Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Baps 09 Block 02
Baps 09 Block 02
Syllabus under Choice Based Credit System (CBCS). This course material is
designed and developed by Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU),
New Delhi and K.K Handiqui Open University.
Bachelor of Arts
POLITICAL SCIENCES (BAPS)
BAPS-9
Public Policy and Administration in India
Block-2
DECENTRALIZATION
Structure
4.1 Objective
4.2 Introduction
4.3 Decentralisation- Meaning and Dimensions
4.4 Concept of Decentralisation
4.5 Significance of Decentralization
4.6 Types of Decentralisation
4.6.1 Political
4.6.2 Administrative
4.6.3 Fiscal
4.6.4 Market
4.6.5 Environmental
4.7 Approaches to Decentralisation
4.8 Summary
4.9 Exercise
4.10 Reference
4.1 OBJECTIVE
4.2 INTRODUCTION
There has been a wave of efforts globally to reform the State especially since the late
eighties and early nineties. The basic idea behind this was to bring the private players
and the market forces in the governance process along with the State thereby
lessening its burden as also making it more effective and accountable.
1
Decentralisation is one such reform effort that was globally advocated. Accordingly,
many countries decentralised State powers to the sub-national governments and
shifted some of their powers to the periphery. India was no exception to this.
Decentralisation has become one of the most politically correct ideals for better
governance in today‘s time. It is seen as how the locus of power shifts from the
inefficient, corrupt, and rent-seeking central governments to more accountable,
responsive, and transparent local governments. It encourages greater political
participation and increases the responsiveness of the government institutions
ultimately improving the planning and implementation of the development schemes
and programs. In developing countries such as India, it is seen as a progressive
strategy to promote development by identifying the needs and preferences of the
people through their direct participation in governance especially at the grassroots
level.
Decentralisation is a system in which the basic activities are carried out at various
levels giving adequate scope for all the partners to participate in these activities.
Decentralisation involves a systematic distribution of powers and functions across
different political and economic agents in a society. Decentralisation has both
political and economic dimensions. Political decentralisation involves different levels
of government and distribution of powers and functions at various levels of
government such as national, state, and local levels.
2
4.4 CONCEPT OF DECENTRALISATION
Decentralisation refers to the physical location of facilities and the extent of dispersal
of authority throughout an organisation. Hence, it is an arrangement by which the
ultimate authority to command and the ultimate responsibility for results is localised
in units located in different parts of the country. It is argued that assigning of
functions and responsibilities, for their efficient and effective performance, to the
decentralised lower levels where they are allowed to decide many matters and a few
cases involving major policies or interpretations are referred to the higher levels of
the organisation is yielding results.
3
To be precise, decentralisation is an ideological principle associated with objectives
of self-reliance, democratic decision making, popular participation in government,
and accountability of public officials to citizens. It is a prime mechanism through
which democracy becomes truly representative and responsive (Arora and Goyal,
1995). Decentralisation is a political decision, and its implementation, a reflection of
a country‘s political process. It is the dispersal of authority among the lower levels of
an organisation and its field offices. It, thus, creates a sense of responsibility in local
decision making agencies with a more or less independent existence and powers. It is
sharing the decision-making authority with lower levels in organisations, thereby
improving their efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness (Chakrabarty and
Chand, 2012).
The urge for decentralisation has come from many sources. Firstly, it has been
prompted by the need to deliver basic public goods such as food, housing, and water
from local units of administration. Secondly, most people in developing countries live
in rural areas, which are away from the national capital located in distant urban areas.
The administration has to penetrate the rural areas and link these up with the nation as
a whole. Thirdly, in many countries, sociological diversities manifest themselves in
ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences. The administration needs to be
decentralised in response to regional diversities.
Fourthly, regional and local resources can be utilised for area development purposes,
only if the administration would move out to the regions and localities.
Decentralisation, therefore, facilitates local planning and development with the help
of local responses leading to better development outcomes. Fifthly, decentralisation
has its value in political and administrative terms. Politically, local participation in
development activities, with intensive response paves the way for the meaningful
articulation of local demands.
Planning thus becomes much more realistic and receives ready political support.
From the administrative point of view, the local capability to govern local areas
increases through sustained participation in local decision making. Decentralisation is
expected to release local energies and enlist local support for development activities.
In the process, the local community can steadily attain political and administrative
4
maturity. Finally, it is needed to institutionalise the participation of citizens in
development planning by creating alternative means of decision making.
4.6.1 Political
Political decentralization signifies a reduction in the authority of national
governments over policymaking. This process is accomplished by the institution of
reforms that either delegate a certain degree of meaningful decision-making
autonomy to subnational tiers of government, or grant citizens the right to elect
lower-level officials, like local or regional representatives. Depending on the country,
this may require constitutional or statutory reforms, the development of new political
parties, increased power for legislatures, the creation of local political units, and
encouragement of advocacy groups.
5
A national government may decide to decentralize its authority and responsibilities
for a variety of reasons. Decentralization reforms may occur for administrative
reasons when government officials decide that certain responsibilities and decisions
would be handled best at the regional or local level. In democracies,
traditionally conservative parties include political decentralization as a directive in
their platforms because rightist parties tend to advocate for a decrease in the role of
the central government. There is also strong evidence to support the idea that
government stability increases the probability of political decentralization since
instability brought on by gridlock between opposing parties in legislatures often
impedes a government's overall ability to enact sweeping reforms.
The European Union follows the principle of subsidiary, which holds that decision-
making should be made by the most local competent authority. The EU should decide
only on enumerated issues that a local or member state authority cannot address them.
Furthermore, enforcement is exclusively the domain of member states. In Finland,
6
the Centre Party explicitly supports decentralization. For example, government
departments have been moved from the capital Helsinki to the provinces. The Centre
supports substantial subsidies that limit potential economic and political
centralization to Helsinki.
Political decentralization does not come without its drawbacks. A study by Fan
concludes that there is an increase in corruption and rent-seeking when there are more
vertical tiers in the government, as well as when there are higher levels of subnational
government employment. Other studies warn of high-level politicians that may
intentionally deprive regional and local authorities of power and resources when
conflicts arise. To combat these negative forces, experts believe that political
decentralization should be supplemented with other conflict management mechanisms
like power-sharing, particularly in regions with ethnic tensions.
4.6.2 Administrative
7
imbalances" where the central government gives too much or too little money to the
lower levels. It actually can be a way of increasing central government control of
lower levels of government, if it is not linked to other kinds of responsibilities and
authority.
Fiscal decentralization can be achieved through user fees, user participation through
monetary or labor contributions, expansion of local property or sales taxes,
intergovernmental transfers of central government tax monies to local governments
through transfer payments or grants, and authorization of municipal borrowing with
national government loan guarantees. Transfers of money may be given conditionally
with instructions or unconditionally without them.
4.6.4 Market
Market decentralization can be done through the privatization of public-owned
functions and businesses, as described briefly above. But it also is done
through deregulation, the abolition of restrictions on businesses competing with
government services, for example, postal services, schools, garbage collection. Even
as private companies and corporations have worked to have such services contracted
out to or privatized by them, others have worked to have these turned over to non-
profit organizations or associations,
Since the 1970s there has been deregulation of some industries, like banking,
trucking, airlines, and telecommunications which resulted generally in more
competition and lower prices. According to Cato Institute, an American libertarian
think-tank, some industries' deregulation of aspects of the industry were offset by
more ambitious regulations elsewhere that hurt consumers, the electricity industry
being a prime example. For example, in banking, Cato Institute believes some
deregulation allowed banks to compete across state lines, increasing consumer choice,
while an actual increase in regulators and regulations forced banks to do business the
way central government regulators commanded, including making loans to
individuals incapable of repaying them, leading eventually to the financial crisis of
2007–2008.
One example of economic decentralization, which is based on a libertarian socialist
model, is decentralized economic planning. Decentralized planning is a type of
economic system in which decision-making is distributed amongst various economic
agents or localized within production agents. An example of this method in practice is
in Kerala, India which started in 1996 as, The People's Planning in Kerala.
Some argue that government standardisation in areas from commodity market,
inspection and testing procurement bidding, Building codes, professional and
vocational education, trade certification, safety, etc. are necessary. Emmanuelle
Auriol and Michel Benaim write about the "comparative benefits" of decentralization
versus government regulation in the setting of standards. They find that while there
may be a need for public regulation if public safety is at stake, private creation of
8
standards usually is better because "regulators or 'experts' might misrepresent
consumers' tastes and needs." As long as companies are averse to incompatible
standards, standards will be created that satisfy the needs of a modern economy.
4.6.5 Environmental
Central governments themselves may own large tracts of land and control the forest,
water, mineral, wildlife, and other resources they contain. They may manage them
through government operations or leasing them to private businesses, or they may
neglect them to be exploited by individuals or groups who defy non-enforced laws
against exploitation. It also may control most private land through land-use, zoning,
environmental and other regulations. Selling off or leasing lands can be profitable for
governments willing to relinquish control, but such programs can face public scrutiny
because of fear of a loss of heritage or environmental damage. Devolution of control
to regional or local governments is an effective way of dealing with these concerns.
Such decentralization has happened in India and other third world nations.
The different approaches to the concept have been clearly and profoundly presented
by Fesler. Following his classification, the approaches can be grouped into four
categories: the doctrinal, the political, the administrative, and the dual role.
Finally, the dual role approach, as Fesler puts it, is a kind of rehearsal of the area
function dichotomy in a new setting. Decentralisation is placed within a larger
context of development and change, as distinguished from the maintenance of the
status quo. Conceived in administrative terms, the dual role approach seeks to
highlight the conflict in field administration between tradition and change. Most field
administrative systems were evolved in an earlier era mainly to maintain the
established order, to collect revenue, and to keep things from going wrong. Almost all
the developing countries that have inherited the colonial field system are seeking to
bring about speedy social and economic change. As a consequence, there has been a
radical change in the functions of field administration. To quote Fesler, "The intent is
to change established ways of doing things to carry economic and social.
Development forward rapidly. This contrasts with the status quo orientation of a field
system geared to the maintenance of the established order and may conflict with the
personal orientation of field generalists so chosen and trained as to identify
themselves with the classes, families, and other groups who constitute the
'establishment'." Resolution of conflict between two different orientations in field
administration calls for adaptation of decentralisation to changing circumstances. The
theme is not unfamiliar to Indian administration in general and to the district
administration in particular.
4.8 SUMMARY
The process of decentralising powers to the lower levels of governance had been
going on since the pre-Independence days. The motives, assumptions and political-
administrative compulsions have, however, differed from age to age. Since
Independence, India has been experimenting with decentralisation and development.
The establishment of Panchayati Raj institutions, on the recommendations of the
Balwant Rai Mehta Committee (1957), was a landmark in the history of decentralised
development. For a variety of reasons, the Panchayati Raj institutions could not play
10
the desired role and in most states, the institutions languished for want of political
production and administrative and financial support. Reports of commissions and
committees and many research studies have pointed out the danger of continued
neglect of the grassroots institutions, both for the health of Indian democracy and for
bringing about meaningful local development with active popular participation. The
Constitutional amendments - 73rd (for Panchayati Raj) and 74th (for Municipal
Bodies) - have since been enacted, granting Constitutional status to local government.
The 'decentralisation debate' has assumed considerable significance in recent times
for various reasons as discussed in this Unit. There is a need to deepen democracy.
People at the grassroots level need to be "empowered". And, above all, participatory
development is possible and becomes a reality only with decentralisation. In this Unit,
all-attempt was made to discuss the approaches, types of decentralisation, the
evolution of the system of decentralisation in India. It also highlighted the recent
trends and functioning of institutions of decentralisation in India and factors impeding
decentralisation.
4.9 EXERCISE
4.10 REFERENCE
Avasthi and Maheshwari S.R., 1985, Public Administration (141h rev. ed.); Lakshmi
Narain Agarwal; Agra.
Jain L.C., Krishnamurthy B.V., and Tripathi P.M., 1985, Grass Without Roots: Rural
Development Under Government Auspicies, Sage Publications, New Delhi.
Maheshwari S.R., 1989, Indian Administration (4Ih rev, ed. and updated), Orient
Longman Limited, New Delhi.
Satyanarayana P. (ed.), 1990, Towards New Panchayati Raj, Uppal Publishing House,
New Delhi.
11
UNIT-5 LOCAL SELF GOVERNANCE: RURAL
Structure
5.1 Objectives
5.2 Introductions
5.3 Historical Background
5.4 Historical Evolution of Panchayati Raj Institutions
5.4.1 Balwant Rai Mehta Committee
5.4.2 Ashok Mehta Committee
5.5 73rd Constitutional Amendment
5.6 Structure Of Panchayati Raj System
5.6.1 Gram Panchayat
5.6.1.1 Function of Gram Panchayat
5.6.2 Panchayat Samiti
5.6.2.1 Functions of Panchayat Samiti
5.6.3 Zilla Parishad
5.6.3.1 Functions of Zilla Parishad
5.7 Summary
5.8 Exercise
5.9 Reference
5.1 OBJECTIVE
5.2 INTRODUCTION
In India, the system of village Panchayat is very old. In ancient India, the village
formed the basic unit of social and economic life in India. During the foreign rule, the
inhabitants of our country were denied all the benefits of civilized life. This tendency
has been in its naked form since the onset of the Industrial Revolution in England.
The 18th century Revolution in England bought far-reaching changes in Great Britain
in different field‗s viz., agriculture, transport, and Industry. These changes in Britain
subsequently affected the economy of the country. The village suffered the most. The
village suffered the most. The village organization as a self-sufficient unit which was
the characteristic feature of the old Indian economy disappeared. Our handicrafts and
manufactured were ruined to provide a push to British Industries. In due course of
time, agriculture became more and more an uneconomic population.
Britishers made all efforts to ruin our culture, arts and crafts, and foreign trade. The
villagers became conservative and shrewd. In this way, the condition of the rural
masses from physical-economic, social, educational, and cultural points of view
became gradually very unsatisfactory and beyond the limit of tolerance. There were
the victims of mental lethargy. Thus, in the course of a few decades a developed and
advanced country due to the imposition of certain checks, hindrances, and obstacles 3
on the smooth path of developing process in our country, lagged far behind many
other countries was put in the category of underdeveloped countries. The several
causes led to the village Panchayats during the British rule in our country. It is
13
stressed and claimed that India had a self-governing system at the base level during
the ancient time in the form of village Panchayats. The village organization then
functioned as a center of Community life independent of the state. It is, therefore,
argued that the British rule dismantled our self-governing system. Planning in a
welfare State is a social process in which every citizen has to participate says
Planning Commission. India is a land of villages and we have a lack of villages in the
country. Gandhiji used to say that India consists of villages and ultimately our
progress will be regulated by the advancement that the village people can show.
Gandhiji drew the picture of free India‗s political structure in the words, Indian
Independence must begin at the bottom. Every village should be a republic or a
Panchayat having full powers the greater the power of Panchayats, the better for the
people. (Harijan, 1946). Swaraj signified to him the vesting of the ultimate authority
in the peasant and the laborer. True democracy cannot be worked out by twenty men
sitting at the center. It has to be worked from below by the people of every village.
(Harijan, 18th Jan 1948).
The Report on the organization of Local –self Institutions (Rural and Urban) about
Planned social and economic development in India emphasized in 1951, ―A
democratic Government at the center can never function satisfactorily unless it is
supported by the democratic organization of local administration.‖ Democratic
government will never be secure unless it is so supported. Our leaders were careful,
cautious, and watchful and they realized that we may also be in\ danger of losing our
democratic government unless we take steps to afford security to our system of
Parliamentary Democracy by establishing a properly organized scheme of local-self
government.
Soon after achieving independence, the Planning Commission came into existence in
1950 and began to plan for large-scale economic and social progress. It was by then
commonly understood that actual all-around development could not be achieved until
it is backed by the development of rural areas. The Planning Commission, therefore,
thought of shaping the village development program, to attack the five giants of
hunger, poverty, disease, squalor, and ignorance through a self-help program of
Community Development in 1952. These steps were designed to secure the
involvement of rural people in the process of rural development.
The inadequate success registered by these necessitated the need for reforms. In 1954,
the Government of India established the Balwant Rai Mehta Committee for
suggesting reforms in this regard, which submitted its report in 1957. Among others,
the most important contribution of the report pertains to ‗democratic decentralisation‘
and the proposed politico-administrative system at the grassroots. The report
14
emphatically stated that ―so long as we do not discover or create a representative and
democratic institution which will supply the local interest, supervision, and care
necessary to ensure that expenditure of money upon local objects conforms with the
needs and wishes of the locality, invest it with adequate power and assign to it
appropriate finances, we will never be able to evoke local interest and excite local
initiative in the field of development.‖
Balwant Rai Mehta is widely known as the ‗Architect of Panchayati Raj‘ in India and
his birthday (19th February) is observed as Panchayat Day
In brief, the village Panchayat should be elected, with provision for the co-option of
two women members and one member each from the SC and ST communities.
Panchayat Samiti should be constituted for the area included in a block by indirect
election, that is, members of the Panchayats within the block area will elect members
of the Panchayat Samiti from amongst themselves. The Committee emphasised the
importance of a block and said, ―the block offers an area large enough for functions
which the village Panchayat cannot perform and yet small enough to attract the
interest and service of the residents.‖ The third tier was to be occupied by the Zilla
Parishad whose main function would be to achieve necessary coordination between
the Panchayat Samitis within the district. It will consist of presidents of Panchayat
Samitis, Members of Parliament and State Legislatures and district level officers of
the development departments. The Zilla Parishad would be an advisory-cum-
supervisory body, having no executive functions.
The Committee gave a broad blueprint for democratic decentralisation, and it was left
to each State to work out the structure and functional details best suited to its local
conditions. Consequently, different patterns of Panchayati Raj emerged in different
states. These recommendations were considered by the National Development
Council (NDC) in January 1958, and democratic decentralisation became a part of the
national agenda.
Panchayati Raj institutions did not take off successfully. In the 1960s, PRIs was
portrayed as a ‗God that failed‘. One of the main reasons for the failure was sabotage
by state politicians who were not enthusiastic about devolving powers to the district
level and below. State politicians were apprehensive that PRIs with real powers may
pose a threat to their power and influence. The lack of resources, absence of
15
coordination, dependence on district development staff, lack of delegation of effective
authority, domination by the upper castes, and better-off sections of society had
rendered the PRIs ineffective and purposeless as institutions of decentralisation and
development.
By the middle of the 1970‘s governments, both at the center and in the states had
become indifferent to PRI‘s, which had become defunct. Elections to these
institutions had not been held in most places, and the sitting councils were either
dissolved or suspended.
Another plausible reason seems to be the fact that by the late 1970s the Green
Revolution had become a decade old and it had given birth to a rich peasant class who
were fully aware of the importance of direct access to decentralised government
machinery, more particularly it's the delivery system. The central place of PRIs was
thus restored.
In the late seventies, another Committee chaired by Ashok Mehta was given the task
of revisiting the institutions of Panchayats and making suitable recommendations to
renew the Gandhian vision of ‗village republics‘. The Ashok Mehta Committee report
refused to accept the view that Panchayati Raj was a ‗failed God‘. The Committee
credited these institutions with starting the process of democratic decentralisation and
making the citizens more conscious of their rights than before. Among other positive
fallouts was the bridging of the gap between the bureaucratic elite and the people.
The Ashok Mehta Committee was innovative in many ways. It recognised the
importance of participation of political parties in Panchayati Raj elections to make
them more accountable and to link Panchayati Raj institutions with the national
political process. The Committee also proposed reservation of seats for both women
and weaker sections of society.
The decline of the Janata Government created a hostile climate for the
implementation of the Ashok Mehta Committee report. Despite this, the Non-
Congress State Governments of Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and West Bengal took
concrete measures to reactivate the PRIs. In Karnataka, the PRIs that came into
existence incorporated most of the recommendations made by the Mehta report.
16
While Non-Congress State Governments were busy implementing the
recommendations of the Ashok Mehta Committee, the new Congress government at
the center appointed other commissions. C.H. Hanumantharao‘s working group of
1983 and G.V.K. Rao Committee report of 1985 emphasized the need for integration
of the Panchayati Raj system with development programs and administration. The
concept paper on Panchayati Raj prepared by the L. M. Singhvi Committee Report of
19863 suggested that Panchayati Raj institutions should be closely involved in the
planning and implementation of the rural development programs. Both the Singhvi
and the Ashok Mehta Committees recommended a constitutional basis for democratic
decentralisation.
The 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution in 1992 bestowed constitutional
status on Panchayati Raj and Nagarpalika institutions. The main aim of the
Panchayati Raj system envisaged under the 73rd constitutional amendment is the
socio-economic development of rural India. Panchayati Raj has been designed to
encourage rural people to actively participate in governance, thereby inculcating a
habit of democratic living. It seeks to transform villages into self-governing and self-
sufficient units, and thus imbue a sense of self-confidence among the villagers. It
further acts as a system of education and training in the democratic process and
ensures that local needs and development are attained through local efforts.
Some of the fundamental principles of the Panchayati Raj system as envisaged in the
amendment are as follows:
The amendment added a new part IX to the Constitution consisting of 16 Articles and
the Eleventh Schedule. The Eleventh Schedule contains 29 subjects on which the
Panchayats have administrative control. We will now look at the relevant
constitutional provisions about different aspects of Panchayati Raj.
17
Structure of PRIs
Article 243A provides that the Gram Sabha may exercise such powers and perform
such functions at the village level as the State Legislature may by law provide. The
Gram Sabha is envisaged as the foundation of the Panchayati Raj system. The Gram
Sabha consists of all the residents of a village who are above 18 years of age and are
on the electoral rolls of the village.
Almost all the State Acts identify the functions of the Gram Sabha. The functions
include discussion on the annual statement of accounts, administration, and reports,
and selection of beneficiaries of anti-poverty programs. Drafting and implementation
of development plans have to be vetted and monitored by the Gram Sabha. The State
Acts of Haryana, Punjab, and Tamil Nadu gives the power of approval of the budget
to the Gram Sabha.
In the Panchayati Raj system, Gram Sabha is the only permanent unit. The tenure of a
Panchayat i.e. Mukhiya and other members is for 5 years, but the villagers do not
change! All the representatives in the PRIs are answerable and accountable to the
Gram Sabha. Further, under laws like the Panchayati Raj (Extension) Act (PESA),
Gram Sabha has been endowed with extensive powers to take decisions on all matters
affecting it directly and locally. The Gram Sabha elects the Gram Pradhan and other
members of the Gram Panchayat. Success or failure of the Panchayati Raj system
depends largely upon the strength of the Gram Sabha. We will discuss the role and
powers of the Gram Sabha in detail in the next unit of this block.
Article 243B envisages three tiers of elected Panchayats at the village level, the
intermediate level (also known as the Block or Taluka level), and finally at the district
level, and creates an organic linkage between the three. The constitution of
intermediate Panchayats is not mandatory and is dependent on the size of the
population in that state. In states having a population of fewer than twenty lakhs, the
State Government may decide not to constitute intermediate Panchayats.
The obligatory functions of the Gram Panchayat include the provision of safe
drinking water, maintenance of public wells, ponds, dispensaries, primary and
secondary schools, etc. Now they have also been assigned developmental functions
like minor irrigation schemes, rural electrification, cottage, and small industries, and
poverty alleviation programmes.
The Block level PRI institution is known by different names in different parts of the
country. For example, in Gujarat they are called Taluka Panchayat; in UP Kshetra
Samiti; and in MP Janapada Panchayat. The powers of the Panchayat Samiti include
the provision of an improved variety of seeds and fertilizers, maintenance of schools,
hospitals, roads, and implementing anti-poverty programs, and supervising the
functioning of the Gram Panchayat.
18
The Zilla Parishad is the apex body of the PRIs. It approves the budgets and
coordinates the activities of the Panchayat Samitis. It maintains educational
institutions, irrigation schemes, and undertakes programmes for the weaker sections.
Article 243C enunciates how Panchayats shall be constituted. The State Legislatures,
when identifying the territorial extents of various Panchayats within their States, as
far as may be practicable, shall ensure that all the Panchayats are similar in size.
Further, the ratio between the number of seats and the population of the Panchayat
area should be maintained as a constant. The experience of the last 15 years shows
that Panchayats covering a small area not only function better but are also more
financially viable. At the Gram Panchayat level, all the seats in a Panchayat shall be
filled in by direct election from the territorial jurisdiction of the Panchayat.
Reservation of Seats
Article 243D provides for 33 percent reservation for women in Panchayat institutions
as well as for the position of chairpersons. Rural women, who for centuries have lived
in conditions of malnutrition, illiteracy, and powerlessness, are now taking leadership
roles in addressing these very issues. This Article further provides for the reservation
of seats in these bodies for SCs and STs according to their proportion in the
population in that Panchayat.
The extent of reservation that is permissible under this provision was debated in the
case of Krishna Kumar Mishra v State of Bihar, where the following main issues
were agitated before the Patna High Court:
19
I. The constitutional validity of reservation in Panchayat elections.
II. Determination of permissible limit of reservation in Panchayat elections. After
considering these issues and interpreting various provisions of the
Constitution and the Bihar Panchayati Raj Act, the High Court held that
reservation can be made in the matter of Panchayat elections, in favor of
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Backward Classes. However, it was
clarified that the limit of such reservation cannot exceed 50% of the total
seats. The court further held that no reservation can be made against solitary
seats like that of Mukhiya of Gram Panchayat, Pramukh of a Panchayat
Samiti, or Adhyaksha of a Zilla Parishad.
Principle of Subsidiarity
Article 243C (3) enunciates the principle of subsidiarity between the various tiers of
the Panchayati Raj system. The Article provides that the State Legislatures may by
law provide for the representation of:
The Article while providing for subsidiarity mentions that the persons so represented,
shall have equal voting rights as the other members of that Panchayat.
At this level, administrative functions include (i) Preparation of annual plans for the
development of the village Panchayat; (ii) preparation of the annual budget;(iii)
mobilizing relief in natural calamities;(iv) removal of encroachment on public
properties;(v) organizing voluntary labor and contribution or community works ;(v)
maintenance of statistics of the village;(vi) any other functions entrusted by the
Panchayat Samiti, Zilla Panchayats or state or central government on an agency basis,
is most commonly found across the states. Apart from this, village defense,
information and publicity, and the constitution of Nyaya Panchayat were found in
Andhra, West Bengal, and Maharastra. In the case of developmental and social
activities, are agriculture, social forestry, animal husbandry, rural housing, education,
etc. Next is a maintenance function which includes rural electrifications, rural
sanitation, and conservation.
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5.6.2 Panchayat Samiti
The Panchayat Samiti is the intermediate tier in the PRIs of rural local government in
India. The term varies from three to five years. There is no uniformity in consisting of
a Panchayat Samiti in different states. It consists of Ex-Officio, associate, and co-
opted members. The Sarpanches of the Panchayats is an ex-officio member. Members
of State Legislatures and Parliament are also members. Women members and
members from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Panchayats are also
members. President of Panchayat Samiti can be removed from his office by a no-
confidence vote of the Panchayat Samiti passed with a special majority. President
exercises control over the Block Development Officer for implementing resolutions
of the samiti or its standing committee. He has all access to all records of the
Panchayat Samiti. He is empowered to demote, suspend or dismiss any member of
the staff whose jurisdiction is less than the whole Block.
The Panchayat Samiti is the pivot of the Panchayati Raj system of rural local
government. It is the principal executive body in all the states except Gujarat and
Maharashtra charged with the responsibility of implementing Community
Development Programmes. Besides, it also acts as an agent of the state government in
the performance of tasks that may be assigned to it. It also exercises supervision and
control over Panchayats within the jurisdiction and provides necessary technical and
financial assistance to them. It scrutinizes budgets of the Panchayats of the area under
its control and makes suggestions to them. Functions may be classified in two broad
areas: (1) provision of civic amenities and (ii) fulfillment of development functions.
22
maintenance functions, the market and fair maintenance, health, family welfare,
sanitation, and medical and cultural activities and sports were common
responsibilities of PS in many states
The Zilla Parishads constitutes the apex in the Panchayati Raj System of rural local
government in India. It is a corporate body. Membership of Zilla Parishads has been
designed in such a way as to link it, with the intermediate tier of PR, i.e., PS. ZP is an
official rather than a popular body because of its ex-officio and co-opted membership.
The Zilla Parishad‗s membership varies between forty to sixty. Urban local
governments in the districts must be represented in the ZP to enable them to view and
function in a comprehensive, intelligent, and meaningful manner. The term varies
from three to five years. The members of the ZP elect amongst themselves a president
called chairman. He exercises administrative supervision over the chief executive
officer for implementing resolutions and orders of the ZP and sends a confidential
report on the CEO to the Divisional Commissioner. The provision is made in all
statutes to remove the president by a vote of no-confidence. The ZP functions through
a network of standing committees.
In most of the states, the ZP has been assigned with the executive‗s authority,
particularly in those of planning and development, and designed to be the strongest
tier of PRIs Except in Gujarat and Maharashtra, ZP functions as a supervisory and
coordinating body. It coordinates development plans prepared by the Panchayat
Samiti, advises the state government on all matters relating to developmental
activities in the district informs the district collector and Divisional Commissioner
about irregularities, collects statistics relating to the activities of local authorities in
the district, it advises the state government on allocation of work to be done among
Panchayats and Panchayat Samitis. Normally sources of income available to ZP are
taxes, non-tax revenue, grants from State Government, etc.
Many problems hindered the success of PRIs (i) the illiteracy and conservatism of the
village people;(ii) rural local self-government have become riddled with casteism,
communalism, factionalism;(iii) benefits not reached to the common man;(iv)
dishonesty and corruption in the local bodies;(v) urbanization is another problem;(vi)
excessive government control is also responsible for the slow progress;( vii) shortage
of funds;(viii) irregular elections to these bodies.
5.7 SUMMARY
The fruit of democracy could not immediately travel to a level below that of the state
as the transfer of power from the British to Indian hands on the mid-night of the 14th
August 1947 was, in effect the handing over the keys of the administration to the
people‗s representatives at the center and the state levels. It was expected that by this
pattern state legislature will travel from the state headquarters down through the
districts and the block to the village Panchayats. In this way, there will be a complete
line-up of the millions in this country from the Gram Sabha to the Lok Sabha. the
people of India will govern themselves through their representatives in institutions
from the Panchayat to the Parliament and then democracy will travel from Lok Sabha
to Gram Sabha. ―Panchayati Raj thus reflects the new concept of inter-connected
democracy from the Gam-Sabha to the Lok Sabha. (Dey)
It can be said that India is on the threshold of a historic transition of political power to
the grassroots with all the states completing the process of enacting fresh legislation
on strengthening the PRIs on 23 rd April 1994. As many as 11 states pushed through
fresh legislation in 72 hours, some of them even in the early hours of 23 rd April 1994
to beat the stipulated deadline of 23 rd April 1994, the day Panchayats became part of
the Indian Constitution. However, the 73 rd constitutional Amendment Act does not
apply to Jammu and Kashmir, Mizoram, Nagaland, and certain scheduled areas of the
country. But mere legislative enactments do not ensure the effectiveness and viability
of the PRIs in the states. What is more important is their operationalization. So, we
will take up the state-wise assessment of the New Panchayati Raj in Action to have a
clear picture of the ground realities.
5.8 EXERCISE
24
5. Explain the structure and functions of Gram Panchayat.
6. Explain the structure and functions of Panchayat Samiti.
7. Explain the structure and functions of Zilla Parishad.
5.9 REFERENCE
Rahadive, J.D. 2005, Women in SelfHelp Groups and Panchayati Raj Institutions:
Suggesting synergetic linkages, Centre for Women's Development Studies, New
Delhi.
Saraswati S, 1988, Youth in India, Indian Council for Social Science Research, New
Delhi.
Tandon, R. and Ranjitha Mohanty (eds), 2003, Does Civil Society Matter-
Govemance on Contemporary India, New Delhi.
25
UNIT-6 LOCAL SELF GOVERNANCE: URBAN
Structure
6.1 Objective
6.2 Introduction
6.3 Urban Governance: Concept and Need
6.4 Urban Local Bodies and Municipal Governance in India
6.5 The 74th Constitution Amendment Act of 1992 and Urban Local Bodies
6.6 Municipal Legislation
6.6.1 Composition of Municipalities
6.6.2 Powers, Authority and Responsibilities of Municipalities (Article 243 W)
6.7 The Municipal Corporation – Organisational Structures
6.8 Urban Governance in India: Structural Changes and Innovations
6.9 Impediments in Improved Governance
6.10 Measures to Strengthen Urban Governance
6.11 Summary
6.12 Exercise
6.13 References
6.1 OBJECTIVE
6.2 INTRODUCTION
Governance, in modern times, has been becoming an important means for achieving
societal development objectives. Although governance improvements are perceived
differently in the developed and developing worlds, it is also becoming an area of
convergence where both developed and developing societies could learn from
experiments and make use of it for transforming respective societies. Governance is a
concept that is used in different meanings in different contexts; it varies from the
26
narrow structural definition of its management of public affairs by government
constituents i.e., legislation, executive, and judiciary, to the processes that ensure
deliveries, participation, justice, respect of rights, innovation and networking. Urban
Governance is derived from the concept of governance about urban areas to be
reflective of how the various constituents of public service delivery are organized to
increase the welfare of citizens (both current and future).
Urban Governance is derived from the concept of governance about urban areas to be
reflective of how the various constituents of public service delivery are organized to
increase the welfare of citizens (both current and future). It can only be measured
relatively, and somewhat subjectively, how effective the institutions are in terms of
the principles of sustainability, decentralization, efficiency, equity, participation,
transparency, accountability, civic engagement and citizenship, and security. It
requires a periodic strengthening of these aspects of city management to ensure
service delivery, which is considered achievable through strategies of enabling,
participation, and capacity building.
The urban or city governance definition and process are essentially those about
governance in general i.e., central to the concept of city governance are the notion
that a multitude of actors is involved in the city governance process. However,
initiatives towards better governance can come not only due to the pressures of
urbanization but also with increasing financial constraints and fragmented
responsibilities, which is making many cities realize now that only a collegiate effort
can improve the city and its competitiveness, thereby the cities can discover the
virtuous circles.
In this context, city governance is more concerned with a network of the system of
governance rather than the government, in which all sectors (public, private, and
other social organizations) and geographies (cities, regional and national) interact in
the decision making process to produce an efficient and effectively managed city as
well as promoting city at a global level. This perspective has important implications
for city strategists, planners, businesses, and real estate players, because, once
adopted, it involves all of them in a complex and networked process of decision
making that can shape and change the future of their city. The realization of this is
leading to the emergence of new networks that create new platforms for discussion
and debate on how to make the cities better governed and what resources are required
to make it happen.
It is the partnerships that need to be forged and developed to improve the overall city
governance. However, city governance can be understood not only in the static
framework of interactions but also as a dynamic interaction between these major
stakeholders and external agencies operating outside the city. Sometimes, these
27
agencies might provide a direction to the change, known as good urban governance.
In many ways, urban governments in the developing countries are a classic case for
the application of ‗good governance‘ prescription because of:
Municipal governance in India was first introduced in 1687 when the Madras
Municipal Corporation was formed, followed by the creation of the Calcutta
Municipal Corporation and the Bombay Municipal Corporation in 1726. In 1850, the
Improvements in Towns Act were passed by the Government of India that established
a system of councilors and gave them administrative authority. Subsequently, Lord
Mayo‘s Resolution of 1870 instituted the system of city municipalities and called for
the introduction of an elected president to lead them.
In 1882, Lord Ripon‘s Resolution of Local Self-Government created the outline and
structure of municipal governance in India. It introduced a two-tier system of
governance to increase governance efficiency through the decentralisation of
functions. Based on the 1918 Montague-Chelmsford Report, the Government of India
Act 1919 introduced the system of ‗Dyarchy‘, where power-sharing arrangements
between the state and the local bodies differed, but conformed to the same
organizational pattern.
The District Municipalities Act of 1920 transformed the Municipal Councils into
elected bodies and granted them powers to flesh out their budgets. Government of
India Act 1935 brought local government within the purview of the state or provincial
government and granted them enhanced powers.
29
be created either by an act of State Legislature or by an order of the executive.
Some of these agencies are Housing Board, Water Supply Undertaking,
Electricity Supply Undertakings, Urban Development Authorities, etc.
Before 1992, Indian local governments did not have a constitutional status but only a
statutory status under state law. Therefore, the governance of urban areas was directly
under the control of the state government. This changed with the enactment of the
74th Constitution Amendment Act, 1992. For the first time in the history of urban
governance, Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) were granted a constitutional position as the
third tier of government.
These bodies were given a constitutional outline for conducting regular elections,
powers, and financial devolution. The Amendment assigned local bodies the
responsibility of providing basic services.
“In many states, local bodies have become weak and ineffective on account of a
variety of reasons, including the failure to hold regular elections, prolonged
supersessions, and inadequate devolution of powers and functions. As a result,
Urban Local Bodies are not able to perform effectively as vibrant democratic units
of self-government.”
The 74th Constitution Amendment Act also sought to institute the Directive Principle
of decentralisation in the urban context. ULBs were granted powers and
responsibilities in terms of preparation of plans, implementation of development
schemes, and administration of taxes. A state-level Finance Commission was
established to review the finances of ULBs falling within its purview.
30
(Article 243W) enumerates the functional responsibilities that the municipalities are
meant to shoulder.
31
Note: *A ―large urban area‖, a ―small urban area‖ and a ―transitional area‖ are
defined as such area ―as the Governor may, having regard to the population of the
area, the density of the population therein, the revenue generated for local
administration, the percentage of employment in non-agricultural activities, the
economic importance of such other factors as the Governor may deem fit, specify by
public notification‖ (Constitutional Provisions Relating to Village Panchayats and
Municipalities in India, 1999).
Municipalities are constituted by the State governments, which specify the class to
which a municipality shall belong by the provisions of the municipal. For this
purpose, the size of the urban population is the main criterion. However, in some
States consideration is also given to other criteria, such as the location of the urban
area and the per capita income.
Urban local governments are governed by the provisions of the State municipal Acts.
Every state has its municipal Act. The State legislature is empowered by the central
government to decide on the structure, functions, and powers to be entrusted to the
local governments. Although the content and format of various State municipal Acts
are more or less uniform, there are striking differences in the provisions for
devolution of powers, functions, and funds to local governments since this is
determined by the condition of both the State and the local government. The system is
regulated by enactments passed from time to time by State legislatures. Furthermore,
municipalities possess powers to draft local bye-laws on various provisions for the
furtherance of municipal administration. This is because each urban area has its
distinct character. The bylaws are sent to the State legislature for approval. The
municipal Act is, therefore, a comprehensive guiding legal document for the local
government officials and the elected representatives, and Byelaws are framed to
further clarify the administrative procedures.
In every State, two different types of Acts are generally in use – one for the
Municipal Corporations and a common Act for the Municipal Councils and Nagar
Panchayats. In a few States where several municipal corporations exist, the legislature
has framed municipal Acts, especially for some corporations. The remaining
corporations in the State are governed by a common municipal corporations Act.
32
6.6.1 Composition of Municipalities
There have been significant changes in the composition of municipalities since their
constitution. In the ancient period, municipal administration was in the hands of the
ruling class or the ruling government and their subordinate offices and departments.
Urban citizens were not happy with the prevailing ‗centralized approach‘, which was
characterized by excessive bureaucracy. It was gradually realized that because local
governments were formed for the welfare of the urban citizens, it was necessary to
involve them. This thinking paved the way for citizen‘s participation in municipal
affairs. A select number of urban citizens are now chosen by holding elections to
municipalities. For this purpose, the municipal area is divided into several wards
delineated based on population. There is a contest for the seat/post of councilors in
municipalities among the eligible voters at the ward level. One person from each
ward is elected to the post of councilor. Elections are also held for the post of a mayor
in municipal corporations and a chairperson (also known as a president/chairman) in
municipal councils and Nagar Panchayats.
The State government departments are responsible for the organisation of municipal
elections. Besides, the State government appointed staff and persons nominated by
the State government, citizen‘s representatives have become a part of the local
government. Whereas the appointed staff is trained to handle their duties, citizens‘
representatives are more aware of the quality of life at the ward level. The effort of
the government has been on maintaining a balance in the distribution of power
between the officials and the non-officials and on establishing a democratic form of
local government. To enable wider participation in municipal affairs, seats in local
governments are reserved for some sections of the society. In addition to the
appointed, nominated and the elected functionaries, ex-officio persons are also
affiliated with the local government. A typical composition of an urban local
government is shown below:
Composition of Urban Local Governments
Type of Municipality
Category Municipal Municipal Council/
Corporation Nagar Panchayat
• Mayor; Deputy Mayor • Chairperson/President;
Elected Members • Councilors/Elected Ward Vice-President
Representatives • Councillors/Elected
Ward Representatives
• MPs • MPs
Ward Representatives • MLAs • MLAs
• MLCs • MLCs
Ex-officio Members
• Municipal Commissioner • Executive Officer
Appointed Staff
• Subordinate Staff • Subordinate Staff
Nominated Members • Selected Citizens • Selected Citizens
33
Notes:
1. Seats shall be reserved for the SCs and STs in every Municipality and the
number of seats so reserved shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same
proportion to the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in that
Municipality as the population of the SCs in the Municipal area or of the STs
in the Municipal area bears to the total population of that area and such seats
may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Municipality.
2. Not less than one-third of the total number of seats reserved under clause (1)
shall be reserved for women belonging to the SCs or as the case may be,
the STs.
3. Not less than one-third (including the number of seats reserved for women
belonging to the SCs and the STs) of the total number of seats to be filled by
direct election in every Municipality shall be reserved for women and such
seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Municipality.
4. The offices of Chairpersons in the Municipalities shall be reserved for the
SCs, the STs, and women in such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by
law, provide.
5. The reservation of seats under clauses (1) and (2) and the reservation of
offices of Chairpersons (other than the reservation for women) under clause
(4) shall cease to affect the expiration of the period specified in Article 334.
6. Nothing in this Part shall prevent the Legislature of a State from making any
provision for reservation of seats in any Municipality or offices of
Chairpersons in the Municipalities in favor of a backward class of citizens.
34
Duties of Municipalities
The basic objective of an urban local government has changed from the maintenance
of law and order in the early years to the promotion of the welfare of the community
in recent times. The State municipal Acts provide an exhaustive list of functions,
which are classified into obligatory and optional or discretionary functions. The
former has to be necessarily performed by the local government and for which
sufficient provision in the budget has to be made. Failure to perform any of these
functions may compel the State government to supersede a municipality.
Discretionary functions may be taken up depending upon the availability of funds.
Municipal functions listed in the State municipal Acts generally fall in the following
broad categories: (a) public health and sanitation; (b) medical relief; (c) public works;
(d) education; (e) development; and (f) administrative.
35
ensure that State governments give priority to at least those functions that are of
importance to every urban area. In most State municipal Acts, the list of 18 functions
has been inserted.
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law,
endow: a) the Municipalities with such powers and authority as may be necessary to
enable them to function as institutions of self-government and such law may contain
provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon Municipalities,
subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, concerning: i) the preparation
of plans for economic development and social justice; ii) the performance of
functions and the implementation of schemes as may be entrusted to them including
those about the matters listed in the Twelfth Schedule; b) the Committees with such
powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to carry out the
responsibilities conferred upon them including those
Twelfth Schedule
36
Division of Powers - Elected, Nominated, and Administrative
The 74th Constitution Amendment Act provides the outline for elected and
nominated councilors. The number of elected councilors varies according to the
population of an area. Nominated councilors are to be selected by the elected
councilors for their expertise in municipal administration. However, they are not
granted voting rights.
The 74th Constitution Amendment Act does not specify any specific organisational
structure for municipal administration in India. This is an issue for state legislation
and the structure differs from state to state.
The Ministry of Urban Development drafted a Model Municipal Law, 2003 which
was circulated to state governments. The rationale for the lack of a centrally
administered Municipal Model is that local bodies need to be flexible to respond
better to local requirements. As detailed below, two broad models are commonly in
use.
I. Commissioner system
The mayor
The Executive
The Municipal Commissioner acts as the Chief Executive Officer and head of the
executive arm of the Municipal Corporation. All executive powers are vested in the
Municipal Commissioner. The powers of the Commissioner are provided by the
statute and delegated to the Standing Committee.
This form of city governance is similar to a cabinet government and follows the
framework of state and national governments. This model consists of a Mayor and a
cabinet, with individual portfolios, chosen from among the elected councilors. The
37
Municipal Commissioner acts as the Principal under the supervision of the Mayor
who is the Chief Executive Officer.
Although the above ―model‖ structure may seem relatively simple, in reality, urban
governance is a confusing mix of multiple agencies. Some are new while others are
legacies of older regimes; some are answerable to local government while others to
state-level or even national government.
India has been experiencing several changes in the political and economic space,
which have some implications to governance and, so also, to urban governance. India
had followed a mixed economic model with the public sector leading the economy
and public spending determining the welfare of the society. There was a significant
deviation in this approach through economic policy reforms in 1991 that were
brought as a necessity to make India emerge as a strong economy in line with
competition from other countries. With this added pressure on services, in addition to
the pressures from rapid urbanization gripping the country in the 1980s, markets
emerged as an important institution in the wider allocation of resources, in their
ability to mop-up and bring-in private resources in economic activities and in
representing the needs (and aspirations) of growing consumer class in cities.
74th Constitutional Amendment Act in 1992 sought to give a new lease of life to
municipal bodies by identifying them as the third tier of urban governance. The
Amendment Act focused on devolving additional functions to the municipal bodies
and urging the state governments to assign them more taxation powers commensurate
to their additional responsibilities. These are as follows:
Most of the states have incorporated a provision in the Municipal Acts for the
devolution of power to the municipal bodies. However, the extent of functions
devolved differs from state to state. The states of Kerala, West Bengal, and Tamil
38
Nadu have assigned some additional responsibilities apart from those mentioned in
the 12th Schedule.
It is widely held in the public finance literature that the Act, however, did not address
the mobilization of resources to cover financial requirements of service provision but,
rather, exacerbated it by the addition of new functions. Yet, as noted earlier, cities
have not done enough in terms of improving governance modes and building
governance structures that can anticipate changes and prepare themselves for the
same. The capacity of many local governments to plan and manage their cities is
limited and, as a result, they are not able to meet the challenges of increasing
demands.
i. Issues in decentralization
The ULBs are financially weak, and while there is a provision to levy and collect
adequate user, charges, such provisions are not fully utilized. Many municipal bodies
are running into deficits and are heavily dependent on government grants. The state
budgetary allocations have, however, been drying up for most states, and it is being
realized that the traditional system of funding based on plan and budgetary allocations
will only reduce in the future.
Most ULBs face problems due to lack of capacity, improper staffing patterns, and
lack of standardization. They do not have the institutional, operational, educational,
and legal capability to develop commercially viable infrastructure projects, mobilize
resources for the projects, and implement them. Lack of adequate training is the main
impediment in introducing new technologies and management styles in the working
of the municipal corporations. E-governance initiatives, accounting reforms, and in
fact, even private participation all require a certain level of training of the staff on IT
systems, accounting norms, and so on.
40
iv) Insufficient public participation
The lack of transparency and accountability in the working of urban local bodies has
already been brought out in the earlier discussions on the Municipal Disclosure Law.
The main impediment towards achieving transparency and accountability is not the
lack of understanding of the need for the same but the lack of means to achieve the
same. Most ULBs are severely capacity constrained both in terms of funds and
manpower. In such a scenario, it becomes difficult to put in place systems that would
enhance accountability. The root cause of the problem of inefficient service delivery
is the capacity constraints of ULB.s.
The states should adopt standard norms for the classification of ULBs. It would be
advisable that all the municipalities should be reclassified into three categories:
Municipal Corporation for large urban areas of 5 lakh and more population;
Municipal Council for urban areas of 1 lakh to 5 lakh population and Nagar
Panchayat for towns below 1 lakh population.
There is wide variation in the functioning of ward committees across the state.
Although the legal provisions for the constitution of a Wards Committees have been
made in most of the states, the actual spirit of the Amendment is diffused. Hence, the
constitution of ward committees and their functioning needs to be incentivized.
Further, there is a need to establish area sabhas and to create the linkage between area
sabhas and ward committees to ensure that accountability and participatory processes
became a reality.
41
3) Strengthening Metropolitan Planning Committees:
The Mayors or Chairpersons of the ULBs should be accountable to people and need
to have power and tenure commensurate with this objective. The local conditions
should determine whether the cities should adopt a ―Mayor in Council‖ system or an
―Executive Mayor‖ system. Also, there is a critical need for building the capacity of
the political executive specifically in areas such as sensitization vis-à-vis the need for
reforms, service level benchmarks, etc.
Historically, due to poor staffing and technical capabilities of the Local Bodies,
several Para-Statal Bodies were created for providing services listed in the 12th
Schedule. Consequently, a large number of parastatals, including Development
Authorities, Water Supply & Sewerage Boards, Slum Housing & Development
Boards, and PWD, etc. have been performing various functions that could have been
vested with the Local Bodies by the mandate of the 74thAmendment. The multiplicity
of agencies providing various services in the Urban Sector have led to overlapping,
ambiguity, and wastage of resources. Over and above that, the parastatal bodies are
not elected Bodies and are not directly answerable to the citizens. There is a need for
activity mapping for these bodies.
The problems of megacities are admittedly complex. The large scale of interventions
required for core services such as water supply, sanitation, and roads, leads to
formidable administrative challenges. This is made more complex as trunk services
historically have not been mapped or digitized, unregulated use of vacant lands have
to lead to haphazard growth, the proliferation of slums, unauthorized construction,
and encroachment. Therefore, the challenge before the megacities is how to ensure
good municipal administration keeping in view such large complexities. There is a
need for creating a governance system for these cities.
The poor quality of urban managers is one of the major reasons for sub-optimal urban
administration. The manpower available in most of the urban local bodies is not
42
equipped with the necessary technical and planning skills to meet the growing urban
challenges. There is an urgent need for increased investment, financial management,
and audits in local bodies. Thus, the creation of a municipal cadre is essential.
An Independent Urban service Regulator is the need of the hour as the current
paradigm of service providers deciding service levels and tariff is outdated. The
regulator would monitor the provision of service as well as tariff regime and ensure
transparency and efficiency.
9) Public-Private Partnership(PPP):
PPPs which are structured around a robust revenue model (including user charges,
targeted subsidies, and viability gap funding) and offer a good prospect of a return on
investment can contribute to systemic gains and better management of urban services.
The State governments should bring out a legislative framework to address the entire
gamut of issues in the implementation of PPP Projects and develop clear policies
about the identification of projects which can be developed and implemented on a
PPP basis, delivery processes, project development, approval, and implementation
process, guiding principles of contract management, etc.
6.11 SUMMARY
43
trajectories of city growth or because they did not plan and allocate resources to do it;
even otherwise, there are inefficiencies built-in through traditional designs of
institutions of service delivery made on political and bureaucratic forces. This is
leading to government failures in service delivery, which can be addressed by
institutional innovations under partnership mode (apart from governance reforms) to
steer urban governance in the right direction. However, policy reforms are also
needed so that the right kinds of incentives prevail for nurturing new institutions.
6.12 EXERCISE
6.13 REFERENCE
Mathur M P. (2007), Impact of the Constitution (74th) Amendment Act on the urban
local bodies: a review NIUAWP 07-02 (National Institute of Urban Affairs). 2007,
Documentation of Best Practices, Delhi, NIUA.
Aijaz R. (2007), Challenges for Urban Local Governments in India Asia Research
Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
Chaubey P K. (2006), Urban Local Bodies in India: the quest for making them self-
reliant New Delhi, Indian Institute of Public Administration.
Mathur 0P. (2006), Urban Finance, India Infrastructure Report Delhi, Oxford
University Press
45