SORIANO V LAGUARDIA

FACTS:            In the evening of 10 Aug 2004, petitioner Eliseo Soriano as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired
on UNTV 37, made the following remarks directed towards private respondent Michael Sandoval, a minister of
the Iglesia ni Cristo and a host of the program Ang Tamang Daan:

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling.  Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung
putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol
pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga
demonyong ito.

            Two days after, complaints were lodged by Jessie Galapon and other private respondents, all members of
the Iglesia ni Cristo before the MTRCB.  On 16 Aug 2004, the MTRCB issued an order preventively suspending Ang
Dating Daan for 20 days in accordance with Sec 3(d) of PD 1986.

            Petitioner sought for reconsideration praying that respondent Chairperson Consoliza Laguardia recuse
themselves from hearing the case but later withdrew his motion followed by the filing for certiorari and prohibition
to nullify the preventive suspension order.

            On 27 Sept 2004, the MTRCB issued a decision imposing 3 months suspension from the program Ang Dating
Daan.

ISSUES:

 W/N MTRCB is authorized under PD 1986 to issue preventive suspension.

 W/N petitioner was deprived of due process and equal protection for lack of due hearing in the case.
 W/N petitioner’s utterance was religious speech protected by religious freedom.
 W/N petitioner’s utterance was protected by freedom of speech and expression.

HELD:

            1.)  Yes.  The Court ruled that administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative,
investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as conferred by the Constitution or
the law.  The authority given should be liberally construed.  A perusal of the PD 1986 reveal the possession of
authority to issue preventive suspension as found in Sec 3(d), “To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or
cancel… exhibition, and/or television broadcast… as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable…”  Any other
construal would render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory.

Preventive suspension is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.
And the power to discipline and impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to investigate administrative
complaints and, during such investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint.

Moreover, the assailed Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) issued by MTRCB in pursuant to PD 1986 merely
formalizes the power bestowed by said statute.  The IRR provision on preventive suspension is applicable not only to
motion pictures and publicity materials but only beyond motion pictures.  The MTRCB would regretfully be rendered
ineffective should it be subject to the restrictions petitioner envisages.

2.)  No. The Court ruled that since MTRCB handed out the assailed order in response to a written notice after
petitioner appeared before that Board for a hearing on private respondents complaint, no violation of the guarantee
was made.  Under Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986, preventive suspension shall issue any time during the
pendency of the case. In this particular case, it was done after MTRCB duly apprised petitioner of his having possibly
violated PD 1986 and of administrative complaints that had been filed against him for such violation.  At any event,
that preventive suspension can validly be meted out even without a hearing
 Neither the guarantee of equal protection was denied.  Petitioner argues that he was unable to answer the criticisms
coming from the INC ministers.  The equal protection clause demands that all persons subject to legislation should be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.  The
Court ruled that petitioner cannot, under the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for
one, are not facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB.  For another, he offers no proof to such allegations.

3.)  No.  The Court ruled that there is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints expressing any
particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission.  The fact that he came out with his
statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious
discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech.
Even petitioners attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek
retribution, not by any religious conviction.

4.)  No.  The Court held that be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g., judicial injunction against publication or threat of
cancellation of license/franchise, or subsequent liability, whether in libel and damage suits, prosecution for sedition,
or contempt proceedings, are anathema to the freedom of expression.  Prior restraint means official government
restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.  The freedom
of speech may be regulated to serve important public interests and it may not be invoked when the expression
touches upon matters of essentially private concern.  The freedom to express ones sentiments and belief does not
grant one the license to vilify in public the honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments must be expressed within
the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of others.  A speech would fall under the unprotected type if
the utterances involved are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step of
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.

The Petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child, and thus his
utterances cannot be considered as protected speech.  Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the Court said
that the analysis should be context based and found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use of
television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are all factors that
made the utterances susceptible to children viewers.  The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be
easily understood by a child literally rather than in the context that they were used.