Borja v.

Borja, 46 SCRA 577

Facts:

It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October
1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-
7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In
1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de
Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the
sole administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco
de Borja allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death,
Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in
1955, she was appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco
was questioned in said proceeding.

The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been
plagued with several court suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some
eighteen (18) cases remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate of Josefa
Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to
all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963,  by and
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between "[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and
surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
Borja.

On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12 October 1963
to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August
1966, to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the
compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable. Special
administratrix Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval
(now Supreme Court G.R. case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the
order of disapproval (G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.

The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963 is not
disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1)
the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de
Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco
de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force
and effect.

In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the
Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479,
wherein the Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory
and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent
left a will, is against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana
Ongsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an
extrajudicial settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that
"(if) the decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having
been submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement
was made, those circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.

Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja
stresses that at the time it was entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision was
Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. 

Ruling:

The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent
from an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana
Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000
payable to Tasiana Ongsingco —

shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of her hereditary

share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa
Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late
Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or
Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.

This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to
the cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de
Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was
merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest,
actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation
as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is
transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or
predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777)  there is no legal bar to a
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successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share
immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the
subsequent liquidation of the estate.  Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed
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limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory character of the
contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement
that the numerous litigations between the parties (the approving order of the Rizal Court
enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and should be
dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the
character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to
avoid a multiplicity of suits.

It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja,
Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code.
Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed
independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were
not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the
Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de
Borja.
Uriarte v. CFI of Negros Occidental, 33 SCRA 252

Facts:

It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344)
alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that,
during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same
Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion the
Negros Court appointed the Philippine National Bank as special administrator on November 13,
1961 and two days later it set the date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the
requisite notices be published in accordance with law. The record discloses, however, that, for
one reason or another, the Philippine, National Bank never actually qualified as special
administrator.

On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein, filed an
opposition to the above-mentioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy
whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to this Honorable Court upon receipt
thereof," and further questioning petitioner's capacity and interest to commence the intestate
proceeding.

On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special
Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last
will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding
No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that, as
the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with
said intestate proceedings, and (2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and
interest to initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the
decedent. A copy of the Petition for Probate and of the alleged Will were attached to the Motion
to Dismiss.

It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the
Negros Court, Vicente Uriarte filed in the same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite,
Civil Case No. 6142 to obtain judgment for his compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child.
Clearly inferrable from this is that at the time he filed the action, as well as when he commenced
the aforesaid special proceeding, he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan
Uriarte y Goite. Up to this time, no final judgment to that effect appears to have been rendered.

The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros Court has not gone
farther than the appointment of a special administrator in the person of the Philippine National
Bank who, as stated heretofore, failed to qualify.

Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special proceeding pending before the
Negros Court filed by Higinio Uriarte were attached a copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte
y Goite and of the petition filed with the Manila Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore, that
almost from the start of Special Proceeding No. 6344, the Negros Court and petitioner Vicente
Uriarte knew of the existence of the aforesaid last will and of the proceedings for its probate.
Issue:

(a) whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the
one hand, and on the other

Ruling:

Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident alien — like the deceased
Juan Uriarte y Goite — the Courts of First Instance in provinces where the deceased left any
property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of First Instance are the Negros and
the Manila Courts — province and city where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable
properties. From this premise petitioner argues that, as the Negros Court had first taken
cognizance of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of said decedent (Special
Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special
Proceeding No. 51396 intended to settle the estate of the same decedent in accordance with his
alleged will, and that consequently, the first court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No.
6344, while the second court similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396.

It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a
deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance
with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally
true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the
course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found it hat the
decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate
proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being
required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor
subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the
alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As
already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy
priority over intestate proceedings.
Cagro v. Cagro, 92 Phil. 1032

Facts:

The main objection insisted upon by the appellant in that the will is fatally defective, because its
attestation clause is not signed by the attesting witnesses. There is no question that the
signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause,
although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.

Ruling:

We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause is
'a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will' required by law to be made by the
attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause
cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the
bottom thereof negatives their participation.

The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand
margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation
clause. This is untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that
the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by
the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such
clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the
witnesses.

Vicente Cagro died on Feb. 14, 1949 in Samar. Since the decedent allegedly made a
will prior to his death, the will was probated before the CFI of Samar. However, the
oppositors-appellant objected the probate proceeding alleging that the will is
fatally defective because its attestation clause is not signed by the attesting witnesses.
It is undisputed that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at
the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed
by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.
Vda. De Baluyot v. Luciano, L-42215, July 13, 1976

Facts:

Sotero Baluyut, a resident of 59 Quezon Boulevard Extension Quezon City, died at the age of
eighty-six years, leaving an estate allegedly valued at not less than two million pesos. He was
survived by Encarnacion Lopez, his seventy-five-year old widow.

Soon after Sotero Baluyut's death, his alleged nephew, Alfredo G. Baluyut, exerted efforts to
control the decedent's estate. Assisting him in the attainment of that goal were the widow's
sisters, Cristeta Lopez Vda. de la Cuesta and Guadalupe Lopez Viray. Their antagonists were
the widow and her ally, Jose G. Espino an alleged natural child of Sotero Baluyut.

On February, 20, 1975, or forty-five days after Sotero Baluyut's demise, Alfredo filed a petition in
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the settlement of the decedent's estate. He alleged
that Mrs. Baluyut was mentally incapable of administering her affairs and the decedent's estate
or of acting as executrix of his will, if any. He prayed that, after hearing, he be appointed
administrator and, in the meantime, special administrator.

He alleged that due to a head injury she "has suffered impairment of her mental faculties" and
that "she is no longer competent, physically and mentally", to manage her affairs. He claimed
that he was able, qualified and ready to act as her guardian. Evidently, Alfredo sought to
immobilize Mrs. Baluyut and prevent her from administering the decedent's estate, supposely a
conjugal estate (Special Proceeding No. Q-00925).

After the petition was partially heard, Mrs. Baluyut learned of the guardianship proceeding. She
filed a verified opposition wherein she denied the allegations regarding her alleged mental
incompetency. 

She alleged that the petition was filed after Alfredo's attempts to get possession of the
decedent's estate were aborted and after Mrs. Baluyut's residence was ransacked on February
12, resulting in the loss of important papers and cash of not less than one hundred thousand
pesos.

She alleged that the documents being used by Alfredo against her were "the product not only of
an illegal seizure but of a plain and simple robbery"; that the filing of the petition was "an act of
disrespect to the deceased", since Alfredo and his cohorts were "cuddled and reared" by the
spouses Sotero Baluyut and Encarnacion Lopez; that there could be no justice in declaring her
an incompetent just to enable Alfredo to take her properties, and that Because of the malicious
petition she suffered sleepless nights and serious anxiety.

Issue:

(1) whether the resolution in the guardianship proceeding of the question as to Mrs.
Baluyut's alleged incompetency should await the adjudication in the administrative
proceeding (pending in the probate court) of the issue as to her competency to act as
administratrix
Ruling:

The probate court appointed her as administratrix after finding that she was sui juris or was still
in possession of her capacidad de obrar o capacidad de ejercicio. In fact, she qualified as
administratrix on November 29, 1975. This Court in Baluyut vs. Judge Paño, supra, set aside
that appointment, not because Mrs. Baluyut was an incompetent but because that adequate
opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.

We hold that in consonance with the last sentence of section 29-A of the charter of Quezon City
the guardianship proceedings should be suspended and should await the adjudication await the
adjudication of the issue as to Mrs. Baluyut's competency to act as administratrix.

It is true, as observed by Justices Barredo and Antonio during the deliberation on this case, that
the incompetency to act as executor or administrator cannot be equated with the incompetency
that justifies the placing of a person under guardianship. From the fact that a person may be
incompetent to act as executor or administrator, it does not follow that he could be placed under
guardianship. But if a person is competent to act as executor or administrator, then he is not the
incompetent person envisaged in the law of guardianship.

Section 29-A in divesting the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of jurisdiction or authority to
resolve questions already in issue as an incident in any case pending in the ordinary court has a
salutary purpose. That provision or exception is designed to obviate the rendition of conflicting
rulings on the same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court.

The lower court, upon being apprised of the foregoing conclusion of the probate judge, should
have at least tried to take judicial notice of what was happening in the administration proceeding.
The voice of prudence should have cautioned the guardianship court to avoid the issuance of a
declaration contracting the probate court's pronouncement on Mrs. Baluyut's capacity to act.

Here, we have the sorry spectacle of two court of Quezon City making divergent findings on Mrs.
Baluyut's capacity to act (Art. 37, Civil Code). What the guardianship court did (as the saying
goes) was to take the second step before having taken the first step. It declared Mrs. Baluyut as
an incompetent and then scheduled the cross-examination of the psychiatrist so that the parties
could ascertain whether the declaration of incompetency is correct or not.

In the nature of things, the guardianship court should have first set for hearing the psychiatrist's
report and examined Mrs. Baluyut before prematurely adjudging that she is an incompetent. Its
hasty and premature pronouncement, with its derogatory implications, was not the offspring of
fundamental fairness which is the essence of due process.

Moreover, the lower court should have adhered strictly to the procedure laid down in Rule 93 of
the Rules of Court for appointment of guardians. Rule 93 provides that after the filing of the
petition, the court should fix a time and place for hearing and give the proper notices. At the
hearing, "the alleged incompetent must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown that
the required notice has been given. Thereupon, the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in
support of their respective allegations" (Sec. 5, Rule 93).

In the instant case, the lower court before hearing the evidence of the parties, particularly Mrs.
Baluyutm immediately subjected her to a psychiatric examination. That unorthodox procedure
was not warranted. Undoubtedly, the lower court could consult a psychiatrist but the normal
procedure is to hear first the evidence of the parties and examine the prospective ward. The
testimony of the alleged incompetent himself has peculiar cogency in the determination of
whether he should be placed under guardianship (22 ALR 2nd 762).