SCOPE OF SECTION 300

Section 300 defines murder with reference to culpable homicide defined in s 299. If the
special requirements provided in cl1-4 of s 300 are fulfilled, culpable homicide will then
amount to murder, provided, of course, the act does not fall within any of the
Exceptions provided in s 300. If an act, which falls within cl 1-4 of s 300, also falls
within one of the Exceptions, then it will be culpable homicide not amounting to
murder.
A careful reading of s 300, in the backdrop of s 299, reveals that some clauses in
ss 299 and 300 overlap. Such overlapping, rather defining murder with reference to
culpable homicide, has led to a lot of discussions, debates and differences in_judicial
pronouncements about the scope of each section and the distinctions and ditferences
between them.
Culpable homicide is murder, if it is done with: 6) intention to cause death; or (i)
cention to cause bodily injury knowing that the injury caused is likely to cause death,

577
 Criminal Law

In) intention of causing bodily injury sufficicnt in the ordinary course of natureto
Cause death, or (iv) knowledge that the act is: (a) im1mincntly dangerous that in all
Probability it will causc death or bodily injury wlich is likcly to cause death, and (b)
OnC risk of
Without any justification for incurring the causing dcath or the injury.
Culpable homicidc does not amount to murder, if it is:
(1) Committed on grave and sudden provocatio, provided the provocation was
not: (a) voluntarily sought or deliberatcly caused by the accused; (b) a result of
any act done by public scrvant or in obedience to law; or (c) given by any act
done in the exercisc of the private defence.
(2) Committod in the excrcisc of the right of private defence of body or of property
by excecding, in good faith and without premeditation && without any intention
of causing harm more than that was necessary for exercising the right of private
defence, the right of self-defence.
(3) Committed by a public servant or a person aiding a public servant acting in
advancement of public justice by exceeding his powers conterred by law on him,
provided: (a) he believed, in good faith, that the act (leading to death) was
lawtul; (b) he thought it was necessary for discharging his duty, and (c) he had
no ill-will towards the person whose death was caused.
(4) Committed, without premeditation, in sudden fight in the heat of
a
without taking any undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner.
passion
5) Caused to a person above eighteen years of age with his consent.

INTENTIONALLY CAUSING DEATH-CLAUSE (1) OF SECTION 300

The first clause of s 300 stipulates that when an act
with the intention of causing death, then it is (including legal omission) is done
It is the simplest and at the same time, the most
culpable homicide amounting to murder.
gravest of the of murder. The
definition in this clause is direct and without any subtleties aboutspecies
it. It is the action of a
person with the clear intention of killing a person. 'Intention is what intention does. So,
the intention of the person can be
gathered from the action of the person. If a person
administers a deadly poison to a man, then it is
very clear that he has an intention to kill
that man, because the cause and effect of the act are
very clear. It is evident that the
cause of death is
poisoning and etfect of poisoning is to cause instant death. Intention to
cause death can be inferred from the
act. If the
administered the poison is known, then the case is all identity
of the person who has
are cases in real life so
neatly wrapped. However, seldom
simple to come by.
Since intention is always a of
mind, it can be proved only by its external
state
manifestations. When injuries intlicted on vital parts of the
are
instruments then the intention to kill can be
body with sharp edged
attributed to the offender.
When a person sets fire to the deceased, after another
had poured kerosene on his
body, there cannot be any doubt that the intention of the accused was to kill the
deceased.
When an accused hit the deceased on a vital
part of the body, the chest, with the
blade of a sword, wo feet in length with such
it was held the offence was
force as to impair the liver and the aorta.
plainly one of murder."

17 Chahat Khan State of Haryana AlR 1972 SC 2574, (1972) 3

v

Bandampalli Veukateswarlu State of Andhra Pradesh (1975) 3 SCC 408

SCC
18 v

19 Rau Bhagwanta Hargude State 492.

v
of Mabarashtra AIR 1979 SC 1224, (1979) Cr LI 1022 (SC).
578
 Homicide
When the accusec on seeing the deceased said that
he was searching for him
re and stabbed him with a knife, and especially when the knife
drawn
everywhere

was
as
ownwards as if to cut the
body into two, it was held that the intention to kill the
clear from the facts 20
deceased was very
Whetu the accused pierced a sharp edged weapon in the heart of the deceased and
uttered words of 'doing away with the deceased' before the commissioning the crime,
held by the Supreme Court that the intention to kill can be
of
itwas inferred.
In Vasanth v State of Mabarashtra, there was previous enmity between the accused
an the deceased. The accused and the deceased were seen grappling with each other.
Some persons who were present separated the two. The acused then went running to
his jeep, drove it on the wrong side and towards the deceased in high speed, knocked
him down and ran over him, killing him. The road on which the incident took place
was a wide and deserted one. There was no reason or necessity for the accused to have
driven the jeep in the wrong direction. The Supreme Court held that the accused had
deliberately dashed his jeep against the accused and ran over him with the intention to
cause his death.

It is pertinent to point out that the first clause of s 300, which is 'act done with
intention of causing death', is identical to the first clause of s 299, which is also 'doing an
act with the intention of causing death. Therefore, an act coming under cl (1) of s 300
will also fall under cl (1) of s 299, and in both instances, it will be culpable homicide
amounting to murder."

INTENTIONAL CAUSING OF BODILY INJURY WITH KNOWLEDGE THAT IT WILL

CAUSE DEATH-CLAUSE (2) OF SECTION 300

The second clause of s 300 stipulates that if a person intentionally causes bodily injury,
WIththe knowledge that such bodily injury will cause death of the person injured, then
It will be culpable homicide amounting to murder. Thus, the mens rea or the mental
attitude contemplated under cl2 of s 300 is twofold. First, there must be an intention to
cause bodily harm. Secondly, there must be 'knowledge that death is the likely result
or
consequence of such intended bodily injury.
The second clause of s 300 will apply if there is first, the intention to cause bodily

m and next, there is the subjective knowledge that death will be the likely
because it is
scquence of the intended injury." It is said to be 'subjective knowledge,
of his The knowledge
ccused's own personal perception of the consequencesin cl 3 ofact. s 300. Clause 3 of
requirement
20 ubJective, as opposed to the objective is sutticient the ordinary course of
Stipulates that the bodily injury intended of cl (3) otins 300 is that it must be
Lr to cause death. Therefore, the requirementin the ord1nary course to cause death.
objectivelyo
established that the injury is sufficient of the accused that matters, bur
wcctive, it means it is not the personal perception intentionally caused is sufficient
oDjectively speaking, in real terms, the injury
to caue death.

20 varaj v State ofTamil Nadu (1998) 9 SCC 308.

21 Katta Ramud. v State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1997 SC 2428.
3 AR 1998 SC 699, (1998) Cr LJ 844 (S)
AIR 1972 SC 952.
24 *Dusadh v State ofBihar (1972) 3 SCC 118, also State of Uttar Pradesh v Virendra
Rajwant 1874 ( 1878); see
S ing Singh Sta of Kerala AIR 1966 SC
h vv State
Prasad AIR 2004 SC 1517.
579
 Criminal Law

The second clause of s 300 is less precise than the first clause. In the first clase
act is donc with the intention to cause death, straight and simple. But in cl o
intcntion is only to cause such bodily injury, as the offender subjectivcly knows
knows is the
likely
to causc death. Thus, the only difference betwcen cl ( ) and cl (2) is the dee
intention. In a way, the essence of cl (2) is the knowlcdge of the accused that the O
act i
likely to cause death.
The second clause ofs 299, which states 'with the intcntion of causing, such bodily
injur as is likely to cause dcath', is similar to cl 2 of s 300. But, in s 299, "knowled
that the injury is likcly to cause dcatlh is not postulated as contemplated in cd (2 ge
ot
s300.
The word likely' in cl (2) ofs 300, coupled with the word knowledge', indic-
detinitencss or certainty of death and not a mere probability. It imports some kind of
certainty and not mere probability. It conveys that the chances of a thing happening are
ver high. This clause contemplates a situation, where the offender has a certain special
knowledge regarding the peculiar situation or health condition of the particular victim
that the intentional bodily injury is likely to be fatal."
In Willie (William) Saney v State of Madhya Pradesh," the accused was in love with
the deceased's sister, which the deceased did not like. There was a quarrel between them
and the deceased asked the accused to leave the house. The accused went and came back
with his brother. He called out for the deceased's sister. Instead, the deceased came out.
There was a heated exchange of words. The accused snatched a hockey stick, which was
with his brother, and hit the deceased on his head. As a result, there was a fracture of the
skull and the deceased died. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the act of the
accused is only one which was likely to cause death and the accused did not have any
special knowledge to bring in under cl (2) of s 300. The accused was convicted under
s 304, Pt II, and not under s 300.
In BN Srikantiah v State of Mysore," there were as many as 24 injuries on the
deceased and of them 21 were incised. They were on his head, the neck, the shoulders
and the forcarms. Since, most of the injuries were on vital parts and the weapons used
were sharp, it was held that the intention of causing bodily injuries was establisheur
bringing it under the cover of s 300.
In State of Rajasthan v Dhool Singh," the Supreme Court held the aceused guilty o
murder who inflicted incised cur with a sword on the neck of the deceased. which le
excessive bleeding and the consequential heart failure, on the ground that he kncwtna
the bodily injury caused by him would likely cause death of the injured.

INTENTIONAL CAUSING OF INJURY SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE DEATH-CLA

OF SECTION 300
oint.
The third clause, as stated earlier, views the matter from an objecive staug
consists of rwo parts. Under the first part, it has to be shown that there was an n h
o be
to intlict the particular injury. The second part requires that the injury intenaeu

25 Arun Nivalaji More v State ofMaharashtra (2006) 12 SCC 613, AIR 2006 SC 2880. I Bon

26 Ilhustration (b) appended to s 300 elucidates the proposition. Also see Rv Govindd (o
342; Anda v S State of Rajasthan AlR 1966 SC 148, 1966 Cr L.J 171.
27 AIR 1956 SC 116, (1956) Cr 1J 291 (SC).
28 AlR 1958 SC 672, (1958) Cr LJ 1251 (SC).
29 (2004) 12 SCC 546, AlR 2004 SC 1264.

580
 Homicide
cufficicnt in the ordinary
i n l l i c t e d

aISC bodily injury, course ot nature to

which is cause dcath. Ir
i n t c n t i o n
to
sutficient in the speaks
of an
d e a t h . The
of the clause is essencc
the ordinary course of nature to
I S C

of nature to
oursc of death." When the
cause death,"
acause sufficiency word
of the injury in the
ordinary
there
Very high probabi
is a
injury resulting'sufficiency
of the
in death.
is used. it
means where
te of
i
irsa Singh r State
hin (3)
ci of
Punjab," the Supreme Court laid down
300, the s that in order
a Casc With prosecution nnust
prove the
to
bring
1) l must cstablish. quite objectively, that a following:
bodily injury is
2)7hc nature of the injury must be proved.
2 l t must be proved that there was an
iniun, that is to say, that it was not
intcntion to inflict that
accidental particular bodily
kind of injury was intended. or
unintentional, or somc other
Once these three clements are
prOved to be
present, the
further, and enquiry proceeds
(4) lt must be proved that the injury of the
above, is sufficient to causejust described made up of the three
elements set out type
nature. death in the ordinary course of
The apex also stressed that: (1) the
court
existence and nature of
matter of pure
objective investigation, and (ii) the bodily injury must be a
ordinary course of nature is a matter of pure sufficiency of injury to cause death in
to do with the objective
intention of the offender. It does not
and inferential and it has nothing
cause death. It does matter there was no intention
not matter that there to
was no intention even to
that is sutticient to cause injury of a kind
cause death in the
that there is no ordinary course of nature. It does not even matter
knowledge
ntention to cause the
that an act of that kind will be
likely to cause death. Once the
bodily injury actually found to be
present is proved, the rest of the
cnguiry 1s purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter ot
oDcctive interence, the injury is sufficient in the pureliy
dcath course ot ordinary nature to cause

Latention as to
Sufficiency of Injury Not Required
shas Deen seen that the earlier cl (2) contemplates rwo levels ot
in to cause bodily injury and thereafter secondly, intention-tirst
the knowledge that such
K e l y to cause death. But, as far as cl (3) is concerned, it is sutticient thatbodily
there
de to cause the bodily injury that was actually caused. The subjective tactor
Cnds
ththe that. There need be no further enquiry whether the ottender had the intention
Hature knowedge to
that such bodily injury hould be sutficient in the ordinary course of
cause dearh. In Virsa Singh's case, the Supreme Court had observed that the
30 Gudar Dusadi
I966 SSC "State of Bihar (1972) 3 SCC 118, AIR 1972 SC 952, Audeu Suite of Rajiasthan NUN
31 u6
AIR 1958 48, (1968) Cr LJ 171(SC).
32 bid. pata SC 465.
icd i 3.These essentials and observations of che apes cout have becnc lovua claisic ia, are
ngraned in
e our
ga legall system, and have become part of the rule ot law. Sce, Chicku ee tnivutrt Aunju
rash ala (2004) 12 SCC 269, AIR 2004 SC 2688, ShAankur Navuua
2005 C LJ 2004
G84.
SC 1966, (2005) 9 SCC 7!; Thanguiya v Siule af lumil N.idu ( u w ) 9 S U ' a n u
926 (SC); KajKajinder v State of Haryana AlR 2000 SC 2257, (200o) S 4 ! (2000) C t
Pal vS ate of flaryana (2006) 9 SCC0/8, 2006 (4) SAL T0, dobus Al Siuie uf
4jasthan (2007) 9 CC 129, AÍR 2007 SC 1259, (2007) Ci 1J 1G0/ (90), Acdr Sngh Sute o
)ana (2008)
15 SCC 753, 2008(0) SCALE 435.
7

581
 Criminal Law

that the accuscd should have thc intention or knowledge cause ini
to
rcquirement
that is sutticicnt in the ordinary course to cause death, IS fallaci0us. The court held
the rwo parts to cl (3) arc disjunctive. The first part is subjective to the offender: '
donc with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person. Once this is estahlie.
thc sufticiency of the injury is purcly an objective fact. It is a matter of infcrene
deduction from the proven facts abot the naturc of the injury and has nothing to
with the intention. The ternm 'sufliciency used in this clause is the high probahili.
dcath in the ordinary course of nature, and it such 'sutticicncy exists and death is ca
Ised
and the injury causing it is intentional, the case talls under cl (3) of s 300." The inis.
caused should be the cause of death." Whether a particular injury is sufficient in the
nature to causc dcath or not,
is obviously a question of fact.
ordinary coursc ot
From thc above discussion, what cemerges is that the accused, who intentionall
caused the injury, may not be aware that injury was sutticient to cause death or was

likehy toiscausc death. But, if his intention to cause the injury is established and the injury
caused sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, then the accused is
to murder. For cases to fall within cl (3), it is
guilty of
culpable amounting
homicide
not necessan that the offtender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from
the intentional bodily injury or injuries sutticient to cause death in the ordinary course
of nature.

Intention to Cause Particular Injury Required

In the Virsa Singh case, while postulating the ingredients of cl (3) of s 300, the apex
court has observed inter alia 'it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that
or that
particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional,
some other kind of injury was intended'. This aspect of the matter came up tor
consideration before the Supreme Court in Harjinder Singh v Delhi Administration. In
this case, the accused was trying to assault one Dalip Singh and the deceased intervened.
The accused finding himself one against rwo, took out the knife and stabbed the
deceased. At that stage, the deceased happened to be in a crouching position presumao
to intervene and separate the rwo. The knife pierced the upper portion of the lett thigh.
The stab wound was oblique and it cut the femoral artery and vein under the muscle.
which are important main vessels of the body. The cutting of these vessels would resuu
in grear loss of blood and would lead to immediate death or death after a short duraton
The Supreme Cour held that from the evidence, it was not proved that it was
intention of the appellant to inflict that particular injury on that particular placc.
view of this, it was held that cl (3) of s 300 would not apply. The accused was conv
under s 304, Pt I.
the
In Laxman Kalu Nikalje v State of Maharashtra," there was a quarrel berween ccused

accused and the deceased and the accused whipped out a knife and stabbed the
on the chest near the shoulder. The stab injury was nor on a vital part ot the caco

33 Stare of Andhra Pradesh v Rayaavarapu Punnayya (1976) 4 SCC 382.

34 Dashrath Singh v Stae of Uuar Pradesh (2004) 7 SCC 408, AlR 2004 SC 4488. unnay
35 Veera Muthu v Stase of Madras (1971) 3 SCC 427; State of Andhra radesh v Ravdtu 2
AlR 1977 SC 45, (1977) (Cr 1JI (SC); Kishore Singh v Saie of Madbya lvudesh A irendna
Ramasbraya v Stae of Madhya Pradesh (2001) Cr LJ 1452 (SC); State of Vtar Praden
sad AlR 2004 SC 1517.
36 Shankar Narayan Bhadotkar v State ofMaharushura AlR 2004 SC 1966, (2005) 9 SC.7
37 AlR 1968 SC 867, (1968) C 1J 1025 (SC).
38 AIR 1968 SC 1390.

582
 Homicide

the artery
knite cut the. inside, it resulted n death. Fven in this case, thc Suprerne
I et h e
as no proof that the injury caused w.as the injury intended, as bur
held
sCvering of the artery, death might not have ensued. Ir was held thar the case
of th
the
nder cl (3) of s 300 Accordingly, the accused was convicted under
d not Sinmilarly, in Addlba v State of Madhya Pradesh," wherein the accused in a
s,304. 1P betwccn
the two groups attacked the deccascd with lathi that resulted in his

sInhden
ght wCnc Court, in the abscnce of cvidence indicating his intention to cause
the Suprcme

onvictedl the accuscd undcr s 304 and not for murder.

deanh. r

NOWEDGE THAT ACT IS SO IMMINENTLY DANGEROUS SO AS TO CAUSE

(4) OF SECTION 300
DEATH-CLAUSE

(4) ofs
300 contemplates generally, commission of acts which are so imminently
death. Under this clausc, the act need not be directed
Clause
IShat it is likely to cause
danarticular individual nor need there be an intention to cause the death of any
be a reckless act, which is imminently dangerous.
miular individual. lt has to merely the clause. 'A without excuses fires a
lcrTation (d) clearly sets out the scope of kills one of them. A isany
partio

laaded cannon into a crowd of persons

and guilty of murder,.
have had a pre-meditated design to kill any particular individual.
although he may not
the act must be imminently dangerous: (ii)
The essential ingredients of this clause are: (1)
must have knowledge that it is so imminently dangerous:
the person committing the act is likely to cause
cause (a) death or (b) bodily injury as
(i) that in all probability it will
should be done without any reason or
death, and (iv) such imminently dangerous act
justification tor running the risk of causing death or such injury.
that the act is so
The mental element contemplated under this clause is 'knowledge
death or such bodily injury that is likely
imminently dangerous that it is likely to cause that the danger should be
to cause death. The term 'imminently dangerous requires the intention to kill anybody is
ummediate and close at hand. Hence, under this clause,
murder. The recklessness and
HOT
required in order to constitute the offence of
circunmstances case, becauSeot cach
HEACUsability of an act must be by the facts and amount to murder only it it has been
will
mminenuy dangerous acts causing death
Without any reasonable excuse for taking such a risk.
clause was applied by the Supreme
Lale of Madhya Pradesh v Ram Prasad," this accused Ram Prasad and his wite
Cou the
a totally different c o n t e x t . In this case, to no avail. At
chat tune, the
called to mediate, but
quarrel. Villagers
d w e r e
her on tire. She suttered
burn extensive

kerosene oil over the wife and set

iniuie c a Court observed that in respect
as a result of the injuries. The Supreme
ofdll 1-3 ofed as what was
the intention ot the accused,
the na
s 300, the
question would arise ot be
which would all
maters
etc,
nuries he intended to cause
reliance on ci
peculario would be simpler to place
Ca eit
4), because Supreme Court opined that it intention. The c o u r r helt
that
conten
emplates only 'knowledge' and no ot
ugh intention to cause the death
generally clause isi invoked where there is
no
y the clause
the where there s

suchparticular pers be used in those

cases
its terms
callous PTSOn, the clause may on
taken is such that it may be
statert that
Owards the result, and the risk

3 Ses 587 (SC); Harcdeu S:ng Sie

also, Jagrup 952, (1972) Cr L.J T-8. i l ° o o

unial Sing v State of Bihar AIR 1972 SC v
ngh
S C 179, (1975) 3 SCC 731; And
State of Rujasthun AlR
St
19o0

TLJ 17 (c
(SC).
(2001)
AIR Cr LI 4675 (SC).
1968 SC 881.
583
 Criminal Law

death. In the present case

knows that the act is likely to c a u s e the
the person
fire to his wife, he
must have known that the
accused poured kerosene
and set
no r e a s o n for incurring
such risk, the offence wacud
held
result in her death. As he had homicide amounting to murder
to
would be culpable
fall within cl (4) ofs 300 and
In Thangaiya v State of Tamil Nadu," the Supreme Courtofcategorically
the offender
ruled th..
nat c
where the knowledge the
(4) of s 300 would be applicable practical certainty. Such knowled
approximates
probability of death of a person be
to
a
the highest degree of probability.
ledge
on the part of the offender must of
was armed with a 303 rifle. frad
a constable, who
In Sehaj Ram v State of Haryana," victim beneath the knee of his rio
One shot hit the
several shots at another constable.
the accused fired another shot at him, though the
leg and he fell down. Even after that, hit the deceased
shot did not hit him. Since, the bullet below the knee, it was contended
to trighten the deceased or cause grievous hurt
that the intention of the accused was only
the contention and held that the act
and not to kill him. The Supreme Court rejected
ct
and convicted the accused of murder.
would fall within the ambit of cl 4 of s 300
the accused incurred the risk of causing
Further, s 300 fourthly requires the proof that
death or bodily injury
the clause
'without any excuse. A casual reading of might
create an

impression that the phrase without any excuse

refers to the special five exceptions
reveals that the words 'without any excuse
appended to s 300. But a careful reading thereof

do not contemplate the situations that fall within any of

these exceptions to s 300. The
or other than, these exceptions. It
phrase does connote the situations that fall short of, murder if the
on knowledge does not amount to
conveys that culpable homicide based
accused has an 'excuse for incurring the risk, even if none of the five special exceptions
to

s 300 is applicable. The words 'without excuse used in cl 4, thus, contemplate situations
other than those which fall within the five exceptions tos 300, IPC."

WHEN CULPABLE HOMICIDE IS NOT MURDER

Clauses 1-4 of s 300 provide the essential ingredients wherein culpable homicide
amounts to murder. The section also provides five exceptional situations, the existe
of which will remove a case from the purview of s 300. In other words, even it a caserali
within any of the four clauses of s 300, if it also falls within any of the five exceptiO
provided thereunder, then it will cease to be murder. It will merely be culpable homicue
not amounting to murder.

The exceptions provided for under s 300 are: (1) grave and sudden provocation: 2)
private defence; (3) acts of public servants: (4) sudden fight, and (5) consent.
However, it becomes necessary to take note of two significant propositions aDonthe
nature and operation of these exceptions to s 300. First, these are the 'special exccpin
to murder only.In this sense, they are distinct from 'General Exceptions' enumernead
Chapter IV (ss 76-106) of the IPC. The latter, unlike the former, by virtuc ather
with s 40, IPC, are applicable to offences created under the IPC as
well a
special or local laws in force in India. Secondly, the 'special exceptions n ecOver
the
murder to 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder and thereby reduce
n e r a l

criminal liability of its perpetrator. These

exceptions to s 300, uniu
exceptions, do not exonerate the wrongdoer. They only operate as mitigatio actors.

42 (2005) 9 SCC 650.

43 AIR 1983 SC 614.
44 See Emperor v Dhirajia AlR 1940 AIl 486; Gyarsibai v State AIR 1953 MP 61

584
 Homicide

Eurption1
I-Grave and udden Provocation
alpable h o m i c i d de will
be murder,
not
it, the oftender, on account of
provocation, is deprivec of his grave and sudden
power of self-control and causes
whose death is .caused,
may be the person who the death of a person.
the
T h e p e r s o n ,

nistake or accident. gave provocation or any

person by
other
The exception is itse subject to three exceptions:
The provocation should not been have
for killing or doing any harm sought
(1) for voluntarily by the
an exci to offender, as
any person.
T h e Drovocation is not as a
result an act done in
act of a public servant in the lawfulofexercise of his obedience of law or by the
powers.
/2The provocation is not a result of
anything done in the exercise of the right of
private detence.

fn order that this exception should apply, the provocation should be both
and
dden, If the provocation is sudden but not grave, or grave but not sudden,grave then the
offender cannot avail of the benetit of this exception. Further, it should also be shown
that the provocation was of such a nature that the offender was deprived of the power of
self-control.
Nanavati v State of Maharashtra," the accused was a naval officer. He
In KM
was
married with three children. One day, his wife confessed to him that she had
developed
intimacy with the deceased. Enraged at this, the accused went to his ship, took a semi-
automatic revolver and six cartridges from the store of the
ship, went to the flat of the
deceased, entered his bedroom and shot him dead. Thereafter, the accused surrendered
himself to the police. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the act of the
accused could be said to fall within Exception 1 of s 300. The Supreme Court laid down
the
following postulates relating to grave and sudden provocation:
h e test of grave and sudden' provocation is whether a reasonable man,
belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in
which the accused was placed, would be so provoked as to lose his self-control.
9
nIndia, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave
and sudden provocation to an accused, so as to bring his act within the first
exception to section 300, IPC.
h e mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken
nto consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and
Sudden provocation for committing the oftence.
4) of from
he fatal blow should be clearly traced had
the influence passion
to
arising
cooled down by lapse of time, or
provocation and not after the passion
othe rw gIVing room and scope for premeditation and calculation.
The Supreme Court wife confessed her illicit to
held that the accused, after his
nship wi
OPped h n the deceased, may have momentarily
lost control. He had thereafter
revolver, did
is the ship, collected the
me official wife
band children at a cinema, went to
the office of the deceased and later to his
to regain bhi
usihess there, drove his car totherefore, there was sutticient time for him
nours had psed by then and
that the provisions of Exception
r-control. In view of this, the court held

45
AIR 1962
SC 605.

585
 Criminal Law

attractcd. The accused was convicted for murder

er and
I to s 300 were not sentenced to
sene.

lifte imprisonment.
The Explanation to Exception I states that wlhcther the provocation was Oras
and
sudden is a qucstion of fact.
In Hansa Singh v State of Punjab," the accuscd saw the deccascd committing an act
sodomy on his son, which cnraged him and he killed the deccased. It was held h
amounted to a grave and sudden provocation. The conviction under s 302 was Seta
aside,
He was convicted under s 304, PC.
In Daitu Genu Gaikwadr State of Maharashtrt, the reason given by the accused for
killing the deccased was the fact that he auempted to outrage the modesty of his wifea
month back. In view of the long time interval, it was held that the plea of 'sudden and
grave provocation was not available.
In Mannam Balasuamy v State of Andhra Pradesh," the accused had a quarrel with his
father. The deceased tried to intervene and pacify. The accused then went into the
house, brought out a knife and stabbed the deceased. The plea of grave and sudden
provocation was rejected, holding that there was no provocation and the accused merely
tried to use the quarrel as an excuse to kill the deceased.
In Bhura Ram v State of Rajasthan," the accused, accompanied with others, entered
into the hut of the deceased. Apprehending danger to his life, the deceased fired at one
of the companions of the accused and thereby caused his death. The accused then
attacked the deceased with an axe on his head and killed him. During trial, he pleaded
that the death of his companion caused grave and sudden provocation to him. The
Supreme Court refused to accept the plea as the accused solicited the provocation. A
killing under provocation sought by the accused annot be covered by the exception.
It may be pointed out that even in cases where the court may not accept the plea of
sudden and grave provocation, the background facts of earlier incidents. which may
cause a grave provocation but are not sudden, may be considered by courts as factos
that mitigate
sentence. In Franscis alias Pannan v State
the of Kerala,"
the deceased had
on
rwo previous occasions attacked the accused's brother and brother-in-law. The
accused was in constant fear of menace from the deceased to the lives and
satety or ne
near and dear of the accused. So, even
though the earlier incidents of attack on famuy
members did not constitute 'sudden and
grave provocation, his sentence was reducea
life imprisonment.

Exception 2-Exceeding the Right of Private Defence

As seen in the
chapter on General Exceptions', a person has a right of private dere ot
property and person. This right, under certain circumstances, even extends ausing
of death. This clause is in to the e
respect of cases where a person has ceeded his right ot prv
defence. t may be pointed out that the fact that a person has exceeded his rignted rivate
defence does not
totally exonerate a person under this
exception. It merely is cot
a
mitigating factor to reduce the offence from that of
murder to culpable honn
46 AIR 1977 SC 1801, (1977) Cr
47 AIR 1974 SC 387, (1974) Cr
1.J 1448 (SC).
1.J 446 (SC).
48 AlR 1980 SC 448.
49 (2003)9 SCC 205.
50 Raj Kumar v State of Mahurush1ra (2009) 15
SCC 292, 2009 (9) SCALE 495.
51 AIR 1974 SC 2281, (1974) Cr 1.J 1310
(SC).

586
 Homicide

amounti urder. Of
to m u r d e r .
betore this exception can be availed of, it has to be
course,
accused had the right of
that the private detence as stipulated in ss 96-106, IPC. It
proved

after the existence of the right established that the question whether the accused
is
is onyded his right to private
had excee detence will arise. It, in the first instance, it appears that
the accused does not have th right of private defence, then obviously this clause will not
come into play.
A already noted in the chapter on General Exceptions, if a person genuinely exercises
hright
t of Drivate defence within the limits prescribed by law, then he commits no
fence. However, if he exceeds the right, it will amount to a lesser offence than murder.
The most important Circumstance in determining this factor is the intention of the
ffender. The second exception stipulates that the exceeding of the
defence should be without pre-meditation, and without any intention right
of
of doingprivate
more
harm than is necessary tor the purpose of coverage by the exception. In other words, the
exceeding of private detence by the accused should be done unintentionally. Only then
can the accused avail of the exception provided under this clause. The question whether
the exceeding of the right of private defence was done intentionally or unintentionally is
aquestion of fact, which has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case.
In Nathan v State of Madras," the accused and his wife were in possession of some
land which they had been cultivating for several years. They fell into arrears in respect of
the lease amount due to the landlady. The landlord tried to evict the accused forcefully
and tried to harvest the crop. So, the accused, in the exercise of his
right to private
detence of property, killed the deceased. The Supreme Court accepted the contention
that the incident took place when the accused had exercised his lawful right of private
erence against the property. However, since the deceased party was not armed with any
deadlyweapons and there could not have been any fear of death or grievous hurt on the
part of the accused and his party, the right to private defence of property was limited to
the extent of causing any harm other than death under s 104, IPC. It was therefore held
that the accused exceeded his right of private defence and the case would fall under
CDtIon 2 to s 300, IPC, and the offence committed by the accused was held to be
D l e homicide not amounting to murder, as it was committed in good faith and

a n y intention of causing death. The sentence of death imposed upon the

Cused was reduced to of life
imprisonment.
one

nkarnath Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, the deceased party had initially
was an incident
of grappling between the
haPa to attack the accused party. There the accused
cs. When the deceased party was fleeing, party made a murderous
murder was committed when the deceased
since the
was held in this case that right is co-terminus
the right of private defence ended with that, since the of
with 8, reasonable apprenensiOn danger to bod
Commencement and existence of a The Suprememe Court held that
exist.
Or property and notot after the threat
had ceased to
force used a
the accused were maliciously excessive aCt. Ihe
were guilty of vindictive and existed from the decea.
Out af danger, which
no longer d
PTOportion to the supposed
that the accused were neither entitled to
to a
party. Urer these circumstances, it was held
2 to s 300, IPC.
ight of *vare detence, n o r to the benefit of Exception
his colleagues were
the deceased and
In Mohinder
17der Pal Jolly v
Joly State uf Punjab," herween them with regard to payment
the factory ofPal
berween
in a dispute
the accused. There
was

52
3
AIR (1974) CrLJLJ608
1973 SC 1550,(1973)
AIR 1974 SC 665,
Cr
1015 (SC).
54 AI LJ 584 (S
1979 SC 577, (1979) Cr
587
 Criminal Law

of wages. On the day of occurrence, the workers had asembled outside the facto
raised provocative slogans and hurled brickbats at the factory. Some Dronay and
Accused was damaged. The accused thercafter came out of his office room d o the
on the 7hari fired a shot from his revolver which killed the deccased instan anding
The Supreme Court held that the accused had a ight of private defence of his boey
the circumstances were not such as to crcatc apprehension in his mind that the Dut
gricvous hurt would be the conscqucnce, ifhis right of private defcnce was not evOr
it was held that the accused had excceded his right of private defence. Exceptiona
s 300 was held not applicable to the facts of the case.
In Kattu Surendra v State of Andhra Pradesh," the Supreme Court rued that deadl
caused by a person after his right to private defence ceases to exist falls outside the amhi
of the exception.

Exreption 3-Act of Public Servant

Exception 3 is similar to Exception 2, in the sense that it deals with situations where a
public servant exceeds his lawful powers in the discharge of his duties and thereby Causes
death. The essential ingredients of this exception are: (i) the oftence must be commited
by a public servant or by a person aiding a public servant; (i) the act alleged must have
been committed by the public servant in the discharge of his oficial duties; (i) he
should have exceeded the powers given to him by law; (iv) the act should be done in
good faith; (v) the public servant should have believed that his act was lawful and
necessary for the due discharge of his duties, and (vi) he should not have borne any il
will towards the person whose death was caused.
A suspected thief was arrested by a police constable and was being taken in a train.
The thief escaped from the running train. The constable pursued him. When he was not
in a position to apprehend him, he fired at him. But, in that process, he hit the tireman
6
and killed him. It was held that the case was covered by this exception.
Where an order to shoot was given by the public servant and his subordinate caried
his orders, when there was no occasion to do so, it was held that the order of the pubic
order
servant was illegal and neither the public servant nor the person acting under the
can be said to have acted in good faith." Obedience of a superior's lawful order protecs
a subordinate. Causing death by the subordinate in pursuance
of an ex tacie unlawru
order, therefore, cannot be exonerated."

Exception 4-Sudden Fight

The fourth Exception to s 300 covers acts done without premeditation in a sudden hght
In a way, this also deals with a case of provocation provided in the first Exception.under
r
which are covered by the first Exception. However. alse
exception applies to instances, but it
Exception 1, provocation should not only be sudden and grave,
the sho
cause total deprivation of
self-control. Only under such circumstances, can the o
seek shelter under Exception 1. However, under Exception 4 offender loses hs p
to
heat of passion aroused suddenly. Further, under the
tirst
t. e
reasoning due d
the offender should not have sought or voluntarily provoked the provocation. "
the term sudden tight' implies mutual provOCat
under this exception,

Cr 1.J 3196 (SC).

55 (2008) 11 SCC 360, (2008)
v State AlR 1955 AIl 379, (1955)
Cr LJ 905 (All) (DB).
56 Dakhi Singh
EP 32 (DB).
57 AIR 1950
v Shew Mangal Singh AlR 1981 SC 1917.
58 State of West Bengal

588
 Homicide
implies the absence of previous
It implic
aggravation. lt
situations, it may not
be
possible deliberation or determination to
nated." The only equisitesof this
to trace from
which party the initial fight. In
em
mitted without premeditation; (i) Exception arc that: provocation
it should have (i)
the murder should have
h(it) it should have becn committed in the hcat bccn committed in sudden a

mmitted upon a sucdden quarrcl, and (v) it should ofhavepassion; (iv) it should have been
afender having taken undue advantage or actcd in a crucl orbecn committed without the
unusual manner.
All these conditions are required to be
proved for bringing the case within the ambit
of Exception 4 to s 300."
There has to have a tight. Where there is no
The word fight, which not defined under the fight
at all, the
Exception is not attracted."
IPC, conveys something more than a verbal
auarrel. It implies mutual attack in which both the
partices
of blows. An actual attack by one party and retreat another participate. It implies
exchange
by
One-sided attack cannot be a fight. Nevertheless, attack one and
does not constitute
fight."
by
by another constitutes a fight. However, the Exception will come preparation to attack

culpable homicide is committed in an unpremeditated sudden into play only when a

fight."
The words 'sudden fight' or
of a tree
'upon sudden quarrel' indicate something in the nature
fight. Free fight is said to take place when both sides mean to fight from the
start, go out to fight and there is a pitched battle." The question of who attacks and who
defends in such a fight is wholly immaterial and depends on the tactics adopted by the
val commanders. There can be no question of a free fight in the face ot the clear
tinding of the court that one of the parties was the aggressor.
where an accused inflicted three fatal blows with an axe on the deceased who was
Lrmed, it was held that it could not be said to be a sudden fight, as a fight postulates a
diCral transaction in which blows are exchanged by both the parties. When the
Eression is only on one side, it cannot be said to be a tight.

59 Sukhdev Sngh Sute

Drajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v Stare of Gujarat (2003) 9 SCC 32; sce 11also,
v

Pradesh (2004) SCC 410. AIR 2004 SC

S SCC 441; Sachchey Lal Tiwari v Sate of Urtar
9 Sridhar Bhuryan v State of Orisa (2004) 6 JT 299.
60
v State of Rajasthan AIR 1993 SC 2426; Rajendra Singh v Suate of Bthur AlR 2000 SC
1726 Prakash Chand State of Himachal Pridesh (200-4) I
v
SC aeu Singh v State (2003) 7 SCC 441, Pradesh (2008) 12 SCC 769, AIR 2008 SC 184
laYeluga Govinda v State of Andhra (2008) SCC 213, 2008 (3) SC.ALE +05,
7

Has 2607 (SC); Trimbak v State of Maharashtra

(2009) Cr LJ 1146 (SC).
61 SSikandenghvState of Haryana (2009) 3 SCC 411, SC. 1406, Subhash Shumrdo P'acunde Suse of
AlR 1999
Mahare ale (Delhi Administration)v Stae of Madhya Pradesh (2000) 7 SCALE 24, D Saila Sute v

SCC 384; Pappu

uf A a (2006) Cr 1J 686 (SC)}; Kulexy
Mondsl v Siate of Ws Bengu.
(2017 adesh AlR 2008 SC 505, (2008)
2007)8Singhv
62 Jasuas SCC 578, AlR 2007 SC 3228.
Stae f Unar Pradesh (1998) SCC 1544(Cr).
3 Kesar
4 Muha Singhv State ofHaryana (2008)
15 SCC 755
SC
AlR 1980 T08; Abuk Aun.ar Burk v S.e o
Shahul Hamidv State of Keralu
sa i(1992)then Praderh (200-4) 1| S 81
Oisa CrLJ State uf Homushul
65 Chu 1849 (Ori); rakash Chand v
SCC 501 (Cu),
Avhnul lwuwy v Siaie ofB:har (U0
3277 1cuan v State of Kerala (1994) luwar: r Sls or
/i dunney L.ul
SC
(2002)$
ar Prde RDIr Sngh v State of Haryana Sublhish Shamiilu l'a hunudk
v Siate of .M.aha.a

2004 SC 5039, (2004) 1I SCC 410,

lR 2003 S 784, (2008) Cr LJ I72 (1)
8 4 ; Chinnathaman v State AlR 4ini).aiih4\R
2u S
Shanras Valuke V
ile v/
331, D 1954) Cr LJ 331 (SC); Dauu
67
2005) Cr 1J 2555 (SC). (1954) Cr15 17io (5C)
a1ar:and yState
ale of Vutarl'rudesh AlR
1954 SC 95,
|55 (9 y i0 ()m1.L
Mdbarushtra
1979 AllR 5%
1l4t P'uiade v Stale ul
ittf tuar Pradeb (2007) 15
47
589
 Criminal Law

Mercly sudden quarrel and the absence of premeditation do not warrant

Exception. It is also required to show70 that the acusccd has not taken undue advantaa
or acted in cruel or unusual
manne."
In Dharman v Statc of l'unjab," there
deccascd concerning a
dispute betwecn the accused and the
was a
picce of
vacant land. The accused claimed that he wac
possession of the land. On the other hand, the deccascd party claimed that they had se
up a limc-crushing machine on the land. Procccdings were pending under s 145, CrPC
betwecn the partics. In the mcantime, the accusccd party
destroyed the lime-crushin
machinc. The deceascd party intervened at that time. Immediately, a
the course of this fight, the deceased rcceived fatal
fight ensued and in
injuries. lt was held that the injuties
caused to the deccascd were done without
accused caused the injuries in the heat of
pre-meditation in a sudden
fight and the
passion and upon a sudden quarrel. The
accuscd had also not taken undue advantage or acted in a
cruel or unusual manner. It
was theretore held that the accused clearly fell within Exception 4 to s 300, IPC."
In Narayanan Nair
Raghavan Nair v State of Travancore, there was a fight between
the accused and one Velayuthan Nair. It resulted in a minor scuftle between the
two.
The deceased came up to them and tried to them and admonished
who was the son-in-law, not to
separate Velayuthan,
quarrel. The accused thereupon took a penknife from his
waist and hit out at the deceased. The deceased tried to ward off the blow and was hit
on
the back of his left forearm. The accused struck
again and this time the blow landed on
the chest and caused the injury, which
eventually killed the man. It was contended on
behalf of the accused that this was a case of sudden fight and so the case falls within the
fourth Exception to s 300, IPC. The Supreme Court rejected this contention and said
that the accused stabbed an unarmed man who made no threats
against him, but merely
asked the accused's opponent to stop fighting. The fight of the accused was not with the
deceased, but with the son-in-law of the deceased. The accused simply took undue
advantage and stabbed the deceased. The court held that the Exception 4 to s 300 would
not apply.

In Sukhbir Singh v State of Haryana," a sudden quarrel, over splashing of mud by the
son of the deceascd while sweeping of the street on the accused, ensued berween the
accused and the deceased along with his son. The deceased, for no fault of his,
gave slaps
to the accused. Thereafter, the accused
wen: home, which was at a very nearby place
and came back armed in the company of others, including his relatives, though without
telling his intention to vehemently retaliate his slaps. He gave rwo blows with his bhala
on the upper right chest of the deceased. Ihe deceased fell down and thereafter other
Dersons, who had accompanied the accused, assaulted the
deceased with their respective

69 The expression 'undue advantage as used in the txcCpton eant untair advantage', See Dbirajobui
Gorakbblbai Nayak v Stateof Gujarat (2005) 9 S 2 Prakash Chand v State of Himachal Pradesó
(2004) 11 SCC 381l; Anil v State of tHaryana (2007 0 SCC 274, (2007) Cr LI 4294 (SC)
70 Ramkishan Madhav Shelke vSate ofMaharashtra (2007) 3 SCC 89, AIR 2007 S 761; Suresh Kunar
wdchal Pradesh
State of Himachal (2008) 13 SCC
Pradesh (2008) AIR 2008 SC 1973.
459, AlK
SCC499, 0SC
2008 SC 1973; Benguru
Andbra Pradesh (2008) 9 SCC 707, (2008) Cr LJ 4353 (SC). Venkuta Rao v Seare of
71 AJR 1957 SC 324, (1957) Cr LJ 420 Sce also Mahesh Balmiki v State of'N.ll
3 SCC 436.
ISCC 319; JaipalvState of Haryana (2000)
Wazir (Cband AlR 1976 SC 315 ( 1 u 7 a l
72 See also State of Himachal Pradeshv i47
1957 SC 469, (1957) Cr 1) 86 (SC); 7hakurda (SC); Jamman
v State ofPunjab AlR
AIR 1974 SC 1351; Chamru Budhwa vStute of udhyu Yudesh AIR 195 St1te of Ciujurat
Stute 1umil Nadu AlR T976 SC TU AO , (1954) Cr LI
1976 (SC); Amrithalinga Nudur v
f
73 AlR 1956 SC 99,
(1956) Cr1J 278 (SC).
see also, Prakash
(hand v Stule of tlimachal Pradesl, ( .
74 (2002) 3 SCC 327.;

590
 Homicide

weapons. The deceased, ultimately, succumbed to his injuries. The

iction of the accused under s 302 by the Punjab
conviction
Supreme Court,
s e t t i n ga s i d e
High Court based on
hat the accused acted in a cruel and unusual manner, held that the homicide
the fact that
n a sudden fight and the time gap between the quarrel and the fight did not
w a sc a u s e d

the accused to
accusedto premeditate the death. It gave benefit of Exception 4 to the
able
cnab
The court also held that sudden fight must follow sudden quarrel. If there
accused.

accues a sufficient time for passion to subside giving the accused time to premeditate
int
nd
foht takes place thereafter, the accused may disqualify for getting benefits of the
Exception as the killing with premeditation amounts to murder.

In Manke Ram v State of Haryana," the Supreme Court gave benefit of exception 4 to
a Dolice inspector who, in a set of peculiar facts, killed his subordinate. He invited the
dccased to drink in his room. When they were drinking the nephew of the deceased
Came to the room and called him for dinner. As the deceased got up to leave the room,
the appellant got annoyed and started abusing the deceased in filthy language to which
the deceased objected. This further infuriated the appellant. A fight started between the
two. The appellant picked up his service revolver, which kept nearby, and fired two
shots at the deceased. These shots proved fatal. Reversing his conviction under s 302 of
the Code by the Punjab High Court, the Supreme Court held that the incident took
of Exception 4 to the
place in a sudden fight in the heat of passion and granted benefit
of facts and circumstances of the case,
appellant. lt held that the appellant, in the totality or unusual m a n n e r .
aid not take an undue advantage of the fight or acted in a cruel

Exception 5-Death by Consent

death is caused, being above
Lulpable homicide is murder when the person whose
not
the risk of death with his o w n
consent.
e
age of 18 years, suffers death or takes
c o n s e n t of the
be proved are: (i) the
death was caused with the
he
points to
18 years of age, and (ii)
the consent given was
deceased then above
Ceased (i) the was
fear or misconception of
tacts.
C e and
voluntary, and was not given through
infirm, old and invalid
"
the accused killed his stepfather who was an
n jagar Singh his motive being to get three innocent
(his enemies)
men

n , With the latter's consent,

the ifth Exception to s 300,
offence was covered by
licated. It was held that the s 304, 1PC.
, and punishable under the first part of student of the tenth
the accused, who
was a
State of Bihar, trustrated by these
Dasrath Paswan v in succession. He was upset and
failed in his examination
thrice his wife, a literate girl of
, his life and informed
end to first and then kill
r e s and decided to put wife thereupon requested him to kill herbefore he could end
an

Out 19 years of age. The he killed his

wife but was arrested
convicted him
pursuance of the pact, 5 to s 300, IPC,
. In Court, relying upon
Exception
e. The Patna High
under s 304, Pt I of the IPC. soldier requests his
A wounded
also be noted. latter shoots
illustrations may
his agonising pain. The
n e following him and thereby
relieve him of above 18 years of age
Lrade to shoot the soldier is certainly
exception will apply,
as

um to death. This death.

and he gave c o n s e n t to his o w n

75 (2003) 11 SCC 238.

76 AIR 1918 Lah 145.
77 AIR 1958 Pat 190.

591
 Criminal Law

A and B, snake charmers, induced Cand

allow themselves to he D to
belicf that theybitten by a
snake, whose fangs had been imperfectly extracted, under the
e
protected from harm. C'and D died. A and B were held guilty of culpable would
ould behe
under this Exception, on the ground that the deccascd gavc thcir consent 'withomicide
knowledge of the fact, in the belicf of the existence of powers which t h e t a ful
ich the prisoners
asserted and belicved themsclves to possess."
DISTINCTION BETWEEN MURDER AND CULPABLE HOMICIDE

As seen in the introductory paragraphs, both culpable homicide and murder deal .
the killing of a person. Culpable homicide is the
genus and murder is its specie Al
murders are culpable homicides. but all culpable homicides are not murder. S
distinction really is as to whether an act is culpable homicide he
amounting to murder. o
culpable homicide not amounting to murder. There are practically three degrees of
culpable homicide recognised in the IPC:
(1) Culpable homicide of the first
degree, which is made punishable with death or
imprisonment for life, to either ofwhich fine may be added (s 302):
(2) Culpable homicide of the second degree, which is made
punishable with
imprisonment up to a limit of 10 years, or with imprisonment for life, to either
of which fine may be added (s 304, Pt I); and
3) Culpable homicide of the third degree, which is punishable with fine only, or
with imprisonment up to a limit of 10
years or with both (s 304, Pt I).
From the above, it is clear that there is no radical difference between
and murder. The true difference between culpable homicide
culpable
difference in degrees of intention and knowledge. A
homicide and murder is only the
the
greater degree
of intention and
knowledge, the would fall under murder. A lesser
case
degree of intention or knowledge.
the case would fall under culpable homicide. It is therefore
difficult to arrive at any
categorical demarcations or strait jacket ditferences between culpable homicide and
murder.
A practical approach to
distinguish whether a particular situation would come under
murder or
culpable homic1ide is to
appreciate the facts and apply the law in stages as
indicated below.
(1) The first stage is to establish whether the
accused had done an act, which has
caused the death of another person. This is
obviously the most fundamental tac
which has to be established betore any further
knowledge of the accused is gone into. enquiry into the intention. an
(2) The second stage establish whether the act of the accused would amount to
is
to
culpable homicide. other In
which has caused the death ofwords,
it has to
be ascertained that a
person, is not as result of accidentparticular
a
a
act
or any otnet
excevtions provided under the 1P. lt has to be
intention of the accused was not nerely to cause further
hurt
established that tne
homicide
due
or grievous hurt
(3) C c e ir is established that an
accused has caused death either with the
f causine it or
with ntcntion ot act such bodily iniury as isintentio
the
cause death, or with knowledge that hiscausng
is likely to likely o
cause death, then the next

78 Ganesh Dooley (1879) LR 5 Cal 351

592
 Homicide

whether the act would fall under any of the four

stage of enquiry is to ascertain
clauses ofs 300, IPC.
that culpable homicide is murder and the act
falls under any of
If it is established
(4) then there must be a further enquiry to
consider
the four clauses of s 300, IPC.
the five exceptions provided under s 300,
whether the act falls within any of murder. If the act,
the exceptions, then the act is
If it does not fall under any of then it will be culpable homicide
not

however, falls under any of the exceptions,

79
amounting to murder.
lor andmirder as