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ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.

Survey of 2009-2010 SC Decisions
Political Law
Dean ED VINCENT S. ALBANO
BILL OF RIGHTS
DUE PROCESS
Essence of due process in

administrative proceedings.
Once again in Gatus vs. Quality House, Inc., et. al., G.R. No. 156766, April 16, 2009 had the
occasion to say that in due process, the law itself only requires “ample opportunity to be heard”. The
essence of this requirement as an element of due process in administrative proceedings is the
chance to explain one’s side. Jurisprudence has amply clarified that administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in the strict judicial sense, (Concerned Officials of MWSS
vs. Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502 (1995), and that there is no violation of due process even if no formal or
actual hearing was conducted, provided a party is given a chance to explain his side. What is
frowned upon is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. (PAL vs. NLRC, 198 SCRA 748; Felix B.
Perez and Amante G. Doria vs. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company and Jose Luis Santiago,
G.R. No. 152048, March 31, 2009).
DUE PROCESS
Q – The notice to an employee who was being terminated merely stated that he was being dropped
from the rolls. It did not specify the factual and legal reasons for terminating the services of the
employee. Is this the notice required to comply with due process? Why?
Answer: No. This is a violation of due process since it strikes at its essence. The opportunity to be
heard, or the opportunity to adequately and intelligently mount a defense made against him was
violated. He was completely left in the dark why his services were being summarily terminated. LBP
v. Paden, G.R. No. 157607, July 7, 2009).
Aspects of right to security of tenure.
The right to security of tenure. Article IX (B), Section 2(3) of the 1987 Constitution expressly
provides that “no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause provided by law.” The constitutional provision does not distinguish between a regular
employee and a probationary employee. (Daza v. Lugo, G.R. No. 168999, April 30, 3008, 553 SCRA
532, 537-538).
The constitutional guaranty of security of tenure in the civil service has two legal
ramifications. In Tria v. Chairman Patricia Sto. Tomas, et al., it was held that the prohibition against
suspension or dismissal of an officer or employee of the Civil Service “except for cause provided by
law” is “a guaranty of both procedural and substantive due process.” “Not only must removal
or suspension be in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, but also they can only be
made on the basis of a valid cause provided by law.”
Procedural due process basically requires that suspension or dismissal comes only after notice
and hearing. Thus, the minimum requirements of due process are: (1) that the employees or officers
must be informed of the charges preferred against them, and the formal way by which the
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employees or officers are informed is by furnishing them with a copy of the charges made against
them; and (2) that they must have a reasonable opportunity to present their side of the matter, that
is to say, their defenses against the charges and to present evidence in support of their defenses.
Substantive due process on the other hand requires that the suspension or dismissal be “for
cause.” Delos Santos v. Mallare, best expresses what is for cause provided by law:
It means for reasons which the law and sound public policy recognize as sufficient for
removal, that is legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the
exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be
removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of removal or without cause.
Moreover, the cause must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and
must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights
and interests of the public. [Emphasis supplied]
Deemed resigned provision is not

violative of the equal protection
clause.
Q – On December 1, 2009, the SC rendered a judgment ruling as unconstitutional the third

paragraph of Sec. 13, RA 9369, Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec. 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 mainly on the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution and suffer from overbreadth. The Decision paved the way for appointive public officials
to continue discharging the powers, prerogatives and functions of their office notwithstanding their
entry into the political arena. The COMELEC and movant-intervenors filed motions for
reconsiderations and in support of the same, they alleged:
(1) The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the constitutional proscription
against the participation of public appointive officials and members of the military in
partisan political activity;
(2) The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when they accord
differential treatment to elective and appointive officials, because such differential
treatment rests on material and substantial distinctions and is germane to the purposes
of the law;
(3) The assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth; and
(4) There is a compelling need to reverse the assailed Decision, as public safety and interest
demand such reversal.
The motions for reconsideration were granted and hence, the SC reversed the December 1,
2009 Decision.
Intent of the Constitution and the

Law in prohibiting appointive
public officers in participating in
partisan political activities.
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the present state of the
law and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:
Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66

of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees
in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
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Incumbent Elected Official. – Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or
the Fair Election Act, which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code and rendered
ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only
upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are
running, an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an
elected official may run for another position without forfeiting his seat.
These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,
which prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan
political campaign.
The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the participation of
civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities are too plain to be mistaken.
But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes apply
only to civil servants holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does
not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that “[t]he civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters.” (Sec. 2(1), Article IX-B, 1987 Constitution).
This is because elected public officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan political
activities almost all year round, even outside of the campaign period. Political partisanship is the
inevitable essence of a political office, elective positions included.
Exception to prohibition is the right to vote.
The prohibition notwithstanding, civil service officers and employees are allowed to vote, as
well as express their views on political issues, or mention the names of certain candidates for public
office whom they support.
Equal protection clause; not

violated by the deemed resigned
provision.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. (Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 147387, December
10, 2003, 417 SCRA 503).
In Fariñas, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections
66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, was assailed on the ground, among others, that it unduly
discriminates against appointive officials. As Section 14 repealed Section 67 (i.e., the deemed-
resigned provision in respect of elected officials) of the Omnibus Election Code, elected officials are
no longer considered ipso facto resigned from their respective offices upon their filing of certificates
of candidacy. In contrast, since Section 66 was not repealed, the limitation on appointive officials
continues to be operative – they are deemed resigned when they file their certificates of candidacy.
It was held, however, that the legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is a reasonable
classification, as there are material and significant distinctions between the two classes of officials.
Consequently, the contention that Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and
67 of the Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal protection clause of the Constitution, failed
muster. It was ruled:
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not
absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The
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Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this
manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within
such class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions between

elective and appointive officials.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office
for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other
hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing
authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55,
Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service,
are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election
except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political
offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators
deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their
tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those
occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the
wisdom of this classification.
Classification Germane to the

Purposes of the Law
The Fariñas ruling on the equal protection challenge stands on solid ground even if
reexamined.
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction. (Phil Judges Assn., et al. v. Prado, et al., G.R. No.
105371, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 712). What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder
is that of reasonableness, (PNP v. De Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 106724, February 9, 1994, 229 SCRA
801) which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. (People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 (1939).
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The assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy
the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion
that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not germane to the
purpose of the law, because “whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils
sought to be prevented by the measure remain.
The Court cannot “equalize the playing field” by invalidating provisions of law that seek to
restrain the evils from running riot. Under the pretext of equal protection, it would favor a situation
in which the evils are unconfined and vagrant, existing at the behest of both appointive and elected
officials, over another in which a significant portion thereof is contained. The absurdity of that
position is self-evident.
Deemed resigned provision serves

governmental interests.
The provisions challenged in the case at bar, are not violative of the equal protection clause.
The deemed-resigned provisions substantially serve governmental interests (i.e., (i) efficient civil
service faithful to the government and the people rather than to party; (ii) avoidance of the
appearance of “political justice” as to policy; (iii) avoidance of the danger of a powerful political
machine; and (iv) ensuring that employees achieve advancement on their merits and that they be
free from both coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity. These are interests that are
important enough to outweigh the non-fundamental right of appointive officials and employees to
seek elective office.
Filing of certificate of candidacy is engaging in

partisan political activity.
Q – What is the effect if a person holding appointive position in government files his certificate of
candidacy? Explain.
Answer: The filing of a Certificate of Candidacy for an elective position is, by the very nature of the
act, an electioneering or partisan political party.
Two provisions of the Constitution, taken together, mandate that civil service employees
cannot engage in any electioneering or partisan political activity except to vote. Thus, the
Constitution provides:
No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly

or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political activity. (Section
2(4), Article IX-B of the Constitution).
No member of the military shall engage, directly or indirectly, in

any partisan political activity, except to vote. (Section 5(3), Article IX-B
of the Constitution).
The exercise of the right to vote is the only non-partisan political activity a citizen can do. All
other political activities are deemed partisan. As a matter of fact, the only non-partisan political
activity one can engage in as a citizen is voting.
Indisputably, any political activity except to vote is a partisan political activity. Section 79(b)
of the Omnibus Election Code implements this by declaring that any act designed to elect or promote
the election of a candidate is an electioneering or partisan political activity, thus:
The term “election campaign” or “partisan political activity”

refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a
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particular candidate or candidates to a public office x x x.” (Quinto, et

al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010).
SEARCH & SEIZURE
Meaning of paraphernalia in
search warrant.
Q – A search warrant was issued authorizing the taking of shabu and paraphernalia only. The police
officers took lady’s wallet, cash, grinder, camera, etc. Is the act proper? Why?
Answer: No. As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may be seized
by the authorities. (People vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81 (2003). By the principle of ejusdem generis, where
a statute describes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character,
the generic word will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly
enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statement which would repel such
inference.
Certainly, the lady’s wallet, cash, grinder, camera, component, speakers, electric planer,
jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer, drill and bolo were not encompassed by the word
paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of drugs. In seizing the said items
then, the police officers exercised their own discretion and determined for themselves which items in
appellant’s residence they believed were “proceeds of the crime” or “means of committing the
offense.” This is absolutely impermissible. (People vs. Go)
The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly
described in the warrant is to limit the things to be taken to those, and only those particularly
described in the search warrant – to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what
articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a sweeping authoring empowering a raiding party
to undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a
crime. Accordingly, the objects taken which were not specified in the search warrant should be
restored to appellant. (People vs. Raul Nuñez, G.R. No. 177148, June 30, 2009).
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Obscene language is an unprotected speech.
In Eliseo Soriano vs. Laguardia, et al., G.R. No. 164785; Soriano vs. MTRCB, et al., G.R. No.
165636, April 29, 2009 (Velasco, J), the respondent issued an order suspending the program of
Soriano due to certain utterances he made in his television show, Ang Dating Daan. He uttered the
following:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling.
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung

putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, (dito) kay Michael
ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan.
Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang
kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito. x x x
Hence, a complaint was filed with the MTRCB where after hearings were conducted, an order of
suspension of his program was issued. He filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
invoking the following issues:
1. It violated the equal protection clause;

2. It violated the freedom of religion clause;
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3. It violated the freedom of speech cluse.
(1) On the first issue; equal protection clause.
He contended that the MTRCB denied him his right to the equal protection of the law, arguing
that, owing to the preventive suspension order, he was unable to answer the criticisms coming from
the INC ministers. Is his contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. His position does not persuade. The equal protection clause demands that “all persons
subject to legislation should be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the
privileges conferred and liabilities imposed”. It guards against undue favor and individual privilege as
well as hostile discrimination. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957). Surely, petitioner
cannot, under the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are
not facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offered no proof that the
said ministers, in their TV programs, used language similar to that which he used in his own,
necessitating the MTRCB’s disciplinary action. If the immediate result of the preventive suspension
order is that petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is unable to answer his critics, this does not
become a deprivation of the equal protection guarantee. Such suspension is not an indication of
oppressive inequality.
(2) On the second issue; freedom of religion.
He injected the notion of religious freedom, submitting that what he uttered was religious
speech, adding that words like “putang babae” were said in the exercise of his religious freedom.
Rule on the contention. Explain.
Answer: The argument has no merit.
There is nothing in his statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular
religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with
his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the
character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be
elevated to the status of religious speech. He was only moved by anger and the need to seek
retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers
distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert
the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech. It cannot be accepted that petitioner made
his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or
refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They simply illustrate that he
had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. He could have chosen to
contradict and disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road.
(3) On the third issue; freedom of speech.
He contended that the 20-day suspension order, was an unconstitutional abridgement of the
freedom of speech and expression and an impermissible prior restraint. Is the contention correct?
Why?
Answer: No. It is settled that expressions by means of newspapers, radio, television and motion
pictures come within the broad protection of the free speech and expression clause. Each method
though, because of its dissimilar presence in the lives of people and accessibility to children, tends to
present its own problems in the area of free speech protection, with broadcast media, of all forms of
communication, enjoying a lesser degree of protection. (Eastern Broadcasting Corp. vs. Dans, Jr.,
137 SCRA 628 (1985). Just as settled is the rule that restrictions, be it in the form of prior restraint,
e.g., judicial injunction against publication or threat of cancellation of license/franchise, or
subsequent liability, whether in libel and damage suits, prosecution for sedition, or contempt
proceedings, are anathema to the freedom of expression. Prior restraint means official government
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restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or

dissemination. The freedom of expression, as with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights,
is, however, not absolute. It may be regulated to some extent to serve important public interests,
some forms of speech not being protected. As has been held, the limits of the freedom of expression
are reached when the expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern. (Lagunsad vs.
Soto Vda. De Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476). In the oft-quoted expression of Justice Holmes, the
constitutional guarantee “obviously was not intended to give immunity for every possible use of
language.” (Trohwerk vs. U.S., 249 U.S. 204 (1919). From Lucas vs. Royo comes this line: “The
freedom to express one’s sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the
honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments must be expressed within the proper forum and with
proper regard for the rights of others. (344 SCRA 481 (2000).
Q - He asserted that his utterance in question is a protected form of speech. Is his contention
correct? Why?
Answer: No. Unprotected speech or low-value expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or
pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or “fighting words”, i.e., those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression
endangering national security.
His statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child. Hence, it
is, in that context, unprotected speech.
They can be viewed as figures of speech or merely a play on words. In the context they were
used, they may not appeal to the prurient interests of an adult. The problem with the challenged
statements is that they were uttered in a TV program that is rated “G” or for general viewership, and
in a time slot that would likely reach even the eyes and ears of children.
While adults may have understood that the terms thus used were not to be taken literally,
children could hardly be expected to have the same discernment. Without parental guidance, the
unbridled use of such language as that of petitioner in a television broadcast could corrupt
impressionable young minds. The term “putang babae” means “a female prostitute”, a term wholly
inappropriate for children, who could look it up in a dictionary and just get literal meaning, missing
the context within which it was used. Petitioner further used the terms, “ang gumagana lang doon
yung ibaba,” making reference to the female sexual organ and how a female prostitute uses it in her
trade, then stating that Sandoval was worse that that by using his mouth in a similar manner.
Children could be motivated by curiosity and ask the meaning of what petitioner said, also without
placing the phrase in context. They may be inquisitive as to why Sandoval is different from a female
prostitute and the reasons for the dissimilarity. And upon learning the meanings of the words used,
young minds, without the guidance of an adult, may, from their end, view this kind of indecent
speech as obscene, if they take these words literally and use them in their own speech or form their
own ideas on the matter. In this particular case, where children had the opportunity to hear
petitioner’s words, when speaking of the average person in the test of obscenity, the Court is
speaking of the average child, not the average adult. The average child may not have the adult’s
grasp of figures of speech, and may lack the understanding that language may be colorful, and
words may convey more than the literal meaning. Undeniably the subject speech is very suggestive
of a female sexual organ and its function as such. In this sense, the utterances are obscene and not
entitled to protection under the umbrella of freedom of speech.
Even if the remarks are not obscene but merely indecent speech, still he cannot avail himself
of the constitutional protection of free speech. Said statements were made in a medium easily
accessible to children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances are to be treated as
unprotected speech.
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Content based and content neutral regulation.
Q – Is there a distinction between regulation or restriction of protected speech that is content-based

and that which is content-neutral?
Answer: Yes. A content-based restraint is aimed at the contents or idea of the expression, whereas a
content-neutral restraint intends to regulate the time, place, and manner of the expression under
well-defined standards tailored to serve a compelling state interest, without restraint on the
message of the expression. Courts subject content-based restraint to strict scrutiny. (Chavez vs.
Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441 (2008).
Q – Why is the suspension by the MTRCB a permissible restriction? Explain.
Answer: It is due to the following interplaying factors: First, the indecent speech was made via
television, a pervasive medium that to borrow from Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katigbak, 137 SCRA 717
(1985) easily “reaches every home where there is a set and where children will likely be among the
avid viewers of the programs therein shown”; second, the broadcast was aired at the time of the day
when there was a reasonable risk that children might be in the audience; and third, petitioner
uttered his speech on a “G” or “for general patronage” rated program. Under Sec. 2(a) of Chapter IV
of the IRR of the MTRCB, a show for general patronage is “suitable for all ages”, meaning that the
”material for television in the judgment of the board, does not contain anything unsuitable for
children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision.” The words
petitioner used were, by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable for children. Where a language is
categorized as indecent, as in petitioner’s utterances on a general patronage rated TV program, it
may be readily proscribed as unprotected speech.
Q – He asserted that his utterances must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a
substantive evil the State has right and duty to prevent and such danger must be grave and
imminent. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. His invocation of the clear and present danger doctrine, arguably the most permissive
of speech tests, would not avail him any relief, for the application of said test is uncalled for under
the premises. The doctrine, first formulated by Justice Holmes, accords protection for utterances so
that the printed or spoken words may not be subject to prior restraint or subsequent punishment
unless its expression creates a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantial evil which
the government has the power to prohibit. (16A AM. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law Sec. 493; Schenck
vs. U.S. 249 U.S. 47). Under the doctrine, freedom of speech and of press is susceptible of
restriction when and only when necessary to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which
the government may lawfully protect. As it were, said doctrine evolved in the context of prosecutions
for rebellion and other crimes involving the overthrow of government. It was originally designed to
determine the latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-government action, or to
have serious and substantial deleterious consequences on the security and public order of the
community. (Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835 (1969). The clear and present danger rule has
been applied to this jurisdiction. As a standard of limitation on free speech and press, however, the
clear and present danger test is not a magic incantation that wipes out all problems and does away
with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech and which
compels a court to release a defendant from liability the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent
proof of imminent catastrophic disaster. (Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 170 SCRA 1 (1989). As observed in
Eastern Broadcasting Corporation, the clear and present danger test “does not lend itself to a
simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.” (137 SCRA 628
(1985).
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Q – Is the clear and present danger the only test to restrain forms of speech? Explain.
Answer: No. The clear and present danger doctrine is not the only test which has been applied by
the courts. Generally, said doctrine is applied to cases involving the overthrow of the government
and even other evils which do not clearly undermine national security. Since not all evils can be
measured in terms of “proximity and degree” the Court, however, in several cases – Ayer
Productions vs. Capulong, 160 SCRA 861 (1988) and Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 28 SCRA 835 (1969)
applied the balancing of interests test. In Gonzales vs. COMELEC, it was said that “where the
legislation under constitutional attack interferes with the freedom of speech and assembly in a more
generalized way and where the effect of the speech and assembly in terms of the probability of
realization of a specific danger is not susceptible even of impressionistic calculation,” then the
“balancing interests” test can be applied.
The Court explained also in Gonzales vs. COMELEC the “balancing interests” test:
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the
regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the duty of
the courts is to determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the greater
protection under the particular circumstances presented. We must, therefore,
undertake the “delicate and difficult task to weigh the circumstances and to appraise
the substantiality of the reasons advance in support of the regulation of the free
enjoyment of rights.
In enunciating standard premised on a judicial balancing of the conflicting

social values and individual interests competing for ascendancy in legislation which
restricts expression, the court in Douds laid the basis for what has been called the
“balancing-of-interests” test which has found application in more recent decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court. Briefly stated, the “balancing” test requires a court to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given
situation or type of situation.
Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured by

Congressional power restricting the individual’s freedom, and the social importance
and value of the freedom so restricted, “are to be judged in the concrete, not on the
basis of abstractions”, a wide range of factors are necessarily relevant in ascertaining
the point or line of equilibrium. Among these are (a) the social value and importance
of the specific aspect of the particular freedom restricted by the legislation; (b) the
specific thrust of the restriction, i.e., whether the restriction is direct or indirect,
whether or not the persons affected are few; (c) the value and importance of the
public interest sought to be secured by the legislation – the reference here is to the
nature and gravity of the evil which Congress seeks to prevent; (d) whether the
specific restriction decreed by Congress is reasonably appropriate and necessary for
the protection of such public interest; and (e) whether the necessary safeguarding of
the public interest involved may be achieved by some other measure less restrictive of
the protected freedom.
The balancing of interest test, to borrow from Professor Kauper, rests on the theory that it is
the court’s function in a case before it when it finds public interests served by legislation, on the one
hand, and the free expression clause affected by it, on the other, to balance one against the other
and arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall be placed. If, on balance, it appears that
the public interest served by restrictive legislation is of such nature that it outweighs the abridgment
of freedom, then the court will find the legislated valid. In short, the balance-of-interests theory
rests on the basis that constitutional freedoms are not absolute, not even those stated in the free
speech and expression clause, and that they may be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate
and important interests. To the mind of the Court, the balancing of interest doctrine is the more
appropriate test to follow.
10


Q – In this case, the assertion by petitioner of his enjoyment of his freedom of speech is ranged
against the duty of the government to protect and promote the development and welfare of the
youth. Which will prevail? Explain.
Answer: The government’s interest to protect and promote the interests and welfare of the children
adequately buttresses the reasonable curtailment and valid restraint on the suspension of his
program.
No doubt, one of the fundamental and most vital rights granted to citizens of a State is the
freedom of speech or expression, for without the enjoyment of such right, a free, stable, effective,
and progressive democratic stated would be difficult to attain. Arrayed against the freedom of
speech is the right of the youth to their moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social being which the State
is constitutionally tasked to promote and protect. Moreover, the State is also mandated to recognize
and support the vital role of the youth in nation building as laid down in Sec. 13, Article II of the
1987 Constitution.
The Constitution has, therefore, imposed the sacred obligation and responsibility on the State
to provide protection to the youth against illegal or improper activities which may prejudice their
general well-being.
Indisputably, the State has a compelling interest in extending social protection to minors
against all forms of neglect, exploitation, and immorality which may pollute innocent minds. It has a
compelling interest in helping parents, through regulatory mechanisms, protect their children’s
minds from exposure to undesirable materials and corrupting experiences. The Constitution, no less,
in fact enjoins the State, to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and
social well-being of the youth to better prepare them fulfill their role in the field of nation-building.
In the same way, the State is mandated to support parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character.
Petitioner’s offensive and obscene language uttered in a television broadcast, without doubt,
was easily accessible to the children. His statements could have exposed children to a language that
is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and the State’s mandate to protect
and care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in
regulating petitioner’s utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986.
FCC explains the duty of the government to act as parens patriae to protect the children who,
because of age or interest capacity, are susceptible of being corrupted or prejudiced by offensive
language, thus:
Broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read.

Although Cohen’s written message, (“Fuck the Draft”), might have been
incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacifica’s broadcast could have enlarged a child’s
vocabulary in an instant. Other forms of offensive expression may be withheld from
the young without restricting the expression at its source. Bookstores and motion
picture theaters, for example, may be prohibited from making indecent material
available to children. We held in Ginsberg vs. New York that the government’s
interest in the “well-being of its youth” and in supporting “parents’ claim to authority
in their own household” justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression.
The case with which children may obtain access to broadcast material, coupled with
the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special treatment of indecent
broadcasting.
11


Moreover, Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katigbak likewise stressed the duty of the State to attend to
the welfare of the young:
It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned, a less

liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where
the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set.
Children then will likely will be among the avid viewers of the programs therein
shown. As was observed by Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank, it is hardly
the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It
cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an
attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.
One who utters indecent, insulting, or offensive words on television when unsuspecting
children are in the audience is, in the graphic language of FCC, a “pig in the parlor.” Public interest
would be served if the “pig” is reasonably restrained or even removed from the “parlor.”
Suspension is not prior restraint but a

sanction.
The three (3) months suspension in this case is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner
to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB
for such broadcast. Rather, the suspension is in the form of permissible administrative sanction or
subsequent punishment for the offensive and obscene remarks he uttered on the evening of August
10, 2004 in his television program, Ang Dating Daan. It is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly
impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause. And the imposition is
separate and distinct from the criminal action the Board may take pursuant to Sec. 3(i) of PD 1986
and the remedies that may be availed of by the aggrieved private party under the provisions on libel
or tort, if applicable. As FCC teaches, the imposition of sanctions on broadcasters who indulge in
profane or indecent broadcasting does not constitute forbidden censorship. Lest it be overlooked, the
sanction imposed is not per se for petitioner’s exercise of his freedom of speech via television, but
for the indecent contents of his utterances in a “G” rated TV program.
Reason why television broadcasts

should be regulated.
Television broadcasts should be subject to some form of regulation, considering the ease with
which they can be accessed, and violations of the regulations must be met with appropriate and
proportional disciplinary action. The suspension of a violating television program would be sufficient
punishment and serve as a deterrent for those responsible. The prevention of the broadcast of
petitioner’s television program is justified, and does not constitute prohibited prior restraint. It
behooves the Court to respond to the needs of the changing times, and craft jurisprudence to reflect
these times.
Q – Petitioner argued that there has been undue delegation of legislative power, as PD 1986 does
not provide for the range of imposable penalties that may be applied with respect to violations of the
provisions of the law. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a
particular statute. The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of
the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the non-delegation of legislative powers.
Administrative regulations or “subordinate legislation” calculated to promote the public interest are
necessary because of “the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law.” Allowing the MTRCB
some reasonable elbow-room in its operations and, in the exercise of its statutory disciplinary
functions, according it ample latitude in fixing, by way of an appropriate issuance, administrative
penalties with due regard for the severity of the offense and attending mitigating or aggravating
12


circumstances, as the case may be, would be consistent with its mandate to effectively and
efficiently regulate the movie and television industry. (See: Edu vs. Ericta).
Right to be informed of the nature

of accusation.
In People vs. Rogelio Marcos, G.R. No. 185380, June 18, 2009 accused was charged with the
crime of rape. He complained that the prosecution presented evidence of subsequent rapes hence,
he contended that his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him was violated.
Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: The contention is not well-taken. While it is a basic constitutional precept that the accused
in a criminal case should be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he
is put on trial, and that the accused be convicted only of an offense alleged in the complaint or
information, such principle finds no application to this case. Accused was being tried for the rapes he
committed subsequent to that alleged in the information. The prosecution does not seek that he be
punished for the rapes he perpetrated outside the date mentioned in the information. The said
principle becomes relevant if he were sought to be punished for the acts of rape he carried out other
than the one stated in the information. The prosecution adduced evidence that he raped the victim
several times after the date in question, precisely to show that the pregnancy of victim was
authored by him and not to prove that he should be punished for such. Even assuming arguendo
that the testimony on the successive molestations could not be considered as evidence for the
prosecution, the cause of the prosecution is sufficiently proved by the credible testimony of the
victim relating to the 13 July 2003 rape incident. This is an established proof. This alone can sustain
the conviction of the accused.
Impairment of contract clause.
Q – The constitutionality of the provision of Sec. 34, RA 9369 which fixes the per diem of poll
watchers of the dominant majority and dominant minority parties at P400.00 on election day was
questioned on the ground that it violates the freedom of the parties to contract and their right to fix
the terms and conditions of the contract they see as fair, equitable and just. He added that this is a
purely private contract using private funds which cannot be regulated by law.
Both the COMELEC and the OSG argue that the law is a proper exercise of police power and it
will prevail over a contract. According to the COMELEC, poll watching is not just an ordinary
contract but is an agreement with the solemn duty to ensure the sanctity of votes. The role of poll
watchers is vested with public interest which can be regulated by Congress in the exercise of its
police power. The OSG further argued that the assurance that the poll watchers will receive fair and
equitable compensation promotes the general welfare. The OSG also stated that this was a
reasonable regulation considering that the dominant majority and minority parties will secure a copy
of the election returns and are given the right to assign poll watchers inside the polling precincts. Is
the contention of petitioner correct? Why?
Answer: No. There is no violation of the non-impairment clause. First, the non- impairment clause is
limited in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in
any manner changing the intention of the parties. (Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R.
No. 167614, march 24, 2009). There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a
contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or
withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. (Clemons v. Nolting, 42 Phil.
702 (1922).
Second, it is settled that police power is superior to the non-impairment clause. The
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power
of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community.
(Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
13


177508, August 7, 2009).
There is no impairment of
contract but a valid exercise of
police power of the State, when
State recovers property
fraudulently covered by TCT.
Q – If the State recovers a property fraudulently covered by a TCT, is there no violation of the non-
impairment of contract clause? Explain.
Answer: No. The constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contracts may not likewise be used
by LBP to validate its interest over the land as mortgagee. The State’s restraint upon the right to
have an interest or ownership over forest lands does not violate the constitutional guarantee of non-
impairment of contracts. Said restraint is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. In
Director of Forestry v. Munoz, 132 Phil. 637 (1968), it was said that because of the importance of
forests to the nation, the State’s police power has been wielded to regulate the use and occupancy
of forest and forest reserves.
Preservation of our forest lands could entail intrusion upon contractual rights as in this case
but it is justified by the Latin maxims Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
(Ynot v. IAC, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987, 148 SCRA 659; LBP v. Republic, G.R. No. 150824,
February 4, 2008).
IMMUNITY OF STATE FROM SUIT
Facts:
PROVI is an entity engaged in the sale of high technology equipment, information technology
products and broadcast devices, including the supply of plastic card printing and security facilities.
TESDA is an instrumentality of the government established under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7796 (the TESDA Act of 1994) and attached to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to
“develop and establish a national system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the
country.” To fulfill this mandate, it sought to issue security-printed certification and/or identification
polyvinyl (PVC) cards to trainees who have passed the certification process.
The parties entered into a contract for the supply of security-printed certification worth
P39,475,000.00. After delivery of the certification, TESDA paid only P3,739,500.00, hence, PROVI
demanded for payment of the balance. For failure to pay, a suit was filed with prayer for attachment
which the RTC granted. A petition for certiorari was filed by TESDA where the CA reversed the RTC
finding that (a) TESDA’s funds are public in nature and, therefore, exempt from garnishment; and
(b) TESDA’s purchase of the PVC cards was a necessary incident of its governmental function;
consequently, it ruled that there was no legal basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment/garnishment. The CA subsequently denied PROVI’s motion for reconsideration; hence,
the petition for certiorari. Is the ruling of the CA correct? Why?
Held: Yes, because TESDA is an instrumentality of the government undertaking governmental

function.
R.A. No. 7796 created the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority or TESDA
under the declared “policy of the State to provide relevant, accessible, high quality and efficient
technical education and skills development in support of the development of high quality Filipino
middle-level manpower responsible to and in accordance with Philippine development goals and
priorities.”
14


Among others, TESDA is empowered to: approve trade skills standards and trade tests as
established and conducted by private industries; establish and administer a system of accreditation
of both public and private institutions; establish, develop and support the institutions’ trainors’
training and/or programs; exact reasonable fees and charges for such tests and trainings conducted,
and retain such earnings for its own use, subject to guidelines promulgated by the Authority; and
perform such other duties and functions necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act, consistent
with the purposes of the creation of TESDA.
All these measures are undertaken pursuant to the constitutional command that “The State
affirms labor as a primary social economic force”, and shall “protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare”; that “ The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all”; in
order “to afford protection to labor” and “promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.” (Professional Video, Inc. vs. Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA), G.R. No. 155504, June 26, 2009).
TESDA, as an agency of the State,

cannot be sued without its
consent; reason.
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodies in Section 3, Article
XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an established principle that antedates this Constitution.
It is as well a universally recognized principle of international law that exempts a state and its
organs from the jurisdiction of another state. The principle is based on the very essence of
sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy – that public
service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected
to law suits at the instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the uses and
dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the government.
The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms, namely:
a suit against the Republic by name; a suit against an unincorporated government agency; a suit
against a government agency covered by a charter with respect to the agency’s performance of
governmental functions; and a suit that on its face is against a government officer, but where the
ultimate liability will fall on the government. In the present case, the writ of attachment was issued
against a government agency covered by its own charter. TESDA performs governmental functions,
and the issuance of certification is a task within its function of developing and establishing a system
of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country. From the perspective of this
function, the core reason for the existence of state immunity applies, i.e., the public policy reason
that the performance of governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can
these suits control the use and disposition of the means for the performance of governmental
functions.
Effect of TESDA’s Contract.
Q – PROVI argued that TESDA can be sued because it has effectively waived its immunity when it
entered into a contract with PROVI for a commercial purpose. According to PROVI, since the purpose
of its contract with TESDA is to provide identification PVC cards with security seal which TESDA will
thereafter sell to TESDA trainees, TESDA thereby engages in commercial transactions not incidental
to its governmental functions.
TESDA contented that it is not engaged in business. While TESDA admitted that it will charge
the trainees with a fee for the PVC cards, it claimed that this fee is only to recover their costs and is
not intended for profit. Rule on the contentions.
15


Held: TESDA is correct. The PVC cards purchased by TESDA from PROVI are meant to properly
identify the trainees who passed TESDA’s National Skills Certification Program – the program that
immediately serves TESDA’s mandated function of developing and establishing a national system of
skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country.
That TESDA sells the PVC cards to its trainees for a fee does not characterize the transaction
as industrial or business; the sale, expressly authorized by the TESDA Act, cannot be considered
separately from TESDA’s general governmental functions, as they are undertaken in the discharge of
these functions. Along this line of reasoning, it was held in Mobil Philippines vs. Customs Arrastre
Services:
The fact a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in

nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental
function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver
thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. (18
SCRA 1120 (1966).
TESDA’s funds are public in

character, hence exempt from
attachment or garnishment.
Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with PROVI and thereby gave
its implied consent to be sued, TESDA’s funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be valid
subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment. In Republic v. Villasor, the limits in dealing with
public funds was explained, thus:
This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made

explicit in the revised charter. It is therein expressly provided, “The State may not be
sued without its consent.” A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense, from
such a basic concept, is that public funds cannot be the object of garnishment
proceedings even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state
liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case of Commissioner of Public Highways vs. San
Diego, such a well-settled doctrine was restated thus:
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action only up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of
the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law.
The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects, as appropriated by law. (54 SCRA 84 (1973); Traders Royal Bank vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 192 SCRA 305 (1990).
The garnished funds constitute TESDA’s lifeblood – in government parlance, its MOOE
(maintenance and other operating expenses) whose withholding via a writ of attachment, even on a
temporary basis, would paralyze TESDA’s functions and services. As well, these funds also include
TESDA’s Personal Services funds from which salaries of TESDA personnel are sourced. For obvious
reasons, the release of these funds cannot be delayed.
16


ARTICLE VI
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Investigation in aid of legislation;

on-going judicial proceedings
cannot prevent investigation in
aid of legislation.
In Reghis Romero II, et al. v. Sen. Jinggoy Estrada, et al., G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009,
the issue on the conduct of investigation in aid of legislation was once again raised in relation to the
investments of the OWWA funds into the Smokey Project. It sought to inquire into the liability of
President Ramos and others for the illegal investment of the OWWA Funds into the project causing
loss to OWWA in the amount of P550 Million. It was intended likewise to aid the Senate in the review
and possible amendments to RA 8042, the Migrants Workers Act. Letters were sent to the
petitioners to appear before the Senate Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources
Development but they contended that since the investigation has been intended to ascertain their
criminal liability for plunder, it is not in aid of legislation and that it could violate their right against
self-incrimination. This is the gist of their petition for injunction filed with the Supreme Court but the
Court in denying the petition:
Held: A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings have different purposes.
On one hand, courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the
application of a law, actual controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable
rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter, alia, undertaken as tools to enable
the legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; (Arnault vs.
Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950); and to determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or
enact new or remedial legislation, (Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 168; citing W. Keefe & M.
Ogul, The American Legislative Process: Congress and the States, 20-23 (4th ed., 1977), albeit the
inquiry need not result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude
congressional hearings in aid of legislation. Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine Branch) vs. Senate
Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies (Standard Chartered Bank) provides the
following reasons:
The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or

quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative
investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry
by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative
complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power
of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a
criminal or administrative investigation.
A succinctly stated in Arnault vs. Nazareno:
The power of inquiry with process to enforce it, is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation
is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information which is not infrequently true, recourse must be had to
others who possess it. (G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007, 541 SCRA 456).
While Sabio and Standard Chartered Bank advert only to pending criminal and administrative
cases before lower courts as not posing a bar to the continuation of a legislative inquiry, there is no
rhyme or reason that these cases’ doctrinal pronouncement and their rationale cannot be extended
to appealed cases and special civil actions awaiting final disposition before the Court.
17


The denial of the petition was further aggravated by the fact that invitations and subpoenas
were sent out by the past Congress. The Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently
of the Senate before and after it, hence, such subpoenas are considered functos oficio and the
related legislative inquiry conducted is, for all intents and purposes, terminated.
Power to issue subpoena; no

violation of the right against self-
incrimination.
Suffice it to state that when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to
appear before it in connection with its investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so
pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Article
IV, Section 21 of the Constitution. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate Committee
from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. (Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
vs. Majaducon, 407 SCRA 356 (2003). Sabio emphasizes the importance of the duty of those
subpoenaed to appear before the legislature, even if incidentally incriminating questions are
expected to be asked:
Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized that “this

right may be invoked by the said directors and officers of Philcomsat only when the
incriminating question is being asked, since they have no way of knowing in advance
the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them.” That this right may possibly
be violated or abused is no ground for denying respondent Senate Committees their
power of inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is abused, such issue may
be presented before the courts.
Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of

witnesses will be respected by respondent Senate Committees, it is their duty to
cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative
action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to
respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with
respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation. (Emphasis supplied).
HRET has the sole power to

decide qualifications of member
of lower House including Party-
List.
In Dr. Hans Christian Señeres vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009, there
were two sets of nominees of BUHAY Party List. After the elections, the nominees by Robles as
President of the organization took their oath and assumed office as members of Congress, hence,
Señeres filed a special Civil Action for Certiorari with the SC alleging grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC in proclaiming the Robles
nominees and there was no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In
denying the petition the SC
Held: The petition is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, because the HRET is the sole judge
of all contents pertaining to the election returns and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. (Art. VI, Sec. 17, Constitution).
In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, the Court elucidated on the import of the word “sole”
in Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, thus:
The use of the word “sole” emphasizes the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction conferred. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under
18


the 1935 Constitution has been described as ‘intended to be as complete and

unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.’ Earlier, this grant of
power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as ‘full, clear and
complete’. Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly
reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that
previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission. The same may be
said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987
Constitution. (168 SCRA 391 (1988); Rasul vs. COMELEC and Aquino-Oreta, 313 SCRA
18 (1999)).
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s (HRET) sole and exclusive jurisdiction over
contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives “begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives.” (Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 119976, September
18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300, 340-341. See also Domingo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134015, July 19,
1999, 310 SCRA 547; Aquino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 1202965, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA
400). Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over elections relating to the
election, returns and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. (Aggabao vs.
COMELEC, 449 SCRA 400 (2007).
Party List representative; effect of

continued operation of the 2%
threshold vote.
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), G.R. No.
179271, and other case, June 24, 2009, filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution. It was denied by the COMELEC using as basis
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC which interprets the clause “in proportion to their total
number of votes” to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. The petitioners contended that
the second clause of Sec. 11(b) of RA 7941 provides the “those garnering more than 2% of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. They
contended that there should be a proclamation of the others to complete the 20% representation of
the party list groups as provided by the Constitution. But to compute the allocation of additional
seats using the operation of the 2% threshold continuously would defeat the aim of the Constitution.
Is the contention of BANAT, etc. correct? Explain.
Answer: Yes. In computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. The two percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of
available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of
the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
The 2% threshold should be striken down as unconstitutional only in relation to the

distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941.
The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.” (Barangay
Association for National Advancement & Transparency (BANAT), G.R. No. 179271, June 24, 2009).
Q – State the procedure in determining the allocation of seats in the party-list representatives.
Answer: In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A.
No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
19


1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1,
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all
the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because
they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party
List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a
provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
Two steps in second round of allocation of seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional the allocation of additional seats is not
limited to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is
arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by (15,950,900), the total
number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat
allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the
difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of
the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats.
Second, one party-list seat is assigned to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are
completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats are distributed in the second
round of seat allocation. Finally, the three-seat cap is applied to determine the number of seats
each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. (Barangay Association for National Advancement &
Transparency (BANAT), G.R. No. 179271, June 24, 2009).
Q – May the major political parties participate in the party-list system? Explain.
Answer: Yes. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly
intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings.
In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral
seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In
defining a “party” that participates in party-list elections as either “a political party or a sectoral
party,” R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. The Court cannot
engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties
from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state
that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for
electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party
participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral
youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector
or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate
in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng
Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor. (Barangay Association for National
Advancement & Transparency (BANAT), G.R. No. 179271, June 24, 2009).
20


Q – If there is a party-list organization of the urban poor, should the nominee wallow in poverty?
Explain.
Answer: No. Under Sec. 9 of RA 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee
wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity as there is no financial status required by the law. It is
enough that the nominee of the sectoral party or organization or coalition belongs to the
marginalized and unrepresented sectors, that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she
must be fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior
citizen. (Barangay Association for National Advancement & Transparency (BANAT), G.R. No. 179271,
and other cases, June 24, 2009).
Q – State the nature of the 20% allocation of party-list representatives. Explain.
Answer: Under the Constitution, the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is
merely a ceiling; it cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. The
continued existence of a provision which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated
20% party-list representatives from being filled up cannot be allowed. The 3-seat capacity as a
limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy remains a valid
statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. (Barangay
Association for National Advancement & Transparency (BANAT), G.R. No. 179271, and other cases,
June 24, 2009).
RA 9369 does not violate Section

26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution
Q – A petition seeking to declare RA 9369, the Automation Law was filed alleging that the title of RA
9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing
with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also alleged that Sections 34, 37, 38, and
43 are neither embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9369.
Both the COMELEC and the OSG maintained that the title of RA 9369 is broad enough to
encompass topics which deal not only with the automation process but with everything related to its
purpose encouraging a transparent, credible, fair, and accurate elections. Rule on the contention.
Explain.
Answer: The contention is not correct. The constitutional requirement that “every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” has always
been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The requirement is satisfied if the title is
comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to
achieve. The title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents and will suffice if the matters
embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. Moreover, a title
which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature
of the amendatory act need not be further stated. (Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009).
Sections 37 and 38 do not violate

Section 17, Article VI and
Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution
Q – It was argued that sections 37 and 38 violate the constitution by impairing the powers of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). According to petitioner,
under the amended provisions, Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of
21


President and Vice President (Congress), and the COMELEC en banc as the National Board of
Canvassers (COMELEC en banc), for the election of senators may now entertain pre-proclamation
cases in the election of the President, Vice President, and Senators. Petitioner concluded that in
entertaining pre-proclamation cases, congress and the comelec en banc undermined the
independence and encroached upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. Is the contention
correct? Why?
Answer: The contention is not correct. Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon
the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of
Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the PET and the SET, on the other, are
exercised on different occasions and for different purposes. The PET is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President. The SET is the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
Senate. The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked once the winning presidential,
vice presidential or senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. On the other hand, under Section
37, Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall determine only the authenticity and due execution of
the certificates of canvass. Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the
proclamation of the winning presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial candidates. (Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177508,
August 7, 2009).
Qualifications of a member of
Congress; petition for quo
warranto is remedy to the HRET.
Q – Danilo Ramon Fernandez filed his certificate of candidacy for representative of the First District
of Laguna. In his certificate of candidacy, he stated that he is a resident of Villa Toledo Subdivision,
Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. A petition to deny due course to his certificate of candidacy
was filed before the COMELEC, Laguna alleging material misrepresentation as in the past elections,
he declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address. He likewise maintains a house outside of the First
District, particularly in Cabuyao, Laguna. He was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of
the First District of Laguna. A petition for quo warranto was filed with the HRET praying that he be
declared ineligible to hold the position since he lacked the one-year residence requirement. At the
hearing, witnesses were presented that he is not from Sta. Rosa; that he was not oftenly seen in
Villa Toledo Subdivision. He presented evidence, however, that he is a resident of said places,
testified to by some witnesses; a certification by the President of the Homeowners Association and
that he bought a property at Bel-Air Sta. Rosa, Laguna and presented a lease contract over a house
being rented by his family. The lessor was presented too, to testify that he is a resident of Sta. Rosa.
The HRET declared him ineligible as he lacked the required residence. Before the SC he contended
that the COMELEC has already passed upon his qualification, thus, the HRET should have dismissed
the case. Is the contention correct? Explain.
Answer: Yes. The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17 thereof that the
HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The authority conferred upon the
Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of
the jurisdiction of these Tribunals, (Co v. HRET, G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 692),
which is conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and the proclamation of the winning
candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office
cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives. (Co v. HRET).
A petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be
considered forum shopping even if the COMELEC had already passed upon in administrative or
quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the qualification of the Member of the House of
Representatives while the latter was still a candidate. (Rep. Danilo Ramon Fernandez v. HRET, et al.,
G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009).
22


Q – Was he able to comply with the residence requirement? Explain.
One of the qualifications of a member of the House of Representatives found in Article VI,
Section 6 of the Constitution is that, he must be a resident thereof for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the election.
The fact that a few barangay health workers attested that they had failed to see petitioner
whenever they allegedly made the rounds in Villa de Toledo is of no moment, especially considering
that there were witnesses (including petitioner’s neighbors in Villa de Toledo) that were in turn
presented by petitioner to prove that he was actually a resident of Villa de Toledo, in the address he
stated in his COC. The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a
day, seven days a week, in order to fulfill the residency requirement.
Moreover, as this Court said in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC:
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which

ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes
material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
The HRET put undue emphasis on the fact that petitioner is only leasing a townhouse in Sta.
Rosa while he owns houses in Pagsanjan and Cabuyao. His ownership of properties in other places
has been taken to mean that petitioner did not intend to make Sta. Rosa his permanent residence or
that he had not abandoned his domicile of origin.
Property ownership not a

requirement to run for public
office.
The Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the
district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to
election day. To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of
permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the
residency requirement. The Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right
to hold public office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional.
This case must be distinguished from Aquino v. COMELEC and Domino v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
134015, July 19, 1999, 310 SCRA 546, where the disqualified candidate was shown to be merely
leasing a residence in the place where he sought to run for office. In Aquino and Domino, there
appeared to be no other material reason for the candidate to lease residential property in the place
where he filed his COC, except to fulfill the residency requirement under election laws.
Purpose of residence requirement.
To be sure, Gallego v. Vera, G.R. No. L-48641, November 24, 1941, 73 Phil. 453 decreed
that:
The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a

stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community
and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community; and
when the evidence on the alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or
inconclusive and it clearly appears, as in the instant case, that the purpose of
the law would not be thwarted by upholding the right to the office, the will of
the electorate should be respected. xxx xxx xxx
23


Frivaldo likewise prescribed that:
xxx xxx xxx To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the

petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people,
would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and
juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. xxx
xxx xxx
In Torayno, G.R. No. 137329, August 9, 2000, 337 SCRA 574, the Court had the occasion to
say that:
The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking
and holding elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be
familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters
vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to
evaluate the office seekers' qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for. xxx
xxx xxx
The residency requirement is a means to prevent a stranger or newcomer from holding office
on the assumption that such stranger or newcomer would be insufficiently acquainted with the needs
of his prospective constituents. However, it is appropriate to point out at this juncture that aside
from petitioner’s actual, physical presence in Sta. Rosa for more than a year prior to election day, he
has demonstrated that he has substantial ties to Sta. Rosa and the First District of Laguna for an
even longer period than that. Petitioner has business interests in Sta. Rosa comprised of restaurants
and a residential property for lease. Petitioner has two children studying in Sta. Rosa schools even
before 2006. These circumstances provided petitioner with material reasons to frequently visit the
area and eventually take up residence in the said district. Significantly, petitioner previously served
as Board Member and Vice-Governor for the Province of Laguna, of which the First District and Sta.
Rosa are a part. It stands to reason that in his previous elected positions petitioner has acquired
knowledge of the needs and aspirations of the residents of the First District who were among his
constituents.
Simply put, petitioner could not be considered a “stranger” to the community which he
sought to represent and that evil that the residency requirement was designed to prevent is not
present in this case.
In Sinaca v. Mula, G.R. No. 135691, September 27, 1999, 315 SCRA 282 to wit:
When a candidate has received popular mandate, overwhelmingly and clearly

expressed, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the candidate's eligibility
for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the people. Above and beyond all, the
determination of the true will of the electorate should be paramount. It is their voice,
not ours or of anyone else, that must prevail. This, in essence, is the democracy we
continue to hold sacred. (Rep. Danilo Ramon Fernandez v. HRET, et al., G.R. No.
187478, December 21, 2009).
Senator can be chair of PNRC.
Q – If a Senator is the head of the Philippine National Red Cross, is he violating the rule that he
cannot occupy any position in government or government-owned or controlled corporations? Explain.
Answer: No, because the PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation, but a privately
owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable organization. The vast majority of the
24


thousands of PNRC members are private individuals including students. Under its charter, those who
contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one
year.
Reliance on the case of Camporedondo v. NLRC, 37 Phil. 91 (1999) is misplaced.
In such case, it was ruled that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation. In
ruling that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation, the simple test used was
whether the corporation was created by its own special charter for the exercise of a public function
or by incorporation under the general corporation law. Since the PNRC was created under a special
charter, the Court then ruled that it is a government corporation. However, the Camporedondo
ruling failed to consider the definition of a government-owned or controlled corporation as provided
under Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. – x x x
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency

organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating
to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by
the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or
where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least
fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock.”
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the

case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the
government. In the case of a non-stock corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members
must be government officials holding such membership by appointment or designation by the
government. Under this criterion, the government does not own or control PNRC. (Liban, et al. v.
Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009).
ARTICLE VII
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Nature of the power to deport; Act

of State; subject to judicial
review.
In Secretary of Justice, et al. vs. Christopher Roruga, G.R. No. 166199, April 24, 2009, the
respondent was sought to be deported for violation of Section 37(a)4 of CA No. 613 otherwise
known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. It was alleged that he was convicted and/or
sentenced for Uniform Controlled Substance Act in connection with his being Drug Trafficker and/or
Courier of prohibited drugs in the Senate of Washington, United States of America, thus, making him
an undesirable alien and/or a public burden in violation of Section 37(4) [sic] of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.
The Board of Commissioners ordered his deportation after trial. The DOJ on appeal affirmed
the order. By way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition he went to the CA which reversed the
ruling of the DOJ holding that there was no valid and legal ground for the deportation of respondent
since there was no violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, because respondent was not convicted or sentenced for a violation of the law on
prohibited drugs since the U.S. Court dismissed the case for violation of the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act in the State of Washington, USA filed against respondent; that petitioners further
failed to present or attach to their pleadings any document which would support their allegations
that respondent entered into a plea bargain with the U.S. Prosecutor for deferred sentence nor did
they attach to the record the alleged order or judgment of the U.S. Court which would show the
conviction of respondent for violation of the prohibited drugs law in the USA; that even if respondent
25


was convicted and sentenced for the alleged offense, his deportation under Section 37(a)(4) is
improper, since the prohibited drugs law, then Republic Act No. 6425 or the “Dangerous Drug Act of
1972”; that although the BOC is clothed with exclusive authority to decide as to the right of a
foreigner to enter the country, still, such executive officers must act within the scope of their
authority or their decision is a nullity.
Before the SC, the petitioners contended that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive
authority to decide whether a foreigner may be deported and such proceedings are beyond judicial
review. Is the contention correct? Why?
Held: No. It is beyond cavil that the BI has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear
cases against an alleged alien, and that the BOC has jurisdiction over deportation proceedings.
Nonetheless, Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution has vested power of judicial review in the
Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the CA, as established by law. Although the courts are
without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the government and are not empowered to execute
absolutely their own judgment from that of Congress or of the President, (Tatad vs. Secretary of the
Department of Energy, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997, 281 SCRA 330, 347; Ledesma vs. CA,
G.R. No. 113216, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 656, 681; Tañada vs. Angara, G.R. No. 118295,
May 2, 1997, 272 SCRA 18, 48-49), the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not
such judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or
executive department is contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. (Republic vs. Garcia,
G.R. No. 167741, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 495, 502; Information Technology Foundation of the
Philippines vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 141, 148;
Domingo vs. Scheer, 466 Phil. 235 (2004);
House of Sara Lee vs. Rey, 500 SCRA 419 (2006).
Right to enter the country is a matter of

privilege.
The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the Philippines is merely a privilege and a
matter of grace; such privilege is not absolute or permanent and may be revoked. However, aliens
may be expelled or deported from the Philippines only on grounds and in the manner provided for by
the Constitution, the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and administrative issuances
pursuant thereto.
It must be remembered that aliens seeking entry in the Philippines do not acquire the right to
be admitted into the country by the simple passage of time. When an alien, such as respondent, has
already physically gained entry in the country, but such entry is later found unlawful or devoid of
legal basis, the alien can be excluded anytime after it is found that he was not lawfully admissible at
the time of his entry. (Board of Commissioners vs. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991). Every
sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it
may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. (Lao Tan Bun vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682
(1948). The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the
sovereign power. (In Re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918). It is a police measure against
undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public
good and the domestic tranquility of the people. (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534 (1910)).
CIVIL SERVICE LAW
Appointment in the Civil Service.
Once again, the SC in Amores vs. CSC, et al., G.R. No. 170093, April 29, 2009, Peralta, J,
had the occasion to say that a permanent appointment in the civil service is issued to a person who
26


has met the requirements of the position to which the appointment is made in accordance with law
and the rules issued pursuant thereto. An appointment is permanent where the appointee meets all
the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed, and it is temporary where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position
except only the appropriate civil service eligibility.
The mere fact that a particular position belongs to the career service does not automatically
confer security of tenure on its occupant. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his
appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the
requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an
exception to the rule, may be appointed to it in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate
eligibles.
Q – What are the two kinds of suspension?
Answer: There are two kinds of preventive suspension of government employees charged with
offenses punishable by removal or suspension, viz: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation;
and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is
suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated. Preventive suspension
pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority
to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way
influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered
within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated.
If after investigation, respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be
reinstated. (CSC v. Alfonso, G.R. No. 179452, June 11, 2009).
ELECTION LAWS
COMELEC
Candidate’s qualification.
Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for the Office of Mayor of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.
On 15 June 2007, Japzon filed a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Ty’s Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. He averred that Ty was a former natural-
born Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar. Ty eventually migrated to the United States and became a citizen thereof. Ty had been
residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March
2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or
immigrant of any foreign country. While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship, he never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as required under Section 39 of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. In fact, even after
filing his application for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the
USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007. Moreover,
although Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philipines, he continued to
comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to
renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws. Hence, Japzon prayed for in his
Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from running for public office and the
cancellation of the latter’s Certification of Candidacy.
However, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign

Citizenship. Given the aforementioned facts, Ty argued that he had reacquired his Philippine
27


citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, and he had been a resident of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Same, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections.
Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzon’s Petition.
Japzon asserted that Ty did not meet the one-year residency requirement for running as a
mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections. The one-year residency requirement for
those running for public office cannot be waived or liberally applied in favor of dual citizens.
Consequently, Japzon believed he was the only remaining candidate for the Office of Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, and is the only placer in the 14 May 2007 local
elections. Is his contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. Ty has complied with the requirement of express renunciation of foreign citizenship
when he executed a document of renunciation on March 19, 2007.
For a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
That Ty complied with the second requirement is beyond question. On 19 March 2007, he
personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping
solely his Philippine citizenship. (Manuel Japzon v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No., 180088, January 19,
2009).
Q – How should domicile be understood? Explain.
Answer: The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to
“dwelling” or “habituation”, but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a
party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).” (Japzon vs.
COMELEC, supra.).
Q – How is domicile of origin acquired? Explain.
Answer: A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the
child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile
(domicile of choice). In Coquilla vs. COMELEC, 438 Phil. 861 (2002), the Court already
acknowledged that for an individual to acquire American citizenship, he must establish residence in
the USA. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, then he must
have necessarily abandoned the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, as
his domicile of origin; and transferred to the USA, as his domicile of choice. (Japzon vs. COMELEC).
Q – State the effect of Ty’s reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on his residence/domicile? Explain.
Answer: Ty’s reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic
impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did
not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of
his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it
shall not retroact to the time of his birth. (Japzon vs. COMELEC).
28


Q – How then could it be established that Ty indeed established a new domicile in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines?
Answer: It is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the residency qualification requirement.
Ty’s intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines, became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine
citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that
his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax
jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and
securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his address as A. Mabini St., Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a
voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
In addition, Ty has also been bodily present in the Municipality General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines, since his arrival on 4 May 2006, inarguably, just a little over a year prior to the
14 May 2007 local elections. The fact that Ty did not come back to the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, after said trips, is a further manifestation of his animus
manendi and animus revertendi.
In Papandayan, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 430 Phil. 754 (2002), the Court provided a
summation of the different principles and concepts in jurisprudence relating to the residency
qualification for elective local officials. Pertinent portions of the ratio in Papandayan are reproduced
below:
Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts in

resolving the issue of whether or not a candidate has complied with the
residency requirement for elective positions. The principle of animus
revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has an
“intention to return” to the place where he seeks to be elected. Corollary
to this is a determination whether there has been an “abandonment” of
his former residence which signifies an intention to depart therefrom. In
Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, this Court set aside the appealed orders of
the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the
respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground
that respondent’s immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted
an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being
a green card holder, which was proof that he was a permanent resident
or immigrant of the United States, and in the absence of any waiver of
his status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988,
respondent was held to be disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,

respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was proclaimed the duly elected representative
of the 2nd District of Northern Samar. The House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upheld his election against claims that he was
not a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar. In sustaining the ruling of the HRET, this Court, citing Faypon
vs. Quirino, applied the concept of animus revertendi or “intent to
return”, stating that his absence from his residence in order to pursue
studies or practice his profession as a certified public accountant in
Manila or his registration as a voter other than in the place where he
29


was elected did not constitute loss of residence. The fact that
respondent made periodical journeys to his home province in Laoag
revealed that he always had animus revertendi.
In Abella vs. COMELEC and Larrazabal vs. COMELEC, it was

explained that the determination of a person’s legal residence or
domicile largely depends upon the intention that may be inferred from
his acts, activities, and utterances. In that case, petitioner Adelina
Larrazabal, who had obtained the highest number of votes in the local
elections of February 1, 1988 and who had thus been proclaimed as the
duly elected governor, was disqualified by the COMELEC for lack of
residence and registration qualifications, not being a resident nor a
registered voter of Kananga, Leyte. The COMELEC ruled that the
attempt of petitioner Larrazabal to change her residence one year
before the election by registering at Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to run
for the position of governor of Ormoc City. This Court affirmed the ruling
of the COMELEC and held that petitioner Larrazabal had established her
residence in Ormoc City, not in Kananga, Leyte, from 1975 up to the
time that she ran for the position of Provincial Governor of Leyte on
February 1, 1988. There was no evidence to show that she and her
husband at Ormoc City. The fact that she occasionally visited Kananga,
Leyte through the years did not signify an intention to continue her
residence after leaving that place.
In Romualdez vs. RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City, the Court held

that “domicile” and “residence” are synonymous. The term “residence,”
as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. “Domicile” denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or
for like reasons, one intends to return. In that case, petitioner Philip G.
Romualdez established his residence during the early 1980’s in
Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. It was held that the sudden departure
from the country of petitioner, because of the EDSA People’s Power
Revolution of 1986, to go into self-exile in the United States until
favorable conditions had been established, was not voluntary so as to
constitute an abandonment of residence. The Court explained that in
order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to
remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There
must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choicec must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary;
and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.
Acquisition of land during period of election;

not banned.
Q – Is the acquisition of a parcel of land by a local government unit for a public cemetery during the
period of the election ban considered as public works in violation of Section 261(u) of the Omnibus
Election Code? Explain.
Answer: No, because land cannot be considered as public works.
30


The Local Government Code of 1991 considers public works to be the fixed infrastructures
and facilities owned and operated by the government for public use and enjoyment. According to the
Code, cities have the responsibility of providing infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service
the needs of their residents and funded out of city funds, such as, among others, roads and bridges;
school buildings and other facilities for public elementary and secondary schools; and clinics, health
centers and other health facilities necessary to carry out health services.
The enumeration in Sec. 1, supra “infrastructure facilities, especially national highways,

flood control and water resources development systems, and other public works in accordance with
national development objectives” means that only the fixed public infrastructures for use of the
public are regarded as public works. This construction conforms to the rule of ejusdem generis.
(Guzman v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 182380, August 28, 2009).
Residence and domicile once again interpreted.
Q – Arsenio Noble was born in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. He claimed to have chosen
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental as his new domicile contending that he has voted there three (3)
times; he is married to Bernadith Go, a resident therein; that he paid his water bills therein and
proved that he is an owner of a property there. He sought to be elected for mayor in Kinoguitan. Is
he qualified? Why?
Answer: No. While voting gives rise to a strong presumption of residence, it is not conclusive
evidence thereof. (Domino v. COMELEC, 369 Phil. 798 (1999).
In Perez v. Commission on Elections, 375 SCRA 1106 (1999) it was held that a person’s
registration as voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. The
registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to
have abandoned or lost his residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954).
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with
conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a
declared and probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode. (Pundaodaya v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 179313, September 17, 2009).
Note:
In this case, the alleged change of domicile was effected solely for the purpose of qualifying
as a candidate in the 2007 elections. This we cannot allow. In Torayno, Sr. v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 137329, August 9, 2000, 337 SCRA 574, it was held that the one-year residency
requirement is aimed at excluding outsiders “from taking advantage of favorable circumstances
existing in that community for electoral gain.” Establishing residence in a community merely to meet
an election law requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of
voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community. (Aquino v. COMELEC, 248
SCRA 400). Noble disqualified from running as municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental.
Application of the principle of idem sonams.
In Cordia v. Monforte, et al., G.R. No. 174620, March 4, 2009, Morales, J, the parties were
candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay 16, Legaspi City in the 2002 Barangay Elections.
Petitioner was proclaimed the winner, hence, an electoral protest was filed by respondent alleging
that the Board of Election Teller failed to credit at least 10 votes for him. The MTCC rendered a
judgment in favor of respondent setting aside the earlier proclamation. The COMELEC affirmed the
ruling on appeal hence, a petition for certiorari was filed with the SC alleging that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the neighborhood rule on the basis alone that his
name was written on the first space or line intended for the position of Kagawad and the principle of
idem sonams when it counted in favor of private respondent the vote “Mantete” appearing in the
31


questioned ballot written not on the line or space for punong barangay but kagawad. Is the petition
proper? Why?
Answer: No, it is bereft of merit. The object of the appreciation of ballots is to ascertain and carry
into effect the intention of the voter, if it can be determined with reasonable certainty. (Juan v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 166639, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 192). When placed in issue, the appreciation
of contested ballots and election documents, which involves a question of fact, is best left to the
determination of the COMELEC. (Juan v. COMELEC).
The COMELEC, in crediting to respondent the vote for “Mantete” in Exhibit “A,” following the
idem sonans rule, did not commit grave abuse discretion.
Petitioner contended that “Mantete” could refer to Pedro Andes, a candidate for kagawad who,
according to him, was fondly called “Pete” or “Mang Pete” in the barangay. There is no proof that
“Mang Pete” is Andes’ registered nickname.
Premature campaigning; its nature.
Q – Rosalinda Penera filed her certificate of candidacy but she was charged with premature
campaigning since there was a motorcade that immediately took place in the locality after the filing
of her certificate of candidacy. No speeches were however made, instead, there was only marching
music in the background and a grandstanding for the purpose of raising the hands of the candidates
in the motorcade. Is she disqualified to run for mayor considering that she conducted premature
campaigning? Explain.
Answer: No, because at the time of the motorcade, she was not yet a candidate. The mere filing of
her certificate of candidacy did not make her a candidate because she can only be considered a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which she filed her certificate of candidacy. (Sec.
13(3), RA 9369). The unlawful acts or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon
the start of the aforesaid campaign period. (Sec. 13). Hence, the election offenses may be
committed by a candidate only upon the start of the campaign period. Before the start of the
campaign period, such election offenses cannot be committed. (Rosalinda Penera v. COMELEC, et
al., G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009 citing Lanot v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164858, November 16,
2006, 507 SCRA 114).
Note:
Rationale for the principle.
It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law.
This is specially true to expression or speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except on very narrow
grounds involving clear, present and imminent danger to the State. The mere fact that the law does
not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for
Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, that political partisan
activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state
that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the campaign period.” The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before
the start of the campaign period, are lawful.
In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for
acts done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election
offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before
the start of the campaign period.
32


Statistical improbability.
Q – When is the doctrine of statistical improbability applicable? Explain.
Answer: The doctrine of statistical improbability is applied only where the unique uniformity of tally
of all the votes cast in favor of all the candidates belonging to one party and the systematic blanking
of all the candidates of all the opposing parties appear in the election return. (Lagumbay v.
COMELEC, 16 SCRA 175 (1966); Sinsuat v. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-31501, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA
630). The doctrine has no application where there is neither uniformity of tallies nor systematic
blanking of the candidates of one party. (Doruelo v. COMELEC, 133 SCRA 376 (1984). Thus, the
bare fact that a candidate for public office received no votes in one or two precincts, standing alone
and without more, cannot adequately support a finding that the subject election returns are
statistically improbable. Verily, a zero vote for a particular candidate in the election returns is but
one strand in the web of circumstantial evidence that the electoral returns were prepared under
duress, force and intimidation. (Velayo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135613, March 9, 2000, 327 SCRA
713; Suhuri v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 181869, October 2, 2009).
Q – How is the doctrine of statistical improbability viewed? Explain.
Answer: The doctrine of statistical improbability must be restrictively viewed, with the utmost care
being taken lest in penalizing fraudulent and corrupt practices – which is truly called for – innocent
voters become disenfranchised, a result that hardly commends itself. (Suhuri v. COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 181869, October 2, 2009).
Q – When as the doctrine first pronounced? Explain.
Answer: The doctrine of statistical improbability was first pronounced in Lagumbay v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. L-25444, January 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 175 in which the Court upheld the power
and duty of the COMELEC to reject the returns of about 50 precincts affecting the elections of
Senators, because their results were “contrary to all statistical probabilities,” thus:
It appearing therein that — contrary to all statistical probabilities — in the first

set, in each precinct the number of registered voters equalled the number of ballots
and the number of votes reportedly cast and tallied for each and every candidate of
the Liberal Party, the party in power; whereas, all the candidates of the Nacionalista
Party got exactly zero; and in the second set, — again contrary to all statistical
probabilities — all the reported votes were for candidates of the Liberal Party, all of
whom were credited with exactly the same number of votes in each precinct, ranging
from 240 in one precinct to 650 in another precinct; whereas, all the candidates of the
Nacionalista Party were given exactly zero in all said precincts.
Lagumbay expounded on the doctrine of statistical improbability and the doctrine’s effect on
the power of the COMELEC to reject the results reflected in the election returns when such returns
showed prima facie that they did not reflect the true and valid reports of regular voting, thus:
The Court opined that the election result in said precincts as reported was
utterly improbable and clearly incredible. For it is not likely, in the ordinary course of
things, that all the electors of one precinct would, as one man, vote for all the eight
candidates of the Liberal Party, without giving a single vote to one of the eight
candidates of the Nacionalista Party. Such extraordinary coincidence was quite
impossible to believe, knowing that the Nacionalista Party had and has a nationwide
organization, with branches in every province, and was, in previous years, the party
in power in these islands. (Suhuri v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 181869, October 2,
2009).
33


COMELEC
Q – Section 43 of RA 9369 was questioned as unconstitutional since it is violative of Section 2(6),

Article IX-C of the Constitution which vests in the COMELEC the exclusive power to investigate and
prosecute cases of violation of the election laws. It was contended that since it gives other
prosecuting arms of the government the concurrent power with the COMELEC to investigate and
prosecute election cases, it is unconstitutional. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to
“investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.” The phrase “where appropriate”
leaves to the legislature the power to determine the kind of election offenses that the COMELEC shall
prosecute exclusively or concurrently with other prosecuting arms of the government.
The grant of the “exclusive power” to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the
COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a legislative enactment. If the
intention of the framers of the Constitution were to give the COMELEC the “exclusive power” to
investigate and prosecute election offenses, the framers would have expressly so stated in the
Constitution. They did not. (Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009).
ELECTION
Proclaimed candidate was the

loser; remedy is to annul
proclamation.
Q – Records show that petitioner was declared the 12th winning candidate based on SOVPs
containing mathematical and clerical errors. The total number of votes in the SOVPs of the identified
precincts are markedly different from the votes tabulated in their respective ERs, i.e., petitioner was
given additional votes, while private respondent’s votes were reduced, which altered the outcome of
the election. Petitioner was declared the last winning candidate for the position of Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Tuguegarao City, instead of private respondent. A petition for correction of manifest
error and annulment of the proclamation was filed. It was contended that protest is the appropriate
remedy. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: As a rule, the remedy of the losing party is an election protest after his opponent has
already been proclaimed as winning candidate, but such recourse is on the assumption, however,
that there has been a valid proclamation. Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is
no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the
COMELEC of the power to declare such nullity and annul the proclamation. (Torres v. COMELEC, 337
Phil. 270 (1997); Duremdes v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 86362-63, October 27, 1989, 178 SCRA 746
and Aguam v. COMELEC, 132 Phil. 353 (1968).
In this case, it is very clear that the proclaimed candidate was the loser, hence, the petition
to amend and annul was proper. (Taguiam v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 184801, July 30, 2009).
EMINENT DOMAIN
Nature of determination of just

compensation.
In LBP v. J.L. Jocson & Sons, G.R. No. 180803, October 23, 2009, Morales, J, the SC once
again had the occasion to say that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases
is a judicial function.
34


In the recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Chico, G.R. No. 168543, March 13,
2009, the Court declared in no uncertain terms that R.A. No. 6657 is the relevant law for
determining just compensation after noting several decided cases where the Court found it more
equitable to determine just compensation based on the value of the property at the time of
payment. This was a clear departure from the Court’s earlier stance in Gabatin v. Land Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 148223, November 24, 2004, 444 SCRA 176, where it declared that the
reckoning period for the determination of just compensation is the time when the land was taken
applying P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228.
P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 vis a vis R.A. No. 6657 was applied to cases involving lands placed
under the coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 where payment of just compensation had not been
completed. When in the interim R.A. No. 6657 was passed before the full payment of just
compensation, as in the case at bar, the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 on just compensation control.
Discussing the retroactive application of the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 for lands yet to be
paid by the government although expropriated under P.D. No. 27, the Court in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Estanislao, 527 SCRA 181 (2007) ratiocinated:
“Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is
still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be
settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) before the
completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the
process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD
27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in Paris v.
Alfeche.”
“It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the

guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR's failure to determine
the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation
should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is
especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent
being real, substantial, full and ample.”
Retroactivity of RA 6657; enacted

to promote social justice.
Q – If a property was originally covered by PD27 but the compensation has not yet been paid when
RA 6657 was enacted, what is the basis of just compensation? Explain.
Answer: The basis would be RA 6657. Under the law, in determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of the like properties, its nature, actual use and income,
the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessments made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation.
The reason is that, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or R.A. No. 6657 was
enacted to promote special justice to the landless farmers and provide “a more equitable distribution
and ownership of land with due regard to the rights of landowners to just compensation and to the
ecological needs of the nation.” (LBP v. Heirs of Angee T. Domingo, G.R. No. 168533, February 4,
2008, 543 SCRA 627; LBP v. Heirs of Honorato de Leon, G.R. No. 164025, May 8, 2009; DAR v.
Tongson, G.R. No. 171674, August 4, 2009).
35


Easement of right of way; eminent domain.
Once again, the SC in NPC v. Villamor, G.R. No. 160080, June 19, 2009 had the occasion to
say that easement of right of way falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. In
installing the 230 KV Talisay-Compostela transmission lines which traversed respondent’s lands, a
permanent limitation is imposed by petitioner against the use of the lands for an indefinite period.
This deprived respondent of the normal use of the lands. In fact, not only are the affected areas of
the lands traversed by petitioner’s transmission lines but a portion is used as the site of its
transmission tower. Because of the danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath the high-
tension live wires, the landowner will not be able to use the lands for farming or any agricultural
purposes. Hence, the owner has the right to be paid the full value of his property.
Along the same vein, in Rep. v. Sps. Ruperto Libunao, et al., G.R. No. 166553, July 30, 2009,
it was said that reliance on Section 3-A of R.A. 6395, as amended, is misplaced. While Section 3-A
of R.A. 6395 indeed states that only 10% of the market value of the property is due to the owner of
the property subject to an easement of right-of-way, said rule is not binding on the Court. It has
been reiterated that the determination of “just compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function. Any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding
principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s
own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.
The owners are entitled to the payment of legal interest on the compensation for the subject
lands from the time of the taking of their possession up to the time that full payment is made by
petitioner. In accordance with jurisprudence, the legal interest allowed in payment of just
compensation for lands expropriated for public use is six percent (6%) per annum.
Requirements before there can be immediate

entry into property being expropriated.
Q – RA No. 8874 otherwise known as An Act to Facilitate Site or Location for National Government
Infrastructure Project and for Other Purposes provides for guidelines for expropriation proceedings.
To attain the objective of the government to facilitate infrastructure projects, what are the
requirements for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings involving real property?
Answer: The requirements for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings involving
real property are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; (2)
due notice to the defendant; (3) payment of an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the
property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR including payment of the value of
the improvements and/or structures if any, or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost
urgency, the payment of the proffered value of the property to be seized; and (4) presentation to
the court of a certificate of availability of funds from the proper officials.
Upon compliance with the requirements, a complainant in an expropriation case is entitled to

a writ of possession as a matter of right, and it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to
forthwith issue the writ of possession. No hearing is required, and the court exercises neither its
discretion nor its judgment in determining the amount of the provisional value of the properties to
be expropriated, as the legislature has fixed the amount under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974.
(Rep. v. Far East Ent. Inc., et al., G.R. No. 176487, August 25, 2009 citing Capitol Steel Corp. v.
PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority, G.R. No. 169453, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 590).
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
LGU has the power to reclassify lands.
Q – Are the courts the proper venue in which to resolve any despite involving the classification of
lands? Explain.
36


Answer: No. It is well-settled that a local government has the power to reclassify and convert lands
through local ordinance, especially if said ordinance is approved by the HLURB. (Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation v. Amante, G.R. Nos. 112526 and 118838, 453 SCRA 432, 459). In
Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court Appeals, 473 Phil. 64 (2004) the local
government units have the power to adopt zoning ordinances. Discretion is vested in the
appropriate government agencies to determine the suitability of a land for residential, commercial,
industrial or other purposes. It is also a settled rule that an ordinance enjoys the presumption of
validity. Having the power to classify lands, the local government unit may consider factors that are
just, reasonable and legal, for it is within the local government unit’s power to determine these.
However, if they abuse their authority in the performance of this duty, the courts, if prompted, can
step in. (Rep v. Far East Ent. Inc., et al., G.R. No. 176487, August 25, 2009).
Q – What are the double purposes of the requirement of payment of 100% of the value of the
property sought to be taken under RA 8974? Explain.
Answer: As the preliminary or provisional determination of the value of the property equivalent to
100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR, said
amount serves a double purpose of pre-payment if the property is fully expropriated, and of
indemnity for damages if the proceedings are dismissed. Said provisional value must be paid to the
owner of the land before a writ of possession may be issued. The issuance of a certificate of
availability of funds will not suffice for the purpose of issuance of a writ of possession. (Rep v. Far
East Ent. Inc., et al., G.R. No. 176487, August 25, 2009).
ELECTION / LGU
3-term limit.
Q – Marino Morales was elected Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga in 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007
local elections. He was, however disqualified in the 2004 elections because of the 3-term limit. While
his proclamation in the 1998-2001 election was declared void, it was done after serving the term or
on July 4, 2001. On May 7, 2007, the SC promulgated a decision disqualifying him. He vacated the
position, the next day, the Vice-Mayor assumed office from May 17, 2007 to June 30, 2007. It was
contended that he was not qualified to run in the 2007 local elections, otherwise, he would be
serving a 5th term. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. It is true that he occupied the position of mayor of the following periods: 1995-1998;
1998-2001; 2001-2004; 2004-2007 but because of his disqualification he was not duly elected
mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the
full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was
ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales’ occupancy of the position of
mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of
computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a
gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is
effectively Morales’ first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. (Dizon v. COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009).
Q – It was alleged that Morales “was able to serve his fourth term as mayor through lengthy
litigations. x x x In other words, he was violating the rule on three-term limit with impunity by the
sheer length of litigation and profit from it even more by raising the technicalities arising therefrom.”
Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner
and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years and resultantly extended the
petitioner’s incumbency in an office to which he was not lawfully elected. We note that such delay
cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due
to any political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez,
37


was not without legal recourse to move for the early resolution of the election protest while it was
pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion for the execution of the regional trial
court’s decision declaring the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume office
while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not here shown to have been
intentionally sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar his
right to be elected and to serve his chosen local government post in the succeeding mayoral
election. (Dizon v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009).
Q – What is the effect of the disqualification of Morales in the 2004 elections? Explain.
Answer: He cannot be considered a candidate at all. The votes cast for him were considered as stray
votes.
Q – What are the tests in determining whether a candidate is disqualified because of the 3-term
limit? Explain.
Answer: For purposes of determining the resulting disqualification brought about by the three-term
limit, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times. (Borja,
Jr. v. COMELEC, 356 Phil. 467 (1998). There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the
application of the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. (Dizon v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009 citing Lonzanida
v. COMELEC, 370 Phil. 625 (1999)).
Q – He was disqualified in the 2004-2007 term. State the effect of such disqualification where he
was unseated. Explain.
Answer: It can be considered as involuntary severance from office.

Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The decision in the Rivera case unseating him
was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the
vice mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May
2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter
how short it may seem interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office
for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. (Dizon v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 182088,
January 30, 2009).
TAX
Tax exemption is construed strictly.
In Davao Oriental Electric Cooperative Inc. v. The Province of Davao Oriental, G.R. No.
170901, January 20, 2009, the SC once again said that because taxes are the lifeblood of the
nation, the court has always applied the doctrine of strict interpretation in construing tax
exemptions. A claim for exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and be based on
language in the law too plain to be mistaken. Elsewise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption
therefrom is the exception. (Paseo Realty & Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 119286, October 13, 2004, 440 SCRA 235).
3-TERM LIMIT
Q – Nicasio Bolos ran for Punong Barangay in Dauis, Bohol in the 1994, 1997 and 2002 barangay
elections and won.
38


Petitioner contended that he is qualified to run for the position of Punong Barangay in the
October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections since he did not serve continuously
three consecutive terms. He admitted that in the 1994, 1997 and 2002 Barangay elections, while
serving his third term as Punong Barangay, he ran as Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol, and won.
On July 1, 2004, he assumed office and, consequently, left his post as Punong Barangay by
operation of law. He averred that he served the full term as member of the Sangguniang Bayan until
June 30, 2007. On October 29, 2007, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Punong Barangay and
won. The COMELEC issued an order disqualifying him as a candidate for Punong Barangay since he
did not complete his third term by operation of law. Is his contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
David v. Commission on Elections, 271 SCRA 90 (1997) elucidates that the Constitution did
not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials, thereby leaving
to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service.
The discussions in the Constitutional Commission showed that the term of office of barangay
officials would be “[a]s may be determined by law,” and more precisely, “[a]s provided for in the
Local Government Code.” Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code provides that barangay
officials are covered by the three-term limit, while Section 43(c) thereof states that the term of
office of barangay officials shall be five (5) years. The cited provisions read, thus:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. – xxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which the elective official concerned was elected.
Socrates v. Commission on Elections, 391 SCRA 457 (2002) held that the rule on the three-
term limit, embodied in the Constitution and the Local Government Code, has two parts:
x x x The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve
for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive
terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that
voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the
continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for
any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and
after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or
consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election
for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term.
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, 311 SCRA 602 (1999) the Court stated that the
second part of the rule on the three-term limit shows the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of
office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of
a term. The Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same government
post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
39


It is undisputed that petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms,
satisfying the first condition for disqualification.
Indeed, petitioner was serving his third term as Punong Barangay when he ran for
Sangguniang Bayan member and, upon winning, assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan
member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as Punong Barangay which the Court deems as a
voluntary renunciation of said office.
Q – Petitioner argued that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, he left
his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, he did not fully serve his third term as
Punong Barangay. Is his contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. The term “operation of law” is defined by the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia as “a term
describing the fact that rights may be acquired or lost by the effect of a legal rule without any act of
the person affected.” Black's Law Dictionary also defines it as a term that “expresses the manner in
which rights, and sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a person by the mere application to the
particular transaction of the established rules of law, without the act or cooperation of the party
himself.”
An interruption in the service of a term of office, by operation of law, is exemplified in

Montebon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180444, April 9, 2008, 551 SCRA 50). The
respondent therein, Sesinando F. Potencioso, Jr., was elected and served three consecutive terms
as Municipal Councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. However,
during his second term, he succeeded as Vice-Mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of the Vice-
Mayor pursuant to Section 44 of R.A. No. 7160. Potencioso’s assumption of office as Vice-Mayor was
considered an involuntary severance from his office as Municipal Councilor, resulting in an
interruption in his second term of service. The Court held that it could not be deemed to have been
by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law. Hence, Potencioso was
qualified to run as candidate for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu in the May
14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. (See also: Borja v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157
(1998).
In this case, petitioner did not fill in or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He instead
relinquished his office as Punong Barangay during his third term when he won and assumed office as
Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office
of Punong Barangay.
ELECTION LAW
Cayat principle not applied.
Q – Nardo Velasco, a Filipino citizen acquired American citizenship. Later on he became a dual
citizen. He applied for registration as a voter but his application was denied, hence, he filed his
petition for inclusion as voter with the MTC which granted the petition. The RTC on appeal reversed
the order, hence, he appealed to the CA but the latter dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
In the meantime, he filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor, hence, Panlaqui filed a petition to
deny due course to and/or cancel his COC based on gross misrepresentation as to his residency,
hence, disqualified to vote. He won in the elections and took his oath. Finding material
misrepresentations, the COMELEC nullified his proclamation hence, Panlaqui moved for proclamation
but the COMELEC denied the motion, applying the rule on succession, hence, Panlaqui filed a petition
for certiorari with the SC imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for not
regarding the RTC decision disqualifying Velasco as a voter as a final judgment so as to fall under
the Cayat principle as an exception to the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer. Is the
contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. Since the disqualification of Velasco had not yet become final and executory before the
40


elections, the COMELEC properly applied the rule on succession. Cayat v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
163776, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23 does not apply because Cayat was disqualified in a final and
executory judgment before the elections. As the only candidate Palileng, who numerically lost in the
elections, he was not a second placer. On the contrary, Palileng was the sole and only placer, second
to none. The doctrine in the rejection of the second placer which triggers the rule on succession does
not apply. (Panlaqui vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 188671, February 24, 2010).
Q – What are the specific requirements for the application of the doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer?
Answer: The doctrine will apply if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification
remained pending on election day, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates; and (2)
the decision on Cayat’s disqualification became final only after the elections. (Panlaqui v. COMELEC,
et al., G.R. No. 188671, February 24, 2010, Morales, J).
Q – What is the rationale behind the rejection of the second placer? Explain.
Answer: To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would
be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second
placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could
not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the
disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under such circumstances.
To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his
rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise them through no fault on their part, and to undermine
the importance and the meaning of democracy and the right of the people to elect officials of their
choice.
Theoretically, the second placer could receive just one vote. In such a case, it would be
absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters’ choice. (Panlaqui v. COMELEC, et
al., G.R. No. 188671, February 24, 2010, citing Kare v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157526, April 28, 2004,
428 SCRA 264, Morales, J).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Exhaustion of administrative
remedy; importance; effect if not
resorted to.
Once more, the SC in Ongsuco, et al. v. Hon. Mariano Malones, G.R. No. 182065, October 27,
2009, had the occasion to rule that it is true that the general rule is that before a party is allowed to
seek intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted
first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of
the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser
expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of
justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. However, there are
several exceptions to this rule.
41


The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from
arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue raised is a
purely legal question, well within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not the
administrative agency, would clearly constitute an exception. Resolving questions of law, which
involve the interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial
power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such lower courts the Legislature may
establish.
In this case, the sole issue petitioners raised before was whether Municipal Ordinance No. 98-
01 was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to its enactment, of a public hearing held in
accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government
Code. This is undoubtedly a pure question of law, within the competence and jurisdiction of the RTC
to resolve.
Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly establishes the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly recognizes the original jurisdiction of lower courts
over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance.
In J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 113 Phil. 673 (1968) Ynot v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 232 Phil. 615 (1987) and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, 343 Phil 441
(1997) the Court has affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve questions of constitutionality and
validity of laws (deemed to include local ordinances) in the first instance, without deciding questions
which pertain to legislative policy.
42


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Survey of 2009-2010 SC Decisions

Essence of due process in

Aspects of right to security of tenure.

Deemed resigned provision is not

Q – On December 1, 2009, the SC rendered a judgment ruling as unconstitutional the third

Intent of the Constitution and the

Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66

Exception to prohibition is the right to vote.

Equal protection clause; not

Substantial distinctions between

Classification Germane to the

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

Deemed resigned provision serves

Filing of certificate of candidacy is engaging in

No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly

No member of the military shall engage, directly or indirectly, in

The term “election campaign” or “partisan political activity”

particular candidate or candidates to a public office x x x.” (Quinto, et

SEARCH & SEIZURE

Obscene language is an unprotected speech.

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling.

Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung

1. It violated the equal protection clause;

3. It violated the freedom of speech cluse.

(1) On the first issue; equal protection clause.

(2) On the second issue; freedom of religion.

Answer: The argument has no merit.

(3) On the third issue; freedom of speech.

restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or

Content based and content neutral regulation.

Q – Is there a distinction between regulation or restriction of protected speech that is content-based

Q – Why is the suspension by the MTRCB a permissible restriction? Explain.

In enunciating standard premised on a judicial balancing of the conflicting

Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured by

Broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read.

It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned, a less

Suspension is not prior restraint but a

Reason why television broadcasts

Right to be informed of the nature

Impairment of contract clause.

177508, August 7, 2009).

IMMUNITY OF STATE FROM SUIT

Held: Yes, because TESDA is an instrumentality of the government undertaking governmental

TESDA, as an agency of the State,

Effect of TESDA’s Contract.

The fact a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in

TESDA’s funds are public in

This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made

Investigation in aid of legislation;

The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or

A succinctly stated in Arnault vs. Nazareno:

Power to issue subpoena; no

Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized that “this

Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of

HRET has the sole power to

the 1935 Constitution has been described as ‘intended to be as complete and

Party List representative; effect of

The 2% threshold should be striken down as unconstitutional only in relation to the

Two steps in second round of allocation of seats.

Q – State the nature of the 20% allocation of party-list representatives. Explain.

RA 9369 does not violate Section