Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues: Rethinking the Standard

Philosophical Interpretation of Moral Virtue in Aquinas

Author(s): John Inglis
Source: The Journal of Religious Ethics , Spring, 1999, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), pp.
3-27
Published by: Blackwell Publishing Ltd on behalf of Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc

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 AQUINAS'S REPLICATION
OF THE ACQUIRED MORAL VIRTUES

Rethinking the Standard Philosophical

Interpretation of Moral Virtue in Aquinas

John Inglis

ABSTRACT

Aquinas is often presented as following Aristotle's Nicomachean

when treating moral virtue. Less often do philosophers consider that
nas's conception of the highest good and its relation to the function
acter of human activity led him to break with Aristotle by replicati
of the acquired moral virtues on an infused level. The author sugges
we can discern reasons for this move by examining Aquinas's comm
on the Sententiae of Peter the Lombard and the Summa theologiae
their historical context. The author's thesis is that Dominican p
and intellectual concerns led Aquinas to argue that moral virtue mu
essarily be ordered toward the highest good. Understanding this pu
helps to explain his presentation of moral virtue and its implicatio
standard philosophical interpretations of his work.
KEY WORDS: Aquinas, Dominican, fortitude, infused, martyrdom,
William Peraldus

AS INTEREST IN THE VIRTUE ETHICS OF THE MIDDLE AGES continues to gTOW,

Thomas Aquinas is often presented as following Aristotle's Ni-
comachean Ethics (NE) in his treatment of moral virtue (Casey 1990, ix,
51, 104; Mclnerny 1993, 202-5; Maclntyre 1984, 178-80; Stump and
Kretzmann 1991, 119). For example, his viewing moral virtue in rela-
tion to particular human functions as the acquisition of the human good
is, according to Ralph Mclnerny, derived from Aristotle (1993, 202-5;
1992, 34-35). In fact, Aristotle had presented an influential account of
the role that repeated human activity plays in the acquisition of moral
virtue. Unlike a rock that cannot be trained to go against its nature,

I would like to thank David Barry, Paul H. Benson, Daniel C. Fouke, Daniel H. Frank,
Monalisa M. Mullins, Raymond M. Herbenick, Terrence W. Tilley, Jane S. Zembaty, and
two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. An earlier version was read at the 31st
International Congress on Medieval Studies in Kalamazoo, Michigan.

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4 Journal of Religious Ethics

even if tossed up in the air ten thousand times, human beings become
perfected through habituation because by nature they are able to ac-
quire virtue (NE 1103al8- 25). This view of virtue acquisition was im-
portant for Aquinas, yet examination of his treatment of moral virtue
within the modern disciplinary boundaries of philosophy often results in
a one-sided approach. While philosophers see the commonalities be-
tween Aquinas and Aristotle, they less often consider the fact that Aqui-
nas's conception of the highest good and its relation to the functional
character of human activity led him to break with Aristotle by replicat-
ing each of the acquired moral virtues on an infused level, a level that
both parallels and extends the work of the acquired virtues.1 I do not
wish to imply that philosophers make no mention of the theological con-
text of this discussion. Mclnerny, for example, notes that Aquinas's the-
ology presupposes his knowledge of philosophy (1993, 214; 1992, 42-43;
1982, 122-23). Yet he does not state what implications Aquinas's theol-
ogy had for his account of the moral virtues. The reader is left with the
impression that Aquinas offered a philosophical theory of virtue ethics
for the Christian that could stand apart from theology.
Recently, Christian ethicists have made great strides in retrieving a
more balanced view of Aquinas's account of moral virtue. For example,
Jean Porter asks provocatively, ". . . how much is really left of an Aristo-
telian account of the virtues when Aquinas's overall theory is in place?"
(1992, 33). She argues persuasively that we need to pay attention to the
manner in which Aquinas used, and ultimately subverted, Aristotle's ac-
count of moral virtue within his treatment of infused moral virtue. In a
similar vein, Pamela Hall explains that, for Aquinas, this type of virtue
transforms the attachments a person has to material objects so that he
or she is not hindered from loving God (1994, 80). These discussions
often concentrate on Aquinas's distinction between acquired and infused
virtue.2
What has not been discussed at any length in this recent literature is
how the reception of infused moral virtue relates to acquired moral vir-
tue already possessed. For example, after introducing Aquinas's view of
infused virtue in Moral Action and Christian Ethics, Porter turns her
attention to the acquired virtues without unpacking the relations

1 On the widespread practice of interpreting the medievals, including Aquinas, accord-

ing to the modern branches of philosophy, see Marenbon 1988, vii-xii; Inglis 1997; Inglis
1998.
2 Cessario 1991, 109-13; Keenan 1992, 94-96. Traditionally, discussion of infused
moral virtue occurred in theological circles with the debate focusing on whether the ac-
quired and the infused virtues operate separately from each other or in tandem. For
theological accounts of infused moral virtue, see Bullet 1958; Coerver 1946; Vooght 1933;
Harvey 1955; Schockenhoff 1987; Sutter 1963. For a philosopher's summary of this de-
bate, see Kent 1995, 32-36.

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 Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues 5

between the two (1995, 146-50, 170-200). Hall notes that acquired vir-
tue has a restricted sphere of activity for one who lives the life of infused
virtue, but as this is not her project, she does not develop this point
(1994, 85). However, this is, in my judgment, an important and illumi-
nating issue that deserves careful attention: If acquired virtue does not
disappear after the reception of infused virtue, then what implications
does the latter have for the exercise of the former? While the difference
between acquired and infused moral virtue has been considered in rela-
tion to Aquinas's treatment of the virtues in general in the first part of
the second part of the Summa theologiae, I will examine his treatments
of the particular virtues in the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum and
in the second part of the second part of the Summa theologiae. By situat-
ing Aquinas's arguments in his own interpretive context - the Domini-
can context - I will develop the argument that by replicating the
acquired moral virtues by way of infusion from the highest good, Aqui-
nas, counter to Aristotle, placed the acquired virtues within a tightly cir-
cumscribed field.
What follows is neither a proposal of influences nor an interpretation
according to philosophical categories of the late twentieth century; it is,
rather, an attempt to read Aquinas on the limits placed on acquired vir-
tue within his own intellectual environment. While not attempting to be
exhaustive, I hope to shed light on his account of moral virtue in a way
that discloses its implications for contemporary virtue theory.

1. The Dominican Context

As a member of the Dominican order, Aquinas had reason to be in

ested in moral virtue for the preparation of preachers and confe
For instance, Humbert of Romans, who was elected Master of the O
in 1254, indicated the need for moral education in his De eruditione
praedicatorum by claiming that townspeople and villagers would not
know how to live moral lives without a type of preaching that would pro-
vide illumination (Humbertus 1888-89, 2:437). In fact, as Leonard
Boyle has pointed out, the first literary works of the order were commis-
sioned as reference works to serve these purposes.3 Raymond of Pena-
fort, Master of the Order from 1238 to 1240, wrote and revised one of
these, his Summa de casibus poenitentiae, between 1224 and 1235 (Mul-
chahey 1998, 534-39). This text, structured according to different types
of moral problems, supplied what Dominicans needed to know in order

3 In addition to the two Dominican reference works discussed below, these include the
Speculum ecclesiae (cl240) of Hugh of Saint-Cher and the Speculum maius (1244-1259) of
Vincent of Beauvais (see Boyle 1982, 1-2; Jordan 1994, 84-85; Torrell 1996, 119-20; Mul-
chahey 1998, 539-40, 467-70).

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3 Journal of Religious Ethics

to hear confessions and give moral advice. Boyle has established that
Aquinas used this work in writing accounts of virtue and vice in his
Summa theologiae, even to the point of reproducing specific texts (Boyle
1982, 5-7). Since writers in that period possessed a more communal no-
tion of authorship than we have today, it was not uncommon for authors
to incorporate others' work into their texts (Destrez 1933, 87-105).
While Raymond's text was useful for Aquinas, it did not supply him with
the framework for his mature treatment of moral virtue.

1.1 The education of Dominicans

The work that Aquinas did find useful for constructing the second
part of his Summa theologiae was the Summa de vitiis et virtutibus
(SW) of William Peraldus, which was completed in two parts around
1250, shortly before Aquinas began to lecture on the Sentences of Peter
the Lombard.4 Peraldus was an important Dominican preacher and
writer who is on record for preaching in Vienne around 1249 and holding
the post of Dominican prior at Lyons in 1261 (Dondaine 1948, 163). His
Summa was an authoritative text within the order, one of the significant
reference works to be read at each Dominican house, as may be seen in
the admonishment of the Spanish provincial chapter of 1250 that priors
at each house in its domain were to make available and use Peraldus's
Summa (Friars 1893-, 3:415). It was to be read and commented on by a
trained lector at each community.
Only a small minority of members were sent to a university or stu-
dium generale for the type of higher education enjoyed by Aquinas an
Albert the Great. The vast majority of Dominicans were educated by le
tors within their own religious houses. They did not receive advan
education, but they were expected to attend scheduled conferences
throughout the liturgical year. For this reason, Humbert of Roma
stated (in his Liber de instructione officialium, written after his resign
tion as Master in 1263) that a copy of Peraldus's Summa should be p
vided in each religious house for general use throughout the order
(Humbertus 1888-89, 2:265; Boyle 1982, 15; on dating the Liber, se
Tugwell 1982, 34). Multiple copies of the work appear on the late
thirteenth-century list of books in the collection of the library of Sai
Catherine's, the Dominican convent at Barcelona, and this provides fur
ther evidence of its use in education (Denifle 1886, 2:202, 242-48).
These multiple copies were left to the library by individual members of
the convent who had acquired copies of Peraldus's text for study over

4 On Peraldus's life and works, see Dondaine 1948. Very little is known about the edu-
cation of Peraldus, not even whether he studied at a university (Dondaine 1948, 162, 172).
On Peraldus's Summa, written between 1236 and 1249/50, see Dondaine 1948, 184-97.

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 Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues 7

many years; it therefore represents their actual reading and teaching.

Thus, it seems clear that study of Peraldus's Summa - together with
Raymond's Summa de casibus poenitentiae - was necessary in order for
lectors to prepare and deliver the moral conferences that took place
every week or two (Boyle 1982, 21; Mulchahey 1998, 541).
In the generation before the appearance of Aquinas's Summa theolo-
giae, no treatise on moral virtue was as frequently used in Dominican cir-
cles as Peraldus's Summa. While Raymond had discussed different types
of moral cases like simony, lying, and murder, Peraldus offered an intellec-
tual exposition of moral virtue and vice in general, together with a treat-
ment of the individual virtues and vices. He wrote a speculative account of
the moral life that complemented Raymond's more practical description
- which was why members regarded Peraldus as the major reference on
moral questions having to do with virtue and vice (Boyle 1982, 21; Mul-
chahey 1998, 541). As I will argue, Aquinas then used this work as the
model for his treatment of virtue in his commentary on the Sentences and
in the second part of his Summa. The point I wish to make is that under-
standing the limits that Peraldus placed on the acquisition of moral virtue
helps to clarify the position of Aquinas within his Dominican context.

1.2 Peraldus's "Summa"

Peraldus divided his Summa de vitiis et virtutibus (SW) into two

parts, one devoted to vice and the other to virtue. The treatment of vir-
tue was divided into two sections, the first on virtue in general and the
second on the individual virtues.5 In the first section, Peraldus drew a
contrast between a philosophical view of virtue and a more comprehen-
sive one that had implications for his conception of the relation between
the acquired virtues and the highest good. He recognized that in the phi-
losophical view, virtue is habitual activity that is directed to the human
good (SW 2.1.2; 1:2). The focus here is on what one accomplishes with
his or her own activity. The more comprehensive view conceives virtue to
be a type of action that tends to the highest good based on assistance
freely given by God. Peraldus devoted the majority of his remarks in this
section to this more comprehensive conception of virtue.
He criticized the philosopher's view of virtue as an incomplete ac-
count. In fact, he came close to reducing acquired virtue to theological
virtue with the claim that what philosophers call virtue in moral

5 In contrast to the common practice in printed editions of having the part on virtue ap-
pear first and the part on vice appear second, I will adhere to the custom of the thirteenth
century by citing the text on virtue with the number two. Following each citation accord-
ing to the standard divisions of the text, reference will be made to the volume and pagina-
tion of the Clutii printed edition: Peraldus 1629.

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8 Journal of Religious Ethics

doctrine, sacred Scripture frequently calls grace (SW 2.1.2; 1:2). While
Peraldus discussed the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, tem-
perance, and fortitude, he placed them in a strikingly theological con-
text. To prepare for this view, he cited the Confessions of Augustine
(Confessions 4.16.30) in order to make the point that philosophers who
talk about virtue only in the philosophical sense have turned their faces
toward the things of this world. By not facing the divine, they fail to gain
illumination or understand the origin of human moral activity. Con-
cerned with their own glory rather than that of God, the philosophers do
not know the good toward which one ought to tend, nor do they recognize
that human beings need help in order to live a good life. By placing
stress on the divine role in the production of virtue, Peraldus concluded
that the cardinal virtues effect right living only when practiced together
with the theological virtues.6
In reflecting on the human role in the acquisition of moral virtue, Per-
aldus puzzled over whether it is fair to say that God produces virtue "in
us without us" (SW 2. 1.3; 1:5). In doing so, he asked a question that had
arisen in earlier glosses and commentaries on the Sentences (Sent) of
Peter the Lombard, and such works would have been familiar to those
Dominicans who had proceeded to higher theological study. The Lom-
bard had cited Augustine, in the second book of the Sentences, to support
the view that God plays the active role in the life of virtue, so exclusive a
role that grace can fittingly be given the name of virtue.7 Yet he asserted
that it continues to be important to speak about human activity. He did
not present divine grace as a power that simply causes human beings to
act like puppets on a string, but as a power that needs to be freely re-
ceived by each individual. For example, the Lombard claimed that
human beings move either toward good or toward evil out of free will
(Sent 2.27.2). Human freedom has a role in the acceptance of what God
initiates. Yet, while acknowledging this, the Lombard stated clearly that
God alone produces virtue in human beings (Sent 2.27.8), a view that
Peter of Poitiers further refined in his glosses on the Sentences through
the addition of the phrase "without human beings."8 Many who agreed

6 SW2.1.3; 1:4. 1 will present Aquinas's view of infused moral virtue as an attempt to
clarify how the acquired and theological virtues can be practiced together.
7 Sent 2.27.2.3. The Quaracchi editors of the recent edition of the Sentences point out
that the Lombard arrived at the definition of the divine gratuity of virtue, a definition that
he attributed to Augustine, only partly on the basis of the texts of Augustine. This interpre-
tation follows Odon Lottin's conclusion that the Lombard combined a text of Augustine and
an Augustinian idea, which itself was based on the notes in the older Quaracchi edition of
the Sentences (Peter Lombard 1971-81, 1:480, note to dist. 27; Lottin 1949, 3:101 n. 2).
8 Peter of Poitiers, Sententiae Petri Pictaviensis III.l. On the role of the divine, see Lot-
tin 1949, 3:101-2; Cessario 1991, 175 n. 24. For a careful consideration of the role of
human freedom that complements Lottin's account, see Colish 1994, 2:489-92.

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 Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues 9

that something more than human effort was required for the acquisition
of moral virtue adopted this formulation in the thirteenth century (Lot-
tin 1949, 3:142-50).
It was against this background, then, that Peraldus asked whether it
would be fair to say that God produces virtue "in us without us." He de-
parted from the received Augustinian picture by interpreting this
phrase as applicable only to infused virtue and not to the virtues that in-
volve voluntary habit. Drawing a distinction between the two, Peraldus
argued that human beings play a role in the acquisition of the second
type. For example, while infused charity is received from God alone
without any assistance on our part, human effort plays a role in the ac-
quisition of the cardinal virtues. But if he believed that Scripture calls
grace what philosophers call moral virtue, how could he assert any
human role in this acquisition?
Peraldus resolved this problem by drawing an analogy between the
acquisition of virtue and the illumination of the interior of a house, an
analogy that allowed him to make a distinction between human effort
and divine assistance. He claimed that when someone uncovers a win-
dow so that the sun illuminates the interior of a house, the uncovering
the window represents effort but not cooperation (SW 2.1.3; 1:5). H
point was that when one removes an obstacle to the source of light, he o
she plays an active role but does not assist the sun in illuminating t
house. Analogously, human beings can prepare (adoperante) themselv
through their efforts to receive the cardinal virtues from God, but th
cannot cooperate in the infusion required.9 Thus, they do not cooperat
with God in the acquisition of moral virtue. Importantly, he conceived
human activity as more than simply accepting what God has given. Per
aldus opposed the strong Augustinian view that God works "in us
without us." By granting human activity a preparatory role in the acqui-
sition of the cardinal virtues, he enabled his reader to appreciate the
role of human effort. This point was important for his account of the car-
dinal virtues, to which he devoted a considerable portion of the text.
In sum, then, Peraldus worked out a position between the Augustinian
position that virtue is a gift of grace and the Aristotelian position that vir-
tue is an achievement of human effort. He did not, however, do this by ti-
dily equating the theological virtues with grace and the moral virtues
with effort; indeed, he subverted that strategy by declaring that what phi-
losophers call (moral) virtue, Scripture calls grace. Nor did he follow the
Lombard in making acceptance of grace the sphere of freedom. Like
Augustine and the Lombard, he held that certain virtues, the theological

9 Building on Macrobius's view of the cardinal virtues in relation to their exemplars in

the mind of God, Peraldus presented the cardinal virtues as depending, for the Christian,
on the highest good (SW 2.3.6; 1:322-23).

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10 Journal of Religious Ethics

virtues, are obtained from God "without us"; with respect to these virtues,
he agreed that human freedom and human effort play no role. However, in
his view, the cardinal virtues are not of this class, but neither are they
simply a human achievement. They require human effort (not just human
acceptance), but the effort is an effort of preparation (not cooperation or
assistance), as in the removal of obstacles to the light. Thus, Peraldus held
that Aristotle exaggerated the human role in virtue acquisition; he was
wrong to think that human action alone could make one virtuous. But the
Lombard's view that God alone produces the cardinal as well as the theo-
logical virtues in human beings was also an exaggeration.
Peraldus raised issues concerning the role played by human effort in
the moral life and developed a framework for discussing infused virtue.
Holding that a purely philosophical conception of virtue was not consis-
tent with the good life, he nonetheless argued for the importance of
human moral activity, a view that consequently would have been wide-
spread at Dominican houses in the middle of the thirteenth century
when Aquinas was a student and a commentator on the Sentences.
While previous commentaries on the Sentences had already discussed
the distinction between the theological and the cardinal virtues, little
attention had been paid to the latter in these works. In line with a Do-
minican interest in moral reflection, Aquinas broke this pattern in his
Scriptum super libros Sententiarum (In Sent) through the insertion of
what amounts to a monograph on the moral virtues (In Sent 3.33). In
order to prepare for this discussion, he followed Peraldus in reinterpret-
ing the Augustinian claim that God operates in us without us. Aquinas
stated that Augustine was not speaking about all virtue, but only about
the infused (or theological) virtues (In Sent 2.27.1.2). By thus narrowing
the received authority of Augustine on this issue, Aquinas, like Peraldus
before him, opened the door for consideration of the role played by
human beings in the acquisition of the cardinal virtues.

2. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum

Marie-Dominique Chenu considers the section on virtue in Aquinas's
Scriptum to be the first theological treatise on moral virtue (Chenu
1964, 271 n. 20). 10 He points out that Aquinas treated forty-one separate

10 While I agree that Aquinas's Scriptum was the earliest detailed treatment in a com-
mentary on the Sentences, Chenu appears to neglect the extensive treatments in, for ex-
ample, the third book of William of Auxerre's Summa aurea (SA III. 10-11, 19-29;
Ribaillier ed., bk. 3, 1:112-96, 385-578) and Philip the Chancellor's Summa de bono (SB
"De bono gratie in homine"; Wicki ed., 2:744-1106). Nevertheless, as I will argue below,
Peraldus, and not these writers, provided Aquinas with the model for treating so many dif-
ferent virtues in his Summa.

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 Aquinas 's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues 11

moral questions based on two pages of text in the Lombard's Sentences

(In Sent 3.33). Previous commentators had determined far fewer ques-
tions on this text. For example, Albert the Great treated only four, and
Bonaventure, six. In comparison with his predecessors, Aquinas exhib-
ited a marked interest in the moral life.
In this treatment of moral virtue, Aquinas adopted the framework of
Peraldus's Summa. This appeared in the general structure of Aquinas's
moral treatment. As noted above, Peraldus divided his treatment of vir-
tue into two sections, one on general issues concerning virtue and the
other on specific virtues. Aquinas used the same structure in his treat-
ment. He first treated general issues concerning moral virtue and then
considered specific virtues. Considering the influence that Peraldus had
within the Dominicans and the lack of any similar model in earlier com-
mentaries on the Sentences, the conclusion seems apt that Aquinas used
Peraldus's text as a model. As I will explain in section 3, the structural
influence became even more pronounced in Aquinas's Summa.
Like Peraldus, Aquinas discussed human effort and divine infusion
within his treatment of virtue in general. He distinguished between the
acquired and the infused virtues in order to ascertain the efficient cau-
sality of moral virtue. In clarifying this, he supplied one of the four
causes necessary in order to provide a scientific account of virtue (In
Sent 3.33.1, intro. div). More sympathetic to acquired virtue than Per-
aldus, Aquinas argued that since human beings naturally possess the
principles of knowledge and virtue, they produce this virtue out of these
principles through action (In Sent 3.33.1.2.2). Moral virtue is acquired
through human habitual activity, a process that can be recognized by
noting how actions that were once difficult become easier in time.
The human role was so important for Aquinas that he departed from
Peraldus and claimed that human beings do cooperate with God in the
acquisition of specific moral virtues. Peraldus argued that we can pre-
pare for, but not cooperate in, the reception of moral virtue. To be fair to
Peraldus, the concept of cooperation that he opposed is one that had to
do with assistance. He denied that human beings assist the Godhead in
carrying out divine work. Aquinas did not depart from Peraldus so far as
to argue for direct human assistance to the divine; rather, he argued
that because human nature is received from God, activities that conform
with nature represent cooperation with the divine. Since acquired moral
virtue is produced according to the natural principles of virtue that have
been received from God, the acquired virtues are exercised in coopera-
tion with the highest good (In Sent 3.33.1.2.2 and ad 1). In this sense,
the acquired moral virtues are both a gift from and a cooperation with
the highest good.
On the other hand - and this is the tension I wish to highlight in re-
gard to the implications that it had for his view of moral virtue -

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12 Journal of Religious Ethics

Aquinas held that there is a type of moral virtue which is infused but in
which no human cooperation occurs (In Sent 3.33.1.2.2 ad 1). He took up
this issue in the subsequent quaestiuncula, in which he considered
whether or not it was necessary to posit morally infused virtue. He as-
sumed there that human beings are freely ordained by God to a certain
good that stands above nature, one that cannot be obtained through ac-
quired virtue. This good is the highest good for human beings. He sug-
gested that the acquired virtues aim at the flourishing of human nature
without extending to this good. Therefore, Aquinas argued that, in order
for human beings to be able to attain their highest good and final end, it
is necessary that there be virtues that direct human life to this end.
Since such virtues are not acquired by human effort, he concluded that
they must be received through the grace of God (In Sent 3.33.1.2.3).
Therefore, moral virtue infused by God is necessary if one is to obtain
the highest good. This is a top-down version of necessity that concerns
the conditions required for eternal glory.
On this account, there is a specific difference between the acquired
and the infused moral virtues in that dissimilar ends serve as principles
of operation. Aquinas made a specific distinction that helps to clarify
this difference, one between the moral virtues that perfect human be-
ings in regard to the civil life and those that perfect in regard to the
spiritual life - that is, between the civic virtues that direct actions to the
earthly body-politic and the suprapolitical virtues that ordain human
beings to the highest good (In Sent 3.33.1.2.4). For example, Aquinas
stated specifically that acquired fortitude differs from infused fortitude
and acquired temperance from infused temperance. Yet both concern the
same matter. To clarify this point, he considered the case of those who
die as a consequence of their refusal to betray the good. He explained
that while the matter of death is the same whether a person gives up his
or her life to preserve the faith or to secure a civil goal, the infused forti-
tude that is necessary for religious martyrdom differs specifically from
acquired fortitude because its purpose goes beyond what is required for
the good of the civil community (In Sent 3.33.1.2.4 ad 2). Therefore, even
though acquired and infused moral virtue concern the same matter
when we speak materially, they concern different ends when we speak
formally.
Clearly, then, on Aquinas's account, the infused moral virtues are
needed if human beings are to obtain the highest good; what is not so
clear is their relation to the acquired virtues. Aquinas said little about
this relationship. He proceeded to a consideration of the acquired cardi-
nal virtues and of those virtues that fall under them, but he did so with-
out explaining specific infused moral virtues (In Sent 3.33.2 and 3). For
example, in the case of fortitude, he referred to Aristotle in order to
claim that one's activity is rendered good through the habits of virtue (In

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 Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues 13

Sent 3.33.2.4.2; NE 1106al5.). This allowed him to conclude that reason

does not stand apart from the lower powers, but comes to participate in
the irascible powers through the virtue of fortitude. In light of what
Aquinas said about infused virtue, it is interesting that he did not con-
sider martyrdom, which he earlier gave as an example of infused forti-
tude; instead, he postponed the discussion of the place of the martyrs in
the next life until the fourth book of his commentary (In Sent 4.49.5.3.2
ad 8-10). It is difficult to tell whether at this point he viewed the infused
virtue of martyrdom as only a spiritual appendix to the acquired virtue
of fortitude or thought that it played a more central role.
The question that this introduces for a modern reader - as well as to
those familiar with Peraldus - is whether the infused moral virtues
were, for Aquinas, like icing on a single-layer cake - important, but n
concerned with the body of the cake itself. For example, did he think
acquired virtues possessed their own independent status upon whi
God, if he so wills, can arrange a sort of divine icing? If the answer is y
then it makes sense to treat Aquinas's view of acquired moral virt
apart from what he said about infused moral virtue, as has been a com
mon practice in philosophical discussions. Yet I suggest that this i
pression is due in part to Aquinas's dependence on the structure of th
Sentences, a framework which kept him from treating specific infus
moral virtues under the heading of moral virtue. Commenting on
Lombard's text on the four cardinal virtues in distinction 33, he con-
structed an appreciation of acquired virtue without clearly addres
Peraldus's concern for the role played by the highest good; thus, he l
himself open to a separatist reading of the relation between the acqui
and infused moral virtues. Given the account of the moral virtues of-
fered in this commentary, Aquinas can appear to be in close agreement
with Aristotle on the central place of the acquired virtues in the goo
life. The consequences of his view of infused moral virtue can appear
limited in regard to acquired moral virtue.
That these appearances are misleading is, however, made clear by the
more adequate treatment of this relation that is advanced in his Summa
theologiae. There Aquinas was no longer bound by the structure of the
Sentences, but was free at last to integrate his treatments of acquired
and infused virtue. It is to this text that we must turn in order to clarif
the significance of the infused moral virtues.

3. Summa theologiae
The importance of Peraldus for Aquinas's treatment of virtue is even
more apparent in the second part of the Summa theologiae (ST). Again,
Aquinas adopted the structural framework of treating general issue
concerning virtue first and then turning to the specific virtues. Th

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14 Journal of Religious Ethics

questions concerning virtue in general had multiplied to such a point

that they took up the first half of the treatment, that is, the first part of
the second part. The second half, the second part of the second part, was
given over to issues concerning specific virtues. Boyle points out that
the structure of this treatment was so novel that some scholars have
thought that Aquinas was the first to write such an account.11 Yet Aqui-
nas had already done so in his commentary on the Sentences, as had
Peraldus before him.
In contrast to Aquinas, Peraldus had devoted more detail to specific
virtues and vices than to virtue in general. The number of virtues Per-
aldus treated was remarkable - many more than appear in the Lom-
bard's Sentences or in commentaries on the Sentences. Aquinas offered a
similar account in his Summa, covering much of the same material
(Boyle 1982, 22). There is no other work that I know that could have
served Aquinas here as a model in terms of the numbers and types of
specific virtues and vices. As I concluded earlier, considering the role of
Peraldus's Summa as a reference work within the Dominican order, it is
reasonable to assume that Aquinas knew the work quite well and that
he may have had a copy before him when writing his Summa.

3.1 True virtue and the lower appetites

In the Summa, Aquinas widened the scope of the infused moral vir-
tues to include all human action. He argued that God infuses the theo-
logical virtues in place of the natural principles of the acquired virtues
for the purpose of ordaining moral action to the highest good (ST I-II
62.1 and 63.3). With more precision than he had achieved in his com-
mentary on the Lombard, he explained that while the theological vir-
tues begin to perfect people in relation to the highest good, the soul
needs to be perfected in relation to things other than God (ST I-II 63.3
ad 2). People act not only in regard to God but also in regard to physical
objects and other people. Therefore, in order for these other actions to be
ordered rightly to the highest good, there is a need for infused moral vir-
tue. This represented a more detailed account of the rationale for this
type of virtue than he had developed in the Scriptum.
For instance, in the Summa it is clear that the soul stands in need of
perfection in regard to all those things that a person fears and desires.
Without a moral component, there are many human actions that the
theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity would not direct to the
highest good. This claim is important because for an individual to attain
this good, infused moral virtue is required for each and every human

11 For example, Boyle mentions Deman 1951, 105 (Boyle 1982, 22).

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 Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues 15

activity; this, then, was Aquinas's reason for arguing that all the moral
virtues need to be infused together with charity (ST I-II 65.3). He ar-
gued for the infused replication of all of one's acquired moral virtues, as
well as the infusion of those needed virtues that have yet to be acquired.
Aquinas provided further explanation of this point in his discussion of
the activities of the lower appetites, in his contemporaneous disputed
question De virtutibus in communi (DVC).12 The objection was raised
that since infused virtue is in the mind rather than in the irrational
parts, moral virtue is not infused. Against this view Aquinas argu
that infused moral virtue is in the lower appetites in order to ordain
them to the ultimate end (DVC 10 ad 5, ob 11, ad 11). Although, accord-
ing to Aquinas, faith, hope, and charity do not relate directly to the
lower appetites, these appetites must nevertheless be ordered to the
highest good if a person is to progress on the road to perfection. To speak
of infused moral virtue is to indicate an aid necessary for the perfection
of the whole person. Since Aquinas took creation, including the lower
appetites, so seriously, he posited a type of virtue for this purpose. Be-
cause he understood acquired moral virtue to be insufficient for this end
and because he held that the only other type of virtue is infused, he rea-
soned that there must be infused moral virtue.
Aquinas offered the examples of the infused virtues of temperance and
fortitude, which must be received if a person's lower appetites are to be or-
dained to the highest good. Again he made the material-formal distinction
in order to explain the difference between the two forms of each. Both ac-
quired and infused temperance are materially the same, for they concern
the enjoyable in regard to touch. Yet acquired temperance directs a per-
son's actions in regard to the good of the present life, while infused
temperance directs a person to the final end (DVC 10 ad 8). Therefore, ac-
quired virtue falls short of what is required for true virtue. Within his
teleological account of human action, the infused moral virtues were not
just icing on the cake of acquired virtue - that is, he did not construe them
to concern actions that ought to stand apart from the acquired virtues. On
the contrary, he held that if all human actions are to have the proper tele-
ology, then every action stands in need of infused moral virtue. As a neces-
sary requirement for human moral perfection, infused moral virtue is
(ideally) to govern even the lowest human actions.
This picture of infused virtue was clarified in Aquinas's treatment of
individual virtues and vices in the second part of the second part of the
Summa. While Aquinas continued to follow Peraldus's schema of treat-
ing general issues of moral virtue before treating specific moral virtues,
he departed from the practice of treating virtue and vice separately,

12 On dating the De virtutibus in communi at the time of the composition of the second
part of the Summa, see Weisheipl 1974, 365; Torrell 1996, 205, 336.

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16 Journal of Religious Ethics

choosing instead to adopt the structure of Aristotle's Nicomachean Eth-

ics by considering specific virtues together with the corresponding vices.
This was not an arbitrary or accidental decision. Since he, like Aristotle,
viewed virtue as a mean between two excesses, he believed that the best
way to analyze any particular moral virtue was to treat it in connection
with the vices that mark its absence.
By attending to his remarks on the specific virtues, we can develop a
much clearer understanding of the relation he posited between the ac-
quired and infused moral virtues and of the privileged position he ac-
corded to the infused moral virtues. Let us take as our example his
treatment of fortitude.

3.2 Martyrdom as the exemplification of infused fortitude

Aquinas followed Peraldus in structuring his accounts of the cardinal
virtues in two parts, first treating the virtue in general and then the
specific virtues that fall under it. For example, he first treated fortitude
in general and then the specific virtues of fortitude. No longer bound by
the constraints of the Sentences, he integrated the virtue of martyrdom
into his treatment of fortitude. Furthermore - and importantly for my
argument - he presented this infused moral virtue as the most perfect
act of fortitude, highlighting this point by discussing it immediately
after his treatment of fortitude in general and before a consideration of
the vices associated with fortitude (ST II-II 124.intro to the question;
see Congar 1974, 343-44; Hauerwas 1993, 259-60; Yearley 1990, 141).
Such a placement distanced martyrdom from the other specific virtues
of fortitude, which he treated only after discussion of the vices.
Aquinas's argument for presenting martyrdom as the principal act of
fortitude was that since human beings love life more than any other
present good, to give it up out of love for God is the most perfect act.13
The example of Saint Lawrence's death on a gridiron for his adherence
to the highest good, given in Aquinas's commentary on Aristotle's M-
comachean Ethics, serves to illustrate this point.14 The cruelty of the

13 ST II-II 124.3. Aquinas appears to have drawn on both Peraldus and Aristotle in
constructing this argument. In a less precise manner, Peraldus talked about the virtue of
fortitude as concerning the ability not to fear giving service to God through death (SW
2.3.4.5; 1:213). Aristotle argued that since death is most terrible, courage in the face of
death is courage to the fullest extent (NE 1115a26-35).
14 Sententia libri Ethicorum 3.2, 395. Discussing the roasting of Saint Lawrence in a
commentary on the Ethics of Aristotle indicates how deeply Aquinas thought the infused
virtues impinged upon the acquired. Conversely, as this was a frequent subject of liturgi-
cal and ecclesiastical art, the moral purpose of such depictions ought to be kept in mind.
For example, consider the central doorway of the west portal of the Cathedral of Notre
Dame in Paris: the acquired and infused virtues are depicted on the socle, the lowest level

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 Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues 17

suffering undergone was not a good in itself (Aquinas noted that it is

evil), but it did indicate the strength of the relation to God that Law-
rence would not violate (ST II-II 124.3).
In light of this good, martyrdom is a higher moral end than guarding
one's purse from highway robbers or fighting in battle merely for politi-
cal goals (ST II-II 123.5 and ad 1). While protecting one's purse could
serve the civic good, risking one's life for this purpose could go against
the highest good. Loss of life could keep one from carrying out responsi-
bilities that serve the ultimate good, and it could therefore lead to seri-
ous moral evil. Therefore, guarding one's purse could run contrary to the
highest good in a way that martyrdom does not.
For Aquinas, martyrdom meant having the strength to consider the
present world of little value when compared with the highest good in the
life to come (ST II-II 124.4). He was not arguing for the degradation of
this world, but for a perspective that would properly view this world
within a wider context. While he thought that this virtue could be shown
perfectly only in the approach of death, he held that infused fortitude is
also needed in order to perform lesser deeds in light of the highest good.
Since the perfect act of fortitude has implications for the other types of
fortitude, Aquinas discussed martyrdom before commenting on these
others.
In order to attain the highest good, acts of the civil virtue of fortitude
would need to be redirected to a suprapolitical end through infused forti-
tude. For example, one who needs strength to continue to car-pool with
others would do so in light of the final end and not just for the financial
savings that would result. A person could car-pool in order to protect the
environment for the sake of society, but this would still be for the good of
the present life and not for the highest good. With infused fortitude, one
could car-pool out of concern for divine providence, which includes more
than a political end. This does not mean that savings would not occur,
but that one's attachment to the highest good would tend to redirect
choices otherwise made only for personal, domestic, or civic goals.
In addition to redirecting acts of acquired fortitude, infused moral vir-
tue also has implications for the infused moral virtues of prudence, tem-
perance, and justice, and those virtuous actions that they direct; of this
dimension of Aquinas's argument I can provide only the briefest hint.
He explained, for example, that infused fortitude strengthens one in in-
fused justice (ST II-II 124.2 ad 1), which, in contrast to acquired justice,
is the true justice in that it concerns actions that are just before God (ST
I-II 100.12). This relation between infused fortitude and infused justice

of sculpture, and the martyrs and virgins on the archivolt, the highest level. Such were the
implications that theological discussions had for society at large (Katzenellenbogen 1964,
65-69, 75, 81; Sauerlander and Hirmer 1972, 13, 31, plates 145, 148, 149, 151).

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18 Journal of Religious Ethics

would have enormous consequences for everyday actions. For instance,

a shopkeeper would have the strength to give each customer his or her
due not only according to local custom, but according to divine justice.
Actions would no longer be just with reference only to human nature or
to civil life.15

3.3 The relation of infused and acquired moral virtue

Thus, in the Summa of Aquinas, as in the work of Peraldus, infused
virtue and the gifts of grace played a central role in the presentation of
moral virtue. As we have seen, Peraldus distinguished between those
virtues that are received by grace alone and those for which one can
prepare. The cardinal virtues belong to the second case. Here human
effort prepares a person to receive virtue by way of infusion and does
not represent cooperation. All moral virtue, he asserted, is attained
through infusion. Within this intellectual context, it was not unusual
that Aquinas also granted a primary role to infusion in the Christian
life of virtue, suggesting that it is only in this way that a person can
come to possess the true cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, temper-
ance, and fortitude.
The significance of the view that the infused moral virtues are needed
in order to live the truly good life should not be underestimated. Consid-
eration of Aquinas's audience highlights this significance. Whether or
not he was still writing for beginners in the study of theology at the time
he was composing the second part of the second part, his audience would
have consisted largely of members of the Dominican order (Weisheipl
1974, 222-23; Boyle 1982, 15-20; Torrell 1996, 142-46). As the perfect
act of fortitude, martyrdom would have had particular appeal for such
an audience, many of whom would have been preparing to preach to the
Cathars in southern France and Italy, as well as to the Muslims in
Spain. They would have been reminded, for instance, of the example of
Peter of Verona, who had been raised by Cathar parents and later joined
the Dominicans. Preaching against the Cathars and being raised to the
rank of general inquisitor in northern Italy, he worked under heroic con-
ditions only to be killed with an ax by the Cathar Carino in 1252. 16 His
canonization a year later confirmed the contemporary significance of the
infused virtue of martyrdom. The two sermons on Peter given by Per-
aldus between 1254 and 1259 confirmed the importance of conceiving

15 This point can be extended to the virtues of prudence and temperance (ST II-II 47.14
and ad 3, II-II 147.1-3). On the infused virtue of prudence, see Porter 1992, 34-37.
16 On Peter's death, see Dondaine 1953, 101-7. For an account of his intellectual con-
tribution to the Dominican efforts against the Cathars, including selections from the
Summa that has been attributed to him, see Kappeli 1947.

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 Aquinas 's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues 19

martyrdom as an optimal example of fortitudinal strength.17 Within

that context, for one to aim his or her actions at anything less than the
highest good would have been the equivalent of moral failure.
On a lesser scale, one could talk about the need for the acquired vir-
tue of fortitude in order to participate in a disputation with resolve, yet
on my reading of Aquinas, such an action would be imperfect if it were
not directed to the highest good. The reception of infused fortitude
would direct one to perfect virtue even when disputing a question in
logic. To focus on the acquired virtues apart from the infused would have
been to live one's life apart from the highest good, which for a Dominican
would have been the gravest of moral evils.
This does not mean that he thought that the acquired virtues had no
role to play in the Christian moral life. Aquinas agreed with Aristotle that
human beings acquire virtue from their own actions, and he offered a
sketch of how this relates to infused virtue. For example, in reply to the
classic Augustinian objection that there is no need for acquired virtue be-
cause God alone effects virtue in us without us, he argued that the ac-
quired virtues dispose a person to receive infused moral virtue.18 On this
view, the acquired virtue of fortitude supplies the type of characteristics in
regard to fear that prepare a person to receive infused moral virtue. With
the example of martyrdom in mind, we could put it this way: a person who
is strong in regard to the civil life is more like one strengthened in regard
to martyrdom than a person who lacks the acquired virtue of fortitude.
The strength of the former stands in need of redirection, whereas the lat-
ter needs to receive both strength and the proper teleology.
This view could be interpreted to suggest that, according to Aquinas,
infused virtue replaces acquired virtue for the Christian. After all, if ac-
quired fortitude prepares one to receive infused fortitude, there is no
reason why the acquired must persist after the reception of the infused.
Why not say that when the infused virtue governs and directs a person's
actions, the corresponding acquired virtue disappears - like the prover-
bial ladder that can be kicked away when the climber is secure on the
higher level? My claim is that the infused virtue does not replace the ac-
quired virtue for Aquinas, but rather builds upon it. This is a point that
is not pursued in the literature mentioned at the outset of this investiga-
tion, yet it is important for reconstructing Aquinas's view of the role
played by acquired virtue in the life of the Christian.19

17 "De Sancto Petro Martyre" by Peraldus appears in Sermones de dominicis et festis

(1632, 99). These sermons were collected and circulated within the order by 1259/1260. On
dating these sermons, see Dondaine 1948, 207.
18 ST I-II 92.1 ad 1; DVC 2 ad 18. Peraldus had already argued that the cardinal vir-
tues dispose one to receive perfect virtue (SW 2.2.1; 1:15).
19 While Romanus Cessario points out that infused virtue perfects acquired virtue, he
does not explain how this occurs (1991, 125).

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20 Journal of Religious Ethics

Aquinas claimed that receiving the proper infused moral virtue

strengthens the corresponding acquired moral virtue (ST I-II 51.4 ad 3).
That is why he argued that the infused virtues do not counter human
nature, but rather redirect and strengthen human action (ST I-II 51.4
ad 2). He offered a medicinal analogy to explicate this point. Just as a
remedy restores health to one who is naturally healthy rather than
causing another type of health, so acts produced by infused moral virtue
do not cause another type of habit but strengthen habits already pos-
sessed (ST I-II 51.4 ad 3). The infused virtues are like a medicine that
strengthens the acquired virtues and allows one to surpass them in liv-
ing the good life. Without the parallel infused moral virtues that redi-
rect one's actions, such actions would remain imperfect. Therefore, one
prepares for the infusion of moral virtue through the acquisition of
moral habits that are themselves strengthened by infusion.

3.4 Two virtues in one action

This relationship between infused and acquired virtue makes it diffi-

cult to distinguish the two types when evaluating the intricacies o
human action (a long-standing problem in the history of philosophi
and theological ethics), yet Aquinas made a specific distinction between
the human and divine contributions. For example, he used the distin
tion between infused virtue that is effected by God without us and ac-
quired virtue that is effected with us, in order to argue for a specif
difference between the two (ST I-II 63A.sed contra). Furthermore, they
are specifically different because they have different ends; acquired vi
tues direct action to a political end while the infused virtues direct ac-
tion to the highest good.
The difficulty is this: if one already possesses an acquired moral
virtue and receives the corresponding infused version, how can the
be a specific difference between the two virtues in one concrete action
Should we not attribute the action to one virtue or the other? Aquinas
responded to this issue briefly when arguing that infused virtue
strengthens acquired virtue (ST I-II 51.4 ad 3). He claimed that the
two work together and not independently from each other. Yet how are
we to understand this response? What does it mean for an act to be ac-
quired and infused when there is a specific difference between the
two?
To claim that acquired and infused virtue cannot occur in the same
act is to assume that both lie on the same playing field. Like physical ob-
jects, if one virtue is present at one time and place, the other is not. This
is a category mistake. Paying attention to the different ways that Aqui-
nas talked about virtue undoes this perplexity. He used the language of
Aristotle's four causes to explain how these two types of virtue are

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 Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues 21

similar, yet different,20 so I will use his remarks on the material, effi-
cient, and final causes of moral actions in order to explain how both
types of virtue can be at work in a single concrete deed.
Both types of virtue can be in the same act in regard to the material
cause. As noted above, the matter is the same for both. Consider Aqui-
nas's example of the difference between curbing one's appetite for food in
order to protect the health of the body and abstaining from overeating
out of love for God (ST I-II 63.4, II-II 146.1 ad 1). The first is an act of ac-
quired virtue and the second, an act of infused virtue. The matter of
both is desire for food. Assume that a person is converted to Christianity
who has already acquired good eating habits. Also assume that this per-
son receives the infused virtue of abstinence and limits his or her con-
sumption in order to retain a clear head out of love for God. The same
material cause would exist both before and after conversion.
On the other hand, acquired and infused moral virtue differ in regard
to the efficient cause. For example, acquiring the habit of abstinence dif-
fers from receiving through infusion the strength to abstain. However,
even though the efficient causes differ, this is no reason why both cannot
be present in one concrete act. The reason for this is that virtue is rarely,
if ever, absolute in the concrete. For example, as Porter has argued in re-
lation to acquired virtue, virtue is not normally exercised to the point of
perfection (1995, 162-65). This would be the ideal at which to aim. In
fact, Aquinas took into account different capacities between people and
situations which shape a person's acquired acts of virtue. For example,
in acquiring the virtue of abstinence, one can acquire specific expres-
sions and ways of handling his or her levels of desire. These acquired
character traits have implications for one's reception of infused virtue
because there is a psychological continuity between a person's acquired
and infused acts of virtue. Infused virtue builds upon, but does not de-
stroy, virtuous characteristics acquired through human effort. In this
sense, two different efficient causes can be at work when one acts ac-
cording to an infused moral virtue that corresponds to an acquired vir-
tue already possessed.
Since, as we have already seen, acquired and infused moral virtues
have different ends, they differ in regard to the final cause. For example,
acquired abstinence serves the civil good and infused abstinence serves
the final good. Yet the second can and often should complete the first.
For example, abstaining from food in order to keep one's head clear out
of love for God should also serve bodily health. The higher end directs
the work of the acquired virtue and transforms its final cause.

20 ST I-II 55.4. Peraldus had defined the theological virtues according to the four
causes of Aristotle (SW 2.2.1; 1:15).

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22 Journal of Religious Ethics

Furthermore, acquired virtue can enable one to move more easily to-
ward the final end. That is why Aquinas argued that it is easier for one
with acquired virtue to live the life of infused virtue than it is for one
with infused moral virtue alone (ST I-II 65.3 ad 2). Acquired virtue can
remove habits that are contrary to infused virtue, habits that make acts
difficult and unpleasant. In this regard, infused moral virtue transforms
the final cause of acquired virtue and benefits from the acquired habits.
So, to sum up, for Aquinas, a single action can be simultaneously one
of acquired and infused moral virtue. Infusion strengthens those charac-
teristics of acquired virtue that remain, and it supplies an overriding
final cause that transforms the virtue. In the example given, abstaining
out of love for God could fill out and perfect the traits one has exhibited
in showing concern for bodily health. Even here, the concept of acquired
virtue is valuable in order to point out when an action might lead to ill
health. For instance, it goes against reason for one to harm his or her
health through the infused virtue of abstention. Such distinctions would
be helpful for Dominican preachers and confessors in order to provide
clear moral advice of a "medicinal" nature. Within this context, acquired
virtue retains a role while a priority is reserved for infused virtue.
Though it by no means disappears, acquired virtue no longer holds the
same place in the moral life that it had prior to conversion.

4. Conclusion

Aquinas represents a Dominican tradition that carved out a r

human effort within a theological account of moral virtue. He
at a position that is surprisingly similar to and yet ultimately di
from that of Peraldus. Christians should not praise the acquir
tues only for their own sake, but chiefly in order to prepare the
and others for the reception and retention of a panoply of infus
virtues. While Aquinas held that human beings can cooperate
acquisition of the acquired virtues (on this point he differs fr
aldus), he regarded true virtue as a gift for which one can prepar
in which one cannot cooperate. Like Peraldus, he believed that
beings can open the window, but not cooperate in the infusion of
Clearly, we are no longer talking here about the acquired vi
Aristotle, but about a more theological type.21 While there ar
points of agreement between Aristotle and Aquinas on the moral

21Noting that Aquinas did not provide a moral philosophy in his Summa theologiae,
Jacques Maritain writes: "The Secunda Pars of the Summa theologiae offers us a complete
and perfectly articulated theological treatise on human conduct. But we have other things
to do than to follow and comment on this treatise. For our task is philosophical, not theo-
logical" (1964, ix).

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 Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues 23

virtues, in order to be fair to Aquinas, significant differences need to be

kept in mind.
When writing accounts of Aquinas's view of moral virtue, we should
not neglect the infused replication of the acquired moral virtues. The
Dominican context demonstrates the importance of discussing the ac-
quired moral virtues in light of the infused. The former have a role to
play in the moral life, but they are useful only within a limited domain.
For instance, Porter's skillful discussions of acquired fortitude would be
enhanced through consideration of the relation of acquired to infused
fortitude (1995, 170-79). After all, according to Aquinas the charity and
faith proper to martyrdom are ideals for the Christian that have impli-
cations for every other act of virtue. Reading him within the Dominican
intellectual context suggests that this is the goal both for the entire com-
munity and for those to whom they minister. Infused virtue is not an end
only for a few. This introduces certain puzzles concerning the place of
reason and infusion in the moral life, and others concerning degrees of
rationality and charity. Clarifying these will contribute much to the re-
trieval of Aquinas's view of virtue and generate a conceptual language
useful for current moral discussions.

REFERENCES

ABBREVIATIONS

DVC = De virtutibus in communi, by Thomas Aquinas

In Sent - Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, by Thomas Aquinas
NE = Nichomachean Ethics, by Aristotle
SA = Summa aurea, by William of Auxerre
SB = Summa de bono, by Phillip the Chancellor
Sent = Sentences, by Peter the Lombard
ST = Summa theologiae, by Thomas Aquinas
SW = Summa de vitiis et virtutibus, by William Peraldus

REFERENCE LIST

Aquinas, Thomas
1929-47 Scriptum super libros Sententiarum. 1252-1256. Edited by R. P.
Mandonnet and Maria Fabianus Moos. 4 vols. Paris: P. Lethielleux.
1934 In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio.
1271-1272. Edited by Angeli M. Pirotta. Turin: Marietti.
1942 Quaestiones Disputatae. 7th ed. 5 vols. Turin and Rome: Marietti.
1953 Summa theologiae. 1266-1273. 5 vols. Ottawa Institute of Medie-
val Studies. Ottawa: Harpell's Press.

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24 Journal of Religious Ethics

1992 Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia cum hypertextibus in CD-ROM.

Edited by Roberto Busa. Milan: Editoria Elettronica Editel.
Boyle, Leonard
1982 The Setting of the Summa theologiae of Saint Thomas. Toronto:
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

Bullet, Gabriel
1958 Vertus morales infuses et vertus morales acquises selon saint Tho-
mas d'Aquin. Fribourg: Editions universitaires.
Casey, John
1990 Pagan Virtue: An Essay in Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Cessario, Romanus
1991 The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics. Notre Dame, Ind.: Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Press.
Chenu, Marie-Dominique
1964 Toward Understanding St. Thomas. Translated by A.-M. Landry
and D. Hughes. Chicago: Henry Regnery.
Coerver, Robert Florent
1946 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues. Washington, D.C.:
Catholic University of America Press.
Colish, Marcia L.
1994 Peter Lombard. 2 vols. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Congar, Yves M.-J.

1974 "Le traite de la force dans la 'Somme Theologique. "' Angelicum 51:
331-48.

Deman, T.
1951 Aux origines de la theologie morale. Montreal: Institut d'Etudes
medievales; Paris: J. Vrin.
DenifLe, Heinrich
1886 "Assignation und Austausch der Biicher im Kloster zu Barcelona
nach der Mitte des 13. Jhs." Archiv fiir Literatur-und Kirchen-
geschichte des Mittelalters 2:202-3, 241-48.
Destrez, Jean
1933 Etudes critiques sur les oeuvres de saint Thomas dAquin d'apres la
tradition manuscrite. Bibliotheque thomistes, vol. 18. Paris: J.
Vrin.

Dondaine, Antoine
1948 "Guillaume Peyraut: Vie et oeuvres." Archivum fratrum praedica-
torum 18:162-236.
1953 "Saint Pierre Martyr." Archivum fratrum praedicatorum 23:66-162.
Friars Preachers, Order of the
1893- Analecta Sacri Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum. Rome: Vatican
Press.

Hall, Pamela M.
1994 Narrative and the Natural Law: An Interpretation of Thomistic
Ethics. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.

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 Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues 25

Harvey, John
1955 "The Nature of the Infused Moral Virtues." Proceedings of the
Tenth Annual Convention of the Catholic Theological Society of
America 10:172-221.

Hauerwas, Stanley
1993 "The Difference of Virtue and the Difference It Makes: Courage Ex
emplified." Modern Theology 9:258-60.
Humbertus de Romanis
1888-89 Opera. Edited by J. J. Berthier. 2 vols. Rome: A. Befani.
Inglis, John
1997 "Philosophical Autonomy and the Historiography of Medieval Phi-
losophy." The British Journal for the History of Philosophy 5:21-53.
1998 Spheres of Philosophical Inquiry and the Historiography of Medie-
val Philosophy. Brill's Studies in Intellectual History. Leiden: E. J.
Brill.

Jordan, Mark
1994 "The Competition of Authoritative Languages and Aquinas's Theo-
logical Rhetoric." Medieval Philosophy and Theology 4:71-90.
Kappeli, Thomas
1947 "Une Somme contre les heretiques de S. Pierre Martyr(?)." Archi-
vum fratrum praedicatorum 17:295-335.
Katzenellenbogen, Adolf
1964 Allegories of the Virtues and Vices in Medieval Art from Early Chris-
tian Times to the Thirteenth Century. New York: W. W. Norton.
Keenan, James R, S.J.
1992 Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae.
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
Kent, Bonnie
1995 Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thir-
teenth Century. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America
Press.

Lottin, Odon
1949 "Les premieres definitions et classifications des vertus au moyen
age." In Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siecles, 6 vols, 3:99-
150. Gembloux, Belgium: J. Duculot; Louvain: Abbaye du Mont
Cesar, 1942-1960.
Maclntyre, Alasdair
1984 After Virtue. 2d ed. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press.

Marenbon, John
1988 Early Medieval Philosophy (480-1150): An Introduction. Rev. ed.
London and New York: Routledge.
Maritain, Jacques
1964 Moral Philosophy. Translated by Marshall Suther et al. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons.

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26 Journal of Religious Ethics

Mclnerny, Ralph
1982 Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas.
Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press.
1992 Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice. Washington, D.C.:
Catholic University of America Press.
1993 "Ethics." In The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, edited by Nor-
man Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, 196-216. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Mulchahey, M. Michele
1998 "First the Bow Is Bent in Study. . . ." Dominican Education before
1350. Studies and Texts, 132. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Me-
dieval Studies.

Peraldus, William
1629 Summae virtutum ac vitiorum. 1236-1250. Edited by Rodolphi
Clutii. 2 vols. Cologne: Antonij Boetzeri Haeredum.
1632 Sermones aurei. De tempore et sanctis Mira. Edited by Rodolphi
Clutii. Cologne: Antonij Boetzeri Haeredum.
Peter Lombard
1971-81 Sententiae in TV libris distinctae. 1155-1158. 3d ed. 2 vols. Grotta-
ferrata: Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas.
Peter of Poitiers
1961 Sententiae. ca. 1176. 2d ed. Edited by P. S. Moore and M. Dulong.
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Philip the Chancellor
1985 Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis Summa de bono. 1225-1228. Ed-
ited by Nicolai Wicki. 2 vols. Berne: A. Francke SA.
Porter, Jean
1992 "The Subversion of Virtue: Acquired and Infused Virtues in the
Summa theologiae." The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics
1992:19-41.
1995 Moral Action and Christian Ethics. New Studies in Christian Eth-
ics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Raymund of Penafort
1976 Summa de paenitentia. Edited by X. Ochoa and A. Diez. Universa
Bibliotheca Iuris, vol. IB. Rome: Commentarium pro religiosis.
Sauerlander, Willibald, and Max Hirmer
1972 Gothic Sculpture in France 1140-1270. Translated by Janet Sond-
heimer. New York: Harry N. Abrams.
Schockenhoff, Eberhard
1987 Bonum hominis: Die anthropologischen und theologischen Grund-
lagen der Tugendethik des Thomas von Aquin. Mainz: Matthias-
Griinewald.

Stump, Eleonore, and Norman Kretzmann

1991 "Being and Goodness." In Being and Goodness: The Concept of the
Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, edited by Scott
MacDonald, 98-128. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

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 Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues 27

Sutter, A. de
1963 "De virtutum moralium infusarum existentia controversia recen-
tior." Ephemerides Carmeliticae 14:413-31.
Torrell, Jean-Pierre
1996 The Person and His Work. Vol. 1 of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Trans-
lated by Robert Royal. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of
America Press.

Tugwell, Simon, ed. and trans.

1982 Early Dominicans: Selected Writings. Ramsey, N.J.: Paulist Press.
Vooght, P. de
1933 "Y a-t-il des Vertus Morales Infuses?" Ephemerides Theologicae
Lovanienses 10:232-42.

Weisheipl, James A.
1974 Friar Thomas D'Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works. Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc.
William of Auxerre
1980-87 Magistri Guillelmi Altissiodorensis Summa aurea. 1215-1229. Ed-
ited by Jean Ribaillier. Grottaferrata: Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad
Clara Aquas.
Yearley, Lee
1990 Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Cour-
age. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press.

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