Below are cases for digests and for recitation next meeting:

1. Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Green Asia Construction &

Development Corporation (G.R. No. 188866, 19 October 2011)
Facts: The petitioner and respondent entered into a contract for a road network/storm
drainage project. Later, the respondent sent a letter to the PEZA Director General,
claiming for the price escalation of the construction of the PEZA project, invoking P.D.
No. 1594. However, it was denied by PEZA invoking Section 8 of P.D. No. 1594 as
Green Asia failed to present proof as the law required to do so.
The exchanges of correspondence concerning the Green Asia’s claim persisted until
2006. Yet, PEZA was consistent in its position that Green Asia was not entitled to claim.
In its letter, PEZA also explicated that the contract price was fixed.
Despite of the denial, Green Asia sent to PEZA another notice wherein a copy of which
was also sent to the Office of the President, comprising the unpaid claims for the price
escalation of the road network and drainage system and the sewage treatment plant.
Green Asia pointed out that the basis of its claim was under CL 12.1 of the
Implementing Ruled and Regulation, and not just the price adjustment provided in
Section 8 of PD 1594. The OP took cognizance of the letter as an appeal and the case
was decided in favor of Green Asia.
Issue: Whether or not the price escalation of the relevant construction requires proof
due to the acts of the government, invoking Section 8 of P.D. No. 1594.
Ruling: No. The Court sustained the OP decision. The OP held that proof of increase in
relevant construction prices due to the direct acts of the government was not required
by law. The OP interpreted the phrase "due to direct acts of the Government." It held
that PD 454 is an earlier enactment on government infrastructure projects, authorized
price escalation; and that "direct acts of the government" included increases in the
prices of gasoline, fuel oil and cement. It was, therefore, not necessary to actually show
that the prices of those commodities increased because of the direct acts of the
government. In effect, the OP Decision held that price escalation is automatically
awarded to contractors of all government infrastructure projects.
Since PD 454 was not expressly repealed by PD 1594, and since there was no
apparent conflict between the two laws, the appellate court deemed it best to harmonize
them. The result was again a favorable Decision to Green Asia.
2. City of Naga v. Agna (G.R. No. L-36049, 31 May 1976)
Facts: The City of Naga enacted Ordinance No. 360, amending the graduated tax on
quarterly gross sales of merchants prescribe in Section 3 of Ordinance 4 of the City of
Naga to percentage tax on gross sales provided for in Section 2 of Ordinance 4. Thus,
private respondents paid to the City of Naga the taxes on their gross sales for the
quarter.
Soon after, the private respondents filed with the City Treasurer a claim for refund of
their taxes paid together with the interests from the date of payments. They alleged that
under existing law, Ordinance No. 360 which amended Section of Ordinance 4, the
taxes they paid in 1970 on their gross sales for the quarter were unlawful and should be
reimbursed to them by the petitioners.
The City Treasurer denied the claim and so the private respondents filed a complaint
before the Court of First Instance of Naga, seeking to have Ordinance No. 360
proclaimed effective only in the year succeeding its approval; to have Section 4, 6, 8 of
Ordinance No 360 declared null and void; and to require petitioners to refund the sums
being claimed with interests and to pay all legal costs and attorney’s fees. They further
prayed that the petitioners be enjoined from enforcing Ordinance No. 360.
In their answer, the petitioners claimed that the private respondents voluntarily made
the payments of their taxes; that the ordinance was published in accordance with RA No
305, directing an ordinance to take effect after the tenth day following its passage
unless otherwise stated.
Issue: Whether or not the effectivity of Ordinance No. 360 falls under Section 2309 of
the Revised Administrative Code, even if Section 2 of RA No. 2264 requires 10 days
after its passage pursuant to
Ruling: Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of RA No. 2264
relate to the same subject matter which is the enactment and effectivity of a tax
ordinance. Thus, they are statutes that can be considered in pari materia which holds
that statutes must be construed together when they relate to the same person, thing,
subject, or purpose. So, Construing the two statutes, the Court held that since
Ordinance No. 360 changed the graduated sales of tax of an existing imposition, the
case falls under Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code, which covers the
effectivity of new ordinances amending an existing local tax.
3. Gordon v. Veridiano (G.R. No. L-55230, 8 November 1988)
Facts: The San Sebastian Drug Store (SSDS) and the Olongapo City Drug Store
(OCDS), owned by the respondent, were covered by the mayor’s permit issued for the
year 1980 and licenses to operate issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
for the same year.
Later, a joint team of agents from the FDA and narcotics agents from the Philippine
Constabulary conducted a “test buy” at SSDS. A report on the operation was submitted
to the mayor of Olongapo City. He issued a letter summarily revoking the store’s
Mayor’s permit of SSDS for rampant violation of the Pharmacy Law and the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.
On the same investigation report, the FDA administrator directed the closure of the
drugstore for 3 days and its payment of a P100 fine for violation of RA No. 3720. He
further released a strict notice to Yambao against a repetition of the infraction. Later, the
FDA lifted its closure order after noting that the penalties enforced has already been
terminated and permitted the drug store to continue operations.
Yambao wrote a letter to Mayor Gordon seeking reconsideration of the revocation of the
Mayor's Permit. She received no reply. Thus, she filed before the RTC of Olongapo City
a complaint for mandamus and damages together with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction, against Mayor Gordon. On the same day, Yambao requested permission
from the FDA to exchange the locations of the two stores for reasons of "business
preference." The request was permitted but Mayor Gordon rejected the transfers and
suspended the Mayor's Permit for the OCDS. The CFI released a writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction against Mayor Gordon.
Issue: Whether or not the mayor of Olongapo city can revoke the business license of an
enterprise for violating a law, even if such enterprise has subsequently been allowed by
FDA to resume its operations.
Ruling: No. the Supreme Court held that the City mayor cannot revoke the business
permit of the drug store for the same ground which it was penalized by the FDA. Courts
of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to
reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the
other.
A study of the said laws will show that the authorization to operate issued by the FDA is
a condition precedent to the grant of a mayor’s permit to the drug store seeking to
operate within the limits of the city.
The power to approve a license includes by implication, even if not expressly granted,
the power to revoke it. By extension, the power to revoke is limited by the authority to
grant the license, from which it is derived in the first place. Thus, if the FDA grants a
license upon its finding that the applicant drug store has complied with the requirements
of the general laws and the implementing administrative rules and regulations, it is only
for their violation that the FDA may revoke the said license.
4. Lopez v. Civil Service Commission, et.al. (G.R. No. 87119, 16 April 1991)
Facts: Hon. Danilo R. Lacuna, submitted to the Civil Service Commission, through the
Regional Director of NCR, the appointments of nineteen officers and employees in the
Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding Officer, City Council of Manila, pursuant to
the provisions of Section 15 of RA No. 409.
The City Budget Officer of Manila later sought from the Personnel Bureau of the Mayor's
office "comment and/or recommendation" on whether the payroll of the newly appointed
employees of the City Council may be paid on the basis of appointments signed by the
Vice-Mayor. The Personnel Bureau then forwarded the query to the City Legal Officer.
This opinion was transmitted by the Secretary to the City Mayor to the Commission.
Later, the Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-075, and held that contrary to
the opinion of the City Legal Officer, it is the City Council to which the appointing power
is vested.
As the petitioner contends, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 409 as amended has
supposedly been repealed by Republic Act No. 5185, specifically, Section 4 thereof and
by Batas Blg. 337.
Issue: Whether or not the City Council of Manila has the power to appoint Council
officers and employees under RA No. 409 ,even if such power has been vested in the
City Mayor pursuant to RA No. 5185.
Ruling: Yes. The court noted that RA No. 409 is a special law as it provides specifically
for the organization of the Government of the City of Manila, while RA. No 5158 and BP
Blg. 337, which apply to local government are general laws. Thus, the applicable rule of
construction on the case is that a special law prevails over the general law, regardless
of their dates of passage, and that the special law shall be considered as remaining to
be an exception to what is provided in the general law.
5. Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, et.al. (G.R. Nos.
120865 to 120871, 7 December 1976)
Facts: R.A. No.4850, created the Laguna Lake Development Authority, to carry out
and effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so as to accelerate the development and
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and
towns, in the act clearly named, within the context of the national and regional plans and
policies for social and economic development. Presidential Decree No. 813 of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos amended certain sections of Republic Act No. 4850
because of the concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and
the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of
the lake for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like.
Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The
municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean
that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to
issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters. Municipal governments thereupon
assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits.
Issue: Whether or not the authority to grant fishing privileges on Laguna Lake continues
to be vested in LLDA under its charter or such power has been transferred to the local
governments
Ruling: Yes. Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special law, the
special law should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the
general statute. The Court held that RA No. 4850 is a special law as it applies
specifically to the Laguna Lake while RA. No. 7160 is a general law as it applies
generally to local government units. Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the
Authority should prevail over that Local Government Code of 1991
6. Bagatsing, et.al. v. Ramirez, et.al (G.R. No. L-41631, 17 December 1976)
Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522 and the petitioner,
City mayor, later approved the ordinance. respondent Federation of Manila Market
Vendors, Inc. commenced Civil Case 96787 before the Court of First Instance of Manila
presided over by respondent Judge, seeking the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No.
7522 on the ground among others, that the publication requirement under the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration of the adverse decision, stressing that (a) only a post-publication is
required by the Local Tax Code; and (b) private respondent failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies before instituting an action in court.
While the Revised Charter of the City of Manila requires publication before the
enactment of the ordinance and after the approval thereof in two daily newspapers of
general circulation in the city, the Local Tax Code only prescribes for publication after
the approval of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" either in a
newspaper or publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government
or by posting the ordinance in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other
conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. Petitioners'
compliance with the Local Tax Code rather than with the Revised Charter of the City
spawned this litigation.
Issue: Whether or not the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code shall govern the
publication of a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila.
Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that there is no question that the Revised Charter of City
of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the Local
Tax Code is a general because it applies universally to all local governments. The fact
that one is a special and the other general creates a presumption that the special is to
be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of the
land, the other as the law of a particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a
situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general
statute treats in particular.
Thus, Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of ‘ordinance’ in
general, whereas Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or
imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances
in general, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that
dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying
or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code
controls. Here, as always, a general provision must give way to a particular provision.
Special provision governs. This is especially true where the law containing the particular
provision was enacted later than the one containing the general provision. The City
Charter of Manila was promulgated on June 18, 1949 as against the Local Tax Code
which was decreed on June 1, 1973. The law-making power cannot be said to have
intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems upon the same subject, or
to leave in force provisions of a prior law by which the new will of the legislating power
may be thwarted and overthrown. Such a result would render legislation a useless and
Idle ceremony, and subject the law to the reproach of uncertainty and unintelligibility.
7. City of Manila v. Teotico (G.R. No. L-23052, 29 January 1968)
Facts: Genaro Teptico was at the corner of Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila,
when he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole resulting to injuries. As a
consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance
of Manila, a complaint — which was, subsequently, amended — for damages against
the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of
police.
Issue: Whether the case is governed by Section 4 of RA No. 409 or Article 2189 of the
Civil Code.
Ruling: Yes. The exception to the rule that a special law prevails over a general law is
that a special or particular provision in general law prevails over a general provision in a
special law.
8. Fabian v. Desierto (G.R. No. 129742, 16 September 1998)
Facts: The petitioner was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation. Private respondent was the incumbent District
Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District when he allegedly committed the
violations for which he was administratively charged in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Private respondent tricked petitioner into a romantic relationship. He refused and
resisted to the point of harassing, intimidating and throwing threats to the petitioner
when petitioner attempted to end their relationship due to misunderstandings and
unpleasant incidents. She eventually filed an administrative case against him in a letter-
complaint, which sought to dismiss private respondent for violating Section 19, Republic
Act No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807, with additional prayer for
his preventive suspension. Later, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a
resolution finding private respondent guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law.
After private respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman found that
the former's new counsel had been his "classmate and close associate" hence he
restrained himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus
F. Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the
February 26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and acquitted private respondent
from the administrative charges.
Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the SC regulates
procedure.
Ruling: Yes. In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the
practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any
substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule
takes away a vested right, it is no; procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right
to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of
its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which
shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure
only. This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is
affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the
appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that no
litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution
without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which
relate to the remedy.
9. Philippine National Bank v. Asuncion (G.R. No. L-46905, 23 November 1977)
Facts: Philippine National Bank granted in favor of respondent Fabar Incorporated
various credit accommodations and advances. The said credit accommodations are
secured by the joint and several signatures of Jose Ma. Barredo, Carmen B. Borromeo
and Tomas L. Borromeo (private respondents herein) and Manuel H. Barredo.
Petitioner filed a case before the respondent court against all private respondents and
Manuel H. Barredo in a complaint due to failure of private respondents to pay their
obligations despite repeated demands.
Before the case could be decided, Manuel H. Barredo died. Thus, counsel for private
respondents informed the respondent Court of said death. Later, respondent Court
issued an Order of dismissal pursuant to Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of
Court
Petitioner prayed for the reconsideration of respondent Court’s Order dismissing the
case as against all the defendants, contending that the dismissal should only be as
against the deceased defendant. Respondent Court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration for lack of meritorious grounds.
Issue: Whether or not Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court will deprive the
creditor of its substantive rights.
Ruling: Yes.The court held that to require the creditor to proceed against the estate,
making it a condition precedent for any collection action against the surviving debtors to
prosper, would deprive him of his substantive rights provided by Article 1216 of the New
Civil Code.
As correctly argued by petitioner, if Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court
were applied literally, Article 1216 of the New Civil Code would, in effect, be repealed
since under the Rules of Court, petitioner has no choice but to proceed against the
estate of Manuel Barredo only. Obviously, this provision diminishes the Bank’s right
under the New Civil Code to proceed against any one, some or all of the solidary
debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled
to require citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule.
Otherwise stated, Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot be made to
prevail over Article 1216 of the New Civil Code, the former being merely procedural,
while the latter, substantive.
Moreover, no less than the New Constitution of the Philippines, in Section 5, Article X,
provides that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court should not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights.
10. Estipona v. Lobrigat (G.R. No. 226679, 15 August 2017)
Facts: The petitioner is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of Section
11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Estipona prayed to withdraw his not guilty plea and,
instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal
quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2
thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the
three equal branches of the government.
The prosecution moved for the denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose
which offense it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition, it
manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to
give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165,
however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea
bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."
Respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3,
Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion
Issue: Whether or not Section 23 of RA No. 9165 contradicts the rule-making authority
of the Supreme Court.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme court declare void Section 23 of RA No. 9165 for being
contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court. The Court held that In this
jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and
the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval." There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence
of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to
avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged
because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the
accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining
neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to
implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress
for a disregard or infraction of them.
11. Philippine National Bank v. Cruz, et.al. (G.R. No. 80593, 18 December 1989)
Facts: Aggregate Mining Exponents (AMEX) experienced business reverses, thus,
retaining only 30% of its employees, who, however, were not paid their wages which
went on until July 1982 when AMEX completely stopped operations and instead entered
into an operating agreement with T.M. San Andres Development Corporation. The
unpaid employees sought redress from the Labor Arbiter 1 who, on August 27, 1986
rendered a decision finding their claim valid and meritorious.
AMEX and its President, Tirso Revilla did not appeal from this decision. But PNB, in its
capacity as mortgagee-creditor of AMEX appealed with the respondent Commission,
questioning among others, whether the employees have a superior claim over the
assets of AMEX over a creditor. Under Articles 2241 to 2245 of the Civil Code, secured
creditors are in the list of preferred claims under the rules on Concurrence and
Preference on Credits. However, 110 of the Labor Code provides that workers shall
enjoy first preference about wages due them in cases of bankruptcy or liquidation of an
employer’s business.
Issue: Whether or not the employees have a superior claim over the assets of AMEX
over a creditor.
Ruling: Yes. The Court held that it must uphold the preference accorded to the private
respondents in view of the provisions of Article 110 of the Labor Code which are clear,
and which admit of no other interpretation. The phrase "any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding" indicates that such preference shall prevail despite the order
set forth in Articles 2241 to 2245 of the Civil Code.
Finally, the Court noted that the Labor Code, having been enacted after the Civil Code,
should prevail. It declared that whenever two statutes of different dates and of contrary
tenor are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the statute of later date
must prevail being a later expression of legislative will. Applying this rule in the case, the
Civil Code provisions cited by the petitioner must yield to Article 110 of the Labor Code.

12. Mecano v. Commission on Audit (G.R. No. 103982, 11 December 1992)

Facts: Petitioner is a Director II of NBI. He was hospitalized for cholecystitis on account
of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he
is claiming from the COA. He based his claim under Section 699 of the RAC. NBI
Director Lim then forwarded petitioner's claim, to the Secretary of Justice. COA denied
the claim because Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code has been repealed
by the Administrative Code of 1987
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S.
19912 of then Secretary of Justice Secretary Drilon stating that "the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter".
COA, however, denied petitioner's claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had
been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely because the same section
was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented,
however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees' Compensation Commission,
considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Eventually, petitioner's claim was returned by
Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro to Director Lim, with the advice that
petitioner "elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so desires".
Issue: Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section
699 of the RAC
Ruling: No. The Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to
give due course to petitioner's claim for benefits. No costs.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are
not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the
legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
Regarding respondent's contention that recovery under this subject section shall bar the
recovery of benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program, the same cannot be
upheld. The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees'
Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended by
P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall
not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the system (meaning SSS
or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government."

13. Dreamworks Construction, Inc. v. Janiola (G.R. No. 184861, 30 June 2009)
Facts: Petitioner, through its President and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing,
filed a Complaint Affidavit for violation of BP 22 against private respondent Cleofe S.
Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. Correspondingly,
petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent
with the MTC. Private respondent filed a separate civil action against petitioner for the
rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties and for damages.
Thereafter, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, claiming that the
civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases. Petitioner opposed
the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases, citing Section 7 of Rule 111 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Later, the MTC issued its Order, granting the Motion to
Suspend Proceedings
In an Order, the MTC denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner
appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition. Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed
decision denying the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of civil case subsequent to the institution of the criminal
case can result in the suspension of the criminal proceedings.
Ruling: No. The Court decided in favor of petitioner and held that the filing of the civil
case after the institution of the criminal case cannot result in the suspension of the
criminal proceedings. The Court cited two reasons: the first reason is that the Rules of
Court effectively amended the Civil Code provision on prejudicial questions, which is a
rule of procedure. Whereas the second reason attempted to reconcile the two
provisions.

14. Valera v. Tuason (G.R. No. L-1276, 30 April 1948)

Facts: A complaint for forcible entry was filed in the justice of the peace of court of
Lagayan was transferred to the justice of the peace of La Paz because the Judge who
initially presided has relationship to one of the parties.
The justice of the peace decided for the plaintiff and returned of the case with his
decision to the justice of the peace of Lagayan. Meanwhile, Mariano B. Tuason, one of
the respondents in the petition for certiorari, was a new justice of peace had been
appointed for Lagayan. Thus, the defendants moved for a new trial impeaching the
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace of La Paz. Tuason discovered the challenge well
founded, declared the judgment null and void, and ordered the case reset for hearing
before him, invoking Section 211, Rev. Adm. Code. He believes that the circular of the
Secretary of Justice of January 17, 1940, in pursuance of which the case was
transferred, is legally wrong.
The decision was sustained on appeal by the Court of First Instance, but on a different
ground. Judge Ceniza does not agree that section 211 of the Revised Code of Civil
Procedure (Act No. 190.) He is of the opinion that it is the new Rules of Court which
have abrogated the last-named section.
Issue: Whether or not Section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been impliedly
repealed by the Rules of Court than that it has been abrogated by section 211 of the
Revised Administrative Code
Ruling: No. The history of the two laws gives positive indication that they were
designed to complement each other. This history reveals that the two enactments have
different origins, one independent of the other, and have been intended to operate side
by side. The purpose to keep both laws in force and subsisting can find no clearer proof
than this unless it be an express declaration of intention.
The Court held that Ceniza's opinion that the Rules of court have replaced and
absorbed section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure is clearly erroneous. It may be said
that there is less reason to hold that this section has been impliedly repealed by the
Rules of Court than that it has been abrogated by section 211 of the Revised
Administrative Code; for authority of a judge to try a case is a matter of substantive law,
not embraced by the purposes and scope of the Rules of Court, which concern
"pleading, practice admission and procedure in all courts of the Philippines, and the
admission to the practice of law therein."

15. United States v. Soliman (G.R. No. L-11555, 6 January 1917)

Facts: Soliman who was charged with the crime of perjury after testifying falsely in court
in another criminal case involving him for estafa. The crime of perjury was originally
penalized under the Penal Code, which was subsequently repealed by Act No. 1697 by
implication. At the time he committed perjury, the crime is punished with six months’
imprisonment and a fine of Php300 under Section 3 of Act No. 1697. However, the
judgement of the case was entered on November 23, 1915, and that Section 3 of Act
No. 1697 has been expressly repealed by the enactment of the Administrative Code.
Thus, it has been suggested that the judgment convicting and sentencing the accused
under the provisions of that statute should not be sustained, and that the repeal of the
statute should be held to have the effect of remitting and extinguishing the criminal
responsibility of the accused incurred under the provisions of the repealed law prior to
the enactment of the Administrative Code.
Issue: Whether or not the express repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment
of the Administrative Code revived the provisions of the Penal Code touching perjury,
which were themselves repealed, not expressly but by implication, by the enactment of
Act No. 1697.
Ruling: Yes. The Court held that section 12 of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657)
which is found in Article III, [Chapter I] dealing with the form and effect of laws in
general, provides that "when a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed
the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided." From
which it may fairly be inferred that the old rule continues in force where a law which
repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, it itself repealed; and that in such
cases the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language of the
repealing statute provides otherwise.
Applying this rule, the Court conclude that the express repeal of section 3 of Act No.
1697 by the enactment of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657) revived the provisions
of the Penal Code touching perjury, which were themselves repealed, not expressly but
by implication, by the enactment of Act No. 1697.