SERRANO DE AGBAYANI vs PNB et al

Effects of Declaration of
Unconstitutionality
G.R. No. Ponente Date
L-23127 JUSTICE FERNANDO April 29, 1971
Petitioners Respondents
FRANCISCO SERRANO DE AGBAYANI, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and THE
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PANGASINAN,
defendants, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

DOCTRINE:

Unconstitutional statutes; Effect of.—The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a

determination (of unconstitutionality), is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects,—
with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private
and official.

Same; Same; Unconstitutionality of act, still to be shown.—Such an approach all the more
commends itself whenever police power legislation intended to promote public welfare but
adversely affecting property rights is involved. While subject to be assailed on due process,
equal protection and non-impairment grounds, all that is required to avoid the corrosion of
invalidity is that the rational basis or reasonableness test is satisfied. The legislature on the
whole is not likely to allow an enactment suffering, to paraphrase Cardozo, from the infirmity of
outrunning the bounds of reason and resulting in sheer oppression. It may be of course that if
challenged, an adverse judgment could be the result, as its running counter to the Constitution
could still be shown. In the meanwhile though, in the normal course of things, it has been
acted upon by the public and accepted as valid. To ignore such a fact would indeed be the
fruitful parent of injustice. Moreover, as its constitutionality is conditioned on its being fair or
reasonable, which in turn is dependent on the actual situation, never static but subject to
change, a measure valid when enacted may subsequently, due to altered circumstances, be
stricken down.

I. Facts of the case

● Francisco Serrano De Agbayani obtained the loan in the amount of P450.00 from the
PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage
duly registered covering property described in T.C.T. No. 11275 of the province of
Pangasinan.

● As of November 27, 1959, the balance due on said loan was in the amount of
P1,294.00. As early as July 13 of the same year, PNP instituted extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings in the office of the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan for the
recovery of the balance of the loan.

● Serrano de Agbayani countered with his suit against PNB and the Provincial Sheriff on
August 10, 1959, her main allegation being that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed
had long prescribed, 15 years having elapsed from the date of maturity, July 19, 1944.

● She sought and was able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against defendant
Provincial Sheriff, which was made permanent in the decision now on appeal. PNB in
its answer prayed for the dismissal of the suit as even on Serrano de Agbayani’s own
theory the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from March 10,
1945, when Executive Order No. 32 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the
subsequent legislative act extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid,
were to be deducted from the computation of the time during which the bank took no
legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As noted, the lower court did not find such
contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of Serrano de Agbayani.

II. Issue/s
 Whether or Not the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act extending the Moratorium
Law before the same were declared invalid thus tolling the period of prescription?

III. Ratio/Legal Basis

● SCOTUS has stated that: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official."

● The assailed moratorium was a valid governmental response to the plight of the debtors
who were war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a series of cases
impressive in their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period that Executive
Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run

● When the legislation was before this Court in 1953, the question pending was its
satisfying the rational basis test, not as of the time of its enactment but as of such date.
If found unreasonable, the right to non-impairment of contractual obligations must
prevail over the assertion of community power to remedy an existing evil. The Court was
convinced that such was the case. As stated in the opinion of Justice Bautista Angelo:
the conclusion to which the foregoing considerations inevitably led was that as of the
time of adjudication, it was apparent that Republic Act No. 342 could not survive the test
of validity. Executive Order No. 32 should likewise be nullified. That before the decision
they were not constitutionally infirm was admitted expressly. There is more reason then
to yield assent to the now prevailing principle that the existence of a statute or executive
order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences
are attached.

● The error of the lower court in sustaining Serrano de Agbayani’s suit is thus manifest.
From July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings were started by PNB, the time consumed is six days short of
fifteen years. The prescriptive period was tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the
effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v.
Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two months and eight days. Obviously
then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage obligation,
there was time to spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.

IV. Disposition

WHEREFORE, the decision of January 27, 1960 is reversed and the suit of plaintiff filed
August 10, 1959 dismissed. No costs.