CASE DIGEST
of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
ANGARA V. ELECTORAL
COMMISSION
GR NO. L-45081
FACTS
Ynsua, a candidate vying for the Angara’s
position filed his election protest before the
Electoral Commission. Angara sought to
prohibit the Electoral Commission from
taking further cognizance of the Ynsua’s
motion.
Angara argues, “the constitution excludes
from the Commission’s jurisdiction the
power to regulate the proceedings of such
election contests. Moreover, the
Commission can regulate the proceedings of
election protests only if the National
Assembly has not availed of its primary
power to regulate such proceedings.
Issue
Does the Electoral Commission have the
power to promulgate rules notwithstanding
the resolution of the National Assembly?
Ruling
Yes.
The purpose of the creation of the Electoral
Commission was to transfer in its totality all
the powers previously exercised by the
Legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against
the Electoral Commission is hereby denied,
with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral
Commission was acting within the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance
Ynsua against the election of the herein
petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the
resolution of the National Assembly of
December 3, 1935 can not in any manner
toll the time for filing protests against the
elections, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, nor
prevent the filing of a protest within such
time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us
relative to the character of the Electoral
Commission as a constitutional creation and
as to the scope and extent of its authority
under the facts of the present controversy,
we deem it unnecessary to determine
whether the Electoral Commission is an
inferior tribunal, corporation, board or
person within the purview of sections 226
and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
CALTEX V PALOMAR
GR NO. L-19650
FACTS:
Caltex conceived a promotional scheme
which will increase its patronage for oil
products called “Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest.” The contest calls for participants
to estimate the number of liters a hooded gas
pump at each Caltex station will dispense
during a specified period. To participate,
entry forms are only needed which can be
made available upon request at each Caltex
station. No fee is required to be paid nor
purchase has to be made prior to
participating. Foreseeing the extensive use
of mails to publicize the promotional
scheme, Caltex made representations with
the postal authorities to secure advanced
clearance for mailing. Caltex, through its
counsel, posited that the contest does not
violate anti-lottery provisions of the Postal
Law. The Postmaster General Palomar
declined the grant of the requested
clearance. Caltex sought a reconsideration.
Palomar maintained that if the contest was
pursued, a fraud order will be issued against
Caltex. Thus, this case at bar.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petition states a
sufficient cause of action for declaratory
relief
2. Whether or not the proposed contest
violates the Postal Law
RULINGS:
The Court held that the petition states a
sufficient cause of action for declaratory
relief since it qualifies for the 4 requisites on
invoking declaratory relief available to any
person whose rights are affected by a statute
to determine any question of construction or
validity. To the petitioner, the construction
hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance
its business while to the respondent,
suppression of the petitioner’s proposed
contest believed to transgress the law he has
sworn to uphold and enforce is an
unavoidable duty.
Likewise, using the rules of Statutory
Construction in discovering the meaning and
intention of the authors in a case clouded
with doubt as to its application, it was held
that the promotional scheme does not violate
the Postal Law in that it does not entail
lottery or gift enterprise. Using the principle
“noscitur a sociis’, the term under
construction shall be understood by the
words preceding and following it. Thus,
using the definitions of lottery and gift
enterprise which both has the requisites of
prize, chance and consideration, the promo
contest does not clearly violate the Postal
Law because of lack of consideration.
City of Baguio v. Marcos G.R. No. L-
26100. February 28, 1969
Facts: In April 12, 1912, the director of
lands in the CFI of Baguio INSTITUTED
the reopening of cadastral proceedings. In
November 13, 1922, a decision was
RENDERED. The land involved was the
Baguio Townsite which was declared public
land. In July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes
petitioned to reopen the civil case on the
following grounds: 1) he and his
predecessors have been in continuous
possession and cultivation of the land since
Spanish times; 2) his predecessors were
illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file
their claim. On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr.,
F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita Buchholz
opposed Lutes’ reopening on the following
grounds: 1) the reopening was filed outside
the 40-year period provided in RA 931; 2)
the petition to reopen the case was not
published; and 3) as lessees of the land, they
have standing on the issue.
Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the
peririon was filed outside the 40-year period
provided in RA 931, which was ENACTED
on June 20, 1953
Ruling: The Supreme Court grabted the
reopening of cadastral proceedings
Ratio: The title of RA 931 was “An Act to
Authorize the Filing in Proper Court under
Certain Conditions, of Certain Claims of
Title to Parcels of Land that have been
Declared Public Land, by Virtue of Judicial
Decisions RENDERED within the 40 Years
Next Preceding the Approval of this Act.”
Section 1 of the Act reads as “..in case such
parcels of land, on account of their failure to
file such claims, have been, or about to be
declared land of the public domain by virtue
of judicial proceedings INSTITUTED
within the 40 years next preceding the
approval of this act.” If the title is to be
followed, November 13, 1922 is the date
which should be followed, hence, would
allow the reopening of the case. If Section 1
is to be followed, the date of the institution
of reopening of the case which was April 12,
1912, the petition would be invalid.
StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable
part of a statute, and what may inadequately
be omitted in the text may be supplied or
remedied by its title.
DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483,
171400, 171489 & 171424 May 3, 2006
TOPICS: Constitutional Law, PP 1017, Sec.
17, Article XII
FACTS:
Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of
national emergency and call upon AFP and
the to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism
and lawless violence in the country. Permits
to hold rallies issued earlier by the local
governments were revoked. Rallyists were
dispersed. The police arrested petitioner
David and Llamas without a warrant.
President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring
that the state of national emergency has
ceased to exist. Petitioners filed petitions
with the SC, impleading Arroyo,
questioning the legality of the proclamation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Presidential Proclamation
No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
RULING:
No. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it
constitutes a call by the President for the
AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence
whenever becomes necessary as prescribe
under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. However, the SC ruled that
under Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution, the President, in the absence of
legislative legislation, cannot take over
privately-owned public utility and private
business affected with public interest.
Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly
unconstitutional.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL, GR No. 202242,
2012-07-17
Facts:
Does the first paragraph of Section 8, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution allow more
than one (1) member of Congress to sit in
the JBC? Is the practice of having two (2)
representatives from each house of Congress
with one (1) vote each sanctioned by the
Constitution?
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was
substantially altered. Instead of having only
seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member
was added to the JBC as two (2)
representatives from Congress began sitting
in the JBC - one from the House of
Representatives... and one from the Senate,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.[7]
Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001,
decided to allow the representatives from the
Senate and the House of Representatives one
full vote... each.[8] At present, Senator
Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC
as representatives of the legislature.
petitioner has questioned in this petition,[9]
setting forth the following
GROUNDS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE
PETITION
I controversy is the phrase "a representative of
Article VIII, Section 8, Paragraph 1 is clear,
definite and needs no interpretation in that
the JBC shall have only one representative
from Congress.
II
The framers of the Constitution clearly
envisioned, contemplated and decided on a
JBC composed of only seven (7) members.
III
Had the framers of the Constitution intended
that the JBC composed of the one member
from the Senate and one member from the
House of Representatives, they could have
easily said so as they did in the other
provisions of the Constitution.
IV
The composition of the JBC providing for
three ex- fficio members is purposely
designed for a balanced representation of
each of the three branches of the
government.
V the petition is also for prohibition under
One of the two (2) members of the JBC from
Congress has no right (not even ½ right) to
sit in the said constitutional body and
perform the duties and functions of a
member thereof.
VI
The JBC cannot conduct valid proceedings
as its composition is illegal and
unconstitutional
Through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), respondents defended their position
as members of the JBC in their
Comment[13] filed on July 12, 2012.
According to them, the crux of the
Congress."... the House of Representatives,
without the Senate and vice-versa, is not
Congress.[16] Bicameralism, as the system
of choice by the Framers, requires that both
houses exercise their respective powers in
the performance of its mandated duty which
is to legislate.
when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution speaks of "a representative...
from Congress," it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress.
Tracing the subject provision's history, the
respondents claim that when the JBC was
established, the Framers originally
envisioned a unicameral legislative body,
thereby allocating "a representative of the
National Assembly" to the JBC.
The phrase, however, was not modified to...
aptly jive with the change to bicameralism...
the Court... views the petition as essentially
an action for declaratory relief under Rule
63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure...
Rule 65 seeking to enjoin
Congress from sending two (2)
representatives with one (1) full vote each to
the JBC.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua
non for the exercise of the power of judicial
review have been met in this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the
JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of
Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit
of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
the determinants established in
jurisprudence are attendant in this case: (1)
the character of the funds or other assets
involved in the... case; (2) the presence of a
clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest
in the questions being... raised.
The allegations are substantiated by facts
and, therefore, deserve an evaluation from
the Court. The Court... need not elaborate on
the legal and societal ramifications of the
issues raised. It cannot be gainsaid that the
JBC is a constitutional innovation crucial in
the selection of the magistrates in our
judicial system.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted
provision, it can readily be discerned that the
provision is clear and unambiguous. The
first paragraph calls for the creation of a
JBC and places the same under the
supervision of the Court.
the use of the singular letter "a" preceding
"representative of Congress" is unequivocal
and leaves no room for any other
construction.
It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that
is, Congress may... designate only one (1)
representative to the JBC. Had it been the
intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit
in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided.
erba legis non est recedendum from... the
words of a statute there should be no
departure.
even if the Court should proceed to look into
the minds of the members of the
Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable
from the records thereof that it was intended
that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only.
the Court takes the initiative to clarify that it
is not in a position to determine as to who
should remain as the sole representative of
Congress in the JBC. This is a matter
beyond the province of the Court and is best
left to the determination of
Congress.
the remedy lies in the amendment of this
constitutional provision. The courts merely
give effect to the lawgiver's intent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The current numerical composition of the
Judicial and Bar Council IS declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and
Bar Council is hereby enjoined to
reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1)
member of Congress will sit as a...
representative in its proceedings, in
accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution.
Principles:
The Court considers this a constitutional
issue that must be passed upon, lest a
constitutional process be plagued by
misgivings, doubts and worse, mistrust.
Hence, a citizen has a right to bring this
question to the Court, clothed with legal...
standing and at the same time, armed with
issues of transcendental importance to
society. The claim that the composition of
the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an
object of concern, not just for a nominee to a
judicial post, but for all citizens who have
the right to seek... judicial intervention for
rectification of legal blunders.
August 25, 1994
Arturo M. Tolentino vs. The Secretary of Finance
and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Facts:
These are motions seeking reconsideration of
our decision dismissing the petitions filed in
these cases for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716,
otherwise known as the Expanded Value-
Added Tax Law. Now it is contended by the
Philippine Press Institute (PPI) that by
removing the exemption of the press from the
VAT while maintaining those granted to
others, the law discriminates against the
press. At any rate, it is averred, “even
nondiscriminatory taxation of
constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional.”
RA 7716, otherwise known as the “Expanded
Value Added Tax”, is an act that seeks to widen
the tax base of the existing VAT system and
enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners
contend that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716.
Congress violated the Constitution because it did
not originate exclusively from the House of
Representatives but is mere consolidation of HB.
No. 11197 and SB No. 1630 and it did not pass
three readings on separate days on the Senate thus
violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the
Constitution, respectively.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 7716 violated the
Constitution.
Ruling:
No. the phrase “originate exclusively” refers to
the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is
sufficient that the House of Representatives
initiated the passage of the bill whish may
undergo extensive changes in the senate. SB. No.
1630, having been certified as urgent by the
President need not meet the requirement not only
of printing but also reading the bill on separate
days.
The motions for reconsideration are denied with
the finality and the temporary restraining order
previously issued is hereby lifted.
De Guzman vs Commission on Elections Case
Digest De Guzman vs Commission on Elections
GR 129118
19 July 2000
Facts:
Comelec reassigned petitioners to other
stations pursuant to Section 44 of the Voter’s
registration act. The act prohibits election
officers from holding office in a particular city or
municipality for more than 4 years. Petitioners
claim that the act violated the equal protection
clause because not all election officials were
covered by the prohibition. Petitioners contend
that RA 8189 Section 44 is unconstitutional as it
violates the equal protection clause enshrined in
the constitution; that it violates constitutional
guarantee on security of civil servants; that it
undermines the constitutional independence of
comelec and comelec’s constitutional authority;
that it contravenes the basic constitutional
precept; that it is void for its failure to be read on
3 separate readings
Issue:
Whether or Not section 44 of RA 8189 is
unconstitutional
Ruling:
No, RA 8189 Sec 44 is not unconstitutional. It has
not violated the equal protection clause. It is
intended to ensure the impartiality of election
officials by preventing them from developing
familiarity with the people of their place of
assignment. Large-scale anomalies in the
registration of voters cannot be carried out
without the complicity of election officers, who
are the highest representatives of Comelec in a
city or municipality.
The petition is DISMISSED; and the
constitutionality and validity of Section 44 of RA
8189 UPHELD. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-63915
December 29, 1986
Tanada v. Tuvera
FACTS:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked
due process in demanding the disclosure of a
number of Presidential Decrees which they
claimed had not been published as required by
Law. The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was otherwise provided, as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon approval.
The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming
the necessity for publication of some of the
decrees. The court ordered the respondents to
publish in the official gazette all unpublished
Presidential Issuances which are of general force
and effect. The petitioners suggest that there
should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not. The
publication means complete publication, and
that publication must be made in the official
gazette.
ISSUE:
Whether or not all laws shall be published in the
official gazette.
RULING:
The Court hereby orders respondents to publish
in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall
have no binding force and effect.
The court held that all statute including those of
local application shall be published as condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days
after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.
The publication must be full or no publication at
all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the laws. The clause “unless
otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new Civil
Code meant that the publication required
therein was not always imperative, that the
publication when necessary, did not have to be
made in the official gazette.
FACTS:
On 11 March 1991, CIR Jose U. Ong issued
Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No.
15-91 classifying pawnshops as lending
investors and therefore imposing a 5%
lending investor’s tax on pawnshops. This
RMO was clarified by Revenue
Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 43-91 on
27 May 1991. Pursuant to these issuances, the
BIR issued an Assessment Notice against
Lhuillier demanding payment of deficiency
percentage tax in the sum of P3,360,335.11
for 1994 inclusive of interest and surcharges.
On 3 October 1997, Lhuillier filed an
administrative protest with the Office of
the Revenue Regional Director contending,
inter alia, that pawnshops are different from
lending investors, which are subject to the 5%
percentage tax under the specific provision of
the Tax Code, and that RMO No. 15-91
impliedly amends the Tax Code and is
therefore taxation by implication, which is
proscribed by law.
Deputy BIR Commissioner Panganiban
issued a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy
against Lhuillier’s property for the
enforcement and payment of the assessed
percentage tax.
Its protest having been unacted upon,
Lhuillier elevated the matter to the CIR. Still,
the protest was not acted upon by the CIR.
Thus, Lhuillier filed an appeal with the CTA.
The CTA rendered a decision declaring
RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 null
and void insofar as they classify
pawnshops as lending investors subject to
5% percentage tax.
Dissatisfied, the CIR filed a petition for
review with the CA, which affirmed the CTA
decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether pawnshops are considered lending
investors for the purpose of imposing
percentage tax.
RULING:
We rule in the negative.
While it is true that pawnshops are engaged
in the business of lending money, they are not
considered “lending investors” for the
purpose of imposing the 5% percentage
taxes.
Pawnshops and lending investors were, in
fact, subjected to different tax treatments
under the Tax
The petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The decision of the court of appeals
of 20, November 2001 in CA-G.R SP
No.62463 is AFFIRMED.
Code.
Moreover, Congress never intended
pawnshops to be treated in the same way as
lending investors. Both the NIRC of 1986 and
the NIRC of 1977 dealt with pawnshops and
lending investors differently. Verily then, it
was the intent of Congress to deal with both
subjects differently. Hence, we must likewise
interpret the statute to conform with such
legislative intent.
Furthermore, RMC No. 43-91 and RMO No.
15-91 lacked publication. RMO No. 15-91
and RMC No. 43-91 were issued in
accordance with the power of the CIR to
make rulings and opinions in connection with
the implementation of internal revenue laws,
which was bestowed by then Section 245 of
the NIRC of 1977, as amended by E.O. No.
273. Such power of the CIR cannot be
controverted.
However, the CIR cannot, in the exercise of
such power, issue administrative rulings or
circulars not consistent with the law sought to
be applied. Indeed, administrative issuances
must not override, supplant or modify the
law, but must remain consistent with the law
they intend to carry out. Only Congress can
repeal or amend the law.
G.R. No. 179579 01 February 2012
Ponente: J. Sereno
Topic: Statutory construction, effectivity of
statutes
Laws: Book VII, Chapter 2, Revised
Administrative Code
Doctrine: Failure to follow the basic
requirements of hearing and publication under
the Revised Administrative Code invalidates an
agency’s regulation.
Thesis:
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs (COC)
issued CMO 27-2003 to impose tariffs on wheat
imports based on grade classification. Hypermix,
a wheat importer, filed for Declaratory Relief
with the RTC on the ground of failure to follow
requirement of hearing and publication in the
issuance of CMO 27-2003. RTC ruled in favor of
the respondent.
Issue/Ruling:
Whether or not CMO No. 27-2003 is valid.
Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003 is
declared INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND
EFFECT. It was issued without following the
mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on
public participation, prior notice, and publication
or registration with the University of the
Philippines Law Center. Petitioners violated
respondent’s right to due process in the issuance
of CMO 27-2003 when they failed to observe the
requirements under the Revised Administrative
Code.
When an administrative rule is merely
interpretative in nature, its applicability needs
nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives
no real consequence more than what the law
itself has already prescribed. When, on the other
hand, the administrative rule goes beyond
merely providing for the means that can
facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially
increases the burden of those governed, it
behooves the agency to accord at least to those
directly affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be duly informed, before that new
issuance is given the force and effect of law.
Thus, without publication, the people have no
means of knowing what presidential decrees
have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees.
Facts:
• On November 7, 2003, petitioner COC
issued CMO 27-2003, which for tariff purposes,
classifies wheat according to the (1) importer or
consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of
discharge. Depending on these factors, wheat
would then be classified either as food grade or
feed grade with a corresponding tariff of 3% and
7% respectively.
• On December 19, 2003, the respondent,
a wheat importer, filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief with the RTC of Las Pinas contending that
CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the
mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on
public participation, prior notice, and publication
or registration with the University of the
Philippines Law Center.
• On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Topic: Statutory construction,
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for effectivity of statutes
twenty (20) days from notice.

• Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Laws: Section 6 of E.O. No. 801

Dismiss alleging that, among others, was an
internal administrative rule and not legislative in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
nature. 8072

• On 28 February 2005, the RTC ruled in Republic Act No. 3019, ANTI-
favor of respondent, declaring CMO 27-2003 as GRAFT AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT
INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT, citing
the petitioner’s failure to follow the basic
requirements of hearing and publication in the
Doctrine: Where the law is clear, plain and
issuance of the CMO.
free from ambiguity, it must be
• Petitioners appealed to the CA, raising given its literal meaning and
the same allegations in defense of CMO 27-2003. applied without any
interpretation or even
• CA dismissed the appeal, holding that construction.
the regulation affected substantial rights of
petitioners and other importers and that the
petitioners should have observed the Laws shall have only a
requirements of notice, hearing and publication. prospective effect and must not
be applied retroactively in such a
way as to apply to pending
G.R. No. 173615 (EB) disputes and cases. Lex prospicit,
non respicit (the law looks
16 Oct. 2009 forward and not backward.
Ponente: J. Peralta

Issue/Ruling:

1
Section 6 of E.O. No. 80, also known as the Revised
Charter of PNB, treats of the effects of converting
the bank into a private financial and banking
institution. It states:
Section 6. Change in Ownership of the Majority of
the Voting Equity of the Bank. - When the ownership
of the majority of the issued common voting shares
passes to private investors, the stockholders shall
cause the adoption and registration with the
Securities and Exchange Commission of the
appropriate Articles of Incorporation and revised by-
laws within three (3) months from such transfer of
ownership. Upon the issuance of the certificate of
incorporation under the provisions of the
Corporation Code, this Charter shall cease to have
force and effect, and shall be deemed repealed. Any
special privileges granted to the Bank such as the
authority to act as official government depositary, or
restrictions imposed upon the Bank, shall be
withdrawn, and the Bank shall thereafter be
considered a privately organized bank subject to the
laws and regulations generally applicable to private
banks. The Bank shall likewise cease to be a
government-owned or controlled corporation
subject to the coverage of service-wide agencies
such as the Commission on Audit and the Civil
Service Commission.
2
Whether E.O. No. 80 has the effect of
removing from the jurisdiction of the
CSC the appeal of respondent which
was already pending before the CSC at
the time the said law converted PNB
into a private banking institution.
No. PNB believes that while indeed
jurisdiction ordinarily continues until the
termination of the case, it advances the
opinion that the rule does not apply where
the law provides otherwise or where the said
law intends to operate on cases pending at
the time of its enactment. The fact that
Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 states that PNB
would be removed from the coverage of the
CSC must be taken to govern acts committed
by the bank’s employees after privatization.
It is binding rule, conformably with Article 4
of the Civil Code, that, generally, laws shall
have only a prospective effect and must not
be applied retroactively in such a way as to
apply to pending disputes and cases. This is
expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex
prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward
and not backward.)
The rationale against retroactivity is easy to
perceive: the retroactive application of a law
usually divests rights that have already
become vested or impairs the obligations of
contract and, hence, is unconstitutional.
Although the rule admits of certain well-
defined exceptions such as, for instance,
where the law itself expressly provides for
retroactivity, we find that not one of such
exceptions that would otherwise lend
credence to petitioner’s argument obtains in
this case. Hence, in other words, the fact
that Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 states that
PNB would be removed from the
coverage of the CSC must be taken to
govern acts committed by the bank’s
employees after privatization.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
January 3, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50084, which
reversed and set aside CSC Resolution Nos.
980716 and 983099 and ordered the remand
of the case to the CSC for further
proceedings, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Facts:
• 1992 - Cayetano Tejano was found
guilty of grave misconduct in
connection with a number of
irregular and fraudulent
transactions PNB Cebu City Branch.
• February 24 and March 17, 1994 –
Tejano and 8 others were
administratively charged before the
PNB Management Hearing
Committee. Tejano was charged
guilty of gross misconduct in
misappropriating funds and of gross
neglect in extending unwarranted
credit accommodations. The
Committee then recommended that
respondent be meted the penalty of
forced resignation without forfeiture
of benefits.
• June 21, 1995. – PNB Board of
Directors however, ruled that Tejano
must serve the penalty of forced
resignation with forfeiture of
benefits.
• May 27, 1996 – PNB had ceased to be
a government-owned and controlled
corporation, and converted into a
private banking institution by virtue
of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 80.
• Tejano filed before CSC and
dismissed the respondent’s appeal for
being filed out of time.
• CSC required petitioner to comment.
In its Comment, petitioner theorized
 that even granting respondent’s
appeal was filed on time, the same
must, nevertheless, be dismissed on
account of the privatization of
PNB which thereby removed the
case from the jurisdiction of the
CSC.
• The CSC found this argument
meritorious and, subsequently, in its
Resolution No. 98309913 dated
December 7, 1998, it denied
respondent’s reconsideration on that
ground.