ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR. vs.

 ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO

Facts:

The administrative complaint arose from the paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of Philippine
Daily Inquirer which read: Annulment of Marriage Specialist 532-4333/521-2667. Ms. Ma. Theresa Espeleta, a staff
member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, took notice of the advertisement and inquired by
pretending as an interested party. After such inquiry, confirming that Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is actually promoting
himself as an expert in handling annulment cases and is guaranteeing a court decree within four to six months with a
fee of P48,000 to be paid in installment basis, further research was conducted by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). The research revealed other similar advertisements published in two other newspapers –
August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star. Atty. Ismael Khan,
Jr., afterwards, in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation in violation of Rule
2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court. The IBP, taking cognizance of the referral to investigate, report and recommend, found the respondent guilty.
Respondent, then, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of CPR.

Held:

Yes. The Court agreed with the IBP’s resolution, holding that the practice of law is not a business but a profession in
which duty to public service and not money is the primary consideration. By advertising himself as an “Annulment
Specialist,” he undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage —encouraging people who might have otherwise
been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so. In addition, although
solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the
dignity of the legal profession which the petitioner failed to do. Therefore, the Court suspended the petitioner from
the practice of law for one year and sternly warned him that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt
with more severely.

PHILIPPINE LAWYER’S ASSOCIATION VS. AGRAVA 105 PHIL. 173 , FEBRUARY 16, 1959

FACTS:

Celedonio Agrava, as Director of the Philippine Patent Office, set a schedule for an examination to determine
who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the said office. The Philippine Lawyer’s Association
contends that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippine Patent Office, and that the
act of Agrava, requiring an examination to allow someone to practice before the said office is in excess of his
jurisdiction and a violation of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the members of the Philippine Bar are still required to take the examination in order to practice
law before the said office.

RULING:

No. Under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law, and
in good standing may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in
said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other
laws applicable as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved.

UI VS BONIFACIO
Adm. Case No. 3319, June 8, 2000

Facts:

Complainant Lesli Ui found out that her husband Carlos Ui was carrying out an illicit relationship with respondent
Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot two children. Hence, a complaint for disbarment was filed by complainant
against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on the ground
of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant’s husband. It is
respondent’s contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that
after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui’s true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him.
Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her.

Issue:

Whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the
practice of law.

Held:

The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, was dismissed.

All the facts taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her
personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what
respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that
shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly immoral,” that is,
it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.

IN RE: VICTORIO LANUEVO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING AGAINST VICTORIO LANUEVO FOR

DISBARMENT.

FACTS:
Admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the respective examiners for
re-evalution or re-checking. The five examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by
the Bar Confidant, stating that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his
particular subject and was on the borderline of passing.

Ramon galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevo’s move but the exam results bears that he
failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).
Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical Injuries on Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of
MLQU.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Lanuevo is guilty defrauding the examiners into re-evaluating Galang’s exam notebook.

2. Whether or not Galang is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the court his pending case.

RULING:
The court disbarred Lanuevo – has no authority to request the examiners to re-evaluate grades of examinees w/o
prior authority from Supreme Court.
He does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the bar. He does not a
have any business evaluating the answers of the examinees.

Consequently, Galang was also disbarred Sec. 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Curt of 1964, candidates for
admission to the bar must be of good moral character. Galang has a pending criminal cases of Physical Injuries, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case this resulted him to revoked
his license.

GARRIDO v. GARRIDO [4 February 2010]

FACTS:
The petitioner, the respondent’s legal wife, filed a complaint-affidavit and a supplemental affidavit for disbarment
against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Committee on Discipline, charging them with gross immorality, in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01, of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complaint arose after the petitioner caught wind through her daughter
that her husband was having an affair with a woman other than his wife and already had a child with her; and the
same information was confirmed when one of her daughters saw that her husband walking in a Robinsons mall with
the other respondent, Atty. Valencia, with their child in tow. After a much further investigation into the matter, the
time and effort given yielded results telling her that Atty.Valencia and her legal husband had been married in Hong
Kong.

Moreover, on June 1993, her husband left their conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their
residence, and has since failed to render much needed financial support. In their defense, they postulated that they
were not lawyers as of yet when they committed the supposed immorality, so as such, they were not guilty of a
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Garrido’s and Valencia’s actions constitute a violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and thus a good
enough cause for their disbarment, despite the offense being supposedly committed when they were not lawyers.

HELD:
Yes. Membership in the Bar is a privilege, and as a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court,
membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances show the lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications
required of lawyers, be they academic or moral.

In the present case, the Court had resolved to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena
P. Valencia for the reason of their blatant violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which commands that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Furthermore,
the contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers when they got married shall not afford them exemption
from sanctions; good moral character was already required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar. As a
lawyer, a person whom the community looked up to, Atty. Garrido and Valencia were shouldered with the
expectation that they would set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When they
violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, not only did their actions
discredit the legal profession. Such actions by themselves, without even including the fact of
Garrido’s abandonment of paternal responsibility, to the detriment of his children by the petitioner; or the fact that
Valencia married Garrido despite knowing of his other marriages to two other women including the petitioner, are
clear indications of a lack of moral values not consistent with the proper conduct of practicing lawyers within the
country. As such, their disbarment is affirmed.

GIZALE O. TUMBAGA , complainant, vs . ATTY. MANUEL P. TEOXON ,respondent.A.C. No. 5573. November
21, 2017Case # 32

FACTS:

This is an administrative case against Atty. Manuel P. Teoxon charging him with gross immorality, deceitful
and fraudulent conduct, and gross misconduct. Complainant’s Arguments that she met respondent sometime in
September 1999. He was then the City Legal Officer of Naga City from whom complainant sought legal
advice. After complainant consulted with him a few times, he visited her often at her residence and brought gifts for
her son, Al Greg Tumbaga. Respondent even volunteered to be the godfather of Al Greg. In view of respondent's
persistence and generosity to her son, complainant believed his representation that he was eligible to marry her.
Complainant averred that on December 19, 1999, she moved in with respondent at the Puncia Apartment in
Naga City. In April 2000, she became pregnant. Respondent allegedly wanted to have the baby aborted but
complainant refused. After the birth of their son, Billy John, respondent spent more time with them. He used
their apartment as a temporary law office and he lived there for two to three days at a time. After Billy John was
baptized, complainant secured a Certificate of Live Birth from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Naga City and
gave it to respondent to sign. He hesitantly signed it and volunteered to facilitate its filing. After respondent failed to
file the same, complainant secured another form and asked respondent to sign it twice. On February 15, 2001, the
Certificate of Live Birth was registered. Thereafter, complainant related that respondent rarely visited them. oshe
decided to work in a law office in Naga City. However, respondentcompelled her to resign, assuring her that he
would take care of her financial needs. As respondent failed to fulfill his promise, complainant sought assistance
from the Office of the City Fiscal in Naga City on the second week of March 2001. In the early morning of the
conference set by said office, respondent gave complainant an affidavit of support and told her there was no need for
him to appear in the conference. On May 2001 the respondent issued a promissory note to support the complainant
but once again failed to honor it. On June 2001 the complainant moved out from the Punicia Apartment as the
respondent allegedly failed in paying the rental of the said apartment. In the evening of September 9, 2001,
respondent raided complainant's new residence, accompanied by three SWAT members and his wife. Visibly
drunk, respondent threatened to hurt complainant if she will not return the personal belongings that he left
in their previous apartment unit. As respondent barged into the apartment, complainant sought help from the
SWAT members and one of them was able to pacify respondent.

Respondent's wife also tried to attack complainant, but she too was prevailed upon by the SWAT members. The
incident was recorded in the police blotter.

The RTC held that Teoxon is guilty of immorality but does not face the sanction of disbarment. Since, to
warrant an administrative penalty, a lawyer's immoral conduct must be so gross as to be "willful, flagrant,
or shameless," so much so that it "shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community." Grossly immoral conduct must be an act that is “so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Teoxon is guilty of immorality and thus face the sanction of disbarment?

RULING:
The Court Finds respondent Atty. Manuel P. Teoxon GUILTY of gross immorality and is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon notice hereof, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be punished with a more severe penalty.The court found Atty. Teoxon
Guilty of gross immorality as he blatantly attempted to deceive the courts and the IBP with regards to his true
relationship with the complainant. Furthermore, with regards to the pictures which the complainant presented and
was denied by the respondent, the respondent claimed that the pictures were taken secretly and was used to extort
money from him. However, as these pictures were examined, it was clear that he was aware of the picture and was
facing on the angle from where the picture was taken. Their body language and smiles also displayed the closeness
of the two. Moreover, it is not proven that Billy John is an illegitimate child of the respondent

Magdalena Arciga vs Segundino Maniwang

106 SCRA 591

FACTS:

In 1970, when Maniwang was still a law student, he had a relationship with Arciga, then a medical technology
student. They started having a sexual relationship in 1971. In 1973, Arciga got pregnant. The two then went to
Arciga’s hometown to tell the latter’s parent about the pregnancy. They also made Arciga’s parents believe that they
were already married but they would have to have the church wedding in abeyance until Maniwang passes the bar
exams. Maniwang secured a copy of his birth certificate in preparation of securing a marriage license. In 1975,
Maniwang passed the bar. But after his oath taking, he stopped communicating with Arciga. Arciga located his
whereabouts and there she found out that Maniwang married another woman. Arciga confronted Maniwang’s wife
and this irked Maniwang so he inflicted physical injuries against Arciga. Arciga then filed a disbarment case against
Maniwang grounded on gross immoral conduct. Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arciga’s child; that he
did promise to marry Arciga many times; that he broke those promises because of Arciga’s shady past because
apparently Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born.

ISSUE: Whether or not Maniwang should be disbarred.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwang’s case is different from the cases of Mortel vs Aspiras and Almirez vs
Lopez, and other cases therein cited. Maniwang’s refusal to marry Arciga was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to
warrant disbarment (though not much discussion was provided by the ponente as to why). But the Supreme Court
did say that it is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is “grossly immoral
conduct” or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a
member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not
be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as “that conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community”.

ADVINCULA VS. MACABATA A.C NO. 7204 MARCH 7, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner Advincula, a client of the respondent lawyer Atty. Macabata filed a disbarment case against the latter on
the grounds of gross immorality. The petitioner alleged that the respondent took advantage of his position as a
lawyer by kissing her and lure her to agree to have sexual relations with him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which constitute serious moral depravity that
would warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.

HELD:

No. The Court perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie,
forms of greetings, casual and customary. The act of kissing by the respondent towards the complainant, even if
considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral.

Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which
neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such
nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer’s unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious
character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly
demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
attended the commission of the offense should also be considered.

The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality, is hereby
DISMISSED and hereby reprimanded.

MILAGROS N. ALDOVINO v. ATTY. PEDRO C. PUJALTE, AC. No. 5082, 2004-02-17

Facts:

This is a complaint for disbarment and/or disciplinary action against Atty. Pedro C. Pujalte, Jr.filed by Milagros
Nicodemus-Aldovino, Virgilio Nicodemus, Angela Nicodemus-dela Cruz, Julita Nicodemus-Soco, Magdalena
Nicodemus-Talens and Teodoro S. Nicodemus for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Complainants alleged in their complaint that they are brothers and sisters and heirs of ArcadiaNicodemus. Sometime
in March, 1995, they hired the services of respondent Atty. Pujalte, Jr. astheir counsel in Civil Case No. 95-46 filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, Lucena City. The suit was for specific performance with damages to
compel their sister, Loreto Nicodemus Pulumbarit, to deliver to them their shares in the estate of their deceased
mother.The trial court rendered its Decision to withdraw from Savings Account No. 435-527745-9 at the Philippine
National Bank and to deliver the proceeds to all the heirs of Arcadia Nicodemus upon proper receipt. Both counsels
are directed to oversee the distribution and for them to jointly filetheir manifestation on the matter.In the presence of
defendant Mrs. Loreto N. Pulumbarit and respondent counsel, Branch Clerkof Court Serdon divided the withdrawn
amount into eight shares of P166,888.71 each. He gave the defendant two shares. Then he handed the remaining
amount of P1,001,332.26, corresponding to six shares, to respondent upon his representation that he is authorized
toreceive the money and to oversee the distribution to complainants of their respective shares.However,
complainants did not receive their shares from respondent despite repeateddemands. Thus, they engaged the services
of Atty. Francisco I. Chavez who, on December 17,1998, sent a letter to respondent demanding that the amount of
P1,001,332.26 entrusted to him by the Branch Clerk of Court be turned over to complainants.

ISSUE:

RULING:

This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are
expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legalprofession11 and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidencereposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of
the legal profession.12Membership in the legal profession is a privilege.13 And whenever it is made to appear that
an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only theright but also the
duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him theprivilege of ministering within its Bar, to
withdraw the privilege.14 Respondent, by his conduct,blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but
also that of the legal profession.

DANTES A.C. No. 6486. September 22, 2004

FACTS:

Mrs. Dantes alleged that his husband is a philanderer. Atty. Dantes purportedly engaged in illicit relationships with
two women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the time respondents illicit affairs
started, he failed to give regular support to his wife and their children, thus forcing her to work abroad to provide for
their children’s needs.

Atty. Dantes admitted the fact of marriage with her and the birth of their children, but alleged that they have
mutually agreed to separate eighteen years before after his wife had abandoned him in their residence. He further
asserted that Mrs. Dantes filed the case just to force him to remit 70% of his monthly salary to her.

Mrs. Dantes then presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling, and
Christian Dave, all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of his husband and his paramour to prove the fact that he
sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with two different women.

ISSUE:

Whether or not having an illicit relationship during the subsistence of marriage warrants the disbarment of a lawyer.

RULING:

Yes.

The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.To be the basis of disciplinary
action, the lawyers conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

Undoubtedly, respondent’s acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the subsistence
of his marriage to the complainant constitute grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition appropriate
sanctions. Complainant’s testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established
respondent’s commission of marital infidelity and immorality.

MACARRUBO VS. ATTY. MACARRUBO A.C. NO. 6148, 27 FEBRUARY 2004

FACTS:

A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Edmundo Macarrubo who had a subsisting marriage with Helen
Esparza (with whom he had two children) before he entered into a second marriage with Florence Macarrubo (with
whom he also had two children), herein Complainant. It was further averred that Atty. Macarrubo also entered into a
third marriage with one Josephine Constantino. On the other hand, Atty. Macarrubo claims that he was able to secure
the annulment of his first two marriages and is in the process of procuring one for his third.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Macarrubo should be held administratively liable.

RULNG:

Yes. Atty. Macarrubo has exhibited the vice of entering into multiple marriages and then leaving them behind by the
mere expedient of resorting to legal remedies to sever them. Atty. Macarrubo is found guilty of gross immorality and
is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is likewise ordered to show satisfactory evidence that he is
supporting his two children by the complainant.

AQUINO VS ACOSTA
A.M. No. CTA-01-1. April 2, 2002

FACTS:
In 2000, (Aquino) reported for work after her vacation in the U.S., bringing gifts for the three judges of the
CTA, including respondent. In the afternoon of the same day, he entered her room and greeted her by shaking her
hand. Suddenly, he pulled her towards him and kissed her on her cheek.

In another occasion, while respondent was on official leave, he called complainant by phone, saying he will
get something in her office. Shortly thereafter, he entered her room, shook her hand and greeted her, "Merry
Christmas." Thereupon, he embraced her and kissed her. She was able to free herself by slightly pushing him away.

On the first working day in 2001, respondent phoned complainant, asking if she could see him in his
chambers in order to discuss some matters. When complainant arrived there, respondent tried to kiss her but she was
able to evade his sexual attempt.

Weeks later, after the Senate approved the proposed bill expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, while
complainant and her companions were congratulating and kissing each other, respondent suddenly placed his arms
around her shoulders and kissed her.

The last incident: Respondent called complainant and asked her to see him in his office to discuss the
Senate bill on the CTA. Complainant sat in front of respondent's table and asked him what he wanted to know about
the Senate bill. Respondent then approached complainant saying, “me gusto akong gawin sa iyo kahapon pa”.
Thereupon, he tried to grab her. Complainant instinctively raised her hands to protect herself but respondent held her
arms tightly, pulled her towards him and kissed her. She pushed him away, then slumped on a chair trembling.
Meantime, respondent sat on his chair and covered his face with his hands. Thereafter, complainant left crying and
locked herself inside a comfort room. After that incident, respondent went to her office and tossed a note stating,
“sorry, it won’t happen again.”

ISSUE:
WON respondent judge could be held guilty for sexual harassment.

HELD:
Respondent judge could not be held guilty for sexual harassment. The complainant failed to show by
convincing evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta in greeting her with a kiss on the cheek, in a 'beso-beso' fashion,
were carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or were motivated by malice or ill-motive. It is clear under the
circumstances that most of the kissing incidents were done on festive and special occasions. Notably, complainant
declared in her affidavit-complaint that she brought some 'pasalubongs' for the respondent judge from her trip
abroad. Therefore, Atty. Aquino could not have been 'taken aback' by the respondent's act of greeting her in a
friendly manner and thanking her by way of a kiss on the cheek. Atty. Aquino failed to state categorically in her
affidavit-complaint that respondent demanded sexual advances or favors from her, or that the former had committed
physical conduct of sexual nature against her.

ROYONG V. OBLENA

FACTS:

The Solicitor-General submitted a report before the Court recommending the disbarment of Atty. Oblena. Such
report was due to the complaint filed by Royong who is the nephew of Oblenas common-law wife, Bricia. One of
the grounds for such recommendation was the contention that Atty Oblena was not of good moral characted when he
applied for admission to the bar. This was because Atty. Oblena cohabited with Bricia who was then married to
another man, even with his knowledge. Atty. Oblena argued that to his estimation and opinion, he was of good moral
character and he did not committed any crime involving moral turpitude, not even a violation of Section 25, Rule
127.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Oblena was not in good moral character during his application for admission to the bar.

HELD:

No. Atty. Oblena was not in good moral character when he applied for admission to the bar. In the case of In re:
Pelaez the Court ruled that the grounds for disbarment provided for in Section 25, Rule 127 is not exclusive and that
the power of the courts and that the power of the Court to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is
inherent and may be exercised even without any special statutory authority.In the case at bar, the fact that Atty.
Oblena committed an adulterous relationship with Bricia is a valid proof of his unfitness and immorality. Good
moral character is not subjective to his own estimation.

REYNARIA BARCENAS VS. ATTY. ANORLITO ALVEROA.C. NO. 8159APRIL 23, 2010

FACTS:

On May 7, 2004, Barcenas, through her employee Rodolfo San Antonio, entrusted to Atty. Alvero the amount of
P300,000, which the latter was supposed to give to a certain Amanda Gasta to redeem the rights of his deceased
father as tenant of a rice field located in Barangay San Benito, Victoria, Laguna. The receipt of the money was
evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt dated May 7, 2004. In the said receipt, Atty. Alvero said that he would
deposit the money in court because Amanda Gasta refused to accept the same. Later, Barcenas found out that Atty.
Alvero was losing a lot of money in cockfights. To check if the money they gave Atty. Alvero was still intact,
Barcenas pretended to borrow P80,000.00 from the P300,000.00 and promised to return the amount when needed or
as soon as the case was set for hearing. However, Atty. Alvero allegedly replied, “Akala nyo ba ay madali kunin ang
pera pag nasa korte na?” Subsequently, Barcenas discovered that Atty. Alvero did not deposit the money in court, but
instead converted and used the same for his personal needs. Despite repeated demands to return the money, Atty.
Alvero refused. Hence, Barcenas filed a case with the IBP. Atty. Alvero stressed that there was no lawyer-client
relationship between him and Barcenas. He, however, insisted that the lawyer-client relationship between him and
San Antonio still subsisted as his service was never severed by the latter. He further emphasized that he had not
breached the trust of his client, since he had, in fact, manifested his willingness to return the said amount as long as
his lawyer-client relationship with San Antonio subsisted.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Alvero breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16
of the Code of Professional Responsibility

RULING:

Yes. Atty. Alvero breached 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. There is a clear breach of lawyer-client relations. When a lawyer receives money from a
client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was
spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to his client. These, Atty. Alvero failed to do. Jurisprudence dictates that a lawyer
who obtains possession of the funds and properties of his client in the course of his professional employment shall
deliver the same to his client (a) when they become due, or (b) upon demand. In the instant case, respondent failed
to account for and return the P300,000.00 despite complainant's repeated demands.

IN RE CUNANAN

94 PHIL. 534

FACTS:

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, “An
Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to
have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in
subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:

Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its
title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the
fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in
force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate
preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice of law
and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down
by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who
can practice law; and the pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover,
the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions
denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to
alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case
No. MDD-1)
A.M. No. 1928 | August 3, 1978 | En Banc | Chief Justice Castro
Legal Ethics | Integrated Bar of the Philippines | Membership Dues

Requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses
of regulation of the profession to which they belong is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise
funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. Such compulsion is justified as a valid exercise of
the police power of the State over an important profession.

FACTS:
Atty. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. In 1975, the IBP Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership
Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” notwithstanding due notice
pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art. III of the By-Laws of the IBP.

In his pleadings, conceded to the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, but
questions the all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership therein and the obligation to pay membership
dues arguing that the provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of the Court Rule 139-A) constitute an invasion of his
constitutional right in the sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in
good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by theConstitution. Respondent likewise questions
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that this matter is not
among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is of an administrative nature pertaining to an administrative
body.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar may be compelled to pay the required membership fee in IBP.

RULING:
An “Integrated Bar” is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction
of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar xxx.

The Court sees nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article
X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of
a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed
to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. Such compulsion is justified as a valid
exercise of the police power of the State over an important profession.

Jimenez v. Francisco 2004 A.C. No. 10548, December 10, 2014

FACTS:

Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint for estafa filed by Jimenez against her. She
felt even more betrayed when she read the affidavit of Atty. Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer
and Clarion’s corporate counsel and secretary of Clarion. This prompted her to file a disciplinary case against Atty.
Francisco for representing conflicting interests. According to her, she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco
regarding the legal implications of Clarion’s transactions. More significantly, the principal documents relative to the
sale and transfer of Clarion’s property were all prepared and drafted by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law
office.7 Atty. Francisco was the one who actively participated in the transactions involving the sale of the Forbes
property. Without admitting the truth of the allegations in his affidavit, complainant argued that its execution clearly
betrayed the trust and confidence she reposed on him as a lawyer. For this reason, complainant prayed for the
disbarment of Atty. Francisco.

Issue: Whether respondent’s actively and passively allowing Clarion to make untruthful representations to the SEC
and in other public documents, still constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney.

HELD:

Yes, While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of interests and disclosure of privileged
communication, the acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively allowing Clarion to make untruthful
representations to the SEC and in other public documents, still constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his
office as attorney, for which a suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months is warranted. Atty. Francisco
could have prevented his entanglement with this fiasco among the members of Jimenez’s family by taking an
upfront and candid stance in dealing with Jimenez’s children and complainant. He could have been staunch in
reminding the latter that his tasks were performed in his capacity as legal counsel for Clarion and Jimenez. Be that
as it may, Atty. Francisco’s indiscretion does not detract the Court from finding that the totality of evidence
presented by the complainant miserably failed to discharge the burden of proving that Atty. Francisco was her
lawyer. At most, he served as the legal counsel of Clarion and, based on the affirmation presented, of Jimenez.
Suffice it to say, complainant failed to establish that Atty. Francisco committed a violation of the rule on conflict of
interests.

Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113 | September 3, 1991
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Atty. Monsod has worked as a lawyer in the law
office of his father (1960-1963); an operations officer with the World Bank Group (1963-1970); Chief Executive
Officer of an investment bank (1970-1986); legal or economic consultant on various companies (1986); Secretary
General of NAMFREL (1986); member of Constitutional Commission (1986-1987); National Chairman of
NAMFREL (1987); and member of the quasi-judicial Davide Commission (1990).

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC.Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that
said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent posseses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Monsod possessed the required qualification. In the case of Philippine Lawyers
Association vs. Agrava: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is whether
in or out of court. As such, the petition is dismissed.

IN RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY

AM NO. 10-10-4-SC

FACTS:

On 28 April 2010, the decision of the case Vinuya v Executive Secretary was promulgated with Justice Mariano del
Castillo as its ponente. Motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner’s counsel on various grounds but most
notably on the ground that not only did the ponente of the case plagiarised at least 3 books and articles in discussing
the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes, but have also twisted such quotations making it appear contrary to the
intent of the original works. The authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles are: 1) Evan J Criddle and Evan
Fox-Decent’s A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens published in 2009 in the Yale Journal of International Law; 2)
Christian J. Tams’ Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in Internation Law published by the Cambridge University
Press in 2005; and 3) Mark Ellis’ Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime published in the Case
Western Reserve Journal of Internation Law in 2006. Thereafter, news regarding the plagiarism by the Supreme
Court spread over the media and the original authors wrote letters to the Chief Justice expressing discontent by the
questioned act of Justice del Castillo.

On 27 July 2010, the UP College of Law faculty members gave their opinion on the matter of plagiarism by issuing
an article titled “Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law
on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court” signed overall 37 faculty members.
In said article, the faculty expressly gave their dismay saying that the court had the hopes of relief from those
“comfort women” during the war “crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by
the Highest Court of the Land.”

In the article, it was stated that plagiarism, as appropriation and misrepresentation of another person’s work as one’s
own, is considered as “dishonesty, pure and simple.” Hence, it was argued that since the decision in the Vinuya case
form part of the Philippine judicial system, the Court, in fine, is allowing dishonesty to be promulgated.
Furthermore, the plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Vinuya case undermines the judicial system of our country
and is a dirt on the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court, the article sought for the resignation of Associate Justice
Mariano del Castillo.

In response to the said article, the Court issued a resolution stating that the remarks and choice of words used were
such a great insult to the members of the Court and a threat to the independence of the judiciary, a clear violation of
Canons 1, 11 and 13 and the Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thereafter, the Court
ordered the signatories to show cause on why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for such alleged
violations.
In fulfillment of the directive by the Court, the signatories passed a Common Compliance stating therein that their
intention in issuing the article in question “was not to malign the Court but rather to defend its integrity and
credibility and to ensure continued confidence in the legal system” by the words used therein as “focusing on
constructive action.” Also, it was alleged that the respondents are correct in seeking responsibility from Justice del
Castillo for he, indeed, committed plagiarism thus, rectifying their issuance of the article. Furthermore, the
respondents argued that the article in question is a valid exercise of the freedom of expression as citizens of a
democracy, and an exercise of academic freedom.

ISSUES:

W/N the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violation of various Canons and Rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

Yes. The Court ruled that the Common Compliance given by the respondent-signatories in the questioned article is
not sufficient in reasoning why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar.

“…the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of
their duty to advance the interests of their clients.

“However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the
use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

“On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his
pleadings must be dignified.

“Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment
and cannot be deemed as protected free speech.”

“In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views on any subject, be
it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their points of view they
are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be
shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another
under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private
practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for
admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this
sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to which they
belong.”

The Court further reminded the respondent law professors “of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive
language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration of
justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.”

DISSENTING OPINION

Sereno, J.:

The Court’s act in directing the law professors to furnish the Show Cause Resolution is like the little boy
who exclaimed that the emperor has no clothes in the Danish story be made to explain why he should not be
punished for his keen observation which is an act of prematurely judging them guilty. The Court’s act of labelling
Justice del Castillo’s act as not plagiarism is what makes this contempt case grave. It should not be the place of the
Court to seek revenge against those who have the courage to say what is wrong with it.

The Resolution requiring the Show Cause Resolution demonstrates nothing but an abrasive flexing of the judicial
muscle that could hardly be characterized as judicious. This knee-jerk response from the Court stares back at its
own face, since this judicial act is the one that is totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced
vigilance.

Carpio, J.:

The Show Cause Resolution by the respondents is sufficient and there is no need to admonish or warn them of the
use of disrespectful language. The Court adheres to the clear and present danger test and it appears that the evil
consequences of the statements are absent and it does not exhibit that irrational obsession to demean, ridicule,
degrade and even destroy the courts and their members. There is only contempt when the article is taken apart,
contrary to the practice of the Court which is to read with contextual care making sure that disparaging statements
are not taken out of context.

MIRPURI V. CA (G.R. NO. 114508)

FACTS:

Lolita Escobar applied for the registration of the trademark ‘Barbizon’ for her products such as brassieres and ladies
undergarments. Respondent Barbizon Corporation, an American corporation, opposed alleging that petitioner’s mark
is confusingly similar to its own trademark ‘Barbizon.’ Escobar’s application was given due course and her
trademark was registered. Later, Escobar assigned all her rights to petitioner Mirpuri who failed to file an Affidavit
of Use resulting in the cancellation of the trademark. Petitioner then applied for registration of the trademark to
which respondent Barbizon again opposed, now invoking the protection under Article 6bis of the Paris Convention.
The Director of Patents declaring respondent’s opposition was already barred, petitioner’s application was given due
course. CA reversed the judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent may invoke the protection under Article 6bis of the Paris Convention.

RULING: YES.

The Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, otherwise known as the Paris Convention, is a
multilateral treaty that seeks to protect industrial property consisting of patents, utility models, industrial designs,
trademarks, service marks, trade names and indications of source or appellations of origin, and at the same time aims
to repress unfair competition. The Convention is essentially a compact among various countries which, as members
of the Union, have pledged to accord to citizens of the other member countries trademark and other rights
comparable to those accorded their own citizens by their domestic laws for an effective protection against unfair
competition. Art. 6bis is a self-executing provision and does not require legislative enactment to give it effect in the
member country. It may be applied directly by the tribunals and officials of each member country by the mere
publication or proclamation of the Convention, after its ratification according to the public law of each state and the
order for its execution.

The Philippines and the United States of America have acceded to the WTO Agreement. Conformably, the State
must reaffirm its commitment to the global community and take part in evolving a new international economic order
at the dawn of the new millennium.

RHONDA VIVARES VS ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, G.R. No. 202666 – 737 SCRA 92

FACTS:

In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several
pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through a
student’s Facebook account, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STC’s
Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.

Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from “marching” in their
graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.

The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the
school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students.

Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ
of habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable
expectation of privacy which must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent. Thus,
Escudero violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s
officials. The Facebook accounts of the children were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images
happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject
data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy.
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.

HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.

Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal killing or enforced
disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the business of
“gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party”.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only
against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.

Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)

The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and the user
makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to informational
privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be respected and protected.

In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such privacy tools. Evidence
would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published as “Public”.

Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s posts on his “wall” (profile page):

(a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

(b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;

(c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;

(d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
(e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose any setting other than
“Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did set the posts subject of this case so much so that only five
people can see them (as they claim), then how come most of their classmates were able to view them. This fact was
not refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said
pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no
reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.

STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the pictures cannot be
considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who showed the picture to their teacher and
the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a
legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students according to the standards of the school (to which the students and
their parents agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).

ULEP VS. LEGAL CLINIC, INC., 223 SCRA 378

FACTS:

Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist
from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to
perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession
other than those allowed by law.” The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
Please call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical, demeaning of
the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar
and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the
reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals
with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the
services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light
of the caseof John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decidedby the United States
Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
ISSUE: Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes
practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein
complained of.

HELD: YES

The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of law. The definition of
“practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:Black defines "practice of law"
as:"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with thelaw." The
contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering. While
some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how,
such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What
is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that
such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example,
about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely
a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies
of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That
is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity
falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the
fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority
holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting,
and so forth. That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtueof the nature of the services it renders which thereby
brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published
and are now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement
of his talents. (SEE CANON 2) A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents
or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal
services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession.
The canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention.
That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is rightand proper. A good and reputable lawyer
needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal
by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.

ELENA BIETE LEONES VDA. DE MILLER v. ATTY. ROLANDO B. MIRANDA

FACTS:
Complainant alleged that she filed a complaint for ejectment (ejectment case) against a certain Clarita Rodriguez
Magbuhos2 (Magbuhos), docketed as Civil Case No. 08-749, before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Angeles
City, Branch III (MTCC).3 A certain Corazon P. Manansala (Manansala), who claimed to be Magbuhos's attorney-
in-fact, appeared in the latter's behalf alongside with her counsel, herein respondent. To prove her authority as
attorney-in-fact, she presented a Special Power of Attorney4 (SPA) duly notarized by respondent on March 6, 2009
and entered into his notarial register as Doc. No. 340; Page No. 68; Book No. IX, Series of 2009 (original SPA).5
However, upon scrutiny of the original SPA, complainant's counsel pointed out that Manansala's authority to
represent Magbuhos pertained to an alleged "cash loan extended to one Nestor Cabais" and not to the ejectment
case. Insisting that she was authorized to represent Magbuhos in the ejectment case, Manansala, thru respondent,
submitted another SPA6 (altered SPA), which turned out to be almost identical to the original SPA earlier submitted,
with the following notable changes: (a) the phrase "the cash loan extended to one Nestor Cabais" was enclosed with
a handwritten parenthesis; and (b) the handwritten phrase "my property located at Purok 6, Aguinaldo St., Sapang
Bato, Angeles City," was inserted in its stead, with all handwritten iterations not having any initials or counter-
signatures of Magbuhos, as well as any indication as to when the aforesaid alterations were made.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable

HELD: YES.

A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the
acknowledgement and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these notarial acts, the notary
public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The notarial seal converts a
document from a private to a public instrument, after which it may be presented as evidence without need of proof
of its genuineness and due execution. Thus, notarization should not be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary
act. A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the
facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal
transactions.

In Re: JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, 241 SCRA 405

FACTS:

The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently read some law books, and
ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive legal principles and procedural rules.
Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now,
from 1978 to the present, been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts, dogmatically
pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the Supreme Court.

Case 1: Cases involving Traders Royal Bank (TRB).

The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the Traders Royal Bank (TRB). On June 2,
1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. This he secured by a real estate mortgage created over two
parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned, respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria
(his sister) and Teresita Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan from TRB in the
amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as security a mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente
V. Borromeo, covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was vested in him by a Special
Power of Attorney executed by their respective owners.

Case 2: Cases involving United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).

Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
and executed a real estate mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The mortgage was constituted over a 122-square-
meter commercial lot covered by TCT No. 75680 in Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwards sold on August
7, 1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by
him (Borromeo, as the vendor). The sale was made without the knowledge and consent of UCPB.

Case 3: Cases involving Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC).

The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running court battles, was the Security Bank &
Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate sum of P189,126.19,
consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979. To secure payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp.
(Summa) issued a performance bond which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability thereunder. Again, as in the
case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB, Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual obligations.
Hence, SBTC brought an action in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent-accused is liable for constructive contempt?

HELD:

Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt repeatedly committed over time,
despite warnings and instructions given to him, and to the end that he may ponder his serious errors and grave
misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of
imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of any of the offenses of which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or
other offense against courts, judges or court employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.

ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, MALANA, LUCILA VS. JUDGE CRUZ & FISCAL QUILATAN

FACTS:

Petitioner Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints against two police officers for less serious physical
injuries in the municipal court of Paranaque. Petitioners Malana and Lucila, were the senior law students of
the UP, assisting the needy clients in the office of legal aid. They filed their separate appearances as
friends of complainant petitioner Cantimbuhan which was opposed by Fiscal Quilatan and sustained by
Judge Cruz and disallowed the appearances if petitioner Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said
criminal cases. The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners was also denied. It was contended by the
respondents that pursuant to Sec. 4 and 15 of Rule 110 of ROC, the fiscal is empowered to determine who
shall be the private prosecutor and the exercise of the offended party to intervene is subject to the direction
and control of the fiscal and that his appearance requires the prior approval of the fiscal. The basis of the petitioner
on the other hand is section34of Rule 138 of the ROC which provides that in the court of the justice of the
peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally
or by the aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member
of the bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Malana and Lucila are allowed to appear as friends of party litigant Cantimbuhan.

HELD: YES

There is merit in the petition. The court held that pursuant to Sec. 34 Rule 138 ROC in a municipal court a party
may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for that purpose. In the case
of Laput vs. Bernade, a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the
Manila Municipal Court, who was charged for damages to properly through reckless imprudence. Further, the
court held that the permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his appearance as private
prosecutors because the law does not impose this condition. What the fiscal can do if he wants to handle
the case personally is to disallow the private prosecutor’s participate, whether he be a lawyer or not. On the
other hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the
court that the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under his
supervision and control. Furthermore, the court held that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense council or as friend
of the accused in a case before the MTC, with more reason that he allowed to appear as private prosecutor
under the supervision and control of their fiscal. Wherefore, the orders issued by the respondent Judge
disallowing the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila were set aside and Judge Cruz was ordered to
allow the appearance and intervention of Malana and Lucila as friends of Cantimbuhan.

CRUZ v. MINA – G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007

FACT:

Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor for Grave
Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The petitioner, describing himself as a third
year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear
before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of0020a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his
appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz
appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No.
19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student
Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan. Petitioner filed before
the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or
the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to
interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone. The MeTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
The petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the public respondent MeTC. RTC denied the
petition of the petitioner and its Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
litigant.

HELD: YES

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of
whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a
law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior
courts. There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the
appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule
provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the
courts.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU),ENRIQUE ENTILA &

VICTORIANOTENEZA vs. BINALBANGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY,COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS & QUINTINMUNING

FACTS:
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, entitled, "PAFLU,et al, vs. Binalbagan-
Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961,
ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision
became final On 18 October1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed
a noticeof attorney's hen equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty.Atanacio Pacis also
filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila andTenazas, on 3 December 1963, filed a
manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the
same day, Quintin Muning filed a"Petition for Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages.
Muning's petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates on the ground that he is not a lawyer.

ISSUE: WON a non- lawyer may recover Atty’s fees for legal services rendered

HELD: NO.

The award of 10% to Quintin Muning, who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided in the
present petition. Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers'Association, et
al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968, that anagreement providing for the division of
attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president isallowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by
Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and isimmoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less
immoral in theabsence of a contract, as in the present case. The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession
should not be violated; that acting as anattorney without authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable
by fine orimprisonment or both, and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of anunlawful act or
an act done in violation of law; and that if fees were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in
hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case ofnecessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside
from the fact that non-lawyers arenot amenable to disciplinary measures.The weight of the reasons heretofore stated
why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney'sfees should suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances
by non-lawyers before theCourt of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court
ofspecial jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not outweigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an
exception. WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the
backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning.

VILLAHERMOSA, S R. V. CARACOL, A.C. NO. 7325 (RESOLUTION), JANUARY 21, 2015

FACTS:
OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had two sons, Fernando and Efren. When the
agrarian reform law was enacted, emancipation patents and titles were issued to Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot,
beneficiaries of the program, who in turn sold the parcels of land to complainant’s spouse, Raymunda Villahermosa.
The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a decision ordering the cancellation of
the emancipation patents and TCTs derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it was not covered by the agrarian reform
law. This decision was appealed to and affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court of Appeals. Atty.
Caracol, as “Add’l Counsel for the Plaintiffs -Movant,” filed a motion for execution with the DARAB, Malaybalay,
Bukidnon praying for the full implementation of the decision. Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second
Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition which he signed as “Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela.” Villahermosa
filed this complaint alleging that Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the motions since he obtained no authority
from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record. Villahermosa posited that Efren could not have authorized Atty.
Caracol to file the second motion because Efren had already been dead for more than a year. He claimed that Atty.
Caracol’s real client was a certain Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had allegedly bought the same parcel of land. Atty.
Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as “additional counsel”. He said that he had
consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go ahead with the filing. Moreover, he stated that he was not aware that
there was a waiver of rights executed in Ernesto Aguirre’s favor. In its Report and Recommendation, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) found that Atty. Caracol committed deceitful acts
and misconduct.

ISSUE: Is Atty. Caracol guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court?

HELD: YES.

The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a lawyer’s appearance on behalf of his
client, hence:

Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person without being retained nor
may he appear in court without being employed unless by leave of court. If an attorney appears on a client’s
behalf without a retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant whom he purports to represent nor the adverse
party may be bound or affected by his appearance unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his
assumed authority. If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a party to a case without authority, he
may be disciplined or punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transaction.

Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he filed the Motion for Issuance of Second Alias
Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an honest, prudent and conscientious lawyer, he should have informed the
Court of his client’s passing and presented au thority that he was retained by the client’s successors-in-interest and
thus the parties may have been substituted.

DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS V. BAYOT (AC L-1117, 20 MARCH 1994)

FACTS:

The case involves Respondent Estanislao Bayot, an attorney-at-law, who is charged with malpractice for having
published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune, regarding marriage arrangements; to wit:

Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and
marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Respondent asks for “the indulgence and mercy” of the Court, promising not to repeat it and that he published it
only once.

ISSUE: Whether Respondent’s act is in violation of the legal profession

HELD: YES

It is undeniable that the advertisement was a flagrant violation by the Respondent of the ethics of his profession, it
being a brazen solicitation of business from public.

That pursuant to section 25 of Rule 127, “the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain constitutes
malpractice”. It is settled that it is highly unethical for lawyers to advertise his talent and skills. LAW PROFESSION
IS NOT A TRADE.

IN RE LUIS B. TAGORDA, MARCH 23, 1929

FACTS:

Atty. Tagorda, in his card written in Spanish and Ilocano, noted his capability as a lawyer such as executing a deed o
f sale, collection of loans, etc. Also, in his letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality, he also 
advertised his profession as a lawyer and even asked a favor to disseminate this information to the barrio people in a
ny of their meetings or social gatherings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the advertisement of Atty. Tagorda through the card and letter is wrong and be punished.

HELD: YES

The acts of Atty Tagorda of direct and indirect advertising and stirring up litigation were violative of the Code of Et
hics. Still, the most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his br
other lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.

It becomes the duty of the court to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyer
s. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It works against the c
onfidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incentin
g to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.

The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigatin
g, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the improp
riety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistak
e in the future. Atty. Tagorda is suspended for one month.

ZALDY NUEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO, RESPONDENT. A.M. NO. CA-05-18-P;
APRIL 12, 2005

FACTS:

The complaint arose out of respondent’s solicitation of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez
(Complainant) in exchange for a speedy and favorable decision of the latter’s pending case in the Court of Appeals.

Complainant earlier sought the assistance of Imbestigador. The crew of the TV program accompanied him to
PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for extortion. Thereafter, he communicated with
respondent again to verify if the latter was still asking for the money and to set up a meeting with her. Upon
learning that respondent’s offer of a favorable decision in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was still
standing, the plan for the entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC.

During the hearing of this case, respondent would like the court to believe that she never had any intention of
committing a crime, that the offer of a million pesos for a favorable decision came from complainant and that it was
complainant and the law enforcers who instigated the whole incident.

When she was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in complainant’s cellphone and which reflected her
cellphone number, respondent admitted those that were not incriminating but claimed she did not remember those
that clearly showed she was transacting with complainant.

Respondent thus stated that she met with complainant only to tell the latter to stop calling and texting her, not to get
the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as pre-arranged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the text messages are admissible as evidence in court

HELD: YES

Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from respondent duly
presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a
favorable decision of the former’s pending case with the CA. The text messages were properly admitted by the
Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence65 which
provides:

“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other electronic
forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.”
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, “Ephemeral electronic communications shall be
proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . .” In
this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof
testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in
complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have
had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to
the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative
cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.

The Court has no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack
thereof of respondent in this case.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, COURT OF APPEALS vs. CIELITO M.

SALUD, CLERK IV, COURT OF APPEALS, A.M. No. CA-05-20-P; September 9, 2005

FACTS:

Respondent is charged and held liable for offenses on inefficiency and incompetence of official duty; conduct
grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and directly and indirectly having financial and material interest
in an official transaction considering his undue interest in the service of the order of release and actual release of
Melchor Lagua.

Lagua was found guilty of homicide and was then detained at the Bureau of Prisons National Penitentiary in
Muntinlupa City. Lagua’s petition for bond was approved in a Resolution where the appellate court directed the
issuance of an order of release in favor of Lagua. The resolution was brought to the office of Atty. Madarang,
Division Clerk of Court, for promulgation.

Respondent served the resolution and order of release of Lagua at the National Penitentiary, where Lagua was
detained for homicide.

Meanwhile, Atty. Madarang received a call from a certain Melissa Melchor, who introduced herself as Lagua’s
relative, asking how much more they had to give to facilitate Lagua’s provisional liberty, and that they sought the
help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of RTC Pasig, but was told that they still had a balance. When Atty. Madarang was
able to get the mobile number of respondent, he represented himself as Lagua’s relative and exchanged text
messages with said respondent for a possible pay-off for the Lagua’s provisional liberty. Atty. Madarang later
discovered that the respondent did not properly serve the copies of the Resolution and Order of Release upon the
accused-appellant and his counsel. but gave them to a certain Art Baluran, allegedly Lagua’s relative.

Later on, Complainant called the respondent to her office. When confronted, the respondent denied extorting or
receiving money for Lagua’s release, or in any other case. He, however, admitted serving the copies of resolution
and order of release intended for Lagua and his counsel to Art Baluran. Complainant then lodged the complaint
against the respondent in a Letter dated November 14, 2003.

ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of text messages as evidence constitutes a violation of right to privacy of the
accused?

HELD: NO.

The respondent’s claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him constitutes a violation of his
right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as “ephemeral electronic communication” under
Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and “shall be proven by the testimony of a person who
was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof.” Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is
now moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the sender
of the first three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.

HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO VS. EXAMEN

FACTS:

Pedro Alilano and his wife, Florentina, were the holders of Original Certificate of Title covering a 98,460 sq. m.
parcel of land. It appears that on March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984 Absolute Deeds of Salewere executed
by the Spouses Alilano in favor of Ramon Examen and his wife, Edna.Both documents were notarized
by respondent Atty. Roberto Examen, brother of the vendee.Sometime in September 1984, Spouses Examen
obtained possession of the property.On January 12, 2002, the heirs of Alilano filed a suit for recovery of possession
before the RTC against Edna Examen and Atty. Roberto Examen.It was during this proceeding that Atty.
Examen introduced into evidence the Absolute Deeds of Sale.On November 15, 2003,the heirs of Alilano filed
this complaint alleging that Atty. Examen, based onBarretto v. Cabreza,violated the notarial law when he
notarized the absolute deeds of sale since a notary public is prohibited from notarizing a document when
one of the parties is a relative by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree or affinity within the second
civil degree.It is also alleged that Atty. Examen notarized the documents knowing that thecedulaor
residence certificate number used by Ramon Examen was not actually his but the residence certificate
number of Florentina.Atty. Examen also falsely acknowledged that the two witnesses personally appeared before
him when they did not.Lastly, it is alleged that despite knowing the infirmities of these documents, Atty. Examen
introduced these documents into evidence violating his oath as a lawyer and the CPR.In his defense, Atty.
Examen pointed out that there was no longer any prohibition under the Revised Administrative Code
for a notary public to notarize a document where one of the parties is related to him by consanguinity and
affinity.With regard to the use of Florentina’s residence certificate as Ramon’s, Atty. Examen said that he
was in good faith and that it was office practice that the secretary type details without him personally
examining the output.In any event, he reasoned that the use of another’s residence certificate is not a ground
for disbarment and is barred by prescription based on IBP Resolution No. XVI-2004-13 dated January 26, 2004
where it was proposed that the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, Section 1, Rule VIII, be revised to include a prescription period for professional misconduct:
within two years from the date of the act.In its Report and Recommendation, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Examen liable for breach of the Notarial Law and introducing false Absolute Deeds
of Sale before court proceedings. It stated that there was ample evidence to support the complainants’ contention
that the Spouses Alilano did not voluntarily and knowingly convey their property, i.e. denials under oath by
attesting witnesses and NBI Report by Handwriting Expert Jennifer Dominguez stating that Pedro
Alilano’s signature in the September 1984 Absolute Deed of Sale was significantly different from the
specimen signatures.It also noted that Ramon Examen’s residence certificate number, date and place of issue
were also falsified since the residence certificate actually belonged to Florentina Pueblo. It thus
recommended that the penalty of disbarment be imposed. The IBP Board of Governors (BOG) in its June 26, 2007
Resolutionadopted the IBP CBD’s report but modified the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a
period of two years and a suspension of Atty. Examen’s Notarial Commission for a period of two
years.Atty. Examen moved for reconsideration. In its Notice of Resolution, the IBP BOG denied the motion
for reconsideration. It also modified the penalty imposed to suspension from the practice of law for a period of
one year and disqualification from re-appointment as Notary Public for a period of two years.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the action has already prescribed
2. W/N the Spanish notarial law of1889 was repealed by the revisedadministrative code of 1917
3. W/N Atty. Examen was negligent in the performance of his duties as a notary public

HELD:
1. NO. In Frias v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada,, it was ruled that there can be no prescription in bar discipline cases.
If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a
chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty
of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how
much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of
the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. We therefore
ruled in Frias, that Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the IBP CBD was void and had no legal effect
for being ultra vires and thus null and void.

2. YES. Prior to 1917, governing law for notaries public in the Philippines was the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889.
However, the law governing Notarial Practice is changed with the passage of the January 3, 1916 Revised
Administrative Code, which took effect in 1917. In 2004, the Revised Rules on Notarial Practice27 was passed by
the Supreme Court. In Kapunan, et al. v. Casilan and Court of Appeals,28 the Court had the opportunity to state that
enactment of the Revised Administrative Code repealed the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889. In this case, the heirs of
Alilano stated that Atty. Examen was prohibited to notarize the absolute deeds of sale since he was related by
consanguinity within the fourth civil degree with the vendee, Ramon. The prohibition might have still applied had
the applicable rule been the Spanish Notarial Law. However, following the Court’s ruling in Kapunan, the law in
force at the time of signing was the Revised Administrative Code, thus, the prohibition was removed. Atty. Examen
was not incompetent to notarize the document even if one of the parties to the deed was a relative, his brother. Note
must be taken that under 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule IV, Section 3(c), a notary public is disqualified
among others to perform the notarial act if he is related by affinity or consanguinity to a principal within the fourth
civil degree, to wit: SEC. 3. Disqualifications. – A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal
within the fourth civil degree. That Atty. Examen was not incompetent to act as a notary public in the present case
does not mean that he can evade administrative liability under the CPR in conjunction with the provisions of the
Notarial Law. 3. YES. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. For this reason, notaries
public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Thus under the
prevailing law at the time of notarization it was the duty of the notary public to comply with the requirements of the
Notarial Law. This includes the duty under Chapter 11, Section 251 of the Revised Administrative Code:

SEC. 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of cedula [residence] tax. – Every contract, deed, or other
document acknowledged before a notary public shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented
their proper cedula [residence] certificates or are exempt from the cedula [residence] tax, and there shall be entered
by the notary public as a part of such certification the number, place of issue, and date of each cedula [residence]
certificate as aforesaid.

Under Chapter 11, Section 249 of the Revised Administrative Code provided a list of the grounds for
disqualification: SEC. 249. Grounds for revocation of commission. – The following derelictions of duty on the part
of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation
of his commission:

(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula certificates.

In Soriano v. Atty. Basco,33 the Court stated that notaries public are required to follow formalities as these are
mandatory and cannot be simply neglected. Thus, the Notarial Law requires them to certify that a party to the
instrument acknowledged before him has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence
certificate) and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of the certification. Failure to perform his duties
results in the revocation of a notary’s commission. Here, based on the submission of the complainants, it is clear that
the residence certificate number used by Ramon Examen and as notarized by Atty. Examen in both Absolute Deeds
of Sale was not in fact the residence certificate of Ramon but Florentina’s residence certificate number.

3 Atty. Examen interposes that he was in good faith in that it was office practice to have his secretary type up the
details of the documents and requirements without him checking the correctness of same. A notary public must
discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.36 Good faith
cannot be a mitigating circumstance in situations since the duty to function as a notary public is personal. We note
that the error could have been prevented had Atty. Examen diligently performed his functions: personally checked
the correctness of the documents. To say that it was his secretary’s fault reflects disregard and unfitness to discharge
the functions of a notary public for it is he who personally acknowledges the document. Atty. Examen posits that the
failure of a notary to make the proper notation of cedulas can only be a ground for disqualification and not the
proper subject for a disbarment proceeding. We disagree. In violating the provisions of the Notarial Law, Atty.
Examen also transgressed the his oath as a lawyer, provisions of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court which provides: SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly and willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. By his negligent act of not
checking the work of his secretary and merely perfunctorily notarizing documents, it cannot be said that he upheld
legal processes thus violating Canon 1 of the CPR. Neither can it be said that he promoted confidence in the legal
system. If anything, his acts serve to undermine the functions of a diligent lawyer. He thus ran afoul Rule 1.02 of the
CPR. We cannot stress enough that as a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession. A lawyer’s mandate includes thoroughly going over
documents presented to them typed or transcribed by their secretaries.

A.C. No. 10689, ROMEO A. ALMARIO vs. ATTY. DOMINICA LLERA-AGNO,DEL CASTILLO, J.,
January 8, 2018

FACTS:

This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint filed by complainant Romeo A. Almario (complainant) before
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking to disbar Atty. Dominica L.
Agno (respondent lawyer), for notarizing a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) without the personal appearance of one
of the affiants therein.

It is complainant's contention: (l) that the said SP A was falsified because one of the affiants therein, Francisca A.
Mallari (Mallari), could not possibly have executed the same because she was in Japan at the time the SP A was
executed, as certified to by the Bureau of Immigration (BI); (2) that this SP A was used in the said civil case to
perpetrate fraud and deception against complainant resulting in the filing of Criminal Case No. 452612-CR, for
violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (Use of Falsified Document) against Ma. Lourdes Almario Pedia,
(Pedia), the attorney-in-fact mentioned in the SPA; (3) that respondent lawyer notarized the SPA although Mallari
did not personally appear before her; (4) that in the process of notarizing the SPA, respondent lawyer also accepted a
Community Tax Certificate (CTC), which is no longer considered a competent evidence of identity pursuant to the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice; and (5) that, therefore, respondent lawyer violated Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, xxx.

In her Answer, respondent lawyer prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and offered the following arguments:1)
On July 12, 2006, Pedia sent the SPA to Mallari in Japan and it was brought back to the Philippines on July 25, 2006
by Mallari's son, Roman Mallari-Vestido; 2) The SPA was notarized on July 26, 2006 for reasons of expediency,
because therein defendants were pressed for time in filing their Answer in the civil case, and that in any event,
Mallari undertook to have the SPA acknowledged before the Philippine Consulate in Tokyo, Japan on August 28,
2006, (thereby giving it retroactive effect). Respondent lawyer claimed that the aforementioned circumstances
showed that she acted in good faith in notarizing the SPA; 3) Mallari was able to acknowledge the SP A with red
ribbon before the Philippine Consulate in Tokyo, Japan on August 28, 2006; 4) Neither fraud nor deception was
perpetrated as the parties in the said civil case executed a Compromise Agreement, which was approved by the RTC;
5) Contrary to complainant's claim, CTCs are still presently accepted as proof of personal identification in cases
where no other proof of personal identification is available; and, 6) That, if at all, it was complainant himself who
defrauded the RTC when he stated in his verified complaint that Mallari is a resident of No. 973 Del Pan St., San
Antonio, Tondo, Manila, even though he knew that Mallari was in Japan at the time of filing of the civil case.
In a Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent lawyer liable for violation of
Section 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and recommended that she be suspended for six months as notary
public.

On April 16, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution adopting the finding and approving the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent lawyer filed a verified Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in
a Resolution dated May 3, 2014.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent lawyer liable for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
2. Whether or not the penalty of six months as the IBP had recommended is proper.

HELD:
(1) YES.
The importance of the affiant's personal appearance when a document is notarized is underscored by Section 1, Rule
II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which states:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - 'Acknowledgment' refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete instrument or document;
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him
for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or document as
his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to
sign in that capacity. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, Section 2(b), Rule 1V of the same Rules provides that:
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document –
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
These provisions mandate the notary public to require the physical or personal presence of the person/s who
executed a document, before notarizing the same. In other words, a document should not be notarized unless the
person/s who is/are executing it is/are personally or physically present before the notary public. The personal and
physical presence of the parties to the deed is necessary to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature/s of the affiant/s therein and the due execution of the document.
This Court, in Ferguson v. Atty. Ramos, held that "notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act[;i]t is
imbued with public interest x xx."
In cognate or similar cases, this Court likewise held that a notary public must not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed it are the very same persons who executed the same, and personally appeared before him to
attest to the truth of the contents thereof. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free and
voluntary act and deed.
In the present case, the SPA in question was notarized by respondent lawyer despite the absence of Mallari, one of
the affiants therein. Mallari could not have personally appeared before respondent lawyer in Muntinlupa City,
Philippines where the SPA was notarized on July 26, 2006 because Mallari was in Japan at that time, as certified to
by the Bureau of Immigration.

(2) NO.
The Court opts to suspend respondent lawyer as a notary public for two months, instead of six months as the IBP
had recommended. We are impelled by the following reasons for taking this course of action: first, the apparent
absence of bad faith in her notarizing the SP A in question; second, the civil case wherein the flawed SP A was used
ended up in a judicial Compromise Agreement; and finally, this is her first administrative case since she was
commissioned as a Notary Public in 1973. In addition, respondent lawyer invites our attention to the fact that she is
already in the twilight years of her life.

ORLANDO S. CASTELO, ET AL. VS. ATTY. RONALD SEGUNDINO C. CHING A.C. NO. 11165
FEBRUARY 6, 2017

FACTS:

Orlando Castello, et al received summons from Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 22 for an ejectment case filed
against them by Leonida Delen and Spouses Nestor and Jesiebel Delen alleged owner of the residence of the
Castellos. Upon verifying, the Castellos discovered that the property in contention was actually named previously
from Castello heirs parents but was cancelled in favor of the Delens by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Irregularities were present in the execution and authorization of the Deed of Absolute Sale. With their discovery, the
Castello heirs filed with IBP an administrative case against Atty. Ching on the lawyer’s gross negligence in
notarizing the Deed. After due proceedings, Commissioner Eduardo Robles rendered a report and recommendation
finding Atty. CHing guilty of gross negligence in notarizing the Deed. The IBP on the other hand adopted and
approved the recommendation with modification.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ching was guilty of gross negligence in notarizing the Deed.

HELD:

The Supreme Court affirmed Commissioner Robles’ observation. Giving Atty. Ching the benefit of the doubt, the
court cannot skip to notice the fact that Atty. Ching still failed in insuring the necessary requirements as regards
those which were supposed to be entered in the notarial books. This also meant that Atty. Ching failed to secure
properly his instruments, so that persons would not have opportunity to forge notarizing documents with his
signature affixed therein. With these facts taken into considerations, the SC found Atty. Ching guilty of gross
negligence in notarizing Deed.

IN RE: OMB-C-C-13-0104 ATTY. SOCRATES G. MARANAN v. FRANCISCO DOMAGOSO,” ATTY.

SOCRATES G. MARANAN A.C. No. 12877 2004 Notarial Rules

FACTS:

Atty. Maranan filed a criminal complaint before the Ombudsman against then Vice Mayor Francisco “Isko Moreno”
Domagoso of the City of Manila, charging him with Falsification of Public Documents and violation of Section 3
(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for having signed, in behalf of the Manila City Government, consultancy contracts
with persons who were either deceased or out of the country for extended periods of time. In defense, Domagoso
claimed, among others, that he signed the consultancy contracts upon the assurance of his former Secretary,
Abraham Cabochan, that everything was in order, and pointed out that it was Atty. Maranan who actually notarized
the subject contract. After due proceedings, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges against Domagoso and referred
the matter to the IBP for determination of Atty. Maranan’s administrative liability for having notarized the
consultancy contracts.

Atty. Maranan denied having authored or notarized the consultancy contracts, and averred that the consultancy
contracts do not appear in any of his monthly notarial reports that he regularly submitted to the RTC.

In a Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the
administrative case against Atty. Maranan for lack of merit, finding that there was lack of clear and convincing
evidence to substantiate the allegations against him.

However, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to reverse the recommendation and found that there was substantial
evidence to prove that Atty. Maranan violated the 2004 Notarial Rules, considering that it was his responsibility to
impose safeguards against the unauthorized notarization of documents in his register. Indeed, even if the signatures
above his name as notary public in the consultancy contracts do not appear to be his, Atty. Maranan cannot sever
himself from the supposed notarized documents as the same bore his notarial seal.

Accordingly, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that: (a) Atty. Maranan be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months; (b) he be disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for a period
of two (2) years; and (c) his current notarial commission be immediately revoked.

Aggrieved, Atty. Maranan moved for reconsideration, which was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not grounds exist to hold Atty. Maranan administratively liable.

HELD:

After a judicious review of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board
of Governors that Atty. Maranan should be held administratively liable in this case.

The act of notarization is not an ordinary routine but is imbued with substantive public interest. A notary public is
empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the acknowledgment and affirmation
of documents or instruments. In the performance of these notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the
significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a
public instrument, after which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due
execution. A notarized document is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Thus, a notary public should
observe utmost care in performing his duties to preserve public confidence in the integrity of notarized documents.

A notarial seal is a mark, image or impression on a document which would indicate that the notary public has
officially signed it. Section 2, Rule VII of the 2004 Notarial Rules states that every notary public shall have his
own notarial seal, which shall have the name of the city or province and the word “Philippines,” and his own name
on the margin and the roll of attorney’s number on its face. The said seal shall only be possessed by the notary
public, to wit:

Section 2. Official Seal. – (a) Every person commissioned as

notary public shall have a seal of office, to be procured at his own expense, which shall not be possessed or owned
by any other person. It shall be of metal, circular in shape, two inches in diameter, and shall have the name of the
city or province and the word “Philippines” and his own name on the margin and the roll of attorney’s number on
the face thereof, with the words “notary public” across the center. A mark, image or impression of such seal shall
be made directly on the paper or parchment on which the writing appears.
xxx

Further, the 2004 Notarial Rules is explicit on the duties and obligations of the notary public, which include the
duty to secure and safeguard his notarial seal so that no unauthorized persons can have access thereto, viz.:

Section 2. Official Seal. – xx x

xxxx

(c) When not in use, the official seal shall be kept safe and secure

and shall be accessible 011/y to the notary public or the person duly authorized by him.

x x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied)

In this case, Atty. Maranan denied having authored or notarized the consultancy contracts and claimed that his
signatures therein as notary public were forged. Although the IBP observed that Atty. Maranan’s signatures in the
subject contracts were strikingly dissimilar to his specimen signatures on file before the Notarial Section of the
RTC, and while it may likewise be true that said contracts were not included in the notarial reports he submitted
thereto, he cannot claim full deniability and be exculpated from administrative Liability because the contracts bore
his notarial seal.

No justifiable explanation was given to prove that he had performed his mandatory duties as a notary public as set
forth under the 2004 Notarial Rules, which include the duty to safeguard his notarial seal to prevent possible
tampering or misuse thereof. Clearly, Atty. Maranan had been remiss in his obligation as a notary public. Had he
been more vigilant in the performance of his notarial duties, his notarial seal would not have been affixed in the
subject contracts. Indubitably, this failure on the part of Atty. Maranan constitutes a transgression of the 2004
Notarial Rules, for which he must be held administratively liable.

AGUSTIN VS. LEANA, AC NO. 8124, MARCH 19, 2019

FACTS:

Atty. Laeno and the mother of complainant Atty. Ferdinand S. Agustin, Marcelina Agustin, agreed to the sale of a
house and lot registered under E.M. Laeno and Associates for ₱6,500,000.00. In the agreement to sell and the
completion of the sale thereof, Marcelina was represented by her daughter Perpetua. After the property was
transferred in the name of Marcelina, Perpetua entered into a rental agreement with Atty. Laeno at ₱20,000.00 per
month over the same property.

Later, Atty. Laeno started to miss rental payments and when asked, refused to vacate the premises. After Marcelina
through her son Atty. Agustin instituted an ejectment case against Atty. Laeno, it was discovered that the sale of the
above-mentioned property was covered by two (2) Deeds of Absolute Sale executed and signed by Atty. Laeno and
both were notarized by Atty. Bergado. None of these documents reflected the true consideration of the property. One
said it was for ₱2,000,000.00 and the other said it was for ₱2,500,000.00.

In the ejectment case, Atty. Laeno denied dealing with MarceJina and recognized only Perpetua as the beneficial and
absolute owner of the subject property. He further claimed that there is an unpaid balance of ₱1,500,000.00.
According to the Commissioner, Atty. Laeno made it appear that Perpetua's loan with the wife of Atty. Laeno was
connected with the consideration of the sale on the subject property as the unpaid portion.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated rules of reposnibility

HELD: YES

Atty. Laeno's acts of (i) executing two deeds of sale that covered one single property, (ii) indicating an undervalued
consideration contrary to what was agreed on by the contracting parties, and (iii) offering one of these bogus deeds
as evidence before the Court is exactly what is proscribed under the following Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession x x x.

xxxx

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Next, Atty. Laeno's resort to several suits against Marcelina and Perpetua to avoid eviction or cause the delay in the
execution of an unfavorable judgment in an ejectment suit is likewise contrary to Canon 12.

Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.

Certainly, he had a duty as an officer of the court to abide by the judgment rendered even if it was unfavorable to
him. Therefore, a five (5) year suspension is appropriate to penalize his reprehensible transgressions. In Lazareto v.
Atty. Acorda,6 We said:

[T]he ethics of the legal profession rightly en joins every lawyer to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair
play, and nobility in the course of his practice of law. x x x.7 (Citations omitted)

As regards to Atty. Bergado, it has come to the Court's attention that he is dead. A copy of his death certificate dated
November 22, 2008 was attached as Exhibit 2 in the position paper of Atty. Laeno submitted on March 24, 2010,8
but was overlooked by the IBP Investigating Commissioner.