Wedgeworth Sentencing Memorandum

Case 4:21-cr-00050-RH-MAF Document 41 Filed 08/09/22 Page 1 of 42
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. Case No.: 4:21CR50/RH-MAF
BRIAN BRAINARD WEDGEWORTH

a/k/a “DR. BRIAN ANDERSON”
a/k/a “DR. ANTHONY WATKINS”
a/k/a “DR. BRIAN ADAMS”
a/k/a “DR. EDWARD CHEN”
a/k/a “DR. BRIAN CHRIS”
a/k/a “DR. CHRIS WILLIAMSON”
a/k/a “DR. BRIAN CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMSON”
a/k/a “DR. BRIAN EDMONDS”
a/k/a “DR. BRIAN AMMERSON”
a/k/a “DR. BRIAN LAMAR WILSON”
a/k/a “DR. BRIAN WILSON”
a/k/a “DR. BRIAN MIMS”
a/k/a “DR. BRIAN LAMAR SIMS”
_______________________________/
GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM AND MOTION FOR

AN UPWARD DEPARTURE AND AN UPWARD VARIANCE
COMES NOW, the United States of America, by and through the undersigned
Assistant United States Attorney, and files the following memorandum in aid of
sentencing, and moves this Honorable Court to impose a sentence that constitutes an
upward departure and an upward variance from the sentencing range that is
recommended by the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) in this case:

________________________
* An unredacted version of this memorandum and motion will be filed under seal.
1
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant is not a college graduate, nor did he even attend Harvard
University, the University of Pennsylvania, or any other prestigious institutions as
he falsely claimed. Nor was he a member of the Kappa Alpha Psi fraternity. More
importantly, Defendant is not, nor was he ever, a physician or surgeon. Yet for
over a decade, Defendant lied about his educational background and professional
accomplishments to the women that he met through online dating websites and
apps. These women were generally educated, ambitious, and successful in their
respective careers; that they were so severely duped by the Defendant should not
reflect negatively on them. Rather, as Charles Caleb Colton1 once said, “there are
some frauds so well conducted that it would be stupidity not to be deceived by
them.”
The following are examples of some of the false social media and dating
profiles, and photos contained therein, that Defendant used to execute his
sophisticated scheme to defraud women who resided all over the country:
1
Charles Caleb Colton was an English cleric, writer, and collector whose books included
collections of aphorisms and short essays on conduct. He is also credited with the saying,
“imitation is the sincerest of flattery.” https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Charles Caleb Colton
(accessed August 4, 2022).
2
3
4
5
6
However, these lies were merely the hook that Defendant initially used to ensnare
his victims into his overarching web of lies which would result in their financial
ruin, broken hearts, and loss of trust in others. Once he caught the victims’
interests and made them think that they had met a successful, independent, and
single man on the Internet, Defendant wooed them with his smooth talking and
flirtatious tactics, often causing the victims to lower their guard and fall prey to his
scheme to defraud.
Following a period of courting the victims by phone, through text
messaging, and over video chat sessions, Defendant offered to pay the victims’
debts, which often included student loans, home mortgages, vehicle loans, and
credit card bills. After some convincing, the victims agreed to give Defendant
their personal identifying information, which included their social security
numbers, dates of birth, or account login credentials. To create the false

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In the small window of time between the fraudulent payments being made by
Defendant and the victims’ discovery that those payments were actually worthless,
Defendant showed up in person to meet some of the victims. During that time, he
financially exploited them.
For example, Defendant asked some of the victims to loan him money for
false purposes, such as for medical practice expenses or funeral expenses for a
family member. Also, Defendant convinced other victims to purchase expensive
items for him, such as Rolex watches, under the guise that it was his birthday and
he did not want to buy his own gift or that because he had just paid off the victims’
debts, his bank accounts were tied up for a few days. Either way, Defendant
falsely promised the victims that he would pay them back.
Because Defendant executed his sophisticated scheme to defraud so well, his
victims–many of whom were highly educated and successful in their chosen fields
of work–believed Defendant’s many lies, even after trying to do their own due
diligence in an attempt to validate Defendant’s (false) claims. For example, some
victims Googled the false aliases that Defendant had used and located professional
networking and social media profiles that corroborated Defendant’s lies. Also,
Defendant possessed and used a number of counterfeit documents to substantiate
his lies, including a California driver license (though he never resided in
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California), a University of Pennsylvania diploma, and a Harvard University
School of Medicine transcript.
Consequently, at least one victim allowed Defendant to move in with her,
during which time Defendant displayed his counterfeit University of Pennsylvania
diploma that displayed one of his aliases (as seen below) next to the victim’s
legitimate diplomas.
Defendant possessed the following counterfeit transcript that was
purportedly from the Harvard School of Medicine, which displayed one of his
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policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid

unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide
restitution to victims.
United States v. Ochoa-Torres, 519 F. App’x 583, 584 (11th Cir. 2013). The
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §3553 mirror the reasons traditionally recognized for
imposing sentence: (a) retribution, (b) deterrence, sometimes referred to as
“general deterrence” (i.e., the need to deter others from committing like crimes),
(c) incapacitation, sometimes referred to as “specific deterrence” (i.e., the need to
prevent Defendant from committing crime), and (d) rehabilitation. Bullington v.
Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 443 n.16 (1981); United States v. Godfrey, 22 F.3d 1048,
1058 (11th Cir. 1994).
III. APPLICATION OF 18 U.S.C. § 3553(A) FACTORS3
A. The Nature and Circumstance of the Offense and the History and
Characteristics of Defendant – 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)
1. The Offense Conduct
The Government urges this Court to rely on the testimony and evidence to
be adduced at the sentencing hearing, the attachments to this memo,4 the facts
summarized in the draft PSR, ECF No. 37, and the final version of the PSR that
3
This Sentencing Memorandum does not specifically discuss every § 3553 sentencing
factor.
Attached hereto as a sentencing exhibit is a summary of the Defendant’s criminal conduct
4
and other pertinent information, including screenshots of text messages between the Defendant
and some of his victims, and other records obtained during the investigation.
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will be filed with the Court, as a complete account of Defendant’s offense conduct.
Such evidence against Defendant demonstrates that his crimes were organized,
well-planned, and calculated. Further, the evidence shows that in this case,
Defendant’s crimes were ongoing for at least a decade, including while Defendant
was incarcerated in the Georgia state prison for the very same type of crimes as the
instant case. In total, at the time of Defendant’s change of plea in this case,
Defendant’s intended loss as a result of his entire fraud scheme was $1,302,306.94.
(SOF at 34.)
2. The History and Characteristics of Defendant
Defendant’s family life and upbringing are set forth in the PSR. Neither
Defendant’s history nor his personal characteristics justify a sentence mitigation or
a downward variance in this case. Rather, Defendant’s prior criminal history –
some of which was not scored pursuant to the U.S.S.G. – warrants an upward
departure and variance (as discussed, below). Thus, the Government urges this
Court to impose a term of imprisonment, at least within the Guideline range, in this
case.
B. The Sentence Should Reflect the Seriousness of the Offense,

Promote Respect for the Law, Afford Adequate Deterrence to
Criminal Conduct, Protect the Public from Further Crimes of
Defendant, and Provide Just Punishment for the Offense -
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)
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1. Reflecting Seriousness of the Offense
The Government notes that economic crimes, like those at issue here, are as
serious as many other cases that come before this Court. This is especially true
when the case, such as this one, involves a long-term scam, comprised of layers of
fraud and deceit. Thus, the Sentencing Guidelines should not be ignored or
discounted because Defendant is being sentenced for what are typically referred to
as “white-collar” crimes.
Section 3553(a)(2)(A) requires that district courts consider “the need for the
sentence imposed” to “reflect the seriousness of the offense.” Stated differently,
“the length of the sentence should reflect the harm done and the gravity of
Defendant’s conduct.” United States v. Walker, 844 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir.
2017); see also United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1195 (11th Cir. 2008).
Here, in furtherance of his scheme to defraud women, Defendant:
• created and maintained multiple false social media profiles which falsely
represented that Defendant was a well-educated and successful physician
and surgeon,
• fraudulently obtained victims’ personal identification information and
bank account information under false pretenses (i.e., that he would pay
off the victims’ debts),
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• made payments toward the victims’ debts which ultimately were reversed
due to insufficient funds or the payor account being closed,
• added himself to or used victims’ credit cards without permission or
knowledge of the victims for his own personal purposes, such as college
football tickets and expensive watches,
• fraudulently convinced victims to purchase watches for him (under the
guise that it was Defendant’s birthday and that he would promptly repay
the victims),
• sold the newly-purchased watches that he received using victims’ money
to second-hand watch and jewelry retailers,
• using false excuses and explanations, strung along victims after they
realized that the payments made toward their debts were reversed and
invalid,
• utilized multiple bank accounts to receive proceeds of the watch sales
and funds wired to him by victims (under false pretenses), and
• when banks closed his accounts due to fraudulent activity and barred him
from opening more accounts, used his own mother’s personal
identification information to open bank accounts to further his scheme to
defraud.
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Such egregious conduct, and the greed and manipulation exhibited by Defendant,
warrant the imposition of a stiff sentence.
2. General Deterrence
Further, “[g]eneral deterrence is one of the key purposes of sentencing.”
Walker, 844 F.3d at 1257. Congress has recognized that general deterrence is
particularly important in the context of white collar crime. United States v. Sample,
901 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d
1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006)) (“[T]he Congress that adopted the § 3553 sentencing
factors emphasized the critical deterrent value of imprisoning serious white collar
criminals, even where those criminals might themselves be unlikely to commit
another offense.”); S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 76 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3259 (“The second purpose of sentencing is to deter others
from committing the offense. This is particularly important in the area of white
collar crime.”). “In enacting § 3553, Congress was especially concerned that prior
to the Sentencing Guidelines, major white collar criminals often were sentenced to
small fines and little or no imprisonment.” United States v. Livesay, 587 F.3d 1274,
1279 (11th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). “White collar criminals may be particularly
susceptible to general deterrence because ‘[d]efendants in white-collar crimes often
calculate the financial gain and risk of loss, and white-collar crime therefore can be
affected and reduced with serious punishment.’” Sample, 901 F.3d at 1200 (citing
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United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1329 (11th Cir. 2013)); see also United
States v. Vrancea, 136 F. Supp. 3d 378, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Persons who
commit white-collar crimes like [D]efendant’s are capable of calculating the costs
and benefits of their illegal activities relative to the severity of punishments that
may be imposed. A serious sentence is required to discourage such crimes.”).
Further, a district court’s dismissal of the relevance of deterrence to others5 was
found to conflict with Congress’ directive to sentencing judges. Walker, 844 F.3d
at 1257.
Further, as a part of the Fifth Circuit’s discussion in United States v.
Hoffman, 901 F.3d 523, 556-57 (5th Cir. 2018), the Court noted that:
Another problem with probation in multimillion dollar fraud cases is

that it undermines public confidence in whether the justice system is
“do[ing] equal right to the poor and to the rich” as our oath requires. 28
U.S.C. § 453. For these reasons, we have repeatedly expressed a
“distaste for sentencing that reflects different standards of justice being
applied to white and blue collar criminals,” United States v. Saleh, 257
F. App’x 740, 745 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Andrews, 390
F.3d 840, 848 (5th Cir. 2004)); see also United States v. Mueffelman,
470 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting the need to minimize
“discrepancies between white- and blue-collar offenses”).
This Court’s sentence in the instant case will have nationwide importance, as
Americans have been falling victim to romance scams, just like that committed by
Defendant, at an alarming rate in recent years. See, e.g., Mike Snider, Online
5
Such as by making the following comment: “[I] don’t give much stock in the fact that
others are deterred by the fact that you’re sent to prison for a long time.”
20
dating scams are on the rise, FBI and FTC warn. Here are some red flags., USA
Today (Feb. 16, 2022),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2022/02/16/romance-scams-rise-
cost-americans-millions-fbi-ftc/6797616001 (The FBI recently reported that
victims of romance fraud lost $1 billion in 2021; similarly, romance scams
reported to the Federal Trade Commission rose 80% in 2021, with victims having
reported losses of $547 million); Emma Fletcher, Romance scams take record
dollars in 2020, Federal Trade Commission Data Spotlight (Feb. 10, 2021),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/data-visualizations/data-
spotlight/2021/02/romance-scams-take-record-dollars-2020 (In 2020, reported
losses to romance scams reached a record $304 million, up about 50% from 2019;
from 2016 to 2020, reported total dollar losses increased more than fourfold, and
the number of reports nearly tripled). The imposition of a severe sentence, here,
will help deter others who might consider perpetrating romance scams; yet a
lenient sentence might do little to dissuade such criminal conduct.
3. Purpose and Intent of Sentencing Guidelines
In United States v. Rigas, two defendants were convicted of white-collar
offenses. 583 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009). On appeal, the defendants noted that their
sentences for their white-collar crimes were only slightly shorter than the sentences
of some admitted or convicted terrorists. Id. The Second Circuit rejected the
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argument and affirmed the sentences, finding that they “were procedurally and
substantively reasonable.” Id. at 126. Further, Rigas stated that “stiff Guidelines
sentences for ‘white-collar’ crimes reflect Congress’ judgment as to the
appropriate national policy for such crimes.” Rigas, 583 F.3d at 124 (internal
citation omitted); see also Martin, 455 F.3d at 1240 (“The fact that Martin’s
guidelines range was 108-135 months’ imprisonment evinces Congress’s attempt
to curb judicial leniency in the area of white collar crime.”).
In the instant case, the Government is requesting an above-guidelines
sentence. As discussed below, the Government submits that an upward variance
and/or an upward departure are warranted here. Thus, the Government submits
that at least a guidelines term of imprisonment would be consistent with Congress’
intent for such crimes.6 Defendant victimized over 30 women (at the time of the
Change of Plea); however, since then multiple women saw news reports about
Defendant’s case and contacted law enforcement to report that they too were
victims of Defendant’s scheme to defraud. Common sense dictates that the list of
known victims is not exhaustive; there certainly exists more
(unidentified) victims who may not even be aware of the pendency of this case or
who do not want to be identified as having fallen victim to Defendant.
6
The Government first submits that a sentence below the recommended guidelines range
of imprisonment would not be appropriate here. At the same time, the Government also submits
that the recommended guidelines range is insufficient, and thus, that an upward departure and
upward variance are needed.
22
Nonetheless, Defendant’s scam was far-reaching and victimized women across the
country, and caused both financial and non-financial harm to the women who fell
for his lies.
C. Avoiding Sentencing Disparities - 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)
The rationale for using loss amount to calculate a Guidelines Sentence was
to “eliminate disparities between white- and blue-collar offenders.” United States
v. Prosperi, 686 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Davis, 537
F.3d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 2008) (“One of the central reasons for creating the
sentencing guidelines was to ensure stiffer penalties for white-collar crimes and to
eliminate disparities between white-collar sentences and sentences for other
crimes.”). Further, “[o]ne of the goals of the Sentencing Guidelines was to give
greater equivalence between penalties for white collar crimes like fraud and violent
crimes like robbery.” Prosperi, 686 F.3d at 38. The fact that “some judges have
chosen as a policy matter not to sentence white collar criminals to the harshest
permissible punishments, [ ] does not entitle other white collar criminals to
[receive] lighter punishments[.]” United States v. Goffer, 721 F.3d 113, 131 (2d
Cir. 2013).
In other courts, convictions for “romance scams” have resulted in lengthy
prison sentences. For example, Defendant in United States v. Ezeah, 738 F. App’x
591 (10th Cir. 2018) was indicted on 20 counts of conspiracy, wire fraud, and
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aggravated identity theft arising out of a romance scam designed to obtain money
from wealthy widows. Ezeah pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to commit
wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 and was sentenced to 132 months in
prison.
In another case, United States v. Ayelotan, 917 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2019), as
revised (Mar. 4, 2019), three Africa-based cybercriminals masterminded an
international romance in which they posed online as bachelors and bachelorettes to
falsely defraud Americans. The court calculated the total intended loss of their
scheme at over $25 million. At least one defendant was sentenced to 25 years in
prison.
In United States v. Onebunne, No. 1:18-CR-92-TCB, 2020 WL 6689642, at
*1 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 13, 2020), Onebunne pleaded to one count of conspiracy to
commit wire fraud for his participation in a romance scam. The Court sentenced
him to a variance sentence of 120 months of imprisonment followed by three years
of supervised release. Id. Restitution was ordered in the amount of approximately
$1.8 million. (Onebunne, No. 1:18-CR-92-TCB, Doc. 83). The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed Onebunne’s trial court’s sentence and reasoning, that the guideline range
“does not come close to providing adequate deterrence and adequate punishment”
because the crime was “pure evil, ... not accounted for by the guideline range.”
United States v. Onebunne, 815 F. App’x 501, 502–03 (11th Cir. 2020). The trial
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court reasoned that the crime was “a fraud conspiracy that involved lying to gain
the trust of individuals who were simply looking for love and companionship and
then violating that trust for monetary gain.” Id.
IV. DEPARTURES7 AND VARIANCES 8 FROM DEFENDANT’S

GUIDELINE SENTENCE
A. Sentencing Framework – The Importance of the Guidelines
The sentencing guidelines “are an indispensable tool in helping courts
achieve Congress’s mandate to consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among similarly situated defendants,” United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d
7
“Departure’ is a term of art under the Guidelines and refers only to non-Guidelines
sentences imposed under the framework set out in the Guidelines.” Irizarry v. United States, 553
U.S. 708, 714 (2008). “A ‘departure’ is a divergence from the originally calculated sentence range
based on a specific Guidelines departure provision, whereas a ‘variance’ is a divergence from the
Guidelines range based on an exercise of the Court's discretion under § 3553(a).” United States v.
Gorbatenko, 181 F. Supp. 3d 842, 849 (D. Or. 2015) (citing United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288,
317 (3d Cir. 2011)).
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“A variance must be based on the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Myers,
503 F.3d 676, 684 (8th Cir. 2007). “When the district court correctly calculated the guidelines
range, found that the range did not address adequately the § 3553(a) factors, and did not cite a
specific departure provision, [the Eleventh Circuit] has concluded that the above-guidelines
sentence involved a variance rather than a departure.” United States v. Nelson, 644 F. App'x 979,
982 (11th Cir. 2016). Where the district court's rationale for a particular sentence does not refer
to the U.S.S.G. and is based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and its finding that the advisory
guidelines range was inadequate, the district court's decision is properly considered an upward
variance, not a departure.” Id. at 983. Because the guidelines are now advisory (post-Booker), a
“departure” is only a “variance” based on the sentencing factors in § 3553(a); thus, there is no
longer a need for strict compliance with Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(h) (requiring prior notice to the parties)
before imposing a variance sentence. See United States v. DuBoc, 2009 WL 150670, at *4 (N.D.
Fla. Jan. 21, 2009) (J. Hinkle). In reviewing the sentence, the appellate court must give due
deference to the district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors justify the variance; “that the
appellate court might have reasonably reached a different conclusion does not justify reversal.”
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 39 (2007).
25
1180, 1184 (11th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up), which is required by 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(6).
Even though not bound by the guidelines, a sentencing court may not give
them so little consideration that it amounts to “not giv[ing] any real weight to the
Guidelines range in imposing the sentence.” Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1200 (11th Cir.
2008); see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (“The district courts, while not bound to
apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account
when sentencing.”); see generally, Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 107
(2007) (“[I]t is unquestioned that uniformity remains an important goal of
sentencing. As we explained in Booker, however, advisory Guidelines combined
with appellate review for reasonableness and ongoing revision of the Guidelines in
response to sentencing practices will help ‘to avoid excessive sentencing
disparities.’”); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 348 (2007) (“The upshot is that
the sentencing statutes envision both the sentencing judge and the Commission as
carrying out the same basic § 3553(a) objectives, the one, at retail, the other at
wholesale.”); United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 2010).
B. There is No Basis to Depart or Vary Downward

from Defendant’s Guidelines Range.
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Defendant’s aggravated role in this case – and utter greed and
manipulation – demonstrate the appropriateness of a prison sentence that falls at
least within Defendant’s guideline range.
C. An Upward Departure is Warranted Pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1)
Further, the sentencing court may depart upward if “reliable information
indicates that Defendant’s criminal history category substantially under-represents
the seriousness of [Defendant]’s criminal history or the likelihood that [Defendant]
will commit other crimes.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1). Such information can include
“[p]rior sentence(s) not used in computing the criminal history category,” and
“[p]rior sentence(s) of substantially more than one year imposed as a result of
independent crimes committed on different occasions.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(2).
Further, “[i]n determining whether an upward departure from Criminal History
Category VI is warranted, the court should consider that the nature of the prior
offenses rather than simply their number is often more indicative of the seriousness
of Defendant’s criminal record.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, Application Note 2(B). “For
example, a defendant with five prior sentences for very large-scale fraud offenses
may have 15 criminal history points, within the range of points typical for Criminal
History Category VI, yet have a substantially more serious criminal history overall
because of the nature of the prior offenses.” (Id.)
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The fact that some of Defendant’s prior crimes occurred while he was serving a
prison sentence or was on parole especially warrants an upward departure in the
instant case for two reasons:
1) the prior criminal convictions indicate that Defendant is likely to commit
other (future) crimes, and
2) the prior criminal convictions show that Defendant is not likely to be
deterred in the instant case by a sentence similar in length to those imposed in his
prior criminal cases (and thus, a prison sentence longer than recommended by the
guidelines is appropriate).
Should this Court agree with the Government and “determine[ ] that the
extent and nature of Defendant’s criminal history, taken together, are sufficient to
warrant an upward departure from Criminal History Category VI, the court should
structure the departure by moving incrementally down the sentencing table to the
next higher offense level in Criminal History Category VI until it finds a guideline
range appropriate to the case.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(4)(B).
29
D. An Upward Departure is Warranted Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.3
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.3 provides that:
If a victim or victims suffered psychological injury much more

serious than that normally resulting from commission of the
offense, the court may increase the sentence above the authorized
guideline range. The extent of the increase ordinarily should
depend on the severity of the psychological injury and the extent
to which the injury was intended or knowingly risked.
Defendant’s sentencing guideline calculations were based solely on the
financial harm Defendant caused to the victims. ; see also
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1). Consequently, Defendant’s guideline range of prison does not
account for the severe psychological injury (i.e., emotional harm and feeling
violated, and the resulting lack of trust in others) that he caused to his victims.
This is important because in many “white-collar” crimes for which U.S.S.G. §
2B1.1 applies, such psychological injury is absent (or at least to the extent that it
exists in this case). For instance, in a bank fraud case where consumers’ credit
card numbers are fraudulently used to obtain money or things of value, the
consumers rarely know the identities of the offender nor have they formed an
emotional connection with him or her. In such cases, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 sufficiently
accounts for the total harm caused to victims.
Yet, here, Defendant courted the women that he victimized, gained their
trust, and—at least for some of the victims—coerced them (by deception and false
pretenses) into having sex with him. For example, as noted in the Victim Impact
30
Thus, the severe psychological and emotional injury Defendant caused to
one or more of his victims warrants an upward departure from the guideline range,
because such injury is not contemplated by the guideline range.
Caselaw Supports an Upward Variance
“A sentence’s variance outside the guidelines range, whether upward or
downward, represents a district court’s judgment that the combined force of the
other § 3553(a) factors are entitled to greater weight than the guidelines range.
Otherwise, there would never be any variances.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno,
789 F.3d 1249, 1259 (11th Cir. 2015). The instant case falls “outside the
heartland” of fraud cases because of Defendant’s manipulative nature, the
preparation that went into his scheme to defraud, and the circumstances
surrounding the fraud — i.e., long-term courtship of victims coupled with in-
person rendezvous across the country, in order to defraud victims, plus the
emotional damage caused to victims. See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
1182 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (explaining that a case falls “outside the heartland”
when “there [is] something unusual, either about Defendant or the circumstances
surrounding the crime,” that warrants a sentence outside of the guidelines range).
A district court’s decision to vary from the advisory Guidelines may attract
greatest respect when the sentencing judge finds a particular case outside the
32
heartland to which the Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply.
Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109.
Upward variances are routinely applied in white-collar cases where the §
3553(a) factors justify them. See, e.g., United States v. Lantigua, 749 F. App’x 875
(11th Cir. 2018) (affirming sentence of 168 months’ imprisonment – an 81-month
upward variance from the top of the applicable guidelines range – for conspiracy to
commit mail fraud and wire fraud, bank fraud, passport fraud, and aggravated
identity theft); United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1274, 1280-81 (11th Cir.
2007) (affirming 240–month sentence for, inter alia, conspiracy to steal U.S. mail,
theft of U.S mail, and money laundering, despite guidelines range of only 51–63
months and the defendant’s lack of criminal history, where the district court
expressed its belief that crimes presented “a very serious matter,” that the advisory
range was “inadequate,” and where the court noted that the lengthy sentence
was imposed to “provide adequate deterrence” and “to protect the public”);
United States v. Barnes, 288 F. App’x 683 (11th Cir. 2008) (120–month sentence,
which represented an upward variance from Guidelines range of 27 to 33 months’
imprisonment, was not unreasonable for filing false tax returns, identity theft, and
theft of government property where the district court concluded that the
sentence it imposed was necessary to protect the public from future crimes by
defendant, deter others from similar crimes, and communicate the seriousness
33
of defendant’s crimes); United States v. Green, 497 F. App’x 894 (11th Cir. 2012)
(affirming a sentence of 120 months – an upward variance – for bank fraud and
aggravated identity theft where the district court believed the Guidelines range
underrepresented the defendant’s criminal history); United States v. Mitchell,
789 F. App’x 774 (11th Cir. 2019) (upward variance affirmed for possessing 15
or more counterfeit credit cards where the court noted significant number of
fraudulent cards and sensitive personal information involved, and the minimal
deterrent effect prior penalties had on the defendant); United States v.
Rodriguez, 486 F. App’x 30 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming sentenced of 144 months’
imprisonment – an upward variance – for possession of counterfeit or unauthorized
devices, possession of device-making equipment and aggravated identity theft
based on the need for future deterrence); United States v. Coffie-Joseph, 637 F.
App’x 752 (4th Cir. 2016) (affirming total of 120 months’ imprisonment for wire
fraud, money laundering, passport fraud, and aggravated identity theft where
district court “considered maximum sentence provided by Congress on all of
defendant’s counts, explicitly stated that Guidelines’ focus on amount of
monetary loss did not sufficiently take into account consequences of crime or
purposes of sentencing factors, and stated that sentence imposed was necessary
to promote respect for the law and deter conduct, and district court focused on
defendant’s history, characteristics, and need to protect public from further crimes
34
by defendant”); United States v. Weathers, 581 F. App’x 273 (4th Cir. 2014)
(affirming 259 months’ imprisonment – an upward variance from Guidelines range
of 140-175 months – for conspiracy to commit bank fraud, bank fraud, and
aggravated identity theft); United States v. Biyiklioglu, 716 F. App’x 270 (5th Cir.
2017) (affirming sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment for wire fraud, aggravated
identity theft, tax evasion, and money laundering); United States v. Thomas, 2021
WL 245275 (6th Cir. Jan. 26, 2021) (bank fraud, aggravated identity theft, and
passing a Treasury check with a falsely made and forged endorsement); United
States v. Bricker, 574 F. App’x 906 (11th Cir. 2014) (upward variance for mail
theft, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft affirmed in light of the statutory
sentencing factors).
Defendant’s egregious or extraordinary conduct justifies an upward variance.
The Court can rely on certain aspects of a defendant’s conduct that it has
considered in imposing an enhancement, particularly where a defendant’s conduct
was egregious or extraordinary. See United States v. Jenkins, 677 F. App’x 566,
569 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833-34 (11th
Cir. 2007)). As described in the Statement of Facts (“SOF”), ECF No. 28, and the
PSR, ECF No. 37, Defendant’s criminal conduct was indeed “egregious” and
“extraordinary.” Not only did Defendant’s scheme negatively impact his victims
35
financially (and in some cases, significantly), Defendant caused emotional distress
to his victims which has caused many of them to distrust others.
Defendant’s criminal history supports an upward variance.
The Court may also impose an upward variance if it concludes that the
Guidelines range was insufficient in light of a defendant’s criminal history. United
States v. Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918, 936 (11th Cir. 2009). In doing so, district courts
have broad leeway in deciding how much weight to give to prior crimes Defendant
has committed. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1261 (citing United States v.
Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 638 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Williams, 526
F.3d 1312, 1323–24 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1223
(11th Cir. 2012)). Defendant’s prior criminal history—which includes many
convictions for felonies including fraud, identity theft, and forgery—warrants a
higher sentence than what the sentencing guidelines suggest. This is even truer
when the Court considers that Defendant committed his crimes for which he is
being sentenced while he was in prison for other felonies and while on parole.
Defendant’s lack of remorse warrants an upward variance.
“A finding that Defendant lacked remorse…is a valid basis for an upward
variance.” United States v. Kolla, 819 F. App’x 739, 740 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing
United States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245, 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2019) (affirming a
100-month sentence as substantively reasonable, despite a guideline range of 46 to
36
57 months, where Defendant lacked remorse); United States v. Mateos, 623 F.3d
1350, 1367–68 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming a major upward variance as
substantively reasonable based, in part, on Defendant’s lack of remorse); United
States v. Hawkins, 695 F. App’x 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2017) (upward variance was
necessary to account for Hawkins’ lack of remorse). Further, “lack of remorse”
and “acceptance of responsibility” can be separate factors and a district court may
consider each independently of the other. United States v. Douglas, 569 F.3d 523,
527 (5th Cir. 2009).
Here, while Defendant was being held in custody on pretrial detention
pending a resolution of this case, he made phone calls from the prison which were
recorded:11
• In a call on January 17, 2022, Defendant states that “if I have to go to prison,
it is a real, real easy one…they have a federal prison camp and you can play
golf while you’re in prison…it’s more like a vacation.”
• In a call to his mother12 on January 28, 2022, Defendant states “to go to a
[prison] camp…you have to be [sentenced] under 10 years…and I have these
types of crimes, so I’m good with that.”
11
These select audio recordings are being filed as an exhibit to this memorandum to afford
this Court ample opportunity to listen to these calls in advance of the sentencing hearing. The
audio recordings of the Defendant’s phone calls have not been professionally transcribed; rather,
the undersigned has made a good-faith attempt to transcribe them himself.
12
37
• In a call with his cousin on May 20, 2022, Defendant gleefully chuckles
when he hears that the media has dubbed him the “Tinder Swindler of
Florida,” and says “[the media] is doing a documentary [about
Defendant]…and I know I am going to have to do a couple years…it won’t
be a long time…but I want to look into writing a book (or getting it ghost
written)…and the book will sell…and the media wanted to give me a
standing ovation.”
• In a call with his parents on May 21, 2022, Defendant says, “there is going
to be a book [about this case] and I might as well get ahead of it before
someone else does and profits from it,” and brags about the media referring
to him as the “Florida Tinder Swindler.” Later in that call, Defendant says
“I am looking at 4-6 years in prison…and for white collar crime and fraud
and stuff…fortunately for me, they don’t hammer you too bad for it yet…it
won’t be long…and it ain’t too bad.”
• In a call with his brother on May 22, 2022, Defendant says “we may be able
to get a couple of quarters [money] out of this” in reference to the media
attention to the case and a possible book deal.
38
• In a call with his daughter on May 26, 2022, during which Defendant was
laughing and joking about his case going “viral”13 on social media and his
popularity, and Defendant said things such as “We need a Netflix series…so
we can get us some money…I’m famous…the most I’m looking at worse-
case scenario is like seven years and which would mean that I’ll be home in
like four-and-a-half or five years…but if lying to a boyfriend or a girlfriend
is a crime, then 98% of Americans will be in prison too… It’s like I’m a
mini-celebrity…we need to capitalize on it [writing a book and getting a
Netflix deal about Defendant’s crimes],,,.and if it’s a lot of money it can
secure [Defendant’s daughters’] future.”
Surprisingly, these calls show that Defendant is focused more on his notoriety in
the media, and his potential to make money off of his crimes by getting a book deal
or Netflix series. Further, these calls show that Defendant lacks the level of
remorse and nervousness that a Defendant pending sentencing in a federal case,
especially one of this magnitude, would be expected to exhibit. Thus, the
Government submits that these statements of Defendant demonstrate that he lacks
remorse for his crimes such that it justifies an upward variance. Also, the
Government has confirmed with BOP’s Designation and Sentence Computation
13
Going viral means “quickly and widely spread or popularized especially by means of
social media.” Viral, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/viral (accessed Aug. 8, 2022).
39
Center (DSCC) that inmates who receive prison sentences in excess of ten (10)
years are ineligible for placement in a prison camp. Thus, the Government
particularly moves this Honorable Court to sentence Defendant to a term of prison
in excess of 120 months to avoid the Court’s sentence in this case from being
perceived by Defendant as “a vacation.”
V. CONCLUSION
Defendant has been a fraudster for decades. The facts
of this case demonstrate the extreme lengths Defendant will go to in order to
defraud women and their credit card companies and banks. Moreover, Defendant
employed sophisticated means to carry out his scheme to defraud. Examples of his
sophistication in this case include Defendant’s: (1) use of multiple aliases, many
false social media and dating profiles, and counterfeit documentations (such as
identification and college diplomas), and (2) “worthless” electronic payments to
victims’ creditors, knowing that the payments would be reversed.
Before this Court for sentencing is a man who, despite his prior
incarcerations in several states, carried out a complex, nationwide scheme to
defraud women and their banks and credit card companies. In doing so, Defendant
wove a web of lies and deceit to scam women for over a decade. Defendant
endeavored to fraudulently obtain over $1.3 million, and successfully received
over $1 million in fraud proceeds. In sum, Defendant’s greed and years of deceit
40
necessitate a lengthy prison sentence – one that exceeds the applicable guideline
range.
WHEREFORE, the United States urges this Court to impose a prison sentence
at least at the top of the applicable guidelines range, but more importantly, one that
is above such range as an upward departure, and as an upward variance consistent
with the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.
Respectfully submitted,
JASON R. COODY
United States Attorney
/s/ Justin M. Keen

JUSTIN M. KEEN
Assistant United States Attorney
Florida Bar Number: 021034
111 North Adams Street, Fourth Floor
Tallahassee, FL 32301
Justin.Keen@usdoj.gov
(850) 942-8430
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 7.1(F)
I HEREBY CERTIFY that this memorandum complies with the type-
volume limitation of Local Rule 7.1(F) because this pleading contains
approximately 7,835 words.
/s/ Justin M. Keen

JUSTIN M. KEEN
41
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been
filed via the Court’s CM/ECF system on this 9th day of August, 2022, which will
send notification of such filing to all counsel of record.
/s/ Justin M. Keen

JUSTIN M. KEEN
42
Case 4:21-cr-00050-RH-MAF Document 41-1 Filed 08/09/22 Page 1 of 172
U.S. v. Brian B. Wedgeworth

a/k/a “DR. BRIAN ANDERSON,”
a/k/a “DR. ANTHONY WATKINS,”
a/k/a “DR. BRIAN ADAMS,”
a/k/a “DR. EDWARD CHEN,”
a/k/a “DR. BRIAN CHRIS,”
a/k/a “DR. CHRIS WILLIAMSON,”
a/k/a “DR. BRIAN CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMSON,”
a/k/a “DR. BRIAN EDMONDS,”
a/k/a “DR. BRIAN AMMERSON,”
a/k/a “DR. BRIAN LAMAR WILSON,”
a/k/a “DR. BRIAN WILSON,” 1
a/k/a “DR. BRIAN MIMS,”
a/k/a “DR. BRIAN LAMAR SIMS,”
a/k/a “The Casanova Scammer”

The Beginning
December 2019 – U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) received

investigative tip regarding Brian Brainard Wedgeworth
– Residing in Tallahassee, FL
– Online romance scam defrauding woman throughout the U.S.
– News article named him, “The Casanova Scammer”
The Real Brian Wedgeworth


Wedgeworth’s Relevant Criminal
History in Georgia
DeKalb County, Georgia

“Theft by Conversion – Felony”
Sentence start date: 04/04/2006
Douglas County, Georgia

“Financial Identity Fraud – Felony”
DeKalb County, Georgia

Arrested: 2012
As follows:
Georgia prison: 07/10/2014

Paroled from Georgia prison: 02/15/2017
Examples of
Brian
Wedgeworth’s
Scheme to
Defraud
Further
Investigation Led
to
Victim
Identifications
Count 15 – Mail Fraud
Count
4–
Wire
Fraud
Count 8 – Wire Fraud
End of victims named in Indictment

Leon County, Florida
Suspicious incident at jewelry store

09/2019
Suwannee County, Florida

Driving without License
Arrest: 10/10/2019
Sentenced: 11/04/2019
Violated Georgia parole

Back in Georgia prison

(parole violation): 02/06/2020
until 10/27/2020
C.G.
January 2021
• St. Louis, MO
• HR Management – Long-Term Care
• Met on Bumble
• “Dr. Brian Mims”
- Cardio Thoracic Surgeon
- Cedars Sinai (showed her ID badge in his name)
- Said he was transferring to St. Louis
• Met in Nashville, TN in person ($3,400 - Nordstrom purchase / bought
him $3,000 bottles of Hennessey because he would pay her back)
• Sent him wire transfers / Zelle payments (for payroll for his medical
practice)
Total Financial Loss: $19,694.25
(Wedgeworth just released from incarceration during their encounter online)
Arrest of Wedgeworth (at Dr. W.W.’s
residence) – November 2021

Search warrant for safe

After Indictment and Mr. Wedgeworth’s

change of plea, additional victims contact U.S.
Postal Inspection Service and USAO-NDFL
about falling for this scam.
(see PSR)
t
* I g(e$
{
$e
or
ft 'tfi"
.-
?.
2

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Case 4:21-cr-00050-RH-MAF Document 41 Filed 08/09/22 Page 1 of 42

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. Case No.: 4:21CR50/RH-MAF

BRIAN BRAINARD WEDGEWORTH

GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM AND MOTION FOR

recommended by the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) in this case:

Defendant is not a college graduate, nor did he even attend Harvard

University, the University of Pennsylvania, or any other prestigious institutions as

some frauds so well conducted that it would be stupidity not to be deceived by

Following a period of courting the victims by phone, through text

their personal identifying information, which included their social security

numbers, dates of birth, or account login credentials. To create the false

financially exploited them.

family member. Also, Defendant convinced other victims to purchase expensive

falsely promised the victims that he would pay them back.

Because Defendant executed his sophisticated scheme to defraud so well, his

diligence in an attempt to validate Defendant’s (false) claims. For example, some

Defendant possessed and used a number of counterfeit documents to substantiate

his lies, including a California driver license (though he never resided in

California), a University of Pennsylvania diploma, and a Harvard University

School of Medicine transcript.

Consequently, at least one victim allowed Defendant to move in with her,

during which time Defendant displayed his counterfeit University of Pennsylvania

Defendant possessed the following counterfeit transcript that was

policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid

imposing sentence: (a) retribution, (b) deterrence, sometimes referred to as

(c) incapacitation, sometimes referred to as “specific deterrence” (i.e., the need to

prevent Defendant from committing crime), and (d) rehabilitation. Bullington v.

1058 (11th Cir. 1994).

III. APPLICATION OF 18 U.S.C. § 3553(A) FACTORS3

1. The Offense Conduct

2. The History and Characteristics of Defendant

Defendant’s history nor his personal characteristics justify a sentence mitigation or

a downward variance in this case. Rather, Defendant’s prior criminal history –

B. The Sentence Should Reflect the Seriousness of the Offense,

1. Reflecting Seriousness of the Offense

sentence imposed” to “reflect the seriousness of the offense.” Stated differently,

Here, in furtherance of his scheme to defraud women, Defendant:

represented that Defendant was a well-educated and successful physician

• fraudulently obtained victims’ personal identification information and

off the victims’ debts),

due to insufficient funds or the payor account being closed,

• added himself to or used victims’ credit cards without permission or

football tickets and expensive watches,

• fraudulently convinced victims to purchase watches for him (under the

• sold the newly-purchased watches that he received using victims’ money

to second-hand watch and jewelry retailers,

• utilized multiple bank accounts to receive proceeds of the watch sales

and funds wired to him by victims (under false pretenses), and

from opening more accounts, used his own mother’s personal

identification information to open bank accounts to further his scheme to

warrant the imposition of a stiff sentence.

Further, “[g]eneral deterrence is one of the key purposes of sentencing.”

criminals, even where those criminals might themselves be unlikely to commit

another offense.”); S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 76 (1983), reprinted in 1984

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3259 (“The second purpose of sentencing is to deter others

susceptible to general deterrence because ‘[d]efendants in white-collar crimes often

may be imposed. A serious sentence is required to discourage such crimes.”).

Further, a district court’s dismissal of the relevance of deterrence to others5 was

Further, as a part of the Fifth Circuit’s discussion in United States v.

Another problem with probation in multimillion dollar fraud cases is

Today (Feb. 16, 2022),

cost-americans-millions-fbi-ftc/6797616001 (The FBI recently reported that