ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD vs CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R.

No. 197762, March 7, 2017

FACTS:
CESB filed the instant Petition imputing grave abuse of discretion to respondent CSC.
It asserts that (a) the CSC has no jurisdiction to review the Resolution of the CESB,
given the latter's autonomy as an attached agency; (b) CESB Resolution No. 918
should have been appealed to the Office of the President, and not to the CSC, in
accordance with Article IV, Part III of the Integrated Reorganization Plan. The subject
PAO positions are supposedly part of the CES, based on criteria established by the
CESB. These criteria were set pursuant to the latter's power to identify positions
belonging to the third-level of the civil service and to prescribe the requirements for
entry thereto.

ISSUE:
Whether the CSC acted in accordance with law when it reversed the CESB and
declared that third-level eligibility is not required for occupants of the subject PAO
positions.

RULING:
On this point, the CESB argues that third-level eligibility is required for the positions
pursuant to R.A. 9406 in relation to R.A. 10071. -- The latter law is the old one that
governs the NPS and requires third-level eligibility for senior prosecutorial posts.
According to the CESB, R.A. 10071 cannot apply, because R.A. 9406 could not have
referred to a law that had not yet been enacted at the time. It also asserts that the
subsequent declassification of prosecutors cannot benefit members of the PAO,
because the prosecutors exercise quasi-judicial functions while the PAO members do
not.
On the other hand, the CSC argues that nowhere in R.A. 9406, P.D. 1275, R.A. 10071
or Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129 is there a reference to third-level eligibility and
CESO rank as qualification requirements. It emphasizes that the CESB cannot add to
the provisions of these laws, which only require the practice of law for a certain period
of time and presuppose a bar license.--It also claims that the legislature could never
have intended to require third-level eligibility for occupants of the subject posts when
it enacted R.A. 9406.
After a careful consideration of the relevant statutes and rules, this Court agrees with
the conclusion of the CSC. To require the occupants of the subject PAO positions to
possess third-level eligibility would be to amend the law and defeat its spirit and intent.
NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION, (NPC DAMA) vs. THE
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), G.R. No. 156208, September 26,
2006

FACTS:
On 8 June 2001, Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the "Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA Law), was approved and signed into law by
PGMA. Under the EPIRA Law, a new National Power Board of Directors was
constituted. On 27 February 2002, the Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE)
promulgated the IRR of the EPIRA Law. Said IRR were approved by the Joint
Congressional Power Commission on even date. The NPB passed Resolution No.
2002-124 which provided for the Guidelines on the Separation Program of the NPC
and the Selection and Placement of Personnel in the NPC Table of Organization.
Under said Resolution, all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on 31 January
2003, and shall be entitled to separation benefits.
Petitioners argue that the challenged NPB Resolutions are unlawful and without force
and effect since only three members of the lawfully constituted Board of Directors were
present when they were passed and issued. Furthermore, the other four members who
attended the meeting and signed the Resolutions were not the secretaries of their
respective departments, but rather representatives or selected alternates of the
officials who were appointed to the NPB under the EPIRA Law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 were properly
enacted.

RULING:
No. In the case at bar, it is not difficult to comprehend that in approving NPB
Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, it is the representatives of the
secretaries of the different executive departments and not the secretaries themselves
who exercised judgment in passing the assailed Resolution, as shown by the fact that
it is the signatures of the respective representatives that are affixed to the questioned
Resolutions. This, to our mind, violates the duty imposed upon the specifically
enumerated department heads to employ their own sound discretion in exercising the
corporate powers of the NPC. Evidently, the votes cast by these mere representatives
in favor of the adoption of the said Resolutions must not be considered in determining
whether or not the necessary number of votes was garnered in order that the assailed
Resolutions may be validly enacted. Hence, there being only three valid votes cast out
of the nine board members, namely those of DOE Secretary Vincent S. Perez, Jr.;
Department of Budget and Management Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin; and NPC OIC-
President Rolando S. Quilala, NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are
void and are of no legal effect.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON.
PAQUITO OCHOA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET
AL. G.R. No. 204605, 19 July 2016
Facts:
The Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks (Madrid System), which
is the centralized system providing a one-stop solution for registering and managing
marks worldwide, allows the trademark owner to file one application in one language,
and to pay one set of fees to protect his mark in the territories of up to 97 member-
states. The Madrid System is governed by the Madrid Agreement, concluded in 1891,
and the Madrid Protocol, concluded in 1989. The Madrid Protocol has two objectives,
namely: (1) to facilitate securing protection for marks; and (2) to make the
management of the registered marks easier in different countries. In 2004, the
Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines (IPOPHL), began considering the
country's accession to the Madrid Protocol. The Madrid Protocol entered into force in
the Philippines on July 25, 2012. Thus, the Intellectual Property Association of the
Philippines (IPAP) commenced this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition to
challenge the validity of the President's accession to the Madrid Protocol without the
concurrence of the Senate. According to the IPAP, the Madrid Protocol is a treaty, not
an executive agreement; hence, respondent DFA Secretary Albert Del Rosario acted
with grave abuse of discretion in determining the Madrid Protocol as an executive
agreement.

Issue:
Is the Madrid Protocol unconstitutional for lack of concurrence by the Senate?

Ruling:
NO. The Court finds and declares that the President’s ratification is valid and
constitutional because the Madrid Protocol, being an executive agreement as
determined by the Department of Foreign Affairs, does not require the concurrence of
the Senate. Under prevailing jurisprudence, the registration of trademarks and
copyrights have been the subject of executive agreements entered into without the
concurrence of the Senate. Some executive agreements have been concluded in
conformity with the policies declared in the acts of Congress with respect to the general
subject matter. Accordingly, DFA Secretary Del Rosario’s determination and treatment
of the Madrid Protocol as an executive agreement; being in apparent contemplation of
the express state policies on intellectual property as well as within his power under
Executive Order No. 459, are upheld. The primary consideration in the choice of the
form of agreement is the parties’ intent and desire to craft their international agreement
in the form they so wish to further their respective interests. The matter of form takes
a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a
treaty or an executive agreement; inasmuch as all the parties; regardless of the form,
become obliged to comply conformably with the time-honored principle of pacta sunt
servanda. The principle binds the parties to perform in good faith their parts in the
agreements.
Montejo vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 232272. July 24, 2018

FACTS:
SECRETARY MARIO G. MONTEJO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (DOST) filed a petition against the Commission on
Audit on Notice of Disallowance disallowing the grant/release of Collective Negotiation
Agreement Incentives (CNA Incentives) to the officials and employees of the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST). During two consecutive years,
petitioner released CNa Incentives. Thereafter, the COA ordered the department to
stop the CNAI as it was contrary to a DBM Budget Circular. Based on what is lawful,
the giving of CNAI should be after the year provided that all the programs and plans
have been implemented accomplished during the performance targets for the year.
The CNA Incentive shall be sourced solely from savings from released MOOE
allotments for the year under review, still valid for obligation during the year of payment
of the CNA, subject to conditions like savings generated out of cost-cutting measures.

ISSUE:
Whether or not unduly disbursed CNA Incentives to DOST officials and employees are
not excused from refunding the amounts

RULING:
This Court finds that the COA did not err in disallowing petitioner's grant of CNA
Incentives to DOST officials and employees. Petitioner's erroneous interpretation of
the DBM circular aside, the action of petitioner was indicative of good faith because
he acted in an honest belief that the grant of the CNA Incentives had legal bases. It is
unfair to penalize public officials based on overly stretched and strained interpretations
of rules which were not that readily capable of being understood at the time such
functionaries acted in good faith. If there is any ambiguity, which is actually clarified
years later, then it should only be applied prospectively. A contrary rule would be
counterproductive. Thus, although this Court considers the questioned Notices of
Disallowance valid, this Court also considers it to be in the better interest of justice
and prudence that petitioner, other officials concerned and the employees who
benefited from the CNA Incentives be relieved of any personal liability to refund the
disallowed amount.

WHEREFORE, the Petition of petitioner Secretary Mario G. Montejo is DISMISSED

and Notice of Disallowance issued by the Office of the Auditor, Commission on Audit,
disallowing the payment of Collective Negotiation Agreement Incentives are
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 120422. September 27, 1995 Acop v. Ombudsman, 318 PHIL 673-701

FACTS:
On May 18, 1995, eleven (11) suspected members of the notorious robbery gang,
"Kuratong Baleleng," were killed in an alleged shootout with composite teams of the
National Capital Regional Command (NCRC),Traffic Management Command
(TMC),Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC),Central Police District Command
(CPDC) and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC).
On May 22, 1995, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Eduardo de los Reyes of the Central
Intelligence Command (CIC) made an exposé, stating that there was no shootout. De
los Reyes stated that the eleven (11) suspected members of the "Kuratong Baleleng"
gang were victims of summary execution.
On May 26, 1995, Acting Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa, in a handwritten note,
directed public respondent Deputy Ombudsman Casaclang to monitor the
investigations being conducted by the Commission on Human Rights, the Senate
Committee on Justice and Human Rights, and the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Director for Investigation regarding the alleged shootout.
On May 30, 1995, SPO2 Corazon de la Cruz appeared and testified before the Joint
Senate Committee conducting a legislative inquiry into the May 18, 1995 incident.
SPO2 De la Cruz corroborated the statements of SPO2 De los Reyes stating that no
shootout had taken place and that the eleven (11) slain suspected "Kuratong Baleleng"
gang members were summarily executed by the composite teams.
On June 8, 1995, the Panel of Investigators submitted their Evaluation Report in OMB-
AFP-CRIM-95-0084 to public respondent Casaclang. The report recommended that a
preliminary investigation be conducted against herein petitioners and all the
participating personnel of the NCRC, PACC, CIC, TMC and CPDC listed in the After
Operations Report of the PNP
On June 14, 1995, public respondent Casaclang issued the questioned order directing
petitioners and nine others to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting
evidence within ten days from receipt thereof.

ISSUE: Whether it is the Office of the Ombudsman or the Office of the Special
Prosecutor which has jurisdiction over the complaint in question.

RULING: In the light of this Court's decision in Zaldivar, it is the Ombudsman, and not
the Office of the Special Prosecutor, which has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation on the complaint filed against public officer. paragraph 8, Section 13,
Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or
perform functions or duties as may be provided by law," it is indubitable then that
Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office
of the Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress may remove some of the powers
granted to the Tanodbayan by P.D No. 1630 and transfer them to the Ombudsman; or
grant the Office of the Special Prosecutor such other powers and functions and duties
as Congress may deem fit and wise. This Congress did through the passage of R.A.
No. 6770. Through the said law, the Office of the Special Prosecutor was made an
organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman.
AGBAY VS. HON. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY
G. R. NO. 134503 JULY 2, 1999

Facts:
On September 7, 1997, petitioner, together with Sherwin Jugalbot, was arrested and
detained at the Liloan Police Station, Metro Cebu for an alleged violation of R.A. 7610
or the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act.” Thereafter, a complaint was filed against petitioner and Jugalbot
before the 7th MCTC, Metro Cebu by Joan Gicaraya for and in behalf of her daughter
Gayle. The complaint states that the accused, did then and there, willfully, feloniously
and unlawfully, conspiring, confederating, helping with one another, while Agbay
manipulating to finger the vagina of Gayle Fatima Amigable Gicayara, his companion
block the sight of the victim’s mother, while on board a tricycle going their destinations.
On September 10, counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of Police of Liloan demanding
the immediate release of petitioner considering that the latter had "failed to deliver
Agbay to the proper judicial authority within 36 hours from September 7, 1997. Private
respondents did not act on this letter and continued to detain petitioner. On September
26, petitioner filed a complaint for delay in the delivery of detained persons against
herein private respondents SPO4 Nemesio Natividad, Jr., SPO2 Eleazar M. Salomon
and other unidentified police officers stationed at the Liloan Police Substation.
Regarding the complaint for violation of R.A. 7610, it is alleged by petitioner that on
November 10, the 7th MCTC of Liloan, Metro Cebu issued a resolution stating that
there is probable cause for the crime in violation of R.A. 7610.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman for the Military gravely abused its discretion in not
holding the private respondents liable for violating Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling:
No. The Court held that the private respondents should not be liable for not releasing
the petitioners as there was already a complaint filed by the mother of private
complainant and there was no release order from the court. Art. 125 of the Revised
Penal Code is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a person without
informing him of his offense and without permitting him to go on bail. It also punishes
public officials or employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground and
shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods
prescribed by law. The continued detention of the accused becomes illegal upon the
expiration of the periods provided for by Art. 125 without such detainee having been
delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities. Furthermore, upon the filing of the
complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied
considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime imputed
against him and, upon his application with the court, he may be released on bail.
Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release when he
applied for and was granted his release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose
underlying Art. 125 has been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the
MCTC. The petition is dismissed.
Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were
several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September
1997. These news items referred to; the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of
Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and the reported
execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos
heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the
state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands
that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to
PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any
compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount
public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would
be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people
in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected
by the government.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with
the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because
there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the
Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any
disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not
become effective and binding.
Issue:
Whether or not PCGG should disclose public information regarding the Marcoses’ ill-
gotten wealth.
Ruling:
Yes, the PCGG should disclose public information regarding the Marcoses’ ill-gotten
wealth.
The Court held that the "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject
provisions of the Constitution (Sec. 7 [Article III]) have as yet no defined scope and
extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the
right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged. However, the
following are some of the recognized restrictions: national security matters and
intelligence information, trade secrets and banking transactions, criminal matters, and
other confidential information.
Office of the Ombudsman vs Manuel P. Valencia, G.R. No. 183890 April 13,
2011

FACTS:
On July 2003, Napoleon P. Guenero (Guerrero), Intelligence Officer V of the
Department of Finance, filed a complaint/motion for Subpoena/Subpoena Duces
Tecum with the Ombudsman against for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1379 8 in
relation to Section 8, R.A. No. 3019 because he was not satisfied that the entries
made by Manuel Valencia in his SALN were reflective of his actual net worth.
In his complaint, Guerrero alleged that Valencia maintained two (2) US dollar time
deposit accounts with the Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC). The first
account with the amount of US$2,013,248.8 was covered by Certificate No. 962460,
while the second, with the amount of US$1,812,165.38, was covered by Certificate
No. 962461. According to Guerrero, these huge amounts were “the actual fruits of his
illegal transactions and activities of as an employee of the Bureau of Customs. The
complaint also alleged that the house and lot declared by Valencia in his SALNs was
grossly undervalued considering that the house, described as “impressive”.
Finally, it was alleged that from the credit card billings of his Bank of the Philippine
(BPI) Mastercard, it could be inferred that Valencia maintained a lavish lifestyle.
Consequently, an accused charged with Unexplained Wealth cannot claim to have
been denied due process should be held administratively liable for Dishonesty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to hold Valencia liable for dishonesty due
to his unexplained wealth.

RULING:
The Court stated that to dismiss a public officer or employee on the basis of
photocopies of private documents which are questioned and disputed is to set a
dangerous precedent. It can be abused by oppressive or abusive superiors who may
want their own protégé to replace the charged officers or employees or by any
individual who may want to harass a public employee for no legitimate reason at all.
Photocopies should only be considered as evidence if they are not contested, if they
are admitted, or if they constitute matters which need not proved. Unverified
photocopied private documents are not evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
As observed by the CA, the Ombudsman totally ignored the affidavit of BPI Service
Manager Olaguer certifying that he could not locate any time deposit record belonging
to Valencia. Being a responsible officer in custody of the supposed time deposits, his
attestation is the best evidence that the bank does not have a record of any time
deposit.
In sum, with the presented SALNs being the only competent evidence for the
prosecution, the Court upholds the finding of the CA that there is no substantial
evidence that respondence Manuel P. Valencia acquired property through unlawful
means, maintained US time deposit accounts, and lived a lavish lifestyle.
Arroyo vs. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 199082 September 18, 2012

FACTS:
The Comelec approved Resolution No. 9266, which establishes a joint commission
with the Department of Justice (DOJ) to begin preliminary investigations into alleged
election violations and anomalies in the 2004 and 2007 elections.
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011, establishing and
establishing a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections electoral fraud and manipulation charges, made up of DOJ and Comelec
personnel. The Fact-Finding Team determined in its initial report that there was indeed
manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of
North and South Cotabato, as well as Maguindanao. The Fact-Finding Team
suggested that petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. be investigated for
electoral sabotage.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid.

RULING:
Petitions are dismissed. Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates
the powers and functions of the Comelec. The grant to the Comelec of the power to
investigate and prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and
administration of all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to effectively
insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections. The
constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in Section 265
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code.
Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is
vested exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same
provision of law the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms
of the government. Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation had been lodged with the Comelec,
the prosecutors had been conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to the
continuing delegated authority given by the Comelec.
Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint Committee
and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional
bodys independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt
investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of
ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
SAGUISAG v. OCHOA JR (RESOLUTION) G.R. No. 212426 & 212444, 26 July
2016

FACTS:
This is a Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the Decision
of this Court in Saguisag et. al., v. Executive Secretary dated 12 January 2016.
Petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the US was not a treaty.
In connection to this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in
order to comply with the constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article· XVIII of the
1987 Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and facilities. Additionally, they
reiterate their arguments on the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear
weapons.

The principal reason for the Motion for Reconsideration is evidently petitioners’
disagreement with the Decision that EDCA implements the VFA and Mutual Defense
Treaty (MDT). Petitioners argue that EDCA’s provisions fall outside the allegedly
limited scope of the VFA and MDT because it provides a wider arrangement than the
VFA for military bases, troops, and facilities, and it allows the establishment of U.S.
military bases.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.) constitutional?

RULING:
Yes. The EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has long
been authorized under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA). Reading the VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense
Treaty (MDT) led the Court to the conclusion that an executive agreement such as the
EDCA was well within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties.

Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to

the Philippines' legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the
government's continued policy to enhance our military capability in the face of various
military and humanitarian issues that may arise. This Motion for Reconsideration has
not raised any additional legal arguments that warrant revisiting the Decision.

The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution
should be construed as such and should not be given a construction that changes its
meaning With due respect, the Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno's theory of "initial entry" mentioned above ventured into a construction of the
provisions of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution which is patently contrary to
the plain language and meaning of the said constitutional provision.
G.R. No. 215746 October 8, 2019
Ang Nars Party-List
Vs
The Executive Secretary
Facts:
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo approved RA 9173 Section 32, which provides
that the minimum base pay of nurses working in the public health institutions shall not
be lower than salary grade 15 prescribed under RA 6758. On July 28, 2008 the
congress approved a joint resolution no. 4 to authorized the president to modify the
Compensation and Position Classification System of Civilian Personnel and the Base
Pay Schedule of Military and Uniformed Personnel in the Government, and For Other
Purposes and it was approved by former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on June
17, 2009. Inside joint resolution no. 4 it amends the existing law including, among
others RA 9173 and signed an Executive Order no. 811 to implement Joint Resolution
No. 4 which provides that entry level Nurse I shall have a salary grade of 11.

Issue:
Whether or not Joint Resolution No. 4 (Series of 2009) of the Senate and the House
of Representatives amended Section 32 of the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002.

Ruling:
Under the Constitution, only a bill can become a law. Before a bill can become a law,
it must pass three readings on three separate days, unless the President certifies that
its enactment is urgent. (Section 26, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution)The purpose for which three readings on separate days are requir
ed is two-fold to inform the members of Congress of what they must vote on, and to
give the members of Congress notice that a measure is progressing through legislative
process, allowing them and others interested in the measure to prepare their positions
on the matter.
G.R. No. 226420 March 04, 2020
ABDON A. IMINGAN, PETITIONER
VS
THE OFFICE OF THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, AND THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION-
CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
Abdon A. Imingan filed an affidavit against Gov. Maximo B. Dalog et al, for the
violations of RA 6713 and RA 3019 and multiple counts of Estafa on falsifying the
public documents, during the purchased of 1-unit L300 Versa Van. According to the
Complainant the said L300 Versa Van was originally purchased by Helen Macli-Ing
from Motorplaza, Inc. with the amount of 756,000.00 only. Because it was stated in
the documents that during the procurement of the said unit L300 Versa Van it was
procured by the Government of Mt. Province from Ronald C. Kimakim proprietor of
RONHIL Trading with the Amount of 999,000.00, that according to the complainant it
was being intentionally fabricated the documents in order to cover up their
anomalies. And respondent Gov. Maximo B. Dalog, response that it was 999,000.00
pesos the unit cost of the said L300 Versa Van because it includes the accessories
of the van because the Van is intended to use as ambulance and they admitted that
they are mistakenly use a tittle of the resolution “purchasing one-unit L300 Versa
Van” instead of, “one unit MITSUBISHI L300 VAN with AMBULANCE EQUIPMENT
and OTHER ACCESSORIES”.
Issues:
Whether or not Gov. Maximo B. Dalaog et al, violated RA 6713.
Whether or not Gov. Maximo B. Dalaog et, al violated RA 3019.
Ruling:
No, the charges of Gov. Maximo B. Dalaog et al, of Estafa through Falsification and
Violation of Republic Act No. 6713 Section 4. The court dismissed for the reason that
the petitioner has lack of merit.
Yes, the court find it’s probable cause on violating Republic Act 3019 Section 3 and it
was amended according to the appropriate information that has been filed against
the respondents.
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE v. HON. MARINO M. DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 209331, April 24, 2015

Facts:
EO 140 was published in Manila Bulletin and Philippine Star on 17 September 2013.
Commissioner Biazon issued Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 (CPO 189-
2013) detailing 27 BOC personnel holding the positions of Collector of Customs V and
VI, including respondents in this case, to CPRO "effective immediately and valid until
sooner revoked." CPO 189-2013 was approved by DOF Secretary Purisima.
Petitioners assail the Order dated 4 October 2013 issued by Judge Felicitas O. Laron-
Cacanindin (Judge Laron-Cacanindin) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
17 (RTC Branch 17), in Civil Case No. 13-130820. The Order extended the 72-hour
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by Executive Judge Marino M. Dela Cruz,
Jr. (Executive Judge Dela Cruz) in favor of respondents Silvestre, et al. to 20 days or
until 21 October 2013 without need of posting bond.

Issues:
1. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief filed by
respondents; and
2. Whether respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies in filing the action
before the RTC
Ruling:
1. Yes. A reading of the petition filed before the RTC shows that respondents were
questioning their mass detail and reassignment to CPRO. According to
respondents, their detail was carried out in bad faith and was meant to remove
them from their permanent positions in the BOC. The action appears to be a
personnel action under the jurisdiction of the CSC. However, the petition went
beyond questioning the detail of respondents… When respondents raised the
issue of validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013, the issue took the case
beyond the scope of the CSC's jurisdiction because the matter is no longer limited
to personnel action. Thus, the RTC did not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance
of the action.
2. No. Direct recourse to the trial court, when administrative remedies are available,
is a ground for dismissal of the action. The doctrine, however, is not without
exceptions. Among the exceptions are: (1) where there is estoppel on the part of
the party invoking the doctrine; (2) where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (3) where there is unreasonable
delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (4) where
the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive; (5) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have
to be decided by the courts of justice; (6) where judicial intervention is urgent; (7)
where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (8)
where the controverted acts violate due process; (9) where the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies had been rendered moot; (10) where there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) where strong public interest
is involved; and (12) in quo warranto proceedings.
In this case, respondents allege that CPO 189-2013 is contrary to law and
unconstitutional. Respondents assail CPO 189-2013 as patently illegal, arbitrary,
and oppressive. This case clearly falls within the exceptions where exhaustion of
administrative remedies need not be resorted to by respondents.
Enrile vs. People of the Philippines
GR No, 213455, 11 August 2015

Facts:
In 2014, the Petitioner-Enrile, along with Napoles, et al. was charged by the Office of
the Ombudsman for plunder before the Sandiganbayan. While being in the public
office as a Senator, he allegedly repeatedly received from the co-accused kickbacks
or commissions from Napoles’ non-government organizations which became the
recipients and/or target implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects, which duly-funded
projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to
misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain.

Subsequently, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars on material facts which should
have been clearly alleged in the Information so that he may be fully informed of the
charges against him and be prepared to meet the issues at the trial. However, his
motion was denied, hence this petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
Petitioner’s motion for bill of particulars

Ruling:
The Court holds that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s motion for a bill of
particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be itemized or specified are all
evidentiary – without any explanation supporting this conclusion – constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.

As discussed above, some of the desired details are material facts that must be
alleged to enable the petitioner to properly plead and prepare his defense. The
Sandiganbayan should have diligently sifted through each detail sought to be
specified, and made the necessary determination of whether each detail was an
ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly after Enrile stated in his Reply that the “desired
details” could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution. We
cannot insist or speculate that he is feigning ignorance of the presence of these
desired details; neither can we put on him the burden of unearthing from these
voluminous documents what the desired details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars
is precisely made available by the Rules to enable an accused to positively respond
and make an intelligent defense.

Plunder thus involves intricate predicate criminal acts and numerous transactions and
schemes that span a period of time. Naturally, in its prosecution, the State possesses
an “effective flexibility” of proving a predicate criminal act or transaction, not originally
contemplated in the Information, but is otherwise included in the broad statutory
definition, in light of subsequently discovered evidence. The unwarranted use of the
flexibility is what the bill of particulars guards against.

As we emphasized in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, “the administration of justice is not

a matter of guesswork. The name of the game is fair play, not foul play. We cannot
allow a legal skirmish where, from the start, one of the protagonists enters the arena
with one arm tied to his back.
BELGICA v. PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
Facts:
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social
Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents
Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the
incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further
taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in
whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further
releases pursuant thereto. The Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel operate defies public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking
itself or its Members. In particular, they point out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives
each legislator a direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly
budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested partners."They also
claim that the system has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-perpetuation
of elective officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment"
as such "funds are indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the decisions of senators.‘"
Issue:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of
constitutional provisions on accountability.
Ruling:
The Court agrees in part. The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder
that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in
accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the
people‘s trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability, hence, the various
mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public
officers. Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure
of public funds may be checked is the power of congressional oversight. The Court agrees
with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight.
The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation
of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when
scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a
certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are
vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which
they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of
post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation
– a matter before another office of government – renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office. The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same
post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would
allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and
a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-
election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a
case-to-case basis.
DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 199114 July 16, 2013
Facts:
Labrador was the former Chief of the POEA’s Employment Services Regulation
Division (ESRD). On May 2, 1997, then Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing
(Quisumbing) ordered his dismissal from service as he was found to have bribed a
certain Madoline Villapando, an overseas Filipino worker, in the amount of ₱6,200.00
in order to expedite the issuance of her overseas employment certificate. Labrador’s
dismissal was affirmed on appeal by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) through CSC
Resolution No. 03-0339 dated March 12, 2003, and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration was denied through CSC Resolution No. 040547 dated May 17, 2004.
In a Resolution dated January 26, 2000 (January 26, 2000 Resolution), the Court
affirmed Labrador’s conviction and subsequently denied his motion for reconsideration
with finality on March 15, 2000. Likewise, in a Resolution dated June 28, 2000, the
Court denied Labrador’s motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration
with motion for new trial and prayer for referral to the Court En Banc, resulting in the
January 26, 2000 Resolution’s entry of judgment. On October 26, 2000, the SB
received copies of the same resolution and its corresponding entry of judgment
through a Letter of Transmittal dated August 23, 2000 which contained an explicit
directive from the Court for the SB to submit proof of execution within fifteen (15) days
from receipt. As such, the SB immediately set the case for this purpose. Based on
these observations, the COA issued a Notice of Disallowance (Notice of Disallowance)
on January 18, 2006, finding Dimapilis-Baldoz, among other POEA employees,
personally liable for the salaries and other benefits unduly received by Labrador in the
amount of ₱1,740,124.08, paid through various checks issued from August 1999 to
March 15, 2004.
Through a letter dated March 3, 2006, Dimapilis-Baldoz sought the reconsideration of
the Notice of Disallowance, asserting that the POEA should not be held liable for the
refund of the foregoing amount since Labrador's employment was fully and promptly
terminated upon receipt of the SB’s March 2, 2004 Resolution.
Issue:
Whether Dimapilis-Baldoz is administratively liable.
Ruling:
No. An equally compelling incident relevant to the finding of grave abuse of discretion
in this case is the adjudged personal liability of Dimapilis-Baldoz, among other POEA
personnel. It is a standing rule that every public official is entitled to the presumption
of good faith in the discharge of official duties, such that, in the absence of any proof
that a public officer has acted with malice or bad faith, he should not be charged with
personal liability for damages that may result from the performance of an official duty.
Good faith is always presumed and he who alleges the contrary bears the burden to
convincingly show that malice or bad faith attended the public officer’s performance of
his duties. To elucidate, while the COA correctly affirmed the disallowance of the
salaries and benefits which Labrador unduly received when he continued to hold office
despite his conviction, the liability for refund cannot be imposed upon Dimapilis-Baldoz
because she had no knowledge or any reasonable indication that the payment of
salaries to Labrador was actually improper. Two important incidents impel this
conclusion: first, Labrador’s 201 File with the POEA was without any record of the SB
case; and second, Dimapilis-Baldoz was only apprised of his conviction when her
office was furnished a copy of the SB’s March 2, 2004 Resolution which ordered the
revocation of Labrador’s probation.
EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF PHILIPPINES
GR No. 196231 2014-01-28

FACTS:
This involved two separate cases involving Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III
and Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit. Gonzales was accused of delay in
acting on a criminal case pending before his office while Sulit was said to have entered
into an apparent one-sided plea bargaining agreement which drew public outrage. By
reason of said cases, Gonzales was dismissed while Sulit was subjected to
disciplinary proceedings by the Office of the President (OP) pursuant to the powers
granted by Section 8(2) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770. Gonzales challenged the
constitutionality of said law granting the OP to discipline the Ombudsman while Sulit
sought to restrain the proceedings questioned the OP jurisdiction. The Court upheld
the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled that the President has
disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. The
Court, however, reversed the OP ruling. In view of the Court's ruling, the OP filed the
present motion for reconsideration through the Office of the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:
Whether the Office of the President has administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.

RULING:
No. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key
officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate.
Unfortunately, intrusion upon the... constitutionally-granted independence is what
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only
with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the
Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation
of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize. However, by another vote of 8-7, the
Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit
is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be
constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the
independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. GLORIA MACAPACAL ARROYO G.R. No. 146738.
March 2, 2001

FACTS:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning
of his term, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity.
Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused
petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The
expose’ immediately ignited reactions of rage. House Speaker Villar transmitted the
Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the
members of the House to the Senate. On the Senate formally opened the
impeachment trial of the petitioner. The Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their
support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries,
assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts.

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath
to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner
issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on
the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he
was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law
and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the
letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same
day. After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters.
Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set
in motion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.

RULING:
No. The Court in the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable
to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave.
The inability claim is contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate
Pres. Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of
Representatives passed a resolution supporting the assumption into office by Arroyo
as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the nomination of
Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent
Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the
inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
petitioner’s claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim of inability
to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature
and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which
cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of
powers.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C.
CALIDA vs. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO G.R. No. 237428 June 19, 2018

FACTS:
Solicitor General Calida filed a petition for Quo Warranto against Maria Lourdes
Sereno on the ground of failure to file her SALN within 30 days of her assumption of
office in which she is not legible to occupy the position of chief Justice. Former
Associate Sereno for her part, maintains that the quo warranto is time barred and she
is a person of integrity

ISSUE:
Is filling of SALN bears relation to the constitutional qualification of integrity?

RULING:
YES. The SALN laws were passed in aid of the enforcement of the Constitutional duty
to submit a declaration under oath of one’s assets, liabilities, and net worth. The
constitution, law, and rules clearly require that the sworn entry SALN “must be
reckoned as of his/her first day of service” and must be filed “within thirty (30) days
after assumption of office. Failure to comply the above obligation constitutes violation
to the constitutional requirement for appointment to the Judiciary.

RAMA V. MOISES (G.R. NO. 197146. AUGUST 08, 2017)

Facts: On December 6, 2016, the Supreme Court rendered a decision annulling and
setting aside the decision by the Regional Trial Court (RTC); and declaring Section
3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 198 unconstitutional to the extent that the provision
applied to highly urbanized cities like Cebu City as well as to component cities with
charters expressly providing for their voters not eligible to vote for the officials of the
provinces to which they belong, and for being in violation of the express policy of the
1987 Constitution on local autonomy, among others. The respondents claim that the
petitioners have disregarded the principle of hierarchy of courts, and have resorted to
the wrong remedy in assailing the decision of the RTC.[3]They explain that under the
principle of hierarchy of courts, the petitioners should have filed their petition in the
Court of Appeals instead of in this Court, which is a court of last resort. They also insist
that the petitioners have no locus standi inasmuch as they - being officials of Cebu
City - will never sustain direct injury from the application of Section 3(b) of P.D. 198.

Issues: Whether Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 was void on its face for violating the
constitutional provision on local autonomy and independence of HUCs under Article X
of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling: Section 3(b) of P.D. 198 is already superseded, The Court opines that Section
3(b) of P.D. No. 198 should be partially struck down for being repugnant to the local
autonomy granted by the 1987 Constitution to LGUs, and for being inconsistent with
R.A. No. 7160 (1991 Local Government Code) and related laws on local governments.
The enactment of P.D. No. 198 on May 25, 1973 was prior to the enactment on
December 22, 1979 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 (An Act Providing for the Elective or
Appointive Positions in Various Local Governments and for Other Purposes) and
antedated as well the effectivity of the 1991 Local Government Code on January 1,
1992. At the time of the enactment of P.D. No. 198, Cebu City was still a component
city of Cebu Province. Section 328 of B.P. Blg. 51 reclassified the cities of the
Philippines based on well-defined criteria. Cebu City thus became an HUC, which
immediately meant that its inhabitants were ineligible to vote for the officials of Cebu
Province. In accordance with Section 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, cities
that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of
the province, but the voters of component cities within a province, whose charters
contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective
provincial officials.

Hence, all matters relating to its administration, powers and functions were exercised
through its local executives led by the City Mayor, subject to the President's retained
power of general supervision over provinces, HUCs, and independent component
cities pursuant to and in accordance with Section 252 of the 1991 Local Government
Code, a law enacted for the purpose of strengthening the autonomy of the LGUs in
accordance with the 1987 Constitution. Article X of the 1987 Constitution guarantees
and promotes the administrative and fiscal autonomy of the LGUs. The foregoing
statutory enactments enunciate and implement the local autonomy provisions
explicitly recognized under the 1987 Constitution Supreme Court DENIED the motion
for reconsideration.
NERI V SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
549 SCRA 77 AND 564 SCRA 152) 20 JUNE 2020

FACTS:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to
conduct an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was
then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC
Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project,
that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer
the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him
to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive
privilege.

RULING:
The Supreme Court found the Senate to have gravely abused its discretion in citing
the petitioner for contempt for his refusal to answer questions propounded to him in
the course of legislative inquiry. The Court declared that “there being a legitimate
claim of executive privilege, the issuance of contempt order suffers from constitutional
infirmity.” Executive privilege: 2 kinds: presidential communications (between
president and executive official) and deliberative process (between executive officials
only)
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION V. COA, GR NO. 222710,
2018-07-24

FACTS: On August 1, 2011, former PhilHealth President and CEO Dr. Rey B. Aquino
issued Office Order No. 0053, S-2011, prescribing the guidelines on the grant of
longevity pay, incorporating it in the basic salary of qualified PhilHealth employees for
the year 2011 and every year thereafter. On January 31, 2012, the PhilHealth Board
passed and approved Resolution No. 1584, S. 2012, which among others, confirmed
the grant of longevity pay to its officers and employees for the period of January to
September 2011 in the amount of PhP5,575,294.70.However, on post-audit of the
Personal Services account for Calendar Year (CY) 2011, COA Supervising Auditor
Ms. Elena C. Agustin... found lack of legal basis for the grant of longevity pay, thus
recommended the discontinuance of the grant thereof. On May 18, 2012, PhilHealth,
through its then President and CEO Dr. Eduardo P. Banzon (Dr. Banzon) asserted
that PhilHealth personnel were public health workers, as determined by the DOH in its
February 20, 2000 Certification... therefore entitled to the grant of longevity pay under
RA No. 7305. However, Supervising Auditor Agustin found unsatisfactory the
justifications for the grant of longevity pay
Philhealth received the ND No. H.O. 12-005 (11) on July 30, 2012, and after 179 days
from receipt thereof or on January 25, 2013, Philhealth filed its appeal memorandum
before the COA Corporate Government Sector. COA ruled that PhilHealth personnel
were not public health workers but merely engaged in paying and utilization of health
services by its covered beneficiaries. Aggrieved, PhilHealth filed the instant Petition
for Certiorari with prayer for TRO and WPI before the Court

ISSUES: Whether PhilHealth personnel are considered public health workers within
the contemplation of Section 3 of RA No. 7305, as well as Section 1 of Rule III of its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).

RULING: PhilHealth personnel are not public health workers the question then arises
whether the PhilHealth personnel are performing functions which are health or health-
related to include them within the coverage of RA No. 7305 and consider them as
health workers.
Based on the provisions of RA No. 7305 and the IRR, it readily shows that to be
included within the coverage, an employee must be principally tasked to render health
or health-related services, such as in hospitals, sanitaria, health infirmaries, health
centers, clinical laboratories and facilities and other similar activities which involved
health services to the public; medical professionals, allied health professionals,
administrative and support personnel in the aforementioned agencies or offices;
employees of the health-related establishments, that is, facilities or units engaged in
the delivery of health services, although the agencies to which such facilities or units
are attached are not primarily involved in health or health-related services. Otherwise
stated, an employee performing functions not primarily connected with the delivery of
health services to the public is not a public health worker within the contemplation of
the law.
PhilHealth is prohibited from providing health care directly, from buying and dispensing
drugs and pharmaceuticals, from employing physicians and other professionals for the
purpose of directly rendering care, and from owning or investing in health care
facilities.
SUBA V. SANDIGANBAYAN FIRST DIVISION, G.R. NO. 235418, MARCH 3,
2021

FACTS:
On September 4, 2013, an Information was filed charging ROBERTO R. NAVIDA as
Philippine Aerospace Development Corporation (PADC) President, and ANTONIO
M. SUBA as Department Manager B of PADC, both public officials of violating
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Their case was regarding their unlawful request and
processing of, and receiving cash advances for their trip to Beijing, China, despite
fully knowing the existence of a letter/order from the Department of Transportation
and Communications denying their application for a travel authority.
Suba pleaded "not guilty” and testified that he relied on Navida's assurance that they
already have an authority to travel issued by the DOTC Secretary. He also already
reimbursed PADC the full amount of the checks that were issued to him. But, the
Sandiganbayan held that Suba's justifications could not cure the defect that he and
Navida travelled without the required travel authority.

ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan correctly found petitioner guilty of violating Section 3
(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

RULING:
Jurisprudence instructs that bad faith referred to under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019
does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence but of having a palpably and
patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do some moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing for some perverse motive, or ill will. It connotes a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill
will or for ulterior purposes. It is a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent
or ill will and partakes of the nature of fraud. |||
It is undisputed in this case that Suba and Navida attended an aviation conference
that was relevant to their functions as VP for Operations and President of PADC,
respectively. The cash that was disbursed to Suba and Navida were actually used
in connection with their attendance in said conference. Navida also assured Suba
that they have a travel authority from the DOTC Secretary and that the PADC Board,
where the DOTC Secretary sits as Chairman, had previously approved foreign
travels of PADC officials. Subsequently, Suba restituted the subject amount, after
the COA Notice of Disallowance became final and executory.|||
Given these circumstances, it cannot be said that Suba acted with a palpably
and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose or with some perverse or ill
motive, that is tantamount to "evident bad faith" which the Anti-Graft Law
seeks to punish. There was a legitimate purpose. Since evident bad faith
entails deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or to cause
damage, it must be shown that the accused was spurred by corrupt motive.
Here, the circumstances established do not show beyond reasonable doubt that
Suba was spurred by corrupt or ill motive.
AMURAO V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 249168, APRIL 26, 2021

FACTS:
In an Information dated March 5, 2015, petitioner Aileen Cynthia M. Amurao, City
Tourism Officer and several others of the City Tourism Department, City Government
of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan were charged before the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Section 7 (d) of R.A. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees with regards to their sending of
solicitation letters to tourism-oriented and private entities or individuals for
sponsorship of the City Government of Puerto Princesa's tourism activities and
related projects.

On September 5, 2019, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution suspending Amurao

for a period of 90 days. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the offense charged against
petitioner is covered by the rule on preventive suspension under Section 13 of R.A.
3019. It noted that the imposition of preventive suspension is applicable not only to
those charged with violation of R.A. 3019 and Title 7, Book II of the RPC, but also to
those charged with any offense involving fraud upon the government and any
offense involving public funds or property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not offense charged against petitioner is considered as fraud upon the
government or public funds or property.

RULING:
The Court has already settled the term “fraud” used in Section 13 of RA 3019 in the
case of Bustillo vs. Sandiganbayan, as "an instance or an act of trickery or deceit
especially when involving misrepresentation." By soliciting money and gifts from
private individuals and entities for the City’s tourism activities and projects while in
the performance of their functions and taking advantage of their positions as tourism
officers, it is clear that there was an involvement of fraud upon public funds as such
money and gifts solicited were collected for the purpose of funding the tourism
activities.

Since the petitioner is charged with an offense that clearly falls under Section 13 of
R.A. 3019, her suspension pendente lite is justified. The Sandiganbayan has no
other option but to order the suspension of the petitioner when it is convinced that
the information charges her with acts of fraud involving government funds.
SENATOR LEILA DE LIMA V. PRES. RODRIGO R. DUTERTE G.R. NO. 227635,
OCTOBER15,2019

FACTS:
May 9, 2016: Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte was elected as the 16th
President of the Philippines with a key agenda of his Administration was the relentless
national crackdown on illegal drugs. August 2, 2016: Sen. De Lima delivered a
privilege speech on the floor of the Senate calling a stop to the alleged extrajudicial
killings committed in the course of the crackdown. Petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas data seeking to enjoin President Rodrigo Roa Dutete from committing acts
allegedly violative of her right to life, liberty and security through his public
statements: August 11, 2016 public statement of President Duterte: “I know I’m the
favorite whipping boy of the NGOs and the human rights stalwarts. But, I have a
special ano kaya no. She is a government official. One day soon I will – bitiwan ko
yan in public and I will have to destroy her in public.” Incidentally, in the same event,
President Duterte insinuated that with the help of another country, he was keeping
surveillance of her. “Akala nila na hindi rin ako nakikinig sa kanila. So while all the
time they were also listening to what I’ve done, I’ve also been busy, and with the help
of another country, listening to them.

ISSUE:
Within Presidential’s immunity from suit can shield the President from being held to
court.

RULING:
Dismissed even without the President invoking the privilege of immunity from suit.
YES. brought against him, and then avail himself of presidential immunity on a case
to case basis, then the rationale for the privilege – protecting the President from
harassment, hindrance or distraction in the discharge of his duties – would very well
be defeated.
Constitution provides remedies for violations committed by the Chief Executive except
an ordinary suit before the courts. The Chief Executive must 1st be allowed to end his
tenure (not his term) either through resignation or removal by impeachment.
 INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

CAGAS V. COMELEC; G.R. No. 194139, 24 January 2012

Facts:
The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of
Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national
and local elections. Results led to the completion by May 14, 2010 of the canvassing
of votes cast for Governor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner was proclaimed the
winner. Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election
laws, rules and resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest on May 24, 2010 (EPC
No. 2010-42).In his answer submitted on June 22, 2010, the petitioner averred as his
special affirmative defenses that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on
time; and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions
complained of. COMELEC First Division issued the first assailed order denying the
special affirmative defenses of the petitioner.
COMELEC First Division issued its second assailed order, denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration for failing to show that the first order was contrary to law.
Not satisfied, the petitioner commenced this special civil action directly in this Court.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the
protest for insufficiency in form and content.

Ruling:
No. Petition Denied Political Law- SC cannot review a decision of a COMELEC
Division. The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides: Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution.
This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order
or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division
of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
In a situation such as this where the Commission in division committed grave abuse
of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders
relative to an action pending before it and the controversy did not fall under any of the
instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the Commission en
banc as this is not permissible under its present rules but to elevate it to this Court via
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. PETITION DENIED.
MALAYANG MANGGAGAWA NG STAYFAST PHILS., INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, STAYFAST PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R. No. 155306, 28
August 2013
Facts:
The Med-Arbiter who supervised the certification election issued an Order certifying
NLMS-Olalia as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file employees
of Stayfast. On appeal to the Secretary, it affirmed the MA’s decision. The matter was
elevated via petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Pending, when the company
refused to bargain, it staged a strike which was restrained. Then, it filed a Notice of
Strike to the NCMB.
However, the Union’s members staged a “sit-down strike” to dramatize their demand
for a fair and equal treatment as respondent company allegedly continued to
discriminate against them. Respondent company issued a memorandum requiring the
alleged participants in the “sit-down strike” to explain within 24 hours why they should
not be terminated or suspended from work for infraction of company rules and
regulations pertaining to unauthorized work stoppage, acts inimical to company
interest, and disregard of instruction of immediate supervisor to perform assigned
task.

Issue:
Whether or not a union may file a notice of strike considering it is not the exclusive
bargaining agent.

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter which ruled that,
while union may file a notice of strike on behalf of its members, petitioner failed to cite
any instance of discrimination or harassment when it filed its notice of strike and the
incidents mentioned as discriminatory occurred after the filing of the said notice.
Moreover, assuming the strike was legal at the beginning, it became illegal when
petitioner committed acts prohibited under Article 264(e) of the Labor Code, such as
acts of violence, coercion and intimidation and obstruction of the free ingress to and
egress from respondent company’s premises. Also, petitioner was supposed to have
made a self-imposed prohibition to stage a strike when it submitted its labor dispute
with respondent company for compulsory arbitration. Yet, petitioner continued with its
strike. Besides, union filed no new notice of strike that could have supported its
charges of discriminatory acts and unfair labor practice. Moreover, no evidence was
presented to establish such charges.
The “sit-down strike” made by union’s officers and members was in violation of
respondent company’s rules, and petitioner’s officers and members ignored the
opportunity given by respondent company for them to explain their misconduct, which
resulted in the termination of their employment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
said findings were supported by substantial evidence.
CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R.
No. 196890. January 11, 2018.

FACTS:
Chairman Bernardo Abesamis (Chairman Abesamis) of the Career Executive Service
Board (CESB) filed a petition to the Civil Service Commission on Private respondent
Blesilda Lodevico (Lodevico) who was appointed by then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as Director III, Recruitment and Career Development Service, CESB. The
Office of the President promulgated the Implementing Guidelines which states that all
non-Career Executive Service Officers (non-CESO) in all agencies of the Executive
Branch shall remain in office and continue to perform their duties until July 31, 2010
or until their resignations have been accepted and/or their replacements have been
appointed or designated, whichever comes first. Chairman Abesamis of the CESB
issued a Memorandum which informed Lodevico that she shall only remain in office
and continue to perform her duties and responsibilities until July 31, 2010. Meanwhile,
Memorandum Circular was extended the term stated under MC 1 to October 31, 2010.
The same circular provides.

ISSUE:
Is the dismissal of Lodevico as Director III, Recruitment and Career Development
Services from the CESB, proper?

RULING:
The position of Director III, equivalent to Assistant Bureau Director, is considered as
a Career Executive Service position, belonging to the third-level. Guilty of repetition,
being CES eligible alone does not qualify her appointment as a permanent one, for
there is a necessity for her appointment to an appropriate CES rank to attain security
of tenure. That being said, We consider Lodevico's appointment as mere temporary.
Such being the case, her services may be terminated with or without cause as she
merely serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority. The temporary appointee
accepts the position with the condition that he shall surrender the office when called
upon to do so by the appointing authority." Consequently, her removal from service
based on MC Nos. 1 and 2, which discharged all non-CESO occupying CES positions
in all agencies, was proper. Thus, petitioners are correct in stating that mere
appointment of Lodevico as Director III and her CES eligibility do not automatically
mean that her appointment becomes a permanent one. It is necessary that she be
appointed in an appropriate CES rank to convert her temporary appointment into a
permanent one. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Civil Service Commission was REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 113212. December 29, 1995

Facts:
Ceferino R. Laur is an employee of Dr. Jose N. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital (DJRMH)
as a patient-assistant, specifically assigned as a member of the Patient-Assistant
Police Force.
Many complaints have been filed against the private respondent according to the
report made by his Chief of Police. Upon a finding of guilt of the aforesaid offenses,
the said private respondent was meted the penalty of suspension for sixty (60) days,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same would result in his outright dismissal.
Private respondent got involved in the mauling of Jake Bondoc, along with his two
policemen. Two (2) months later the private respondent was dismissed by the Chief
of the Hospital.
Private respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission a complaint for
illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter Cornelio Linsangan rendered his Decision in private
respondent's favor.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents NLRC and Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan committed
serious error in their decisions and acted without jurisdiction when they took
cognizance of the complaint filed by private respondent Ceferino R. Laur before the
NLRC instead of the Civil Service Commission.

Ruling:
Yes. The petitioner-hospital exercises strictly governmental functions relating to the
management and control of the dreaded communicable Hansen's disease, commonly
known as leprosy. As it is clearly an agency of the Government, the DJRMH falls well
within the scope and/or coverage of the Civil Service Law in accordance with
paragraph 1, Section 2, Article IX B, 1987 Constitution and the provisions of Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 and Presidential
Decree No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines.
As the central personnel agency of the Government, the Civil Service Commission
administers the Civil Service Law. It is, therefore, the single arbiter of all contests
relating to the civil service.
WHEREFORE, finding the Dr. Jose N. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital to be within the
scope of the Civil Service Law and not of the Labor Code,the questioned decision of
the respondent labor arbiter and the resolution of the NLRC, are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
FELIMON LUEGO vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. L-69137. August 5, 1986

Facts:
The petitioner Felimon Luego was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City
Mayor, Cebu City. The appointment was describe permanent, but the Civil Service
Commission approved it as temporary. The petitioner has no pending administrative
case against him, no protest against the appointment, and no decision by any
competent authority that will affect the approval of the appointment.
The CSC found the private respondent Felicula Tuozo is better qualified than the
petitioner, directed that the private respondent be appointed to the position, and
revoked the appointment of the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the CSC is authorize to disapprove a permanent appointment on the
ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of
this finding, ordering his replacement by the latter.

Ruling:
No. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature
of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to
approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil
Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance
with the Civil Service Laws.
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR. vs. HAYDEE B. YORAC
G.R. No. 93867. December 18, 1990

Facts:
The petitioner has challenge the appointment by the President of the Philippines of
Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Commissioner of the
Commission on Elections.
The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves
and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence.
The Solicitor General argues that the designation of the President should be sustained
for the reasons of “administrative expediency” to prevent disruption of the COMELEC.

Issue:
Whether or not the appointment of Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac is
constitutional.

Ruling:
Yes. Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the
Constitutional Commissions as "independent." Although essentially executive in
nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the
discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own
proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own
discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by
this Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.
The problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for
presidential action. The situation could have been handled by the members of the
Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President,
however well-meaning.

In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections
would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would
have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and
not the President to make.
Jalosjos v COMELEC, G.R. No. 193314 February 26, 2013

FACTS:
The petitioner filed certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baliangao, Mis. Occ. Indicating
her place of birth and residence as Brgy. Tugas. Private respondents asserted that
petitioner falsely represented her birth place and residence because Jalosjos was born
in San Juan, Metro Manila and had not totally abandoned her previous domicile,
Dapitan City. Petitioner averred that she had established her residence in the said
barangay when she purchased two parcels of land there, and that she had been
staying in the house of a certain Mrs. Lourdes Yap (Yap) while the former was
overseeing the construction of her house. Furthermore, the error in her place of birth
was committed by her secretary. Petitioner was proclaimed as duly elected mayor but
COMELEC issued a resolution that Jalosjos was disqualified from running the position
of mayor. This was affirmed by another resolution issued by COMELEC en Banc.

ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner had
failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective
officials.

RULING:
Yes, petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement for local
elective officials. The court find that petitioner failed to establish by clear and positive
proof that she had resided in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, one year prior to the 10
May 2010 elections. There were inconsistencies in the Affidavits of the Brgy. Officials
and these discrepancies bolster the statement of the Brgy. Tugas officials that
petitioner was not and never had been a resident of their barangay. At most, the
Affidavits of all the witnesses only show that petitioner was building and developing a
beach resort and a house in Brgy. Tugas, and that she only stayed in Brgy. Punta
Miray whenever she wanted to oversee the construction of the resort and the house.
Barra v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 205250, March 18, 2013

FACTS:
An anonymous letter sent via email questioned the appointments of the petitioner and
colleagues for violation of the prohibition on nepotism under Sec. 79 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987. CSC issued resolution to conduct further investigation
and to file disciplinary cases against them. CSC recalled the appointments while
petitioner filed motion for reconsideration claiming they were denied of due process.
CSC denied the motion which was affirmed by CSC en banc. Petitioner filed petition
for review with Court of Appeals was dismissed outright.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the petition outright for (a) failure to state the
date of receipt of the copy of the October 10, 2011 CSC decision; and (b) failure to
indicate the notary public's office address in the notarial certificates in the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping and in the affidavit of service.

RULING:
Yes, Courts should not be unduly strict in cases involving procedural lapses that do
not really impair the proper administration of justice. Since litigation is not a game of
technicalities, every litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just determination of his case, free from the constraints of technicalities.
Procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and
even the Rules of Court expressly mandates that it "shall be liberally construed in order
to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding."

The demands of justice require the CA to resolve the issues before it, considering that
what is at stake is not only the petitioner's position, but her very livelihood. Dismissing
the petitioner's appeal could give rise to the impression that the appellate court may
be fostering injustice should the appeal turn out to be meritorious. Thus, it is far better
and more prudent for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a
substantive review of the case on appeal, to attain the ends of justice than to dismiss
said appeal on technicalities.
OÑATE v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 213660, 5 July 2016

FACTS:
This is a petition for to reverse the Commission on Audit (COA) Decision No. 2014-
126 which ruled that the payment of the legal services of Atty. Alex A. Arejola shall be
the personal liability of petitioner Dr. Wenifredo T. Oñate.
A retainership contract was entered into by and between Atty. Alex A. Arejola and
Camarines Norte State College (CNSC), as represented by its President, Dr. Oñate.
Pursuant thereto, Atty. Arejola was engaged to act as the legal counsel of CNSC for
a period of one (1) year, renewable every year, at a monthly retainer fee of P10,000.00
net of tax and appearance fee of P500.00 and P1,500.00 for every hearing attended
within and outside, respectively, of Camarines Norte.
COA issued a Notice of Disallowance, which found the payee and the approving
signatories liable for the disallowed amount of P184,649.25. Dr. Oñate moved to
reconsider the decision, but the COA Commissioners affirmed the questioned LRR.
Relying on Polloso v. Hon. Gangan and Santayana v. Alampay, it was held that the
payment for the legal services of Atty. Arejola shall be the personal liability of Dr. Oñate
as the official concerned who secured and who actually benefited therefrom. Hence,
this petition praying that the COA Decision finding him solely liable be set aside.

ISSUE:
Whether or not COA erred in its Disallowance decision where payment for the legal
services of Atty. Arejola (private legal counsel) shall be the personal liability of Dr.
Oñate (CNSC President)?

RULING:
No. Camarines Norte State College was created by Republic Act No. 7352. Under
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, or the Administrative Code of 1987, a state college is
classified as a chartered institution. As such, only the OSG is authorized to represent
CNSC and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. COA Circular No. 95-011 stresses that public funds
shall not be utilized for the payment of services of a private legal counsel or law firm
to represent government agencies in court or to render legal services for them.
Nonetheless, petitioner must not be entirely accountable for the refund of the
disallowed amount. Evidence on record indubitably shows that he was properly armed
with the necessary CNSC Board approval before he secured the legal services of Atty.
Arejola. The board of trustees who approved Board Referendum No. 2, s. 2009, which
granted authority to Dr. Oñate to enter into a retainer's contract with Atty. Arejola but
did not require the prior conformity of the OSG and written concurrence of the COA,
should also be held liable for the unauthorized disbursement of public funds.

Petitioner Dr. Wenifredo T. Oñate, the CNSC Board of Trustees, and the other persons
found liable for the disallowed amount of P184,649.25 in LRR No. 2010-158 dated
December 2, 2010, are personally and solidarily liable for the reimbursement of the
amount paid for the legal services rendered by Atty. Alex A. Arejola. In the interest of
due process, however, considering that the board of trustees were not impleaded in
the case, the Commission on Audit is DIRECTED to ORDER them to file a
memorandum and/or call a hearing to allow the presentation of evidence that may
exempt them from any liability.
MARIO M. MADERA, et al. v. COA, GR No. 244128, 2020-09-08

Facts:
In December 2013, the Municipality passed and approved Sangguniang Bayan
Ordinance and Resolutions granting various allowances to its officials and employees.
On post audit, the Audit Team Leader and the Supervising Auditor of the Municipality
issued a total of 11 Notices of Disallowance dated February 20, 2014 for the grant of
the allowances on the ground that the grants were in violation of the following :a)
Section 12 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6758 or the Salary Standardization Law (SSL)
as regards the consolidation of allowances and compensation; b) Item II of COA
Circular No. 2013-003 dated January 30, 2013 which excluded the subject allowances
among the list of authorized allowances, incentives, and benefits. The records show
that Madera, Mananguite, Galing and Pelo also received the benefits covered by the
NDs. COA Regional Office ruled that government units are not exempt from the SSL
and the grant and payment of the subject allowances were subject to Section 12 of
R.A. 6758 which provides that all allowances are deemed integrated in the
standardized salary rates and only six enumerated allowances are considered
excluded from the integration. As for petitioners' contention that no appropriation
ordinance of the Municipality had been declared invalid and that the subject
allowances were given as financial assistance to the employees because good
intention, no matter how noble, cannot be made an excuse for not adhering to the
rules. The COA Proper affirmed the ruling of the COA RO, with modification in that the
officials and employees who unwittingly received the disallowed benefits or allowances
are not held liable for their reimbursement since they are recipient-payees in good
faith. The COA opined that, following applicable rules, the approving officer and each
employee who received the disallowed benefit or allowance are obligated, jointly and
severally, to refund the amount received.
Issue:
Whether or not the COA was correct in holding petitioners liable for the refund of the
disallowed amounts.
Ruling:
Petitioners disbursed the subject allowances in the honest belief that the amounts
given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude,
confident that they richly deserve such reward. Otherwise stated, and to borrow the
language of Lumayna, these mistakes committed are not actionable, absent a clear
showing that such actions were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting
to bad faith. There was no showing of some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or
intent, or ill will in the grant of these benefits. There was no fraud nor was there a state
of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill
will for ulterior purposes. Government employment should be seen as an opportunity
for individuals of good will to render honest-to-goodness public service, and not a trap
for the unwary. It should be an attractive alternative to private employment, not an
undesirable undertaking grudgingly accepted, to therefore regret.121 While the Court
supports the mandate of the COA in ensuring that the funds of the government are
properly utilized and the return to the government of funds unduly spent, the same
must not be at the expense of public officials and employees who are directly tasked
to discharge and render public service - especially when the presumptions of good
faith and regularity in the performance of their duties have not been rebutted or
overturned. The petition was partially granted.
Civil Service Commission Vs. Peter G. Cutao, G.R. No. 225151. Sept. 30, 2020

Facts:
Cutao started in the civil service with the Philippine National Police (PNP) as PO1. He
was later on promoted to PO3,5 SPO1,6 and SPO2.7 All of the promotions were
approved by the CSC. The CSC Field Office Agusan Del Norte, through Meshach D.
Dinhayan, wrote a Letter dated February 16, 2011, to CHED Caraga Administrative
Region, through Dr. Isabela L. Mahler requesting the latter to verify the authenticity of
Cutao's transcript and CAV. The documents sought to be verified were alleged “not
authentic” thus the approval of the promotional appointments of Mr. Peter G. Cutao
were recalled. Petitioner appealed to CSCRO Decision. The CSC Proper dismissed
Cutao's appeal and gave more weight to CHED's declaration that the transcript and
CAV submitted by Cutao were not authentic, thus that he does not possess the
requisite educational attainment for the higher positions. Cutao elevated the case to
the CA arguing that the CSC violated his constitutional right to due process. CA
overturned the CSC's rulings hence the CSC filed a petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the CSC’s recall of the promotional appointments is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court finds the CSC's recall or invalidation of the subject promotional
appointments to be justified. When the CSC recalled his promotional appointments for
not meeting the qualification standard, it was merely performing its recognized duty of
ensuring that the appointee has all the qualifications for the position. If it finds that the
appointee does not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualification, it is
duty-bound to disapprove his appointment. The CSC properly relied on the CHED
certification expressly declaring the subject documents as inauthentic. Cutao's
appointments were initially approved by the CSC and that he has been in position for
six years do not preclude the CSC from reviewing his appointments and disapproving
them if the appointee is eventually found ineligible to occupy such office. The
fundamental rule is that appointments in the civil service shall be made only according
to merit and fitness. As his promotional appointments violated the qualification
standards set for the positions of PO3, SPO1, and SPO3, these were all null and void
ab initio, "A void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the
holder of such appointment" much less ripen into a vested right to office. Thus,
contrary to the CA ruling, the Court cannot allow Cutao to hold office merely on the
basis of good faith or the sheer length of time spent therein. Otherwise, the Court
would be condoning the entrance of unqualified individuals to government service.
GURO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. NO. 234345, JUNE 22, 2021

FACTS:
Private respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Municipal Mayor of
Lumbaca-Unayan, Lanao del Sur for the May 2016 NLE. However, the petitioner,
who was the erstwhile municipal mayor of Lumbaca-Unayan, running for re-election,
challenged private respondent's candidacy via a Petition for Disqualification on April
29, 2016 on the ground that private respondent is not a registered voter of the
municipality based on the posted certified voters' list.
But the private respondent insisted that his name was included in the supplemental
list of voters as per COMELEC's resolution and likewise averred that he was able to
cast his vote on Election Day, and that he won and was proclaimed as the Mayor of
Lumbaca-Unayan in the May 2016 NLE.
Both the COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc dismissed the petition
on the ground that petitioner filed the same beyond the prescriptive period of twenty-
five (25) days for filing a Petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC). Thus, the petitioner filed a certiorari in the Supreme Court attributing grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
COMELEC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction for dismissing the petitioner’s petition.

RULING:
NO. The COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.
Section 1 and 2 of Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by
COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, provides that, “A verified Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy for any elective office may be filed by
any registered voter or a duly registered political party, organization or coalition of
political parties on the exclusive ground that any material representation contained
therein as required by law is false. A Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy invoking grounds other than those stated above or grounds
for disqualification, or combining grounds for a separate remedy, shall be summarily
dismissed (Sec.1). The Petition must be filed within five (5) days from the last day
for filing of certificate of candidacy; but not later than twenty-five (25) days from the
time of filing of the certificate of candidacy subject of the Petition. In case of a
substitute candidate, the Petition must be filed within five (5) days from the time the
substitute candidate filed his certificate of candidacy. (sec.2)”
The Court noted that private respondent filed his COC on October 16, 2015 while
petitioner filed his petition before the COMELEC on April 29, 2016, or after the lapse
of a whopping one hundred ninety-six (196) days. On the ground that herein private
respondent allegedly misrepresented himself as being a registered voter, the Court
saw no reason to depart from settled jurisprudence and accordingly rule that the
reglementary period provided by law should likewise be strictly applied to such a
disqualification.
Panarigan v. Civil Service Commission-Regional Office (CSCRO) No. III,
G.R.No. 238077, March 17, 2021

FACTS:
Petitioner Teddy L. Panarigan, an employee at the National Food Authority (NFA) in
Bulacan Branch - Malolos, Bulacan applied for a position as Clerk II, permanent
status. In support of his application, Panarigan submitted his Personal Data Sheet 5
(PDS) stating that he has a professional career service eligibility after he took the
Career Service Professional Examination (CSPE). Subsequently, Panarigan was
appointed to the said position. Sometime afterwards, the Provincial Manager of the
NFA received an anonymous letter alleging that Panarigan's civil service eligibility
was fake and that Panarigan paid another person to take the civil service
examination on his behalf.
When the Civil Service Commission-Regional Office No. III (CSCRO) conducted an
investigation regarding the authenticity of Panarigan's eligibility; they found the
existence of a prima facie case, formally charged Panarigan for Dishonesty,
Falsification of Official Document, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service. However, the petitioner denied the findings of the CSC and that he was only
a victim of substitution or tampering of document. But the CSCRO found Panarigan
guilty of the crime charged. Panarigan filed a Motion for Reconsideration and even
appealed but all of which were denied in the CSC and in the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding Panarigan guilty of Serious Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct and Falsification of Official Document.

RULING:
No. The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service 29 (Uniform
Rules) does not require strict adherence to the technical rules of evidence. The
investigation shall be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the truth without
necessarily adhering to technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings. Thus, just
like in this case, the CSC validly considered the photocopies of the PSP and the
examination application receipt in resolving the formal charge against Panarigan,
even if not duly authenticated.
Dishonesty means the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant
to one's office or connected with the performance of his duty. For dishonesty to be
considered serious, the presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in
Section 3 of CSC Resolution No. 06-0538 or the Rules on the Administrative Offense
of Dishonesty, must be present.
Section 3 (e) and (g) of CSC Resolution No. 06-0538 states that, “The respondent
employed fraud and/or falsification or official documents in the commission of the
dishonest act related to his/her employment (e). The dishonest act involves a Civil
Service examination irregularity or fake Civil Service eligibility such as, but not limited
to, impersonation, cheating and use of crib sheets (g).
The duly accomplished form of the Civil Service is an official document of the CSC,
which, by its very nature is considered in the same category as that of a public
document, admissible in evidence without need of further proof.
ISABELITA P. GRAVIDES, Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and PEDRO C. BORJAL, Respondents
G.R. No. 199433 November 13, 2012

FACTS:
Borjal and Gravides both ran for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay U.P.
Results of the elections showed that Gravides garnered a total of 2,322 votes as
against Borjal’s 2,320 votes.
The Barangay Board of Canvassers (BBOC) officially proclaimed Gravides as the
winning candidate for the said post. Borjal filed an Election Protest Borjal asserting
that there is a need for revision, re-appreciation of ballots, judicial recount and
thorough scrutiny of the election returns and minutes of voting in the protested
precincts, the results of which will change the election sufficient to overcome the
presumptive lead of the declared winner. Gravides filed her Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim denying the allegations of fraud, vote manipulation,
misreading/misappreciation of ballots and other irregularities in the counting and
tallying of votes, committed either by her or by the Board of Election Tellers
(BET)/BBOC. She pointed out that the protest failed to provide a detailed specification
of the acts or omissions complained of. Such general and sweeping allegations violate
the provisions of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC. During the preliminary conference, Gravides
moved for the dismissal of the election protest for non-compliance with Section 4, Rule
9 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC as to the contents of the preliminary conference brief. The
MeTC resolved to grant the motion, ordering the dismissal of the election protest.
Borjal appealed the order of dismissal to the COMELEC arguing that the MeTC (1)
misinformed him of the contents of a preliminary conference brief in its Notice of Pre-
Trial Conference; (2) prematurely issued such notice, contrary to the mandate of
Section 1,Rule 9 of A.M. No. 07-4- 15-SC; (3) erred in applying the ruling in Cabrera
v. COMELEC considering that the factual circumstances are not foursquare with the
present case; and (4) erred in dismissing the election protest by holding that his
Preliminary Conference Brief failed to comply with the required contents under Section
4, Rule 9 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.
In its Resolution, the COMELEC’s First Division granted the appeal,
Annulled the order of the MeTC and remanded the case for further proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in giving the mandatory rules governing the filing of
preliminary conference briefs and its required contents.
RULING:
No. Contrary to petitioner’s submissions, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the
proper consideration by COMELEC of the attendant circumstances warranting a more
reasonable and liberal application of the rules. Foremost of these is the fact that Borjal
was misled by the Notice of Preliminary Conference issued by the MeTC which
erroneously applied the provision on pre-trial brief under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The mistake committed by Borjal’s counsel in complying with the court’s directive
should not prejudice his cause, as no intent to unduly prolong the resolution of the
election protest can be gleaned from his failure to include such manifestation of
withdrawal of certain protested precincts and of the procedure to be followed in case
the election protest seeks the examination, verification, or re-tabulation of election
returns.
LETICIA A. CADENA vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. 191412 January
17, 2012
FACTS:
Cadena, then a State Auditing Examiner II, Commission on Audit, assigned at the
National Power Corporation, was charged with grave misconduct by the Civil Service
Commission-National Capital Region (CSC-NCR) following an incident that occurred
during the Career Service Professional Examination held on June 29, 1997. Records
indicate that while all examinees were instructed at the start of the examination to clear
their desks of things other than their examination booklets, scratch papers and answer
sheets, Cadena kept her Notice of Assignment. In the course of the examination, the
examiner caught Cadena with the said notice of assignment where some questions
from the examination were reproduced.
In her answer to the formal charge, Cadena averred that she failed to fully comprehend
the instructions to examinees because she arrived late for the examinations. She did
not know that she was prohibited from keeping her notice of assignment while the
examinations were ongoing. She further alleged that what she copied from the
examination booklet and wrote on the notice of assignment were terms she
encountered for the first time, and that she only intended to look up in the dictionary
the meaning of those words once she arrived home.
While Cadena manifested her desire to file a position paper during the investigations,
no such pleading was filed by her counsel. A decision was then rendered by the CSC-
NCR based on available records.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commission-NCR erred in denying the Appeal on its Resolution of
March 24, 2008 filed by Petitioner for being arbitrary and not supported by the
evidence on record and therefore errors of law or irregularities have been committed
prejudicial to the interest of the Petitioner.

RULING:
NO. This Court has sufficient grounds to deny the present petition, barring the need to
further rule on the issues now brought before us. In any case, we rule that both the
CSC and the CA have correctly held that the rulings of the CSC-NCR had become
final and executory when the petitioner failed to make a timely appeal before the CSC.
As held by the CSC in its decision denying the appeal:
For her failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the adverse decision, herein appellant lost her right to appeal.
Technically, there is nothing more to appeal as the decision sought to be appealed
had already attained finality. It is well settled that judgments or orders become final
and executory by operation of law and not by judicial declaration. Thus, finality of
judgment becomes an established fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of
appeal, if no appeal is perfected or motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed. This
jurisprudential rule must be read together with Section 72 Rule V (B) of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), which provides that the
prescriptive period to appeal the decision of the Regional Offices of the Commission
is fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof by the party adversely affected.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V MADLAWI B. MAGOYAG G.R. No. 197792,
December 09, 2015

FACTS:

This is to resolve the Petition for Review dated September 12, 2011 of petitioner Civil
Service Commission (CSC) assailing the Decision dated May 12, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and the latter's Resolution dated July 22, 2011 that directed the CSC to
comply with the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur, 12th
Judicial Region, Branch 9, Marawi City ordering the correction of entry on the date of
birth of respondent Madlawi B. Magoyag.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CSC will comply with the directives of the RTC of Lanao del Sur.

RULING:

Yes. The Civil Service Commission is directed to comply with the Decision of the RTC
of Lanao del Sur, 12 Judicial Region, Branch 9.
th
Erdito Quarto v. Simeon Marcelo, G.R. No. 169042, October 5, 2011.

Facts:
The petitioner Erdito Quarto filed certiorari and mandamus, assailing the
Ombudsman's January 7, 2004 and November 4, 2004 resolutions which granted
Luisito M. Tablan, Raul B. Borillo, and Luis A. Gayya (collectively, respondents)
immunity from prosecution, resulting in the respondents' exclusion from the criminal
informations filed before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner seeks to nullify the
immunity granted to the respondents, and to compel the Ombudsman to include them
as accused in the informations for estafa through falsification of public documents and
for violation of Section 3 (e), Republic Act (RA) No. 3019.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondents' exclusion in the informations is grounded on the
Ombudsman's grant of immunity.

Ruling:
Yes. The Ombudsman granted the respondents immunity from prosecution pursuant
to RA No. 6770 which specifically empowers the Ombudsman to grant immunity "in
any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its
authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and
statutory objectives."

Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended the
privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment
of the prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall
be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute.

RA No. 6770 fully recognizes this prosecutory prerogative by empowering the

Ombudsman to grant immunity, subject to "such terms and conditions" as he may
determine. The only textual limitation imposed by law on this authority is the need to
take "into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court," — i.e., Section 17,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. 6

The Constitution and RA No. 6770 have endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with
a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers, freed, to the extent possible
within our governmental system and structure, from legislative, executive, or judicial
intervention, and insulated from outside pressure and improper influence. Consistent
with this purpose and subject to the command of paragraph 2, Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution, the Court reiterates its policy of non-interference with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers (among them, the
power to grant immunity to witnesses), and respects the initiative and independence
inherent in the Ombudsman who, "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the
people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.”
Dennis Funa vs. Francisco Duque G.R. No. 191672; November 25, 2014

Facts:
Pursuant to EO 864, Duque was designated as a member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees of the following government-owned or government controlled corporations
(GOCCs): (a) GSIS; (b) PHILHEALTH; (c) ECC; and (d) HDMF.

On April 8, 2010, petitioner Dennis A.B. Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned
citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of EO 864,
as well as Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (EO
292), otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987, and the designation of
Duque as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC
and HDMF for being clear violations of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution.

Petitioner asserts that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292
violate the independence of the CSC, which was constitutionally created to be
protected from outside influences and political pressures due to the significance of its
government functions.

Issue:
Whether or not the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair
the independence of the CSC.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court partially grants the petition. The Court upholds the constitutionality of
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but declares unconstitutional EO
864 and the designation of Duque in an ex officio capacity as a member of the Board
of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.

Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is clear that the CSC Chairman's
membership in a governing body is dependent on the condition that the functions of
the government entity where he will sit as its Board member must affect the career
development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government
officials and employees. Based on this, the Court finds no irregularity in Section 14,
Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 because matters affecting the career
development, rights and welfare of government employees are among the primary
functions of the CSC and are consequently exercised through its Chairman. The CSC
Chairman's membership therein must, therefore, be considered to be derived from his
position as such. Accordingly, the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A,
Book V of EO 292 is upheld.

The Court also notes that Duque's designation as member of the governing Boards of
the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, 41 a form
of additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position
by virtue of its clear contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes against the principle behind an ex officio
position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Atty. Anacleto B. Buena, Jr. vs. Dr. Sangcad D. Benito; G.R. No. 181760; October
14, 2014

Facts:
Petitioner Regional Director Buena maintains that the position of Assistant Schools
Division Superintendent requires career executive service eligibility, citing Civil
Service Commission Resolution No. 021011 49 dated August 1, 2002. Since the
resolution does not distinguish between a holder of a government position in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and one in a regular agency of the national
government, the qualifications for positions in the national government must apply to
positions in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

August 20, 2012, respondent Dr. Benito added that the issuance of Civil Service
Commission Resolution No. 100623 and, subsequently, the Regional Assembly's
enactment of the Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 279 or the ARMM Basic
Education Act of 2010 confirm that the position of Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent does not require career executive service eligibility.

Issue:
Whether the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent requires career
executive service eligibility.

Ruling:
Yes. the exercise of its legal mandate, the Career Executive Service Board issued
Resolution No. 945 dated June 14, 2011, where it set the following criteria to determine
whether a position belongs to the Career Executive Service. Aside from satisfying the
criteria set by the Career Executive Service Board, the holder of the position must also
be a presidential appointee. Applying these principles in this case, we rule that the
position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent belongs to the Career Executive
Service.

The position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent is a career position.

Appointment to the position is based on merit and fitness and gives the appointee an
opportunity for advancement to higher career positions, such as Schools Division
Superintendent. If permanently appointed, the appointee is guaranteed security of
tenure. In fact, the law recognizes that the position of Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent belongs to the Career Executive Service. Section 7 of Republic Act
No. 9155 explicitly provides that an appointee to the position must be a career
executive service officer

It is settled, therefore, that the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent

belongs to the Career Executive Service. The appointee to the position must be career
executive service eligible. In this case, respondent Dr. Benito does not possess the
required career executive service eligibility. He, therefore, cannot be appointed to the
position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent in a permanent capacity. The
Civil Service Commission cannot be compelled to attest to the permanent appointment
of respondent Dr. Benito.
G.R. No. 95346, January 18, 1991
PERFECTO V. GALIDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
SATURNINO R. GALEON, respondents

FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates during the 18 January 1988 local
elections for the position of mayor in the Municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, Province
of Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed duly-elected Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers. On 25 January 1988, private respondent Saturnino
R. Galeon filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, 7 Judicial
th

Region, Branch I, Tagbilaran City. After hearing, the said court upheld the
proclamation of petitioner as the duly-elected Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, by a
majority of eleven (11) votes. Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC).Through its First Division, the COMELEC
reversed the trial court’s decision and declared private respondent the duly-elected
mayor by a plurality of five (5) votes. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied
by the COMELEC in its en banc resolution of 20 September 1990 which affirmed the
decision of its First Division. The COMELEC held that the fifteen (15) ballots in the
same precinct containing the initial “C” after the name Galido were marked ballots and,
therefore, invalid

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision.

RULING:
No. It is settled that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court or
tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As correctly argued by
public respondent COMELEC, it has the inherent power to decide an election contest
on physical evidence, equity, law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence in
support of its findings and conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents
apply rests on its discretion, the exercise of which should not be controlled unless such
discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party.

Finally, the records disclose that private respondent had already assumed the position
of Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez as the duly-elected mayor of the municipality by virtue
of the COMELEC decision. The main purpose of prohibition is to suspend all action
and prevent the further performance of the act complained of. In this light, the petition
at bar has become moot and academic.
Feliciano vs. Department of National Defense
G.R. Nos. 199232 & 201577 (Resolution), November 8, 2017

Facts:
Pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 1, DND Sec. Gazmin issued an order to
terminate 11 officials of the DND, including Gonzalez, on account of their lack of the
CSEE; and to re-designate Feliciano as Assistant Secretary for Strategic Assessment
of the DND. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed their respective appeals by letter complaint
in the CSC on the ground of illegal termination. The CSC rendered its decision in favor
of Feliciano and Gonzalez directing their reinstatement. The CA Fourteenth Division
held that the CSC had no jurisdiction over the case of Feliciano.

Issue:
Whether or not the CSC had jurisdiction over the appeals of the petitioners?

Ruling:
Yes. The CSC has jurisdiction over the cases of the petitioners. The CSC is invested
with adjudicative powers to render final arbitration on disputes and personnel actions
involving matters relating to the Civil Service. The present case involves the
classification of positions belonging to the CES and the qualifications for these posts.
These are matters clearly within the scope of the powers granted to the CESB under
the Administrative Code and the Integrated Reorganization Plan. However, this fact
alone does not push the matter beyond the reach of the CSC. Since the CESB is an
attached agency of the CSC, the former's decisions are expressly subject to the CSC's
review on appeal. Although the CESB is expressly empowered to promulgate rules,
standards and procedures on the selection, classification, compensation and career
development of the members of the CES, the power and function to hear and decide
administrative cases on all personnel and civil service matters remained to be duty
and function of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the Government. The mere
fact that the positions involved in these cases were CES positions does not divest the
CSC of its constitutional power to hear and decide the cases.
Marmeto vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 213953. September 26, 2017

Facts:
Marmeto filed a proposed ordinance with the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Muntinlupa.
The proposal sought the creation of a sectoral council and appropriation of P200
million for the livelihood programs and projects. Marmeto filed a petition for initiative
with the same body to invoke the power of initiative under the Republic Act (RA) No.
7160. The COMELEC set aside Marmeto's initiative petition because the propositions
were beyond the powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to enact. Marmeto assails
the COMELEC's Resolution contending that the denial of an initiative petition due to
lack of appropriated funds constitutes a gross neglect and abandonment of the
COMELEC's duties under the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC is mandated to enforce and administer the laws on local
initiative and referendum?

Ruling:
No. The Constitution mandated the Congress to "provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or
reject any act or law or part thereof by the Congress or local legislative body." The
Congress enacted RA No. 6735 which provide a system of initiative and referendum
on national and local laws. To implement RA No. 6735, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 2300, which provided the rules and regulations governing the conduct
of initiative on the Constitution, and initiative and referendum on national and local
laws. Since the LGC codified all laws pertaining to local governments, the provisions
on local initiative and referendum found in RA No. 6735 were reiterated, with slight
modifications, in Sections 120 to 127 of the LGC; all other provisions in RA No. 6735
not inconsistent within the Sections 120 and 127 of the LGC remained valid and in
effect. RA No. 6735 and the LGC are thus the pertinent laws on local initiative and
referendum which the COMELEC is mandated to enforce and administer under Article
IX-C, Section 2 (1) of the Constitution. Naturally, the conduct of initiative and
referendum (as with any election exercise) will entail expenses on the part of the
government. The budget for the conduct of the exercise of political rights, specifically
those on suffrage and electoral rights, is given to the COMELEC, whose approved
annual appropriations are automatically and regularly released.
HILARIO DASCO v. PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES INC/CENTURION
SOLANO, GR No. 211141, 2016-06-29

Facts:
On various dates from 2006 to 2010, the petitioners were employed by the
respondents as bus drivers and/or conductors with travel routes of Manila (Pasay) to
Bicol, Visayas and Mindanao, and vice versa. the petitioners filed a case against the
respondents alleging that: (1) they were already qualified for regular employment
status since they have been working with the respondents for several years; (2) they
were paid only P404.00 per round trip (3) they cannot be considered as field personnel
because their working hours are controlled by the respondents from dispatching to
end point and their travel time is monitored and measured by the distance (4) they had
not been given their yearly five-day SIL since the time they were hired by the
respondents.
(1) the petitioners were paid on a fixed salary rate of P0.49 centavos per kilometer run,
or minimum wage, whichever is higher; (2) the petitioners are seasonal employees
since their contracts are for a fixed period and their... employment was dependent on
the exigency of the extraordinary public demand for more buses during peak months
of the year; and (3) the petitioners are not entitled to overtime pay and SIL pay because
they are field personnel whose time outside the company premises cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty since they ply provincial routes and are left alone
in the field unsupervised. The Decision of the [LA] dated October 17, 2011 is hereby
MODIFIED in that [PSEI] is directed to pay [the petitioners] wage differentials. The
NLRC held that the petitioners are not field personnel considering that they ply specific
routes with fixed time schedules determined by the respondents
With regard to the respondents' claim that the petitioners have a fixed term contract,
the NLRC concurred with the findings of the LA that the respondents failed to show
any document, such as employment contracts and employment records, that would
show the dates of hiring, as well as the fixed period agreed upon. The CA, in its
Decision[23] dated August 30, 2013, reversed and set aside the NLRC rulings and
reinstated the LA's decision.
Issues:
The main issue in this case is whether the petitioners as bus drivers and/or conductors
are field personnel, and thus entitled to overtime pay and SIL pay.
Ruling:
In order to monitor their drivers and/or conductors, as well as the passengers and the
bus itself, the bus companies put checkers, who are assigned at tactical places along
the travel routes that are plied by their buses. The drivers and/or conductors are
required to be at the... specific bus terminals at a specified time. In addition, there are
always dispatchers in each and every bus terminal, who supervise and ensure prompt
departure at specified times and arrival at the estimated proper time. Obviously, these
drivers and/or conductors cannot be... considered as field personnel because they are
under the control and constant supervision of the bus companies while in the
performance of their work. Since the respondents are engaged in the public utility
business, the petitioners, as bus drivers and/or conductors, should be considered as
regular employees of the respondents because they perform tasks which are directly
and necessarily connected with the... respondents' business. Thus, they are
consequently entitled to the benefits accorded to regular employees of the
respondents, including overtime pay and SIL pay.
AQUILES U. REYES vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ORIENTAL MINDORO,
BRANCH XXXIX, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ADOLFO G. COMIA, and THE
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO G.R. No. 108886
May 5, 1995

FACTS: Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private respondent Adolfo Comia were
candidates for the position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections. during the proceedings of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers, private respondent moved for the exclusion of certain
election returns, on the ground of serious irregularity in counting in favor of petitioner
Aquiles Reyes votes cast for "Reyes" only, considering that there was another
candidate (Epitacio Reyes) bearing the same surname. However, without resolving
his petition, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed on the same day petitioner
as the eighth winning candidate, private respondent filed an election protest before the
trial court, he alleged that a vital mistake had been committed by the Board of
Canvassers in the mathematical computation of the total number of votes garnered by
petitioner [now private respondent], petitioner filed a motion to dismiss private
respondent's petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period
of ten days from proclamation. However, the trial court denied his motion. On the other
hand, the Municipal Board of Canvassers filed its answer in which it admitted that it
had made a mistake in crediting private respondent with only 858 votes when he was
entitled to 915 votes in the Statement of Votes (C.E. Form No. 20-A). The trial court
rendered its decision annuling the proclamation of petitioner and declaring private
respondent as the eighth winning candidate for the position of councilor of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to
the COMELEC. In addition, he filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition in the
Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because of petitioner's
pending appeal in the COMELEC. The appellate court cited Supreme Court Circular
28-91 which prohibits the filing of multiple petitions involving the same issues.
Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied thereafter. On the other hand, the
COMELEC's First Division dismissed petitioner's appeal on the ground that he had
failed to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period.

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC's First Division committed a grave abuse of discretion
by dismissing petitioner's appeal from the decision of the trial court for late payment
of the appeal fee.

RULING: No. Rule 22, Section 9 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure expressly
provides that appeal may be dismissed for failure of the appellant to pay the appeal
fee, In accordance with Sec. 2 (b) of COMELEC Resolution No. 2108-A, the appeal
fee must be paid within the period to perfect the appeal. Sec. 3 of the same Rules
provides that Notice of appeal must be paid within five (5) days after promulgation of
the decision of the court, the aggrieved party may file with said court a notice of appeal,
and serve a copy thereof upon the attorney of record of the adverse party.
The records show that petitioner received a copy of the decision of the trial court on
June 26, 1992. However, he paid the appeal fee of P1,020.00 only on August 6,
1992. In other words, petitioner allowed forty (40) days to lapse when the appeal fee
should have been paid within five (5) days after promulgation of the trial court's
decision.
MARIO M. GERONIMO V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 224163, December
04, 2018
FACTS: On June 28, 2010, Geronimo filed with the respondent COA a petition for
collection of sum of money against the Republic of the Philippines and the Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Geronimo alleged that sometime in February
2005, he was invited to attend a meeting with the officials of the DPWH, including its
then secretary, Florante Soriquez. The DPWH sought Geronimo's services for several
landscaping projects which the DPWH seeks to be implemented in the areas of Ayala
Boulevard, Padre Burgos Street, Roxas Boulevard, Osmefia Highway, and other
median strips or center islands of main thoroughfares within Metro Manila, in
connection with the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Summit in Manila. Due to the
limited time left as the IPU Summit was about to commence, Geronimo was
commissioned to implement the projects without the parties executing any written
contract. On the said meeting, Geronimo was verbally requested to initiate and
complete the projects at the earliest possible time. Geronimo was further assured that
he will be paid in full upon completion of the projects. Relying on the assurance and
representations by the DPWH officials, Geronimo proceeded with the implementation
and completion of the projects in accordance with the plans and specifications by the
DPWH. The projects were completed sometime in July 2005. Geronimo alleged that
he incurred a total amount of ~14,245,994.20 for the projects. Although no written
contract had been executed between the parties, Geronimo asserted that he is entitled
to receive payment for his services on the basis of quantum meruit. Despite the
completion of the project, and in spite of several demands, the DPWH failed to pay
Geronimo compensation for his services. Thus, he was prompted to file his claim
before the COA.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED
GERONIMO'S MONEY CLAIM DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT DPWH'S LIABILITY IN
FAVOR OF GERONIMO EXISTS.
RULING: The petition is meritorious. Principle of quantum meruit is applicable in this
case. The COA erred when it denied the petition for money claim. Quantum meruit
literally means "as much as he deserves." Under this principle, a person may recover
a reasonable value of the thing he delivered or the service he rendered. The principle
also acts as a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate
that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it. The principle of
quantum meruit is predicated on equity. Nevertheless, the COA erred in denying
Geronimo's petition for money claim. As a principle predicated on equity, the
application of quantum meruit should not have been restricted by the provisions of
Section 4(6) of P.D. No. 1445. Although the documents submitted by Geronimo were
insufficient to ascertain what was reasonably due him, the most judicious action which
the COA could have taken was to require him to submit additional supporting evidence
and/or employ whatever auditing technique is necessary to determine the reasonable
value of the services he rendered, and the market value of the materials used in the
subject landscaping projects. Denial of the claim would certainly not be appropriate
and just under the circumstances. Clearly, the COA gravely abused its discretion when
it denied Geronimo's claim despite his obvious and recognized entitlement thereto.