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Counter-Radicalization as Counter-Terrorism: The European Union Case

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Counter-radicalization as counter-terrorism:
The European Union case

Bruno Oliveira Martins and Monika Ziegler

Forthcoming in K. Steiner and A. Önnerfors eds,

Expressions of Radicalization: Global Politics, Processes and Practices
(Palgrave 2017)

1
Counter-radicalization as counter-terrorism:
The European Union case
Bruno Oliveira Martins and Monika Ziegler

Abstract

This chapter provides a critical overview of the European Union’s responses to the recent
increase of terrorist activity in Europe since 2015. It argues that, since the mid-2000s,
counter-radicalization became a fundamental dimension of the preventive counter-terrorism
strategies formulated by the EU. The analysis conducted on recent policy measures reveals
a few important trends: the predominance of preventive strategies, the outsourcing of
knowledge production, the crime-terror nexus, the opening up to the private sector, and an
over-representation of Islamist-inspired terrorism while other forms of terrorism are mostly
absent. We contend that these trends are not exclusive of the EU and constitute a part of
broader tendencies in contemporary international security.

Key-words:
European Union; counter-terrorism; anti-radicalization; terrorism

Introduction

It is common to start analyses of contemporary terrorism in Europe by underscoring that

terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the continent. Several Western European countries have
been exposed to the terrorist threat for decades, with special incidence in the 1960s and 1970s,
in successive waves of nationalist, extremist, and/or anarchist-related political violence that
caused hundreds of casualties in countries such as Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom, and
Italy. Since 2001, European countries have also been targets of several successful terrorist
attacks and many more foiled attempts with many different ideological motivations that
brought terrorism back into the political agendas and, at periods and in some countries, to the
top of the concerns of European citizens (European Commission 2016e). In an effort to bring
contextual precision, it is also common for analysts to mention that the numbers of attacks and
casualties in recent years was significantly lower than what had been observed in previous
decades (Barr 2016). But after the very substantial increase in foiled and successful attacks

2
registered in 2015, 2016, and in the first months of 2017, there can be no doubt that Europe
faces the biggest terrorist threat in decades.

The vast majority of the terrorist activity of 2015 and 2016 in Europe has been carried out from
within Europe. In other words, the majority of these attacks have been carried out by either
European Union (EU) nationals or residents, and do not come from an exclusively external
origin. This pattern was seen already in the 7 July 2005 attacks in London, which were
perpetrated by British citizens. Yet, since 2014, the emergence of Daeshi as a very relevant
movement, which conquered vast amounts of territory in Iraq and Syria, has exerted a strong
appeal on people from all over the world. Its geostrategic achievements, its efficient
propaganda tools, and its radical message has led many Europeans to radicalize (Neumann
2016) and, in different forms and levels, to engage directly and indirectly with the group.

As a consequence, the combined number of casualties of the main Daesh-inspired attacks in

the period 2015-early 2017 (Charlie Hebdo in Paris, Copenhagen, Paris’ November 2015
attacks, Brussels, Nice, the Berlin Christmas market, and Stockholm) represented an enormous
rise from the numbers observed in the 1990s and 2000s. In the words of Europol’s director,
Rob Wainwright, ‘it has become clear that Europe currently faces a shifting and increasing
range of threats from jihadist groups and individuals’ (Europol 2016: 5).

The vast majority of the Europeans that engages with Daesh are not life-long, experienced
jihadists or mercenaries that have participated in a multitude of conflicts throughout decades.
Rather, those Europeans belong to a predominantly young generation and they share a broad
‘lack of identification with the Western societies they (or most of them) were born and grew
up in’ (Neumann 2016: 90). They exhibit different motivations and generally belong to one of
three groups identified by Peter Neumann: the defenders, the seekers, and the hangers-on
(Neumann 2016: 90-97). The defenders correspond to the first wave of European foreign
fighters that travelled to Syria in 2012 and 2013 to protect the Sunni population against the
atrocities of the Assad regime. The seekers are motivated neither by politics nor religion per
se, but are part of a ‘booming jihadist counterculture that meets their needs for identity,
community, power, and a feeling of masculinity’ (ibidem: 93). The third group, the hangers-
on, is made up of individuals that exhibit extreme levels of loyalty to a mentor or a group, and
pursue their social inclusion through commitment to decisions made or inspired by their
leaders.

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Understanding these drivers of radicalization is fundamental for enhancing security in Europe
in the years to come. Even though not all Europeans that travel to Syria and Iraq eventually
return to the continent, and even though not all of them engage in terrorist activity, the recent
attacks of 2015-2017 show us that many certainly do and that others affiliate in proxy or
become self-radicalized supporters. Understanding how Europeans become radicalized,
whatever the ideology that lies beneath these processes, is vital for developing strategies to
counter those same processes and to reduce the potential terrorist threat in the continent.

Since 2004, the EU has identified counter-radicalization as an increasingly important strategy

to prevent and fight terrorism. As will be shown below, the EU has adopted a number of
policies, strategies, and declarations in the course of the years in order to tackle radicalization
among its citizens and residents. But the rise of Daesh and its appeal on thousands of Europeans
poses new challenges to the EU and has triggered a number of responses from Brussels,
national capitals, and local institutions. This multi-level system of counter-radicalization,
encompassing a multitude of actors and a juxtaposition of interventions at different levels of
decision-making, provides an important input to the broader debates about how counter-
radicalization and de-radicalization can be supported and fostered.

In this context, this chapter assesses EU’s counter-radicalization policies, providing a critical
overview of its most important measures. Its main purpose is to develop our understanding of
the way the EU deals with the increasingly prominent phenomenon of radicalization leading to
politically-motivated violence or support thereof. The chapter has a particular focus on the way
the EU and its member states have been reacting to the sharp increase of terrorist activity
observed in Europe since the rise of Daesh in 2014. By looking into official responses to
radicalization dynamics, rather than analyzing the radicalization processes themselves, the
chapter offers a complementary dimension to other contributions to this volume. After a section
with a critical literature review and some conceptual clarifications, we analyze the main pillars
of EU’s counter-terrorism (CT) policy and its main developments in 2015 and 2016. We then
proceed to unveiling the EU’s role in contributing to countering radicalization in Europe, in
particular in the last years, after which a final section will discuss and analyze our findings.

For this purpose, we generate data constituted by two main groups of sources: 1) EU documents
of different nature: official policies and action plans, strategic documents, and political

4
declarations; and 2) national official documents and press releases that communicate new CT
and anti-radicalization measures. We lay our main analytical focus on the period 2015-2017,
but our analysis draws on EU policy and strategic documents from 2001 onwards. The
objective is two-fold: firstly, we aim at illustrating the emergence of an autonomous EU CT
policy as a response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States; secondly,
and most importantly, we want to document the way anti-radicalization entered the vocabulary
of EU CT from 2004 and 2005 and acquired growing importance ever since.

Our main argument is that, for the EU, and due to a number of reasons that we will unfold,
counter-radicalization is counter-terrorism, i.e., it constitutes a vital strategy of the broader CT
effort and has gained increasing prominence over time. As stated in the introductory chapter to
this volume, ‘the underlying dynamics of radicalization is caused by an interplay between a)
mainstream and margins and b) revolves around a set of beliefs we interpret as responses to
global crises on multiple levels’. The analytical elements brought by our chapter will
corroborate this understanding, inasmuch as counter-radicalization policies in Europe are
indeed multilevel and involve actors across different levels of the political spectrum.

We contend that, surprisingly, lessons learned from previous European experiences in dealing
with groups such as IRA or ETA have remained largely absent in the formulation of recent EU
CT and counter-radicalization policies and strategies. We witness a clear bias towards Islamist-
inspired terrorism and radicalization, only slowly opening up to softer issues such as counter-
narratives and collaboration with private and third sector. Studying the evolution of key EU
policy papers allows us to reconstruct this process and to conclude with what we see as
emerging trends that clearly demonstrate the centuries-old conflict of priority between coercive
measures and civil liberties in the name of security.

Literature review and conceptual clarifications

What do we know about EU anti-radicalization policies? In recent years, scholars have been
looking into how radicalization of individuals leading to political violence occurs in Europe,
and how the EU has tried to respond to these processes. Today, a number of relevant book-
length monographs (Neumann 2016), edited volumes (Coolsaet 2011, Ranstorp 2010), and
journal articles focusing on EU counter-radicalization policies can be found, in parallel with
policy reports edited by independent research centers (Vidino and Brandon 2012, Bakker and

5
de Leede 2015), official governmental bodies (MRIIA 2010), and the EU’s Radicalization
Awareness Network (RAN), among others.

Some authors have showed that many of these policies remain largely inefficient. Bossong
(2014), for example, questions the general effectiveness of EU’s policies to counter terrorism
and radicalization. The article argues that preventive counterterrorism CT ‘relies on
contentious scientific evidence and that authoritative evaluations remain tied to national policy-
making’ (Bossong 2014: 66), which affects the capacity of the EU to deliver on its own
policies. Additionally, Bakker (2015), for example, highlights the fact that many of the
measures adopted are not followed by a full implementation at both the national and the EU
level. He assesses the EU counter-radicalization policies by comparing its strategies and other
policy documents to theoretical notions on radicalization and counter-radicalization. In
particular, it focuses on the ‘comprehensiveness, implementation, and consistency of the EU
policies that aim to prevent individuals from turning to violence, while halting the emergence
of the next generation of terrorists’ (Bakker 2015: 281).

Other contributions to the literature have put their focus on how the designing and
implementation of EU anti-radicalization strategies and policies are often misplaced and
generate unintended consequences. In this context, an important reference is Mattsson et al
(2016), that conducts a critical discourse analysis of the European Commission’s RAN
collection of approaches and practices used in education, arguing that the ‘War on terror’
discourse tends to ‘individualize and decontextualize tensions in society that may ultimately
cause terrorism’ (Mattsson et al 2016). The authors suggest that this individualized and
decontextualized approach to preventing radicalization seems to prioritize controlling students
over developing their ability to analyze complex conflicts in society. A final article worth
highlighting is Argomaniz’ (2015) exploration of the way the EU responds to terrorist use of
the internet – including for triggering radicalization processes –, raising critical questions about
the Union’s attempts to balance increased online security with private citizen’s rights.

The present chapter builds on the accumulated knowledge provided by these readings and
evaluates EU anti-radicalization policies in light of recent policy developments. We provide
an overview of the current EU policies in this area and problematize the idea of policy
efficiency – a constant presence of analysis of EU anti-radicalization policies – identifying the
main trends within EU anti-radicalization policies: the externalization of knowledge-

6
production, the crime-terror nexus and the increasingly prominent role of prisons, the opening
up to the private sector, and the over-representation of Islamism. We therefore contribute to
the literature on EU CT and counter-radicalization with an updated analysis of recent policy
developments within these two closely inter-related fields. The chapter maps the trajectories of
EU CT and counter-radicalization policies arguing that the importance of the ‘prevent’ pillar
of EU’s counter-terrorism strategy entails a centrality of the fight against radicalization in the
broader counter-terrorism effort.

At this stage, a conceptual note is also needed. The vast majority of studies in terrorism and
radicalization underline that there is no clear universally accepted definition of either terrorism
or radicalization (see chapter 1 in this volume). In fact, Sedgwick argues that the concept of
radicalization is actually a source of confusion (Sedgwick 2010). In the case of the EU, the
European Commission’s Justice and Home Affairs website stipulates that radicalization is
understood as a ‘complex phenomenon of people embracing radical ideology that could lead
to the commitment of terrorist acts’ (European Commission – Justice and Home Affairs 2017).

As for the definition of terrorism, it can be found in a combined reading of Council Framework
Decision 2002/475/JHA with amending Decision 2008/919/JHA. These two documents
advance a definition of ‘terrorist offence’ encompassing both objective elements (murder,
bodily injuries, hostage taking, extortion, committing attacks, threat to commit any of the
above, etc.) and subjective elements (‘acts committed with the objective of seriously
intimidating a population, destabilizing or destroying structures of a country or international
organization or making a government abstain from performing actions’) (EUR-Lex 2017). All
policies and documents that will be referred to below share these understandings.

The role of the EU in countering terrorism and radicalization in Europe, 2001-2014

The EU became an actor in counter-terrorism in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terror
attacks in the United States (9/11 hereafter). Although several key EU member states had had
acute experiences with terrorism during the 1960s-80s, and in spite of several preliminary
attempts to harmonize policies with the then-Community, there had never been a common
approach to countering terrorism within the EU territory. Yet, this changed in 2001 for two
main factors: 1) the willingness to demonstrate support to and solidarity with the US, and 2)
the sudden realization that a globalized form of terrorism made the EU also a potential target

7
for future attacks. At the same time, these attacks caught the EU in the moment of historical
transformation, in which its foundations were being discussed and the process that led to the
adoption of Constitutional Treaty of 2004 was starting. This provided the EU with an additional
impetus for engaging in the development of a new and sensitive policy area.

Considering EU’s historical slow responsiveness in dealing with security and defense issues,
its initial response to 9/11 was surprisingly comprehensive and well-focused. In the time frame
of about nine months (September 2001 – June 2002), the EU adopted a series of policy
documents and action plans that set the foundations of its common CT policy. At the same
time, it laid out the parameters that would regulate the articulation between policies agreed at
the EU level and then implemented mostly at the member state level. At the same time, it also
adopted its working definition of terrorism encompassing both the actions of individuals and
groups of individuals. Whereas some of these policies were not fully implemented
immediately, the basis of the EU CT policy was created and the policy indeed became
operational.

Yet, importantly, the issue of radicalization was basically absent from the EU action at this
time. A reading of the main documents of this initial period – namely the EU Action Plan on
Combating Terrorism of June 2002 and the Conclusions of the Extraordinary European Council
of 21 September 2001 – shows that there was no reference to the process of radicalization and
the need to address it. This can be explained with the fact that, in the post 9/11 Western security
environment, terrorism was mostly equated with an Islamist-inspired threat coming from
outside the EU. The terrorist attack of 11 March 2004 in Madrid, carried out by apparently
internet-radicalized individuals using explosives partially bought in Spain, changed this
perception. With 192 casualties and more than 2000 injured, the terrorist attack shocked the
continent to its foundation and remains the deadliest single attack in European soil since the
late 1980s. Reacting to these events, the EU adopted in 24 March 2004 a 7-point Declaration
on Combating Terrorism, in which Strategic Objective n.6 calls for policies that address factors
which contribute to support for, and recruitment into, terrorism. Even without mentioning it
explicitly, this was the first time that the EU underlined the need to design strategies to address
processes of radicalization. That would be further expanded in the EU Counter-Terrorism
Strategy adopted in 2005 in the aftermath of the London bombings, carried out by four British
residents: three were British-born sons of Pakistani immigrants and the forth individual was a
convert born in Jamaica.

8
Countering radicalization
Before outlining the EU’s counter-radicalization policy, some EU vocabulary requires
clarification. First, EU documents often mention ‘prevention’ (see, for example, Council of the
EU 2005a, European Commission 2013 and 2016 c). As emerges from the first documents,
chiefly the EU CT Strategy (Council of the EU 2005a) ‘prevention’ first and foremost means
counter-radicalization, as the aim is to prevent people from turning to terrorism and to stop the
next generation of terrorists from emerging’ (Council of the EU 2005a). It does therefore focus
on people vulnerable to radicalization, rather than the prevention of terrorist attacks by
gathering intelligence about already radicalized individuals, for instance. This understanding
of prevention remained prevalent until the present. Yet gradually, as will become apparent in
the following document review, another dimension was added, namely the security aspect,
taking into consideration already radicalized people who are known by the authorities.

Another clarification has to be made when it comes to the two strategies available to support
individuals in pulling away from violent extremism. The first strategy is ‘disengagement’,
which means the individual ‘renounce[s] violence without giving up the ideology underpinning
it’. The more desirable strategy, however, is .de-radicalization’. For this the individual
‘renounce[s] both violence and the underlying ideology’ (European Commission 2013).

The earliest document to be examined is the 2005 European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy
(Council of the EU 2005a), where prevention was included as one of four pillars, next to
protection, pursue and respond European Commission (2016a:2) Always under the premise
that the responsibility of CT measures lies with the member states, the EU defines four ways
in which it can assist the member states in doing so, thereby contributing to all four of the
pillars. These venues are ‘strengthening national capabilities’, ‘facilitating European
cooperation’, ‘developing collective capabilities’ and ‘promoting international partnership’
beyond the EU (Council of the EU 2005a: 5). Even though these pillars are not always referred
to in later documents, the measures adopted follow this logic and do indeed fall into these
categories.

The 2005 European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy underscores the need to ‘identify and
counter the methods, propaganda and conditions through which people are drawn into
terrorism’ (Council of the EU 2005: 7). This can be seen as an effort to protect vulnerable
groups from radicalization by shielding them from terrorist contents, as well as through making

9
radicalization less attractive through ameliorating their social conditions. Another step
identified is ‘limiting the activities of those playing a role in radicalization; preventing access
to terrorist training; establishing a strong legal framework to prevent incitement and
recruitment; and examining ways to impede terrorist recruitment through the internet’ (Council
of the EU 2005: 8). This step addresses individuals already prone to, or in the process of,
radicalization. It furthermore introduces an important and recurring focus point, namely the
internet as platform for terrorist propaganda and hence a crucial starting point for counter-
radicalization measures.

A Strategy as a strategy
The EU Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism (Council of the
EU 2005b), adopted in 2005, outlines the specific challenge Islamist extremism poses and
explains the range of responses the EU and its member states can pursue in order to combat it.
In a last step, the document mentions how these responses should be practically realized.

The EU’s responses introduced by this strategy include four different approaches. The first one
concentrates on those endorsing Islamist views and the different areas in which they act. When
it comes to face-to-face radicalization, the EU aims at preventing Islamists from recruiting
people where they possibly would be vulnerable, for example in prisons, schools and in
religious environments.

If radicalization already took place, the strategy would be to interrupt traveling efforts of
recruited individuals to conflict zones, and thereby preventing extremist training and further
radicalization leading to violent extremism. A final way for extremists to reach out to potential
recruits is the internet, which is thus an additional target point for EU policies and efforts.
Taking the global character of Islamist extremism into consideration, the EU further wanted to
support third countries to implement similar strategies.

The second approach aims at emphasizing mainstream, i.e., moderate, views on Islam, and
thereby preventing Islamism from entering the mainstream. In order to achieve that, the EU
stresses the importance of involving religious organizations and groups who do not accept
extremist views. Furthermore, literature on moderate Islam should be easily available, and
imams should become ‘European’. Another measure is the support of undistorted
representations of the West in Muslim communities, and the other way around, of Muslims in

10
the EU. Lastly, the EU is calling for the development of a ‘non-emotive lexicon’ in order to
discuss the topic without linking Islam to terrorism (Council of the EU 2005b: 4).

As for the third approach, the EU wants to ensure that there are same opportunities for
everybody in societies both within and outside the EU. It recognizes that there might be
‘structural factors’ in certain parts of society, which make extremism more attractive. In the
EU, this should be achieved through creating equality, fighting against discrimination and
fostering intercultural exchange. In third countries, the EU wants use political dialogue and its
assistance programs in order to encourage the development of appropriate frameworks and
values (Council of the EU 2005b: 4-5).

Lastly, the EU sees that in order to find appropriate responses, the phenomenon of
radicalization has to be better understood. For creating this understanding, input from those
concerned, especially Muslims themselves, should be gathered, as well as comparisons of
different national contexts in order to assess the European situation (Council of the EU 2005:
5). It is important to mention that point 14 of the Strategy, coming under the subtitle ‘Increasing
our understanding and developing our response appropriately’, refers exclusively to the
radicalization of Muslims in Europe, neglecting other types and drivers of radicalization that
have led to terrorist attacks in Europe in recent years. The surprising omission of references to
lessons learned from past engagements with terrorism of different motivations indicates how
Islamist-inspired terrorism has risen as the main concern of EU CT and counter-radicalization
policies. Additionally, this omission also seems to indicate that Islamist-inspired terrorism is
perceived as being a different phenomenon from the nationalist and independentist inspired
terrorism of the 1960s-1980s, therefore requiring new counter-measures.

The EU emphasizes that it is the member states’ task to implement appropriate measures, since
they have the according authority. Furthermore, inter-state cooperation, as well as the inclusion
of religious as well as non-religious non-governmental organizations is encouraged. The EU
would support this by setting the framework for coordination, information sharing and the
determination of best practices. The EU would moreover play the central role in interacting
with third countries. (Council of the EU: 5-6)

The EU Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism was further
revised in 2008 and 2014. In the 2014 revision, the main ideas of the original version remained

11
while appropriated to new circumstances. This change is perceivable straight from the
description of the current challenges: whereas the main goal is still preventing people from
turning to extremism, this document emphasizes the necessity of keeping up with the fast-
evolving methods of terrorist action and recruitment, and now explicitly mentions the
involvement of a ‘security approach’. Yet the EU also sees the importance of not only relying
on ‘security-related measures’, but finding a balance with combating structural factors that
‘may create an environment conductive to radicalization and recruitment to terrorism’.
(Council of the EU 2014: 3-4).

In a new section, included in 2014, the EU presents the principles on which the following
measures set foot. The first one already appeared in the original document from 2005, namely
the importance of cooperation with not only governmental but also civil society actors and –
for the first time – the private sector, on different levels. Furthermore, measures taken should
always be in accordance with human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, as well
as fulfil the criteria of ‘transparency, effectiveness, flexibility and continued national and
international collaboration’ (Council of the EU 2014: 5).

The first response listed in the document roots back to the original one from 2005, namely
elimination of a range of, often interrelated, structural factors which make Islamism seem a
valid alternative. Next to the measures mentioned in 2005, the revised 2014 document also
explains that education should be supported in order to foster critical thinking, as well as
tolerance and mutual respect among youths. The 2014 document also underlines the
importance of exchange with civil society, especially with regards to communicating
effectively the already achieved results.

In order to address the above-mentioned structural factors for radicalization in third countries,
the EU’s approach remains the same, namely using political dialogue and assistance programs
to bring respective countries to develop appropriate frameworks. As for the objective “Ensure
that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism,” the importance of
involving civil society is deemed central, and the use of ‘non-emotive lexicon’ is considered
fundamental (Council of the EU 2014: 7). Interestingly, the EU does not clarify what it means
by ‘mainstream’.

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A new separate point in the 2014 revised strategy is the improvement of government
communications. These communications should be clear and consistent, as well as always
adapt the most appropriate language and channel. What should be communicated are norms
and values on the one hand, and the work efforts on the other hand. The aim is to give a clear
picture on policies, strategies, and their objectives. One way of communication should be social
media and the internet, which makes it important to enter public-private partnerships (idem: 7-
8). Another new measure is the deployment of counter-narratives, meaning people telling
‘positive and credible stories’, also in frameworks of projects, in order to de-legitimize the
extremist narrative. One source of such narratives can be victims of terrorism, who can most
credibly de-mask terrorist actions and ideology. A source to be explored is former terrorists.
(idem: 8-9). Counter-narrative messaging is also supposed to happen on the internet, and
therefore different actors should be encouraged to message these positive stories, as the next
set of measures explains. Another measure to combat extremism on the internet is removing
extremist material, which requires not only international cooperation but also collaboration
with the internet industry (idem: 9).

While prisons, schools, and religious environments had already been identified as possible sites
of recruitment in 2005, the 2014 revised strategy addresses actors’ capability to recognize
radicalization and step in early in the process. People in touch with vulnerable persons, like
teachers, religious leaders, as well as prison and probation staff, should receive training and
share experiences. Another new focus lies on building capacity within civil society and
individuals to appropriately address radicalization through education and training, especially
of young people. In order to do so, it is again the cooperation with civil society and the private
sector, as well as the involvement of RAN that should make this possible. The role of the RAN,
that will be further analyzed below in this chapter, is framed as very relevant in the context of
the 2014 revised counter-radicalization strategy, including for developing ‘disengagement and
exit strategies’ for the ones who want to pull out of Islamism.

Another reoccurring point of the 2014 revised strategy is the task to develop a better
understanding of radicalization. Again, one of the measures to achieve this is discussions with
as many actors (potentially) involved as possible. New measures are the employment of the
RAN, as well as the envisaged creation of a ‘knowledge hub’ that should make it possible for
Member States to exchange insights on this topic. Furthermore, the EU mentions that research
into the topic should be (further) encouraged and funded by both the EU and Member States.

13
Considering the international dimension of terrorism and radicalization, the EU measures are
threefold. First, the issue of hindering citizens from travelling abroad for terrorist purposes is
mentioned again. Second, also the support to third countries to build the necessary capacities
re-occurs. Third, as a new measure, the document highlights the need to emphasize and explain
policy purposes at the international level, and to exchange expertise.

When it comes to the implementation of these measures, many elements have been taken over
from the original document. However, the current document also advises that both the EU and
the Member States work with international organizations in order to realize the measures.
Moreover, the document now mentions the necessity to have “common elements and broad
agreements” as the basis for counter-radicalization strategies, even though it is still up to the
Member States to create situation-specific measures.

The Radicalization Awareness Network

In the broader EU counter-radicalization policy, a very important role is played by the already
mentioned RAN, established in September 2011 (European Commission 2017a). The people
involved in this network are those who are closest to persons susceptible to radicalization, and
cover a wide range of professions and organizations. These are for instance policemen and
prison authorities, teachers and youth workers, as well as civil society representatives and
healthcare professionals. RAN is intended to give them the opportunity to share and pool their
respective experiences with anti-radicalization work.

The RAN was expected to be a major asset in the EU’s attempt to support its member states
with the necessary expertise to counter radicalization. This becomes apparent in the
Commission’s Communication from January 2014 (European Commission 2014), outlining
ten areas where Member States and the EU could take more action to prevent radicalization. In
seven of these areas, the RAN is mentioned, either as a source of expertise that should be used,
as a subject of reform itself, namely directing its work better to the actual needs of Member
States, as well as a venue for furthering other measures. Additionally, the RAN plays a role in
two big topics of counter-radicalization, namely tackling online radicalization and research on
radicalization and its prevention.

14
The Commission identifies online radicalization as an area where close cooperation with civil
society and the private sector is needed (European Commission 2017a). The private sector is
needed to find a way to prevent extremist content to find its way into the public online space,
while civil society should help to develop and spread positive counter-narratives, also with the
help of RAN. And concerning research, the Commission states that it would make funds
available, among others through the Horizon 2020, an EU Research and Innovation program
(European Commission 2017b). They also see the need to keep the research targeted, which
they want to ensure by working with the different parties involved.

The new reality of 2015-2016

These policies and strategies were in place when the new wave of terrorist action inspired by
Daesh started to unfold starting with the 2014 attack against the Jewish Museum in Brussels.
From that moment until the time of writing, a string of terrorist attacks has taken place in
several EU member states. Between 7 and 9 January 2015, attacks in Paris on the office of the
magazine Charlie Hebdo, at a kosher grocery store, and in a Paris suburb caused 17 casualties.
One month later, on 14-15 February 2015 in Copenhagen, an individual shot two people and
injured five police officers during and after an event in solidarity with the victims of Charlie
Hebdo. On 18 September 2015, an individual alleged linked to a terrorist organization stabbed
and injured a policewoman in Berlin. On 13 November 2015, a group of coordinated attacks
in Paris caused 133 deaths and a higher number on injured. On 22 March 2016, coordinated
suicide attacks killed 32 people and injured over 300 at Brussels airport and a metro station in
central Brussels. On 13 June 2016, a man stabbed to death two police officers in Île-de-France,
and on 14 July, the same year, a truck was deliberately run over pedestrians in Nice, killing 86
people and injuring over 400. On 26 July 2016, two men with alleged links to a terrorist
organization killed a priest and injured another person in a church in Normandy. On 19
December 2016, a man drove a truck through a Christmas market in Berlin, killing 12 people
and injuring over 50. Finally, on 7 April 2017, an Uzbek individual carried out a similar attack
in the city center of Stockholm, killing 4 people and injuring dozens. How did the EU and its
member states react to this cascade of attacks?

Main national responses

Before outlining the main measures adopted by the EU, it is important to emphasize that
security of their citizens remains a key responsibility of the member states. Therefore, many of
the most relevant CT measures adopted in Europe in this period were taken at the nation level,

15
and not at the EU level. Even though many of them do not refer to countering radicalization,
they were adopted as a response to terrorist attacks and provide a background in which the
actual anti-radicalization measures were taken. These national CT responses are similar across
many European states and include:
• Revisions of the criminal code in several countries - new offenses were added to the
body of actions that can be considered terrorism. For example, Germany made
travelling abroad in order to receive terrorist training an offense in June 2015, as did
Belgium in July 2015 (BMI 2015, Belgian Federal Government 2015). Moreover,
Belgium decided in 2015 that convicted terrorists, who have obtained Belgium
citizenship prior to criminal offences, can have their citizenship revoked. In June 2016
France ruled that to access jihadist websites regularly is now considered a criminal
offence (Belgium Federal Government 2015, French Government 2016c).
• Increase of the national security budgets – Many EU countries reinforced security
through additional spending in material and/or manpower. In January 2015, for
example, France planned for the following three years to create in total 2680 new jobs
in different areas for the fight against terrorism and to spend €425 million for this
purpose (French government 2015a). In July 2015, the UK planned to spend 2% of its
GDP on defense, and announced in October the same year to invest in additional
equipment and technology (UK Government 2015 a and 2015c). Belgium announced
in November 2015 to amend its budget for 2016 by €400 million, and to reinforce
security by deploying 520 military personnel (Belgian Federal Government 2015).
• Anti-radicalization measures – The focus on anti-radicalization in the post 2015 period
was placed on three areas: prisons, internet, and education institutions. De-
radicalization programs in prisons were developed in several EU countries, including
France, the UK and Belgium. The UK also introduced the policy ‘Duty to Prevent’ in
education facilities, like schools and universities, and announced in October 2015 to
spend £5 million in order to counter extremist ideologies (UK Government 2015d).
Belgium on the other hand announced in November 2015 to target hate preachers and
to shut down places, where propagation of jihadism was identified (Belgian National
Government 2015). In Germany, the Integration Bill from August 2016 constitutes a
prevention and de-radicalization measure (BMI 2016).
• Tracking terrorist movements – Several EU countries introduced national PNR
(Passenger Name Record) platforms. In January 2015 France decided to have an

16
 operational platform as of September 2015. Belgium disclosed in November 2015 to
implement PNR without giving a timeframe. Special provisions on data retention have
also been taken. In the UK, this was part of the Counter Terrorism Act from 2015, while
in Germany a similar legislation came into force in December 2015. In another
measure, France established in 2015 a Database for Reporting Radicalized People with
Terrorist tendencies in 2015 (French Government 2015a, German Federal Government
2015, UK Government 2015b, USDOS 2015).
• Institutionalization of the state of emergency – As a response to the terrorist attacks of
November 2015, France declared a State of Emergency. Originally passed for three
months, it was consecutively prolonged in the years afterwards in February, May, and
in July 2016, this time for 6 months as a response to the Nice attack. As of March 2017,
the state of emergency is still in place and cannot be considered an exception anymore.
While Belgium did not declare a State of Emergency, the government announced in
their Action Plan from November 2015 to consider “adapt[ing] legislation linked to the
state of emergency” as well as the “[p]ossibility for temporary and exceptional
measures to ensure public safety.” (French Government 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, Belgium
National Government 2015).

Main EU responses
There have been a number of discussions and decisions on measures for combating and
preventing terrorism on the EU level since the beginning of 2015. The following section will
outline progress in different areas.

Already in February 2015, the heads of states of the EU ushered a statement, based on the Riga
Joint Statement from the month before, in which they announced to seize the possibilities they
have under the Schengen framework, also concerning “systematic checks of EU citizens at
external borders”. (European Council 2015). This measure was decided to be implemented by
the Justice and Home Affairs Council the following month. In December, the same year, the
Commission made a proposal to “manage the EU's external borders and protect the Schengen
area,” while also the European Council highlighted the necessity of those measures. Finally, in
February 2016, the EU Council reached an agreement on the general approach concerning this
matter, which would still have to be discussed with the EP.

17
Another point mentioned in the February Statement was the fight against terrorist financing.
Already on 15 May 2016, the Money Laundering Directive was passed. In December that same
year, the European Council noted the importance of further action in this area. As part of the
fight against terrorist financing, the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) was launched
in January 2016. Furthermore, the EU Council ushered conclusions on the action plan to
strengthen the fight against terrorist financing in February 2016. They stated that they
“expected progress” in the following areas: “avoiding the use of virtual currencies for terrorist
financing”, “improving access to information by financial intelligence units”, “measures on
prepaid cards”, and “measures against illicit cash movements.” In July 2016, the Economy
Council discussed a Commission proposal to strengthen EU rules aimed at preventing money
laundering and terrorist financing.

Information sharing and cooperation between security services is another topic with respect to
fighting terrorism. After the European Council called for proposals from Europol and the
Commission on ways to achieve better information sharing and cooperation in March 2015,
they again highlighted the importance of this topic in December the same year. In the beginning
of 2016, the European Counter Terrorism Center (ECTC), as an “enhanced information hub”
was launched. The month after, the European Council suggested another measure for enhanced
information sharing, namely for “the establishing of an EU platform containing information
about people and organizations connected with terrorist activity whose assets are frozen by
member states.” Moreover, in their Statement in March 2016, the JHA Council called for an
enhanced use of existing international databases, as well as for better ways to collect digital
evidence. Finally, the EU Council published a Roadmap for enhanced information exchange
and information management.

In order to take measures against extremist material on the internet, which was also a point in
the February 2015 Statement, Europol established the EU Internal Referral Unit (IRU) in July
2015 following up on instruction from the European Council. During its first year, the unit ‘has
assessed and processed for the purpose of referral towards concerned internet service providers
over 11 000 messages across some 31 online platforms in 8 languages’. The content had been
put out by ‘criminals to spread violent extremist online content materials, and 91.4% of the
total content has been successfully removed from the platforms by the social media and online
service providers’ (Europol 2016).

18
After the fight against illegal trafficking of firearms was announced in the February 2015
Statement, the following month the EU Council called for according propositions from the
Commission and Europol. In the same month, the JHA Council called for a rapid completion
of, among others, the firearms legislation. In December 2016, the European Parliament and
Council reached a provisional political agreement on the Firearms Directive (European
Commission 2016d).

Adopting an EU PNR framework is one of the measures called for in the February 2015
Statement. After the JHA Council agreed on working with the EP in order to make “decisive
progress” concerning this framework in March 2015, the following November they stated in
Conclusion to finalize the according directive in the same year, and the Home Affairs Council
approved the comprise text agreed with the EP on the proposed directive in December. Finally,
in April 2016, the EU PNR Directive was adopted, after the JHA Council urged the EP to do
so the month before. As a last measure, the Justice Ministers and the EU council proposed a
directive on combating terrorism in March 2016. The directive is supposed to strengthen the
EU’s legal framework in preventing terrorist attacks, for example through making training and
travelling abroad for terrorist purposes a criminal offense, and to strengthen the rules on the
rights of victims of terrorism.

The areas of action for preventing radicalization identified in the Communication of 2014 are
also part of the European Agenda on Security, adopted in April 2015 (European Commission
2015). In order to identify and remove extremist material from the Internet, the Agenda
foresees the establishment of the above-mentioned Internal Referral Unit within Europol.
Additionally, drawing on the previous communication, IT companies would furthermore be
included through an EU-level Forum from 2015 onwards, where they should get in contact
with legal authorities and civil society in order to both take action against online terrorist
propaganda and deal with the technical aspects of new encryption technology.

Another recurrent feature is the development and communication of a positive counter

narrative, supplemented by the factually adequate representation of conflicts. In the words of
the European Agenda on Security, strengthening the EU’s own strategic communication with
common narratives and factual representation of conflicts is an important aspect of the EU’s

19
response’ (European Commission 2015: 14-15). Furthermore, hate crime and hate speech
specifically are identified as issues that require monitoring and reporting.

An additional point of the European Agenda on Security relates to the measures that can be
taken in order to make youth less vulnerable to radicalization. Important aspects, according to
the Agenda, are “[e]ducation, youth participation, interfaith and intercultural dialogue as well
as employment and social inclusion” (European Commission 2015: 15) which should therefore
be a priority in EU policy making. The Agenda also considers a point that was already
mentioned as one of the four strategies in the EU’s counter-radicalization strategy from 2005,
namely the importance of cooperating with third countries, so countries beyond the EU, in
order to effectively fight the roots and reasons of radicalization. This should be made possible
through, among others, the RAN.

The RAN’s importance for the EU is further reflected in this document, since it mentions the
establishment of the RAN Center of Excellence (CoE) – at that point in time still a work in
progress – as an important step to further counter-radicalization. The CoE is needed in order to
‘add a new practical dimension to the cooperation between stakeholders on anti-radicalization’
(European Commission 2016c). Since its launch in October 2015, it guides RAN working
groups and supports the EU and individual countries upon request, and shares the knowledge
pooled in RAN. The role of RAN CoE is consequently a supporting one, rather than an
executive one. This fits to the EU’s main stance to anti-radicalization, which is based on the
perception that such measures lie within the responsibility of the member states.

Shifting attention to the development of a positive counter-narrative that stresses European

values in contrast to extremist propaganda, an important contribution to the development could
be the “Paris Declaration” on promoting citizenship and common values. This document was
signed by the Commission and Education ministers on 17 March 2015, in the aftermath of the
Paris and Copenhagen attacks, and it aimed as reinforcing the centrality of EU’s fundamental
value: ‘respect for human dignity, freedom (including freedom of expression), democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights’ (European Commission and EU
Ministers of Education 2015: 1).

The topics mentioned in the EU policies so far, as areas where the EU plans to support the
Member States, were also taken up in the Council Conclusions from November 2015, which

20
were informed by a High-Level meeting which took place the previous month. The meeting,
in which also the Justice Ministers participated, focused on ‘criminal justice responses to
radicalization’ (European Council and Council of the EU 2015).

The Council picked this topic of criminal justice responses up in their conclusions, as they
‘call[ed] for the exchange of best practices on de-radicalization [and disengagement] in prisons
and rehabilitation program, training and funding’, as well as re-integrating of those who either
returned from or were prevented to travel to fight zones (European Council and Council of the
EU 2015). Repeating the importance of de-radicalizing terrorists, this conclusion also points
again to the RAN’s central role in assisting Member States, as it should help to achieve this
exchange of best practices.

Concerning the internet as a possible platform of radicalization through hate speech, the
Conclusions do not add any new measures. They rather repeat the need for clear counter-
messaging, the inclusion of the private sector as well as the establishment and use of internet
referral units.

What has been done on this topic is mentioned in a more recent Communication from April
2016, which “deliver[s] on the European Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism and
pave the way towards an effective and genuine Security Union.” (European Commission
2016b). While recapping the efforts made on counter-radicalization, and thereby making
explicit the Commission’s engagement in “supporting actions to promote effective alternative
counter-narratives,” the Communication also mentions two ongoing projects, which together
are financed with €10 million (European Commission 2016b).

The first one is the development of a Joint Referral Platform “by the internet industry with full
Europol involvement.” (European Commission 2016b). This measure is therefore an example
of the practical engagement of the private sector in the fight against radicalization. In this
specific case, the platform is meant to make it possible to hinder material prohibited at one
platform on the internet to reappear at another place. The second project, called the EU-wide
"Empowering Civil Society" Program, is concerned with making positive counter-narrative
strategies more effective. (European Commission 2016b). Other funds are dedicated to address
radicalization in prisons (€8 million in 2015 and 2016), as well as supporting education and
youth outreach as counter-radicalization measures (‘up to €400 million’ under Erasmus+).

21
Moreover, also in this Communication, the point is stressed that the most effective outcomes
are to be expected from engagement on the local level. As a new aspect, however, the
Communication furthermore mentions the need of ‘more security-oriented approach’, with the
focus on convicts released from prison and other radicals already known to authorities.
(European Commission 2016b).

The last document to be mentioned in this overview is the Communication on “supporting the
prevention of radicalization leading to violent extremism” from June 2016 (European
Commission 2016a). As the accompanying press release reads, this Communication “outline[s]
actions in seven specific areas where cooperation at EU level can bring added value”. The
Communication’s content mainly discusses and recaps the areas and measures mentioned
above; yet it also introduces new foci and specific measures.

In the area of “countering terrorist propaganda and hate speech online,” for instance, the
Communication announces that a “toolbox of targeted actions” is going to be made public “in
the coming months.” (European Commission 2016a: 6). This toolbox is going to be the result
of the cooperation much proclaimed in the previous documents, namely the working together
of actors on the EU- and national level, including civil society, the private sector and Europol.
In order to better control online hate speech, the Commission has further developed an
according code of conduct, again in cooperation with the private internet sector.

Moreover, the topic of inclusion of marginalized groups is deepened through progress on EU-
level in promoting the fight against discrimination. Next to initiatives and a Directive focusing
of equal chances on the labor market, the EU also provides funding that “will go directly
towards fostering the social inclusion of disadvantaged groups”. (European Commission
2016a:12).

As a last point to be mentioned here, the Commission announces the development of a “specific
toolkit of best practices” supporting to foster youngsters’ “democratic resilience”, their media
literacy paired with critical thinking, as well as their conflict resolving abilities and respect for
others (European Commission 2016a:12).

22
Table 1. Main documents establishing an EU counter-radicalization policy
Year Document
2004 Declaration on Terrorism
2005 EU counter-terrorism strategy
2005 EU Strategy for Combating
Radicalisation and
Recruitment to Terrorism
2008 First revision of the EU
Strategy for Combating
Radicalisation and
Recruitment to Terrorism
2014 Commission’s
Communication on
Preventing Radicalisation to
Terrorism and Violent
Extremism: Strengthening the
EU's Response
2014 Second Revision of the EU
Strategy for Combating
Radicalisation and
Recruitment to Terrorism
2015 European Agenda on
Security
2015 Paris Declaration
2015 Council Conclusions on
enhancing the criminal
justice response to
radicalisation leading to
terrorism and violent
extremism
2016 Communication on
“delivering on the European
Agenda on Security to fight
against terrorism and pave
the way towards an effective
and genuine Security Union”
2016 Communication on
“supporting the prevention of
radicalisation leading to
violent extremism”
Main ideas
- First time the idea of radicalization was mentioned on a
counter-terrorism-related document
× Four pillars: ‘protect’, ‘prevent’, ‘pursue’, ‘respond’
× ‘Prevent’ pillar focuses on countering radicalization
× Four strategies: strengthening national capabilities,
facilitating European cooperation, developing collective
capabilities, promoting international partnership
× Four responses to radicalization:
× Focus on perpetrators of radicalization, strengthening
mainstream Islam, eradicating structural disadvantages,
better understand radicalization
× Updates the Strategy in the context of the policy
developments observed in the period 2005-2008
× 10 areas which could be part of EU and national counter
radicalization efforts
× Cooperation with civil society and private sector,
research, exit strategies, combating propaganda online.
× Balancing measures to combat structural factors and
security related measures
× Messaging counter-narratives
× Enabling local actors and civil society
× A common EU framework for strengthening security in
the Member States
× Tackling terrorism and preventing radicalization as part of
security agenda
× Underlining the existence of common EU values
× Different aspects: prevention, investigation, prosecution,
conviction, rehabilitation and reintegration
× Assessing the actual process concerning the EU Agenda
on Security
× Identifying further necessary actions
× 7 areas where EU policies and measures can support
Member States
× Education, de-radicalisation in prisons, research, online
radicalization, and security-dimension, among other
aspects
23
Analysis: The counter-radicalization / counter-terrorism nexus and other trends

From the general scenario described in the previous section, we identify a number of trends
that will now be analyzed. They correspond to issues that are of particular relevance to the
broader anti-radicalization efforts in Europe. At the same time, we argue that, despite their
centrality to the general functioning of EU anti-radicalization endeavors, they are often
neglected by the literature at the expense of a focus on more traditional vectors such as
efficiency, consistency, or the security vs freedom balance. At the same time, as mentioned
before, it should be highlighted that both EU, CT, and anti-radicalization policies need to be
understood in the context of a multitude of different national policies, that not always are
compatible, or at least in absolute tune, with the EU guidelines.

The predominance of preventive strategies

The development of EU policies aimed at countering radicalization grew out of a realization
that the most pressing contemporary (Islamist) terrorist threat tormenting Europe is in fact
homegrown, and not of an external nature. The Islamist terrorist threat that Europe is
confronted with is often a result of radicalization processes unfolding in Europe. But it also
resulted from the EU’s structural inertia to exhibit higher levels of efficiency in countering
security threats. In other words, the EU focuses on counter-radicalization not only because
preventing terrorism is better than dealing with the consequences of an attack, but also because
countering radicalization does not infringe the member states’ esteemed sovereignty on
security matters. The ‘Prevent’ pillar emerged as a relevant set of strategies in the broader CT
strategy also because it is politically less sensible to be dealt with. This explains why counter-
radicalization is such an important dimension of the wider EU’s counter-terrorism policy.

EU’s externalization of knowledge production

A fundamental idea that results from the EU counter-radicalization policy pictured above is the
way the EU externalizes its knowledge production. As mentioned above, the RAN involves
national and local experts and practitioners sharing experiences and providing input to the EU’s
policy formulation processes. At the same time, the EU – through its Framework Programs –
has channeled research funds to sponsor and stimulate research on topics related to
radicalization, generating knowledge that will eventually inform its policies. Bakker (2015)
shows that the Sixth and Seventh Framework Programs provided funding to several multi-
annual research projects, among them the ‘Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of

24
Law’ (TTSRL), ‘Cultural Approach to Radical Islamism in the Context of European Pluralism:
Radical versus Moderate Muslims’ (CARP) and ‘Scientific Approach to Fighting Radical
Extremism’ (SAFIRE). Other examples are ‘PRIME: Preventing, Interdicting and Mitigating
Extremist Events: Defending against Lone Actor Extremism’ or ‘VOX-POL: Virtual Centre of
Excellence for Research in Violent Online Political Extremism’. Keppel and Rougier (2016),
in their analysis of European terror and security research, provide an overview of the most
important research projects funded by the EU under FP 7 in the area of terrorism and
radicalization. They show the precise intellectual contribution that these projects bring and
which research trends are most promising and should therefore receive the European
Commission’s attention.

Under Horizon 2020 the trend continues. In 2015, for example, calls were open for projects on
‘Developing a comprehensive approach to violent radicalization in the EU from early
understanding to improving protection’ (Topic: SEC-07-FCT-2016-2017), and ‘Human Factor
for the Prevention, Investigation, and Mitigation of criminal and terrorist acts’ (Topic: SEC-
07-FCT-2016-2017). As the number of terrorist incidents in Europe grows, it is expected that
research on radicalization will continue to receive EU funds.

There is nothing inherently wrong with these dynamics, yet they do confirm that EU policy-
making is indeed largely based upon external knowledge. In sensitive areas, such as security
and counter-terrorism, they may prove to be problematic.

The crime-terror nexus and the role of prisons

Several documents referred to above mention the fundamental role exerted by prisons in
processes of radicalization. According to a study published by the King’s College’s
International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, prisons are

places of vulnerability in which extremists can find plenty of ‘angry young men’ who are ‘ripe’ for
radicalization; they bring together criminals and terrorists, and therefore create opportunities for
networking and ‘skills transfers’; and they often leave inmates with few opportunities to re-integrate into
society. (ICSR 2016: 4)

In this report, the authors highlight the crime-terror nexus, i.e., the fact that many terrorists of
today are the criminals of the past. There is general consensus among policy-makers and

25
academics in this respect; in the words of Gilles de Kerchove, EU’s Counter-Terrorism
Coordinator, ‘jail is a major incubator of radicalization’ (European Parliament 2015). Future
EU strategies should inevitably pay close attention to the dynamics of recruitment, conversion
and group identification that occur in prisons across Europe.

The opening up to the private sector

In a movement similar to what has happened in many other policy fields, the revised EU
counter-radicalization strategy of 2014 opens up the door for the private sector to participate
in security-related practices. As mentioned above, the EU institutions understand that the
private sector, in particular companies providing social media platforms and
telecommunications in general, is needed to prevent extremist content to spread freely through
the online space. The most obvious instances of private-sector contribution to the counter-
radicalization occur when law enforcement authorities want to gain access to data collected by
companies that provide online communication systems and social networks. It is also common
that communication companies, either by own initiative or at the request of law enforcement
authorities, prevent specific radical content to be circulated online. Whereas the importance of
these private sector contributions cannot be neglected, there are naturally potential issues of
contending rights, between the right to security and the right to privacy, and Argomaniz (2015)
has demonstrated that the EU faces big challenges in this domain.

The Daesh has shown how successful a well-thought and brilliantly executed online
propaganda strategy can be in reaching the desired outcomes. Through their well-produced,
high-resolution videos and their massive use of social media accounts, the message of the
Caliphate was spread quickly and efficiently all over the world and, according to a report from
the Soufan Group, attracted foreign fighters from at least 86 countries (Soufan Group 2015),
many of which were radicalized either exclusively or mostly online. As the usage of technology
spreads and our lives unfold more and more online, this case reveals that the challenges facing
the EU are unlikely to diminish.

The over-representation of Islamism

No matter how much academics and decision-makers disagree about the efficiency and
adequacy of EU’s counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization measures, the most
controversial – yet too often overlooked – aspect of them is their disproportionate focus on
Islamism as the ideological trigger for radicalization. Even though until recently the Europol

26
annual Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports showed consistently that the majority of terrorist
activity in Europe was not Islamist-inspired, the vast majority of the policies adopted in
Brussels were designed to address Islamist radicalization. An example of this tendency is the
action plan Stronger EU action to better tackle violent radicalisation leading to terrorism,
adopted by the European Commission on 14 June 2016, in which the sole justification for the
new adopted measures is the fact that some 4000 EU nationals had joined terrorist
organizations in Syria and Iraq.

This is unfortunate for several reasons, including because it is an ill-conceived strategy:

although Islamist-inspired terrorism is obviously a present reality in contemporary Western
Europe, policy-makers and bureaucrats should not neglect the other terrorist threats. These
include para-military groups on the far-right, radical nationalists, environmental extremists,
and lone wolves such as Anders Breivik, the Norwegian far-right anti-Islamist that in July 2013
killed 77 people, most of which teenagers from his own country, without showing any signs of
ulterior regret. A number of studies has shown how ill-designed preventive anti-radicalization
programs, such as UK’s Prevent, encapsulate racial stereotypes and pose a risk to human rights
violations. A report from the Open Society Foundations has argued that UK’s Prevent is
‘flawed in both its design and application, rendering it not only unjust but also
counterproductive’ (Open Society Foundations 2016: 15).ii Compatible conclusions were
reached by Mattsson et al (2016)’s study of the RAN collection of approaches and practices
used in education.

Conclusion
Over the last decade, the EU developed a counter-radicalization policy that runs hand in hand
with its broader counter-terrorism policy. This chapter provided an overview of the processes
by which both policies developed, with a particular focus on the way the EU reacted to the
sharp increase in terrorist activity in Europe observed since 2015. Our analysis of the current
state of affairs of the EU’s counter-radicalization strategy reveals new trends that are relevant
in this context and constitute a part of broader tendencies in contemporary international
security: the predominance of preventive strategies, the outsourcing of knowledge production,
the crime-terror nexus, the opening up to the private sector, and an over-representation of
Islamist-inspired terrorism in EU policy documents and strategies, while other forms of
terrorism are mostly absent. Despite their centrality in the EU counter-radicalization policy-
making, these trends are often neglected by the literature.

27
Understanding that these trends are not exclusive to the EU is important, because it contributes
to contextualizing them and to better understand the ratio that leads to them. This also
facilitates a de-mystification of the EU as a sui generis actor whose actions are solely explained
by its peculiar form of political organization. Indeed, as we tried to demonstrate in our
analytical section, many of the measures adopted by the EU are in fact better explained by
broader trends in international politics and security.

It is not unlikely that the rise of nationalist rhetoric and policies sweeping over Europe will
lead to tensions that may end up in more politically-motivated violence, as illustrated by
Önnerfors’ chapter on PEGIDA in this volume, where recent German neo-Nazi terrorist attacks
are mentioned. Our analysis has also revealed that, despite a multitude of documents approved
in recent years, the EU still struggles to efficiently implement many of them – an idea already
advanced in previous studies (e.g. Bossong 2015). This is mostly explained by the co-existence
of multiple layers of policy-making in the fields of CT and anti-radicalization, that include the
European, the national, and the regional levels.

28
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i
In this chapter we use the term Daesh to designate the group also known as Islamic State, Islamic State
in Iraq and in the Levant (ISIL) or Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Daesh corresponds to the
acronym of al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham (Arabic for Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and
is the expression adopted by the EU.
ii
Prevent is the part of the UK government’s counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST. The aim of the
Prevent strategy is to prevent people from becoming radicalized and eventually commit to violent
extremism. This strategy addresses the issue through three different approaches. Firstly, it considers the
ideological underpinning of extremism and its perpetrators, secondly it offers practical support and
lastly, it cooperates with different sectors in which radicalization is likely to happen. CONTEST
contains four pillars, just as the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy from 2005, namely protect, prevent,
pursue and respond. As Bossong (2014:69) points out, this reflects the UK’s influence on EU policy
discussions on counter-terrorism during its presidency, with the result that the UK managed to “upload
[its] strategy to the EU level.” Bossong sees another incident of the UK, together with the Netherlands,
shaping EU measures in the discussions of the ‘Policy Planners Network’ which “clearly run in parallel
to the EU’s efforts.” (idem, 71).

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