On the Ingredients of an Aristotelian Science Jaakko Hintikka No&ucire;s, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Mar, 1972), 55-69. Stable URL: bttp//links jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624%28197203%296%3A 1% 3C5S%3AOTIOAAS%3E2.0,CO%3B2-6 Noducire:s is currently published by Blackwell Publishing. ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hhup:/www.jstororg/about/terms.hml. JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at hup:/www jstor.org/journals/black. hum Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sereen or printed page of such transmission, STOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals, For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support @jstor.org. hupswww jstor.org/ Pri Dec 31 12:59:35 2008EIGHTH SYMPOSIUM On the Ingredients of an Aristotelian Science Jaakko HINTIKKA ACADEMY OF FINLAND Commentators: GareTH B. MatrHews vsivestry oF [MASSACHUSETTS Lynn E. Rose SUNY AT BUFFALO I. The program ‘This paper is a part of a larger attempt to show that A held a consistent, fairly claborate view as to what the different kinds of assumptions are that are needed in a science, how they are related to each other and to the idea of definition, and how they are obtained, I want to argue that Aristotle's different pronounce~ ments on these subjects in the two Analytics hang together quite well, apart from some fluctuation of emphasis and of terminology. "The main lines of my argument for this thesis are four. First, want to point out that Aristotle's syllogistic theory, together with his belief that syllogisms are the universal tool of any sytematic science, naturally led him to a specific view of the ingredients of a science. One is almost tempted to say that Aristotle’s views on the first principles of a science are predictable on the basis of his syllogistc theory, including his ideas of the role of existential pre~ suppositions in syllogistic premisses. ‘Secondly, it seems to me that the same result is reached by taking Aristotle up on his statement that “all sciences are based upon definitions” (Post. An. II, 17, 9942-23). (In quoting Aristotle, 5556 Nos I shall normally use Loeb Library translations. However, the Oxford translation is also occasionally used without explicit me tion.) If so, the different starting-points of a science are as many kinds of definitions. Hence Aristotle’s extensive discussion of the different types of definitions in Post. An. II, 6-10, will amount to an exposition of his doctrine of the different starting-points (in- gredients) of a science. A comparison between Aristotle's remarks on definitions and his theory of the axiomatic basis of a science will (hopefully) throw some light on each other. Thirdly, the outcome of the first two kinds of considerations agrees with the explanations Aristotle himself gives of the several sorts of starting-points of a science. I want to show how precisely these explanations are to be understood. Fourthly, there is also an agreement between what these three lines of argument bring out and what Aristotle says of how the starting-points of a science are obtained. His different remarks on induction (epagoge) are especially relevant here. In the present paper, I shall mainly restrict my attention to the first and to the third of these lines of thought. IL. Deixis vs. apodeixis In trying to understand what Aristotle actually says in Posterior Analytics it is useful to note a few terminological idiosyneracies of Aristotle's, Perhaps the most important one for our present pur- poses is the following: Although Aristotle’s usage vacillates, he often restricts apodeixis (dmédeéis) to syllogistic proofs from scientifically acceptable premisses, whereas deixis (Bettis ) is used ina more general sense to cover the “showing” of the truth of all and sundry propositions, including the first premisses of scientific syllogisms, which of course cannot themselves be proved syllo- gistically. Detailed evidence for this point will be presented elsewhere. ‘Some evidence for it is found (among other things) in the several places in which Aristotle contrasts apodeixis and induction (epagoge). Cases in point include Post. An. I, 18, 81240-61 and II, 5, 91b14- 15, 34-35. (There is no question that epagoge was for Aristotle a kind of deixis, too). In Post, An, IL, 8, 92b37-38, apodeixis and deivis are contrasted to each other in so many words. ‘A similar observation is made (with emphasis on the vagaries, of Aristotelian usage) by Giinther Patzig, Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism (D. Reidel, Dordrecht 1968), p. 185, note 12. As PatzigON THE INGREDIENTS OF AN ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE 7 shows, one cannot even exclude the possibility that Aristotle some- times uses apodeixis in a wider sense more appropriate of deixis. ‘This possibility is a rather distant one for our purposes, and has been badly exaggerated by Jonathan Barnes in his paper, “Aristotle's ‘Theory of Demonstration”, Phronesis vol. 14 (1969), pp. 123-152. Whatever the use of the term apodeixis may be on the different occasions in Aristotle, it always seems to have in his logical works a rather close connection with formal demonstration. ‘After this preparatory remark, we can tackle the problem of the different ingredients of an Aristotelian science. IIL. The structure of Aristotelian syllogisms Aristotelian explanations are supposed to take place by means of syllogisms. Now what is the structure of Aristotle’s syllogistic theory? He reduces all syllogisms to those of the first figure. Other figures are “supplemented and augmented until immediate (amesa) premisses are obtained” (Post. An. I, 14, 79829-31). And while it is not entirely clear how Aristotle thinks that the superiority of the first figure is manifested, itis sufficiently obvious that this superi- ority is somehow due to the fact that syllogisms in the first figure tum directly on the transitivity of class-inclusion. (‘This is, for instance, the upshot of Patzig’s patient examination of Aristotle's notion of perfect syllogism.) Aristotle says himself without quali- fications that “the premisses from which a conclusion follows are always related as whole and part” (Post. An. II, 6, 92a12-13). ‘Accordingly, Aristotelian explanation will operate by making class-inclusions clear through transitivity of this relation, that is, by werting intermediate terms between the ones whose connection is to be explained. “It is by adding a term internally, and not externally, that a proposition is demonstrated”, Aristotle says (Post, An. I, 22, 84236-37). It follows immediately that longer chains of scientific inferences (syllogisms from premisses acceptable in a science) take the form of a nested sequence of terms. Each of them applies to its immediate predecessor so as to form a syllogistic premise. From this fact, several features of Aristotle's theory of science follow as consequences. For one thing, we can see at once why for Aristotle “it is not possible to prove a fact by passing from one ‘genus to another” (Post, An. I, 7, 75238). For all the other terms in a chain of syllogisms of the kind described must be narrower in scope than the predicate term of the last syllogistic premiss—58 ots which is the term characteristic of the “genus” with which all the syllogisnis of a given science are concerned. IV. Atomic connections For the purposes at hand, it is even more important to observe that from the same syllogistic model @ definite conclusion ensues concerning the first (primary) premisses of scientific syllogisms ‘The first irreducible premisses, or perhaps rather one class of primary premisses of an Aristotelian science, are clearly the pre- misses asserting immediate connections between terms, that is, connections between terms so close to each other that no further term can be inserted between them. In Post. An. I, 20-22, Aristotle argues at length to show that there must be such immediate pre~ misses, i.e., that a sequence of terms interpolated between two given terms cannot proceed ad infinitum Although this is not the place to examine Aristotle’s argument —or, rather, the several parallel arguments which he gives—in detail, a couple of aspects of them are relevant to our present interests. An ascending sequence of assertions in which a definite predicate is attributed to a definite subject cannot be infinite ac- cording to Aristotle, “for the subjects of which the attributes are stated are no more than those which are implied in the essence of the individual” —ice., apparently, of the lowest subject term of the sequence—“and these cannot be infinite in number” (Post. An. 1, 22, 83626-27). (The finitude of the elements in question is according to Aristotie a consequence of the knowability of essences.) If s0, a sequence of minimal (immediate) premisses will give us, when their subject terms are combined, the essence of the lowest subject, ie., give its definition, Since each of the subject terms in the ascending sequence applies to its predecessors, the lowest atomic premiss will furthermore give us the distinguishing charac~ teristic of its subject, and in a sense therefore give us the definition of the subject term. Small wonder, therefore, that according to Aristotle “‘the basic premisses of demonstrations are definitions” (Post. An. II, 3, 90624). We can see here how this view is strongly encouraged by’ Aristotle’s theory of syllogisms as the universal vehicle of scientific demonstration. ‘This effect of Aristotle's syl- logistic theory on his views on the structure of a science has not always been fully appreciated, it seems to me. Here, then, we have one class of basic assumptions of a science ‘apud Atistotle, I shall call them premisses about atomic connections.(ON THE INGREDIENTS OF AN ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE 9 V. Atomic connections as turning on definitions By way of instant popularization, we may perhaps see now how a sequence of finer and finer syllogisms was according to Aristotle supposed to lead to a “discussion-stopper”. We may ask: “Why is every C an A?” An Aristotelian answer is of the type: “Because every C is a By, and every B, is an A.” Of course we can continue and to ask: “But why is every C a B, ?” By inserting more and more B, , By,... (in a descending order) between and C we finally come, if Aristotle is right, to a point at which the appropriate answer to the question, “But why is every Ca By?” is: “Because B, is what a C is, that’s why.” One could equally well say: “Because that’s how a C ought to be defined.” One can perhaps see here the great temptation of this idea. No wonder that there always was @ strong conceptual element to Aristotelian science. It is important to observe, however, in order to avoid misunder- standing, that the last answer cannot usually be for Aristotle: “Because B, is what tee mean by aC.” Those Aristotelian de- finitions which are obtained from an ascending sequence of im- mediate scientific syllogisms are not explications of how an expression is in fact used, but rather accounts of what a term should, be defined in view of an exhaustive knowledge of the relevant facts. VI. Common axioms ‘Moreover, his syllogistic theory suggested to Aristotle another class of basic assumptions of any particular science. ‘These as- sumptions come into play through the very principles of syllogistic proof (apodeixis) with which every science operates according to Aristotle. What they are is partly shown by Aristotle's syllogistic theory, including the machinery needed to reduce imperfect syl- logisms to perfect ones. (For this machinery, see Patzig’s mono- graph.) In the last analysis, of course, this class of assumptions includes those and only those assumptions on which the whole structure of Aristotelian syllogisms is based. ‘They are discussed by Aristotle in Met. IV, 3 (in addition to a number of other passages). ‘They include both logical principles such as the laws of contradiction and excluded middle (Aristotle refers them as “the principles of syllogism”) and also such general mathematical principles as “take equals from equals and equals remain” (Post. An. I, 10, 76041). The study of all these principles is said—at least in Met. IV, 3—to belong to “First Philosophy’Cy ots Here we have another class of basic assumptions of a science. I shall call them common axioms. VII. Atomos vs. amesos At this point we can undertake a terminological excursion which throws some light on Aristotle's intentions. We have seen that one class of primary assumptions of an Aristotelian science are the immediate syllogistic premisses, i.c., premisses between the terms of which not further terms can be interpolated. Now it may be the case—and it has to some extent already turned out to be the case—that of the other kinds of basic assumptions needed in a science some are immediate and some others non-immediate in the sense that the latter are established by means of further arguments while the former are not. What nevertheless makes both of them basic for the science (deductive system) in question is that the further arguments in question are not syllogistic. ‘The ‘same contrast of course applies also to syllogistic premisses. "Thus we have two different kinds of immediacy and non- immediacy in Aristotle: (i) syllogistic premisses are immediate if, they do not allow for interpolation; (ii) they as well as other basic assumptions are immediate if they are not obtained by further arguments. This general sense is aptly characterized by Aristotle as follows: “An immediate (amesos) proposition is one which has no other proposition prior to it” (Post. An. I, 2, 72a8). Does Aristotle mark the distinction ()-(ii) terminologically ? As usual, he does not use a hard-and-fast terminology. However, his usage sometimes offers indications of the difference between (-Gil). The term amesos (dueoos) is used by him as a general term covering occasionally both (i) and (ii). In its narrowed use, it emphasizes (ii) in contrast to (i). Because of the latter usage, it is misleading of Bonitz (Index p. 38A) to say that rd ducou are synonymous with deandBeucra and opposed to droSecucrd. This in fact characterizes better (ji) than (ji), while amesos can be seen to apply more typically to (ii) than to (j), although it admittedly is frequently used by Aristotle in cases of (j), too, As a narrowed term covering (i) only, Aristotle occasionally uses atomos (drouos). ‘An instructive ease in point is found in Post. An. I, 14-15, 79230 ff. ‘There Aristotle refers to syllogisms of the first figure as dxeoa. OF course, this cannot mean that they lack a middle term. Nor is the contrast here between what is proved syllogistically and what is not, for the moods in the other figures are not reduced to thos the first figure syllogistically. Rather, the point is simply that un-(ON THE INGREDIENTS OF AN ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE 6 like the other syllogisms they are not established by reducing them to perfect syllogisms. Hence the sense presupposed is (ii). Then Aristotle goes on to discuss immediate syllogistic premisses and. says that in them one term applies to another dréuus. Here the sense involved is clearly (i). ‘Another interesting usage occurs in Post. An. I, 22, 84235. ‘There an immediate syllogistic premiss is said to be not only ‘ameson, but also indivisible (dduaiperov). The context shows that the latter term is what refers to the absence of intermediate terms. According to this typical (but not uniform) Aristotelian usage ‘atomon equals ameson plus adiaireton. At Post. An. II, 5, 91b32 ‘atomos clearly refers to indivisible syllogistic steps (i. In his commentary on Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1949), p. 678, Sir David Ross claims that in Met, 994621 “‘ra droqa is used of the highest universals”. ‘This would constitute an exception to my suggestion that atomos is used by Aristotle to refer immediate (syllogistically unproved) minimal syllogistic premisses. However, a comparison of Met. II, 2, 994b21 with such passages as Post. An. 1, 22, 83b32-84a6 convincingly shows that at 994b21 immediate syllogistic premisses, and not other types of unproven assumptions (such as are involved in the introduction of the highest universals, ef. below), are what is at stake. This squares with my assertion that the term ta atoma is, typically used by Aristotle to refer to the contrast (i) rather than (ii. It is worth noting that the contrast between (ji) and (ji) to some extent parallels my earlier contrast between the use of the terms apodeixis and deixis in Aristotle. VIIL. Generic premisses After this excursion, we return to our survey of the different kkinds of basic assumptions of an Aristotelian science. ‘The contrast between general axioms and premises about atomic connections is a commonplace in the literature. There is a third class of bi assumptions, however, which is less conspicuous but perhaps even ‘more important than these two. In order to find it, we may return to the connection between atomic premisses and definitions which was registered earlier. Combining the subject terms of an ascending sequence of immediate syllogistic premisses, yields a full list of the elements of the lowest subject term only on a further assumption, ‘This is that the ascending sequence is continued as far as it can go, (According to Aristotle, it cannot be continued ad infinitum.) IF it is not continued as far as it can be continued, we obtain lists ofa ots clements which stop at the widest term in the given sequence of premisses, and hence are in a sense relative to it. Then the de- finitions we obtain from the sequence of scientific syllogisms for subject terms yield the fuller analyses of what their essence is the further down these terms are from the widest one. As a limiting case, no definition is obtained for the widest term in question which would explicate its essence at all. ‘This, of course, is precisely the situation in any particular science according to Aristotle. Such a science is characterized by its subject matter, that is, by the genus of objects it is about. As Aristotle writes in Post. An. I, 28, 87238: “A single science is one whose domain is a single genus.” This genus plays precisely the role of the widest term in the remarks just made, ‘Thus the topmost premiss in any maximally fine sequence of scientific syllogisms within one and the same science has according. to Aristotle always the peculiarity that it does not contribute to the analysis of the narrower terms it contains. Nevertheless it is, like any other immediate premiss, a kind of definition of its subject term. Since this term is widest one in a given science, it is the term that specifies the genus this science is about. ‘The topmost premises in the kind of sequence we are considering is therefore definitions of the genus. Yet they have the peculiarity that they do not contribute very much to specifying all the different elements that would go into the full definition (essence) of the genus. Here, I suggest, we have a third class of basic assumptions of a science according to Aristotle. I shall call them the most general premisses of a particular science or in short generic premisses. Atistotle himself characterizes these assumptions as assumptions concerning “the subjects which it (se. the science in question) posits (that is, the genus whose essential attributes it studies)...” (Post. An. I, 10, 7611-13). He distinguished them from assumptions concerning the attributes that can be used within the genus in question. If I am right, such a most general premiss of a particular science is what Aristotle describes (in Post. An. Il, 19, 94a9-10) as a “de- finition of immediate (amesa) terms” which “consists in an in- demonstrable assumption of what they are”. IX. Generic premisses carry the existential import of an Aristotelian assumptions as a special class has often features of the situation which for us moderns may appear somewhat surprising and even paradoxical.(ON THE INGREDIENTS OF AN ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE 8 First, it easily appears to us that the premisses in question are not substantial assumptions at all, but rather mere definitory re- formulations of tautologies of the form (1) every GisaG, (where @ is the genus in question), hence perhaps something like (2) every Gis. a G’ where G’ serves to define G. Thus Aristotle’s statement that these amount to a positing of the genus G may easily appear gratuitous ‘A conclusive answer to this putative objection is obtained from Aristotle's theory of the existential force of the premisses of a scientific syllogism. ‘This is especially clearly in evidence in Post. An. IL, 2. There itis said that the question of existence or “simply being” (Aristotle’s phrase is 73 «i Zorw dnAds) is equivalent to the question whether there exists a “middle term”. By this, Aristotle means a suitable intermediate term between the given term and a higher one. Conversely, if there is such a middle term, that is, if wwe have a premiss of the form (3) every Aisa B which is appropriate to a scientific syllogism, it follows that the A’s exist. In other words, (3) implies according to Aristotle (4) every A is (that is, is haplos, ie, exists) Hence in any appropriate syllogistic premiss (3) there is according to Aristotle a hidden existential assumption, to the effect that all the 4’s exist. ‘A modern modal logician of suitable persuasion—or a Leibni for that matter—might envisage the quantification in a pre like (3) as being basically over certain “possible individuals”. It is only in virtue of a special existential presupposition that the 4’s and B's have the additional predicate of existence. This treatment ‘may seem a rather far cry of Aristotle's way of thinking, but in any case it shows the consistency of the latter. In some tense-logical version, it might even come fairly close to Aristotle's ideas. Of course, within a given science we do not have to make this existential assumption separately for each immediate premiss (3). ‘The existential force is carried downwards from wider terms to narrower ones in a sequence of scientific syllogisms. Hence the only ultimate existential assumption needed in a science concerns the existence of the members of the genus which is its subject s“ nots matter. The existence of all the other terms with which it deals ean be proved, although their definitions—that is, the immediate or “atomic” premisses which were seen to constitute a kind of de~ finition of their subject terms—must be assumed. This, I take, is what Aristotle means by his enigmatic words in Post. An. I, 10, 76a32 ff. where he writes: “Thus the meaning both of the primary truths (74 mpdra) and of the attributes demonstrated of them (78 2x rovruy) is assumed; as for their existence (én 8°Zor.), that of the principles (dpya’) must be assumed, but that of the attributes must be proved. . .. Also special to each science are those subjects whose existence it assumes and whose essential attributes it studies. - .« Of these subjects both the existence (78 elvat) and the meaning (708i elvac) are assumed; but of their essential attributes, only the meaning is assumed.” If I am right, rb ela here means existence pure and simple, not being this or that, This is in fact strongly suggested by Aristotle's subsequent brief discussion (76b 16-22) of why some of the different types of assumptions may appear to be absent from this or that particular science, It is hard to interpret, eg., the words dr Zerw otherwise than as speaking of existence ‘Aristotle's terminology also shows that according to him the existential import is in fact carried downwards from the generic premises by means of strict syllogistic demonstrations. In Post. An. Il, 7, 92bI2-15 Aristotle says that “we hold that it is by demonstration (apodeixis) that everything must be proved to exist, except essence. ... So there will be a demonstration (apodeixis) that a thing is (87 Zorw). This is how the sciences actually proceed.” The use of the “syllogistic” term apodeixis here is very suggestive (cf. section II above). Although Aristotle employs the neutral deixis-terminology most of the time in Post. An. 1, 10, there is one place even there where he speaks of apodeisis. It occurs at 76b10-I1, that is, precisely where he is discussing how the existence of the “essential attributes” assumed in a science are established, "The role of the most general premisses in an Aristotelian science must be recognized in order to be able to appreciate ‘Aristotle's frequent comments on the importance of the most universal assumptions of a science. If premisses about atomic connections were the only primary premisses of a science, the basic assumptions of a science were not the most universal ones but in @ sense the most special ones—viz. in the very sense of being concerned with minimal steps from one term to another.ON THE INGREDIENTS OF AN ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE 6 ‘The importance of the existential force of syllogistic pre- misses is not an accidental peculiarity of Aristotle’s. I do not think that it is sufficiently explained by any peculiarity of his conception, of syllogism nor even by his assumption that on the appropriate reading (quantification over all individuals, past, present, or future) a syllogistic premiss has an empty antecedent only if this ante- cedent term is impossible. Aristotle’s reasons are probably due to the deeply ingrained idea that no science worthy of the name can lack an object. Elsewhere I have studied the background and the role of this idea in Plato. (See “Knowledge and its Objects in Plato”, Ajatus vol. 33 (1971).) In Aristotle, the same idea is perhaps seen in operation most clearly in the passages where he argues that there cannot be any episteme of what is destructible, for the “de~ struction of the knowable carries knowledge to destruction. . For if there is not a knowable, there is not knowledge—there will no longer be anything for knowledge be of” (Categoriae 7, 7b27 ft.) It may also be observed that the existential presuppositions which we have come upon are much more sweeping than those often present in traditional syllogisms. Here it is not only the case ‘that (3) implies (5) Some A isa B but also implies the (in some respects) stronger claim (4)—pro- vided of course that premiss (3) is of the kind that can occur in a chain of “scientific” syllogisms. ‘This kind of conclusion would even be implied by premisses of the form (1) or (2). They, too, imply (©) every G exists. ‘The fact that this follows from the definition (2) shows why Aristotle can write of his most general premisses as follows: “Thus it is clear that of essences too some are immediate (amesa, not atoma!), that is, they are first principles (arkhai), and both their ‘existence and their definition (ré ¢o7w) have to be assumed or made clear in some way” (Post. An. II, 9, 93b21-24). ‘The paral- Ielism between this passage and Post. An. I, 10, 76a32-36 is further enhanced by the identity of Aristotle's examples on the two occasions. It is instructive to see that in the former passage the entities in question are contrasted to “things which have a middle term, i.e., something distinct from themselves which is a cause of their being”. ‘These are clearly those subjects of atomic syllogisms which are narrower than the the genus in question. ‘Their existence6 nots, is not assumed, but demonstrated through a syllogism by means of a middle term. For of course (3)-(4) imply “every B is (exists)”. However, even in the case of these latter assumptions (assumptions TID) “we do not actually demonstrate”, Aristotle says, what their subject terms are (xi éorw'), although we can exhibit it by means of a syllogistic proof (apodeinis). X. “Nominal” definitions. Summary A fourth class of assumptions which play a certain role in an Aristotelian science are what I shall call nominal definitions. What their status is in Aristotle will be discussed later. ‘Thus we have found the following four kinds of unproven assumptions of a given particular science in Aristotle's sense: 1 Common axioms IL_ Generic premisses IIL Premisses about atomic connections IV “Nominal” definitions. XI. Definitions in Post. An. 1, 10 and I, 2 ‘The nature of the fourth class of assumptions—if they may be so called—and their relation to others calls for a few additional explanations. In general, Aristotle’s comments on what he calls definitions (horoi, horismoi) may at first appear puzzling and even confused, and may seem to suggest doubts concerning what I have said. Most of the apparent difficulties are nevertheless due to Aristotle's fluctuating terminology. Among other fluctuations, en- tirely different things are on different occasions called by him definitions, It is instructive to consider from this point of view what Aristotle says in his extended discussion of the different starting- points of a science in Post. An. I, 10. There he says of assumptions of kind I1l—as we have seen—that they merely spell out the meaning of the attributes which are studied within the genus which is the subject-matter of the science in question. If so, it might perhaps be expected that they would be labelled definitions. Aristotle does not here do so, however. Significantly, premisses of kind IIT are not called definitions in Past. An. I, 10, although they are elsewhere 80 classified. Hence what are called here definitions (horoi) are clearly my “nominal” definitions IV. They make their appearance only at the end of Post. An. I, 10. ‘They are contrasted(ON THE INGREDIENTS OF AN ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE 6 to hypotheses which are characterized by saying that they are “as- sumptions from which the conclusion follows in virtue of their being what they are” (76b38-39). In other words, they are assump- tions that can function as premisses of a scientific syllogism. They exclude, on one hand, the purely nominal definitions IV which “only need to be understood”, Aristotle says, and on the other hand the general principles of proof I which Aristotle says are “in itself necessarily truc and must be thought to be so” (76623-24). Since assumptions III do function as premisses of scientific syl- logisms, they clearly are not definitions according to Aristotle's usage in Post. An. I, 10. ‘A small puzzle is here posed by Aristotle’s characterization at 76b35 of his horoi as not speaking of being or not being (odSé yp elias 4 i) elves Aéyerar). Many translators render this by speaking of “existence or non-existence”. If this were correct, it would suggest that Aristotle's horot in Post. An. 1, 10 are after all what I have called assumptions III, for they were seen to be dis- tinguished from assumptions II by the absence of any existential force. However, there is no reason to take the phrase elva i} lve here as meaning specifically existence. ‘The same locution and similar locutions are used elsewhere by Aristotle so as to in- clude also being thus or not being thus, ie., so as to cover the copulative uses of “is” and not only the existential one. (See, e.g., De int. 13, 23a19-20, Post. An. I, 2, 7280-21.) Hence Aristotle's statement is just another way of saying that purely nominal de- finitions TV have no assertive force, ie., that they do not assert any proposition any more than its contradictory ‘What Aristotle says in Post. An. I, 10 is thus seen to square very well with my distinetion between the different basic assump- tions I-IV of a science according to Aristotle. It is a little harder to see what Aristotle is up to in the other main passage of Post. An. lin which the different basic assumptions of a science are discussed, viz. in Post. An. I, 2, 72a5-24. (Part of this difficulty is perhaps due to its being only a tentative statement of Aristotle's views.) Most of what is said here is in full agreement with what we have found elsewhere, it is true, Again, definitions (horismoi) are (at 7220-23) said not to make any assertions of being or not being (73 elvae 7 #) ux) elvar 7). Speaking of being something (vi) makes it especially clear that Aristotle is not here referring, the majority of translators notwithstanding, only to existence and non-existence. (‘This was in fact already pointed out by Richard Robinson in Plato's Earlier Dialectic, Clarendon Press,68 ods Oxford 1953, p. 101.) This conclusion is reinforced by the obser- vation that Aristotle's remark is just @ reformulation of the im- ‘mediately preceding point that, in contrast to a definition, a thesis assumes one or the part of a proposition, that is, one of the two ‘members of a pair of contradictories. However, Aristotle's concluding statement seems to be out of step with the rest: “A definition is a thesis (literally: laying down) because the arithmetician lays it down that to be a unit is to be ‘quantitatively indivisible. But it is not a hypothesis, because it is not the same to say what a unit is and that it is” (72a21-24). The contrast is apparently between what a unit is and its existence, for 1 elvac povdda might prima facie seem to mean nothing but the existence of the unit. Hence the difference between hypotheses and definitions now seems to be that the former have existential content whereas the latter do not. This would certainly be at variance with what Aristotle says elsewhere. However, the crucial phrase 73 elva povdda need not have any existential force here. Although it may not represent an especially happy choice of words on Aristotle's part, it can still mean simply “the unit’s being”, not “the existence of the unit”. ‘That it in fact does so is suggested (among other things) by the neat parallel the quoted passage has in Post. An, II, 92b10-11: 73 8¢ 76 Carw di8pwmos xai 76 elie dilpwnov Ao. The context of this parallel passage (see especially the immediately preceding sentence) shows that the contrast Aristotle is drawing there between “what a man is” and “man’s being” is equivalent with the contrast between questions of “what” (ri é71) and questions of “whether” (ére éo7). The latter, which is analogous to “the unit's being”, is distinguished by Aristotle firmly from questions of existence («i or) in Post. An. Il, 1, 89624-25, Hence there is nothing incompatible with my interpretation here. Definitions are still being characterized by Aristotle as lacking assertive force, not as lacking existential import, as first seemed It must be admitted, however, that in other respects Aristotle may still be using the term “definition” in a wider sense here than elsewhere in Post. An. I. This is shown by the fact that the assump- tion which Aristotle labels a definition at 72a21-24 (assuming what 1 unit is) reappears in Post. An. I, 10, 76a34-36 as a part of an assumption of kind II (assuming the meaning of a generic term), and hence as an assumption contrasted to definitions, as we found above,(ON THE INGREDIENTS OF AN ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE 0 XII. Aristotle's formulations By way of conclusion, it may be interesting to see how the different assumptions I have distinguished from each other can be located in the two main passages where Aristotle discusses in Post. An. I the starting-points of a science. Analytica Posteriora 1, 2, T2a5-24 apply the term thesis to an immediate indemonstrable first principle of syl- logism the grasp of which is not neces- sary for the acquisition of certain kinds of knowledge. But that which must be grasped if any knowledge is to be acquired, I call an A thesis which assumes one or the other part of proposition, ie., that something is or is not, is a hypothesis. A thesis which does not do this is a definition. Analytica Posteriora 1, 10, 16331-7724 I eall “first principles” in each genus those facts which cannot be shown, ‘Thus the meaning both of the primary terms (rd zpiva) and of the attributes, shown of them must be assumed, but as for their being, that of the primary terms must be assumed but that of the attributes must be shown, Every demonstrative science is con- cerned with three things: the subjects which it posits (the genus whose essen tial attributes it studies), the so-called common axioms upon which the dem- ‘onstration is ultimately based, and thirdly the attributes (rd md6%) whose several meanings it assumes. Definitions are not hypotheses, because they say nothing of being or not being. Principles I-IV Principles I Principles 11-1 Principles IV Assumptions concerning the primary terms sumptions II; the meaning of attributes = assumptions IT Positing the subjects = an assumption of kind 1 Common axioms Attributes assumed = IIT Assumptions IV