COMMENCEMENT OF FUNCTIONS MARCIAL COSTIN vs. HONORABLE LOPE C.

QUIMBO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, and HIGINIO VERRA G.R. No. L-32271 January 27, 1983 FACTS: Petitioner Estanislao Lajer was a member of the municipal police force of Abuyog, Leyte since January 1, 1949. He was extended a promotional appointment as sergeant of police on October 15, 1958. On November 25, 1959, the outgoing municipal mayor of Abuyog accorded Lajer another promotional appointment as chief of police. This last appointment was not attested and approved as required by law. On January 14, 1960, the new municipal mayor dismissed Lajer and eight other members of the police department. On the same day, the municipal mayor extended to respondent Higinio Verra a permanent appointment as Chief of Police Lajer and the eight members of the police force filed an action for mandamus against the municipal mayor, municipal treasurer and the municipal council of Abuyog, contesting their separation from the service. While this petition for mandamus was pending, there was again a change in the municipal administration of Abuyog, Leyte as a result of the 1963 local elections. The newly elected municipal mayor dismissed respondent Verra from office on January 16, 1964. Verra was replaced by Victoriano Silleza officer-incharge, on January 17, 1964 until October, 1964 when petitioner Marcial Costin was appointed chief of police. Respondent Verra filed for quo warranto with mandamus against Marcial Costin the municipal mayor, and the municipal treasurer, questioning the legality of his separation alleging that he could not be dismissed as chief of police because he was a civil service eligible and in possession of an appointment to the position of chief of police of Abuyog, Leyte duly attested "Permanent" by the Civil Service Commission. The appellate court found that Lajer ,Tomines and Jervoso "were illegally removed from office and are, the afore entitled to reinstatement to their respective positions with payment of the salaries they failed o receive. " As a result of the appellate decision, petitioner (then mayor) Tisado reinstated Lajer as chief of police on April 1, 1966. Respondent judge rendered his decision in Civil Case No. 3606, declaring that Verra is entitled to reinstatement with salary to be paid to him for the Whole period of his illegal separation to the date of his reinstatement. The court also ordered the municipal mayor to reinstate Verra immediately and the municipal treasurer to pay his salary

PETITIONERS CONTENTION: The appointment issued in favor of respondent Verra as chief of police on January 14, 1960, was invalid and ineffective because the said position was not vacant from the time Lajer was illegally separated on January 14, 1960, up to the time he was actually reinstated. RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The office in question was legally vacant when he was appointed thereto because Lajers appointment was never attested as required by law or incomplete, and, therefore, never became effective. It is further contended that Lajers appointment as chief of police was temporary in character and terminable at the pleasure of the appointing authority and when Lajer was separated from the office of chief of police, the position became legally and physically vacant. ISSUE: Who among Lajer and Verra is rightful in the position of Chief of Police of Abuyog? Lajer. RULING: When respondent Verra was appointed chief of police on January 14, 1960, Lajer had just been dismissed from office with several other members of the police force. The validity of Verras appointment, therefore, hinges on the legality of Lajers removal. It is elementary in the law of public officers that no person, no matter how qualified and eligible he is for a certain position may be appointed to an office which is not vacant. There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed or his appoint. ment validly terminated.

The lower court overlooked the fact that Verra could not have been permanently appointed to the contested position because no less than the Court of Appeals had declared that his predecessor, Estanislao Lajer was illegally terminated from office and must be reinstated to his former position. The private respondent is correct in asserting that when the promotional appointment of Lajer was made in 1959, it could not be considered final or complete. Under Section 2(a) of Rule VI, the Civil Service Rules implementing Section 16(g) of Republic Act 2260, an appointment extended by an officer duly empowered to make it is not final and complete until after the Commissioner of Civil Service has certified that such an appointment may be made. However, these requirements could not be complied with because Lajer who had been appointed on November 25, 1959 was replaced on January 14, 1960 by the new mayor of the municipality who appointed Verra in his stead Respondent Verra cannot rely on the absence of an attestation from the provincial treasurer and a certification from the Civil Service Commissioner insofar as Lajers appointment is concerned because by the fact of Verras appointment, these requirements could no longer be fulfilled. Mayor Octavio Traya took the appointments away from the office of the Provincial Treasurer before they could be acted upon. The Commissioner could no longer act within 180 days. It was precisely the termination of Lajers promotional appointment as chief of police which the appellate court struck down. Since Lajer was not validly terminated from public office and, as a matter of fact, was ordered reinstated through a warrant of mandamus, it follows that there was no vacancy in the office of chief of police on January 14, 1960 and there was no office to which Higinio Verra could have been appointed. ever having been validly appointed, there was no office from which he was -illegally dismissed. At most, he was a de facto officer during the years when Lajer was litigating his action for reinstatement in the court of first instance and in the court of appeals. And as earlier stated, the certification by the Commissioner of Civil Service that Mr. Verra possessed the qualifications and the eligibility, doubtful though the latter may be, for the position of chief of police could not have made the proceedings. in court moot and academic much less rendered inutile the 1966 decision of the Court of Appeals granting the petition for a writ of mandamus in Lajers favor. Non-attestation was not sufficient cause for outright removal

MAROHOMBSAR v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 126481. February 18, 2000 GONZAGA-REYES, J.: FACTS: Private respondent was first appointed Technical Assistant in 1988 and the MSU Board of Regents (BOR) confirmed her appointment per its Resolution No. 279, s. 1988. The position title was subsequently reclassified and retitled to Executive Assistant II upon the effectivity of Republic Act 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law. Since private respondent did not possess the appropriate civil service eligibility required of the position at that time, she was only extended a temporary appointment as Executive Assistant II which was noted by the MSU Board of Regents. Subsequently, upon acquiring Career Service Professional Eligibility, she was extended a permanent appointment to the position of Executive Assistant II by then MSU President Ahmad E. Alonto, Jr. on May 3, 1991. This appointment was approved as permanent by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 12 on June 25, 1991. She assumed office and discharged the duties thereof, without any objection from the Board of Regents. When MSU President Alonto was replaced by herein petitioner Dr. Emily M. Marohombsar on January 5, 1993, private respondent continued her employment and received the corresponding salary and other benefits from the MSU until she was summarily terminated on February 28, 1993. The Civil Service Commission declared her termination as illegal and ordered the payment of all her back salaries and other benefits due her from the date of her separation up to the date of her reinstatement in the service.The Regional Director recommended to respondent Commission of the earlier directive with the imposition of a "stern warning xxx that the order of this Commission must be complied with even if that University may not agree with it." Respondent Commission resolved the case in favor of private respondent. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order. ISSUE: Was private respondents position as Executive Assistant II primarily confidential, hence, coterminous with the term of office of the appointing authority? HELD: No. Petitioners other contention that private respondents position as Executive Assistant II is classified as primarily confidential and is thus co-terminous with the tenure of office of the appointing official must likewise be rejected. In support thereof, petitioner cites Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 13, s. 1990 and MC No. 1, s. 1993 of the Civil Service Commission allegedly declaring the said position as primarily confidential. However, MC No. 01, s. 1993 refers to Executive Assistant, Chauffeur/Driver and other positions located in the Office of the Undersecretary. Herein private respondent is holding the position of Executive Assistant II in the Office of the Chancellor. On the other hand,

MC No. 01, s. 1990 clearly refers to Head Executive Assistant and not Executive Assistant II. There is nothing in the records that would indicate any justification for the respondent Commission to classify the position of private respondent as primarily confidential. Petitioner failed to specify the particular duty of private respondents that would classify her position as highly confidential. In any event, even if reliance is made on said circular, private respondents case still would not fall under such classification since it was categorically stated in the circular that those incumbents to the reclassified positions whose appointments are permanent" "shall retain their permanent status until said positions are vacated. Based on the foregoing, private respondent holds an appointment under permanent status and thus enjoys security of tenure as guaranteed by law. As an employee in the civil service and as a civil service eligible, private respondent is entitled to the benefits, rights and privileges extended to those belonging to the service. Private respondent could not be removed or dismissed from the service without just cause and without observing the requirements of due process as what happened in the present case. Inescapable then is the conclusion that private respondent was illegally dismissed when she was summarily terminated from the service by mere letter on the alleged ground of "urgent need to establish a new order and maintain the trust and confidence reposed upon the Office of the President x x x."

MONA A. TOMALI, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, OFFICE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS (OMA) and ROCAINA M. LUCMA, respondents. G.R. No. 110598. December 1, 1994 Facts: Mona A. Tomali was appointed Development Management Officer II ("DMO II") in the Office on Muslim Affairs ("OMA"). The appointment was extended by then OMA Executive Director Dimasangcay A. Pundato. She assumed the duties and functions of the office four months later, at which time, the appointment had not yet been transmitted to the Civil Service Commission ("CSC") for approval. On 16 July 1991, the new Director of the OMA, Dr. Ali Basir Lucman, revoking the previous incomplete appointment of petitioner, appointed private respondent Rocaina M. Lucman to the position in question. After which, Tomali protested her replacement. he Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), acting thereon, rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint for lack of merit, on the ground that her previous appointment was incomplete, in the absence of approval on the part of the CSC. Tomali faulted public respondents for their failure to have her appointment properly attended to and timely acted upon and for, in effect, allowing her in the meanwhile to assume the office in question. Issue: Whether or not approval of the Civil Service Commission is indispensable for the completion of appointment of the petitioner Ruling: Yes. An appointment to a position in the civil service is required to be submitted to the CSC for approval in order to determine, in main, whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the position and whether or not the rules pertinent to the process of appointment. Compliance with the legal requirements for an appointment to a civil service position is essential in order to make it fully effective. Without the favorable certification or approval of the Commission, in cases when such approval is required, no title to the office can yet be deemed to be permanently vested in favor of the appointee, and the appointment can still be recalled or withdrawn by the appointing authority. Until an appointment has become a completed act, it would likewise be precipitate to invoke the rule on security of tenure. The tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials, resulting in the non-observance of the pertinent rules on the matter does not render the legal requirement, on the necessity of approval of the Commissioner of Civil Service of appointments, ineffective and unenforceable. The employee, whose appointment was not approved, may only be considered as a de facto officer. Petitioner herself would not appear to be all that blameless. She assumed the position four months after her appointment was issued or months after that appointment had already lapsed or had become ineffective by operation of law. Petitioner's appointment was issued on 01 July 1990, but it was only on 31 May 1991 that it was submitted to the CSC, a fact which she knew, should have known or should have at least verified considering the relatively long interval of time between the date of her appointment and the date of her assumption to office.

GENEROSO R. SEVILLA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND NERITO L. SANTOS, respondents. G.R. No. 88498. June 9, 1992 Facts: The petitioner has been in the government service since 1949. His last appointment was an Assistant City Engineer of Palayan City which he discharged until he was designated Acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan City by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on May 2, 1981. He unhesitatingly assumed the latter position and discharged its functions and responsibilities until People Power and the EDSA Revolution intervened. The 1987 Constitution gave way to the changes of the previous constitution, particularly within the Civil Service Commission. Thereafter, the OIC Mayor of Cabanatuan City, Cesar Vergara, appointed Nerito Santos as City Engineer of the City. Sevilla, after leaving his position in Cabanatuan, was designated as acting district engineer of Pasay City, but was subsequently removed by the DPWH Secretary on February 3, 1987. He then returned to Cabanatuan City and filed a petition for quo warranto against Santos. Te lower court decided in favor of Sevilla, ordering his reinstatement to his former position. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals set aside the lower court's decision and entered a new one, dismissing the petition for quo warranto. The Court of Appeals held that by accepting another office, Sevilla in effect voluntarily surrendered his former office, and was thereby precluded from maintaining a quo warranto action against Santos. When he accepted the position in Pasay City, he lost his right to the position in Cabanatuan City. In his quo warranto petition, Sevilla argued that, being a presidential appointee, he could not be removed from office by an OIC mayor. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not considering his appointment as acting city engineer of Cabanatuan City as specie of permanent appointment covered by civil service security of tenure Ruling: No. An "acting" appointment is merely temporary, one which is good only until another appointment is made to take its place. Hence, petitioner's right to hold office as "Acting city Engineer of Cabanatuan City" was merely temporary. It lapsed upon the appointment of Nerito Santos as the permanent city engineer of Cabanatuan City. Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature. Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. The power of appointment is essentially discretionary. Its exercise may not be controlled by the courts. The choice of an appointee from among qualified candidates or applicants is a political and administrative decision calling for considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of the service which can best be made by the head of the office concerned for he is familiar with the organizational structure and environmental circumstances within which the appointee must function. G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993 ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ and MANUEL P. REYES, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and RICHARD J. GORDON, respondents. FACTS: y The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and

Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office. Paragraph (d) reads: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 herein-above quoted in italics infringes on the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code for the reason that the appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May 1992 Elections.

ISSUE(S)/ HELD: y Whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts? YES. RATIO: y Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. y While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency; the Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. y The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. y It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. But, the contention is fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land. y It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City, hence, an excepted circumstance. Congress did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of appointment. The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. y As may be defined, an "appointment" is "the designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some office or trust," or "the selection or designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge the duties of the same. y While Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can qualify for the posts in question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment. y Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached

disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer. Pineda v. Claudio G.R. No. L-29661. May 13, 1969. J. Castro:

FACTS: By reason of the death of Col Tumaliuan, thereby resulting to vacancy in the Office of the Chief of Police, Pasay City Mayor Claudio appointed respondent Villa to the said position. Petitioner Pineda, who was then incumbent deputy chief of police, disputed said appointment. His main argument was that under Section 23 of the Civil Service Act, in relation to Section 4 of the Decentralization Act, it is the duty of the mayor to promote him as the ranking employee, and that only if for some "special reasons" he cannot be promoted may others be considered for transfer, reemployment or certification, "in that order." In refutation, respondent Mayor Claudio argued that what controls is not Section 23 of the Civil Service Act but Section 8 of the Police Act of 1966, which states that a chief of police may be appointed "from the list of eligibles certified by the Civil Service Commissioner." As Villa is one of those certified, Claudio concludes that his appointment as chief of police is in order. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of respondent Villa as chief of police is valid. HELD: Yes. The Court ruled that it is neither mandatory nor ministerial for the mayor of Pasay City to promote to the vacant position of chief of police the incumbent deputy chief of police Pineda, and that the appointment to said position of the respondent Villa, who has been certified as qualified and eligible, although an "outsider" and not the next-in-rank employee, is valid, in the same manner that the appointment of Pineda, although an "outsider" and not the next-inrank, to the position of deputy chief of police was valid. The Civil Service Act does not peremptorily require the mayor to promote the officer next in rank. To construe Section 23 the way the petitioner urges it should be, would be to unduly interfere with the power and prerogatives of the local executive as reinforced by the Decentralization Act at the same time that it would frustrate the policy of the Police Act "to achieve and attain a higher degree of efficiency in the organization, administration, and operation of local police agencies" 2 and that of the Civil Service Act "to attract the best qualified to enter the service." For it is not enough that an aspirant is qualified and eligible or that he is next in rank or line for promotion, albeit by passive prescription. It is just as necessary, in order for public administration to be dynamic and responsive to the needs of the times, that the local executive be allowed the choice of men of his confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible, who in his best estimation are possessed of the requisite reputation, integrity, knowledgeability, energy and judgment. Further, the Court declared that the principle of seniority and the next-in-rank rule embodied in Section 23, with its corollary requirement to set forth the "special reason or reasons" in case the officer next in rank is not appointed to the vacant position, applies only to cases of promotion. Hence, where the appointing power chooses to fill the vacancy not by promotion but by transfer, reinstatement, reemployment or certification (not necessarily in that order, as we have already said) he is under no duty whatsoever to explain his action, for the law does not so require him. The reason for this distinction is simple. When a person who is a junior jumps over his senior, the ranking is disturbed and the person next in rank is actually bypassed, and so it is reasonable to require the appointing power to give his "special reason or reasons" for preferring his appointee to the officer next-in-rank. But where the vacancy is filled not by promotion but by transfer, the person next-in-rank is not really bypassed, because the person appointed is one who holds a position of equivalent rank as the vacant position. To the appointee, the new position is hardly a higher one. As this Court correctly observed in Millares, in distinguishing promotion from transfer, "whereas the first denotes a scalar ascent of a senior officer or employee to another position, higher either in rank or salary, the second refers to a lateral movement from one position to another of equivalent rank level or salary."

RICARDO MEDALLA vs. HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMAS G.R. No. 94255. May 5, 1992. Paras, J. FACTS: Petitioner herein Ricardo Medalla was appointed as a geodetic engineer of the then Manila International Airport Authority. After four years of service, he was promoted to supervising engineer. Respondent Armando Singson, on the other hand, was designated as acting division manager of the same division where Medalla was appointed when the previous incumbent therein was promoted to a higher position, leaving the office vacant. Later, however, the MIAA Selection/Promotion Board unanimously appointed Medalla as the new division manager of the said division. Singson filed a protest before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) of the Civil Service Commission. The Board endorsed the same to the MIAA General Manager for appropriate action. The latter affirmed Medallas appointment and in effect dismissed Singsons protest. Singson appealed the decision. Meanwhile, MIAA underwent a reorganization. Medalla and Singson were subsequently reappointed as Division Manager and Principal Engineer respectively of the new division created pursuant to the new staffing pattern brought by the reorganization. Both accepted their new designations. Notwithstanding the said reorganization however, the MSPB, revoked the appointment of Medalla as division manager, ruling that Singson be appointed in his stead. ISSUE: Whether the CSC, through the MSPB, may replace an appointee with an employee of its choice. HELD: NO. The Court maintained that it is an established jurisprudence that the Civil Service Commission has no power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the authority to review the appointments made by other offices except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the required qualifications. The determination of who among the several candidates for a vacant position has the best qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of the appointing authority since the latter occupies the ideal vantage point from which to identify and designate the individual who can best fill the post and discharge its functions. When the appointing authority has already exercised his power of appointment, the CSC cannot revoke the same on the ground that another employee is better qualified for that would constitute an encroachment on the decision vested in the appointing authority. In view of the foregoing then, the Court ruled that the CSC acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it revoked the appointment of Medalla who was shown to be duly qualified for the position. VICTOR A. AQUINO v. CSC and LEONARDA D. DE LA PAZ 1992 April 22 G.R. No. 92403 FACTS y Victor A. Aquino, then Clerk II, Division of City Schools of San Pablo City, was designated as Officer-inCharge of the Division Supply Office by the DECS Regional Director in view of the retirement of the Supply Officer I. y Prior to such designation, Aquino was designated as Property Inspector and In-Charge of the Supply Office performing the duties and responsibilities of the Supply Officer I. y 2 years thereafter, the Division Superintendent of City Schools, issued a promotional appointment to Leonarda D. de la Paz as Supply Officer I. She assumed and performed the duties and functions of the position and received the compensation and benefits therefor. The Civil Service Regional Officer approved her appointment as permanent "provided that there is no pending administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment, nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the appointment". y 1 month after, Aquino filed a protest with the DECS Secretary questioning the qualification and competence of de la Paz for the position of Supply Officer I. The DECS Secretary sustained the protest finding Aquino more qualified and revoked the appointment of de la Paz as Supply Officer I. y De la Paz then filed her petition for reconsideration but the same was denied. On the basis of the DECS rulings, Aquino was issued a permanent appointment. For her part, de la Paz appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which however, upheld the appointment of Aquino. y De la Paz then appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). In its Resolution, CSC revoked the appointment of Aquino and restoring de la Paz to her position as Supply Officer I. y Hence, this petition seeking the reversal of the Commission's action. ISSUE WON CSC can revoke the appointment of Aquino

HELD y

In some cases, we ruled that the Civil Service Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment simply because it (CSC) believed that another person is better qualified than the appointee for it would constitute an encroachment on the discretion solely vested on the appointing authority. The situation is different, as in the instant case, where the Civil Service Commission revoked the appointment of the successful protestant, petitioner herein, principally because the right to security of tenure of the prior appointee, private respondent herein, to the contested position had already attached. It must be noted that CSC did not direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. It merely restored the appointment of private respondent who was first appointed to the contested position. The records show that de la Paz was issued a permanent appointment. On the basis of the said appointment which was approved by the Civil Service Regional Office No. IV, de la Paz assumed and performed the duties and functions of the position as Supply Officer I and received the compensation and benefits of the said position in accordance with the Civil Service Law. In consonance with the doctrine laid down in Villanueva v. Balallo, that an appointment is complete when the last act required of the appointing power has been performed, but later qualified in Favis v. Rupisan, G.R. No. L-22823, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 190, that the acts of the head of a department or office making the appointment and the Commissioner of Civil Service acting together, though not concurrently, but consecutively, are necessary to make an appointment complete, the permanent appointment extended to private respondent, under the circumstances of the case, is deemed complete. As such, she is entitled to the protection of the law against unjust removal. It is well-settled that once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right (to the position), which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing. There is also authority for the rule that when the appointing power has once acted and the appointee has accepted the office and done what is required of him upon its acceptance, his title to the office becomes complete, and he can then be removed only in the regular way (Mechem, Law of Public Offices and Officers, Sec. 461, p. 294, citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (U.S.) 137). The appointing power can not effect his removal indirectly by rescinding or revoking his appointment after it is complete.