1. Velasquez v. People, G.R. No.

195021, March 15 2017

G.R. No. 195021

NICOLAS VELASQUEZ and VICTOR VELASQUEZ, Petitioners

vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

An accused who pleads a justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code1 admits to the commission of acts, which would
otherwise engender criminal liability. However, he asserts that he is justified in committing the acts. In the process of proving a justifying
circumstance, the accused risks admitting the imputed acts, which may justify the existence of an offense were it not for the exculpating facts.
Conviction follows if the evidence for the accused fails to prove the existence of justifying circumstances.

Through this Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the accused petitioners pray that the assailed March 17,
2010 Decision3 and December 10, 2010 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31333 be reversed and set aside, and that they
be absolved of any criminal liability.

The Court of Appeals' assailed rulings sustained the July 25, 2007 Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, which found
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted murder.

In an Information, petitioners Nicolas Velasquez (Nicolas) and Victor Velasquez (Victor), along with four (4) others -Felix Caballeda (Felix),
Jojo Del Mundo (Jojo), Sonny Boy Velasquez (Sonny), and Ampong Ocumen (Ampong) - were charged with attempted murder under Article
248,6 in relation to Article 6,7 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:

That on May 24, 2003 in the evening at Brgy. Palua, Mangaldan, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused while armed with stones and wooden poles, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with
treachery and abuse of superior strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, maul and hit JESUS DEL MUNDO
inflicting upon him injuries in the vital parts of his body, the said accused having thus commenced a felony directly by overt acts, but did not
perform all the acts of execution which could have produced the crime of Murder but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some causes or
accident other than their own spontaneous desistance to his damage and prejudice.

Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Article 6 and 50 of the Revised Penal Code.8

All accused, except Ampong, who remained at large, pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.9 Trial then ensued.10

According to the prosecution, on May 24, 2003, at about 10:00 p.m., the spouses Jesus and Ana Del Mundo (Del Mundo Spouses) left their
home to sleep in their nipa hut, which was about 100 meters away. 11 Arriving at the nipa hut, the Del Mundo Spouses saw Ampong and Nora
Castillo (Nora) in the midst of having sex.12 Aghast at what he perceived to be a defilement of his property, Jesus Del Mundo (Jesus) shouted
invectives at Ampong and Nora, who both scampered away. 13 Jesus decided to pursue Ampong and Nora, while Ana Del Mundo (Ana) left to
fetch their son, who was then elsewhere. 14 Jesus went to the house of Ampong's aunt, but neither Ampong nor Nora was there. 15 He began
making his way back home when he was blocked by Ampong and his fellow accused.16

Without provocation, petitioner Nicolas hit the left side of Jesus' forehead with a stone. Petitioner Victor also hit Jesus' left eyebrow with a
stone.17 Accused Felix did the same, hitting Jesus above his left ear. 18 Accused Sonny struck Jesus with a bamboo, hitting him at the back, below
his right shoulder.19 Ampong punched Jesus on his left cheek. The accused then left Jesus on the ground, bloodied. Jesus crawled and hid behind
blades of grass, fearing that the accused might return. He then got up and staggered his way back to their house.20

Jesus testified on his own ordeal. In support of his version of the events, the prosecution also presented the testimony of Maria Teresita Viado
(Maria Teresita). Maria Teresita was initially approached by Jesus' wife, Ana, when Jesus failed to immediately return home.21 She and Ana
embarked on a search for Jesus but were separated.22 At the sound of a man being beaten, she hid behind some bamboos.23 From that vantage
point, she saw the accused mauling Jesus.24 The prosecution noted that about four (4) or five (5) meters away was a lamp post, which illuminated
the scene.25

At the Del Mundo Spouses' residence, Maria Teresita recounted to them what she had witnessed (Jesus had managed to return home by
then).26 Ana and Maria Teresita then brought Jesus to Barangay Captain Pili ta Villanueva, who assisted them in bringing Jesus to the hospital.27

After undergoing an x-ray examination, Jesus was found to have sustained a crack in his skull.28 Dr. Jose D. De Guzman (Dr. De Guzman)
issued a medico-legal certificate indicating the following findings:
x.x. Positive Alcoholic Breath

3 ems lacerated wound fronto-parietal area left

1 cm lacerated wound frontal area left

Abrasion back left multi linear approximately 20 cm

Abrasion shoulder left, confluent 4x10 cm

Depressed skull fracture parietal area left.

x.x.29

Dr. De Guzman noted that Jesus' injuries required medical attention for four (4) to six (6) weeks. 30 Jesus was also advised to undergo
surgery.31 He was, however, unable to avail of the required medical procedure due to shortage of funds.32

The defense offered a different version of events.

According to the accused, in the evening of May 24, 2003, petitioner Nicolas was roused in his sleep by his wife, Mercedes Velasquez
(Mercedes), as the nearby house of petitioner Victor was being stoned.33

Nicolas made his way to Victor's place, where he saw Jesus hacking Victor's door. Several neighbors - the other accused - allegedly tried to
pacify Jesus.34 Jesus, who was supposedly inebriated, vented his ire upon Nicolas and the other accused, as well as on Mercedes. 35 The accused
thus responded and countered Jesus' attacks, leading to his injuries.36

In its July 25, 2007 Decision,37 the Regional Tnal Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City found petitioners and Felix Caballeda guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted murder.38 The court also found Sonny Boy Velasquez guilty beyond reasorable doubt of less serious physical
injuries.39 He was found to have hit Jesus on the back with a bamboo rod. Jojo Del Mundo was acquitted. 40 The case was archived with respect to
Ampong, as he remained at large.41

The dispositive portion of its Decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused NICOLAS VELASQUEZ, VICTOR VELASQUEZ and
FELIX CABALLEDA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to
Art.ides 6, paragraph 3 and 51 of the Revised Penal Code, and pursuant to the law, sentences each of them to suffer on (sic) indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and one (1) day of Arrested (sic) Mayor in its maximum period as minimum to eight (8) years of Prison (sic)
Correctional (sic) in its maximum period to Prison (sic) Mayor in its medium period as maximum and to pay proportionately to private
complainant Jesus del Mundo the amount of Php55,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the cost of suit.

The Court likewise finds the accused SONNY BOY VELASQUEZ [guilty] beyond reasonable doubt of the [crime] of Less Serious Physical
Injuries defined and penalized under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code and pursuant thereto, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Arresto Mayor on one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.

Accused JOJO DEL MUNDO is hereby acquitted on the ground of absence of evidence.

With respect to accused AMPONG OCUMEN, the case against him is archived without prejudice to its revival as soon as he is arrested and
brought to the jurisdiction of this Court.42

Petitioners and Felix Caballeda filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Regional Trial Court denied.43

On petitioners' and Caballeda's appeal, the Court of Appeals found that petitioners and Caballeda were only liable for serious physical injuries
because "first, intent to kill was not attendant inasmuch as the accused-appellants, despite their superiority in numbers and strength, left the
victim alive and, second, none of [the] injuries or wounds inflicted upon the victim was fatal."44 The Court of Appeals thus modified the sentence
imposed on petitioners and Caballeda.

The dispositive portion of its assailed March 1 7, 2010 Decision45 read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the July 25, 2007 Decision of Branch 41, Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City is
hereby MODIFIED. Instead, accused-appellants are found guilty of Serious Physical Injuries and each of them is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisi6n correccional as maximum.
SO ORDERED.46 (Emphasis in the original)

Following the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed the present Petition.47 They insist on their version of events,
particularly on how they and their co-accused allegedly merely acted in response to Jesus Del Mundo's aggressive behavior.

For resolution is the issue of whether petitioners may be held criminally liable for the physical harm inflicted on Jesus Del Mundo. More
specifically, this Court is asked to determine whether there was sufficient evidence: first, to prove that justifying circumstances existed, and
second, to convict the petitioners.

Petitioners' defense centers on their claim that they acted in defense of themselves, and also in defense of Mercedes, Nicolas' wife and Victor's
mother. Thus, they invoke the first and second justifying circumstances under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 11. Justifying Circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters,
or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second
requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person
attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.

A person invoking self-defense (or defense of a relative) admits to having inflicted harm upon another person - a potential criminal act under
Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons) of the Revised Penal Code. However, he or she makes the additional, defensive contention that even as he
or she may have inflicted harm, he or she nevertheless incurred no criminal liability as the looming danger upon his or her own person (or that of
his or her relative) justified the infliction of protective harm to an erstwhile aggressor.

The accused's admission enables the prosecution to dispense with discharging its burden of proving that the accused performed acts, which
would otherwise be the basis of criminal liability. All that remains to be established is whether the accused were justified in acting as he or she
did. To this end, the accused's case must rise on its own merits:

It is settled that when an accused admits [harming] the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the
burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he [harmed]
the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely
doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.48

To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must establish: "(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-
defense."49 Defense of a relative under Article 11 (2) of the Revised Penal Code requires the same first two (2) requisites as self-defense and, in
lieu of the third "in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein."50

The first requisite - unlawful aggression - is the condition sine qua non of self-defense and defense of a relative:

At the heart of the claim of self-defense is the presence of an unlawful aggression committed against appellant. Without unlawful aggression,
self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are
present. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claiming self-defense.51

The second requisite - reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression - requires a reasonable proportionality
between the unlawful aggression and the defensive response: "[t]he means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational
equivalence between the means of attack and the defense."52 This is a matter that depends on the circumstances:

Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law
requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the
person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not
depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury ... As WE stated in the case of People vs. Lara, in emergencies of
this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent
that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and hold the act irresponsible in law for the
consequences.53 (Citations omitted)

The third requisite - lack of sufficient provocation - requires the person mounting a defense to be reasonably blameless. He or she must not have
antagonized or incited the attacker into launching an assault. This also requires a consideration of proportionality. As explained in People v.
Boholst-Caballero,54 "[p]rovocation is sufficient when it is proportionate to the aggression, that is, adequate enough to impel one to attack the
person claiming self-defense."55

II

We find petitioners' claims of self-defense and defense of their relative, Mercedes, to be sorely wanting.

Petitioners' entire defense rests on proof that it was Jesus who initiated an assault by barging into the premises of petitioners' residences, hacking
Victor's door, and threatening physical harm upon petitioners and their companions. That is, that unlawful aggression originated from Jesus.

Contrary to what a successful averment of self-defense or defense of a relative requires, petitioners offered nothing more than a self-serving,
uncorroborated claim that Jesus appeared out of nowhere to go berserk in the vicinity of their homes. They failed to present independent and
credible proof to back up their assertions. The Regional Trial Court noted that it was highly dubious that Jesus would go all the way to
petitioners' residences to initiate an attack for no apparent reason.56

The remainder of petitioners' recollection of events strains credulity. They claim that Jesus launched an assault despite the presence of at least
seven (7) antagonists: petitioners, Mercedes, and the four (4) other accused. They further assert that Jesus persisted on his assault despite being
outnumbered, and also despite their and their co-accused's bodily efforts to restrain Jesus. His persistence was supposedly so likely to harm them
that, to neutralize him, they had no other recourse but to hit him on the head with stones for at least three (3) times, and to hit him on the back
with a bamboo rod, aside from dealing him with less severe blows.57

As the Regional Trial Court noted, however:

The Court takes judicial notice of (the) big difference in the physical built of the private complainant and accused Victor Velasquez, Sonny Boy
Velasquez, Felix Caballeda and Jojo del Mundo, private complainant is shorter in height and of smaller built than all the accused.

The said accused could have had easily held the private complainant, who was heavily drunk as they claim, and disarmed him without the need
of hitting him.58

The injuries which Jesus were reported to have sustained speak volumes:

3 ems lacerated wound fronto-parietal area left

1 cm lacerated wound frontal area left

Abrasion back left multi linear approximately 20 cm

Abrasion shoulder left, confluent 4x 10 cm

Depressed skull fracture parietal area left.59

Even if it were to be granted that Jesus was the initial aggressor, the beating dealt to him by petitioners and their co-accused was still glaringly in
excess of what would have sufficed to neutralize him. It was far from a reasonably necessary means to repel his supposed aggression. Petitioners
thereby fail in satisfying the second requisite of self-defense and of defense of a relative.

III

In addition to their tale of self-defense, petitioners insist that the testimony of Maria Teresita is not worthy of trust because she parted ways with
Ana while searching for Jesus.60 They characterize Maria Teresita as the prosecution's "lone eyewitness."61 They make it appear that its entire
case hinges on her. Thus, they theorize that with the shattering of her credibility comes the complete and utter ruin of the prosecution's
case.62 Petitioners claim that Maria Teresita is the prosecution's lone eyewitness at the same time that they acknowledge Jesus' testimony, which
they dismissed as laden with inconsistencies.63

These contentions no longer merit consideration.

Petitioners' averment of justifying circumstances was dispensed with the need for even passing upon their assertions against Maria Teresita's and
Jesus' testimonies.1âwphi1 Upon their mere invocation of self-defense and defense of a relative, they relieved the prosecution of its burden of
proving the acts constitutive of the offense. They took upon themselves the burden of establishing their innocence, and cast their lot on their
capacity to prove their own affirmative allegations.1âwphi1 Unfortunately for them, they failed.

Even if we were to extend them a measure of consideration, their contentions fail to impress.

Petitioners' primordial characterization of Maria Teresita as the "lone eyewitness," upon whose testimony the prosecution's case was to rise or
fall, is plainly erroneous. Apart from her, Jesus testified about his own experience of being mauled by petitioners and their co-accused. Maria
Teresita's testimony was only in support of what Jesus recounted.

Moreover, we fail to see how the mere fact of Maria Teresita's having parted ways with Ana while searching for Jesus diminishes her credibility.
No extraordinary explanation is necessary for this. Their having proceeded separately may be accounted for simply by the wisdom of how
independent searches enabled them to cover more ground in less time.

Regarding Jesus' recollection of events, petitioners' contention centers on Jesus' supposedly flawed recollection of who among the six (6)
accused dealt him, which specific blow, and using which specific weapon. 64 These contentions are too trivial to even warrant an independent,
point by point audit by this Court.

Jurisprudence is replete with clarifications that a witness' recollection of crime need not be foolproof: "Witnesses cannot be expected to recollect
with exactitude every minute detail of an event. This is especially true when the witnesses testify as to facts which transpired in rapid succession,
attended by flurry and excitement."65 This is especially true of a victim's recollection of his or her own harrowing ordeal. One who has
undergone a horrifying and traumatic experience "cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account" 66 of every
minutiae.

Certainly, Jesus' supposed inconsistencies on the intricacies of who struck him which specific blow can be forgiven. The merit of Jesus'
testimony does not depend on whether he has an extraordinary memory despite being hit on the head multiple times. Rather, it is in his credible
narration of his entire ordeal, and how petitioners and their co-accused were its authors. On this, his testimony was unequivocal.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31333 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 2. People v. Regalario, G.R. No. 174483, March 31 2009

G.R. No. 174483               March 31, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RAMON REGALARIO, MARCIANO REGALARIO, SOTERO REGALARIO, BIENVENIDO REGALARIO and NOEL
REGALARIO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For automatic review is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 01556 which affirmed with modification, an earlier
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, Branch 13 in Criminal Case No. 3613, finding accused-appellants Ramon, Marciano,
Sotero, Bienvenido and Noel, all surnamed Regalario guilty of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00, and another sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay
the costs of the proceedings.

In the court of origin, accused-appellants Ramon, Marciano, Sotero, Bienvenido and Noel were originally charged with Homicide. However,
after reinvestigation of the case, the Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, Legaspi City, consisting of State Prosecutors Romulo SJ
Tolentino, Mary May B. De Leoz and Elmer M. Lanuzo filed an amended information3 charging the accused-appellants with murder, committed
as follows:

That on February 22, 1997 at about 11:00 in the evening, at Brgy. Natasan, Municipality of Libon, province of Albay, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to kill, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with cruelty, treachery, abuse of superior strength, nighttime attack, assault, strike and hit
ROLANDO SEVILLA with wooden clubs (bahi) used as their night sticks, hitting the latter at the different parts of his body and tying down his
hands and feet with a rope, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal wounds which directly caused his death, to the damage and
prejudice of his legal heirs.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

On October 9, 1998, accused-appellants, duly assisted by their counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense charged. 4 Thereafter, trial
ensued.

The prosecution presented the following as its witnesses: Zaldy Siglos, Nancy Sara, Ryan Sara, Armando Cabais Poblete, Ronnie Siglos,
Cynthia Sevilla, Norma Torres, Policeman Jose Gregorio, Cenen Talagtag, Cesar Sazon and Dr. Mario Cerillo, while Antonio Relato and
Nicanor Regonia testified on rebuttal. Nancy Sara, Cynthia Sevilla and Ryan Sara were presented for a second time also as rebuttal witnesses.

On their part, accused-appellants took the witness stand. All raised the defense of denial except for Ramon who admitted the act charged but
claimed self-defense. To corroborate their defense, Jose Poblete and Adonis Velasco were presented. The defense also presented Senior Police
Officer 2 (SPO2) Jimmy Colisao, Harold Reolo, Ma. Julieta Razonable, and Dr. Leopoldo Barrosa II.

On August 24, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision 5 giving full faith and credit to the prosecution’s evidence. It ruled out accused-appellant
Ramon Regalario’s claim of self defense, and held that there was conspiracy among the accused-appellants in the commission of the crime as
shown in the manner in which all of them inflicted the wounds on the victim’s body. It further ruled that the killing was qualified to murder by
abuse of superior strength and by their scoffing at the body of the victim. It also appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. The pertinent dispositive portion of the said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding Ramon, Sotero, Bienvenido, Marciano and Noel, all surnamed Regalario, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Par. 1, of Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the aggravating circumstance of
scoffing at the corpse of the victim. However, accused are entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender which
offset the aggravating circumstance of scoffing at his corpse, hence, are hereby sentenced to suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua together
with the accessory penalties provided for by law.

The accused are hereby ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the late Rolando Sevilla the amount of ₱50,000.00 and another
sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 2-92 the ₱200,000.00 bail bond put up by accused Marciano Regalario is hereby
cancelled and is ordered recommitted to jail.
SO ORDERED.

The record of this case was forwarded to this Court for automatic review, in view of the penalty imposed.

In our Resolution6 of August 13, 2001, We accepted the appeal and directed the Chief of the Judicial Records Office, to send notices to the
parties to file their respective briefs. The Court also required the Jail Warden, Municipal Jail, Polangui, Albay to transfer accused-appellants to
the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, and make a report of such transfer within ten (10) days from notice. Likewise, the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections was required to confirm the detention of accused-appellants. Accused-appellants filed their Appellants’ Brief7 on
December 4, 2001, while the People, thru the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Appellee's Brief8 on July 30, 2002.

Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo 9 which modified the provisions of the Rules of Court insofar as they provide for direct
appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this
case was referred for appropriate action and disposition to the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 01556.

The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General, as follows:

Accused-appellants, all surnamed Regalario, are barangay officials of Natasan, Libon, Albay and related to one another by consanguinity.
Marciano, barangay chairman, Sotero, barangay kagawad and Ramon, barangay tanod, are brothers while Bienvenido Regalario, also barangay
tanod, is their cousin and Noel is the son of Marciano. (TSN, November 16, 1998, p. 9; RTC Order dated October 9, 1998, pp. 115-117)

On the night of February 22, 1997, a dance and singing contest was being held in the barangay pavilion of Natasan, Libon, Albay. At around ten
o’clock that evening, Rolando Sevilla and Armando Poblete were enjoying the festivities when appellant Sotero Regalario approached them
(TSN, December 7, 1998, p.4). To avoid trouble, the two distanced themselves from Sotero. Nevertheless, a commotion ensued. (ibid., p. 5).
Appellants Sotero and Bienvenido Regalario were seen striking Rolando Sevilla several times with their respective nightsticks, locally known as
bahi. (TSN, November 16, 1998, pp. 13-17, 32, 34, 36-37). The blows caused Sevilla to fall down in a sitting position but after a short while he
was able to get up (ibid., pp. 16-17). He ran away in the direction of the house of appellant Mariano Regalario, the barangay captain (ibid., pp.
18-38). Bienvenido and Sotero Regalario chased Sevilla (ibid., p. 38, TSN, December 7, 1998. p. 6). When Sevilla was already near Marciano’s
house, he was waylaid by appellant Ramon Regalario and at this point, Marciano Regalario and his son Noel Regalario came out of their house
(TSN, December 7, 1998, pp. 7-9 and 35). Noel was carrying a seven-inch knife. The five appellants caught the victim in front of Marciano’s
house. Armed with their nightsticks, they took turns in hitting the victim until he slumped to the ground face down (ibid., pp. 8, 35 and 38). In
that position, Sevilla was boxed by Marciano in the jaw. After a while, when Sevilla was no longer moving, Marciano first ordered the others to
kill the victim and to tie him up (ibid., pp. 36-37). Upon hearing the order, Bienvenido, with the help of Sotero, tied the neck, hands and feet of
the victim with a nylon rope used by farmers for tying carabao. The rest of the group just stood by watching. (ibid., pp. 37-38).

In the early morning of February 23, 1997, Cynthia Sevilla, the victim’s widow, after she was informed of her husband’s death, went to the
poblacion of Libon to report the incident at the town’s police station (TSN, December 8, 1998, pp. 7-8). However, her statements were not
entered in the police blotter because appellant Marciano Regalario had earlier reported to them, at two o’clock in the morning, a different version
of the incident, i.e., it was the victim Sevilla who shot Marciano’s brother Ramon and that Sevilla, allegedly still alive, was placed under the
custody of the barangay tanods. (ibid., p. 7; TSN, November 20, 1998 [A.M. Session], pp. 9-10). At around eight o’clock of the same morning,
SPO4 Jose Gregorio, with some other police officers and Cynthia Sevilla, left the police station on board a truck and proceeded to the crime
scene in Natasan. SPO4 Gregorio conducted an investigation of the incident. (TSN, November 20, 1998 [A.M. Session], pp. 10-12). Thereafter,
the policemen took the victim’s cadaver to the police station in the poblacion (ibid., p. 26) where pictures were taken showing the victim’s hands
and legs tied behind him [Exhibits ‘C’ and ‘D’] (ibid., pp. 14-15; TSN, December 8, 1998, p. 10; TSN, November 20, 1998 [P.M. Session], pp 5-
7). On that same day, SPO4 Gregorio requested the Libon’s Rural Health Unit to conduct an autopsy on the victim’s body but since the
municipal health officer was not around, it was only performed the next day, February 24 (TSN, November 20, 1998 [A.M. Session], p. 26;
TSN, December 8, 1998, pp. 10-11; TSN, November 20, 1998 [P.M. Session], p. 11). After Dr. Mario Cerillo, Municipal Health Officer of
Libon conducted the autopsy, he forthwith issued a Medico-Legal Report dated February 24, 1997 (Exhibit ‘B’), the pertinent portions of which
read:

Findings:

Head : Lacerated wound 4 cm

frontal area, Right.

: Lacerated wound 8 cm.

occipital area, Right.

: Lacerated wound 4 cm.

with fractured skull

(post auricular area),

Right.

: Abrasion 4 x 2 cm.

eyebrow, Right.

: Abrasion 2 cm. x 1 cm.

with lacerated wound

1 cm. eyebrow, Left.

: Periorbital Hematoma

Left and Right eye.

: Lacerated wound 1 cm.

lower lip, Left.

Neck : Stab wound 2 cm.

penetrating lateral base

of the neck just above

the clavicle, Right.

: Stab wound 2 cm., 6 cm.

depth lateral base of the

neck just above the

clavicle, Right.

Trunk : Hematoma 10 x 8 cm.

clavicular area, Right.

: Multiple abrasion chest

: Contusion 7 x 2 cm.,

7th Intercorsal space and

clavicular line, left.

Extremities : Multiple abrasion and

contusion on both Right

and Left arm and forearm.

: Abrasion (Ropemark)

around Right and Left wrist.

: Abrasion (Ropemark) around

 distal 3rd of both Right and

Left leg.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

Cause of Death:

Sever blood loss secondary to stab wound and multiple lacerated wound, probably secondary to intracranial hemorrhage.

On the witness stand, Dr. Cerillo opined that the victim’s lacerated wounds could have been caused by a blunt instrument like a hard stick, a
stone or iron bar, his stab wounds by a sharp-edged instrument or knife, his contusions and hematoma by a fist blow or through contact with a
blunt instrument. Also according to the physician, the sharp object which caused the victim’s stab wounds could have been a knife 2 cm. wide
and 6 cm. long because they were clean cut wounds. (TSN, November 20, 1998 [P.M. Session], pp. 14-15).10

On the other hand, the accused-appellants’ Brief presents a different story:

At the time of the incident in question, accused Marciano Regalario was the incumbent barangay captain of Natasan, Libon, Albay. Accused
Sotero was a kagawad, while Ramon and Bienvenido were barangay tanods of the same place. Noel Regalario had no public position. He is the
son of one of the other accused.

On the night of February 22, 1997, a public dance and singing contest was held in their barangay. Naturally, being barangay officials, the
accused, (except Noel who is not an official and whose wife has just given birth) were at the place of the celebration, discharging their peace-
keeping duties. They were posted at different places in that vicinity.

At first, a fire broke out in the toilet of the Day Care Center. It was attended to by the persons assigned in that area. A while later, there was
another commotion in the area assigned to accused Ramon Regalario. When he approached the group where the disturbance was taking place
and tried to investigate, Rolando Sevilla suddenly emerged from the group and without any ado, fired a shot at him. He was hit at the left
shoulder. Instinctively, and in order to disable Sevilla from firing more shots, which might prove fatal, he struck his assailant with his nightstick
and hit him at the back of his head. This is the blow which Nancy Sara and Zaldy Siglos said were delivered by Sotero and Bienvenido. This
blow caused Sevilla to reel backward and lean on the bamboo fence. To prevent Sevilla from regaining his balance, Ramon pressed his counter-
attack by continuing to harass him with blows of his nightstick. As Ramon pressed on forward, Sevilla retreated backward. Ramon kept him
busy parrying the blows which hit his arms and front part of the body, as they were face to face with each other. But even in the course of such
harassment, Sevilla was able to fire a second shot which missed Ramon.

When they reached the end of the road pavement, Sevilla lost his footing on edge of the pavement and fell down. At that juncture, Sotero arrived
and shouted to Ramon to stop beating Rolando. But Ramon told him that Rolando still had the gun. So, Sotero plunged at Rolando and they
wrestled on the ground for the possession of the gun. As they struggled, the gun went off but no one was hurt. When Rolando raised his arms to
move the gun away from Sotero, Ramon knocked the gun off his hand and it fell near the place where Jose Poblete was standing. Poblete just
arrived at the scene along with Marciano Regalario who was already told that his brother Ramon was shot by Sevilla. Poblete picked up the gun.
He was instructed by Marciano to keep it until it is turned over to the authorities.

The wounded Ramon Regalario was brought to town for treatment and later to the provincial hospital. Marciano and Sotero proceeded to the
police station to report the shooting of Ramon.

Bienvenido Regalario, the barangay tanod, arrived at the scene after the fact. He was instructed by Marciano, the barangay captain to effect the
arrest of Rolando Sevilla for the crime of shooting Ramon. According to Bienvenido, they were taught in their training seminar to just use a rope
in lieu of handcuffs because they could not be supplied with it. So, he tied the hands and feet of Rolando Sevilla for fear that he might be able to
escape.

On the early morning of February 23, a team of policemen went to Natasan and found the dead body of Rolando Sevilla. Jose Poblete also turned
over to the police, Rolando Sevilla’s gun. Meanwhile, Noel Regalario, after learning of the incident, scoured the place where the third shot was
fired during the struggle between Sotero and Rolando. He found a .38 caliber slug which was also turned over to the police.11

On May 31, 2006, the CA promulgated the herein challenged decision affirming for the most part the decision of the trial court with
modification as to the penalty imposed. Unlike the trial court, the CA did not appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in
favor of the accused-appellants. Thus, the penalty was changed from reclusion perpetua to death, and an additional award of ₱25,000.00 as
exemplary damages was likewise imposed. Pertinently, the CA decision reads in part:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The accused-appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of DEATH and to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Rolando Sevilla the amount of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for its review, pursuant to AM No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases) which took effect on October 15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.12

As can be gleaned from the above quote, the CA elevated the instant case to this Court in view of the penalty imposed. In our Resolution13 dated
November 14, 2006, we required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs. On December 12, 2006, the people
filed a manifestation14 stating that it is waiving the filing of a supplemental brief. Accused-appellants filed their supplemental brief15 on February
15, 2007.

In their Brief, accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL OF THE ACCUSED PARTICIPATED IN THE KILLING OF ROLANDO
SEVILLA AND BASING ITS DECISION, NOT ON DIRECT EVIDENCE BUT ON ITS OWN SUPPOSITIONS, CONJECTURES AND
INFERENCES;

2. THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE EVIDENCE AND DISPLAYED BIAS WHEN IT LEANED IN FAVOR
OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE DESPITE THEIR VITAL CONTRADICTIONS AND OBVIOUS FALSEHOODS;

3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE ACCUSED AND THAT THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE WAS ATTENDED BY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR
STRENGTH AND SCOFFING AT THE BODY OF THE VICTIM;

4. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DECEASED WAS KILLED IN SELF-DEFENSE AND/OR DEFENSE OF
RELATIVE

5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED.16

We begin our evaluation with accused-appellant Ramon Regalario’s claim of self-defense. Both the CA and the trial court gave no credence to
this theory of self-defense.

When self-defense is invoked by an accused charged with murder or homicide he necessarily owns up to the killing but may escape criminal
liability by proving that it was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. Hence, the three (3) elements of self-defense, namely:
(a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (c) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. However, without
unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, either complete or incomplete.17

Accused-appellant Ramon contends that the victim Rolando Sevilla committed an act of unlawful aggression with no provocation on his
[Ramon’s] part. Ramon testified that he was trying to investigate a commotion when, without warning, Rolando emerged from the group, thrust
and fired his gun at him, hitting him in the left shoulder. To disable Rolando from firing more shots, Ramon struck the victim’s head at the back
with his nightstick, causing the victim to reel backward and lean on the bamboo fence. He continued hitting Rolando to prevent the latter from
regaining his balance and, as he pressed on farther, the victim retreated backward.

By Ramon’s own account, after he was shot, he hit the victim at the back of the latter’s head and he continued hitting the victim who retreated
backward. From that moment, the inceptive unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased to exist and the continuation of the offensive
stance of Ramon put him in the place of an aggressor. There was clearly no longer any danger, but still Ramon went beyond the call of self-
preservation. In People v. Cajurao,18 we held:

…The settled rule in jurisprudence is that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has the right to kill or even wound the former
aggressor. Retaliation is not a justifying circumstance. Upon the cessation of the unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life and limb, the
necessity for the person invoking self-defense to attack his adversary ceases.1avvphi1 If he persists in attacking his adversary, he can no longer
invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Self-defense does not justify the unnecessary killing of an aggressor who is retreating from
the fray. (Emphasis supplied)

Ramon’s claim of self-defense is further belied by the presence of two (2) stab wounds on the neck, four (4) lacerated wounds on the head, as
well as multiple abrasions and contusions on different parts of the victim’s body, as shown in the Medico-Legal Report. Dr. Mario Cerillo who
conducted the post-mortem examination on the victim revealed that the victim’s lacerated wounds could have been caused by a blunt instrument
like a hard stick, a stone or an iron bar; his stab wounds by a sharp-edged instrument or knife; his contusions and hematoma by a fist blow or
through contact with a blunt instrument. He also declared that the sharp object which caused the victim’s stab wounds could have been a knife 2
centimeters (cms.) wide and 6 cms. long because they were clean-cut wounds. Indeed, even if it were true that the victim fired a gun at Ramon,
the number, nature and severity of the injuries suffered by the victim indicated that the force used against him by Ramon and his co-accused was
not only to disarm the victim or prevent him from doing harm to others.

The four (4) other accused-appellants, namely, Sotero, Marciano, Bienvenido and Noel, to exonerate themselves, denied their involvement in
inflicting wounds on Rolando.
Sotero claimed that he arrived at the scene of the crime at the time when Rolando lost his footing on the edge of the pavement and fell down. He
even shouted at Ramon to stop beating Rolando. However, when Ramon told him that Rolando still had the gun, he jumped on Rolando and they
wrestled on the ground for the possession of the gun.

Marciano maintained that he, together with Jose Poblete, arrived at the crime scene when Ramon had already knocked the gun out of Rolando’s
hand and the gun fell near the place where Jose Poblete was standing. When he went to that place, he already knew that his brother (Ramon) had
been shot, so, he told the latter to go to the hospital. Thereafter, he and Sotero proceeded to the police station to report the shooting
incident.1avvphi1

Bienvenido asserted that he arrived at the crime scene after the shooting incident. He was asked by Marciano to arrest Rolando.

Lastly, Noel insisted that he was not present when the shooting incident took place. He was inside their house sleeping, as his wife had just given
birth.

We are not convinced.

Accused-appellants’ denials cannot overcome the positive identification by the prosecution’s witnesses. Elementary is the rule that positive
identification, where categorical and consistent, prevails over unsubstantiated denials because the latter are negative and self-serving, and thus,
cannot be given any weight on the scales of justice. 19 The participation of each of the accused-appellants can be fully ascertained from the clear,
categorical and spontaneous testimony given by prosecution witness, Ronnie Siglos, who was at the scene of the crime, thus:

PROSECUTOR RESARI:

Q While you were walking on your way home, was there an unusual incident and can you recall?

A Yes, ma’am

Q What was that incident about?

A While I was on my way towards the house of my parents, I just suddenly saw a person being beaten on the road.

Q When you first noticed that there was a man being beaten along the road, how far were you?

A I was about more or less 9 to 10 meters.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When you saw a man being beaten what did you do?

A I continue walking, but upon reaching that place near the person being beaten, I stopped.

Q Why did you stop?

A To verify and know as to who that person being beaten.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And who was that person being beaten?

A Rolando Sevilla.

Q Who were the persons beating Rolando Sevilla?

A Marciano Regalario, Sotero Regalario, Ramon Regalario, Bienvenido Regalario, Noel Regalario, Ernani Regalario, Reynante
Regalario, Jose Poblete, Jose Quinno and Virgilio Rebanal.

Q Who else?

A Cecilio Lunas.
Q If some of the persons you saw beating Rolando Sevilla are present in this court room, will you be able to point and identify them?

A Yes, ma’am.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR:

Q You stated that you saw the persons you have just named as beating Rolando Sevilla. Were there weapons used in beating Rolando
Sevilla?

A Yes.

Q What kind of weapons (was) used?

A Sotero was armed with bahi wood, and also Ramon. Bienvenido was also armed with bahi, as well as Cecilio Lunas, Jose Quinno
were also armed with ‘malo-palo.’

xxx xxx xxx

Q What kind of weapon was being held by Noel Regalario?

A A knife.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, when you saw Rolando Sevilla being beaten by the persons you mentioned before, what did you notice on the condition of
Rolando Sevilla?

A He was lying on his stomach.

Q Did you see the face of Rolando Sevilla?

A Yes.

Q How were you able to see the face of Rolando Sevilla?

A Because Sotero was holding him by his hair.

Q What was your observation on the condition of Rolando Sevilla?

xxx xxx xxx

WITNESS:

He was already motionless. He is not moving anymore.

PROSECUTOR:

Of the persons you named as holding weapons, you did not mention Marciano Regalario as holding any weapon. What was Marciano
Regalario doing then?

A He boxed Rolando Sevilla and Rolando was hit on his jaw.

Q What else did Marciano Regalario do if any?

A After he boxed Rolando Sevilla, he went inside his house but after about one (1) minute he again return(ed) back.

Q After Marciano Regalario returned back, what did he do if any?

A He shouted to kill that.

Q After you heard Marciano Regalario (say) to kill "that," what did you do?

A I proceeded towards home.

Q While you were walking, was there any unusual incident which again happened?

A Yes.

Q And, what was that incident?

A While I was walking towards home, again I heard Marciano Regalario shouted to tie him, that is why I again stopped.

Q When you heard Marciano Regalario to tie him how far were you from him?

A More or less 7 meters.

Q You said that upon hearing Marciano Regalario, you stopped. What else happened?

A Bienvenido Regalario passed by me and went to that sleigh (pababa) which is on the lower portion and got a rope.

Q What did Bienvenido Regalario do with the rope?

A He tied Rolando Sevilla by placing he rope around his neck and tied his hands.

Q Was there somebody who assisted Bienvenido Regalario in tying Rolando Sevilla?

A Yes.

Q Who were the persons, if any?

A Sotero Regalario.

Q Aside from Sotero, was there anybody else who helped Bienvenido Regalario in tying Rolando Sevilla?

A No more.

Q While Rolando Sevilla was being hog tied, where were the persons of Marciano Regalario, Noel Regalario, Ramon Regalario and
the rest of the persons whom you just mentioned awhile ago?

A They were there standing beside Rolando Sevilla and they were watching.

Q Did you notice whether Rolando Sevilla was still moving when he was still being tied up by Bienvenido and Sotero?

A He was not moving anymore.20

The aforequoted testimony of Ronnie Siglos is corroborated by the following testimony of Armando Poblete:

Q While you were standing by the road, what did you notice?

A Then I saw Rolando Sevilla being chased by Bienvenido and Sotero both surnamed Regalario

Q To what direction was Rolando Sevilla being chased by Sotero and Bienvenido Regalario?

A Towards the place of Kapitan.

xxx xxx xxx

 PROSECUTOR RESARI:

Q Considering that was already nighttime, how were you able to know that the person being chased was Rolando Sevilla and the
persons chasing him were the two (2) Regalarios which you have identified?

A Because, I was with Sevilla during that time and it was moonlit night.

Q When the two (2) were chasing Rolando Sevilla, what happened next?

A Ramon waylaid Rolando Sevilla.

xxx xxx xxx

Q After you saw Ramon Regalario waylaid Rolando Sevilla, what else did you see?

A After that I saw the group of Sotero, Regalario, Marciano, Noel, caught up with Rolando.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR RESARI:

Q Since Bienvenido Regalario and Sotero Regalario were the ones chasing Rolando Sevilla, from what direction did Ramon Regalario
come from when he waylaid Rolando Sevilla?

A That side, left side going towards the house of Kapitan.

Q And where did Marciano and Noel xxx come from?

A From their house.

Q After the five (5) caught up with Rolando Sevilla, what happened to Rolando Sevilla?

A They took turns in beating him.

Q Did they use any weapon in beating Rolando Sevilla?

A Yes, their night sticks.

Q When Bienvenido and Sotero caught up with Rolando Sevilla; and the three (3) other accused also joined the two (2), how far was
your distance to them?

A More or less 14 to 15 meters.21

We agree with the findings of the two courts below as to the presence of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found, for criminals do not write
down their lawless plans and plots. The agreement to commit a crime, however, may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission
of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of intent. It does not matter who
inflicted the mortal wound, as the act of one is the act of all, and each incurs the same criminal liability. 22 We quote with approval the findings
and observations of the CA, thus:

The eyewitnesses’ account surrounding Rolando Sevilla’s death shows that the accused-appellants performed concerted acts in pursuit of a
common objective. Sotero, Bienvenido, and Ramon, armed with nightsticks, and Noel armed with a knife, seven inches in length, beat Rolando
Sevilla. All five accused-appellants caught up with the victim, blocked all means through which the victim could escape and ensured the
achievement of their plan to kill Rolando Sevilla even as the latter already fell to the ground. Accused-appellant Marciano hit the victim on his
jaw and later, ordered his co-accused to kill and tie the victim. Upon hearing Marciano’s instruction, Bienvenido Regalario tied Rolando’s neck,
hands and feet with a rope. The collective act of the accused-appellants is sufficient to make them co-principals to the killing.23

Considering the foregoing, as well as the manner in which the attack against Rolando was carried out, and the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses positively identifying the accused-appellants as the assailants, we concur in the rulings of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, in
(a) disregarding Ramon Regalario’s declaration that he attacked the victim in self-defense and (b) holding that all the accused-appellants acted in
concert and killed Rolando.
We likewise rule that both the CA and the trial court were correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength in
killing Rolando Sevilla. To take advantage of superior strength is to use force out of proportion to the means available to the person attacked to
defend himself. In order to be appreciated, it must be clearly shown that there was deliberate intent on the part of the malefactors to take
advantage thereof.24 In this case, as testified to by the prosecution eyewitnesses, accused-appellants Ramon, Sotero and Bienvenido, with the
exception of Marciano, were armed with nightsticks (bahi) while Noel was holding a knife. Clearly they took advantage of their superiority in
number and arms in killing the victim, as shown by numerous wounds the latter suffered in different parts of his body.

Also affirmed is the ruling of both courts appreciating the presence of the generic aggravating circumstance of scoffing at the body of the victim.
Accused-appellants did not just kill the victim. They tied him hog-style after rendering him immobilized. This action constituted outraging or
scoffing at the corpse of the victim. In this connection, we agree with the trial court’s observation:

…The concerted acts committed by all the accused mostly armed with wooden clubs and one with a 7-inch long knife after the victim fell
pummeling him with mortal blows on the forehead and back of his head and stab wounds on his neck and one of them telling his co-accused to
kill the victim clearly proved that the Regalarios conspired and took advantage of their strength and number. Not satisfied with delivering mortal
blows even when their hapless victim was already immobile, Bienvenido and Sotero, upon order of their co-accused Marciano, tied their victim
hog style. The manner by which Rolando was tied as vividly captured in the picture (Exhs. ‘C’ & ‘D’) clearly speaks for itself that it was nothing
but to scoff at their victim.25

The CA was likewise correct in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of accused-appellants. For said
circumstance to be appreciated, it must be spontaneous, in such a manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to
the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense of finding and capturing
him.26 In the case at bar, accused-appellants remained at large even after Judge Jose S. Sañez issued the warrant for their arrest on February 6,
1998. Accused-appellants surrendered only on September 9, 1998 after several alias warrants of arrest were issued against them. Hence,
voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in their favor as mitigating circumstance.

The accused-appellants’ acts plainly amount to murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength. As the generic aggravating circumstance of
scoffing at the body of the victim was alleged and proven, and as there was no mitigating circumstance, the CA correctly sentenced accused-
appellants to death in accordance with Art. 248, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, in relation to Art. 63(1) of the revised Penal Code.

In view, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346,27 the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited. Thus, the penalty imposed
upon accused-appellants should be reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

While the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the
offense is still heinous.28 Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still ₱75,000.00. In People v. Quiachon,29 we explained that even if
the penalty of death is not to be imposed on appellant because of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 9346, the civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 is
still proper because, following the ratiocination in People v. Victor (292 SCRA 186), the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of
the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the
offense.

As to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the CA correctly held accused-appellants jointly and severally liable to pay the heirs of
Rolando Sevilla for the same. Moral damages are awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs.
As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of
the victim’s family.30 If a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of exemplary damages is
justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. This kind of damage is intended to serve as deterrent to serious wrongdoings and as
vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured, or as a punishment for those guilty of outrageous
conduct.31 However, consistent with recent jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the award of moral damages should be increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.0032 while the award
of exemplary damages should be increased from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00.33

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 01556 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
modifications: (1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellants is lowered to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole; (2) the
monetary awards to be paid jointly and severally by accused-appellants are as follows: ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (3) interest on all the damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from this date until fully
paid is imposed.34

SO ORDERED.
 3. People v. Dulin, G.R. No. 171284, July 29, 2015

G.R. No. 171284               June 29, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALFREDO DULIN Y NARAG, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The accused is guilty only of homicide in a prosecution for murder where the record does not substantiate the attendance of treachery. But he
may not benefit from the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense if there was no unlawful aggression from the victim. The
Case

Alfredo Dulin y Narag appeals the decision promulgated on August 26, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification
his conviction for the murder of Francisco Batulan rendered on December 29, 1997 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan.2 In convicting him, the RTC had appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, and had
then sentenced him to "suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period of imprisonment ranging from 17 years and 4 months and
1 day to 20 years." On appeal, the CA prescribed reclusion perpetua.

Antecedents

The information filed on January7, 1991 averred as follows:

That on or about August 22, 1990, in the Municipality of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, Alfredo Dulin y Narag alias Freddie, armed with a sharp blade(d) instrument, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and
with treachery did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one, Francisco Batulan, inflicting upon him
several stab wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death.

Contrary to law.3

During the trial, the Prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: (a) Dr. Nelson Macaraniag, (b) Alexander Tamayao, (c) Romulo Cabalza and
(d) Estelita Batulan. Their version follows. Tamayao was on Tamayao Street in Atulayan Norte, Tuguegarao at about 10:00 o’clock in the
evening of August 22, 1990 when a young man came running from the house of Vicente Danao towards the house of Batulan, shouting that his
Uncle Totoy (Batulan) had been stabbed. Tamayao rushed towards Danao’s house, which was about 30 meters from his own house, and there he
saw Dulinstabbing Batulan who was already prostrate face down. Dulin was on top of Batulan, as if kneeling with his left foot touching the
ground. Dulin was holding Batulan by the hair with his left hand, and thrusting the knife at the latter with his right hand. Seeing this, Tamayao
ran towards Batulan’s house to inform Estelita Batulan, the victim’s wife who was his aunt, about the incident. He went home afterwards.

Tamayao mentioned of the long standing grudge between Batulan and Dulin, and of seeing them fighting in April 1990. He recalled Dulin
uttering on two occasions: He will soon have his day and I will kill him.4

Cabalza, a barangay tanod, was in his house around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of August 22, 1990 when he heard the commotion in Danao’s
house which was facing his house. It was Carolina, Danao’s daughter, screaming for help. He thus sought out a fellow barangay tanod. On his
return to the scene, he found Batulanat the door of Danao’s house, with Dulin wielding a sharp pointed instrument, about 6-7 inches long.
Fearing for his safety, he rushed to the Barangay Hall to seek the assistance of Edwin Cabalza and Nanding Buenaflor to bring Batulan to the
Provincial Hospital in Carig, Tuguegarao.5

Estelita recalled that Tamayao went to her house around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of August 22, 1990 to inform her that Dulin had stabbed
her husband in Danao’s house. She rushed to Danao’s house but fainted on the way. Upon regaining consciousness, she learned that her husband
had been rushed to the hospital. On her way to the hospital, she met Barangay Captain Loreto Meman, who told her: Finally, Freddie Dulin
killed your husband as he vowed to do. At the hospital, she was told that her husband had sustained two wounds in the back and several stab
wounds in the front, and was being attended to at the hospital’s intensive care unit (ICU) before he expired.
Estelita said that Barangay Captain Meman went to her husband’s wake and repeated what he had said to her about Dulin. But when she later on
sought out Barangay Captain Meman to ask him to confirm what he had told her about Dulin’s vowing to kill her husband, Barangay Captain
Meman’s response was: I’m sorry I cannot go and declare what I have stated because I am afraid of FREDDIE and he will kill all those persons
who will testify in their favor.6

Estelita mentioned of the heated discussion between her husband and his nephew, Seong Bancud, in front of Danao’s house in April 1990. On
that occasion, Dulin wielded a knife with which he tried to stab her husband. Dulin was pacified only when she went to the aid of her husband,
but she then heard Dulin saying: You will soon have your day, I will kill you.7

Batulan was attended to at the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital on August 22, 1990 by Dr. Macaraniag, who said that the victim was in a state
of shock from his 12 stab wounds. Dr. Macaraniag was part of the three teams that conducted the surgery on Batulan. He issued the Medico-
Legal Certificate8 attesting that Batulan died on August 24, 1990 at 12:15 a.m.; and that Batulan had sustained several injuries, as follows:

Multiple stab wounds #12

(1) Lacerated wound, sternum, 1 cm.

(2) Lacerated wound, 4th ICS, 2 cm. MCL

(3) Lacerated wound, 1 cm. post axillary line

(4) Lacerated wound, 3 x 2 cm. 3 cm below scapula

(5) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. lateral aspect, left hand

(6) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. anterior aspect, left hand

(7) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. anterior aspect, about 3 cm. from elbow, left

(8) Lacerated wound, 2 cm. middle third, left forearm

(9) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. posterior aspect left forearm 4 cm. from left wrist

(10) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. lateral aspect of left foot

(11) Lacerated wound, 4 cm. lateral aspect, left thigh

(12) Lacerated wound, 2 cm. scapular area.

x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x.9

Dr. Macaraniag stated the cause of death to be "Hypovolemic shock secondary to Massive Hemothorax secondary to Multiple stab
wounds."10 He clarified in court that there were clerical errors in the preparation of the Medico-Legal Certificate because his handwritten records
indicated that Batulan had sustained stab instead of lacerated wounds. He surmised that one of the clerks could have misread his handwriting in
the process of transcription.11

Estelita declared that her late husband had earned a living from buying pigs, deriving a monthly income of ₱8,000.00; that their marriage bore
only one child; that she spent more or less ₱6,500.00 for Batulan’s hospitalization, including his medicines, and ₱36,000.00 for Batulan’s 10-day
wake, his burial attire and his coffin; that during the wake she butchered one cow worth ₱6,800.00 and six pigsworth ₱15,000.00; that his death
caused her and her family so much pain; and that she and her family expended a total of ₱70,000.00, plus the ₱20,000.00 for the counsel’s
services in bringing the criminal charge against Dulin.12

In his defense, Dulin testified thatin the evening of August 22, 1990, he was in his house in Atulayan Norte, Tuguegarao, Cagayan with Doming
Narag, Imelda Danao, Jun Danao, Carolina Dulin and Caridad Narag; that Nicanor Annariao and Raymund Soriano arrived at his house to see
the fighting cocks being sold by Alberto Eugenio (Alberto); that Alberto was not yet around, arriving only at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening
to talk with Raymund and Nicanor about the price of the fighting cocks; that after their transaction, Alberto served Nicanor and Raymund food,
and he (Dulin) and Jun Danao thereafter accompanied Raymund and Nicanor to the highway to get a tricycle ride, but on their way, they passed
Angel Bancud who called out to him: that he (Dulin) asked the others to go ahead, and he would just catch up with them; that as he (Dulin)
approached Bancud, Batulan, the cousin of his (Dulin) mother, stabbed him on the right side of his body and in the left hand; that he complained
to Batulan: Uncle, you hit me (Dinisgrasya nakun), but Batulan replied: I will really kill you; that he (Dulin) ran to the upper level of Carolina
Danao’s house, pursued by Batulan who stabbed him again several times; that they grappled for the weapon until he (Dulin) was able to wrest it
from Batulan; that he (Dulin) stabbed Batulan with the weapon, and they struggled until he (Dulin) felt weak, eventually falling to the ground;
and that he (Dulin) regained consciousness only the next day at the hospital.

Dulin insisted that there was no grudge between him and Batulan, but interjected that the barangay captain would summon him to bring Batulan
home each time the latter got drunk at night.

Erlinda Danao, Records Officer of the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, authenticated the hospital records showing
that Dulin had also been injured.13 Judgment of the RTC

On December 29, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision convicting Dulin of murder, 14 to wit: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
the accused Alfredo Dulin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and appreciating the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense and no aggravating circumstance, this Court hereby lowers the penalty of said crime by two degrees and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period of imprisonment ranging from 17 years and 4 months and 1 day
to 20 years and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and to pay actual damages in the amount of ₱36,000.00 and
moral damages for ₱40,000.00.

Without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.15

Decision of the CA

In his appeal, Dulin contended that his crime should be homicide instead of murder, considering the RTC’s appreciation of incomplete self-
defense as a privileged mitigating circumstance; and that even if self-defense should be unavailing, he could be found guilty only of homicide
because it was the victim who had first attacked by stabbing him, and that the multiple wounds inflicted on the victim did not mean that he had
not been justified in killing the victim. He argued that the penalty imposed on him was incorrect considering the absence of any aggravating
circumstance and the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.

On August 26, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction subject to the modification of the civil liability, decreeing:

The Court agrees with the OSG representing the State that the penalty requires modification. The Court a quo committed error in the imposition
of the proper penalty. The crime committed by appellant in the case at bench is murder qualified by treachery. There being no aggravating and
no mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua. Where no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the commission
of the crime, the medium period of the imposable penalty, which is reclusion perpetua, should be imposed by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification of the penalty and awards of damages. Appellant
ALFREDO DULIN y NARAG is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The award of ₱36,000 actual damages is
DELETED. Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Francisco Batulan ₱20,000 as temperate damages and ₱50,000 by way of moral damages.

SO ORDERED.16

On January 12, 2006, the CA denied Dulin’s motion for reconsideration.17

Issues

In this appeal, Dulin submits the following issues for our review and consideration, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE ELEMENTS OF SELF-
DEFENSE.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING SELF-DEFENSE AS A PRIVILEGED MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE, IN THE EVENT THAT THE APPRECIATION OF A COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE IS UNAVAILING.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY
IN THE KILLING OF FRANCISCO.18

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is partly meritorious.

I.

There was no self-defense

The accused who pleads self-defense admits the authorship of the crime. The burden of proving self-defense rests entirely on him, that he must
then prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following elements of self-defense, namely: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)

reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.19 The most important of all the elements is unlawful aggression, 20 which is the condition sine qua non for upholding
self-defense as a justifying circumstance. Unless the victim committed unlawful

aggression against the accused, self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, should not be appreciated, for the two other essential elements of
self-defense would have no factual and legal bases without any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel.

Unlawful aggression as the condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense is aptly described in People v. Nugas,21 as follows:

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful
aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is

whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an
imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a)
there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault
must be unlawful.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material
unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor
to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to
shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the
victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw
a pot.

Dulin argues that the CA should have appreciated the justifying circumstance of self-defense in his favor because all its elements had been
present in the commission of the crime.

In rejecting Dulin’s argument, the CA observed that although Batulan had initiated the attack against Dulin the unlawful aggression from
Batulan effectively ceased once Dulin had wrested the weapon from the latter. The CA thus found and held in its assailed decision:

Appellant testified that after the initial stabbing attack on him, he was able to take possession of the weapon and ran towards the second level of
the house of Vicente Danao, away from FRANCISCO. At that point, the unlawful aggression against him effectively ceased. When

FRANCISCO and appellant again grappled for possession of the weapon, appellant now became the armed protagonist, and FRANCISCO’s act
of trying to wrest the weapon cannot be considered as unlawful aggression. At that moment, appellant no longer faced any imminent or
immediate danger to his life and limb from FRANCISCO.

xxxx

From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that FRANCISCO could no longer be considered as unlawful aggressor. Appellant had nothing to repel.
Therefore, appellant’s theory that he was merely defending himself when he killed FRANCISCO is unavailing. A fortiori, there would be no

basis for the second requisite of self-defense.22

We uphold the finding and holding of the CA. Batulan, albeit the initial aggressor against Dulin, ceased to be the aggressor as soon as Dulin had
dispossessed him of the weapon. Even if Batulan still went after Dulin despite the latter going inside the house of Danao, where they again
grappled for control of the weapon, the grappling for the weapon did not amount to aggression from Batulan for it was still Dulin who held
control of the weapon at that point. Whatever Dulin did thereafter – like stabbing Batulan with the weapon – constituted retaliation against
Batulan. In this regard, retaliation was not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that the victim started already ceased when the
accused attacked him, but in self-defense, the aggression was still continuing when the accused injured the aggressor. 23 As such, there was no
unlawful aggression on the part of Batulan to justify his fatal stabbing by Dulin.
Still, Dulin vigorously insists that the initial aggression employed by Batulan did not cease because the latter followed him into Danao’s house
with the singular purpose of ending his life; and that there was no gap in the aggression initiated by Batulan.24

The insistence is unwarranted. Dulin admitted having successfully disarmed Batulan and then running away from him. With the aggression by
Batulan having thereby ceased, he did not anymore pose any imminent threat against Dulin. Hence, Batulan was not committing any aggression
when Dulin fatally stabbed him.

It is notable, too, that the results of the medico-legal examination indicating Batulan to have sustained twelve stab wounds 25 confirmed the
cessation of the attack by Batulan. The numerosity and nature of the wounds inflicted by the accused reflected his determination to kill Batulan,
and the fact that he was not defending himself.26

II.

Incomplete self-defense was not proved

Pursuant to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense reduces the penalty by one
or two degrees than that prescribed by law. For this purpose, the accused must prove the existence of the majority of the elements for self-
defense, but unlawful aggression, being an indispensable element, must be present. Either or both of the other requisites may be absent, namely:
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, or the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.27

Dulin posits that the totality of circumstances indicated that his acts constituted incomplete self-defense, and must be appreciatedas a privileged
mitigating circumstance.28

Dulin’s position is untenable. Like in complete self-defense, Dulin should prove the elements of incomplete self-defense by first credibly
establishing that the victim had committed unlawful aggression against him. With Batulan’s aggression having already ceased from the moment
that Dulin divested Batulan of the weapon, there would not be any incomplete self-defense. Moreover, as borne out by his stabbing of Batulan
several times, Dulin did not act in order to defend himself or to repel any attack, but instead to inflict injury on Batulan.

III.

The RTC and CA erred in appreciating

the attendance of treachery

Murder is the unlawful killing of any person attended by any of the circumstances listed Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.1âwphi1 Treachery, which was alleged in the information, is one such qualifying circumstance.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means and methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.29 Two conditions must concur in order for treachery to be appreciated, namely: one, the assailant employed means, methods or forms in
the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and two, said means, methods or
forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. 30 Treachery, whenever alleged in the information and competently
and clearly proved, qualifies the killing and raises it to the category of murder.31

Based on the established facts, Dulinand Batulan grappled for control of the weapon Batulan had initially wielded against Dulin, who divested
Batulan of it and ran with it into the house of Danao, with Batulan in immediate pursuit. They continued tograpple for the weapon inside the
house of Danao, and it was at that point when Dulin stabbed Batulan several times. Under the circumstances, treachery should not be appreciated
in the killing of Batulan because the stabbing by Dulin did not take Batulan by surprise due to his having been sufficiently forewarned of Dulin’s
impending assault,32 and being thus afforded the opportunity to defend himself, or to escape, or even to recover control of the weapon from
Dulin. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning, or is done in a swift, deliberate and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape, without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. 33 The
mode of attack must not spring from the unexpected turn of events.

Consequently, Dulin should be liable only for homicide, the penalty for which is reclusion temporal. 34 There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the penalty is imposed in its medium period (i.e., 14 years, eight months and one day to 17 years and four months). The
indeterminate sentence of Dulin is, therefore, eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day
of reclusion temporal, with full credit of his preventive imprisonment, if any.

Anent the civil liability, the CA ordered the accused to pay to the heirs of Batulan ₱20,000.00 as temperate damages and ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages. We modify the awards, and grant to the heirs of Batulan ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00
as temperate damages. Indeed, the current judicial policy sets the civil indemnity for death caused by a crime at ₱50,000.00. In addition, the
heirs of the victim are entitled to moral damages of ₱50,000.00. The civil indemnity and moral damages are allowed even without allegation and
proof, it being a certainty that the victim’s heirs were entitled thereto as a matter of law. Temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 should further be
granted to the heirs of the victim for they were presumed to have spent for his interment. It would be unjust to deny them this amount for the
reason that they were not able to establish the actual expenditure for his interment with certainty.35

In line with recent jurisprudence,36 interest of 6% per annum shall be charged on all the items of the civil liability fixed and imposed herein,
computed from the date of the finality of this decision until the items of the civil liability shall be fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the judgment promulgated on August 26, 2005 by finding ALFREDO DULIN YNARAG guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES him to suffer the indeterminate sentence of EIGHT YEARS AND ONE DAY OF PRISION
MAYOR, AS THE MINIMUM, TO 14 YEARS, EIGHT MONTHS AND ONE DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, with full credit of his
preventive imprisonment; ORDERS him to pay to the heirs of Francisco Batulan ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on each item reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment;
and DIRECTS him to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 4. People v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012

G.R. No. 177743               January 25, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALFONSO FONTANILLA y OBALDO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An indispensable requisite of self-defense is that the victim must have mounted an unlawful aggression against the accused. Without such
unlawful aggression, the accused cannot invoke self-defense as a justifying circumstance.

The accused prays for the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his
conviction for murder handed down by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union.

Antecedents

At around 9:30 p.m. on October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in Butubut Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso
Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood called bellang.2 Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again
in the head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-
law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was
pronounced dead on arrival.3

On April 25, 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union filed an information for murder against Fontanilla in the RTC, viz:

That on or about the 29th day of October 1996, along the Provincial Road at Barangay Butubut Oeste, Municipality of Balaoan, Province of La
Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike with a long coconut night stick
and thereafter hit with a stone the head of Jose Olais, thereby inflicting on the latter head wounds which caused the death of the latter, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

The accused pleaded not guilty.

The State presented Marquez and Abunan as its witnesses. They claimed that they were only several meters away from Olais when Fontanilla
struck him; that they shouted at Fontanilla, who fled because of them; and that they were able to see and to identify Fontanilla as the attacker of
their father-in-law because the area was then well-lighted.5

Dr. Felicidad Leda, the physician who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Olais, attested that her post-mortem examination showed that
Olais had suffered a fracture on the left temporal area of the skull, causing his death. She opined that a hard object or a severe force had hit the
skull of the victim more than once, considering that the skull had been already fragmented and the fractures on the skull had been radiating.6

SPO1 Abraham Valdez, who investigated the slaying and apprehended Fontanilla, declared that he had gone looking for Fontanilla in his house
along with other policemen; that Fontanilla’s father had denied that he was around; that their search of the house had led to the arrest of
Fontanilla inside; and that they had then brought him to the police station. 7 Valdez further declared that Fontanilla asserted that he would only
speak in court.8

At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he had been standing on the road near his house when
Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in the stomach; that although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter
had continued hitting him with his fists, striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked him with both his legs; that
he had thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a stone with which he had hit the right side of the victim’s head, causing the latter to fall
face down to the ground; and that he had then left the scene for his house upon seeing that Olais was no longer moving.9
Fontanilla’s daughter Marilou corroborated her father’s version.10

On June 21, 2001, the RTC declared Fontanilla guilty as charged, and disposed thusly:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring he accused ALFONSO FONTANILLA Y OBALDO
@ ‘Carlos’ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Sec. 6, and thereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos ( ₱50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.11

The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense by observing that he had "no necessity to employ a big stone, inflicting upon the victim a
mortal wound causing his death"12 due to the victim attacking him only with bare hands. It noted that Fontanilla did not suffer any injury despite
his claim that the victim had mauled him; that Fontanilla did not receive any treatment, and no medical certificate attested to any injury he might
have suffered, having been immediately released from the hospital;13 that Fontanilla’s failure to give any statement at the time he surrendered to
the police was inconsistent with his plea of self-defense;14 and that the manner of attack against Olais established the attendance of treachery.15

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, holding that Fontanilla did not establish the indispensable element of unlawful aggression; that his failure
to report the incident to the police at the earliest opportunity, or even after he was taken into custody, negated the plea of self-defense; and that
the nature of the victim’s injury was a significant physical proof to show a determined effort on the part of Fontanilla to kill him, and not just to
defend himself.16

The CA ruled that treachery was attendant, because Olais had no inkling that a fatal blow was looming upon him, and because Fontanilla was
inconspicuously hidden from view when he struck Olais from behind, rendering Olais unable to retaliate.17

Nonetheless, the CA rectified the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death to only reclusion perpetua upon noting the absence of any aggravating
or mitigating circumstance, and disposed as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Balaoan, La Union, Branch 34, in Criminal Case
No. 2561 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellant Fontanilla is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
No cost.

SO ORDERED.18

The accused is now appealing, insisting that the CA erred because:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE.

II.

EVEN GRANTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT KILLED THE VICTIM, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WHEN THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III.

FURTHERMORE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE SPECIAL PRIVILEGE[D]
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AND THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.

Ruling

We affirm the conviction.

Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the following
elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 19 Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no
unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel. 20 The character of the element
of unlawful aggression is aptly explained as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful
aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is
whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an
imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a)
there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault
must be unlawful.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material
unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor
to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to
shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the
victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw
a pot.21

By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused
in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. 22 Having thus admitted being the author
of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, 23 and he
would be held criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof.24 He should discharge the burden by
relying on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view of his admission
of the killing.25 Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the proceedings.

Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais did not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla,
and, two, Fontanilla’s act of hitting the victim’s head with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an
unreasonable response to the victim’s fistic attack and kicks.

Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some injury from the aggression. It remains, however, that no injury
of any kind or gravity was found on the person of Fontanilla when he presented himself to the hospital; hence, the attending physician of the
hospital did not issue any medical certificate to him. Nor was any medication applied to him. 26 In contrast, the physician who examined the
cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had been hit on the head more than once. The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for the weapons used by
Fontanilla and the location and number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an
attack from Olais. We consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested the determined effort of the accused to kill his victim,
not just to defend himself.27

The CA and the RTC found that treachery was attendant. We concur. Fontanilla had appeared out of nowhere to strike Olais on the head, first
with the wooden stick, and then with a big stone, causing Olais to fall to the ground facedown. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack
effectively denied to Olais the ability to defend himself or to retaliate against Fontanilla.

The imposition of reclusion perpetua by the CA was warranted under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,28 which prescribes reclusion
perpetua to death as the penalty for murder. Under the rules on the

application of indivisible penalties in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code,29 the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed if there are
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances. Yet, the Court points out that the RTC erroneously imposed "RECLUSION PERPETUA TO
DEATH" as the penalty. Such imposition was bereft of legal justification, for reclusion perpetua and death, being indivisible, should not be
imposed as a compound, alternative or successive penalty for a single felony. In short, the imposition of one precluded the imposition of the
other.

The Court also modifies the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the death indemnity of ₱50,000.00. When death occurs
due to a crime, the damages to be awarded may include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (b) actual or compensatory
damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages.30

Accordingly, the CA and the RTC should also have granted moral damages in addition to the death indemnity, which were of different
kinds.31 The death indemnity compensated the loss of life due to crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the
mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving family of Olais.32 Although mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving
family were not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court must nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of the
deceased to their moral status quo ante. Given the circumstances, ₱50,000.00 should be reasonable as moral damages, which, pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence,33 we are bound to award despite the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ mental anguish and emotional
suffering. The rationale for doing so rested on human nature and experience having shown that:

xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family. It is inherently human
to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing
not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them
with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them.34 1âwphi1
Another omission of the CA and the RTC was their non-recognition of the right of the heirs of the victim to temperate damages. The victim’s
wife testified about her family’s incurring funeral expenses of ₱36,000.00, but only ₱18,000.00 was backed by receipts. It is already settled that
when actual damages substantiated by receipts sum up to lower than ₱25,000.00, temperate damages of at least ₱25,000.00 become justified, in
lieu of actual damages in the lesser amount actually proved by receipts. It would obviously be unfair to the heirs of the victim to deny them
compensation by way of actual damages despite their honest attempt to prove their actual expenses by receipts (but succeeding only in showing
expenses lower than ₱25,000.00 in amount).35 Indeed, the heirs should not be left in a worse situation than the heirs of another victim who might
be nonetheless allowed temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 despite not having presented any receipts at all. With the victim’s wife having proved
₱18,000.00 worth of expenses, granting his heirs temperate damages of ₱25,000.00, not only ₱18,000.00, is just and proper. Not to do so would
foster a travesty of basic fairness.

The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability "when the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances."36 The Civil Code permits such damages to be awarded "by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages." 37 In light of such legal provisions, the CA and the RTC
should have recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages on account of the attendance of treachery. It was of no
moment that treachery was an attendant circumstance in murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. As well explained in People
v. Catubig:38

The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic
sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private
victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and
by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is
basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It
would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary
but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only
be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning
of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

For the purpose, ₱30,000.00 is reasonable and proper as exemplary damages,39 for a lesser amount would not serve result in genuine exemplarity.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006 by the Court of Appeals, subject to the MODIFICATION of the civil
damages, by ordering accused Alfonso Fontanilla y Obaldo to pay to the heirs of Jose Olais ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages in addition to the ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity and the ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on
such amounts from the finality of the judgment.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 5. Josue v. People, G.R. No. 199579, December 10, 2012

G.R. No. 199579               December 10, 2012

RAMON JOSUE y GONZALES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Ramon Josue y Gonzales (Josue) to assail the Decision 1 dated June
30, 2011 and Resolution2 dated December 1, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33180.

The petitioner was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, via an information that
reads:

That on or about May 1, 2004, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of ARMANDO MACARIO y PINEDA a.k.a. BOYET ORA, by then
and there shooting the said Armando Macario y Pineda a.k.a. Boyet Ora several times with a cal. 45 pistol hitting him on the different parts of
his body, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of Homicide, as a consequence, but nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to the said ARMANDO
MACARIO y PINEDA a.k.a. BOYET ORA which prevented his death thereafter.

Contrary to law.3

The case was docketed as Crim. Case No. 05-236299 and raffled to Branch 40 of the RTC. Upon arraignment, the petitioner entered a plea of
"not guilty". After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.

The witnesses for the prosecution were: (1) victim Armando Macario y Pineda (Macario); (2) Dr. Casimiro Tiongson, Jr. (Dr. Tiongson), Chief
Surgical Resident of Chinese General Hospital; (3) Dr. Edith Calalang (Dr. Calalang), a radiologist; (4) Ariel Villanueva, an eyewitness to the
crime; and (5) Josielyn Macario, wife of the victim. The prosecution presented the following account:

On May 1, 2004, at around 11:15 in the evening, Macario, a barangay tanod, was buying medicine from a store near the petitioner’s residence in
Barrio Obrero, Tondo, Manila when he saw the petitioner going towards him, while shouting to ask him why he had painted the petitioner’s
vehicle. Macario denied the petitioner’s accusation, but petitioner still pointed and shot his gun at Macario. The gunshots fired by the petitioner
hit Macario’s elbow and fingers. As the unarmed Macario tried to flee from his assailant, the petitioner still fired his gun at him, causing him to
sustain a gunshot wound at his back. Macario was then rushed to the Chinese General Hospital for medical treatment.

Dr. Tiongson confirmed that Macario sustained three (3) gunshot wounds: (1) one on his right hand, (2) one on his left elbow, and (3) one
indicating a bullet’s entry point at the posterior of the chest, exiting at the anterior line. Dr. Calalang took note of the tiny metallic foreign bodies
found in Macario’s x-ray results, which confirmed that the wounds were caused by gunshots. Further, she said that the victim’s injuries were
fatal, if not medically attended to. Macario incurred medical expenses for his treatments.

For his defense, the petitioner declared to have merely acted in self-defense. He claimed that on the evening of May 1, 2004, he, together with
his son Rafael, was watching a television program when they heard a sound indicating that the hood of his jeepney was being opened. He then
went to the place where his jeepney was parked, armed with a .45 caliber pistol tucked to his waist. There he saw Macario, together with
Eduardo Matias and Richard Akong, in the act of removing the locks of his vehicle’s battery. When the petitioner sought the attention of
Macario’s group, Macario pointed his .38 caliber gun at the petitioner and pulled its trigger, but the gun jammed and failed to fire. The petitioner
then got his gun and used it to fire at Macario, who was hit in the upper arm. Macario again tried to use his gun, but it still jammed then fell on
the ground. As Macario reached down for the gun, the petitioner fired at him once more, hitting him at the back. When Macario still tried to fire
his gun, the petitioner fired at him for the third time, hitting his hand and causing Macario to drop his gun. The petitioner got Macario’s gun and
kept it in his residence.
The petitioner’s son, Rafael Josue, testified in court to corroborate his father’s testimony.

SPO4 Axelito Palmero (SPO4 Palmero) also testified for the defense, declaring that on May 26, 2004, he received from Josue a .38 caliber
revolver that allegedly belonged to Macario.

On October 22, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision4 finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. It
gave full credit to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, further noting that the defense had failed to prove that the .38 caliber revolver that
was turned over to SPO4 Palmero actually belonged to Macario. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, accused RAMON JOSUE y GONZALES is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Frustrated Homicide without any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances to vary the penalty imposable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum.

Accused Ramon Josue y Gonzales is hereby ordered to indemnify the victim, Armando Macario y Pineda, the sum of [P]32,214.25 for
hospitalization and medicine expenses as actual damages.

The accused’s bail is deemed cancelled. Bondsman is ordered to surrender the accused to this Court for execution of the final judgment.

SO ORDERED.5

Unsatisfied, the petitioner appealed from the RTC’s decision to the CA, which affirmed the rulings of the RTC and thus, dismissed the appeal.

Hence, the present petition. The petitioner assails the CA’s dismissal of the appeal, arguing that the prosecution had failed to overthrow the
constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor.

We deny the petition.

At the outset, we emphasize that since the petitioner seeks this Court’s review of his case through a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, only questions of law shall be addressed by the Court, barring any question that pertains to factual issues on the crime’s
commission. The general rule is that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject only to certain exceptions
as when the trial court’s judgment is not supported by sufficient evidence or is premised on a misapprehension of facts.6

Upon review, the Court has determined that the present case does not fall under any of the exceptions. In resolving the present petition, we then
defer to the factual findings made by the trial court, as affirmed by the CA when the case was brought before it on appeal. The Court has, after
all, consistently ruled that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court
which forms first-hand impressions as witnesses testify before it. Factual findings of the trial court as regards its assessment of the witnesses’
credibility are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when affirmed by the CA, and will not be disturbed absent any
showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts and circumstances which could substantially affect the outcome of the case.7

As against the foregoing parameters, the Court finds, and so holds, that both the trial and appellate courts have correctly ruled on the petitioner’s
culpability for the crime of frustrated homicide, which has the following for its elements:

(1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault;

(2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and

(3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is present.

These elements were duly established during the trial.

The trial court’s factual findings, when taken collectively, clearly prove the existence of the crime’s first and second elements, pertaining to the
petitioner’s intent to kill and his infliction of fatal wound upon the victim. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist,
among other things, of the means used by the malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing
of the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim. 8 Significantly, among the witnesses presented by the
prosecution was Villanueva, who, while being a friend of the petitioner, had testified against the petitioner as an eyewitness and specifically
identified the petitioner as the assailant that caused the wounds sustained by the victim Macario. Even the petitioner cites in the petition he filed
with this Court the prosecution’s claim that at the time he fired the first gunshot, he was shouting, "Papatayin kita! (I will kill you!)"9 The doctors
who attended to the victim’s injuries also affirmed before the trial court that Macario had sustained gunshot wounds, and that the injuries caused
thereby were fatal if not given medical attention. The trial court then held:

Weighing the evidence thus proffered, this Court believes the prosecution’s version.
xxxx

The Court gives credence to the testimonies of the witnesses presented by the prosecution as it did not find any fact or circumstance in the
shooting incident to show that said witnesses had falsely testified or that they were actuated by ill-motive.

xxxx

x x x (A)s a result of being shot three (3) times with a .45 caliber gun, complainant sustained mortal wounds which without medical assistance,
complainant could have died therefrom. Dr. Casimiro Tiongson, Jr., the chief surgical resident who attended the complainant and prescribed his
medicines, testified that the victim, Armando Macario, sustained three (3) gunshot wounds located in the left elbow, right hand and another
bullet entering his posterior chest exiting in front of complainant’s chest.

These findings were also contained in the x-ray consultation reports testified to by Dr. Edith Calalang as corroborating witness. 10 (Citations
omitted)

What is also noteworthy is that the petitioner invoked self-defense, after he had admitted that he caused the victim’s wounds when he shot the
latter several times using a deadly weapon, i.e., the .45 caliber pistol that he carried with him to the situs of the crime. In People v.
Mondigo,11 we explained:

By invoking self-defense, appellant admitted committing the felonies for which he was charged albeit under circumstances which, if
proven, would justify his commission of the crimes. Thus, the burden of proof is shifted to appellant who must show, beyond reasonable
doubt, that the killing of Damaso and wounding of Anthony were attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part
of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.12 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

In order to be exonerated from the charge, the petitioner then assumed the burden of proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that he merely acted in
self-defense. Upon review, we agree with the RTC and the CA that the petitioner failed in this regard.

While the three elements quoted above must concur, self-defense relies, first and foremost, on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, then no self-defense may be successfully pleaded. 13 "Unlawful aggression" here presupposes an
actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger of the attack, from the victim.14

In the present case, particularly significant to this element of "unlawful aggression" is the trial court’s finding that Macario was unarmed at the
time of the shooting, while the petitioner then carried with him a .45 caliber pistol. According to prosecution witness Villanueva, it was even the
petitioner who confronted the victim, who was then only buying medicine from a sari-sari store. Granting that the victim tried to steal the
petitioner’s car battery, such did not equate to a danger in his life or personal safety. At one point during the fight, Macario even tried to run
away from his assailant, yet the petitioner continued to chase the victim and, using his .45 caliber pistol, fired at him and caused the mortal
wound on his chest. Contrary to the petitioner’s defense, there then appeared to be no "real danger to his life or personal safety," 15 for no
unlawful aggression, which would have otherwise justified him in inflicting the gunshot wounds for his defense, emanated from Macario’s end.*

The weapon used and the number of gunshots fired by the petitioner, in relation to the nature and location of the victim’s wounds, further negate
the claim of self-defense. For a claim of self-defense to prosper, the means employed by the person claiming the defense must be commensurate
to the nature and extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression.16 Considering the petitioner’s use of a deadly weapon when his victim was unarmed, and his clear intention to cause a fatal wound by
still firing his gun at the victim who had attempted to flee after already sustaining two gunshot wounds, it is evident that the petitioner did not act
merely in self-defense, but was an aggressor who actually intended to kill his victim.

Given the foregoing, and in the absence of any circumstance that would have qualified the crime to murder, we hold that the trial court
committed no error in declaring the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. Applying the rules provided
by the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court correctly imposed for such offense an indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. The award of actual damages is also
sustained. However, we hold that in line with prevailing jurisprudence, 17 the victim is entitled to an award of moral damages in the amount
of P10,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 30, 2011 and Resolution dated December 1, 2011 ofthe Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 33180 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the petitioner Ramon Josue y Gonzales is also ordered to pay the
offended party the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.
 6. Toledo v. People, G.R. No. 158057, September 24, 2004

G.R. No. 158057             September 24, 2004

NOE TOLEDO y TAMBOONG, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23742 affirming on appeal, the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 82, in Criminal Case No. OD-861, convicting the petitioner of homicide.

In an Information filed in the RTC of Romblon, the petitioner was charged with homicide allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of September 1995, at around 9:30 o’clock in the evening, in Barangay Libertad, municipality of
Odiongan, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a bolo, one RICKY F. GUARTE, which causes
(sic) his untimely death.

Contrary to law.3

In due course, the prosecution adduced evidence against the petitioner which was synthesized by the appellate court as follows:

On September 16, 1995, appellant went to a black-smith who made the design of his bolo. When he went home to Tuburan, Odiongan,
Romblon late in the afternoon (TSN, September 4, 1998, p. 2), appellant saw the group of Lani Famero, Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez
and Ricky Guarte drinking gin at the house of the Spouses Manuel and Eliza Guarte, Ricky’s parents. Appellant’s house is about five
(5) meters away from the house of Spouses Guarte. Appellant requested the group of Ricky to refrain from making any noise.
Thereupon, appellant proceeded inside his house and went to sleep (ibid., p. 3). Around 9:00 p.m., Gerardo Faminia, Eliza Guarte’s
brother arrived at the Guarte house and asked for any left-over food (TSN, August 5, 1998, p. 3). Eliza prepared dinner for him and
after Gerardo finished eating, he went home accompanied by Ricky (TSN, April 26, 1996, p. 5). Gerardo’s home is about twelve (12)
meters away from the Guarte home (TSN, February 17, 1997, p. 11). Minutes later, Ricky came back and together with Lani, Rex and
Michael, went to sleep at the Guarte house. They had not laid down for long when they heard stones being hurled at the roof of the
house. The stoning was made three (3) times (TSN, August 5, 1998, pp. 2-3). Ricky rose from bed and peeped through a window. He
saw appellant stoning their house. Ricky went out of the house and proceeded to appellant’s house. Ricky asked appellant, his uncle,
why he was stoning their house. Appellant did not answer but met Ricky at the doorstep of his (appellant’s) house (TSN, April 26,
1996, p. 6; August 5, 1998, pp. 4-5) and, without any warning, stabbed Ricky on the abdomen with a bolo (TSN, August 5, 1998, p. 8).
Eliza had followed his son Ricky and upon seeing that Ricky was stabbed, shouted for help (TSN, February 17, 1997, p. 13). Lani
heard Eliza’s cry for help and immediately rushed outside the house. Lani saw Ricky leaning on the ground and supporting his body
with his hands. Lani helped Ricky stand up and brought him to the main road. Lani asked Ricky who stabbed him and Ricky replied
that it was appellant who stabbed him. Then Docloy Cortez arrived at the scene on board his tricycle. Accordingly, Ricky was put on
the tricycle and taken to the Romblon Provincial Hospital (TSN, January 19, 1998, pp. 4-6).

At the Romblon Provincial Hospital, Dr. Noralie Fetalvero operated on Ricky that very night. Ricky had sustained one (1) stab wound but due to
massive blood loss, he died while being operated on (TSN, November 24, 1997, pp. 2, 6-7). Dr. Fetalvero issued a Medico-Legal Certificate
showing the injuries sustained by Ricky, thus:

Stab wound, left chest with gastric & transverse colon evisceration measuring 6 cms. long, irregular-edged at 8th ICS, left penetrating
(operative findings):

(1) abdominal cavity perforating the stomach (thru & thru) and the left lobe of the liver

(2) thoracic cavity thru the left dome of the diaphragm perforating the lower lobe of the left lung.
 …

(Exhibit C)

The Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Fetalvero stated the cause of Ricky’s death as:

CAUSES OF DEATH:

Immediate cause : a. Cardiorespiratory Arrest

Antecedent cause : b. Hypovolemic shock
Underlying cause : c. Multiple thoraco-abdominal

injury 2º to stab wound

(Exhibit B)4

The Evidence of the Petitioner

The petitioner adduced evidence that at around 5:00 p.m. on September 16, 1995, he was on his way home at Tuburan, Odiongan, Romblon. He
saw his nephew, Ricky Guarte, and the latter’s friends, Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez, and Lani Famero, about five meters away from his house,
having a drinking spree. He ordered them not to make loud noises, and they obliged. He then went to his house, locked the door with a nail, and
went to sleep. However, he was awakened at around 9:30 p.m. by loud noises coming from Ricky and his three companions. He peeped through
the window grills of his house and admonished them not to make any loud noises. Ricky, who was then already inebriated, was incensed; he
pulled out a balisong, pushed the door, and threatened to stab the petitioner. The petitioner pushed their sala set against the door to block the
entry of Ricky, but the latter continued to push the door open with his hands and body. The petitioner ran to the upper portion of their house and
got his bolo.5 He returned to the door and pushed it with all his might using his left hand. He then pointed his bolo, which was in his right hand,
towards Ricky. The bolo accidentally hit Ricky on the stomach, and the latter lost his balance and fell to the floor. The petitioner, thereafter,
surrendered to the barangay captain at 11:00 a.m. on September 17, 1995.

After trial, the court rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty as charged. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, NOE TOLEDO is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of homicide with the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and is meted the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor minimum, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum.

Accused is condemned to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil liability to the heirs of the victim.6

The trial court did not give credence and probative weight to the testimony of the petitioner that his bolo accidentally hit the victim on the
stomach.

On appeal in the CA, the petitioner raised the following issue in his brief as appellant:

WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAN BE CRIMINALLY HELD LIABLE FOR THE ACCIDENTAL DEATH OF
RICKY GUARTE7

Invoking Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner claimed that he stabbed the victim by accident; hence, he is exempt
from criminal liability for the death of the victim.

The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed decision with modifications. The CA also denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
thereof. The appellate court ruled that the petitioner failed to prove that he acted in self-defense.

Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review, contending that the CA erred in not finding that he acted in self-defense when he
stabbed the victim by accident and prays that he be acquitted of the crime charged.

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide based on the evidence on record.

The petitioner contends that the CA committed a reversible error when it affirmed the decision of the RTC convicting him of homicide, on its
finding that he failed to prove that he acted in complete self-defense when the victim was hit by his bolo. The petitioner insists that he acted in
complete self-defense when his bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the petitioner failed to prove self-defense with clear and convincing evidence. Hence,
the decision of the CA affirming, on appeal, the decision of the RTC is correct.

The contention of the petitioner has no merit.

The petitioner testified that his bolo hit the victim accidentally. He asserted in the RTC and in the CA that he is exempt from criminal liability
for the death of the victim under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which reads:

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of
causing it.

In his brief in the CA, the petitioner argued that:

In the case at bar, with all due respect, contrary to the findings of the lower court, it is our humble submission that the death
of Ricky Guarte was merely a sad and unwanted result of an accident without fault or intention of causing it on the part of
accused-appellant. We submit, there were clear and indubitable factual indicators overlooked by the lower court, bolstering
the theory of the defense on accidental death.8

However, the petitioner changed gear, so to speak, and now alleges that he acted in self-defense when he stabbed the victim. As such, he
contends, he is not criminally liable under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code which reads:

Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it:

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

The petitioner avers that he was able to prove the essential elements of complete self-defense, thus:

A close scrutiny of the records of the case would show that the petitioner acted in self-defense.

The essential requisites of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable scrutiny of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself (People vs. Silvano,
350 SCRA 650)9

However, the petitioner also claims that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the victim.

It is a matter of law that when a party adopts a particular theory and the case is tried and decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not
be permitted to change his theory on appeal. The case will be reviewed and decided on that theory and not approached and resolved from a
different point of view. To permit a party to change his theory on appeal will be unfair to the adverse party.10

The petitioner is proscribed from changing in this Court, his theory of defense which he adopted in the trial court and foisted in the CA – by
claiming that he stabbed and killed the victim in complete self-defense. The petitioner relied on Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code in the trial and appellate courts, but adopted in this Court two divergent theories – (1) that he killed the victim to defend himself against his
unlawful aggression; hence, is justified under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that his bolo accidentally hit the victim and
is, thus, exempt from criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical.11 There is
no such defense as accidental self-defense in the realm of criminal law.

Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to
prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of another with the use of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He is aware of the
consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is based on necessity which is the supreme and irresistible master of men of all human affairs,
and of the law. From necessity, and limited by it, proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins when necessity does, and ends where it
ends.12 Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the victim, however, his act is in accordance with law so much so that the accused is
deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liabilities.13 On the other hand, the basis of exempting
circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or the absence of
negligence on the part of the accused.14 The basis of the exemption in Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is lack of negligence
and intent. The accused does not commit either an intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits a crime but there is no criminal liability
because of the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act. 15 An accident is a fortuitous
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is
unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.16

Self-defense, under Article 11, paragraph 1, and accident, under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, are affirmative defenses
which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence. Such affirmative defenses involve questions of facts adduced to the
trial and appellate courts for resolution. By admitting killing the victim in self-defense or by accident without fault or without intention of
causing it, the burden is shifted to the accused to prove such affirmative defenses. He should rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on
the weakness of that of the prosecution. If the accused fails to prove his affirmative defense, he can no longer be acquitted.

The petitioner failed to prove that the victim was killed by accident, without fault or intention on his part to cause it. The petitioner was burdened
to prove with clear and convincing evidence, the essential requisites for the exempting circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 4, viz:

1. A person is performing a lawful act;

2. With due care;

3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;

4. Without fault or intention of causing it.

To prove his affirmative defense, the petitioner relied solely on his testimony, thus:

Q What happened next when Ricky Guarte was able to push through the door and you ran away?

A When Ricky Guarte was able to push the door, that is the time I go (sic) downstairs and got my bolo and at that time the body of
Ricky Guarte was at the entrance of the door and accidentally the bolo reached him.

Q Where did you get the bolo?

A I got the bolo in the post or wall of our house.

Q Was Ricky Guarte hit the first time you boloed him?

A Not hacking but accidentally.

Q What do you mean by accidentally?

A Because when Ricky Guarte pushed the door and unbalance himself (sic) the bolo which I was carrying hit him accidentally.

Q Where was he hit by the bolo you were carrying?

A In the stomach.17

Q And since you were at the left side of the door, your right hand was at the center part of the door, correct?

A No, Sir.

Q Where was your right hand?

A Holding a bolo.

Q Where, in what part of the door?

A Right side.

Q When Ricky Guarte was pushing the door, the door was not opened?
A It was opened.

Q It was opened because you opened the door, correct?

A No, Sir.

Q Now, why was it opened?

A Because he was pushing it.

Q With his left hand?

A With his both hands and body.

Q Now, when he fell down because, according to you, he losses (sic) his balance, the left side of the body was the first to fell (sic)
down, correct?

A Yes, Sir.

Q You are sure of your answer now Mr. Toledo?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Now, and while holding that bolo, you are doing that in [an] upward position, correct?

A No, Sir, pointing the door.

Q Yes, you are pointing the tip of your bolo to the door upward, correct?

A No, Sir, steady pointing to the door.

Q Now, when the door was opened, your bolo did not hit any part of that door, correct?

A "Ginaiwas ko ang sunrang," meaning I was able to get away from hitting any part of the door.

Q The question Mr. Toledo is simple, while the door was opened and while you were pointing directly your bolo at the door, not any
part of the door hit the bolo (sic), correct?

ATTY. FORMILLEZA:

It was a valid answer, it did not hit any part of the door.

COURT:

Answer.

A No, Sir.

PROS. FRADEJAS continuing:

Q You were only about five inches away from your door while pushing it, correct?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Now, when the door was pushed already by Ricky Guarte, not any part of your body hit the door, correct?

A No, Sir.18
The petitioner also testified that the victim was armed with a balisong and threatened to kill him as the said victim pushed, with his body and
hands, the fragile door of his house:

Q Where were you when you saw Ricky went out?

A I was at the door.

Q Did Ricky proceed to the door where you were?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What did he do, if any?

A He drew his fan knife or balisong and asked me what do you like, I will stab you?

Q What did you do?

A I told him I have not done you anything wrong, I am only scolding you or telling you not to make noise.

Q What, if any, did Ricky Guarte do to you?

A He pushed the door.

Q Whose door did he push?

A My own door.

Q Where were you when he pushed the door?

A Inside our house.19

We find the testimony of the petitioner incredible and barren of probative weight.

First. If the testimony of the petitioner is to be believed, the force of the struggle between him and the victim would have caused the door to fall
on the petitioner. However, the petitioner failed to adduce real evidence that the door of his house was destroyed and that he sustained any
physical injuries,20 considering that he was only five inches away from the door.

Second. If the door fell to the sala of the house of the petitioner, the victim must have fallen on top of the door. It is incredible that the bolo of
the petitioner could have hit the stomach of the victim. The claim of the petitioner that he managed to step aside and avoid being crushed by the
door belies his claim that the bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.

Third. When he surrendered to the barangay captain and to the policemen, he failed to relate to them that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of
the victim:

Q Now, that very night when you said Ricky Guarte was accidentally hit by your bolo, you did not surrender to the police, correct?

A I surrendered to the barangay captain at one o’clock in Panique, in the afternoon.

Q Now, you only surrendered to the police when a certain person advised you to surrender, correct?

A On my own volition, I surrendered to the barangay captain.

Q You did not narrate the incident to the barangay captain whom you have surrendered, correct?

A No, Sir.

Q When you were brought to the municipal jail, you did not also narrate to the police what happened, correct?

A No, Sir.
 Q You just remained silent thinking of an excuse that happened that evening of September 16, 1995, correct?

A No, Sir.21

Fourth. There is no evidence that the petitioner surrendered either the bolo that accidentally hit the victim or the balisong held by the deceased to
the barangay captain or the police authorities. Such failure of the petitioner negates his claim that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the
victim and that he acted in self-defense.22

Fifth. To prove self-defense, the petitioner was burdened to prove the essential elements thereof, namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the petitioner; (3) employment by him of reasonable means to prevent or repel the
aggression. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstances of self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete.23 Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude.24 We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petitioner failed to prove self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete:

The evidence on record revealed that there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Ricky. While it was established that Ricky was
stabbed at the doorstep of appellant’s house which would give a semblance of verity to appellant’s version of the incident, such view,
however, is belied by the fact that Ricky arrived at appellant’s house unarmed and had only one purpose in mind, that is, to ask
appellant why he threw stones at his (Ricky’s) house. With no weapon to attack appellant, or defend himself, no sign of hostility may
be deduced from Ricky’s arrival at appellant’s doorstep. Ricky was not threatening to attack nor in any manner did he manifest any
aggressive act that may have imperiled appellant’s well-being. Ricky’s want of any weapon when he arrived at appellant’s doorstep is
supported by the fact that only one weapon was presented in court, and that weapon was the bolo belonging to appellant which he used
in stabbing Ricky. Thus, appellant’s version of the events does not support a finding of unlawful aggression. In People vs. Pletado, the
Supreme Court held:

"xxx (F) or aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, [un]expected attack or imminent danger thereof,
and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude (People vs. Pasco, Jr., supra, People vs. Rey, 172 SCRA 149 [1989])
and the accused must present proof of positively strong act of real aggression (Pacificar vs. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA
716 [1983]). Unlawful aggression must be such as to put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending
himself or of a relative sought to be defended and not an imagined threat."

Appellant was not justified in stabbing Ricky. There was no imminent threat to appellant’s life necessitating his assault on Ricky. Unlawful
aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be
an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. In the absence of such
element, appellant’s claim of self-defense must fail.

Further, appellant’s plea of self-defense is not corroborated by competent evidence. The plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained
where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is in itself extremely doubtful.25

Sixth. With the failure of the petitioner to prove self-defense, the inescapable conclusion is that he is guilty of homicide as found by the trial
court and the CA. He cannot even invoke Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.26

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 7. Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 189405, November 19, 2014

G.R. No. 189405               November 19, 2014

SHERWIN DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CARLOS ALBERTO L. GONZALES, in behalf of his deceased brother, JEFFREY WERNHER
L. GONZALES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the May 7, 2009 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding petitioner Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide,
and its August 19, 2009 Resolution2 denying his motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information3 dated March 2, 2005, which alleged:

That on or about the 1st day of January 2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, with intent to kill and with the use of an unlicensed firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one JEFFREY WERNHER GONZALES Y LIM on the head, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and moral gunshot
wound which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

According to the prosecution, on January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, petitioner went to the office of Sykes Asia Inc. located at the
25th Floor of Robinson’s Summit Center,Ayala Avenue, Makati City. When petitioner was already inside the building, he went to the work
station of the deceased victim, Jeffrey Wernher L. Gonzales (Jeffrey), who, by the configuration of the eye witness Antonette Managbanag’s
sketch, was seated fronting his computer terminal, with his back towards the aisle. As petitioner approached Jeffrey from the back, petitioner
was already holding a gun pointed at the back of Jeffrey’s head. At the last second, Jeffrey managed to deflect the hand of petitioner holding the
gun, and a short struggle for the possession of the gun ensued thereafter. Petitioner won the struggle and remained in possession of the said gun.
Petitioner then pointed the gun at Jeffrey’s face, pulled the trigger four (4) times, the fourth shot finally discharging the bullet that hit Jeffrey in
the forehead, eventually killing him. Finally, after shooting Jeffrey, petitioner fled the office.

The defense recounted a different version of the facts.

Petitioner claimed that on January1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, more or less, petitioner, together with his children, went to Sykes
Asia, the workplace of his wife, Darlene Dela Cruz (Darlene), located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s Summit Building in Makati City, to fetch
the latter so that their family could spend time and celebrate together the New Year’s Day. Before entering the Robinson’s Summit Building,
petitioner underwent the regular security check-up/procedures. He was frisked by the guards-on-duty manning the main entrance of said building
and no firearm was found in his possession. He registered his name at the security logbook and surrendered a valid I.D.

Upon reaching the 25th Floor of the same building, a security guard manning the entrance once again frisked petitioner and, likewise, found no
gun in his possession; hence, he was allowed to enter the premises of Sykes Asia. The security guard also pointed to him the direction towards
his wife’s table.

However, as Darlene was then not on her table, petitioner approached a certain man and asked the latter as to the possible whereabouts of
Darlene. The person whom petitioner had talked towas the deceased-victim, Jeffrey. After casually introducing himself as the husband of
Darlene, Jeffrey curtly told him, "Bakit mo hinahanap si Darlene?"to which he answered, "Nagpapasundo kasi sa akin."The response given by
Jeffrey shocked and appalled petitioner: "Ayaw na nga ng asawa mo sayo sinusundo mo pa!"
Shocked by the words and reaction of Jeffrey, petitioner tried to inquire from Jeffrey who he was. But Jeffrey suddenly cursed petitioner. Then,
Jeffrey suddenly picked up something in his chair which happened to be a gun and pointed the same at petitioner’s face followed by a clicking
sound. The gun, however, did not fire.

Seeing imminent danger to his life,petitioner grappled with Jeffrey for the possession of the gun.While grappling, the gunclicked for two (2) to
three (3) more times. Again, the gun did not fire.

Petitioner was able to wrest away the gun from Jeffrey and tried to run away to avoid any further confrontation with the latter.However, Jeffrey
immediately blocked petitioner’s path and shouted, "Guard! Guard!" Immediately then, Jeffrey took hold ofa big fire extinguisher, aimed and
was about to smash the same on petitioner’s head.

Acting instinctively, petitioner parried the attack while still holding the gun. While in the act of parrying, the gun accidentally fired due to the
reasonable force and contact that his parrying hand had made with the fire extinguisher and the single bullet discharged hit the forehead of
Jeffrey, which caused the latter to fall on the floor and die.

Petitioner left the gun and went out ofthe premises of Sykes Asia and proceeded towards the elevator. On his way to the elevator, he heard
Darlene shout, "Sherwin anong nangyari?", but he was not able to answer.

After said incident, Darlene abandoned petitioner and brought with her their two (2) young children. Petitioner later learned that Darlene and
Jeffrey had an illicit relationship when he received a copy of the blog of Darlene, dated January 30, 2005, sent by his friend.

During his arraignment, on August 22, 2005, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge. Thereafter, pretrial
conference was conducted on even date and trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

During the trial of the case, the prosecution presented the oral testimonies of Marie Antonette Managbanag (Managbanag), Maria Angelina
Pelaez (Pelaez) and Carlos Alberto Lim Gonzales (Gonzales), respectively. The prosecution likewise formally offered several pieces of
documentary evidence to support its claim.

For its part, the defense presented aswitnesses, petitioner himself; his brother, Simeon Sander Dela Cruz III (Cruz), Greg Lasmarias Elbanvuena
(Elbanvuena) and Managbanag, who was recalled to the witness stand as witness for the defense.

On February 26, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Makati City, Branch 147, rendered a Decision 5 finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the fallo thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, Judgment is rendered finding herein accused Sherwin Dela Cruz y Gloria Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Eight
(8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor medium as Minimum to Fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
medium as Maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of Jeffrey Wernher Gonzales y Lim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus moral damages in the
amount of ₱1 Million, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.6

On March 28, 2007, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, while private respondent, through the private prosecutor, filed a Notice of Appeal on
April 11, 2007 insofar as the sentence rendered against petitioner is concerned and the civil damages awarded.

After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). However, the latter denied their
appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with modification on the civil liability of petitioner. The decretal portion of the Decision7 reads:
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147 dated 26 February 2007 finding accused-
appellant Sherwin Dela Cruz y Gloria GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime ofHomicide with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

(2) the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

(3) the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages;

(4) the amount of ₱3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning capacity.

(5) to pay the costs of the litigation.

SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.

Raised are the following issues for resolution:

1. WHETHER ALL THE REQUISITES OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE, AS PROVIDED FOR BY
LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE.

2. WHETHER THE FIRING OF THE GUN WHEREIN ONLY A SINGLE BULLET WAS DISCHARGED THEREFROM WAS
MERELY ACCIDENTAL WHICH OCCURRED DURING THE TIME THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT WAS STILL IN
THE ACT OF DEFENDING HIMSELF FROM THE CONTINUOUS UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION OF THE DECEASED VICTIM.

3. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE
CRIME OF HOMICIDE.

4. WHETHER THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.

5. WHETHER PETITIONER-APPELLANT MAY BE HELD CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM ARISING
FROM THE ACCIDENT THAT TRANSPIRED.9

There is no question that petitioner authored the death of the deceased-victim, Jeffrey. What is leftfor determination by this Court is whether the
elements of self-defenseexist to exculpate petitioner from the criminal liability for Homicide.

The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lackof sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. 10 In other
words, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe
wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.11

Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from any criminal liability, it is well settled thatwhen he invokes the same, it
becomes incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. 12 The burden of proving that
the killing was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor shifts upon him. 13 As such, he must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution for, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused
himself has admitted the killing.14

Measured against this criteria, wefind that petitioner's defense is sorely wanting. Hence, his petition must be denied.

First. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's contention that unlawful aggression was employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey,
against him.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger — not merely
threatening and intimidating action.15 There is aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life. 16 The peril
sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely speculative. 17 In the case at bar, other than petitioner’s testimony, the defense did
not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey condescendingly responded to petitioner’s questions or initiated the confrontation before the shooting
incident; that Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed — an assault which may have caused petitioner to fear
for his life.

Even assuming arguendothat the gun originated from Jeffrey and an altercation transpired, and therefore, danger may have in fact existed, the
imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment petitioner disarmed Jeffrey by wresting the gun from the latter. After petitioner had
successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly
observed by the RTC, petitioner had every opportunity to run away from the scene and seek help but refused to do so, thus:

In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun.1avvphi1 Accused admitted that he wrested the gun from the victim.
From that point in time until the victim shouted "guard, guard", then took the fire extinguisher, there was no unlawful aggression coming from
the victim. Accused had the opportunity to run away. Therefore, even assuming that the aggression with use of the gun initially came from the
victim, the fact remains that it ceased when the gun was wrested away by the accused from the victim. It is settled that when unlawful aggression
ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed (Peo
Vs. Tagana, 424 SCRA 620). A person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased
(PeoVs. Pateo, 430 SCRA 609).

Accused alleged that the victimwas about to smash the fire extinguisher on his (accused’s) headbut he parried it with his hand holding the gun.
This is doubtful as nothing in the records is or would be corroborative of it.In contrast, the two (2) Prosecution witnesses whose credibility was
not impeached, both gave the impression that the victim got the fire extinguisher to shieldhimself from the accused who was then already in
possession of the gun.18
Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even wound the
former aggressor.19 To be sure, when the present victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his attack was
no longer in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on the part of the offender. 20 Undoubtedly,
petitioner went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on Jeffrey, even when the
allegedly unlawful aggression had already ceased.

More, a review of the testimony of the prosecution witness, Pelaez, will show that if there was unlawful aggression in the instant case, the same
rather emanated from petitioner, thus: DIRECT EXAMINATION

Atty. Mariano:

Q: Can you relate to the Court, Ms. Witness, how did this incident happen?

A: We were still at work, we were expecting calls but there were no calls at the moment and I was standing at my work station and then Sherwin
approached Jeff and he pointed a gun at the back of the head of Jeff.

Q: And then what happened?

A: And then Jeff parried the gun and they started struggling for the possession of the gun.

Q: How far were you from this struggle when you witnessed it?

A: Probably 10 to 12 feet.

Q: Going back to your story, Ms. Witness, you mentioned that after Jeffrey warded off the gun, they started to struggle, what happened after that,
if any?

A: After they struggled, the gun clicked three times and then after that Jeff tried to get hold of the fire extinguisher and the fourth shot went off
and then Jeffrey fell down.

Q: And who was holding the gun?

A: Sherwin was holding the gun. (TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 12-14) CROSS-EXAMINATION: Atty. Agoot:

Q: So you did not see when Sherwin approached Jeffrey because he came from the other side? Atty. Mariano:

Objection, your Honor, witness already answered that.

Atty. Agoot:

I am on cross examination, your Honor.

COURT

You didn’t not see when he approached Jeffrey? A: No, as I said, I saw him point the gun at the back of Jeff and he did not come from my side
so that means…

COURT

No, the question is, You did not actually see Sherwin approached Jeffrey?

A: I saw him already at the back of Jeffrey.

Atty. Agoot

He was already at the back of Jeffrey when you saw him?

A: Yes, Sir.

(TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 26-27)21

Clearly, petitioner's allegation that when he approached Jeffrey, the latter pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot him, is not corroborated
by separate competent evidence. Pitted against the testimony of prosecution witnesses, Managbanag and Pelaez, it pales incomparison and loses
probative value. We have, on more thanone occasion, ruled that the plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only
uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but also extremely doubtful in itself.22

In addition, other than petitioner’s testimony, there is dearth of evidence showing that the alleged unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey
continued when he blocked the path of petitioner while the latter tried to run away to avoid further confrontation with Jeffrey. We also agree
with the findings of the RTC that there was no proof evincing that Jeffrey aimed and intended to smash the big fire extinguisher on petitioner’s
head. Alternatively, the prosecution witnesses maintained an impression that Jeffrey used the same to shield himself from petitioner who was
then in possession of the gun, a deadly weapon. An excerpt of the testimony of Managbanag bares just that, to wit:

Atty. Agoot

Q: And then after pulling the fire extinguisher from the wall Jeffrey again faced the person who was holding the gun already?

Witness:

A: He was holding the fire extinguisher like this.

COURT

For the record.

Atty. Mariano:

Witness demonstrating how the victim Jeffrey Gonzales was holding the fire extinguisher upright with his right hand above the fire extinguisher
and his left hand below the fire extinguisher.

Witness:

The left hand would support the weight basically.

Atty. Agoot

Q: And then he used that fire extinguisher to protect himself from the slapping of that person who was in possession of the gun?

Witness

A: Yes, sir.

Atty. Agoot

Q: And then after that there was again a grappling?

Witness

A: No more grappling for possession. Because Jeffrey was still holding the fire extinguisher at thattime. And then he fell holding on to the fire
extinguisher.

Atty. Agoot

Q: You said here which I quote "binaril siya ng lalaki ng sunod-sunod pero hindi pumutok" Do you affirmand confirm this statement?

Witness

A: Yes, sir. They were pushing each other. The other person was trying to point the gun at Jeffrey and Jeffrey was trying to cover himself with
the fire extinguisher so nagkakatulakan sila at the same time.

Atty. Agoot
Q: You said that the gun clicked, how many times did the gun click without firing?

Witness

A: Three (3) times, sir.

Atty. Agoot

Q: And what did the late Jeffrey do when the gun clicked but did not fire?

Witness

A: They were still pushing each other at that time.

Atty. Agoot

Q: Using the fire extinguisher, heused that to push against the person…

Witness

A: Basically trying to cover himself and trying to push away the person who was pointing the gun at him.

Atty. Agoot

Q: And why do you know that Jeffrey was trying hard to push the fire extinguisher?

Witness

A: Because I was seated roughly about 5 to 6 feet away from them. So I clearly saw what was going on at that time.

(Direct Examination of Marie Antonette Managbanag for the Defense, TSN dated 04 September 2006, pp. 12-17, emphasis supplied)23

Petitioner’s contention that Jeffrey’s unlawful aggression was continuous and imminent is, therefore, devoid of merit.

Given that the criteria of unlawful aggression is indubitably absent in the instant case, the severe wounds inflicted by petitioner upon Jeffrey was
unwarranted and, therefore, cannot be considered a justifying circumstance under pertinent laws and jurisprudence.

Second. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the deceased victim, Jeffrey, the means employed by petitioner was not
reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent of the alleged attack, which he sought to avert. As held by the Court in People v. Obordo:24

Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, accused-appellant likewise failed to prove that the means
he employed to repel Homer's punch was reasonable. The means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational
equivalence between the means of attack and the defense. Accused appellant claimed that the victim punched him and was trying to get
something from his waist, so he (accused-appellant) stabbed the victim with his hunting knife. His act of immediately stabbing Homer and
inflicting a wound on a vital part ofthe victim's body was unreasonable and unnecessary considering that, as alleged by accused-appellant
himself, the victim used his bare fist in throwing a punch at him.25

Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. The
opposite was, however, employed by petitioner, as correctly pointed out by the RTC, thus:

The victim was holding the fire extinguisher while the second was holding the gun. The gun and the discharge thereof was unnecessary and
disproportionate to repel the alleged aggression with the use of fire extinguisher. The rule is that the means employed by the person invoking
self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense (Peo vs. Obordo, 382 SCRA 98).

It was the accused who was in a vantage position as he was armed with a gun, as against the victim who was armed, so to speak, with a fire
extinguisher, which is not a deadly weapon. Under the circumstances, accused’s alleged fear was unfounded. The Supreme Court has ruled that
neither an imagined impending attack nor an impending or threatening attitude is sufficient to constitute unlawful aggression (Catalina Security
Agency Vs. Gonzales-Decano, 429 SCRA 628). It is a settled rule that to constitute aggression, the person attacked must be confronted by a real
threat on his lifeand limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not merely imaginary (Senoja v. Peo., 440 SCRA 695).26
If petitioner had honestly believed that Jeffrey was trying to kill him, he should have just run, despite any obstruction, considering that he was
already in possession of the gun. He could have also immediately sought help from the people around him, specifically the guard stationed at the
floor where the shooting incident happened. In fact, he could have reported the incident to the authorities as soon as he had opportunity to do so,
if it was indeed an accident or a cry of self-preservation. Yet, petitioner never did any of that.

We find it highly specious for petitioner to go through the process of tussling and hassling with Jeffrey, and inthe end, shooting the latter on the
forehead, not only once, but four times, the last shot finally killing him, if he had no intention to hurt Jeffrey. Thus:

Moreover, the Prosecution’s eyewitnesses were consistent in declaring that while there was prior struggle for the possession of the gun, it was
nevertheless accused who was holding the gun at the time of the actual firing thereof (TSN, p. 30, October 10, 2005; TSN, p. 14, October 17,
2005). Witness Managbanag even alleged that while the victim (Jeffrey), who was in possession of the fire extinguisher, and the accused were
pushing each other, accused pointed the gun at the victim. She heard three (3) clicks and on the 4th , the gun fired (TSN, p. 12, October 10,
2005). Under the circumstances, it cannot be safely said that the gun was or could have been fired accidentally. The discharge of the gun which
led to the victim’s death was no longer made in the course of the grapple and/or struggle for the possession of the gun.27

The observation of the RTC dispels any doubt that the gun may have been shot accidentally to the detriment of Jeffrey. The fire was neither a
disaster nor a misfortune of sorts. While petitioner may nothave intended to kill Jeffrey at the onset, at the time he clicked the trigger thrice
consecutively, his intent to hurt (or even kill) Jeffrey was too plain to be disregarded. We have held in the pastthat the nature and number of
wounds are constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia which disprove a plea of self-defense.28 Thus, petitioner’s contention that
an accident simultaneously occurred while hewas in the act of self-defense is simply absurd and preposterous at best. There could nothave been
an accident because the victim herein suffered a gunshot wound on his head, a vital part of the body and, thus, demonstrates a criminal mind
resolved to end the life of the victim.

Besides, petitioner’s failure to inform the police of the unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey and to surrender the gun that he used to kill the
victim militates against his claim of self-defense.29

In view of the foregoing, we find it illogical to discuss further the third element of self-defense since it is recognized that unlawful aggression is
a conditio sine qua nonfor upholding the justifying circumstance of self-defense.30 If there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites
of self-defense will have no basis.31 Hence, there is no basis to entertain petitioner’s argument that a privileged mitigating circumstance of
selfdefense is applicable in this case, because unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other, there can be no self-
defense, complete or incomplete, on the part of the latter.32

Anent petitioner’s argument thatthe RTC erred when it failed to consider as suppression of evidence the prosecution’s alleged deliberate
omission to present the testimonies of the security guards-on-duty at the time of the shooting incident, the same fails to persuade. We concur
with the decision of the CA on this point, to wit:

Having admitted the killing of the victim, the burden of evidence that he acted in self-defense, shifted to accused-appellant Dela Cruz. He must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be
disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the killing.

The security guards on duty at the time of the subject incident were at the disposal of both the prosecution and the defense. The defense did not
proffer proof that the prosecution prevented the security guards from testifying. There is therefore no basis for it to conclude that the prosecution
is guilty of suppression of evidence.

The defense could have easily presented the security guards if it is of the opinion that their [the security guards] testimonies were vital and
material to the case of the defense. It could have compelled the security guards on duty to appear before the court. xxx.33

It is worthy to note that the question of whether petitioner acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact. 34 It is the peculiar province of the
trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses and related questions of fact because of its superior advantage in observing the conduct and
demeanor of witnesses while testifying. 35 This being so and in the absence of a showing that the CA and the RTC failed to appreciate facts or
circumstances of such weight and substance that would have merited petitioner's acquittal, this Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the
ruling of the CA that petitioner did not act in self-defense.36

In this regard, we do not subscribe to petitioner’s contention that since the incident transpired in Jeffrey’s office, and the witnesses presented by
the prosecution are known officemates of Jeffrey, the witnesses are expected to testify in favor of Jeffrey and against petitioner. Ascorrectly
pointed out by respondent, there appears no motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against petitioner. 37 The fact that
they are officemates of Jeffrey does not justify a conclusion that Managbanag and Pelaez would concoct or fabricate stories in favorof Jeffrey for
the mere purpose of implicating petitioner with such a serious crime, especially since they are testifying under oath.

All told, we find no basis to doubt ordispute, much less overturn, the findings of the RTC and the CA that the elements of homicide are present
in the instant case as amply shown by the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses, and they constitute sufficient proof of the guilt of
petitioner beyond cavil or doubt.

Nevertheless, with regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm, we deviate from the findings of
the CA. A perusal of the Information will show that the use of unlicensed firearm was expressly alleged in the killing of Jeffrey. This allegation
was further proved during trial by the presentation of the Certification from the PNP Firearms and Explosives Division, dated November 11,
2005, certifying that petitioner is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and calibre, per verification from the records of the said
Division. Accordingly, under Paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, amending Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1866, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance, to wit:

xxxx

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.

x x x x.

Under Article 249 of the RPC, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being an aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearm, the penalty imposable on petitioner should be in its maximum period.38 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the petitioner shall be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as the minimum penalty, to seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum, as the maximum penalty.

As to the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and damages for loss of earning capacity in favor ofprivate respondent, we sustain the
findings of the CA in so far as they are in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. In addition, we find the grant of exemplary damages in the
present case in order, since the presence of special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm has been established. 39 Based on
current jurisprudence, the award of exemplary damages for homicide is ₱30,000.00.40

Finally, pursuant to this Court’s ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,41 an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the aggregate amount awarded
for civil indemnity and damages for loss of earning capacity shall be imposed, computed from the time of finality of this Decision until full
payment thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 7, 2009 Decision and August 19, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 89257, finding petitioner Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS, to wit:

(1) Petitioner shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as the minimum
penalty, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum, as the maximum penalty;

(2) Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim the following:

a. the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

b. the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

c. the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages;

d. the amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages;

e. the amount of ₱3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning capacity;

f. for the civil indemnity and the damages for loss of earning capacity, an interest of six percent (6%) per annum, computed from the
time of finality of this Decision until full payment thereof; and

g. the costs of the litigation.

SO ORDERED.
 8. Guevarra v. People, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014

G.R. No. 170462               February 5, 2014

RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision2 dated October 24, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
28899. The CA affirmed, with modification on the amount of damages, the joint decision3 dated April 16, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 20, Cauayan City, Isabela, finding Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra (petitioners) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide.

Factual Antecedents

Rodolfo and his son, Joey, were charged with the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide under two Informations which read:

In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1560 for Frustrated Homicide:

That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill and without any just motive,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack, hack and stab for several times with a sharp pointed bolo one Erwin
Ordonez, who as a result thereof, suffered multiple hack and stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which injuries would ordinarily
cause the death of the said Erwin Ordonez, thus, performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of homicide as a
consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of their will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to the said Erwin Ordonez, which prevented his death.4

In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1561 for Homicide:

That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill and without any just motive,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack, hack and stab for several times with a sharp pointed bolo one David
Ordonez, who as a result thereof, suffered multiple hack and stab wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused his death.5

Although the informations stated that the crimes were committed on January 8, 2000, the true date of their commission is November 8, 2000, as
confirmed by the CA through the records.6 The parties failed to raise any objection to the discrepancy.7

On arraignment, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to both charges. 8 The cases were jointly tried with the conformity of the prosecution and the
defense. At the pre-trial, the petitioners interposed self-defense, which prompted the RTC to conduct a reverse trial of the case.9

During the trial, the parties presented different versions of the events that transpired on November 8, 2000.

Version of the Defense

To prove the petitioners' claim of self-defense, the defense presented the testimonies of Rodolfo, Joey, and the petitioners' neighbor, Balbino
Agustin.

Testimony of Rodolfo

Rodolfo, who was then fifty-five (55) years old, narrated that, at around 11 :00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, brothers Erwin Ordonez and David
Ordonez, together with their companion, Philip Vingua, forced their way into his compound and threw stones at his house and tricycle. Through
the back door of his house, Rodolfo went down to the basement or "silung' and shouted at the three men to stop. David saw him, threatened to
kill him, and struck him with a ''panabas," hitting him on the palm of his left hand. Rodolfo responded by reaching for the bolo tucked in the
"so/era" of his house, and hacked and stabbed Erwin and David until the two brothers fell to the ground. Upon seeing Erwin and David lying on
the ground, Rodolfo called on someone to bring the brothers to the hospital. He stayed in his house until the policemen arrived.

Testimony of Joey

Joey, who was then thirty-one (31) years old, narrated that, at around 11:00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he was awakened by the sound of stones
being thrown at their house in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela. Through the window, he saw Erwin, David and Philip breaking into their gate,
which was made of wood and interlink wire and located five ( 5) to six ( 6) meters away from their house. He then heard his father Rodolfo say
to the three men, "kung ano man ang problema bukas na natin pag-usapan," 10 and David retorted in their dialect, "Okininam nga lakay adda ka
gayam dita, patayin taka."11

Testimony of Balbino

Balbino narrated that, from inside his house in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela, at around 10:00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he heard a person
from the outside saying "Sige banatan ninyo na."12 He opened his door and saw David, Erwin and Philip throwing stones at the house of his
neighbor Crisanto Briones. Briones got mad and scolded the three men, "Why are you hitting my house? Why don't you hit the house of your
enemy, mga tarantado kayo!"13 David, Erwin and Philip then aimed their stones at the petitioners' house. Balbino heard David calling out to
Joey, "Joey, kung tunay kang lalaki lumabas ka diyan sa kalsada at dito tayo magpatayan," 14 but no one came out of Rodolfo's house. The
stoning lasted for about thirty (30) minutes.

Afterwards, Balbino saw David, Erwin and Philip destroy Rodolfo's gate and pull the gate towards the road. He heard David say to his
companions, "koberan ninyo ako at papasok kami."15 David, Erwin and Philip entered the petitioners' compound and damaged Rodolfo's tricycle
with stones and their ''panabas." Also, he heard Rodolfo say to David in Filipino that they could just talk about their problems with him the
following day. But David

Version of the Prosecution

As its rebuttal witness, the prosecution presented the sole testimony of Erwin who survived the hacking. approached Rodolfo and hacked him
with a ''panabas." Rodolfo parried the blow with the back of his hand, and David and Rodolfo struggled for the possession of the ''panabas."

Balbino also saw Erwin hit Rodolfo on the face with a stone and Joey was hit on his right foot, causing Rodolfo and Joey to retreat to the
"silung" of their house from where Rodolfo got "something shiny," and with it stabbed David and Erwin. He saw the two brothers fall to the
ground.

Erwin narrated that, at around 10:00 to 11 :00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he, his brother David and Philip went to a birthday party and passed
in front of the petitioners' compound. He was walking twenty (20) meters ahead of his companions when, suddenly, Philip ran up to him saying
that David was being stabbed by Joey with a bolo. While approaching the scene of the stabbing, which was three (3) meters away from where his
brother David was, Erwin was met by Rodolfo who then hacked him, hitting his arm and back. Thereafter, Rodolfo and Joey dragged Erwin
inside the petitioners' compound and kept on hacking him. He was hacked and stabbed thirteen (13) times. He became weak and ultimately fell
to the ground.

Erwin denied that he and David threw stones at the petitioners' house and damaged Rodolfo's tricycle.1âwphi1 They did not likewise destroy the
petitioners' gate, which was only damaged when his brother David clung on to it while he was being pulled by Rodolfo and Erwin into their
compound. While they were being hacked and stabbed by Rodolfo and Erwin, stones actually rained on them and people outside the petitioners'
gate were saying, "Do not kill the brothers. Allow them to come out."16

After the incident, Erwin and David, both unconscious, were brought to the hospital. David died in the hospital while being treated for his
wounds.

The RTC's Ruling

In a decision dated April 16, 2004, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution's version of the incident and found the petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide. It disbelieved the defense's version of the events due to material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the defense witnesses. It denied the petitioners' claim of self-defense for lack of clear, convincing and
satisfactory supporting evidence.

The RTC explained in its decision that "[w]hen an accused invokes the justifying circumstance of self-defense, he loses the constitutional
presumption of innocence and assumes the burden of proving, with clear and convincing evidence, the justification for his act";17 that self-
defense is an affirmative allegation which must be proven with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any
vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it.18 The RTC held that the petitioners miserably failed to prove that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the victims, Erwin and David.

Accordingly, the RTC disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes for which they are
charged, and absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance/s that attended the commission of the crimes, the Court hereby sentences each of
the accused to suffer -In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1560 for Frustrated Homicide - an indeterminate penalty ranging from Three (3) years and
one day of prision correccional as minimum to Nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum and to indemnify the victim Erwin Ordonez moral
damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand (₱20,000.00) Pesos, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Cost against the
accused.

In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1561 for Homicide - an indeterminate penalty ranging from Eight (8) years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased David Ordonez Sixty Thousand
(₱60,000.00) Pesos plus Thirty Thousand (₱30,000.00) Pesos as moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Costs
against the accused.

The bail bonds of the accused are CANCELLED.19

The CA's Ruling

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment and convicted the petitioners of the crimes charged. As the RTC did, the CA found that Erwin
and David committed no unlawful aggression sufficient to provoke the actions of the petitioners; that "aggression, to be unlawful, must be actual
and imminent, such that there is a real threat of bodily harm to the person resorting to self-defense or to others whom that person is seeking to
defend."20 Even assuming the truth of the petitioners' claims that David challenged Joey to a fight and threatened to kill Rodolfo on the night of
November 8, 2000, the CA held that these acts do not constitute unlawful aggression to justify the petitioners' actions as no real or actual danger
existed as the petitioners were then inside the safety of their own home.

The CA further held that the petitioners' plea of self-defense was belied by the nature and number of wounds inflicted on Erwin, who sustained
thirteen (13) stab wounds on his arm and back, and David, who suffered around ten (10) stab wounds on his back and stomach causing his death.
These wounds logically indicated that the assault was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined homicidal aggression on the part of the
petitioners.21

The CA, however, found error in the amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded by the RTC. Thus, the CA modified the RTC's
decision in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1561, appellants RODOLFO
GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA are each ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased David Ordonez the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P.50,000.00) as civil indemnity and another Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages.22

The Petition

In the present petition, the petitioners raise the following issues:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF THE
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE ELEMENTS
OF SELF-DEFENSE.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
LONE WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION.

C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER JOEY GUEVARRA WHO
HAS NO PARTICIPATION IN THE SAID INCIDENT.23

Our Ruling

We deny the present petition as we find no reversible error in the CA decision of October 24, 2005.

At the outset, we emphasize that the Court's review of the present case is via a petition for review under Rule 45, which generally bars any
question pertaining to the factual issues raised. The well-settled rule is that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule
45, subject only to certain exceptions, among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial court's judgment or the appellate court's
misapprehension of the adduced facts.24

The petitioners fail to convince us that we should review the findings of fact in this case. Factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA,
are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record. 25 We find
that both the RTC and the CA fully considered the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, and they have adequately explained
the legal and evidentiary reasons in concluding that the petitioners are guilty of the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide.

In the absence of any showing that the trial and appellate courts overlooked certain facts and circumstances that could substantially affect the
outcome of the present case, we uphold the rulings of the RTC and the CA which found the elements of these crimes fully established during the
trial.

The crime of frustrated homicide is committed when: (1) an "accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in
his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying
circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is present."26

On the other hand, the crime of homicide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the accused killed that person without any justifying
circumstance; (3) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and ( 4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide.27

The petitioners' intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of wounds sustained by their victims. Evidence to prove intent to
kill in crimes against persons may consist, among other things, of the means used by the malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at
the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim. 28 The CA aptly
observed that the ten (10) hack/stab wounds David suffered and which eventually caused his death, and the thirteen (13) hack/stab wounds Erwin
sustained, confirmed the prosecution's theory that the petitioners purposely and vigorously attacked David and Erwin.29

In fact, the petitioners admitted at the pre-trial that "the wounds inflicted on the victim Erwin Ordonez would have caused his death were it not
for immediate medical attendance."30

By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the acts for which they were charged, albeit under
circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated them. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to the petitioners to show that the
killing and frustrated killing of David and Erwin, respectively, were attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part
of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the persons resorting to self-defense.31

Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual
physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. 32 The element of unlawful aggression must be proven first in
order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had
committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.33

As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims. As the prosecution fully
established, Erwin and David were just passing by the petitioners' compound on the night of November 8, 2000 when David was suddenly
attacked by Joey while Erwin was attacked by Rodolfo. The attack actually took place outside, not inside, the petitioners' compound, as
evidenced by the way the petitioners' gate was destroyed. The manner by which the wooden gate post was broken coincided with Erwin's
testimony that his brother David, who was then clinging onto the gate, was dragged into the petitioners' compound. These circumstances,
coupled with the nature and number of wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show that the petitioners did not act in self-defense in killing
David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in fact, the real aggressors.

As to the penalties and damages

awarded

We affirm the penalties imposed upon the petitioners, as they are well within the ranges provided by law, but modify the damages awarded by
the CA.
In addition to the ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 moral damages awarded by the CA, we award ₱25,000.00 to each of the victims as
temperate damages, in lieu of the actual damages they sustained by reason of the crimes. Article 2224 of the Civil Code states that temperate or
moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with
certainty.

Also, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from date of finality of the
decision until fully paid.34

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated October 24, 2005 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the petitioners are also ordered to pay Erwin Ordonez and the heirs of David Ordonez the amount of ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages.

The petitioners shall pay interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the civil indemnity, moral and temperate damages from the finality
of this decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

9. People v. Sevillano, G.R. No. 200800, February 09, 2015

G.R. No. 200800               February 9, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
OSCAR SEVILLANO y RETANAL Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

For this Court's resolution is the appeal filed by Oscar Sevillano y Retanal (appellant) assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 04257 which affirmed the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) 4 December 2009 Judgment 2 finding the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

Factual Antecedents

Appellant was charged before the RTC, Branch 1 7, Manila with murder in an information that reads:

That on or about March 11, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of PABLO
MADDAUIN y TAMANG by then and there suddenly and unexpectedly stabbing him several times with a deadly bladed weapon hitting upon
the said Pablo T. Maddauin fatal stab wounds which are the direct cause of his death immediately thereafter.3

During arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial thereafter ensued.

Statement of Facts

The version of the prosecution was summarized by the CA thus wise:

Prosecution witnesses Jose Palavorin and Carmelita Cardona, 67 and 46 years old, respectively, testified that at around 3:00 p.m. of 11 March
2007, they, together with Victim Pablo Maddauin, were seated on a long bench having their usual chit-chat at the vacant lot situated at 4th Street
Guadal Canal, St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. Witness Jose was the watchman of this property. While conversing, they saw appellant coming towards
their direction. Appellant could not walk straight and appeared to be drunk. Without warning, appellant pulled out a knife from his waist and
stabbed the victim on the chest. Jose and Carmelita tried to restrain the appellant from attacking the victim, but Jose experienced leg cramps and
lost his hold on appellant. Appellant turned again on the victim and continued to stab him several times more. The victim was heard asking
appellant, "Bakit?". Carmelita shouted for help. The victim’s wife came to the scene and embraced appellant as she wrestled for the knife.
Thereafter, [the] victim was brought to the University of the East Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Medical center; but unfortunately, he died that
same day.4

Appellant, for his part, denied the accusations against him. He interposed self-defense to absolve himself from criminal liability. He averred that
on that fateful afternoon, he went to the vacant lot where the victim and his friends usually hang-out to feed his chicken. While thereat, the
victim, whom he described to have bloodshot eyes, walk towards him and stepped on his injured foot. While he was on his knees because of the
pain, he saw the victim draw a knife. The latter thereafter stabbed at him while uttering: "Ikaw pa, putang ina mo," but missed his target. As he
and the victim grappled for the knife, the latter was accidentally stabbed. When he saw blood oozing out of the victim, he became apprehensive
of the victim’s relative to such extent that he fled the scene and hid to as far as Bulacan where he was eventually apprehended.

Ruling of the RTC

In a Judgment5 dated 4 December 2009, the trial court found appellant guilty of murder for the death of Pablo Maddauin (Pablo) and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole and to pay the heirs of the deceased ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The trial court gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that appellant, who appeared to be intoxicated, unexpectedly arrived
and stabbed Pablo seven times with a knife. The trial court disregarded appellant’s denial as his testimony was outweighed by the positive
statements of the prosecution witnesses. It likewise ruled that treachery attended the commission of the crime, as demonstrated by the fact that
the victim was seated and engaged in a conversation when suddenly attacked by the appellant. The trial court ruled that such situation foreclosed
any opportunity on the part of the victim to ward off the impending harm.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In his appeal before the CA, appellant contended that:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S GUILT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED
HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYONDREASONABLE DOUBT.

II

ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS LIABLE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF MURDER INSTEAD OF HOMICIDE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED INNOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE.6

The CA found no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and upheld its ruling but with modification on the amount of damages awarded. The
CA ordered appellant to indemnify the heirs of Pablo in the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The appellate court held that the eyewitness accounts of prosecution witnesses Jose Palavorin and Carmelita
Cardona, and their positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator, aptly complemented by the findings of the postmortem examination, are
more plausible than the appellant’s claim of self-defense.7 The CA likewise sustained the trial court’s findings that the qualifying circumstance
of treachery was present in the case. It held that although the attack on the victim was frontal, it was deliberate, sudden and unexpected,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or to defend himself.8

Issues

Undaunted, appellant is now before this Court continuing to insist that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, and that the lower
courts erred in rejecting his claim of self-defense and convicting him of murder instead of homicide.

Our Ruling

We find the appeal bereft of merit.

Well entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, as the trial
judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and has the unique opportunity to observe the witness first hand and note
his demeanor, conduct and attitude under gruelling examination. 9 Absent any showing that the trial court’s calibration of credibility was flawed,
the appellate court is bound by its assessment. In the prosecution of the crime of murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), the following elements must be established by the prosecution: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person; (3)
that the killing was attended by treachery; and (4) that the killing is not infanticide or parricide.10

After a careful evaluation of the records, we find that these elements were clearly met. The prosecution witnesses positively identified the
appellant as the person who stabbed Pablo several times on the chest which eventually caused the latter’s death. They testified that they even
tried to stop appellant’s attack but unfortunately, were unsuccessful. We find no reason to disbelieve the testimonies of these witnesses
considering that their narration of facts were straightforward and replete with details that coincide with the medical examination conducted on
the body of the victim. We are not persuaded by the appellant’s defense of denial as this cannot prevail over the eyewitnesses’ positive
identification of him as the perpetrator of the crime. Denial, like alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-
serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.11

Anent the presence of the element of treachery as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution was able to establish that the attack on the
unsuspecting victim, who was merely seated on a bench and talking with his friends, was very sudden. In fact, the victim was able to utter only
"Bakit?". We note that the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of the crime,
depriving the former of any chance to defend himself or to repel the aggression, thus insuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and
without any provocation on the part of the victim.

By invoking self-defense, appellant in effect, admits to having inflicted the stab wounds which killed the victim.1âwphi1 The burden was,
therefore, shifted on him to prove that the killing was done in self-defense. In Razon v. People,12 this Court held that where an accused admits
the killing, he assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his
admission that he killed the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when corroborated by independent and competent evidence or
when it is extremely doubtful by itself.

Under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the following elements must be present in order that a plea of self-defense may be validly considered
in absolving a person from criminal liability:

First. Unlawful Aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Appellant’s version that it was the victim who was armed with a knife and threatened to stab him was found by the lower court to be untenable.
We agree with the lower court’s conclusion. Assuming arguendo that there was indeed unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the
imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment appellant was able to wrestle the knife from him. Thus, there was no longer any
unlawful aggression to speak of that would justify the need for him to kill the victim or the former aggressor. This Court has ruled that if an
accused still persists in attacking his adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense. 13 The fact that the victim
suffered many stab wounds in the body that caused his demise, and the nature and location of the wound also belies and negates the claim of
self-defense. It demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim.14

As to the penalties and damages

We affirm the penalty imposed upon appellant. Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended, the crime of murder qualified by treachery is
penalized with reclusion perpetua to death. The lower courts were correct in sentencing appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
upon consideration of the absence of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense.

We likewise affirm the CA’s award of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages to
the victim’s heirs, as these amounts are consistent with current jurisprudence. 15 In addition, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of the resolution until fully paid.16

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 17 August 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 04257 finding Oscar
Sevillano y Retanal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of
parole, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Pablo Maddauin in the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that he shall pay interest at the rate of six
percent ( 6%) per annum on the civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages awarded from finality of this resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.