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 (2002). Govonor of West Palawan Sent the First Batch of Migrants to Island of Hope
in Spratlys (in Chinese). Philippine World News, September 24.
21 Clagett, B.M. (1995). Competing Claims of Vietnam and China in the Vanguard Bank
and Blue Dragon Areas of the South China Sea: Part 1. Oil and Gas Law and Taxation
Review, 13, pp. 375–375.
23 Chen, D. (1988). Modern Inernational Maritime Law (in Chinese). Beijing: China
Social Sciences Press, p. 104.
25 Buchholz, H.J. (1987). Law of the Sea Zones in the Pacific Ocean. Singapore: Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, p. 31.
26 Chen, H.Y. (1997). Compilation and Translation of the Sea Laws and Treaties of South-
east Asia. Taipei: Center for Southeast Asian Studies of National Chi Nan University,
pp. 73, 74.
27 Lotilla, R.P. (1992). Defining the Maritime Boundaries of the Philippines. In Aileen
San Pablo-Baviera (Ed.), The South China Sea Disputes: Philippine Perspectives.
Manila: Philippine-China Development Resource Center, p. 10.
28 Roach, J.A., & Smith, R.W. (2000). Straight Baselines: The Need for a Universally
Applied Norm. Ocean Development & International Law, 31(1–2), pp. 47–80.
29 Ibid.
14 Latest developments in the South
China Sea and China’s responses
The situation in the South China Sea underwent great changes in 2009. On Feb-
ruary 17, the Philippine Congress passed An Act to Define the Baselines of the
Territorial Sea of the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as Baseline Law) that
claimed China’s Huangyan Dao and some islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands
as part of the Philippine territory; on March 5, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Malay-
sia’s Prime Minister and Defense Minister, visited Daowan Jiao and Guangxingzai
Jiao in the region to declare sovereignty over both reefs; on March 9, the US Navy
surveillance ship Impeccable (USNS Impeccable) entered China’s EEZ without
authorization; and on March 13, Vietnam protested against China’s approval of a
travel agency to operate sightseeing tours in disputed Xisha Islands. A succession
of these events once again put the issue of the South China Sea under spotlight.
14.1 The Philippines’ Baseline Law

It is reported that the Philippine Congress passed the Baseline Law on two
grounds: first, countries had to submit their respective claims to extended conti-
nental shelf before May 13, 2009, the deadline of UNCLOS; second, claiming to
the disputed islands and reefs through legislation could pave the way for future
arbitration under the UN.1 In short, the real purpose of passing the bill was to
incorporate some of the islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands into the territory
of the Philippines. On March 10, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
signed into law the Baseline Bill (Republic Act No. 9522). Shortly afterward,
Eduardo Ermita, Philippine Presidential Executive Secretary, declared that “we
are sending the message to the whole world that we are affirming our national
sovereignty and interests.”2
In fact, the Philippine claim to part of the Nansha Islands as its territory through
domestic legislation dates to June 11, 1978. Ferdinand Marcos, Philippine Presi-
dent, signed Presidential Decree No. 1596, which declared 33 islands, reefs and
shoals of the Nansha Islands with a total area of 64,976 square nautical miles as
“part of the Philippine territory and subject to its administrative jurisdiction.” This
cluster of islands was then named the Kalayaan Island Group. The Philippines’
claim to sovereignty over Kalayaan Island Group was based on the three grounds:
(1) these maritime features were vital to its security and economic survival; (2) it
is the most proximate state to these islands; (3) these islands were “res nullius,”
and if they had been claimed by other countries, those claims were nullified as a
result of abandonment.3 All of them, as will be discussed as follows, do not hold
water.
First, security and economic considerations can never be an excuse for any
sovereignty claim over territory of another country. It is common sense that a
state cannot base its claims to land of other countries on reasons such as demand
of oil and other natural resources to maintain its economic activities, or protection
of national security.
Second, sovereignty claims based on geographical proximity are untenable.
There have been many cases which demonstrate that geographical proximity
only is not enough to establish a country’s ownership over islands. For example,
Christmas Island of Australia is further away from Australian mainland than Java
Island of Indonesia, but its sovereignty remains with the former. Take the Philip-
pines itself as an example: many isolated islands in the Sulu Archipelago are far
closer to Borneo or Malaysia than the Philippine Islands, yet the sovereignty of
those islands still belongs to the Philippines. Thus, it is totally groundless for the
Philippines to claim sovereignty over parts of the Nansha Islands out of the cause
of “proximity.”
Third, it is widely acknowledged that the Nansha Islands have been Chinese
territory instead of res nullius since historical record began. As Catley and Keliat
note:
It is true according to international law, a territory can be acquired if it is a res

nullius. But the arguments that the Spratlys were res nullius are not entirely
accurate. Before the Philippines occupied some of the islands of Spratleys,
China, Taiwan and Vietnam indeed had already competed against each other
to be the sovereign rulers over the archipelago. In addition, Taiwan and Viet-
nam had occupied parts of the Spratlys and Taiwan had been garrisoning the
largest island since 1956. This means that the principle of res nullius claimed
by the Philippines is different from that which has been previously widely
accepted. A res nullius means that the territory should be either uninhabited
or occupied effectively by other countries. Effective occupation, as generally
accepted, does not necessarily mean that the occupation of the whole territory
should be occupied. It is enough to be valid if there is a force in the center to
exercise control.4
As for the reason concerning “island abandonment,” it is also unfounded.

According to Oppenheim’s International Law, it is only when a territory is really
derelict that any state may acquire it through occupation. Such territory is not
derelict as long as the former possessor is able, and makes efforts, to retake pos-
session.5 After World War II, the Kuomintang government of the Republic of
China (ROC) sent garrison troops to Taiping Dao, the largest island in the Nan-
sha Islands, although the Kuomintang government withdrew its troops in 1950
after PRC forces had gradually taken control of Nansha. Chinese troops have
Latest developments in the South China Sea 201
been stationed on the island ever since 1956. The Philippines, taking advantage of
the Vietnam War (1955–1975), occupied several islands and reefs of the Nansha
Islands near in 1968 and 1971. China repeatedly condemned such violation of its
sovereignty while reiterating on different occasions that the Nansha Islands are
part of its territory which it has never abandoned.
The reason that the Philippines are unwilling to give up its claim of sovereignty
over the Karayaan Islands is that they wish to explore and exploit rich natural
resources of surrounding the islands. The Philippines hoped that the UN would
support their claims in the Baseline Law so that they might be granted exclusive
access to the resources of the Karayaan Islands, including an oil reserve estimated
at 200 billion barrels. The Institute of International Legal Studies of the Univer-
sity of the Philippines stated in a clear tone that the rich resources such as oil,
natural gas, minerals, gold, silver, iron and nickel around the Karayaan Islands
would “greatly boost the Philippine economy and improve the Philippines’ social
and economic conditions.”6
In addition, there is the sovereignty issue concerning Huangyan Dao. Huang-
yan Dao is located in southeast of the Zhongsha Islands, not even within the
perimeter of the disputed area in the Nansha Islands. Its sovereignty has never
been challenged before as it has been consistently under Chinese administration.
Historically, the Philippines made no territorial claim to Huangyan Dao. Even in a
1978 map which was published by the Philippine National Mapping and Resource
Information Authority, Huangyan Dao was not marked as Philippine territory.7
Despite all these facts, the Philippines made its first claim to the sovereignty of
Huangyan Dao in early May 1997, mainly on the following two grounds. On the
one hand, it considered Huangyan Dao as part of Philippine territory. To clarify
this point, we might as well look at the provisions of the Philippine Constitution
concerning its national territory that is set by a series of international treaties,
none of which involves Huangyan Dao. In Article 1 of the 1935 Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines, the territory of the Philippines includes all
the territory within the scope of Article 3 ceded to the United States, its former
colonial ruler, under the Treaty of Paris concluded between the United States and
Spain on December 10, 1898, that of the provisions under the Treaty of Washing-
ton concluded between the United States and Spain on November 7, 1900, the
islands included in the Treaty with Great Britain concluded on January 2, 1930, as
well as the entire territory under which the current Government of the Philippine
Islands exercises jurisdiction. That is to say, the Philippine east-west boundaries
fall between longitude 127° E and 118° E, i.e. the “treaty boundary.” However,
Huangyan Dao is located outside the limits (117°44′E- 117°48′E) and shall never
be part of the Philippine territory.
On the other hand, Huangyan Dao is considered to be inside the EEZ of the
Philippines. The key questions is: if a reef is claimed as part of its territory by one
country while part of its EEZ is claimed by another, which one is more legitimate?
In documents released in 1935, 1947 and 1983, China had claimed the island as its
territory and has repeatedly reaffirmed since. China bases it the right to maritime
zones on its title to the island. As the Chinese Embassy in Manila said, “the land
dominates the sea is a basic principle of international law. . . . Maritime rights
and interests do not generate territorial sovereignty.”8 This means that the basis
of coastal states’ claim for maritime jurisdiction is the territorial sovereignty they
hold, and that only when a country has land territorial sovereignty can it enjoy
the rights to the sea and seabed around the territory. On the contrary, the origi-
nal sovereignty of a land territory is not transferred due to its location falling in
the maritime jurisdiction claimed by another country. The Philippines only sees
that the distance between Huangyan Dao and Luzon Island is within 200 nautical
miles, but ignores the fact that China first discovered and claimed over the sover-
eignty of Huangyan Dao. In the light of the UNCLOS provisions, Huangyan Dao,
like any other land territories, is entitled to its own maritime zones. Therefore, it
is essentially a question of maritime delimitation between Huangyan Island and
Luzon Island. According to Dzurek:
The Philippines’ unilateral claim of EEZ ignores any potential radiating from
the Nanhai Islands (Spratlys) themselves. Maritime jurisdiction flows from
sovereignty over land territory, not the reverse. If the Philippines is not sov-
ereign of the the Nansha Islands, then the Meiji Jiao (Mischief Reef) would
probably fall out Manila’s EEZ jurisdiction. The Philippine claim of violation
to its EEZ may be an effort to muddy the juridical water and gain interna-
tional support for its weak sovereignty claim.9
Dzurek’s comment is apparently applicable to the situation of Huangyan Dao

as well.
In fact, some other experts have voiced their concern about the legitimacy
of the Baseline Law, which usurped China’s Huangyan Dao and some Nansha
Islands as Philippine territory. Among others, Miriam Defensor Santiago, Chair-
woman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Philippine Senate, believed
that the Philippine government would violate international law if it insisted on
incorporating part of the Nansha Islands into its territorial sea baselines. She
said that
there are other ways, such as actual occupation, which is common nowadays,
or discovery or cession. But we can’t just pass a bill delineating the Philip-
pine baselines to include the contested islands of Kalayaan, which is a viola-
tion of international laws and regulations.10
14.2 Malaysia’s sovereignty claims over certain islands

and reefs in the Nansha Islands
On March 5, 2009, Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi visited Daowan Jiao (Swal-
low Reef) and Guangxingzai Jiao (Dallas Reef) of the Nansha Islands to reaffirm
the country’s sovereignty over them, a significant move before he stepped down
in June. It was the second time in less than a year that the country’s state leader
landed on Danwan Jiao after Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak led members
of media and military to Danwan Jiao on August 11, 2008. During his visit, Najib
Razak proclaimed Malaysia’s sovereignty over the disputed island. These actions
by Malaysia came as no surprise as Badawi had scheduled this trip as early as late
February.11
Malaysia occupied Danwan Jiao in early June 1983, when the Five Power
Defence Arrangements (FPDA) held a weeklong naval exercise, “Starfish,” in
the South China Sea, involving about 18 vessels, 16 aircraft and 3,000 military
personnel from Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Malaysia and Sin-
gapore. As part of the exercise, 20 Malaysian naval commandos landed on Dan-
wan Jiao on June 12.12 In November 1986, Malaysia occupied Guangxingzai Jiao,
Nanhai Jiao (Mariveles Reef) and six surrounding islets. Prior to that, on Decem-
ber 21, 1979, Malaysia published a new map showing territorial waters and con-
tinental shelf boundaries. The map included a group of 12 islands and reefs lying
to the southeast of Nansha Islands, namely Anbo Shazhou (Amboyna Cay), Andu
Tan (Ardesier Reef), Bai Tan (Barque Canada Reef), Siling Jiao (Commodore
Reef), Guangxingzai Jiao, Boji Jiao (Erica Reef), Yuya Ansha (Investigator Reef),
Nantong Jiao (Louisa Reef), Lukang Ansha (Luconia Shoals), Nansha Jiao, Huan-
glu Jiao (Royal Charlotte Reef) and Danwan Jiao. The Malaysia based its claim
to these islands on the ground that they all sit on the continental shelf belonging
to its territory.
In the following, we present an analysis of Malaysia’s claim in terms of its
consistency with governing rules of UNCLOS and international law.
First, there is no provision in international law that supports territorial acquisi-
tion based on the principle of the continental shelf. Under international law, there
are five traditional ways of acquisition of territorial sovereignty, namely occupa-
tion, preoccupation, accretion, cession and conquest. However, none of these are
applicable to the Malaysian claim.13
In addition, none of these disputed islands in the South China Sea are geo-
graphical extensions of any country’s continental shelf. Instead, the continental
shelves of these islands are often assessed to be totally separate from both the
Asian landmass and from the Philippines and Borneo/East Malaysia. Therefore,
the validity of the Malaysian claim is highly questionable.14
Second, Malaysia based its sovereignty claim on the provisions of UNCLOS
that a coastal state is entitled to the rights of its continental shelf. However, such
“sovereign rights” shall be limited to “the purpose of exploring it and exploit-
ing its natural resources,” such as minerals and other abiotic resources of the
seabed and subsoil, as well as biological species living there. As the continental
shelf is a natural extension of land territory, the “sovereign rights” derived from
it are exclusive, but such rights shall not extend to the ocean floor that is consid-
ered the common property of mankind and allows no occupation of any country.
As such, terms such as “control and jurisdiction” are inapplicable to continental
shelf, which was stated clearly in the commentary of the 1956 International Law
Commission.
Third, a country’s right to maritime zone of an island situated on its continental
shelf derives from its jurisdiction of the island according to fundamental principles
of territorial acquisition, but not the reverse. In other words, land generates mari-
time zones, not vice versa. However, some countries attempted to take advantage
of relevant provisions of UNCLOS to legitimize their recent occupation of unin-
habited islands that would expand their maritime boundaries. Such claims may be
justified under limited circumstances if no country has ever claimed the islands;
however, this is not the case with the Nansha Islands which have been claimed by
other countries. Thus, the principles regarding territorial acquisition should apply.
In 1988, Abgullah Fadzil Che Wan, Deputy Foreign Minister of Malaysia,
declared that their claim over some islands and reefs in the Nansha Islands was in
conformity with the provisions of the l958 Continental Shelf Convention concern-
ing the seabed and its subsoil. While different standards were adopted in Article
76, Paragraph 1, of the UNCLOS and the Convention on the Continental Shelf,
the purpose of UNCLOS is to establish consistency between rights and limits of a
continental shelf and that of the EEZ. Apparently, it is not justifiable that Malay-
sia used provisions under a certain convention to enjoy more favorable rights of
territorial acquisition than other claimants. Since most of the claimed islands and
reefs have been above sea level for a long time, Malaysia should have provided
sufficient evidence of its ownership of them because under UNCLOS territorial
sea is not acquired on the sole basis of continental shelf .
Fourth, some of the islands and reefs claimed by Malaysia are located beyond
the 200 nautical miles limit measured from baselines they claimed. Under
UNCLOS, claims for continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles can only
be justified under special circumstances. In addition, Malaysia seems to have
claimed sovereign rights to the EEZ on the basis of these islands and reefs (such
as Anbo Shazhou), whereas they are located outside the required 200-nautical-
mile range. However, the Malaysian argument that it can claim 200 nautical miles
EEZ from Danwan Jiao, which then includes Anbo Shazhou, is inadmissible. The
reason is that it bases a secondary claim on a primary claim that is not legally
sound in the first place.15
The foregoing analysis shows that Malaysia’s claims to certain islands and
reefs of the Nansha Islands on the basis of the continental shelf are not legally
grounded. Under UNCLOS, the rights of coastal states to the continental shelf
shall be limited to exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of their
seabed and subsoil but they shall not extend to sovereignty over the islands and
reefs sitting on the continental shelf. The fundamental principle of international
law is that land dominates the sea, not vice versa. This means that only a country
that has sovereignty over the island can claim the waters surrounding it, and if it
does not have sovereignty over the island, it cannot claim that the island within
its presumed continental shelf. As far as the reefs of the Nansha Islands are con-
cerned, China has exercised sovereignty over the islands since ancient times. This
fact has made it impossible for Malaysia to extend its continental shelf to the
territory of other countries, regardless of the geological proximity between these
islands and Malaysia. There is the issue of the delimitation of the continental
shelf here, that is, in accordance with the provisions of Article 83 of UNCLOS,
the boundaries of the continental shelf, the limits of the continental shelf between
adjacent or opposite coastal states shall be delimited by agreement in order to
achieve a fair settlement.
14.3 China’s response to new developments in

the law of the sea
The UNCLOS defines the rights and responsibilities of nations with respect to
their use of the world’s oceans, establishing guidelines for businesses, the envi-
ronment and the management of marine natural resources. The Convention has
been accepted by most countries in the world since it went into effect. Still, it left
some unanswered questions to be addressed in future practice, which led to ongo-
ing changes in the UNCLOS. On December 17, 2002, the ICJ granted sovereignty
of Ligitan and Sipadan to Malaysia. According to Mark Valencia, this is an indica-
tion of new developments in the international law of the sea as the decisions taken
all together but ignore “discovery,” “historic” claims and contiguity in favour of
specific evidence of continuous, effective occupation, administration or control
over a considerable period of time and the absence of protest from others or their
successful exclusion from the area.16
The public mention of disputes over Ligitan and Sipadan occurred in 1982.
Indonesia made its claims over the two islands mainly based on The 1891 Anglo-
Dutch Boundary Convention, which stipulated that the boundary between Sabah
(Malaysia) and Kalimantan (Indonesia) be a straight line which cuts across Pulau
Sebatik continuing eastward and stopping 19 kilometers from the Ligitan Island.
According to the convention, both the disputed islands would be inside Indo-
nesian waters. Indonesia and Malaysia, once under British and Dutch colonial
rule, respectively, refer to maps inherited maps from their masters, particularly an
Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) map of 1967 which shows both islands lying
within Indonesian waters. This was regarded by Indonesia as a trump card in sup-
porting its claim to the two islands.17
In October 1996, Malaysia and Indonesia referred the case of disputed islands
to the ICJ. In early June 2002, a hearing was held for the two countries to present
their arguments. Malaysia made claims mainly based on its actual jurisdiction
over Sipadan Island for more than 150 years, while Indonesia based its claim on
the 1891 Anglo-Dutch Boundary Convention. Indonesian newspapers did report
in June 1991 that the Malaysian troops had “invaded” Ligitan and Sipadan, but
the Indonesian authorities failed to take actions to reaffirm the sovereignty over
the two islands. On December 17, 2002, the ICJ ruled, by 16 votes to one, that on the
basis of effectivités, sovereignty over Ligitan and Sipadan belongs to Malaysia.
Almost no evidence based on colonial maps and unclear treaties provided by both
parties was adopted by the ICJ. The evidence that Malaysia cited to show its effec-
tive administration over the islands include the 1917 Turtle Preservation Ordi-
nance, issuance of fishing licenses, the establishment of a bird reserve on Sipadan
in 1933 and the construction of lighthouses on both islands in the early 1960s.
Such legal principle was also applied in a similar case over the disputed island
Pedra Branca (formerly referred to by Malaysia as Pulau Batu Puteh and now
as Batu Puteh) between Malaysia and Singapore. Pedra Branca is located at the
east exit of the Singapore Strait, about 65 kilometers from Singapore and only
10 kilometers from the coast of Malaysia. In 1979, Malaysia published a new
map which included Pedra Branca in its territory. Singapore then banned Malay-
sian fishermen from fishing in the maritime area surrounding the island in 1989,
which triggered the sovereignty dispute between the two countries. In 2003, the
two filed the disputed case to the ICJ for arbitration. Singapore, a former British
colony, claimed that White Reef had ceded to the United Kingdom to build the
Horsburgh lighthouse in the 1940s, and that its sovereignty should be inherited
by Singapore. Malaysia said that the Sultan of Johor only allowed Britain to build
and manage the lighthouse on Pedra Branca and did not give up the sovereignty
of the island. The island was part of Johor since the early 16th century. However,
Singapore also pointed out that Malaysia did not claim the sovereignty over Pedra
Branca until three decades ago, and Singapore has exercised sovereignty over the
island since the use of the Horsburg Lighthouse in 1851. The International Court
of Justice accepted Singapore’s statement and issued a judgment on May 23, 2008,
awarding sovereignty over Pedra Branca to Singapore on the grounds that it has
succeeded the British colonial authority as the actual administrator of the Hors-
burg Lighthouse on the island since 1940.18
The two cases mentioned here have aroused strong repercussions among
countries with island disputes in the South China Sea, prompting them to fur-
ther strengthen the “actual and continuous jurisdiction” over the occupied islands.
For instance, Vietnam planned to open a tourist route connecting Vietnamese-
occupied islands and reefs in the Nansha Islands. On April 19, 2004, a luxury
cruise with a Vietnamese tour group on board traveled for the first time between
military posts in disputed areas in the Nansha Islands. With some 60 Vietnamese
tourists and 40 “invited” accompanying officials on board, the cruise sailed at 8
a.m. from the port of Ho Chi Minh City. According to a senior official of Viet-
namese National Administration of Tourism, the liner would first dock at Bạch
Ho Oilfield and then visit Nanwei Dao on April 21.19 Vietnamese officials also
claimed that if the virgin tour went smoothly, the Vietnamese would be able to
travel to the Nansha Islands for sightseeing.
In recent years, the Philippine military has also planned to turn the Philippines-
occupied islands and reefs in the Nansha Islands into tourist attractions. On May 1,
2008, a Philippine tourist group composed of 50 people, government officials
and representatives from all walks of life visited Philippines-occupied islands in
Nansha for sightseeing. The Philippine government established a municipality of
“Kalayaan Islands” under the jurisdiction of Palawan Province. Mantez, mayor
of Kalayaan, said that the ten-day tour was welcomed by the Governor and Vice-
Governor of Palawan and aimed at tapping the tourism potential of the Islands.
Mantez also said that the area visited by the tour group totaled around 32.7 hect-
ares, including Zhongye Dao, where the town hall of Karayan was located, Xiyue
Dao (West York Island) and Mahuan Dao (Lawak Island). In addition, a group of
students from the University of the Philippines were also expected to visit sev-
eral sites suitable for diving and underwater sightseeing . He added that summer
tours in the Kalayaan Islands had been operating for eight years by then. On top
of promoting tourism, the Philippine government also aimed to attract Filipinos
to settle on Zhongye Dao by providing government-subsidized food, shelter and
even small fishing boats.20 It can be seen that developing tourism in the Nan-
sha Islands is also associated with an intent to claim sovereignty over the island
through migration.
In the face of recent developments of the international law of the sea, what
should China’s responses be? On March 10, 2009, China sent its largest fishery
patrol ship, Yuzhen 311, to the South China Sea. This ship was reported to be
responsible for cruise management in the EEZ, fishing and escort in the southwest
of Zhongsha, joint supervision of the Beibu Gulf and rescue work of fishery emer-
gencies. This is considered a major step for the Chinese authorities to safeguard
the country’s marine rights and protect the interests of fishermen. Before that,
Chinese fishermen were often attacked by foreign armed vessels when fishing in
Nansha waters. Among them, a 70-ton wooden fishing vessel, Qionghai 03012,
with a tonnage of about 60-70 tons (15 crew members on board were all from
Qionghai, Hainan) was attacked by a foreign armed vessel when working in the
traditional ground of Nansha Islands (10°31′N 116°40′E) at around 6 p.m. in April
27, 2006. Four fishermen were killed on the spot and three injured, two of them
seriously. Navigation and communication equipment and fishing tools on board
were looted.21 In another case, an 88-ton wooden fishing vessel, Qionghai 08099,
was attacked by unidentified personnel during its fishing operation in Nansha
waters on April 26, 2007. The vessel finally sunk, but fortunately 18 fishermen
on board were rescued by Malaysian Maritime Police. According to incomplete
statistics, from January 2000 to May 2006, there were 88 attacks involving 144
fishing vessels and more than 400 fishermen in the Qionghai area during their
operations in the South China Sea, causing five deaths, four injuries and direct
economic loss of more than 70 million RMB.22
To conclude, the changing situation in the South China Sea since 2009 is indica-
tive of some new developments of the international law of the sea. In recent years,
the decisions of the International Court of Justice on certain disputed islands in
the South China Sea have ignored “discovery” and “historic” claims while sup-
porting continuous and effective administration, or control over a considerable
period of time without any protest from others. In response to such developments,
China has also taken measures to step up its efforts in defending its maritime
claims and protecting its fisheries. And yet, there seems still a long way to go
before baselines of the territorial sea surrounding the Nansha Islands are drawn to
delimit EEZ and continental shelf boundaries.
Notes
1 (2009). Resolving the China-Philippines Territorial Disputes in the Spirit of Goodwill
(in Chinese). Philippine World News, Februry 20.
2 (2009). The Philippine President’s Signing of Baseline Act (in Chinese). Philippine
World News, March 12.
Ocean Press, pp. 74–75.
5 Oppenheim, L.F.L. (1996). International Law (9th ed). London and New York: Long-
mans, pp. 716–718.
6 (2008). The Philippines to Claim Sovereignty over Part of Nansha Islands Prior to
March 19, 2009 (in Chinese). Philippine World News, March 25.
7 Zou, K. (1999). Scarborough Reef: A New Flashpoint in Sino-Philippine Relations?
Boundary and Security Bulletin, 7(2), p. 74.
8 Sherry, A., & Tiglao, R. (1997). Law of the Seize. Far Eastern Economic Review,
June 12.
9 Dzurek, D.J. (1995). China Occupies Mischief Reef in Latest Spratly Gambit. IBRU
Boundary and Security Bulletin, 3(1), p. 68.
10 (2008). Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago Said Yesteraday Not to Kill Baseline Bills
(in Chinese). Philippine World News, April 26.
11 (2009). The Malaysian Prime Minister Visits a Malaysian-Controlled Feature in the
Spratly Islands. Ta Kung Pao, March 7 (Philippine edition).
12 Das, K. (1983). Perched on a Claim. Far Eastern Economic Review, September 29.
13 Shen, K.-C. (1991). International Law. Taipei: Student Book Company, pp. 155–162.
15 Haller-Trost, R. (1998). The Contested Maritime and Territorial Boundaries of
Malaysia: An International Law Perspective. London: Kluwer Law International,
pp. 324–325.
16 Valencia, M.J. (2003). The Spratly Islands Dispute. Far Eastern Economic Review,
January 9.
17 Haller-Trost, R. (1998). The Contested Maritime and Territorial Boundaries of
Malaysia: An International Law Perspective. London: Kluwer Law International,
pp. 229–230.
18 (2008). Singapore Has Won Sovereignty over Pedra Branca Island. Ta Kung Pao, May
29 (Philippine edition).
19 (2004). The Philippines and China Launched Protests after Vietnamese Cruise Ship
Had Visited Nansha Islands (in Chinese). Philippine World News, April 20.
20 (2008). Philippine Tourists to Land on Nansha Islands (in Chinese). Philippine World
News, May 3.
21 (2006). Four Dead and Three Injured After Attack on Chinese Fishing Boat (in Chi-
nese). Philippine World News, May 3.
22 (2007). 18 Survived After Attack by Unknown Armed Forces. Ta Kung Pao, April 30
(Philippine edition).
15 Current situation in the South
China Sea and Vietnamese policy
With the rise of China’s economic and military strength and international influence,
the current situation in the South China Sea has been on the whole stable. Territorial
disputes in the area have also been kept at a manageable level. Following the inter-
national court ruling on the South China Sea, Beijing has intensified its diplomatic
efforts to forge a different international image of China in contrast to that portrayed
by the United States, Japan and the Philippines. In dealing with ASEAN, China pro-
posed a dual-track approach to solving the South China Sea disputes on the ASEAN-
China Leaders Summit and the East Asia Summit. On the other hand, it stressed a
strong sense of goodwill to develop friendly Sino-ASEAN relations in the hope of
easing conflicts between China and its member states. After the inauguration of the
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, the US influence in the area of South China
Sea has been on the decline. To make up for such a loss of geopolitical influence, the
United States and Japan increased their engagement with Vietnam and established
their strategic partnership with the latter. Under such circumstances, the Vietnamese
policy toward the disputed region is believed to be a focus of international concern.
15.1 Signs of growing stability in the South China Sea

The current situation in the South China Sea has experienced two major turning
points from tension to stability. The first one is, on the eve of the South China Sea
arbitration, China urged the international community to endorse its position of non-
participation, non-recognition and non-acceptance of the tribunal ruling and finally
won the support of more than 60 countries. This led to the United States changing
its strategy, abandoning a series of practices that had escalated tensions in the South
China Sea before arbitration, and withdrawing some of its warships from the area.
Second, after the new Philippine President Duterte took office, he showed his desire
to improve Philippine-Chinese relations by paying a state visit to Beijing, putting
an end to hostility between the two sides while resuming their friendliness. The fol-
lowing discussion focuses on the signs of growing stability in the South China Sea.
15.1.1 China completed its land reclamation in the South China Sea
In recent years, China built five lighthouses in the South China Sea, which came
into service successively. Among them, four have been now in use on Huayang
Jiao, Chigua Jiao, Zhubi Jiao and Yongshu Jiao, and the one on Meiji Jiao has
been basically completed. These five lighthouses are large multi-functional ones,
with a tower height of 50–55 meters, and they are all equipped with modern large-
scale rotating lamps and a 4.5-meter-diameter lantern and a light range of 22
nautical miles. In addition to their traditional visual navigation functions, they
can also provide rescue guidance and meteorological disaster warning and pre-
vention information services for commercial and fishing vessels sailing in the
South China Sea. The lighthouse has also created favorable conditions for China
to undertake and fulfill its international responsibilities and obligations such as
maritime search and rescue, navigation safety, fishery production, disaster pre-
vention and mitigation, and marine environmental protection.
In addition to the lighthouses, China has also set up four base stations for an
automatic identification system on Yongxing Dao, Dong Dao, Chenhang Dao and
Zhongjian Dao. Moreover, the government opened a marine weather radio station
on Yongxing Dao and planned to continue building such facilities on Yongshu
Jiao, aiming to extend safety signal coverage to all key waters. Up to now, China
has constructed 31 civil navigation aids in the previously mentioned waters,
which has formed a preliminary network of civil navigation support infrastructure
in the South China Sea and greatly enhanced the ability to protect the safety of
passing vessels.1
In addition, China has recently constructed airport runways on Yongshu Jiao,
Chigua Jiao, Zhuubi Jiao and Meiji Jiao of the Nansha Islands. On July 12, 2016,
the Chinese government requisitioned a Cessna CE-680 aircraft from the Flight
Inspection Center of CAAC and successfully completed check flights for the
newly built airports on Meiji Jiao and Zhubi Jiao. The relevant data obtained from
this flight show that these two newly built airports were well prepared for safe
operation of civil passenger airplanes. This means that they will facilitate person-
nel exchanges, emergency aid and medical rescue in the region and be able to
serve as alternate airports for flights flying over the Nansha Islands.
15.1.2 Mitigation of tensions in the South China Sea between

China and the ASEAN
ASEAN is an important neighbor of China. The two sides not only have close
economic ties, but also have importance in strategic security. In recent years, ter-
ritorial disputes over the South China Sea has been further complicated as a result
of the intervention of foreign countries such as the United States and Japan. In
addition, the foreign media continued to play up the South China Sea tensions,
making the issue a dominant one in China-ASEAN relations. Over the recent
years, the degree of such tensions reached a new height as China carried out land
reclamation activities in the region.
To resolve these contradictions, both China and ASEAN have made great
efforts. On the one hand, ASEAN countries were able to show restraint after the
ruling, without pressuring China to accept the arbitration results in cooperation
with uninvolved foreign countries. Even the Philippines, which unilaterally filed
Current situation in the South China Sea 211
for arbitration, kept a low profile and did not put extra pressure on China. On the
other hand, China, while rejecting the arbitration ruling, took advantage of the
China-ASEAN Leadership Conference and the East Asia Summit to propose a
two-track solution to the South China Sea disputes, stressing the desire to develop
friendly relations with ASEAN.
For example, on July 25, 2016, foreign ministers of ASEAN member states
and China issued a Joint Statement on the Full and Effective Implementation of
the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)in Vien-
tiane. The ministers reiterated the importance of DOC in maintaining regional
peace and stability and pledged to solve territorial and jurisdictional disputes
through diplomacy under the principles of international law. Besides, the Philip-
pine President Duterte, in an effort to deescalate tensions between the Philippines
and China, promised to shelve the South China Sea conflict at the 28th and 29th
ASEAN Summits.2
The stated facts show that China has made great endeavors in mitigating tensions
in the wake of the international tribunal’s ruling while it continued to strengthen its
relations with ASEAN countries on important diplomatic occasions. Such efforts
are proven to have paid off. As Liu Zhenmin, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, told
an interviewer from China Central Television on September 12, 2016,
China has the support from more and more countries in terms of its position
on the South China Sea arbitration case, and our talks with leadership during
the ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and ASEAN-China Summit
demonstrate that the arbitration case has become a thing of the past.3
15.1.3 Situation at Huangyan Dao remains stable

Lying 124 nautical miles off Zambales, Huangyan Dao is a place over which both
China and the Philippines made their sovereignty claims. In 2012, the Philippine
warships were engaged in a two-month long standoff with Chinese surveillance
vessels at the contested waters within the area. After the Philippines withdrew
their ships, China took control of the island. This caused concern in the United
States because Huangyan Island is only 100 nautical miles from the Philippines
and 150 nautical miles from the US military base at Subic Bay. If China builds
military facilities on Huangyan Dao, it will directly affect the security of the base.
And if China continues its expansion projects and builds radar and airports there,
it will join Yongxing Dao and Yongshu Jiao to form a strategic triangle, which
could pose a bigger threat to the US military.
Therefore, the US military kept a close eye on the expansion of Huangyan
Island. US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter pointed out at a hearing of the Sen-
ate Armed Services Committee on April 28, 2016, that Huangyan Dao, like other
disputed islands in the South China Sea, may trigger military conflicts. The
United States thus paid particular attention to the contested waters, because the
region is “adjacent to” the mainland of the Philippines.4 In his speech at the 15th
Shangri-La dialogue on June 4, Carter warned in his speech that if China builds
military facilities on Huangyan Dao, over which the Philippines also claims sov-
ereignty, it would force the United States and other Asia-Pacific countries to “take
actions. That was the “first red line the US drew for China in the South China
Sea.” In fact, there have been signs of increased tension prior to Carter’s warn-
ing. On April 19, the US military’s four A-10 ground attack jets and two HH-60G
Pavehawk helicopters took off from Clark Air Force Base in northwest Manila
to conduct patrol missions in the South China Sea, including the airspace around
Huangyan Dao. Given that the A-10 attack aircraft is designed to destroy solid
fortifications and tanks, this movement was considered to be a strong warning to
the potential reclamation activities planned by China.5
On August 11, 2016, America’s Free Beacon website published a report titled
“China Steps up Naval Presence Near Key Disputed Island,” saying that the num-
ber of Chinese coast guard vessels sailing around Huangyan Dao had risen sharply
in the past few weeks. It went on to point out that China usually deployed two-to-
three vessels around the region for the past several years, but the number increased
to more than a dozen recently, and a lot of Chinese fishing boats also appeared in
that area. In the end, the report, quoting Jim Farnell, an intelligence officer in the
US Pacific Fleet, indicates that the increased presence of Chinese military vessels
might a sign of China’s decision to reclaim land in and around Huangyan Dao.6 On
September 4, the Philippine Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana said that a Philip-
pine Air Force Reconnaissance Plane detected two Chinese barge-like vessels, two
suspected troop ships and four maritime police ships in the waters of Huangyan
Dao. As the photos they took show, one of the maritime police ships guarded the
entrance of the Huangyan Dao lagoon. Although there was no sign of any dredging
operation there, “the presence of so many ships other than coast guard is enough to
cause grave concern.”7 On September 7, American Navytimes reported that, quot-
ing an unnamed US official, “another US patrol near Scarborough Shoal is likely
in the coming days. This sort of patrol demonstrates the US position that these are
international waters and could also support a surveillance assessment.”8
This shows that the United States was extremely concerned about construction
work on Huangyan Dao, fearing that such activities would pose a major threat
to its military base in Subic Bay. However, the Chinese side did not make any
moves in the region, nor did it construct any military projects. The situation at
Huangyan Dao has still remained stable. Such a reality was echoed by the Philip-
pine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Perfecto Yasay Jr., who said at a news briefing
in Malaganyan Palace on September 27 that “our intelligence information, as I
understand, it would seem to verify at this point in time that they are not undertak-
ing reclamation activity.” He added that “in fact, the information being shared to
us by the Americans in this regard, on the basis of their own surveillance, will also
confirm that these vessels are not intended for reclamation purposes.”9
15.1.4 Japan plans to boost South China Sea role by training

patrols with the United States
On September 15, 2016, Japan’s Defense Minister Tomomi Inada announced that
“Japan on its part will increase its engagement in the South China Sea through . . .
joint training exercises with the US navy, bilateral and multilateral exercises
with regional navies, as well as providing capacity building assistance for coast
nations.”10
In fact, the navigation of the South China Sea, whether it is civil or commer-
cial, has always been unimpeded. However, the so-called freedom of navigation
wielded by the United States as a “legal basis” for its intervention in the South
China Sea disputes is untenable. Not only did the United States confuse legal
concepts, but it also constantly accused China of posing a threat to the “freedom
of navigation” in the South China Sea, thereby promoting its “Asia-Pacific Rebal-
ance” strategy and maintaining its dominance in Asia-Pacific region for more
strategic interests. However, protecting the freedom of navigation in the South
China Sea shall not be only a matter of concern for the United States, but it has
also been long-standing undertaking by China. In fact, countries surrounding the
South China Sea all share a common responsibility of maintaining the freedom of
navigation as well as safeguarding shared prosperity and stability in the region.11
Japan’s engagement in joint patrol in the South China Sea is believed to aim at
mitigating China’s strategic pressure on Japan in the East China Sea and the Diaoyu
Islands. In addition, the South China Sea can be used as a starting point for the
Japanese Self-Defense Forces to go overseas and break through the long-standing
defense policy of Japan after World War II. Meanwhile, the United States was
able to strengthen its cooperation with Japan on mechanism of collective defense
and solidify the Japan-US military alliance by implementing the strategy of “Pivot
towards the Asia-Pacific.”12 The Japanese approach, however, may have crossed
China’s “red line” in the South China Sea. On June 4, 2016, Sun Jianguo, deputy
chief of the PLA’s Joint Staff Department, warned that, when attending the Asian
Security Summit in Singapore, China has “no reason to sit on its hands” if Japan
and the United States launch joint patrols or other military operations in the South
China Sea. In late June, Cheng Yonghua, the Chinese ambassador to Japan, once
again declared that if the Japanese Self-Defense Forces participate in the US navy
freedom of navigation operation, it is then crossing China’s “red line.” On Septem-
ber 29, Yang Yujun, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Defense, pointed
out that Japan as a power outside the region never stopped its attempt in stirring up
waters in the South China Sea for its own benefit. He further warned that
Japan, as a country outside the South China Sea region, has always been
attempting to mess up the South China Sea situation and trying to gain inter-
ests from the troubled waters. So we’d like to tell the Japanese side that if
Japan wants to conduct joint patrols and joint exercises in China-administered
waters, it is just like playing fire and the Chinese military will not sit idle.13
15.5.5 Rodrigo Duterte’s pursuit of independent foreign policy

and the improvement of Sino-Philippine relations
The Philippines is key to the “Asia-Pacific Rebalance” strategy of the United
States, and the Obama administration saw Manila as one of its most important
allies. Under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) co-signed
by the two countries, five locations of Philippine military bases were opened to
US troops, ensuring the US Army enough supplies essential to increasing its pres-
ence and influence in the South China Sea. If Duterte, in order to pursue an inde-
pendent foreign policy, is determined to ask the United States to withdraw its
troops from the Philippines, there will be a great impact on the situation in the
South China Sea. For the United States, it is no less than a fatal blow to its “Pivot
towards Asia-Pacific” strategy.
On September 12, 2016, Rodrigo Duterte called for the United States to with-
draw its Special Forces from Mindanao, where they could become the target of the
Islamist militant group Abu Sayyaf. On September 13, Duterte decided to suspend
joint patrols with the United States in the contested waters of the South China Sea.
He said he wanted only Philippine territorial waters, up to 12 nautical miles off-
shore, to be patrolled by Filipino forces, and Filipino forces will not join foreign
countries in joint patrols which could entangle the Philippines in troubles. The Phil-
ippine Ministry of Defense immediately stated that they would follow Duterte’s
instructions and stop participating in joint operations in the region to avoid any
tension or misunderstanding. On September 28, President Duterte paid a visit to
Vietnam and delivered a speech to the Filipino community in Laos. He announced
that the 2016 US-Philippines joint exercise would be the last one. On October 2,
Duterte said in a speech that EDCA co-signed by the two countries in 2014 needs
to be reviewed, threatening to throw out all US military troops in the Philippines.
On October 6, 2016, the Philippine Foreign Minister, Perfecto Yasay Jr., accusing
the United States of failing his country, defended the move of President Rodrigo
Duterte to realign the Philippines’ foreign policy toward an independent track in
pursuit of national interests. Yasay also criticized the “carrot and stick” policy of the
United States towards the Philippines which pressures Filipinos to yield to Ameri-
can demands and interests. The statement was later posted by the Philippine Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs, which said that one of the reasons the Americans had failed
the Philippines was not enough assurance was given to take a hard line in the South
China Sea disputes. Yasay further added that the Philippines would pursue a track of
independent foreign policy and stop being subservient to Washington.14
While breaking away from the United States, the Philippines showed their
goodwill toward Beijing and even agreed to resolve the South China Sea disputes
through bilateral negotiations. On September 17, 2016, the Philippine Foreign
Minister Perfecto Yasay Jr. said in Washington that
the Philippines is quietly making arrangements through diplomatic channels

for bilateral talks with China without any preconditions to discuss their com-
peting claims in the South China Sea.” In a meeting with Filipino community
members at the Philippine embassy, Yasay stressed that “the important thing
is that we talk.
He further added that the relationship between the two countries was not restricted
to maritime disputes, and there were many other areas of concern in such fields
as investment, trade and tourism whose discussion could open the door for talks
on the maritime issue.15
At the time when President Duterte took office, the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration in the Hague ruled over the South China Sea disputes in Manila’s favor.
Duterte, however, said that if the two nations were at war, China would be too
formidable an opponent to beat. He did not believe that the United States would
make sacrifices for the Philippines on the South China Sea issue and said that
Manila should not rely entirely on Washington. As a result, Rodrigo Duterte
announced that he would like to have a dialogue with Beijing on the South China
Sea disputes while repairing their bilateral relations.16
On October 21, 2016, Rodrigo Duterte successfully concluded his four-day
state visit to China. This visit not only achieved the goal of “breaking ice,” but
also injected new impetus into the good neighborly and friendly relations between
the two countries. Richard Heydarian, a political scientist at La Salle University
in Manila, said that
Duterte’s shift toward Beijing looks to be a major change not only for the
Philippines, but for the entire Asia-Pacific region. . . . Some of the EU
officials also told me that “why should we take the hardline position when
the very country that initiated the case is suddenly sounding completely
different?”17
15.2 Vietnamese policy toward the South China Sea

Vietnam’s current policy in the South China Sea is mainly aimed at securing its
“sovereign claims” on China’s Xisha and Nansha Islands. In order to strengthen their
control of 29 islands and reefs of Nansha Islands, Vietnam has been stepping up
land reclamation on ten islands and reefs. According to a report in Japanese Yomiuri
Shimbun on May 17, 2016, satellite images published on the website of The Asia
Maritime Transparency Initiative launched by the Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies (CSIS) showed that reclamation efforts under way on ten Vietnamese-
controlled islands and reefs, with a total of area over 0.48 square kilometers (about
48 hectares). The website also indicated that the Vietnamese reclamation projects
were mainly conducted in the recent two years. Take the example of Nanwei Dao,
which is the largest island occupied by Vietnam. Statistics in May 2014 show that
out of the 16.2 hectares of Nanwei Dao, about 1.9 hectares of land were reclaimed. In
the statistics of January 2016, the total area of Nanwei Dao was about 29.3 hectares,
but the area of reclaimed land has reached 15 hectares.18 A report published by CSIS
indicated that Vietnam was in the process of quietly completing a runway on Nanwei
Dao. In addition, satellite images showed Vietnam was also building two large han-
gars on the island, which were big enough to host its PZL M28B maritime surveil-
lance aircraft and CASA C-295 transport planes. As Gregory B. Poling, director of
the Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative, commented in a report, the completion
of facilities upgrades suggested that Vietnam was poised to put them into use for the
purpose of air patrol and surveillance missions around Nansha Islands.19
While stepping up the reclamation of these occupied islands and reefs, Vietnam
is also strengthening its defense on these islands and reefs. According to Western
officials, Vietnam has deployed new mobile rocket launchers capable of striking
China’s airport runways and military facilities in the South China Sea. Diplomats
and military officers said there was intelligence showing that Hanoi had shipped
the launchers from the Vietnamese mainland into position on five bases in the
Nansha Islands in recent months. On August 9, 2016, Reuters quoted three offi-
cials as saying that these rocket launchers could escape aerial surveillance, and
they have yet to be armed, but could be operational with rocket artillery rounds
within two or three days. Vietnamese Deputy Defense Minister, Senior Lieutenant-
General Nguyen Chi Vinh, however, denied the existence of such launchers or
weapons ready in the Nansha Islands when he was interviewed in June. But he
also said that Hanoi reserved the right to take any such steps, adding that “it is
within our legitimate right to self-defense to move any of our weapons to any area
at any time within our sovereign territory.”20 According to foreign envoys, Hanoi
wanted to have the launchers ready as it expected tensions to escalate in the wake
of the international court ruling against China in an arbitration case brought by
the Philippines.
According to Reuters, diplomatic officials and military analysts thought the
launcher was part of Vietnam’s state-of-art EXTRA, a latest rocket artillery sys-
tem recently acquired from Israel. EXTRA rounds were very accurate up to a
range of 150 kilometers. They could attack, with different 150 kilogram warheads,
multiple targets simultaneously by carrying high explosives or bomblets. Besides,
they could strike both ships and land targets when in operation with targeting
drones. This, as the report pointed out, put China’s runways and installations on
many islands and reefs within range of Vietnamese tightly clustered features in
the same region. Although Vietnam developed larger and longer range Russian
coastal defense missiles, the EXTRA was regarded to be highly maneuverable
and capable of effectively combating amphibious landing forces. It uses compact
radars, and therefore does not need to be placed on a large platform – also suitable
for deployment on islets and reefs.21
Furthermore, Japanese media reported that Vietnam was competing for sov-
ereignty over the islands and reefs with China in the region of the South China
Sea. Vietnam has been stepping up its efforts to strengthen marine defense in the
area, including the deployment of more fighter jets and submarines and expan-
sion of military bases. Since 2015, Vietnam has purchased six Russia-made Kilo-
class submarines. Besides, Vietnam has been ready to buy second-hand Japanese
Maritime Self-Defense Force P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircrafts. Meanwhile,
Vietnam has been highly vigilant about China’s large number of submarines
deployed in Nansha Islands while improving its anti-submarine combat capability
from both sea and air.22 Moreover, Hanoi also accepted new patrol ships supplied
by Japan to enhance its maritime law enforcement capability in the contested
South China Sea. On September 15, 2015, General Secretary of the Communist
Party of Vietnam, Nguyen Phu Trong, visited Japan and had a meeting with Japa-
nese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The Prime Minister promised that Japan would
furnish Vietnam with six additional used vessels and confirmed that both sides
could hold further talks on newly built patrol vessels. During this visit, Japan and
Vietnam vowed to sign relevant agreements on Japan’s provision of ODA (Offi-
cial Development Assistance) funds to Vietnam for the construction of military
ports and other facilities that would strengthen the broad strategic partnership
between the two countries.23
Another aspect of Vietnamese policy in the South China Sea concerns its devel-
opment of a comprehensive partnership with the United States. Vietnam was con-
sidered to be a role of growing importance to the US “Asia-Pacific Rebalance”
strategy. Washington increased its engagement with Vietnam to jointly coun-
terbalance China in the South China Sea. Relations between the two countries
developed rapidly as the United States had to realign its policy toward Vietnam
considering its important geo-strategic position and abundant natural resources.
On May 23, 2016, Barack Obama arrived in Vietnam and made a historic visit to
the country. During the visit, Obama declared the lifting of the arms embargo on
Vietnam, who, in return, promised to give access to US navy warships to return
to Cam Ranh Bay.
If the United States and Vietnam reach an agreement that allows the US army
to return to Cam Ranh Bay, this could be a major geopolitical event, suggesting
that Vietnam adopts a national strategy that is completely hostile to China. Most
importantly, the return of US navy forces to Cam Ranh Bay will further boost the
US military presence in the South China Sea following the success of its strate-
gies in the Western Pacific region. Increased US military presence will fill the
strategic gap of the first island chain on the one hand, and impose strategic pres-
sure to China on the other.24 In fact, Vietnam’s active engagement with the United
States aims at striking a strategic balance between major powers. Such a strategic
balance is designed to offset China’s growing naval power, and it also mirrors
the policy orientation of Vietnam, namely dealing with China’s rise in the South
China Sea through cooperation with major powers outside the region.
Besides, Vietnam also cozied up to the Philippines, which also claims for parts
of waterways in the South China Sea. In November 2015, the 23rd Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders Meeting was held in Manila.
During the meeting, Philippine President Benigno Aquino and Vietnamese Presi-
dent Trương Tấn Sang held a bilateral talk and signed a joint statement on strategic
partnership. This made Vietnam the Philippines’ third strategic partner following
the United States and Japan. The agreement enabled the Philippines and Vietnam to
form a closer relationship in many fields, including military personnel interaction,
port exchange visits, intelligence sharing and joint exercises. As both the Philip-
pines and Vietnam have challenged China’s claims on the South China Sea, observ-
ers believed that the Philippine-Vietnamese strategic partnership released a signal
of their forming of a united front against China in the South China Sea disputes.25
However, after the recent 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of
Vietnam and the Vietnamese parliament, Vietnamese policy in the South China
Sea seems to have changed. On September 13, 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping
met with Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyễn Xuân Phúc in Beijing. During the
talks, President Xi called on the two sides to solve the South China Sea disputes
through bilateral consultations as he believed that the common interests of China
and Vietnam far outweighed their differences. Xi also said that the two sides should
promote maritime cooperation and conduct friendly consultations while managing
and controlling differences. Phúc confirmed that Vietnam treasures mutually ben-
eficial cooperation and called on the Chinese side to make more contributions to
consolidating and enhancing the time-honored friendship between the two coun-
tries, helping push forward the bilateral comprehensive strategic cooperative part-
nership.26 On January 12, 2017, General Secretary of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of Vietnam, Nguyễn Phú Trọng, visited China and met with
President Xi. During the meeting, the two top leaders also reiterated the need to
properly control differences and promote maritime cooperation.
The shifts in Vietnam’s policy in the South China Sea might be associated with
Duterte’s visit to Beijing. Since both the Philippines and Vietnam are claimants to
islands in the South China Sea, Duterte’s trip to Vietnam before he visited China
was of special significance. Vietnam attached great importance to the visit of the
Philippine President. Top Vietnamese leaders, including General Secretary of the
Communist Party of Vietnam Nguyễn Xuân Phúc, the Prime Minister of the Gov-
ernment Nguyễn Phú Trọng, and the President of the State Trần Đại Quang, all
held meetings with him. According to the Vietnamese government website, Viet-
namese President Trần Đại Quang met with his Philippine counterpart in Hanoi
on September 29, 2016. On the South China Sea disputes, the two leaders pledged
to maintain and promote regional peace, security and stability. They called on all
parties to show self-restraint and solve disputes through peaceful means. Besides,
Philippine media reported that Mr. Duterte stressed the necessity to have bilateral
talks with China during his talks with his Vietnam counterpart. Vietnam and the
Philippines have been at the forefront of disputes with China, and their strategic
partnership is apparently aimed at counterbalancing China. However, the Viet-
namese president, when meeting with his Philippine counterpart, kept a relatively
low-key attitude. Instead of talking about the tribunal’s arbitration decision pub-
licly, both of them agreed to solve the disputes through bilateral talks.
It can be seen that the Vietnamese policy in the South China Sea has undergone
significant changes after the state visits of Vietnamese and Philippine leaders to
China. This is best shown by the fact that on October 22, 2016, three Chinese war-
ships carrying 750 sailors docked at Vietnam’s biggest naval base at Cam Ranh
Bay. The visit is the first by Chinese navy to the deep-water naval base. Interest-
ingly, Vietnam also allowed the US warships to berth at the Cam Ran Bay earlier
the same month for the first time since the end of the Vietnam War. Therefore,
welcoming Chinese warships to the Cam Ran Bay seems to be an attempt to strike
some balance between China and the United States.27
15.3 Conclusion
The current situation in the South China Sea has shifted from tension to stability.
The ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on July 12, 2016, proves to be
a turning point. Before that, the United States broke its promise of not picking
a side on the South China disputes and conducted navy freedom of navigation
operations, leading to abrupt escalation of tensions in the region. In the wake of the
arbitration decision, Beijing called for international support for its position of non-
participation, non-recognition and non-acceptance of the tribunal ruling and finally
won the support of more than 60 countries. Meanwhile, China spared no effort to
improve China-ASEAN relations, urging ASEAN member states to be sensible to
the arbitration award. Even the Philippines, who submitted the case, kept a low
profile without publicly playing up the matter. As a consequence, tensions in the
South China Sea came eased, bringing peace and stability back to the area.
Ever since the Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte took office, his adminis-
tration has ended joint US-Philippine patrols in the South China Sea and vowed
to stop being subservient to the United States. On the issue of the South China
Sea disputes, he called for an end to US intervention and agreed to conduct bilat-
eral negotiations with China to resolve differences. Duterte’s pragmatic approach
to the South China Sea disputes has, in a sense, had an impact on Vietnamese
policy in the area. During his visit to Vietnam, he and his Vietnamese counter-
part pledged to maintain and promote regional peace, security and stability in the
South China Sea, urging all parties to exercise restraint and settle disputes through
peaceful means.
Notes
1 (2016). Five Lighthouses to Shine on the South China Sea (in Chinese). Philippine
World News, August 26.
2 (2016). President Duterte: Won’t Mention South China Sea on ASEAN Summit (in
Chinese). Philippine World News, August 26.
3 (2016). The Page of South China Sea Arbitration Has Already Been Turned Over (in
Chinese). Philippine World News, September 13.
4 (2016). US: Huangyan Dao Dispute May Lead to Conflict (in Chinese). Philippine
World News, May 1.
5 (2016). US Policy towards South China Sea: Taking No Position or Playing for Real?
(in Chinese). Philippine World News, June 11.
6 (2016). Ten More Chinese Coast Guard Vessels Operative Near Huangyan Dao (in Chi-
nese). Philippine World News, August 16.
7 (2016). The Philippines Accused China of Preparing to Build an Artificial Island at
Huangyan Dao (in Chinese). Philippine World News, August 16.
8 See www.navytimes.com/2016/09/07/u-s-wary-of-chinese-moves-near-disputed-
south-china-sea-reef/ (accessed April 18, 2020).
9 See www.gmanetwork.com/news/news//nation/582944/no-reclamation-by-china-in-
panatag-shoal-says-yasay/story// (access April 18, 2020).
10 See https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/event/160915_Tomomi_Inada_
transcript.pdf (accessed April 18, 2020).
11 (2016). China’s Anger over US-Japan Joint Patrols in the South China Sea (in Chi-
nese). Philippine World News, September 25.
12 (2016). Japan’s Involvement in the South China Sea Troubles China (in Chinese). Phil-
ippine World News, October 4.
13 See http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2016-09/29/content_4740052.htm (accessed
April 18, 2020).
14 (2016). Yasay: The US Failed Us and the Philippines Won’t be Subservient to Washing-
ton Any Longer (in Chinese). Philippine World News, October 7.
15 www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/09/18/1624973/philippines-eyes-talks-china-sans-
preconditions (accessed April 18, 2020).
16 (2016). Duterte to Visit Beijing: A Chance for Beijing to Ease Tensions (in Chinese).
Philippine World News, September 25.
17 See https://qz.com/807203/political-scientist-richard-javad-heydarian-on-rodrigo-
duterte-us-bashing-and-the-south-china-sea/ (accessed April 18, 2020).
18 (2016). Vietnam Quietly Builds Up 10 Islands in South China Sea (in Chinese). Philip-
pine World News, May 18.
19 See https://amti.csis.org/slow-and-steady-vietnams-spratly-upgrades/ (accessed April
18, 2020).
20 See www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-vietnam-exclusive-idUSKCN10K2NE
21 Ibid.
22 (2016). Military Spending in Southeast Asia Continues to Climb (in Chinese). Philip-
pine World News, August 29.
23 (2016). Japan to Provide Patrol Ships for Vietnam to Boost Its Maritime Security Capa-
bilities (in Chinese). Philippine World News, September 17.
24 (2016). China’s Nuclear Submarines Under Threat as US Navy Returns to Cam Ranh
Bay (in Chinese). Philippine World News, May 26.
25 (2015). Philippines and Vietnam to be Strategic Partners (in Chinese). Philippine
World News, November 12.
26 (2016). President Xi Meets Vietnamese Prime Minister: China and Vietnam to Solve
South China Sea Issue through Consultation. Ta Kung Pao, September 14 (Philippine
edition).
27 (2016). Chinese Warships Make First Visit to Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay. Ta Kung Pao,
October 23 (Philippine edition).
Index
Note: Page numbers in italic indicate a figure and page numbers in bold indicate a table
on the corresponding page.
administration 55–56, 94–95, 97–98, Central America 180

127–128, 177, 205–207; of Xisha and Changsha 23, 28–29, 32, 37, 172;
Nansha Islands 76–85 discovery and naming of Xisha and
Anbo Shazhou 12–13, 91, 137, 140, Nansha Islands 44–46; in the Song and
203–204 Yuan dynasties 37–39; see also Nansha
Anglo-Dutch Boundary Convention 205 Islands; Wanli Changsha
archaeological sites 76–79 Channel Islands 152
archipelagic waters 105–106, 114, 121, Cloma, Tomas 153–155, 157
195–197 communism 22–100, 102, 103n23
archipelagos 3–5, 8–9, 83, 91, 99–100; Committee of Examining Maps for Land
and the legal status of the dotted line and Water 92, 101, 111, 128, 145
112–113, 115–116, 128–130; and continental shelves 108, 110–111, 114, 161,
UNCLOS 195–197; see also archipelagic 188–194, 197, 203–205; disputes over
waters; Hoang Sa; Philippines; Sulu delimitation of 158–160, 181–182; and the
Archipelago; Truong Sa EEZs 188–191; law 123, 125–127, 152
ASEAN 162, 188, 209, 219; mitigation of coral banks 4–5, 9, 11
tensions 210–211
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Dai Nam 70; map 69
(APEC) 217 Dai Nam Nhat Thong Chi 66, 68
Atlas of Administrative Areas of the Dai Nam Yi Tong Quan Tu 70, 74
Republic of China 97 Dangerous Ground (Nansha Islands)
Australia 159–160, 189, 196–197, 200, 203 9; features in 16–18; features east of
15–16; features south of 13–15; features
Bach Long Vi 171–174, 181–183 west of 9–13
Bai Cat Vang see Truong Sa Dao Yi Zhi Lue 21–24, 24, 26, 39
banks 13, 16–17, 193; coral banks 4–5, 9, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in
11; sandbanks 7, 9, 41, 61–62, 66 the South China Sea (DOC) 211
Baseline Law see Philippines demarcation 113–114, 165–174, 177–178,
Beibu Gulf see Gulf of Tonkin 189–190, 193–194
Borneo 3, 22, 153, 158–159, 200, 203 delimitation 101, 114–115, 127–131,
Brévié Line 177 165–171, 184–185, 189–191, 204–205;
of the continental shelf in western
calendar 48–50, 57 Palawan 158–160; maritime boundary
Cambodia 37, 72, 76, 82, 177; and the delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin
dotted line 98, 108, 130 179–184; role of islands in 181–183;
Cat Vang 71–74, 81 of the South China Sea nine-dotted line
222 Index
145–147; undelimited maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin
in the Gulf of Tonkin 174–178 179–184; occupation of some Nansha
development: joint development 184; of Islands 89–93; process of boundary
Xisha and Nansha Islands 76–85 demarcation between China and 165–174;
discovery 45–46, 76–79, 192, 205, 207; undelimited maritime boundary in the
Cloma’s alleged claim of 153–155; of Gulf of Tonkin 174–178
Xisha and Nansha Islands 44–46
domino effect 100, 102–103 General Map of Asia 29, 30
Dongsha Islands 34, 82, 99, 141, 155, 194; General Map of Lands within the Four
geographical overview 4–5; and legal Seas 24–25, 25, 29, 32
status of the dotted line 112, 114, 116, Great Britain 34, 84–85, 139, 141–142;
119; and Shitang and Changsha 42, 44 and China’s dispute with the Philippines
dotted line 87, 104, 119, 145–148; and over the Nansha Islands 152, 155–156;
France’s occupation 89–93; “historic the dotted line 90, 94, 97–99, 101–102,
rights” and “the maritime boundary 114; Gulf of Tonkin 177; latest
line” 109–113, 122–129; and historic developments 201, 203, 206
waters 104–108, 119–122; as “an island Greece 152
ownership line” 113–116, 129–132; Gulf of Fonseca 180
and recapture of the Xisha and Nansha Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu Gulf) 26, 108,
Islands 94–97; and the treaty of peace 122, 165, 184–185; maritime boundary
with Japan 97–102 delimitation in 179–184; the process of
Duterte, Rodrigo 209, 211, 213–215, boundary demarcation between China
218–219 and France 165–174; undelimited
maritime boundary in 174–178
East Timor 169 Guo Shoujing 48–49, 50, 57–59
EEZ see exclusive economic zone
effective occupation 56, 90, 154, 200, 205 Hai Guo Jian Wen Lu 25–26, 25, 29, 41–43
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement Hai Lu 28–30, 30, 32, 43–44
(EDCA) 214 Hai Yu 25–28, 27, 39–41, 40, 58, 62–63
exclusive economic zone(EEZ) 158; and historic rights 109–113, 115, 122–126,
continental shelves 188–191; the dotted 131, 195
line 104, 108, 110, 114, 125–126, 128, historic waters 89, 104–111, 115, 119–126,
131; and Gulf of Tonkin 179, 181; 131, 179–181
latest developments 199, 201–202, 204, Hoang Sa Islands 33, 45, 61, 64–71, 73–74
207;and UNCLOS 191–194, 196–197 Huangyan Dao 8–9, 57, 59, 199, 201–202,
211–212
fen shui 26–27, 27, 62 Huangzhu 171–174
Fernandez, Gil S. 158
fishermen 4–5, 63, 77–83, 154, 206–207; Illustrated Geography of Vietnam 66–67, 67
and sovereignty over Xisha and Nansha Indonesia 3; and China’s dispute with the
138–140, 146, 148; in Xisha and Nansha Philippines over the Nansha Islands 153,
Islands 83–85 155, 159–160, 162; and the dotted line
foreign policy 170, 213–215 108, 112, 114, 130; Gulf of Tonkin 182;
Four-Sea Survey 48, 49, 51, 52–53, 54; historical records 23, 26, 29, 34; latest
calculation of longitude and latitude of developments 200, 205; UNCLOS 189,
survey points 50–56; locating the South 195
China Sea survey point 56–59; origin Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) 205
and process of 48–50 Institute for Marine Development Strategy of
France 81–85, 143–148, 152, 157, 176, State Oceanic Administration 111, 127
184–185; and the dotted line 94–95, International Court of Justice (ICJ) 85,
97–101, 103n25, 108, 127; illegal 152, 159, 180, 190; and the dotted line
occupation of Xisha and Nansha 120, 123, 126; latest developments
Islands 137–141; maritime boundary 205–207
Index 223
international law 45–46, 56, 85, 139, 151, Malaysia 3, 25, 39, 108, 126, 161, 184,
200–207, 211; Cloma’s alleged claim of 188–191, 200; new developments in
“discovery and occupation” 153–155; the law of the sea 205–207; sovereignty
disputes over the delimitation of the claims of 202–205
continental shelf in western Palawan maps: of Chinese Domain in the South
158–160; and the dotted line 90, 106, China Sea 93; of Dai Nam 69; General
109–111, 119–126, 130; fabricated Map of Asia 30; General Map of
claims of “trusteeship” 155–157; and Lands within the Four Seas 25; of
the Gulf of Tonkin 178–181; resolving the Location of the South China Sea
the Sino-Philippine dispute over the Islands 96; of Mong Cai and Zhushan
Nansha Islands 160–162; sovereignty 176; of Vietnam 67
not premised on proximity 151–153; maritime boundary line 101, 104, 109–113,
and UNCLOS 189–190, 196 115, 126–131; and the Gulf of Tonkin
island ownership line 104, 113–116, 129–132 175, 177, 179
Italy 103n25, 179, 182–183 measurement of the four seas see Four-Sea
Survey
Japan 82–84, 148, 155–156, 179, 195; Mexico 130
China’s recovery of Xisha and Nansha Ming Dynasty 28, 31, 44, 46, 58, 63, 77–81;
Islands 141–145; current situation Qianli Shitang and Wanli Changsha in
209–210, 215–217; illegal occupation 39–42; records of the South China Sea
of Xisha and Nansha Islands 137–141; in 26–31
training patrols with United States Mong Cai 171–178, 176, 184
212–213; treaty of peace with 97–102;
see also Second Sino-Japanese War; names see place names
War of Resistance against Japanese Nansha Islands 151; ancient temple ruins
Aggression preserved on 79–83; archaeological
Jiangping 171–174 sites and relics on 76–79; Cloma’s
Jin Dynasty 76–77 alleged claim of “discovery and
jurisdiction 31–34, 45–46, 56–58, 146; the occupation” 153–155; defending
dotted line 100–102, 105–107, 112–115, seizure of 147–148; development and
120–122, 127–131; latest developments administration of 76–85; discovery
199–206; and UNCLOS 188–191, 197 and naming of 44–46;disputes over the
delimitation of the continental shelf in
Kalayaan Islands 158, 206–207 western Palawan 158–160; fabricated
Kublai Khan 48–50, 58 claims of “trusteeship” 155–157;
France’s occupation of 89–93; illegal
land reclamation 209–210, 215 occupation by Japan and France
Laos 98, 214 137–141; Malaysia’s sovereignty claims
latitude and longitude calculation 50–56, over 202–205; and the nine-dotted
51, 52–53, 54; see also Four-Sea Survey line 145–147; production activities of
law of the sea 162, 178, 181, 184; new Chinese fishermen in 83–85; recapture of
developments in 205–207; see also UN 94–97; recovery by China of Xisha and
Convention on the Law of the Sea and Nansha Islands 141–145; resolving the
the South China Sea Sino-Philippine dispute over 160–162;
Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and sovereignty not premised on proximity
the Continental Shelf 110, 125, 131 151–153; see also Dangerous Ground
Libya/Tunisia Continental Shelf Case 123, Nanwei Dao (Spratly Island) 12–13,
190 91, 206, 215; development and
Ligitan Island 205 administration of Xisha and Nansha
Liu Bingzhong 48 Islands 77, 79–80, 84; sovereignty over
longitude see latitude and longitude Xisha and Nansha 139–140, 142–143
calculation National Archives and Records
Lý Sơn Islands 65–71 Administration 97
224 Index
natural resources 125, 141, 183–184, 192, Potsdam Proclamation 94, 142
200–205, 217 proximity 151–153, 190, 200, 204
nine-dotted line see dotted line
North Sea Continental Shelf cases 152, 190 Qianli Shitang 26, 30; as the maritime
boundary 42–44; in the Ming and Qing
Obama administration 213–214, 217 dynasties 39–42
occupation: Cloma’s alleged claim of Qing Dynasty 77–79, 81, 89, 139, 184;
153–155; current situation 215–216; and the Four-Sea Survey 57–58; Hoang
development and administration of Sa and Truong Sa 63, 66; the process of
Xisha and Nansha Islands 76, 79, boundary demarcation between China
81–83, 85; dispute with the Philippines and France 166–173; Qianli Shitang and
over the Nansha Islands 151–153, 157, Wanli Changsha in 39–42; records of
161; and the dotted line 98–101, 123, the South China Sea in 26–31; Shitang
127; and the Gulf of Tonkin 172–173, and Changsha 44, 46; sovereignty
175–176; Hoang Sa and Truong Sa 61, and jurisdiction in 31–34; and the
71–72; latest developments 200–206;of undelimited maritime boundary in the
nine small features of the Nansha Gulf of Tonkin 174–178
Islands by France 89–97, 100–101,
127, 146; Shitang and Changsha 45–46; Reed Bank dispute 158
sovereignty over Xisha and Nansha relics 76–82
141–145, 147–148; and UNCLOS rights see historic rights
192–193; of Xisha and Nansha Islands ROC government: background and
by Japan and France 137–141 ramifications of the dotted line 91–92,
Ou tuo 167–169 94–97, 96, 101; legal status of the dotted
line 107, 111, 113, 115; research on the
Palawan 3, 15, 151, 158–161, 190, 194, dotted line 119, 121–122, 127–130;
206 sovereignty over Xisha and Nansha 138,
Philippine Navy 148, 151, 158 146
Philippines 3, 43–44, 76, 140–141, 151; rocks 6–17, 71–73, 78–79; distinction
Baseline Law 199–202; Cloma’s alleged between islands and 191–195, 197
claim of “discovery and occupation” ruins 77, 79–83
153–155; current situation 209–219; Russia 113–114, 152, 177, 216
disputes over the delimitation of the
continental shelf in western Palawan sandbanks 7, 9, 41, 61–62, 66
158–160; and the dotted line 92, Saris, John 70
94–95, 97–102, 114–115, 126–127, Second Sino-Japanese War 141–145
130; fabricated claims of “trusteeship” Shitang 23–24, 29–30, 32, 37, 56;
155–157; growing stability in the South discovery and naming of Xisha and
China Sea 209–215; latest developments Nansha Islands 44–46; as the maritime
199, 203, 206–207; resolving the Sino- boundary 42–44; in the Ming and Qing
Philippine dispute over the Nansha dynasties 39–42; in the Song and Yuan
Islands 160–162; seizure of Nansha dynasties 37–39
Islands from 147–148; sovereignty Sino-French Convention: (1887) 130;
not premised on proximity 151–153; (1894) 178
and UNCLOS 189–191, 194–197; and Sipadan Island 205
Vietnamese policy 215–218; see also solstice see summer solstice
Duterte, Rodrigo Song Dynasty 34, 44, 46, 48, 58, 77–79;
place names 10, 15, 80, 82, 177; and the records of the South China Sea in 21–26;
dotted line 89, 91–92, 95, 101, 127, Shitang and Changsha in 37–39
130–131; and historical records 22, 25, sovereignty 45–46, 61, 81–82, 85; dispute
32, 34; Hoang Sa and Truong Sa 61, with the Philippines over the Nansha
66, 68, 71–74; Shitang and Changsha Islands 155–157, 160–162; and the
37, 41–42, 44–46; and sovereignty over dotted line 89–95, 97–101, 104–107,
Xisha and Nansha 137–138, 140, 145 111–116, 119–122, 127–131, 145–147;
Index 225
and the Four-Sea Survey 54–56; and and Nansha Islands 81–82; and the dotted
historical records 21, 31–34; latest line 104, 107–108, 110–111; and the
developments 199–207; and proximity Four-Sea Survey 54–58; and the Gulf of
151–153; and UNCLOS 189–190, Tonkin 165–169, 184–185; and historical
193–197; over Xisha and Nansha records 21–23, 26, 28–29, 31–34;
137–138, 141, 143–144, 148 Hoang Sa and Truong Sa 61–70; latest
Spain 114, 130, 156–157, 177, 180, 201 developments 199–200, 206; maps 67, 69;
stability 209–215, 218–219 and the maritime boundary delimitation
Sulu Archipelago 153, 177, 200 in the Gulf of Tonkin 179–184; and
summer solstice 49–50, 49, 52, 52–53, 54 the process of boundary demarcation
sundial measurements 49–50, 49, 52–54, 57 between China and France 171–173;
Shitang and Changsha 37–39, 42–45;
terra nullius 45, 76, 83, 85, 154 and sovereignty over Xisha and Nansha
treaties 46, 147, 201, 205; and dispute with 138–139, 144–145; and UNCLOS 189,
the Philippines over the Nansha Islands 194; and the undelimited maritime
155–157, 159–160; and the dotted line boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin 174–178
114–115, 130; and the Gulf of Tonkin Vietnam War 145, 157, 201, 218
165, 168–169, 173–179, 184; with Japan
97–102 Wailuo Sea 26, 58, 61–65, 68–71
Treaty of Paris 147, 156–157, 201 Wang Xun 48
Truman Proclamations 127–128 Wanli Changsha 26, 28–30, 63–64, 68–71,
Truong Sa (Bai Cat Vang) 21, 45, 61–66, 74; as the maritime boundary 42–44; in
68–71, 73–74 the Ming and Qing dynasties 39–42, 40
trusteeship: fabricated claims of 155–157 Wanli Shitang 23–24, 24, 29–30, 37–42,
Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf Case 123, 40, 44
190 War of Resistance against Japanese
Turkey 152 Aggression 94–97, 101, 111, 127
UNCLOS see UN Convention on the Law Xisha Islands: ancient temple ruins
of the Sea and the South China Sea preserved on 79–83; archaeological sites
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and and relics on 76–79; development and
the South China Sea (UNCLOS) 109, administration of 76–85; discovery and
119, 146–147, 162, 188, 199, 202–205; naming of 44–46; illegal occupation
archipelago state and archipelagic by Japan and France 137–141; major
waters 195–197; EEZs and continental features of 5–8; and the nine-dotted
shelves 188–191; islands and rocks line 145–147; production activities of
191–195; new developments in 205–207; Chinese fishermen in 83–85; recapture
UNCLOS II 110; UNCLOS III 105, of 94–97; recovery by China of Xisha
123, 125 and Nansha Islands 141–145
United Kingdom see Great Britain
United States 84, 177, 196, 201; current Yuan Dynasty 21–23, 26, 41, 44, 46, 78–79;
situation 209–211, 214–215, 217, 219; records of the South China Sea in 21–26;
and dispute with the Philippines over the Shitang and Changsha in 37–39; see also
Nansha Islands 151–152, 156; and the Four-Sea Survey
dotted line 94, 97–99, 101–102, 103n23,
113–114, 130, 133; Japan training Zhenghe Qunjiao 9–12
patrols with 212–213; and sovereignty Zhongsha Islands 3–4, 8–9, 29, 38–42,
over Xisha and Nansha 141–142 155, 201; and the dotted line 95, 99,
112–114, 119, 128; and the Four-Sea
Vietnam 3, 5, 98, 130, 154; Cat Vang 71–74; Survey 57, 59
current policy situation 209, 214–219; Zhushan 167, 172–176, 176
development and administration of Xisha Zu Chongzhi 48

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China’s Maritime Boundaries

in the South China Sea

Jinming Li is Professor Emeritus of the Research Center for Southeast Asian

The China Perspectives series focuses on translating and publishing works by

Recent titles in politics partly include:

The BRICS Studies

Cooperative Development in the South China Sea

China’s Maritime Boundaries in the South China Sea

For more information, please visit www.routledge.com/series/CPH

First published in English 2021

ISBN: 978-0-367-54674-8 (hbk)

Typeset in Times New Roman

List of figures vii

1 Geographical overview of China’s maritime boundaries

2 The South China Sea in Song-Yuan-Ming-Qing China 21

7 China’s dotted line in the South China Sea: its background

10 China’s struggle for sovereignty over Xisha and Nansha

2.1 A passage in Dao Yi Zhi Lue that mentions “Wanli Shitang” 24

4.1 Summer Solstice Sundial Scenery and Day-Night Lengths

1.1 Geographical overview of the Dongsha Islands

1.2 Major features of the Xisha Islands

1.3 The Zhongsha Islands

1.4 The “Dangerous Ground” of the Nansha Islands

1.4.1 Features West of the Dangerous Ground

Reefs Southwest of Zhenghe Qunjiao

Anbo Shazhou and Nanwei Dao

Other reefs and banks

1.4.2 Features South of the Dangerous Ground

1.4.3 Features East of the Dangerous Ground

1.4.4 Features in the Dangerous Ground

Chinese historical records

2.1 Records of the South China Sea in the Song and

2.2 Records of the South China Sea in the Ming and

Except for Qizhouyang and Dazhou Island, there is no mountain-like

Figure 2.3 A paragraph in Hai Yu that mentions “fen shui”

Fishermen in Hainan also described their way back: “From Singapore to

Galaba (present-day Jakarta), which is administered by the Dutch, can be

Figure 2.4 The General Map of Asia in Hai Lu

Wanli Changsha, or Wanli Shitang, is undoubtedly the Nansha Islands, the

2.3 Exercise of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the South

Wu Sheng, also known as Wu Yuanze, was born in Tong’an, whose original

It is pointed out in a document published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

3.1 The locations of Shitang and Changsha in the Song

Zhancheng is today’s Bình Định Province in Central Vietnam while Jiaozhi is

Changsha and Shitang in the so-called Dongdayang (West Pacific) refer to

The base of Shitang originates from Chaozhou. It is tortuous as a long snake

3.2 Qianli Shitang and Wanli Changsha in the Ming

The Nan’aoqi in Chen’s record is apparently the Dongsha Islands.

3.3 Qianli Shitang and Wanli Changsha as the

3.4 China as the first country to discover and name the

4.1 Origin and process of the Four-Sea Survey

Location Angle Sun Shadow Day Night Length

South China Sea 15 degrees 1.16 chi (shadow 54 ke 46 ke

4.2 Calculation of the longitude and latitude of survey points

Location Angle Location Angle between Location Angle Location Angle

Tropic of Capricorn. Therefore, the latitude of point O is the angle between Z

Tgα = BC/AC = 1.16/8 = 0.145

Table 4.3 Longitudes and Latitudes of Six Observation Points

Location Angle between Dial Scenery Mid-day Time Estimated Estimated

SCS 15° 1.16 chi 0 15°12′ 116°42′

On January 30, 1980, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a docu-

The latitude of Qiongzhou is 19.75°N; The latitude of Nanhai is 15°N. This

In response to this, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a