Journal of Sustainable Tourism

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Destination net-zero: what does the international

energy agency roadmap mean for tourism?

Daniel Scott & Stefan Gössling

To cite this article: Daniel Scott & Stefan Gössling (2022) Destination net-zero: what does the
international energy agency roadmap mean for tourism?, Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 30:1,
14-31, DOI: 10.1080/09669582.2021.1962890

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09669582.2021.1962890

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JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE TOURISM
2022, VOL. 30, NO. 1, 14–31
https://doi.org/10.1080/09669582.2021.1962890

Destination net-zero: what does the international energy

agency roadmap mean for tourism?
Daniel Scotta,b €sslingc,d,e
and Stefan Go
a
Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada;
b
School of Hospitality and Tourism Management, University of Surrey, Guildford, UK; cWestern Norway
Research Institute, Sogndal, Norway; dService Management and Service Studies, Lund University,
Helsingborg, Sweden; eSchool of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University, Kalmar, Sweden

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

The tourism sector has recommitted itself to be ‘climate neutral’ by Received 16 July 2021
2050 through its 2021 Glasgow Declaration: A Commitment to a Decade Accepted 27 July 2021
of Tourism Climate Action. The declared ambition is consistent with the
KEYWORDS
Paris Climate Agreement and net-zero emission targets; however, lacks
Carbon transition risk;
specific actions by which such a transition might be achieved. The sustainable tourism; net-
highly influential International Energy Agency (IEA) has produced the zero; decarbonization; Paris
most detailed global roadmap to a 2050 net-zero future. This paper Climate Agreement;
examines its implications for the tourism sector. Getting to net-zero is International Energy Agency
imperative to ensure the societal disruption of a þ 3  C or warmer world
are avoided, but the IEA net-zero scenario would nonetheless be as
transformative for tourism as the internet was. International air travel
and tourism growth projections from the tourism sector are not com-
patible with the IEA net-zero scenario. The geography of transition risk
will influence tourism patterns unevenly. The incoherence of tourism
and climate policy represents an increasing vulnerability for tourism
development. While any business and destination in tourism can act
immediately to reduce emissions, the findings compel a critical new
research agenda to determine how the assumptions of the IEA, or any
net-zero scenario, could be achieved and how this will affect tourism
development.

Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has been a devastating tragedy for tens of millions and caused consid-
erable economic damage and major new government debt around the world (World Bank,
2021). With accelerating distribution of vaccines, the post-COVID-19 pandemic recovery is emerg-
ing in a growing number of countries. While pandemic uncertainties associated with health risks,
travel restrictions and the economic recovery will continue to reshape tourism for the foresee-
able future there is optimism that a new appreciation for travel and renewed commitment to
sustainable tourism may emerge (e.g., Galvani et al., 2020; Hall et al. 2020; Ioannides &
Gyimo thy, 2020). The pandemic has provided striking lessons to the tourism sector about the

CONTACT Daniel Scott daniel.scott@uwaterloo.ca Department of Geography and Environmental Management,

University of Waterloo, Waterloo N2L 3G1, Canada.
New content has been added to this article’s online version. Please see Addendum (http://doi.org/10.1080/09669582.
2021.1988457)
ß 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
 JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE TOURISM 15

effects of global change and the urgent need to respond to the unfolding and potentially far
more devastating climate crisis (Go €ssling et al., 2020a). The United Nations World Tourism
Organization (UNWTO) (UNWTO, 2021, no page) has linked the pandemic to the global decline
in emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) and concluded that “There is a growing consensus
among tourism stakeholders as to how the future resilience of tourism will depend on the sec-
tor’s ability to embrace a low carbon pathway and cut emissions by 50% by 2030”.
The pivotal Paris Climate Agreement (UN 2015, p. 22) represents the commitment of 195 signa-
tory countries to avoid the dangerous consequences of anthropogenic climate change by limiting
global warming to “well below 2  C” and aiming for a target of 1.5  C warming above pre-industrial
levels. The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change),) (2018) Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5  C reinforced the dev-
astating and widespread impacts of a 2  C or warmer world for current and future generations and
the prospects for irreversible climate tipping points. To keep the Paris Agreement 1.5  C target
within reach, the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2018) stressed that global
CO2 emissions must decline 45% by 2030 (from 2010 level) and to net-zero by 2050.
Net-zero (NZ) is a concept that emerged in the climate/natural sciences and is expanding
throughout the social sciences as the politics, economics and social dimensions of this historic soci-
etal transition are examined. The IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2018, p. 555)
defined NZ emissions as “achieved when anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases to the
atmosphere are balanced by anthropogenic removals over a specified period” (emphasis added).
NZ has evolved from this technical concept to the new guiding ambition for climate policy and
action. As of June 2021, over 130 countries that collectively represent over 70% of global emissions
have committed to net zero targets (Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit, 2021). The timelines of NZ
pledges vary, with the large majority connected to the IPCC 2050 target, but some (Bhutan,
Suriname, Uruguay, Finland, Austria, Iceland, Sweden) aim to reach their goal before 2050 and
others after (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and China in 2060) or have not yet specified a timeline (Australia
and Singapore). While NZ pledges represent essential political ambition, to operationalize what
would be one of the greatest transformations in human history remains a formidable task. In
response, some countries (Canada, France, New Zealand, UK) have established independent NZ
commissions to advise on pathways with strategies and milestones to achieve NZ emissions and
foster a just transition regionally and across diverse segments of society. Tourism has not yet been
a focal sector for any of these advisory bodies, but their recommendations will be important for
reshaping tourism policy and development within their countries. Likewise, the study of the soci-
etal NZ transition has not yet reached the tourism studies literature.
While NZ ambitions are consistent with the overarching goal of the Paris Agreement, the poli-
cies and plans by which to achieve those ambitions remain a work in progress. An analysis by
Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit (2021) indicated that only 20% of existing net zero targets
met a set of robustness criteria and are not yet supported by near-term policies, legislation, and
investment strategies. UN Secretary General Anto nio Guterres (The Guardian, 2021a), UNEP.
(2020) and others (Carbon Brief, 2021) have strongly emphasized the missed opportunity for fis-
cal rescue and recovery programs to accelerate the NZ transition. Although 2020 emissions were
significantly lower due to the Covid-19 pandemic impact on transportation and manufacturing
(Friedlingstein et al., 2020), the IEA (2021) is projecting emissions to surge in 2021, reversing
most of the 2020 decline.
The tourism sector has voiced its support for the Paris Agreement and its science-based emis-
sion targets (WTTC, 2018). This support was strongly reinforced in the 2021 Glasgow Declaration:
A Commitment to a Decade of Tourism Climate Action, that was led by UNWTO, UNEP,
VisitScotland, Tourism Declares a Climate Emergency, and the Travel Foundation, and supported
by many other tourism departments, organizations, and businesses. While the sector has ‘climate
neutral/net-zero’ ambitions by 2050, communications with international tourism leaders found a
worryingly unfamiliarity of the strategies by which Paris Agreement compatible energy-emission
16 D. SCOTT AND S. GÖSSLING

futures could be achieved and the potential implications for the tourism sector (Go €ssling & Scott,
2018). The lack of specific actions in the Glasgow Declaration, and only unspecific commitments
to measure sector emissions, reduce emissions, finance decarbonization and adaptation, and to
collaborate on the NZ journey reinforce this concern. Many of these actions have been recom-
mended over a decade ago (e.g., Scott et al., 2008), while recent studies demonstrate the persist-
ent disconnect between tourism and climate policy at national scales (Becken et al., 2020;
Go€ssling & Lyle, 2021).
It has been previously argued that there is a salient need for the tourism research community
and tourism sector to assess the implications of Paris Agreement compatible emission scenarios
for global tourism and determine which may represent preferable policy pathways that support
more economically efficient or rapid tourism decarbonization, and better support of tourism
development consistent with the SDGs and principles of climate justice (Go €ssling, 2011; Go€ssling
& Scott, 2018; Scott, 2021; Scott et al., 2010). Diverse international research and civil society
organizations have developed a range of low-carbon emission transition pathways to achieve
the Paris Agreement 1.5  C target). None mention tourism (domestic or international) explicitly
(Go€ssling & Scott, 2018; Scott, 2021) and thus overlook the implications of their policy recom-
mendations for what Lenzen et al. (2018) estimate represents 8% of global emissions.
The inadequate understanding of how the NZ transition would transform tourism, concurrent
with increasing physical risks of a changing climate and potential climate litigation risk, and the
demands it would place on the sector remains a disconcerting knowledge gap. This NZ transition
risk may represent what the Bank for International Settlements (2020) – a forum for global cen-
tral banks – have termed a ‘Green Swan’ for tourism. The NZ policy and planning challenge is no
longer a distant one we have the time to prepare for, rather global leaders in government, busi-
ness and civil society agree the 2020s will be a decisive decade when critical decisions and
investments take place. Illustrative of this momentum are the June 2021 Group of Seven (G7)
countries announcement of support for mandatory climate-related disclosures (European Council,
2021) and the so called ‘Black Wednesday’ series of courtroom and boardroom defeats for the
oil and gas industry in Europe and the US (The Guardian, 2021b) that will force companies to
reduce emissions not only from their own operations but as well as the products they sell. For
example, in a recent case, German NGO Deutsche Umwelthilfe won a lawsuit in Germany’s
Constitutional Court, ruling that the country’s mitigation ambitions are insufficient and violate
fundamental freedoms (BBC. , 2021). The list of similar climate litigation against governments
and corporations continues to grow (Climate Case Chart, 2021) and illustrates the potential perils
of declaring climate ambitions without credible strategies to achieve them. The tourism sector’s
insufficient “aspirational” emission reduction strategies have been pointed out for more than a
decade (Scott et al., 2010), and unfortunately the near decade old conclusion of Go €ssling et al.
(2013, p. 534) remains valid as we embark on this decisive decade of climate action: “ … no
credible plan of how combinations of technological investment, management strategies, market-
ing, and consumer behavioral change could achieve the declared tourism sector emission reduc-
tions targets have been proffered by the UNWTO or WTTC.”
This paper utilizes the most recent and comprehensive NZ scenario from the prominent
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2021) to examine the potentially transformative implications
for tourism over the next 30 years. It begins with a critical assessment of the recommended emis-
sion reduction strategies and timelines most germane to tourism. The key tourism relevant com-
ponents of the scenarios presented by IEA are compared with insights in the scientific literature
as well as other policy analyses by governments and other NZ stakeholders. The authors high-
light where knowledge gaps exist, or where opinion over future pathways, specifically regarding
technology innovations, scaling, and their cost, is varied. A suite of indicators was then selected
to represent the key recommendations for as many countries as possible to enable an analysis of
differential transition risk for the tourism sector worldwide. The methodology and results are fol-
lowed by discussion of research and policy implications.
 JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE TOURISM 17

The IEA roadmap to net-zero by 2050

The choice of the IEA NZ roadmap for this analysis is purposeful. The IEA was founded in the
mid-1970s in response to the world oil crisis. The membership of this multilateral organization is
restricted to 30 OECD countries which hold significant oil or gas reserves. IEA has been criticized
in the past for serving the interests of fossil fuel industry and downplaying climate change. Fatih
Birol, the Executive Director of IEA, called this landmark report the most challenging and import-
ant undertaking in the organization’s history. Because of the influence the IEA has in global
energy policy, their comprehensive and detailed NZ scenario should not go unnoticed by tour-
ism policy makers and scholars.
The aim of the NZ scenario is not solely to decarbonize the global economy but is consistent
with the IEA mandate to advance affordable universal energy access and economic growth. The
IEA NZ scenario for 2050 assumes a global population of 9.8 billion (median United Nations pro-
jection - UNDESA, 2019) and a global GDP that has increased 72%. The scenario relies on six key
pillars of change: (1) the rapid expansion of renewable energy sources, (2) electrification of many
energy end uses, (3) gains in energy efficiency, (4) notable behavioural change and willingness
of citizens, (5) the deployment at scale of a number of emerging and immature technologies
including negative emission technologies, (6) international cooperation to facilitate an orderly
whole of society transformation. Two of the most commented on elements of the roadmap are
the call to end all investment in new fossil fuel extraction projects within one year and that
nearly half of the reductions come from technologies that are in the prototype stage of develop-
ment. Both are highly uncertain and standing in sharp contrast to existing fossil fuel subsidies
criticized the UN Sectary General Anto nio Guterres (The Guardian, 2021a). Behaviour change is
also a major pillar of the scenario (IEA, 2021, p. 67). The IEA (2021, p. 4) scenario emphasizes
that the NZ transition cannot occur without sustained support of citizens around the world and
must be “fair and inclusive, leaving nobody behind.”
Importantly, the IEA emphasizes that this is but one potential path to NZ and that it will need
to evolve as technological, economic, political, and social conditions change. While this roadmap
is not necessarily ‘the path’ to NZ, it is highly illustrative of the many challenges the NZ transi-
tion would instigate for global tourism.

Implications of the IEA NZ roadmap for tourism

The IEA (2021) scenario is the most detailed roadmap to NZ currently available. It sets out 400
specific emission reduction strategies across major emitting sectors to transform the global econ-
omy by 2050. Some of the strategies most germane to tourism are summarized in Table 1. The
IEA NZ scenario has several other notable characteristics. The scenario is consistent with limiting
the global temperature rise to 1.5  C without a temperature overshoot (with a 50% probability).
This is a scenario where global temperatures are allowed to go beyond 1.5  C in the near term,
but then be brought down by the end of the century by removing CO2 from the atmosphere. It
achieves NZ without the use of carbon offsets from outside the energy sector. The IEA contends
it places relatively low reliance on technologies actively removing CO2 from the atmosphere, but
it does include an important role for carbon capture, storage and use which scientists caution
against because these technologies remain unproven at the scale required (Temple, 2021).
Removing CO2 from the atmosphere in an overshoot scenario might also not be as effective at
reducing warming because warming alters the land and ocean CO2 uptake/release feedbacks
(Zickfeld et al., 2021).
While the IEA NZ scenario is necessarily global in scale, it emphasizes that there is no ‘one-
size-fits-all’ approach and that each country will need to implement its own strategy based on
its unique circumstances. Nonetheless, the IEA scenario emphasizes the critical importance of
international cooperation to foster the whole of society cooperation of all levels of government,
18 D. SCOTT AND S. GÖSSLING

Table 1. IEA NZ emission reduction strategies influential for tourism.

Tourism Industry Component NZ Policy Options and Strategies
Air Transportation  Business and long-haul (>6 hours) leisure air travel held at 2019 levels
 Regional flights (<1 hour) shifted to high-speed rail where feasible
 Passenger km increase by 3%/year to 2050 (relative to 2020), from 8.5
trillion in 2019 to 14.5 trillion in 2050
 50% of aviation fuel are sustainable aviation fuels (advanced bio and
synthetic) by 2040, reaching 78% by 2050
 Governments define their strategies for low-carbon fuels in aviation by
2025 at the latest
Marine Transport  Governments define their strategies for low-carbon fuels in shipping by
2025 at the latest
 By 2050, hydrogen and ammonia provide more than 60% of total fuel
consumption in shipping (domestic and international)
Rail Transportation  High speed rail replaces short haul flights (15% of flight in 2020s,
increasing to 17% by 2050)
 Passenger rail doubles its share of total transport activity to 20%
by 2050
 Rail is rapidly electrified
Bus Transportation  60% new bus sales are electric/hybrid in 2030, 100% by 2050
Automobile Transportation  2030 - Eco-driving and speed limits of 100 km/h introduced; ICE cars
(including rental, taxies, private) phased out in large cities
 60% new car sales are electric in 2030, no new ICE sales by 2035
 Global car fleet is completely electrified by 2050
Hotels/Motels/ Resorts  2025 – no new sales of commercial/home fossil fuel boilers/heating
and Other Accommodation  2030 – all new buildings and 20% retrofitted to zero-carbon
ready standard
 50% existing buildings retrofitted to zero-carbon ready in 2040, 85%
in 2050
 By 2050 natural gas no longer used for building heating
Agriculture  Sustainable collection of wastes and residues from forestry, agriculture,
animal and food industries are upscaled
 Carbon prices alter transportation options and costs will influence food
and beverage supply and costs
Cost of travel  Carbon prices are introduced by 2025 across all advanced economies at
USD 75/tCO2 and rise to USD 130 by 2030 and USD 250 by 2050
 Variable lower carbon prices are introduced in all emerging and
developing economies (respectively reaching USD 200 and 55 by 2050)
ICE ¼ internal combustion engine.
Zero-carbon-ready buildings are highly energy efficient and either use renewable energy directly or uses an energy supply
that will be fully decarbonized by 2050.

businesses, investors, and citizens. IEA explored a ‘low international cooperation scenario’ and
found NZ took almost 40 years longer to achieve; far too late to achieve the Paris Agreement
policy goal. It also warned of the potential for disorderly policy regime to delay NZ as well as
adversely impact the global economy. Importantly, the low cooperation scenario acknowledges
other key uncertainties, particularly the level of investment, development of bioenergy and syn-
thetic fuels, carbon capture, as well as the social acceptability and rates of some behavioural
changes. These uncertainties, as they relate to tourism, are further explored below.
Climate change is already influencing tourism sector investment, planning, operations, and
demand (Scott, 2021; WTTC, 2017), and as the strategies summarized in Table 1 illustrate clearly,
the implications of the IEA, or any, net-zero scenario pose salient and largely unrecognized tran-
sition risks for tourism. Several elements of the IEA NZ scenario will influence tourism operations
and investment broadly, including worldwide carbon pricing, the massive deployment of energy
efficiency technologies, and the shift to electrification dominated by renewable energy sources.
Specific strategies most influential on specific components of the tourism system are described
in Table 1.
Air travel is the largest source of warming in the tourism system (Lenzen et al., 2018; Scott
et al., 2010) and one of the most challenging components to decarbonize. The IEA NZ scenario
 JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE TOURISM 19

allows revenue passenger kilometers to grow 3% per year from 2020 levels to 2050 (versus an
average of 6% from 2010 to 2019) reaching 14.5 trillion in 2050 by 2050 (compared to the Air
Transport Action Group, [2021] post-covid revised central estimate of 20 trillion) (Table 1). It
reduces aviation emissions approximately 80% from 2019 levels mainly through a combination
of rapid development and deployment of prototype sustainable aviation fuels (both bio and syn-
thetic) and demand management. The challenges this implies have been discussed by Go €ssling
et al. (2021a), and both strategies remain highly uncertain, as overcapacities and debt character-
ize the aviation market situation (Hepburn et al., 2020).
Three major behavioural changes combine to reduce aviation emissions 50% by 2050 (Table
1). These three strategies to reduce growth in air travel would have important implications for
travel costs and access to many destinations. The first demand management strategy is to
restrict business travel at 2019 levels (estimated to comprise just over one-quarter of pre-pan-
demic air travel). The Covid-19 pandemic has disrupted business travel and this critical moment
of change may provide an opportunity for a long-term shift to achieve this strategy. A 2020 sur-
vey found that between 19% and 36% of airline business travel will not return after the pan-
demic (Idea Works, 2020) and more corporations and governments are seeking to avoid, not
offset work related travel (Skift, 2021). Academics are also rethinking travel patterns for a carbon
constrained world (Higham & Font, 2020; Klo €wer et al., 2020). Furthermore, as more businesses
adopt NZ goals and emission disclosures become mandatory, business leadership may compel
emission reductions associated with business travel.
The second strategy is to freeze long-haul leisure flights (more than six hours) at 2019 levels.
This would impact a relatively small proportion of flights but has important implications for pri-
marily long-haul destinations like New Zealand, Australia, and UAE, as well as the tourism
focused development strategies of many small island developing states and other least devel-
oped countries. As Go €ssling et al. (2015) analysis of inter-market emission intensities demon-
strated, there is large potential for source market shifts and demarketing to reduce emissions
while maintaining the tourism economy of many nations. Voluntary behavioural shifts in holiday
travel will only curtail demand at insignificant levels (Markham et al., 2018; Seetaram et al.,
2014), though there is support for market-based policies (Go €ssling et al., 2020b). There is also a
need for new policy designs informed by behavioural research (Hardisty et al., 2019;
Sonnenschein & Smedby, 2019).
The third strategy requires the modal shift of regional flights of 1 hour to high-speed rail
where it is available (estimated 15% of flights in 2019 and 17% in 2050). In April 2021, the gov-
ernment of France introduced a similar policy banning short-haul domestic flights when rail
alternatives could cover the same journey in under two-and-a-half hours. Austria had imple-
mented similar bans on certain inter-city routes in late 2020. A 2019 survey by the European
Investment Bank found public support (62%) for banning short haul flights (Reuters, 2020). This
is supported by national studies investigating social norm change because of Fridays-for-Future
demonstrations (for example in Germany; Go €ssling et al., 2020b).
Sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) are the other major IEA strategy to reduce emissions from avi-
ation, with the use of synthetic and advanced biofuels increasing rapidly from almost zero in
2020 to 50% in 2040 and 80% in 2050. Niche markets are also projected for limited capacity
electric aircraft. The IEA acknowledges that SAFs are in the low maturity prototype and demon-
stration phases, and given the slow development of SAFs, timelines are considered highly opti-
mistic. For example, the International Council on Clean Transportation (2021) examined SAF
feedstock availability and estimated it could supply between 1.9% and 6.5% of European Union
demand in 2035. Longer range estimates by Rystad Energy and HIS Markit suggest SAF will sup-
ply only between 15% and 30% in 2050 (New York Times, 2021). Important technical, economic,
and political barriers remain (Go €ssling et al., 2021b; Scheelhaase et al., 2019; Go €ssling & Lyle,
2021). A massive and rapid increase in alternative propulsion research and development would
be required in the early 2020s if the gap in these projections is potentially to be narrowed.
20 D. SCOTT AND S. GÖSSLING

With airlines worldwide having received hundreds of billions in rescue funding from govern-
ments (Hepburn et al., 2020; IATA, 2020), can investments in SAF research and development and
production be expected from the aviation sector? This raises important policy questions about
the role of government in SAFs. Aviation’s social licence to operate in a NZ economy and recent
trends in climate law would suggest the onus is on industry to prioritize such investments, but
this will only happen if mandated by governments, for instance through feed-in quotas and car-
bon taxes (Go €ssling & Lyle, 2021). The significant cost of technology innovation and carbon taxes
stand in sharp contrast to the ICAO CORSIA plan and its objective of marginal cost increases.
With much evidence that air travel is to a significant degree induced by the low cost of flying as
the real cost of flying has decreased by 60% over the past 20 years (IATA, 2019), the implications
a technology transition will have for low-cost air carriers as well as tourist destination choices
and travel patterns remains an important area of future inquiry.
Importantly, if the behavioural changes and transition to SAF can be realized, global CO2
emissions from aviation fall to 210 Mt in 2050 in the IEA scenario (down nearly 80% from
approximately 1 Gt in 2019) and represent just over 10% of unabated CO2 emissions in 2050.
Other studies estimate that aviation could represent as much as 12-27% (ICAO, 2016) of the
remaining global carbon budget in 2050. This, however, ignores the role of additional non-CO2
warming, which is likely to remain an issue unless flightpaths are altered (Lee et al., 2021). Social
and litigation risks are likely to increase for airlines as aviation represents an increasing share of
the dwindling allowable global carbon budget. With a court ruling in 2021 that Royal Dutch
Shell’s emission reduction target was inadequate to meet the requisite standard of care under
Dutch law, when might a similar ruling be expected for KLM, the national flag carrier? Any such
ruling against airlines (particularly those partially government owned) to increase emission reduc-
tions would have an abrupt impact on travel cost and possibly demand management strategies.
The IEA aviation strategies and outcomes are highly uncertain and based on the 20-year his-
tory of ICAO negotiations on emissions reduction (Scott et al., 2012), a disorderly regional/coun-
try level implementation is a reasonable prospect, with attendant implications for the
introduction of international travel carbon-levies and airspace/gate restrictions on non-compliant
air carriers. These aviation strategies and associated costs and outcomes for demand patterns, or
indeed any similar carbon constrained scenario for air travel, would be transformative for tourism
and necessitates the prioritization of new research to assess the implications for destination com-
petitiveness and future tourism development.
Marine transport was also identified as a difficult to decarbonize sector within the IEA NZ
scenario and because of a lack of mature low carbon fuel technology and long operating life-
times of vessels it does not achieve zero emissions by 2050. Cruise ships were not specifically
referred to in the scenario, as they represent less than 1% of international vessels, but the
increasing size of cruise ships share the propulsion fuel challenges of other large ships and have
additional challenges of providing electricity for what amounts to a floating resort with thou-
sands of travellers and staff.
The 30 million cruise passengers in 2019 (Cruise Lines International Association [CLIA] 2020)
represent only 2% of international arrivals but is one of the most carbon intensive forms of tour-
ism. The Cruise Lines International Association (2018) committed to reduce its members emis-
sions 40% by 2030 (from 2008 levels, which does not consider most of the sector’s rapid recent
growth). Currently, several cruise operators promote their operations as carbon neutral (MSC
cruises, Lindbald Expeditions, Royal Caribbean Cruises, Virgin Voyages) by purchasing offsets
equivalent to their ship emissions. Offsets include “forest protection” programmes, in which the
conservation of a forest is considered an offset (Mediterranean Shipping Agency, 2021); but net
emissions continue to increase under this scheme. Some new ships are being fueled with LNG,
which reduces emissions approximately 15%-20%. Most new ships are also being equipped to
receive shore-side electricity for their extended time in port. Currently this has limited capacity
to reduce emissions, as many regions where cruise ships operate have not decarbonized their
 JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE TOURISM 21

electricity grids. For example, over 93% of the electricity in the Caribbean region, where one-
third of the global cruise fleet operates (CLIA 2020), is generated from fossil fuels. Given that
most energy is used for propulsion (Simonsen et al., 2019), it is however unlikely that continued
grid-decarbonization will allow CLIA to achieve its emission reduction targets by 2030.
To approach NZ by 2050, the cruise industry will have to achieve a full-scale fuel transition
over the next 30 years and the IEA NZ scenario indicates that governments should define their
strategies for low-carbon fuels in marine transport by 2025 at the latest to guide the major
investments required. Ammonia is the main transition fuel for marine transport in the IEA NZ
scenario and the fuel that a study by Krantz (2020) concluded was the most cost effective. The
IEA NZ estimates ammonia will represent 45% of marine transport fuel in 2050, which is a more
rapid deployment than other estimates (e.g., approximate 25% - DNV 2020). Notably, 87% of the
estimated cost of decarbonizing marine transport was needed for land-based carbon neutral fuel
production and storage infrastructure and only 13% for ship retrofits. Ammonia remains techno-
logically challenging, however, as key problems remain unresolved. It is highly toxic, and the
Royal Society (2020, p. 10) calls it a “chronic hazard to [ … ] ecosystems”. Hydrogen and fuel-cell
technology was the second most prevalent shipping fuel source in the IEA scenario and may be
a long-term option for the cruise industry, but with uncertain fuel cost implications. The transi-
tion to new zero-carbon ship fueling infrastructure would concentrate cruise activity at fewer
ports of departure and routes, with international development assistance required to support
such infrastructure in key markets like the Caribbean. Importantly, a 2020 survey of Europe’s 18
largest cruise ship operators found few had started to develop a credible strategy of alternate
propulsion systems compatible with the NZ transition or launched pilot projects to test new low
emission technologies (Nature & Biodiversity Conservation Union, 2020). Marine policy makers,
meanwhile, have focused on the sector’s relative emission reductions, with limited attention
absolute emission reduction needs (Go €ssling et al., 2021b).
All forms of ground transport are rapidly electrified in the IEA NZ scenario (Table 1), accelerat-
ing transitions that are underway in many countries. Passenger rail is increasingly electrified
(from 50% in 2020 to over 80% in 2040) as electricity grids in more regions are decarbonized
and doubles its share of passenger transport (to 20% globally and much higher regionally) by
2050. This heightened role in passenger transport has important implications for tourism in
regions with well-developed and improving rail networks and will be an important opportunity
for sustainable tourism in destinations with access. New infrastructure, operational systems
(scheduling/ticketing) and cost structures will require policy support (market based as well as
regulatory) to support such a modal shift to rail.
Electrification also rapidly dominates automobile and bus/coach transport. A combination of
policy strategies already enacted in some jurisdictions, including lower speed limits, strict fuel-
economy standards, internal combustion engine (ICE) car access and parking restrictions and tolls
in large cities and other low emission zones, and ICE car sales bans (Table 1), accelerate the mar-
ket penetration of EVs from just under 5% of global new car sales in 2020 to 60% by 2030 and
nearly 100% by the late 2030s. This would represent a faster transition than other projections
that estimate EV sales will represent 23-32% globally by 2030 (IHS Markit, 2021; Deloitte, 2020).
Similarly, the IEA NZ scenario includes no new ICE car sales by 2035, which is later than some
jurisdictions (Norway and South Korea 2025; Belgium, Austria, Washington State 2026-27; and 10
other countries in 2030) and auto manufacturers (Volvo 2030, Volkswagen early 2030s), but ear-
lier than 10 countries and several sub-state jurisdictions in 2040-45 and several auto manufac-
turers (General Motors, Jaguar Land Rover, Honda 2035–2040). By 2050 nearly 90% of cars in
operation are electric with the remaining hydrogen powered. It is worth noting that none of
these scenarios discusses the implications of continued growth in private car numbers and asso-
ciated problems such as urban congestion. Electric cars are expensive but comparably cheap to
drive, pointing at potential rebound effects in terms of greater use. Some jurisdictions, such as
the German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg (Ministry of Transport BW, 2021), have thus declared
22 D. SCOTT AND S. GÖSSLING

that a 30% reduction in private vehicle numbers is necessary by 2030 to meet climate objectives.
This rapid transition also has implications for investment in taxi and rental/car sharing fleets and
their refueling infrastructure. Bus/coach vehicles follow a similar rapid transition, with 60% of
new sales electric/hybrid in 2030, increasing to 100% by 2050. By 2030 nearly one-quarter of the
bus/coach fleet (higher in some regions) would need to be electrified, with important implica-
tions for tour bus fleet investment, charging infrastructure and routing.
Tourism sector planning and investment in EV charging infrastructure at hotels/other accom-
modations, attractions of all types (including remote areas for ecotourism), and travel routes
(highway stops, scenic routes, tunnels) would need to accelerate accordingly. The carbon inten-
sity of local-national electricity grids will also determine the pace at which electrification of tour-
ism ground transport should proceed.
Accommodations is another important area of tourism decarbonization. A step change improve-
ment in energy efficiency and electrification are the two main drivers of decarbonization of
buildings across all real estate classes in the IEA NZ scenario. There is a rapid transition to zero-car-
bon-ready buildings, which are highly energy efficient and either use renewable energy directly
(e.g., heat pump, onsite solar) or an energy supply that will be fully decarbonized by 2050 (e.g.,
zero carbon electricity grid). Building codes for new construction would need to be updated in all
regions by 2030 and widespread retrofit programs put in place to achieve the IEA target of all new
commercial buildings and 20% of existing stock zero-carbon-ready by 2030 and 85% by 2050.
Hotels and resorts, and their NZ transition challenges (i.e., amenities and visitor energy con-
sumption patterns that make them among the most energy intense of all commercial real estate
classes, and complex ownership and management structures), were not specifically examined by
the IEA. However, International Tourism Partnership (2017) concludes that the technology exists
today to fully decarbonize the hotel industry and alternate lodging (e.g., Airbnb, serviced apart-
ments) and emphasized the importance of expanding calculations of revenue and return on
investment to include existing and future price of carbon. Hotel energy intensity is highest
among 4 and 5-star hotels in tropical regions (nearly double the intensity of comparable hotels
in temperate regions) (Dibene-Arriola et al., 2021), and similar NZ retrofit pilot projects are
urgently needed in tropical destinations.
As part of the NZ transition, all forms of accommodation will also need to invest in EV charg-
ing infrastructure to support the EV shift in private and tour coaches. NZ ready transition guid-
ance will need to be integrated into other programs like the UNWTO Hotel Energy Solutions
project supporting small and medium sized enterprises in the accommodation sector. Like
ground transport, the carbon intensity of local-national electricity grids will have an important
influence on how quickly and deeply tourism accommodation can decarbonize.
As indicated by Go €ssling et al. (2012) and Scott and Go €ssling (2018), tourist behavioural
changes will also be fundamental to the NZ transition. There is evidence of growing public sup-
port for strategies that will curb emissions from aviation through regulation (Go €ssling & Lyle,
2021; Kallbekken & Saelen, 2021). While a greater understanding of tourist policy preferences
and willingness to pay or adopt specific decarbonization strategies (e.g., modal shifts, destination
choice), continue to be important areas of research to advance tourism decarbonization, it is
basically understood that governments need to push behavioral change by introducing signifi-
cant prices on carbon.

IEA NZ strategies alignment with tourism sector emissions

Tourism has been estimated to represent approximately 8% of global CO2 emissions in in 2013
(Lenzen et al., 2018). While other studies have used different methodologies, making benchmark
and trend comparisons difficult, they nevertheless also show that tourism can be expected to
grow rapidly, from 130% from 2005 through 2035 (UNWTO et al., 2007) to 169% 2010 through
2050 (Go€ssling & Peeters, 2015). The sector has acknowledged its responsibility to reduce its
 JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE TOURISM 23

emissions as early as the 2007 Davos Declaration on Climate Change and Tourism (UNWTO et al.,
2007) and more recently in accordance with science-based targets of the Paris Agreement
through the United Nations Climate Neutral Now initiative (WTTC, 2018) and the 2021 Glasgow
Declaration: A Commitment to a Decade of Tourism Climate Action.
Common to all studies is that they identify air transport as the largest source of emissions.
Other forms of transportation and accommodations also rank high in all assessments of tourism
emissions. How feasible is it to achieve NZ from each of these major emission sources? As the
consulting group Arup et al. (2021) retrofit analysis and existing pioneering projects demon-
strated, there is no technical barrier to NZ in accommodations, where the cost of saving energy
is often negative (Go €ssling, 2011). The technologies needed exist and, in many cases, will
become less expensive over time as demand for retrofits and onsite solar and battery storage
increase. Enabling policy, substantial investment (much of which provides near term return on
investment), visitor engagement programs, and eventually a low-carbon electricity grid will be
critical to achieve deep emission reductions in accommodations.
As the IEA NZ scenario indicates, there are no technical barriers to decarbonizing automobile
transport with existing technology, although the supplies of rare earth minerals for batteries,
decarbonizing and doubling electricity capacity to power EVs, and reservations among some con-
sumers (current cost comparisons, range, access to charging network) pose important challenges
to a rapid deployment of EVs. Nonetheless, with the majority of required EV technology at the
market uptake and mature stage and some countries well advanced in the transition (e.g., over
50% of new car sales in Norway in 2021 are EVs) decarbonization of automobile travel could
accelerate in accordance with the IEA NZ scenario in many countries with the largest domestic
tourism industry with a strongly supportive policy regime (including measure set out in Table 1).
Air travel remains the most difficult and largest source of tourism emissions to abate, though
a very significant share of emissions could probably be avoided by simply reducing capacity and
addressing the demand patterns of the very frequent fliers (Go €ssling & Lyle, 2021). The political
and technological challenges to emission reduction from aviation are discussed in detail by
Go€ssling and Lyle (2021) and Go €ssling et al. (2021b). With SAFs in the immature prototype stage
(IEA, 2021) and past demand management policy experiments (e.g., Cohen & Higham, 2011;
Higham et al., 2016; Markham et al., 2018; Seetaram et al., 2014) marginally able to influence
behavior, the path to deep emission reductions committed to by the aviation sector (ICAO, 2019)
and required by the IEA NZ scenario remain the most uncertain for the tourism sector, unless
nation states include air transport emissions in their Nationally Determined Contributions and act
accordingly.
The financial costs for the tourism sector to pursue the deep decarbonization strategies
required by the IEA NZ scenario remain uncertain, as a vision of tourism in the NZ economy of
mid-century has not yet been articulated (though calls for a sector wide collaborative vision
have been made by the scientific community). The closest examination of potential costs associ-
ated with pursuing deep decarbonization consistent with tourism sector ambitions and the IEA
NZ scenario found that the cost to achieve a 50% target (by 2050) through abatement and
some strategic offsetting (in aviation), while significant, represented less than 0.1% of the esti-
mated global tourism economy in 2020 (approximately USD 600 million annually) and 3.6%
(approximately USD 351 billion annually) in 2050 as emission reductions became more difficult
(Scott et al., 2015). Achieving a 70% emission reduction target more closely aligned with the
IEA NZ scenario requirements required greater investment of approximately 4.1% of the antici-
pated total global tourism economy near to 2050. While challenging, Scott et al. (2015) found
the cost of the NZ journey for travellers was roughly equivalent to many current travel fees or
taxes, or approximately US$11 per trip when distributed equally among all tourists (international
and domestic). With deep decarbonization achieved near mid-century, costs associated with the
NZ transition could rapidly decline, and would do so sooner for many early adopters and leading
businesses and destinations.
24 D. SCOTT AND S. GÖSSLING

Methodology of comparative NZ transition risk

Net-zero transition risk is defined as the challenges associated with transforming to a low-carbon
global tourism economy in comparison, which includes costs and impacts of decarbonizing the
tourism sector itself, but also the impacts on tourism from emission reduction policies in other
sectors and countries. Like physical climate risk, net-zero transition risks are not equally distrib-
uted and will differentially impact tourism demand and competitiveness of destinations and
countries in the global tourism market. It is also important to emphasize that the net-zero transi-
tion will also represent new market opportunities for many destinations and tourism businesses.
Certain market segments and destinations would be more influenced by the range of strat-
egies and associated costs proposed by the IEA, and it is important to understand this differen-
tial transition risk to inform future policy development and potential implications for tourism to
contribute to the SDGs in some countries. To examine these differential risks, the paper relies on
Scott et al. (2019), who explored the global distribution of climate change risk using 27 indica-
tors. Four of these indicators are selected as specifically relevant to aspects of the NZ transition
set out by the IEA, including: (1) the percentage of electricity supply from fossil fuels (signifying
where electrification is already a viable NZ strategy and where electricity decarbonization costs
are likely to be higher), (2) the average distance to a destination’s top five international markets
(designating countries most dependant on long haul air travel with exposure to travel price
increases and lower modal substitution options), (3) the size of the outbound international mar-
ket (indicative of the potential market to replace any decline in international markets resulting
from changes in competitiveness or access), and (4) food import dependency (representing
exposure to increased transportation costs and price volatility). As in Scott et al. (2019) each indi-
cator was first transposed to quintiles and then combined into a cumulative transition risk score,
with the average distance of top international markets to the destination weighted twice as
important in the index because of its critical influence on difficult to reduce emissions). Other
indicators were weighted equally for a specification as follows:
Transition Risk ¼ percentage of electricity supply from fossil fuels (20%) þ the average distance to a
destination’s top five international markets (40%) þ the size of the outbound international market (20%) þ
food import dependency (20%)

Transition risk was calculated for 192 countries. Results should be seen as indicative and are
shown only for the most and least at-risk destinations. More comprehensive analyses of transi-
tion risks should be carried out in the future as new data on relevant indicators becomes avail-
able, including different scopes (GHG emissions) as well as first and second order effects (for
instance rising carbon costs affecting employment levels in tourism). Other indicators of dimen-
sions of transition risk were explored for this study but were available for too few countries and
few developing countries, which would have adversely impacted global insights. The assessment
does not consider the relevance of each country’s tourism economy in relation to GDP (i.e.,
countries with high transition risks and tourism-dependent economies are highlighted), but this
is examined in the discussion.

The geography of NZ transition risk

The countries most and least exposed to NZ transition risk are presented in Figure 1. The lowest
transition risk was found in diverse countries, including most countries in Europe that often also
have strong outbound markets that could convert to strengthen domestic tourism or neighbour-
ing economies. North America, Argentina, South Africa and China were also found to have low
transition risks, with the USA and China having similarly sizable outbound markets. Other coun-
tries with low transition risk are not major international tourism destinations (Russia, Kazakhstan,
or Ukraine).
 JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE TOURISM 25

Figure 1. Comparative net-zero transition risk.

Based on indicators data from Scott et al. (2019).

Conversely, the highest transition risk was found to largely be concentrated among Small
Island Developing States (SIDS) (Figure 1). These islands all depend on long-haul international
markets, commonly have fossil fuel dominated electricity supply, have high food import depend-
ence, and very small outbound markets that could convert to domestic tourism. These countries
also have among the highest percentage of GDP derived from tourism, accentuating potential
economic impacts associated with tourism transition risk. Many of the larger countries with high
transition risks have insignificant tourism industries (Angola, Somalia, Chad or Mauretania). Israel
and the UAE are notable exceptions on this list, but both share characteristics of high reliance
on long-haul international visitors, fossil fuel dominated electricity, and high food imports.
The climate justice implications of this preliminary analysis of relative NZ transition risk are
inescapable. Even though many of the most at risk countries have contributed the least to
cumulative historic emissions, they are most likely to see declining tourism competitiveness and
adverse impacts on their tourism economies. These tourism economies are carbon-intense and
growing, pushing up per capita emissions in SIDS. Although developed countries are bound by
the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement to support technology transfer and support the NZ transition
in most vulnerable countries, these supports are rarely earmarked to the tourism sector (e.g.,
major investments in synthetic SAFs would represent such a targeted technology transfer in sup-
port of their tourism economies). The tourism sector must therefore develop innovative collab-
orative mechanisms to support the NZ transition and adaptation to physical climate risks in
these most at-risk countries, while also considering alternative business models and economic
development strategies. Clearly, there is limited room for countries to further develop their long-
haul dependent tourism systems under the IEA scenario.

Conclusion
The climate change and tourism literature has predominantly focused on the impacts (and to a
lesser extent the adaptations to) of changing climate on tourism assets, operations, and demand
(Scott et al., 2012, 2015). Less work has been dedicated to assessing tourism sector emissions
and strategies to decarbonize tourism operations and travel. Research on the transition risk to a
net-zero economy is virtually absent in the tourism literature and as this analysis indicates, this is a
salient gap that must rapidly be addressed. Furthermore, as the IEA global roadmap (and others like
it) as well as initial work of national NZ advisory committees, reveal, the tourism sector cannot rely
26 D. SCOTT AND S. GÖSSLING

on climate/energy researchers and policy makers to assess the implications of the NZ transition on
the tourism sector and countries/destinations most dependent on the tourism economy. The sector
and its scholarly community must develop this capacity internally, rapidly, and at scale.
It is important to reiterate that achieving 1.5 C is the most difficult pathway sought by the
Paris Agreement, one that several analyses have indicated has a low likelihood of success
(Raftery et al., 2017; World Meteorological Organization, 2021; Potsdam Institute for Climate
Impact Research, 2021) because of the complex technological, economic, political, and social
challenges to overcome in such a short period of time. The journey to NZ will be uncertain and
unlikely to be orderly in some regions and sectors. Many governments are not likely to closely
follow the IEA NZ roadmap and may pursue different strategies and milestones, as there are
many possible pathways to achieve NZ by 2050. Regardless, there is no avoiding the challenges
and implications of the net-zero transition, for it is assured that governments and industry will
continue to pursue this common agenda, if only at a somewhat slower pace. It is also vital to
reinforce that while the costs and disruption of the NZ transition will be significant for society
and for tourism, as IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2018) and the leaked ver-
sion of the upcoming IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (The Guardian, 2021c) makes abundantly
clear, they absolutely pale in comparison to those associated with higher emission futures.
Achieving the IEA NZ scenario or any other NZ scenario would require tourism to reinvent
itself at both global and destination scales, requiring major and immediate upsurge in research
and innovation, new cross-sector integrated and internationally co-operative policy innovation,
novel demand management strategies, and a massive ongoing investment in infrastructure and
technology deployment. The incoherence of tourism and climate policy at national and inter-
national scales (Go€ssling & Lyle, [2021] and Becken et al., [2020]) is an increasing vulnerability for
tourism development. If the IEA roadmap is supported through the massive policy interventions
it would require, the implications for future tourism development, the distribution of global tour-
ism, and destination competitiveness are nothing short of transformative.
The tourism sector’s Glasgow Declaration: A Commitment to a Decade of Tourism Climate Action
does not discuss potential transition risks or articulate a process by which these may be better
understood and ameliorated. Getting to net-zero will be as disruptive for tourism as the internet was
and will introduce conflicts and trade-offs with tourism development, and these remain to be
acknowledged and unpacked. While the Declaration recognizes the importance of collaboration, it
does not outline how that could be enhanced, such as a commitment to establish a ‘Tourism Net-
zero Advisory Committee’ to develop credible NZ pathways at the global or regional scale. The
Declaration also does not support OECD and academic calls for the removal of fossil fuel subsidies
and the taxation of greenhouse gas emissions (Chepeliev & van der Mensbrugghe, 2020; Elgouacem,
2020). There is also no provision for the assessment of the implications of diverse policy proposals.
The sector was able to mobilize immediately to form the Global Tourism Crisis Committee in
the face of the Covid-19 crisis. The climate crisis demands no less. The net-zero advisory bodies
created by the UK, France, New Zealand, and Canada offer some excellent advice for the tourism
sector to build on as part of their post-Glasgow Declaration action agenda (Net-Zero Advisory
Body, 2021): (1) Collaborate across the sector (government, private sector, destination commun-
ities, tourists) and with other sectors on policy, research and development, investment, and
engagement. (2) Develop a collective vision of tourism in the net-zero economy of mid-century
and identify the many opportunities and co-benefits for tourism businesses, destinations, and
tourists of advancing that vision. (3) Act early and urgently; the illusion of time to act is behind
us. (4) Recognize and assess the regional differences, both in transition risk and strategies to
decarbonize tourism, to advance a just transition. (5) Prioritize strategies and pathways that util-
ize solutions that are already available at scale and do not rely on immature solutions that may
or may not be realized or in the timeframes required. (6) Understand the liabilities of solutions
that may provide near term gains, but do not provide a secure path to deeper reductions
required by the net-zero economy (e.g., Scott et al., [2015] warned against a strategy of relying
 JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE TOURISM 27

on the uncertain quality, availability, and costs of carbon offsets). (7) Beware of the ‘net’ in net-
zero. Negative emissions technologies remain prohibitively expensive and are not proven at scale
(Haikola et al., 2021; Temple, 2021), ecosystem-based strategies have been often overestimated
(Friedlingstein et al., 2019) and a recent study found that offsetting CO2 emissions with negative
emissions of the same magnitude would nonetheless result in greater warming than if CO2 emis-
sions were avoided because of alterations to terrestrial and ocean CO2 releases (Zickfeld et al.,
2021). This also reinforces the importance of putting a global price on carbon, as costing carbon
at significant levels (consistent with or exceeding the IEA NZ scenarios) will remain one of the
most efficient mitigation strategies because it forces the market to devise its own solutions.
The IEA NZ scenario and the societal transformation it implies, compels a critical research
agenda to determine how the central strategies and assumptions of such scenarios that are ger-
mane to tourism could be achieved, develop new methods and information sources to under-
stand the scope and scale of transition risk in order to inform policy innovation that might
support a just transition in tourism sector, and the implications of achieving the scenario for
tourism development and pursuit of the SDGs (and their post-2030 replacements). To accomplish
this requires tourism scholars to reprioritize their research agenda, with less than 4% of research
published in top 5 tourism journals from 2000 to 2019 dedicated to climate change (Scott,
2021). Such a major transition was accomplished with a rapid increase in research to address the
informational needs of the Covid-19 pandemic. The climate crisis demands the same urgent
mobilization of tourism expertise, as global tourism will be changed significantly by both the NZ
transition and the wide-ranging impacts of accelerating changes in climate.
Finally, let us be definitive in our call for urgent climate action in the tourism sector. While the
NZ transition will be disruptive for some tourism businesses and destinations, a þ 3 C or warmer
world will be far more disruptive, and in many cases devastating, for tourism. It is crucial that tour-
ism develop strategies to accelerate its decarbonization and a vision of the place of tourism in a NZ
society. The knowledge and business case to act on emissions is already available for businesses and
destinations, while work on emission tracking/indicators and their adoption, transition effects on
tourism employment and social stability, and the development of alternative business models in the
NZ economy all need greater attention. Growth strategies and market segments will have to be eval-
uated against the potential for emission reductions compatible with NZ future, and some forms of
tourism will, due to their energy-intensity, simply no longer be viable. Net-zero carbon is now, and
will remain, the new policy and planning imperative for everyone working in tourism.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

ORCID
Daniel Scott http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7825-9301
€ssling
Stefan Go http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0505-9207

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