John Stuart Mill pointed thi s out, saying that the _need for large ~apitat

· , t d
m a ra e or business limits the competition in that business.
. · Monopolies
h · ·1 are
not necessan·1y bad 1·fthey can cut the
. costs of production
• • given t e1r• ava1 able
capital, large workforce and factories, corporate stab1hty and expenence, and
network of production facilities.

The Morality of the Free Market

Critics of the capitalist free market, or an economy free from
government intervention, say that it is selfish and anti-poor. But for economist
Walter Williams in Is Capitalism Moral? having a free market is morally and
economically superior than any other way of organizing economic behavior.
It calls for voluntary transactions between individuals choosing to pay value
for value. The money you pay is proof of the value or service you give to your
fellowman so that both buyer and seller are both better off with an agreed
just price. Enter the government imposing a fixed price and one party (usually
the seller) is worse off. While it is true that giant corporations can gain too
much power, consumers can punish them by refusing to buy their products and
shifting to another provider. Aside from the consumers, big unions also punish
and match the influence of big corporations.

In contrast, nationalizing corporations keeps inefficient corporations

afloat no matter how inferior their products are, since citizens are forced to
avail or prefer their products under government and ultimately, taxpayers'
subsidy. While consumers can fire private industries, they cannot simply put
the government out of business .

. ~apitalism does not want the government to provide for those able but
unwll_hng to w~rk a~d pa~icipate in economic output. Giving out food stamps,
fr~b1es, and tmkenng with the market only give the non-worker a sense of
enttt!e~ent to de~and services and claim the profit others worked for. Free
subsidies are "anti-worker" and in the long-run "anti-poor" since the recipient
does not learn the value and need for work. The poor is given free fish but
not taught how to fish and fend for h. If H b .
shell-outs and th , . . •mse · e egms to rely on government
government ' s mtervention
_o . ers generosity
to kee instead
. of his own industry· Furthermore, the
who will be disincentivised to 1: p~e_s 1ow m~y actually hurt poor producers,
hoard these for their own sub ?tece t ~•r goods m the cheap market but instead
.
prices, sis t nee, import
or sell to others willing h. . to countries that o ffier better
them
cheapening the price of products:!~ •gher pnce tags. Moreover, artificially
and redound to cheapening the regar: :::mers doubt ~eir qua~ity and worth
workmanship of their producers.
For George Gilder, economist of US .
free market actually channeis s If . President Ronald Reagan, a
e -interest to altruism. As business owners,

36 I Philamophta.· Pht!D,ophy and 77oeory ofPhl/;ppine law

entrepreneurs have no cho. b
desires of others-their cu1cte ut to concern themselves with the needs and
. s omers They m t d T
satisfy customer feedback If th . h us I igent1y research, know, and
without improving servic~s th e\; oos~ to be greedy, raise prices unjustly
enslave their employees then :~ ey·17~11 lose customers. If they choose to
other entrepreneurs. Capita11·sm . eyth~I ose _workers or their best talents to
, m 1s sense 1s a "com ff f · · ,,
businessman always has to ask "D th ' Id pe I ion o g1vmg. The
If he would cease to ask and r . oes e wor _want what I have to give?"
. espond to that question, he would cease to be 1·n
busmess.

accum~!~;sw!~!!h G;~s ric:? Whilliams ask. _Not because he devilishly

. . e pro ts e earned are Just proof of how much he
satisfied the_ needs of millions who are willing to reach down their pockets
to. P~Y forfh;s products. His accumulated capital is proof of his service to his
m1 11ions o 1e1lowmen.

Fair Market Economy

. s~pposed concession for private, public, and corporate ownership

ts _the fa~r market economy." Unlike in unregulated capitalism, it is not a
la~ssez-fazre free market; but unlike in Communism, neither does it forbid a
pnvate market. The principle is to "make markets free and fair." Industries
will ~emain in private or corporate ownership but the government will provide
pubhc works and ensure basic services such as social security, health care,
pension, basic education, and measures to prohibit monopolies and cartel that
prevent a free playing field in services. The emphasis is national welfare not
national income; the aim being the increase of over-all happiness, including
better living standards, not mere rise of income and gross production.
Government regulation is needed to stabilize the economy, protect both
workers and property owners, and allow profitable return of investments lest
industries close down. To temper the power of corporations engaged in vital
industries, the State can purchase shares and voting rights at fair market value
to have a say on corporate policies, but not to the extent of nationalizing the
corporation, which will discourage private investments or will politicize the
business environment. The government must also take the lead in ensuring
that government workers get competitive salaries and working environment
by raising labor standards. Furthermore, governments should not bail-out and
spoil, but let the market discipline failing banks and corporations.
The "Nordic model" of Scandinavian countries follows the social
market economy, with welfare systems that ensure a quality of life for all.
The Philippine Constitution has also adopted provisions on welfare programs
to enfranchise the marginalized and allow them to participate in the country's
economic life. Social safety nets (SSS, GSIS, PhilHealth, Pag-lbig) are available
to insure services for the working class based on their actual contributions

Legal & Philosophical Issues I 37

 that should not be freely and equally " universalized" without parameters as to
disincentivize work.

Locke, the champion of property rights, advocated the limitation and

regulation of property according to one's share of labor in the Second Treatise
of Civil Government: "The measure of property nature has been well set by the
extent of men's labour and the conveniences of life xx x for, in governments
the laws regulate the right of property, and the possession of land is determined'
by positive constitutions."

For Locke, one is entitled to property not to the extent of what his money
can buy, but as much "as man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use
the product of, so much is his property." This is called as the "homestead
principle" or "labor theory of property," where it is by the exertion of labor
upon natural resources that things become one's property. Based on this
principle, the Public Land Act No. 2874 granted Homestead Patents to landless
Filipinos who are able to cultivate the land they possess during the American
period.

Locke's principle gives premium to hard-earned wealth. Both the rich

and the ~ r should not be entitled to property they did not work for. Giving
free subs1d1es or estates would only reward the indolent at the expense of the
work.er who deserves the property more. l
Law, Freedom, and Duty

A law is valuable, not because it is a law, but because there is right in it.

- Henry Ward Beecher, Life Thoughts

Many of our heroes died in the f fr
valuabl than • name O eedom. For them, it is more
e . mere existence. For to be human is to be free.
. Isaiah Berlin said that freedom has two kinds· N. . ·h
IS the absence of external co . . .• · egative freedom, whic
control or rational m nstram~, and /!0Sitive freedom, which is self.
from coercive and pre~v~v~ one s a~petite~ .. Ne~ative liberty is freedoIIl
individual to control his circumstan~~hile posttive liberty is the ability of all

True freedom takes into account bo . . .. ..

Authentic freedom does not nl th J>enniss1b11ity and possib1litY.
Law in this case must not onl o bye:ean you are allowed, but you are able.
freedom of action even if no~ r . shackles but also empower. There is no
have no control or means fo hg stops you from doing What you want if you
r w at you want.
"If a man is too poor to afford . th .
- a loaf of bread, a journey round thsome ing on which there is no legal ball
e world, recourse to the law courts - he
38 f PhiLawsophui- Ph -1 hy
- l osop and Th . if . _
eory o Philzppine Lnw
is as l~ttle f_ree to have it as he would be if it were forbidden him by law," Berlin
explamed m Two Concepts of Liberty.

The d~g~~e of freedom the law can provide may vary upon the capacity
and responsibility of persons. For example, a minor or a lunatic will need a
~uardian bec~use ?e cann~t really decide for himself and exercise positive
hbe~. Negatl~e h_berty will be taken from criminals to prevent them from
harmmg and v10latmg others' liberty.
Randolph Mayes said that persons are not ordinary objects but
"reasoning objects," requiring personal space for self-determination. To
interfere with a person's choice is to interrupt his reason and right to self-
government and personal autonomy. "Liberalism" teaches that there should
be no compulsion in making choices, whether perceived good or bad, called as
the "right to choose."
Under this paradigm, choice is a value so we can pursue alternative plans
in life. Law should only prohibit one from harming others but not from harming
oneself ("harm principle"). There should be minimal state intervention in the
lives of citizens. A person has complete dominion over what he wills for his
body, his life, and his property ("libertarianism"). In other words, ''your life,
your choice."

Freedom with Duty

Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes and on one hand, traditional,
and paternalistic institutions, view liberty as freedom only to do good and
fulfill duties. Individualistic, self-interested, or anti-social behavior must be
restrained. For the ancient Chinese, all citizens are ''under one heaven" and
liberty must be exercised to promote the good of all. The power to choose is
not the same as freedom, says Edmund Burke.
In Scholasticism, one who commits vice is not really free, but a slave to
his passions. As Aristotle clarified in the Metaphysics, "the free man is he who
is his own master." Freedom is itself a good, but God gave us free will that we
may choose what is right. This is also what Kant called "moral autonomy,"
and what Rousseau referred to as "moral liberty."
According to Kant, a philosophy of freedom will be deficient without
a duty theory or deontology. How do we know what is our duty? Kant
answered that first we must find the maxim or principle of action in what we
want to do. Next, ;e must ask ourselves whether we want our choice of action
to be universal rule or law which will be fine for everyone to do under the same
circumstances.
Authentic freedom is the capacity to enjoy the good life and fulfill one's
potential and not the opportunity to do harm, whether to others or oneself.

Legal & Philosophical Issues I 39

 I

1
The fact that one can choose to harm oneself means one cannot exercise right
judgment and may have to be subject to the contro l of others, such as through
guardians hip, rehabilitation , or property receivership. Self-hann is contrary
to the instinct of self-preservation. Righ ts, when not exercised properly, is
considered abdicated , thus the justifi cation for curtailing the liberty of criminal
offenders through imprisonment. A s the movie Spiderman puts it, "with great
power comes great respons ibi li ty."
Man is capable of so muc h good but a lso of so m uch evil , and the latter
must be checked by law. Disciplinary Jaw must restrain unnatural, self.
destructi ve, and unproductive desires and impul ses thro ugh penology. Social
cooperation is needed in a healthy society, and this includes fulfilling social
duties for the good of all, including the personal good of oneself. The principle
of solidarity highlights the social nature of a person , the interdependence of
each member of society, and the commitment to a common good.
Personal rights do not exist in a vacuum but has a social context. Without
a consciousness of ethical norms and duties, rights-advocacy can simply
degenerate into a liberal platform for licentious behavior, social deviancy, and
individualism . Thus, some countries, including Israel, Japan, India, and the
Scandinavia, scripted in their Constitution a fundamental bil1 of duties or
bill of responsibilities or Articles on the Duties of the People to complement
their bill of rights. There is a move in the Philippines to adopt a Bill of Rights
and Duties in the Constitution, following the Declaration of the Basic Duties
of ASEAN Peoples and Government. This has a precedent in the Karti/ya ng
Katipunan, which was worded in terms of duties.
For Rizal, the increase in duties must correspond with increase in rights.
In his essay The Philippines a Century Hence, he lamented the "increase of
duties, taxes and contributions without any corresponding increase in rights,
privileges, and liberties or an assurance of the continuation of the few existing
ones."

Rights therefore must be balanced with duties and vice versa. The term
"right" ~fter all _came_fron,i the Roman "jus," meaning "just.'' The French
R.evolutwn bad 1t saying: Liberte! Egalite! Fraternite! In this context true
freedom is not solipsistic liberty, but fraternal egalitarian liberty. '

Law, Guilt and Personal Liability

It ilJ better to risk saving a guilty person than to condemn an innocent one.

- Voltaire, Zadig
e. . When is a person guilty'? Does it require malice or the mere doing or
ia1Jure to do an act'?

. . Fr~o~ an~ responsibility are issues in criminal liability. An element of

cnmmal habihty 18 voluntariness, also call ed as "free action ." Since a person

4-0 f Philaw.wphla: Philo.1ophy and Theory of Philippine Law

will commit or omit as he thinks right the .
not matter much so long as an act. d rJresence ofmahce or good-will does
th
in aggravating penalties, the road ~: h:: :::e. Al ough ?ad faith is a factor
1
Whatever one's motivation one t b be paved with good intentions.
made not happen willingly. ' mus e responsible for what one made or

Deliberation or voluntariness is the k Ari st 1

main causes of how an act b . ey. ot e noted that there are two
ecomes mvoluntary· ignoranc d I•
Ignorance
. is lack of kn 1 d · e an compu
ow e ge or awareness of what one is doing or not s10n.
In
compulsion, however,. one. is forced to do someth"mg he would not have done
·
sueh as w hen· a• gun ts pomted into one's head · I nsam·ty may a1so be pleaded'
to excuse cnmma1 .acts due to defective mental 1acu .c. . so 1ong the disease
1ties, .
was present at. the time
. the act was committed and the defiect·1ve cond"1t1on
. has
a causal relation with the act.
But is. free will j_ust a concept? Are not our actions the result of a
conglomeration of physical, psychological, and social forces not really in our
control?
. '~Determinism" is the theory that all events are caused by antecedent
cond1~1ons ~d people .do not have much free will, but is like a complex
machine, subJect to vanous external and internal stimuli. Mental deficiencies,
heredity, hormonal imbalances, psychological lapses, biological instincts,
physical needs, traumas and syndromes, social conditioning, customs and
traditions, parental training, peer influence, environmental conditions, and
pass-on political and religious beliefs can all "conspire" to make a person
commit the perfect crime. As proof, criminal incidence is prevalent in marginal
communities because it is in these areas where people live in multiple sub-
human conditions, who do not have sufficient property, rights, and education
to direct a normal life even if they would want to.
Quantum consciousness says that things are not mechanistic as they
are supposed to be, but there is microcosmic human influence in the turn of
events. By our thoughts, intentions, actions and feelings, we emit brainwaves
and energy frequencies that can affect the tendencies of the smallest particles
of matter, especially ongoing undetermined events. Hence, human volitional
consciousness, especially when collective, may have influence on how things
behave or the outcome of events. In other words, even our circumstances may
be the accumulated result of our choices.
A version of "soft determinism" or "compatibilism" insists that
freedom is compatible with internal and external d~terminants. The antecedent
factors give us alternatives of action and tendencies but our character elects
what we will decide to do. It would be absurd if external factors are considered
but not one's personal agency. The blame game never_ends. We can always rise
out of our circumstances, especially adults psycholog1cally capable of consent.

Legal & Philosophical Issues l 41

If we deny free will, and maintain that freedom is an illusion, then we may as
well deny freedom too.
In civil damages, there is a standard of"strict liability~' where regardless
of whether the tortfeasor is at fault, one is responsible for bemg the proximate
cause without whom the damaging event, in the ordinary course of things
unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, would not arise. Strict liability
prevents defenses and justifications based on still debatable theories of human
free will and degrees of required diligence.
For instance, damages may be committed because one is drunk, and
while the psychological effect of drinking is beyond one's control, one is
responsible for getting drunk in the first place. Injuries may also be due to
an accident, but one can be inviting an accident if he failed to observe traffic
rules. Strict liability does not seek to solve the question of who is the first agent
(God? Genes? Nature?) but who is the last or proximate cause who sealed the
course of events.

Meanwhile, criminal punishment, in recent trends, has been reformed to

be more rehabilitative instead of punitive. It recognizes sociological findings
that people can be driven to commit criminal acts given their environment
and circumstances. People are responsible but not solely responsible, and
mitigating, aggravating, and special circumstances must always be appreciated.

CHAPTER I I CASE READINGS

PHILQSQPHERs QNLAWAND ACADEMIC FREEDOM

FELIXBERTO C. STA. MARIA v. SALVADOR P. LOPEZ, et aL

(G.R. No. L-30773, February 18, 1970)

CASTRO, J., concurring:

xxx

. ~ut the res~ect due the integrity of the individual is by no means

ant1thet1cal to the mterests of society On the contrary · ;:-. th
oth th h'l · , one rem1.orces e
e~, e P 1.~sopher Reinhold Niebuhr has so beautifully brought
out _m his boo~, The Children. of Light and the Children of Darkness."
Whtie sta
bourgeois d~mocracy, with its enshrining of the individual at the
cente~ ge of ~ociety, has now generally been replaced by a new social
consc1_o~sness, its emphasi~ on liberty nevertheless contains an element
~f vahd1ty that transcends its excessive individualism. Perhaps it would
e closer to the truth to say that the community re uires libe
as does the individual and the individual requ1·res q . rty as much
b · th oug ht comprehended. As Dr. Niebuhr explains:
community more than
ourge01s

42 l PhiLawsophia: Philosophy and Theory ofPhilippine Law

 T?e man who searches after both meaning and fulfillments be ond
the ambiguous
· · h . h fulfillments
h" . and frustration s Of h"1story exists
. Y_
. a height
m
o· f spmt· w1 1c no 1stoncal
h . process can comPIe t e1Y contam.
. This . height
.
1s not
· me evant to
·b·l· t e hfe
. . of the communi·ty b ·
, ecause new nchness and
a higher poss1 1 ity of ~ustl~e come to the community from this height of
awareness. But the height . 1s. destroyed by any commumty · w h"1ch seeks
prematurely
. to cut off this pmnacle of m· di·v1·dual·ty 1 m· the mterest
· o f th e
community's peace and order.

And what w~s the community interest involved here? If it was

that .of. the community
. . . of students
. who massed 1·n front o f th e umvers1ty
· ·
a~1mstra~1on bml~mg, then 1t was obviously in their interest that the
stnke contmued_unttl the respondent Lopez yielded to their demand. If, on
the other hand, 1t was that of the community of students who very much
t?
wanted attend classes but were prevented from doing so, or that of the
community of professors and other scholars who could not get inside the
classrooms_ because t~ey were barred by the demonstrating students, then
the protection of t~etr rights is to be found in some solution of a police
character and not m the summary removal of the petitioner. The issue
would always thus narrow down to the vindication of a principle: The
rational solution of any controversy.
Of more than passing relevance are these sentiments articulated
by Dr. Sidney Hook of the Department of Philosophy of the New York
University, a thoughtful commentator on the contemporary university
scene: "Due process in the academic community is reliant upon the
process of nationality it cannot be the same as due process in the political
community as far as the mechanisms of determining the outcome of rational
activity. For what controls the nature and direction of due process in the
academic community is derived from its educational goal - the effective
pursuit, discovery, publication, and teaching of the truth. In the political
community all men are equal as citizens not only as participants in, and
contributors to, the political process, but as voters and decision-makers
on the primary level. Not so in the academic community. What qualifies
a man to enjoy equal human or political rights does not qualify him to
teach equally with others or even to study equally on every level. There
is an authoritative, not authoritarian, aspect of the process of teaching and
learning that depends not upon the person or power of the teacher, but
upon the authority of his knowledge, the cogency of his method, the scope
and depth of his experience. But whatever the differences in the power
of making decisions flowing from legitimate differences in educational
authority, there is an equality of learners, whether of teachers or students,
in the rational processes by which knowledge is won, methods developed,
and experience enriched."
And on the rule of reason in a liberal educational regimen,
Professor Hook gives us pause with his incisive observations: "In a liberal
educational regimen, everything is subject to the i:ule ofreaso~, and all ~e
equals as questioners and participants. Who_ever mterferes ~1th acade~ic
due process either by violence or threat of violence places himself outside

Legal & Philosophical Issues I 43

 . ti sanctions appropriate. to Ththe
the
gra academic commumffi
·ty, and mcurs t lesuspension
. to expu ls1on. e
O
from censure bl " h
pecvity of his. o enses · . . . l'b ral educational esta ts ments
Of the ntuahsttc I e .h •
uliar deficiency t . f t· al due process wit appropnate
.olahons o ra ion Th .
is the failure to mee vi . 1 d intelligent manner. ere ts a
sanctions or to them in a ttm~ y anf lawless behavior on the Part of
l meet eye to expressions o d f h
tendency toh c ose an d deprive their fellow stu ents o t e
· th name of free om, c1m· · ·
students w o, m e . d' It • as if the liberal a m1stratton
freedom to pursue therr fell sit! ,es. ':inued existence by treating such
sought to appease the challenge to its ~on x x There is no panacea that can
incidents as if they had never happene . x tion of a hard line or a soft line,
be applied to all situations. It_ IS not a ques e advice from hindsight, to be
but of an intelligent line. It is easy to l ys helpful for the faculty
. d ksure after the event. But it is a wa .
wise an coc . . .delines for action, so that students will
to promulgate m advance farr gu; negotiations should be conducted
: ~ : ;:a~;x;cc!;!i;::~a;h:: administrators or faculty are held
captive."

PHILOSOPHERS ON LAW AND JUSTICE

JORGE B. VARGAS v. EMILIO RILLORAZA, et al

(G.R. No. L-1612, February 26, 1948)

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

According to Cicero "in justice the brilliance of virtue is gr:ater,

and from her they receive their name just men" (De Offic. 1., 1, Ill. de
Justitia); and Saint Thomas Aquinas maintains that ''.justice exc_els
other moral virtues" and "it is the most excellent among all other vutues
(Summa Theologica, Second Part, Cuestion XVIII, Article XII).

Although the psuedo-progressives of new pattern, those intellectual

renegades who spurn the wisdom of the ages, may not relish it, we have
to quote from Aristotle that "justice seems to be the most excellent
virtue, and that neither the afternoon star nor the morning star inspires
more admiration than her" (Ethics, 1. 5. c. 1), as "the greatest virtue as
necessan1y those which are more useful to others, because virtue is a
beneficient faculty" (Rhetor. I, I, c.9). After all, those who look farther
in the past will see better the future. Who can puU the farther back the
string of a bow, he will send the anow farther. Robert Maynard Hutchins,
President of the University of Chicago, one of the instittitions which
weatly COOtributed to the development of the atomic bomb, in the 1945
edition of his book "The High Learning in America" could not avoid
invoking several times the authority of the Stagirite. The Pleiad of great
physicists who are resPonsible for ushering of the Atomic Energy Era, the
m_ost r~volutionary in the history of humanity- Becquerel, Curie, Hertz,
ElllStem, Bohr, Smyth, Rutherford, Meitner, Oppenheimer, and many
others - themselves admitted that the ideas of Democrirus and Aristotle
on matter, on energy, on the elements of universe, expressed centuries

44 I Philaw,ophio; Phik,sophy ond Theory of Phi!;ppine Law

bef~re Christ, t~e philosopher's stone of the medieval alchemists, and
the ideas of Gahleo and Newton are direct progenitors and inspirers of
the present co~cepts on ~atter an~ energy as the different expressions
of the same thmg and which permitted the discovery of that wonderful
microcosmos where the constellations of electrons, protons, neutrons,
deuterons, photons, alpha, beta, and gamma rays, and other radiant
particles in play, offering to man the mastery it never had on physical
nature with the harnessing of the basic forces of universe.

There are thoughts and ideas bequeathed to us by great thinkers

which remain fresh and young through the ages and centuries, like the
flesh of the wooly mammoth, buried in Russian tundras, which today
can still be eaten, although the beasts died in the pre-historic darkness
of remote antiquity. Those are the thoughts and ideas insuffl.ated with the
vitality of eternal truth. They spring from the minds of the geniuses with
which Nature, once in a while, blesses certain epochs, to be the intellectual
leaders of mankind for all time.

The ignorants and retrogrades will never understand it; but it is a

fact that in the summit of his glorious career, Justice Holmes, the greatest
Judge of modern times, continued reading Aristotle. To free themselves
from the sorrows they feel with the surrounding market of vulgarity,
where pygmys and riffraffs dominate, great minds seek enjoyment in the
company of their kind. Eagles will not be happy in the society of flies and
mosquitoes. That explains the calibre of the friends Rizal had in Europe.
All these may sound esoteric to the unfortunate class of morons
or mental degenerates. We cannot help it. Our words are addressed to
persons with normal understanding.

JURISTS ON POLICE POWER, THE COMMON GOOD AND THE

GENERAL WELFARE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. JULIO POMAR

(G.R. No. L-22008, November 3, 1924)

JOHNSON, J.:
A d fi .f of the police power of the state must depend ~pon the
. l el m iond the particular facts to which it is to be applied. The
part1cu ar aw an . b th hi best courts may be
many definitions which have been given_ _Y e g ·de to
. h ose of givmg us a compass or gm
exammed, however, for t e purp . . the particular case before
assist us in arriving at a correct cone1us1otn itnexpounders of the common
S . w·11· Bl kstone one of the grea es
us. Ir 1 1am ac. ' r as "the due regu1a11· 0 n and domestic order of
law, defines the po1ice pow~ . f tate like members of a well-
kin d h b the mhab1tants o a s ,
the g om, w ere Y ti their general behavior to the rules
nd
governed family, are ~ou to co; ~: ood manners, and to be decent,
of propriety, go~ ne1gh~or~ootheir re;pective stations" (4 Blackstone s
industrious, and moffensive m
Commentaries, 162).

Legal & Philosophical Issues I 45

 Mr. Jeremy Bentham, in his General View of Public Offenses, g~ves
us the following definition: "Police is in general a system ~f precaution,
either for the prevention of crimes or of calamities. Its busmess ~ay be
distributed into eight distinct branches: (1) Polic_e_for the pre_vent1on of
offenses; (2) police for the prevention of calam1t1es; (3) ~ohce _for ~e
prevention of endemic diseased; (4) police of charity; (5) pol!ce of mtenor
communications; (6) police of public amusements; (7) pohce for recent
intelligence; (8) police for registration."

Mr. Justice Cooley, perhaps the greatest expounder of the American

Constitution, says: "The police power is the power vested in the legis-
lature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge
to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subject of
s
the same. x x x" (Cooley Constitutional Limitations, p. 830).

In the case of Commonwealth ofMassachusetts v. Alger, 7 Cushing,

53, we find a very comprehensive definition of the police power of the state.
In that case it appears that the colony of Massachusetts in 1647 adopted an
Act to preserve the harbor of Boston and to prevent encroachments therein.
The defendant unlawfully erected, built, and established in said harbor,
and extended beyond said lines and into and over the tide-water of the
Commonwealth a certain superstructure, obstruction and encumbrance.
Said Act provided a penalty for its violation of a fine of not less than
$1,000 nor more than $5,000 for every offense, and for the destruction of
said buildings, or structures, or obstructions as a public nuisance. Alger
was arrested and placed on trial for violation of said Act. His defense
was that the Act of 1647 was illegal and void, because if permitted the
destruction of private property without compensation. Mr. Justice Shaw,
spe~g for the court in that said: "We think it is a settled principle,
growmg out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder
of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title holds it
under the i~p!ie~ liability that his use of it may be so regulat;d, that it
s~ll not be •~urious to the equal environment of others having an equal
nght to ~e enJoyment of their property nor injurious to the rights of the
commumty. Al_l prope~ in this commonwealth, as well that in the interior
: that bordenng on tide waters, is derived directly or indirectly from
e government and held subject to those general regulations which are
1 ll~thto the_common good and general welfare. Dinl.ts ~f property
nl.eceske
a o er social and c f I · "'-16" '
limitations in th . . onven Iona nghts, are subject to such reasooable
and to sueh reasonable1r enJ,oyment, as shall prevent them from being m·,iun'ous
trai · :.1 '
legislature under th e res _nts and regulations established by law, as the
the consti~tion ma~ ~:~;mmg I and controlling power vested in them by
further adds· ..; x Th necessary and expedient." Mr. Justice Shaw
· x e power we allude to · th th .
the power vested in th 1 . 1s ra er e pohce power,
1
and establish all maiu:ere:~s ai;;; by tbe constitlation, to make, ordain
O
w esome and reasonable laws, statutes

46 I Philawsophia: Philosophy and Theory ol"Ph ·1 · . L

'J , 1pp1ne aw
and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."

This court has, in the case of Case v. Board of Health and Heiser,
24 Phil., 250, in discussing the police power of the state, had occasion
to say: "x x x It is a well settled principle, growing out of the nature of
well-ordered and civilized society, that every holder of property, however
absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability
that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious
to the rights of the community. All property in the state is held subject
to its general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and
general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional
rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as
shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints
and regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the governing
and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think
necessary and expedient. The state, under the police power is possessed
with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health,
morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not contravene any
positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that such power is not
exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to
prevent positive wrong and oppression."

CYBERLIBEL, PROOF QF TRUTHAND RESTRICTIONS TQ

FREEDOM QFSPEECH
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., et al v. THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, et al
(G.R. No. 20333S, February 11, 2014)

ABAD,J.:
But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution
need not prove the presence of malice. The law explicitly presumes its
existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the assailed
statement. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable
reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.
Petitioners peddle the view that both the penal code and the
Cybercrime Prevention Act violate the country's obligations under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). They point
out that in Adonis v. Republic of the Philippines, the United Nations
Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) cited its General Comment 34 to
the effect that penal defamation laws should include the defense of truth.
But General Comment 34 does not say that the truth of the
defamatory statement should constitute an all-encompassing defense.

Legal & Philosophical Issues I 47

 . h pens Artie . 1e 361 reco gn,·zes truth as a defense
. but under the
As it ap that 'the accused has been prompted in making the statement by
condition
good motives and for justifiable ends. Thus:

. roo f o f the truth. - In every criminal prosecution

361 P for
Art. d .f .
libel the truth may be given in evidence to the court an J it a~pears
that ,the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was
published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants shall
be acquitted.

Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not

constituting a crime shall not be admitted, unless the imputation shall have
been made against Government employees with respect to facts related to
the discharge of their official duties.

In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation

made by him. he shall be acquitted.

Besides, the lJNHRC did not actually enjoin the Philippines,

as petitioners urge, to decriminalize libel. It simply suggested that
defamation laws be crafted with care to ensure that they do not stifle
freedom of expression. Indeed, the ICCPR states that although everyone
should enjoy freedom of expression, its exercise carries with it special
duties and responsibilities. Free speech is not absolute. It is subject to
certain restrictions, as may be necessary and as may be provided by law.

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a
constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation
to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is
actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the
Penal Code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(cX4) above merely
affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing
libel

But the Court's acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime

law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel
brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code
provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet
media is distinct from that of print.

. The intern~ is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling,

an~g-goes wnttng style. In a sense, they are a world apart in terms
~f qu1ekness of the reader's reaction to defamatory statements ted
m cyh-.-___ facir• 1 ..+~...i b . pos
~"V~, st .~ Y one-cbck reply options offered by the
: ~ ~ g te as well as_by the speed with which such reactions are
down the lme to other internet users. Whether these
:;"'ons .'° defarnato,y 5taremeat JlOSted on the internet constitute aiding
abetting
another matter libel,
thatacts
th Co that Section·1 5 of the cybercrime law Punishes' is
of the law. e Urt W1 I deal With next in relation to Section 5

4B I Ph;J.,,_,phia, Philow,,hy and 1neory of Philippine I.Aw

 PUBLICAND SECULAR MQRALITYAS PREVAILING
NORM QF CONDUCT
CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS v. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE
WESTGROVE
(G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015)
REYES,J.:

. Howe~er, determining what the prevailing norms of conduct are

considered disgraceful or immoral is not an easy task. An individual's
per_c eption of what is moral or respectable is a confluence of a myriad
of influence~, such as religion, family, social status, and a cacophony of
others. In this regard, the Court's ratiocination in Estrada v. Escritor is
instructive.

In Estrada, an administrative case against a court interpreter

charged with disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Court stressed that in
determining whether a particular conduct can be considered as disgraceful
and immoral, the distinction between public and secular morality on the
one hand, and religious morality, on the other, should be kept in mind.
That the distinction between public and secular m,orality and religious
morality is important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to
public and secular morality. The Court further explained that:
The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular,
not religious x x x. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may
influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved
only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government
relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals,
the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some
might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would
therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by
a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious
freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs,
it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly
disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not
support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious
freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs
are disapproved are second-class citizens. Expansive religious freedom
therefore requires that government be neutral in matters of religion;
governmental reliance upon religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of
immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a
secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because
it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend
the existence and progress of human society" and not because the
conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although

Legal & Philosophical Issues I 49

 d 'tt dl moral judgments based on religion might have a hcompelling .
a m1 e Y, d . blic deliberations over w at actions
influence on t~ose engage 1ts:p~robation punishable by law. After all,
would be cons,~;:!;::;::: 0 ; 3 religion and thus have religious opinions
they might also .h mpelling influence on them; the human mind
and moral codes wit a co . . • f .
l
endeavors to regu a e e t th temporal and spiritual
. mstltutlons o
· 1 society
•m a umform
· manner, a h nnonizing earth with
. . heaven.
• • · · · yd put, a
Succmct
law could be re l.1g10
· us or Kantian or Aqmman .or utihtanan
. m its eepest
roots, but it must have an articulable an~ _discernible secular ~~ose
and justification to pass scrutiny of the rehgion clauses. x x x. (Citations
omitted and emphases ours)

Accordingly, when the law speaks of immoral or, .nec~ssarily,

disgraceful conduct, it pertains to public and secular morahty; i~ refers
to those conducts which are proscribed because they are detrimental
to conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human
society. Thus, in Anonymous v. Radam, an administrative case involving
a court utility worker likewise charged with disgraceful and immoral
conduct, applying the doctrines laid down in Estrada, the Court held that:
For a particular conduct to constitute "disgraceful and immoral"
behavior under civil service laws, it must be regulated on account of the
concerns of public and secular morality. It cannot be judged based on
personal bias, specifically those colored by particular mores. Nor should
it be grounded on "cultural" values not convincingly demonstrated to have
been recognized in the realm of public policy expressed in the Constitution
and the laws. At the same time, the constitutionally guaranteed rights
(such as the ~ght to privacy) should be observed to the extent that they
protect behavior that may be frowned upon by the majority.

EQUAL PROTECTION COMPATIBLE WITH REASONABLE

CLASSIFICATIOJY.

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA v. JUDICIAL AND BAR

COUNCIL
(G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)
REYES,J.:

There is no question that me em

basis to screen applicants who ann t b P1~ys standards to have a rational
to a vacancy in the judiciary ~o d e I acco~odated and appointed
the applicants, and not to di;c . ermme _who is best qualified among
or class. nmmate agamSt any Particular individual

The equal protection clause of th . .

t~e _universal application of the I e Constitution does not require
d1stmc!ion; what it requires is sim ;ws to _all persons or things without
accordmg to a valid classificatio p ~quahty among equals as determined
sol n. ence, the Court has affirmed that if
Philawsophia: Philosophy and Th
eory of Philippine Law
a la~ neit?er burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the
classification stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to some
legitimate government end.

The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude

classification ofindividuals who may be accorded different treatment under
the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary. The
mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality
is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification
of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some
degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC
merely exercised its discretion in accordance with the constitutional
requirement and its rules that a member of the Judiciary must be of proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence.

EQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO

PRIVATE PROPERTY
JUSTA G. GUIDO v. RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION, c/o
FAUSTINO AGUILAR
(G.R. No. L-2089, October 31, 1949)

TUASON~J.:
There are indeed powerful considerations, aside from the intrinsic
meaning of Section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution, for interpreting
Act No. 539 in a restrictive sense. Carried to extremes, this Act would
be subversive of the Philippine political and social structure. It would
be in derogation of individual rights and the time-honored constitutional
guarantee that no private property of law. The protection against
deprivation of property without due process for public use without just
compensation occupies the forefront positions (paragraphs 1 and 2) in the
Bill for private use relieves the owner of his property without due process
of law; and the prohibition that "private property should not be taken for
public use without just compensation" (Section 1 [par. 2}, Article III, ofthe
Constitution) forbids necessary implication the appropriation of private
property for private uses (29 C.J.S., 819). It has been truly said that the
assertion of the right on the part of the legislature to take the property of
and citizen and transfer it to another, even for a full compensation, when
the public interest is not promoted thereby, is claiming a despotic power,
and one inconsistent with very just principle and fundamental maxim of a
free government (29 C.J.S., 820).
Hand in hand with the announced principle, herein invoked,
that "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people should be the concern of the state,"
is a declaration, with which the former should be reconciled, that "the

Legal & Philosophical Issues I 5l

 Philippines is o Republican stnto" created to secure to the f ilipfno r>copl
.. the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, li berty an:
democracy." Democracy, os a way of li fe enshrined in the Constitution
embraces os its necessary components freedom of conscience. freedo~
of express ion, and freedom in the pursuit of happiness. Along with these
freedoms ore included economic freedom and freedom of enterprise
within reasonable bounds and under proper contro l. In paving the way
for the breaking up of existing large estates, trust in perpetuity, feudalism
and their concomitant evils, the Constitution did not propose to destroy 0 ;
undermine the property right or to advocate equal distribution of wealth
or to authorize of what is in excess of one's personal needs and the giving
of it to another. Evincing much concern for the protection of property, the
Constitution distinctly recognize the preferred position which real estate
has occupied in law for ages. Property is bound up with every aspects of
social life in a democracy as democracy is conceived in the Constitution.
The Constitution owned in reasonable quantities and used legitimately,
plays in the stimulation to economic effort and the formation and growth
of a social middle class that is said to be the bulwark of democracy and the
backbone of every progressive and happy country.
The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does
not supply paramount basis for untrammeled expropriation of private
land by the Rural Progress Administration or any other government
instrumentality. Social justice does not champion division of property or
equality of economic status; what it and the Constitution do guaranty are
equality of opportunity, equality of political rights, equality before the
law, equality between values given and received on the basis of efforts
exerted in their production. As applied to metropolitan centers, especially
Manila, in relation to housing problems, it is a command to devise, among
other social measures, ways and means for the elimination of slums,
shambles, shacks, and house that are dilapidated, overcrowded, without
ventilation, light and sanitation facilities, and for the construction in their
place of decent dwellings for the poor and the destitute. As will presently
be shown, condemnation of blighted urban areas bears direct relation to
public safety health, and/or morals, and is legal.

THE TRAGEDYQF CQMMQNS

PRYCE CORPORATION v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

(G.R. No. 172302, February 18, 2014)

LEONEN,J.:
Rather than let struggling corporations slip and vanish, the better
option is to allow commercial courts to come in and apply the process for
corporate rehabilitation.
This option is preferred so as to avoid what Garrett Hardin called the
Tragedy of Commons. Here, Hardin submits that ..coercive government

.sz I Ph /Lawsophia : Philosophy a nd Theory of Philippine Law

regulation is necessary to prevent the degradation of common-pool
resources [since] individual resource appropriators receive the full benefit
of their use and bear only a share of their cost." By analogy to the game
theory, this is the prisoner's dilemma: "Since no individual has the right
to control or exclude others, each appropriator has a very high discount
rate [with] little incentive to efficiently manage the resource in order to
guarantee future use." Thus, the cure is an exogenous policy to equitably
distribute scarce resources. This will incentivize future creditors to
continue lending, resulting in something productive rather than resulting
in nothing.

In fact, these corporations exist within a market. The General Theory

of Second Best holds that "correction for one market imperfection will not
necessarily be efficiency-enhancing unless [there is also] simultaneous
[correction] for all other market imperfections." The correction of one
market imperfection may adversely affect market efficiency elsewhere,
for instance, "a contract rule that corrects for an imperfection in the
market for consensual agreements may [at the same time] induce welfare
losses elsewhere." This theory is one justification for the passing of
corporate rehabilitation laws allowing the suspension of payments so that
corporations can get back on their feet.
As in all markets, the environment is never guaranteed. There are
always risks. Contracts are indeed sacred as the law between the parties.
However, these contracts exist within a society where nothing is risk-free,
and the government is constantly being called to attend to the realities of
the times.
Corporate rehabilitation is preferred for addressing social costs.
Allowing the corporation room to get back on its feet will retain if not
increase employment opportunities for the market as a whole. Indirectly,
the services offered by the corporation will also benefit the market as
"[t]he fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in
motion comes from [the constant entry of] new consumers' goods, the
new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, [and] the
new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates."

MARKETS MUST BE FAIR TO BE FREE

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. INTERPORT

RESOURCES CORPORATION, et aL
(G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008)

TINGA, J., concurring opinion:

The securities market, when active and vibrant, is an effective engine
of economic growth. It is more able to channel capital as it tends to favor
start-up and venture capital companies. To remain attractive to investors,
however the stock market should be fair and orderly . All the regulations,
all the r;quirements, all the procedures and all the people in the industry

legal & Philosophical issues I 53

 h' wed ob.~ec ti·ve · Manipulative devices and
should
d strive to achieve t . t~ av~ 'd trading throw a monkey wrench
. • l dmg ms1 er • d ·
eceptive practices, fme u . . . d try When someone tra es In the
h cunttes m us · • .
right into the heart o t e se . h £ of highly valuable secret tnstde
market with unfair advantage :~ :::frauded. All of the mechanism,
infonnation, all other parttctp b of stock market scandals coupled With
become worthless. Gtven eno:arket such abuses could presage a severe
drainrelated
the loss ofAnd
of capital. fat thmvestors
ID the wou id eventually feel more secure With
their money invested elsewhere. .

.. k t is imbued with public interest and as such It

The secunhes mar e iven for securities regulation are
is regulated. Specifically, the reasons g . nnational needs of investors
( 1) to protect investors, (2) _to supply the IDfoh fundamental value of th~
(3) to ensure that stock pnces conform to t e
companies traded, (4) to allow shareholders to gai~ greater c~ntrol o~er
their corporate managers,
and. access to capital. and (5) to foster economic growth, mnovatton

In checking securities fraud, regulation of the stock market ~ssumes

quite a few forms, the most common being disclosure regulation and
financial activity regulation.

xxx
Yet there is an underlying dangerous implication to respondents'
arguments which makes the Courts rejection thereof even more laudable.
The ability ofthe SEC to effectively regulate the securities market depends
on the breadth of its discretion to undertake regulatory activities. The
intractable adherents of laissez-faire absolutism may decry the fact that
there exists an SEC in the first place, yet it is that body which assures the
protection of interests of ordinary stockholders and investors in the capital
markets, interests which may be overlooked by the issuers of securities
and their corporate overseer, whose own interests may not necessarily
align with that of the investing public. A free market that is not a fair
market is not truly free, even if left unshackled by the State as it would
in fact be shackled by the uninhibited greed of on]y the largest players.

!JNNEGIJGENCF, INTENT, ntonm AND M-Wa.

AR'rEMio VILLAREAL v. PEOPI,E OF THE PlfILIPPINEs
(G.R. No. 1S12S8, December t, 2014)
SERENO, CJ.:

Reckless imprudence consists i l tary . .

doing or falling to do an act fr h. h n vo un ' but without malice,
of inexcUsable lack of Precao; w tc :;'aleria!
damage results by reason
or failing to I>erfonn such ac:' : on _t e Pan ?f the Person perfonning
or occupation, degree of . 'teu· ng mto consideration his employment
circumstances regarding ID tgence, PhYstca] condition and other
persons, tune and place.
541 Philawsophia · Ph·l h
. l osop !Y and Theory ofPhilippine Law
 Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in
those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate
nor the danger clearly manifest. (Emphases supplied)
On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in
which a deliberate malicious intent to do an unlawful act is present. Below
is our exhaustive discussion on the matter: Our Revised Penal Code
belongs to the classical school of thought. x x x The identity of mens rea
- defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent
- is the predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do what the
law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that
the act be committed by means of dolo or "malice."
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the
elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent. x x x The element of intent
- on which this Court shall focus - is described as the state of mind
accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of
the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds. It does not refer to
mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result
of the act. While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action
for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means
to produce the result. On the other hand, the term "felonious" means,
inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or
purpose. With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in
intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and
malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise,
intentional felony requires the existence of do/us ma/us - that the act or
omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent,"
and '<with malice aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum,
nisi mens sit rea - a crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of is innocent. As is required of the other
elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
XXX

The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is

thus a vital ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional
felony of homicide. Being ma/a in se, the felony of homicide requires the
existence of malice or dolo immediately before or simultaneously with
the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill - or animus interficendi - cannot
and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt
of such intent. Furthermore, the victim's death must not have been the
product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an
act executed without malice or criminal intent - but with lack of foresight,
carelessness, or negligence - the act must be qualified as reckless or
simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.
XXX

In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under

Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the employment of

Legal & Philosophical Issues I ss

 • 1 tnJunes
phys1ca • • · m ust be coupled with do/us ma/us. As an
. fund I ·act that
· · is
mala m . se, th e ex1.stence
· of malicious intent 1s . . amenta
. .n.., smce Ill.Jury
.
arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer - zmurza ex a»ectufacientis
•
cons,stat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused
f h · cannot
I · · be · found
guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case o_ p ys~ca 1~~e_s und_der
th R
e evtse · d Penal Code • there must be a spec1. 6 c ·ammus · zmurzan llbez or
malicious intention to do wrong against th~ phys1ca.11~tegnty or ~e i~g
of a person, so as to incapacitate and depnve the v1ct1m of ce~m bodlly
functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the reqmred animus
iniuriandi the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely
satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony.
The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless
his intentions are.

Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere

infliction of physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a
person automatically liable for an intentional felony. x x x.

xxx
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean,
however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of
criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are
committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there
is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack
of foresight, or lack of skill.

Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act

done without malice, from which an immediate personal hann, injury or
material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or
advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this case, the danger
is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple
imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from
which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of
foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the
danger is not openly visible.

The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in

doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the
person to whom negligence is attributed foresee hann to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be Pursued?
If_so, the law imPoses on the doer the duty to take !)reeaution against the
mtscbievous results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.
. As we held in Ga;d v. People, for a P<rson to avoid being cluuged
wnb recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies
wtth the degree of the danger involved. If, on account of a certain line
of conduc~ the danger of causing harm to another person is greai, the
mdtvtdual who cbnoses to follow that J>articular course of conduct is
bound to be very carefu~ in onler to prevent or avoid damage or injury.

56) Phil.,awsophUr PhHosDphy and Theory of PhUipp;n, Law

In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required. It is thus
possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that
may be required of an individual, "from a transitory glance of care to
the most vigilant effort." The duty of the person to employ more or less
degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.
(Emphases supplied, citations omitted)

Legal & Philosophical issues I 57