Jep 20 2 49

Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 20, Number 2—Spring 2006 —Pages 49 –72
Religion and Economy
Rachel M. McCleary and Robert J. Barro
R eligion has a two-way interaction with political economy. With religion

viewed as a dependent variable, a central question is how economic
development and political institutions affect religious participation and
beliefs. With religion viewed as an independent variable, a key issue is how religi-
osity affects individual characteristics, such as work ethic, honesty and thrift, and
thereby influences economic performance. In this paper, we sketch previous stud-
ies of this two-way interaction but focus on our ongoing quantitative research with
international data.
Religion as a Dependent Variable
Theories of religion as a dependent variable break down into demand-side and

supply-side models, though economists instinctively combine the two approaches.
An influential demand-side analysis is the secularization model. In this model,
economic development reduces individual participation in formal religious services
and personal prayer, decreases religious beliefs, and diminishes the influence of
organized religion on politics and governance. This argument has roots in the
sermon on “The Use of Money” by the founder of Methodism, John Wesley (1760).
A fuller version of the secularization hypothesis is in Max Weber’s (1905 [1930])
classic work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, and the idea was
extended by Berger (1967) and Wilson (1966). Extreme views on secularization are
in Hume (1757 [1993]) and Freud (1927), who viewed religious beliefs as mainly
reflections of fear and ignorance. Thus, they predicted that religion would decline
y Rachel M. McCleary is Director, Project on Religion, Political Economy, and Society,

Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, and Robert J. Barro is Paul M. Warburg
Professor of Economics, both at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Their e-mail
addresses are 具mccleary@cfia.harvard.edu典 and 具rbarro@harvard.edu典.
50 Journal of Economic Perspectives
in response to advances in education and science and to movements away from the
vicissitudes of agriculture and toward the greater economic security of advanced,
urbanized economies. In Marx’s (1859 [1913]) analysis, the decline of religion is
one manifestation of a broader trend toward “modernization.”
Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) pioneered the application of the rational-choice
approach to the demand for religion. A key feature is a link between religiosity and
the probability of salvation. As we discuss later, this link might reflect perceived
effects of religious participation and beliefs—more broadly, “good works”— on the
chance of being saved. Alternatively, the sixteenth century preacher John Calvin
(1585, pp. 237–239) emphasized predestination but thought that economic success
and religious faith provided signals that a person had been chosen for salvation.
Azzi and Ehrenberg weigh the benefits from religiousness against the time and
other costs of greater participation. Since they view religious participation as a
time-intensive activity, they predict— consistent with the secularization view—that
an increase in real wage rates reduces religious participation. Their model implies
that time devoted to formal religious services and personal prayer will be high
among persons with low value of time—such as women not in the labor force and
retired persons. In addition, older people will spend more time on religion if the
probability of salvation depends on cumulated religious activities over one’s life.
This force is even stronger if actions taken late in life count the most for
salvation—as is true when past sins can be eradicated through the Catholic con-
fession or other mechanisms for redemption.1
The religion market model, developed by Finke and Stark (1992), Finke and
Iannaccone (1993), Iannaccone and Stark (1994) and Iannaccone (1991), focuses
on supply-side factors. Following Adam Smith (1791), this literature argues that
government regulation and subsidy influence competition among religion provid-
ers and thereby affect the nature of the religion product. When governments
impose state religions and limit entry, the quality and variety of services are
predicted to suffer. In response, people participate less in formal religion, although
the effects on religious beliefs may be minor. Thus, as in Davie’s (1994) analysis of
modern Britain, societies can have low attendance at formal religious services while still
maintaining high religious beliefs— believing may be high relative to belonging.
The United States is an example of a country with a free religion market and
a great variety of religious offerings. In this pluralistic setting, remarked on by
Tocqueville (1835), competition generates religion “products” that are high in
quality and well-aligned with individual preferences about degrees of strictness and
other characteristics. Hence, participation in formal religious services—and per-
haps also levels of religious belief—tend to be high.
Religion as an Independent Variable

Weber’s (1905 [1930]) main analysis in The Protestant Ethic viewed religiosity as
an independent variable that could influence economic outcomes. Religious beliefs
1
See Arruñada (2004) for a discussion of the demand for confession.
Rachel M. McCleary and Robert J. Barro 51
affect the economy by fostering traits such as work ethic, honesty (and hence trust),
thrift, charity, hospitality to strangers and so on. By enhancing these traits, greater
religiosity could spur investment and economic growth. Wesley’s (1760) views, cited
by Weber, are similar in some respects. Wesley famously urged his congregants to
“gain all you can, save all you can, give all you can.” However, he regretted that he
had been more successful in promoting the first two tenets than the third. But the
first two—akin to Weber’s work ethic and thrift—are probably more important
than charity as underpinnings of a productive economy. Wesley also regretted that,
as his congregants became richer, they became less devout—thus giving an early
empirical expression of the secularization hypothesis.
A key point about religion in the Weberian framework is that religious beliefs
are what matter for economic outcomes. This approach contrasts with a social-
capital/cultural perspective, in which the networking associated with attendance at
formal religious services could be what promotes growth. This alternative perspec-
tive trivializes religion by viewing participation in formal religion as just one of
many ways to build social capital or to form a communal culture. For Weber, houses
of worship were not merely forms of social clubs. The special feature of religion is
its potential influence on beliefs that reinforce particular traits and values.
We take the position that religion is sui generis. Otherworldly compensators
like salvation, damnation and nirvana are great motivators of behavior in this world.
Thus, beliefs in these compensators can raise productivity by fostering individual
traits such as honesty, work ethic and thrift. In other contexts, the powerful force
from afterlife beliefs can promote anti-social actions, such as violence—the so-
called “dark side of religion.” In either context, the social capital and cultural
aspects of religion— communal services, rituals, religious schools—are significant
only to the extent that they influence beliefs and, hence, behavior. In fact, for given
beliefs, more time spent on communal activities would tend to be an economic
drag, at least as measured by market output (GDP). Moreover, the costs of formal
religion include not only the time of congregants and religious officials but also the
resources expended on buildings, precious objects and so on. Our general view is
that believing relative to belonging (or attending) is the main channel through
which religion matters for economic and other outcomes.
Salvation and Economic Incentives in the World Religions
Beliefs about salvation in the major world religions—Hinduism, Buddhism, Chris-

tianity and Islam—provide different economic incentives. A key concept is “salvific
merit,” which connects the perceived probability of salvation to a person’s lifetime
activities. In some religions, salvific merit can be earned in this life to enhance the
chances for a better outcome in the next life. Calvinist Protestantism has low or no
salvific merit, because an individual is viewed as predestined to be saved or not.
Therefore, individual action has no impact on the probability of salvation. At the other
end, Buddhism has high salvific merit, in the sense that following a designated path of
lifetime behavior leads with a great deal of assurance to salvation in the sense of enlight-
enment and knowledge. Catholicism, Hinduism, and Islam have medium salvific merit, in
that individuals have some but not necessarily decisive influence on salvation.
Each of the major religions has some mechanism for promoting work effort and
wealth accumulation, which contribute to economic success.2 However, the incentive
to acquire and accumulate property is limited in Buddhism, because the sharing of
wealth tends to be stressed. One reason for this emphasis is to ensure the survival of the
community. By spiritually rewarding networks of mutual aid and charitable acts,
religion lowers the uncertainties of daily life. That is, charity is a form of communal
insurance, which can be efficient if the society has a lot of uncertainty, such as that
associated with agriculture. Private charity supported by religion would be particularly
useful if the society lacks formal structures, such as insurance markets and government
welfare programs, to deal with individual uncertainties (Gill and Lundsgaarde, 2004;
Scheve and Stasavage, 2005). Buddhism also helps to ensure its own survival by linking
salvific merit to particular acts— giving financial aid to the religious class, praying
communally, and constructing religious edifices.
Although Hinduism and Buddhism do not have heaven and hell in the
Judeo-Christian sense, the believers who perform their obligations are effectively
reincarnated into heavenly intermediate stages. Those who fail to perform their
obligations are reincarnated into intermediate, transitory stages of purgatory.
Performing more than is required can also help a person move into a higher stage
of heaven by earning salvific merit and can shorten a person’s stay in purgatory
(Keyes, 1983, p. 267; Conze, 1963, p. 41). Reincarnation is a process that enables a
person to get rid of bad karma and move toward a higher state of perfection or
enlightenment. In short, Hinduism and Buddhism are belief systems about how to
attain perfection, which can be interpreted as a form of salvation.
At the other end, Calvinist Protestantism, with its emphasis on predestination,
seems at first glance to be weak on economic incentives. After all, according to
Calvin (1585, pp. 237–239), a person is either one of the elect or not, and no good
works or other worldly acts can do anything about it. However, the uncertainty
about salvation is also stressed, as is the motivation to gain some kind of sign that
one has been chosen. The Reformed churches, which closely follow Calvin’s
theology, stress outward or social signs of salvation. Human industry and thrift that
result in material success are the clearest possible signals that God has chosen the
person as one of the elect who will be saved (Calvin, 1584, pp. 194 –196). Economic
success is therefore highly valued, but charitable acts are downplayed, if not
condemned, as going against God’s will—for example, by promoting idleness.
Assurance of salvation is also important in Pietism (including forms of Meth-
odism, Lutheranism and Quakers) and Pentecostalism. However, these religions
posit an inward or personal assurance. In Pietism, the doctrine of perfection, or
continuing to mature in faith after receiving salvific assurance, interprets good
works as a spiritual sign and part of the process of perfecting one’s faith. Such
2
For a detailed discussion of the relationship between religious beliefs and economic incentives, see
McCleary (2006).
Religion and Economy 53
personal assurance motivates believers to continue to become more perfect in their

relationship to God. This motivation promotes continued hard work.
Islam and Catholicism interpret hell as having transitory levels with an ultimate
permanent state. Heaven, like hell, has provisional states but is ultimately a per-
manent situation. Those who end up in hell do so as a result of their own volition
and not as the result of a vengeful God. There are levels of hell, where individuals
who have the possibility of being saved yet have committed serious moral wrongs,
will temporarily suffer until an intermediary (angel, prophet, another believer)
intercedes on the person’s behalf.
Our analysis of international survey data, discussed in the next section, shows
that beliefs in some version of hell and an afterlife are highest among Muslims and
“other Christians,” a group that includes many Evangelicals. Next highest is Cath-
olic and Orthodox, followed by Jews and then mainline Protestants and Hindus,
who tend not to identify with Judeo-Christian concepts of heaven and hell. (We lack
sufficient data on Buddhists to separate the effects of Buddhism from those of other
Eastern religions.)
A possible explanation for some of these findings is that Christianity, particu-
larly mainline Protestantism, places emphasis on individual responsibility for reli-
gious obligations. In contrast, Islam is legalistic, stressing the fulfillment of laws that
are communally enforced. The laxness of communal enforcement of religious
beliefs in mainline Protestantism creates an individualistic approach to religious
living, a focus on the inward, personal relationship with God. The legalistic aspect
of Islam creates communal enforcement of religiosity. Therefore, in Islam, beliefs
in heaven and hell are reinforced through a shared understanding of life-after-
death. Evangelical Protestantism may be similar in this respect, with Catholicism at
an intermediate position.
Christianity posits the survival of the soul after death, while Islam posits a physical
as well as spiritual survival. The Koran gives graphic and explicit details of physical
sufferings in the fires of hell and sensual pleasures in paradise. The New Testament also
pictures hell as fire but, overall, provides little detail about hell or heaven. In Islam,
physical survival after death coupled with the Koran’s description of what after-death
survival will be like makes heaven and hell quite real for the believer.
Quantitative Analysis of International Data on Religion and

Political Economy
Our quantitative, cross-country research, applied previously in Barro and

McCleary (2003, 2005a), uses modern data to test the various theories of religion as
a dependent and independent variable. We want to understand how religious
participation and beliefs respond to economic development and to government
influences on the religion market. We seek, in turn, to see how differing degrees of
religiosity and different religion types matter for economic growth and other
economic and political variables.
To relate our research program to Max Weber’s, we note two conflicting
assessments that we have received. One is that, if Weber were alive today and had
access to modern data and statistical tools, he would be carrying out the type of
cross-country empirical work that we have been pursuing. The other is that Weber
thought that religion—notably the contrast between Protestantism and Catholi-
cism—was important for economic development only at a particular stage of history
involving the assimilation of workers into the factory system. He thought that the
religious underpinnings of individual productivity were replaced later by secular insti-
tutions and, hence, that differences in religion no longer mattered much for economic
outcomes at that stage. Thus, Weber did not view religious differences as central in
nineteenth century Europe, and he presumably would not have expected to find
important economic effects of religion in the twentieth century. In this view, Weber
would not find so interesting our quantitative work on modern international data.
International Data on Religiosity

Our empirical research began with a previously constructed broad cross-
country data set. The data include national-accounts variables and an array of other
economic, political, and social indicators. Principal sources of data are Heston,
Summers, and Aten (2002), the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2005),
Barro and Lee (2001), Freedom House (at ⬍http://freedomhouse.org⬎), and the
International Country Risk Guide.
We have expanded the data set to include measures of religiosity. The most useful
sources of international data on participation in formal religious services and personal
prayer and on religious beliefs are seven cross-country surveys carried out from 1981 to
2003. The four waves of the World Values Survey (WVS) are for 1981– 84 (henceforth
called 1981), 1990 –93 (called 1990), 1995–97 (called 1995), and 1999 –2003 (called
2000). There are also two reports on religion from the International Social Survey
Program (ISSP): 1990 –93 (called 1991) and 1998 –2000 (called 1998). Finally, we have
the Gallup Millennium Survey (1999). In this paper, we use the individual data—which
typically contains 1000 to 2000 participants in each (more or less) representative
national survey— only to form country averages of data. This perspective accords with
our focus on country-wide aspects of religion, notably the links among religiosity,
economic growth, and government policies and institutions.
We used Barrett’s (1982, 2001) World Christian Encyclopedia— henceforth, re-
ferred to as Barrett—to gauge religion adherence in 1970 and 2000. (Despite the
term “Christian,” the encyclopedia covers all the world’s religions.) The underlying
data come from censuses and surveys in which people are asked to state the
religion, if any, to which they adhere. We grouped adherence into eleven catego-
ries: Catholic; Protestant (including Anglican); other Christian (in Barrett’s termi-
nology encompassing independent Christian churches, unaffiliated Christians, and
“marginal Christians,” such as Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses); Orthodox;
Muslim3; Hindu (including Jains and Sikhs); Buddhist (including Shinto for
3
We have a rough breakdown from other sources into Sunni, Shiite, and other types but do not use this
breakdown in the present analysis. For a discussion in the context of state religions, see Barro and
McCleary (2005b). That research found that overall Muslim adherence, not the breakdown by type,
Japan); other Eastern religions; Jewish; other religions; and non-religion (including
atheists). These data allow us to construct a measure of religious pluralism, calcu-
lated as one minus the Herfindahl index (sum of squares of adherence shares)
among persons who adhere to some religion. This measure gives the probability
that two persons selected randomly among persons who adhere to some religion
belong to different religions. If everyone belonged to the same religion, the
pluralism index would be zero. If everyone belonged to a different religion (so that
the number of religions equaled the population), the index would equal one.
For assessing the direct impact of government on religion, we use two dummy
variables: one for the existence of an official state religion and another for state
regulation of the religion market. For state religion, we took an all-or-nothing
perspective, based on the classifications in Barrett (1982, pp. 800 – 801; 2001,
pp. 834 –35).4 Although the designations are influenced by legal provisions, includ-
ing statements about religion in constitutions, the concept employed is ultimately
de facto. The classifications are clearer in some cases than others. In many situa-
tions, the constitution designates an official state religion and restricts or prohibits
other forms. However, even without these designations or prohibitions, govern-
ments sometimes favor a designated religion through subsidies and tax collections
or through the mandatory teaching of religion in public schools. These consider-
ations caused Barrett to classify some countries as having a “state religion,” despite
the absence of an official designation in the constitution. Although we disagree
with the classifications in some cases, we thought it problematic to substitute our
subjective judgment for Barrett’s. Therefore, except in cases of obvious error, we
accepted the Barrett designations. (Barrett classifies some governments as favoring
multiple religions or religion in general—we classified these cases as lacking a state
religion.)
For regulation of religion, we relied on Barrett’s narratives for the 1970s for
each country, supplemented in some cases by individual country reports. We used
one of the concepts suggested by Chaves and Cann (1992)—whether the govern-
ment appoints or approves the domestic leaders of religions. One advantage of this
concept is that it allows us to classify nearly all countries on a reasonably consistent
basis. Note that regulation in this sense is not the same as having an official religion.
Some countries with state religions do not regulate this way (for example, Colom-
bia, Denmark and Pakistan), whereas other countries without official religions do
regulate this way (for example, China, France and Turkey).
mattered for the probability of state religion. In contrast, adherence to distinct Christian religions—not
overall Christian adherence—influenced the likelihood of state religion.
4
See Barro and McCleary (2005b) for a fuller discussion of the state-religion variable. This classification
misses the important senses in which, for example, the state religions of England and Iran are not the
same. Fox and Sandler (2003) are assembling a religion and state database in which they classify the
relation between religion and state into four broad groupings: separation of religion and state,
discrimination against minority religions, restrictions on majority religions, and religious legislation.
Although each individual measure is a (0, 1) dummy variable, indexes based on the large number of
separate components would be nearly continuous. Unfortunately, the Fox–Sandler data are available
only since 1990.
Putting the various sources of religion data together, and considering the
availability of data on other variables, we can carry out statistical analysis for up to
81 countries, with a maximum number of country/time observations of 258. The
exact sample size depends on the measure of religiosity. For example, the Gallup
Millennium Survey lacks data on most measures of religious belief, and questions
on personal prayer appear in only two of the World Values Survey (WVS) waves and
the two International Social Survey Program (ISSP) waves.
Until recently, Muslim countries were underrepresented in the surveys. How-
ever, the 2000 World Values Survey wave added a substantial number of predom-
inantly Muslim countries. In terms of most popular religions (not necessarily a
majority of persons adhering to some religion), the full sample has 32 Catholic
countries, 14 Muslim, eleven Orthodox, ten Protestant, six Eastern religions (in-
cluding Buddhist), four other religions (mainly in Africa), two “other Christian”
(one of which is the United States), one Hindu and one Jewish.
The sample has a lot of representation among communist countries—22 that
were communist in 1970, of which only two, China and Vietnam, are still classed as
communist in 2000. Thus, the sample is useful for assessing the effects on religiosity
from current and past communism. (We do not classify communism as itself a form
of religion.) The countries included are richer than the world average, although
poor countries have been increasingly represented over time in the World Values
Survey. For example, the full sample includes seven countries in sub-Saharan
Africa.
The religiosity questions we use concern frequency of attendance at formal
religious services and personal prayer and yes-or-no answers about beliefs in hell,
heaven, an afterlife, and god in some form. We also use a question that is less
subject to theological differences across religions—whether the respondent self-
identifies as a religious person.
Our analysis of the determinants of religiosity uses panels in which the depen-
dent variables are country averages of answers to religiosity questions. In these
panels, we include observations from different surveys at different points in time
(allowing for different intercepts for the three sources: World Values Survey,
International Social Survey Program, and Gallup). In our later analysis of economic
growth, to generate as many observations as possible, we assume as an approxima-
tion that a single answer to each religiosity question can be used for a given country
for every time period for which growth rates and the other explanatory variables
were observed. In these cases, we started by defining each religiosity variable to be
the value from the 1990 World Values Survey if this observation were available.
Then we filled in missing values by using, in sequence, the 1981 WVS, 1991 ISSP,
1995 WVS, 1998 ISSP, 1999 Gallup, and 2000 WVS.5
5
We adjusted for differences in average levels of responses from the different surveys and time periods
by comparing the overlapping observations for each pair of surveys, for example, 1990 WVS and 1981
WVS. This procedure means that, in some cases, the religiosity questions post-date the growth-rate
observations. However, the instruments used apply to earlier points in time. For further discussion, see
Barro and McCleary (2003).
The first part of Table 1 shows the averages of the religiosity responses for the
countries with data. These averages are unweighted across countries. Weighting by
population would mean that China and India would dominate the world statistics.
This population weighting is appropriate if one wants to consider the position of
the average person in the world. However, to learn about cross-country determi-
nants of religiosity, including influences from governmental institutions, it is more
informative to weight each country roughly the same. The table shows that average
attendance at formal religious services at least weekly is 31 percent, monthly is 41
percent, and participation in personal prayer at least weekly is 57 percent. Average
beliefs were 43 percent for hell, 59 percent for heaven and an afterlife, and 82
percent for the existence of god in some sense. Sixty-nine percent of persons said
that they were at least somewhat religious.
The remainder of Table 1 shows means and standard deviations in 1970 and
2000 for the other variables used in the analysis. Thirty-six percent of the countries
had state religions in 1970, compared to 44 percent in 2000. The increase over time
reflected mainly the 13 previously communist countries, such as Bulgaria and
Ukraine, that implemented state religions between 1990 and 2001.6 Forty-one
percent of countries regulated religion (in the sense described before) in the
1970s. Averages for the religious pluralism indicator (one minus the Herfindahl
index for the ten religion categories noted before) were 33 percent in 1970 and 37
percent in 2000.
The fraction of the overall population designated as nonreligious, according to
Barrett, averaged 11 percent in 1970 and 10 percent in 2000, with the small decline
attributable to the ending of communism in many countries. For 59 never-
communist countries, the average for nonreligion rose from 3 percent in 1970 to
6 percent in 2000. Note again that these averages are unweighted across countries.
In particular, the averages for communist countries do not give a large weight to
the unusually high nonreligion fractions in China, 64 percent in 1970 and 50
percent in 2000.
The bottom part of the table shows the breakdown of religion adherence by
type among persons adhering to some religion; note again that the countries are
equally weighted in these averages. In 2000, the Catholic religion had the largest
share of adherents (36 percent), followed by Muslim (18 percent), Protestant (14
percent), Orthodox (11 percent) and other Christian (9 percent).
Determinants of Religiosity
Table 2 shows estimates of systems in which the dependent variables are survey
responses about monthly participation in formal religious services, weekly personal
prayer, belief in hell and an afterlife, and whether people self-identify as religious.7
These panels combine data from up to seven survey waves. (The Gallup data are
6
For the broader sample of countries considered in Barro and McCleary (2005b), the averages for state
religion were 39 percent in 1970 and 40 percent in 2000, compared to 59 percent in 1900.
7
The dependent variables take the form log[x / (1.02 – x)], where x is the fraction who attend, believe,
etc. This form constrains the fitted values to lie in the interval (0, 1).
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables
(cells show unweighted averages across countries; standard deviations
in parentheses)
These variables are averaged over different surveys, with levels geared to 1990
Weekly or more attendance at formal services 0.31 (0.25)

Monthly or more attendance at formal services 0.41 (0.25)
Pray at least weekly 0.57 (0.24)
Belief in hell 0.43 (0.27)
Belief in heaven 0.59 (0.26)
Belief in afterlife 0.59 (0.22)
Belief in god 0.82 (0.18)
Religious person 0.69 (0.19)
1970 2000
Log(real per capita GDP) 8.455 (0.959) 8.982 (0.962)

Real per capita GDP 6828 (5177) 11920 (9523)
State religion 0.36 (0.48) 0.44 (0.50)
State regulation of religion (1970s) 0.41 (0.49) —
Religious pluralism 0.33 (0.24) 0.37 (0.24)
Communist 0.27 (0.44) 0.025 (0.157)
Nonreligion 0.110 (0.176) 0.096 (0.112)
These variables are relative to the population with adherence to some religion
Buddhist 0.041 (0.156) 0.038 (0.142)

Catholic 0.359 (0.401) 0.355 (0.388)
Hindu 0.015 (0.094) 0.015 (0.089)
Jewish 0.015 (0.096) 0.013 (0.090)
Muslim 0.165 (0.309) 0.176 (0.310)
Orthodox 0.125 (0.274) 0.112 (0.249)
Other Christian religions 0.063 (0.098) 0.089 (0.116)
Other Eastern religions 0.039 (0.130) 0.036 (0.123)
Other religions 0.033 (0.084) 0.027 (0.062)
Protestant 0.146 (0.262) 0.140 (0.241)
Notes: The columns show the (unweighted) means and standard deviations of the variables used in Table
2, along with some other variables. The sample for most variables is the set of observations for which data
are available for participation in formal religious services and for the explanatory variables used in Table
2. The maximum sample size is 81. For the religious belief variables, the samples are smaller. The
religious participation and belief variables come from the various international surveys. Each country
with data on these religiosity variables appears only once in computing these averages. The value
entered is for WVS 1990, if available. Otherwise, values from the other surveys are used in the sequence
WVS 1981, ISSP 1991, WVS 1995, ISSP 1998, Gallup 1999, and WVS 2000. Values from surveys other than
1990 WVS are adjusted based on comparisons across the sets of overlapping observations, for example,
between WVS 1990 and WVS 1981. The religion fractions, aside from nonreligious, are relative to the
population of adherents to some religion. The nonreligion fraction is relative to the total population.
available only for participation, and the prayer question comes from only four waves.)
The last column, for the fraction of the population designated as having some religious
adherence, is based on Barrett’s census/survey information for 1970 and 2000.
The explanatory variables include a single indicator of economic develop-
ment—the log of real per capita GDP— dummy variables for state religion and state
regulation of religion, and dummies for contemporaneous and lagged commu-
nism. We include adherence shares for eight religion groups (where Catholic is the
left-out category, and Buddhist and other Eastern religions were combined due to
limited data), and the measure of religious pluralism (computed from the adher-
ence shares for ten religion groups). The adherence shares are measured relative
to persons identifying with some religion: for example, the proportion of Protestant
adherents out of the population of persons adhering to some religion. The idea is
that the breakdown of adhering persons by type of religion may be exogenous with
respect to measures of religiosity, but the fraction of persons adhering to some
religion (rather than no religion) would surely not be exogenous. Since Catholic is
the left-out category, the coefficients on adherence shares should be interpreted as
effects relative to those for Catholic.8 The samples comprise up to 81 countries and
258 observations for monthly attendance in column 1. Fewer observations are
available for the other systems.
The estimation uses instrumental variables to allow for the potential endogeneity
of per capita GDP with respect to religiosity. We use as instruments two arguably
exogenous determinants of economic development: absolute degrees latitude (which
relates to climate and, hence, to health and agricultural productivity) and a dummy
variable for land-locked status (which affects transport costs).9 In effect, the estimation
replaces the log of per capita GDP with the fitted values from a first-stage regression.
This first-stage equation has the log of per capita GDP as the dependent variable and
has as independent variables the two instruments and the other explanatory variables
(which are treated as exogenous). The idea of this instrumental-variable procedure is
to isolate effects of economic development on religiosity, rather than the reverse. The
estimation gives equal weight to each country.
One concern is that explanatory variables other than per capita GDP might
also be endogenous with respect to religiosity. For the measures of religion adher-
ence (among persons adhering to some religion), a possible problem would be
reverse influences of religiosity on conversion into particular faiths. Probably a
more serious concern involves reverse effects of religiosity on the interplay between
state and religion, specifically, on the tendency to have state religion and to
regulate religion.
8
Separate constant terms are included for the different survey sources, but the other coefficients are
constrained to be the same for all surveys. We have tested for whether there are trends in the religiosity
indicators (for given values of per capita GDP and the other explanatory variables). These tests are based
on comparisons across the four WVS waves and between the two ISSP waves. The only statistically
significant trend is for belief in hell, which is increasing over time (holding per capita GDP and other
variables constant).
9
In a very long-term context, land-locked status may be endogenous. Our results are not sensitive to the
exclusion of this instrument.
Table 2
Determinants of Religious Participation and Beliefs
(cells show estimated coefficients with standard errors in parentheses)
Monthly Consider
attendance Weekly self as Religious
Explanatory at formal personal Belief in Belief in religious fraction of
variable services prayer hell afterlife person population
Log of per capita ⫺0.797 ⫺0.992 ⫺0.727 ⫺0.417 ⫺0.481 ⫺0.505

GDP (0.093)** (0.147)** (0.114)** (0.093)** (0.120)** (0.077)**
State religion 0.48 0.14 0.68 0.46 0.18 0.58
(0.15)** (0.25) (0.19)** (0.16)** (0.17) (0.16)**
Regulation of ⫺0.52 ⫺0.49 ⫺0.42 ⫺0.46 ⫺0.37 ⫺0.58
religion (0.11)** (0.16)** (0.13)** (0.11)** (0.12)** (0.14)**
Religious 0.93 ⫺0.17 0.18 ⫺0.26 ⫺0.20 —
pluralism (0.36)* (0.57) (0.46) (0.38) (0.44)
Communist ⫺1.36 ⫺1.52 ⫺0.90 ⫺1.02 ⫺1.03 ⫺2.12
(0.20)** (0.26)** (0.22)** (0.18)** (0.21)** (0.29)**
Ex-communist ⫺1.27 — ⫺0.68 ⫺0.93 ⫺0.53 —
(1995) (0.20)** (0.24)** (0.22)** (0.22)*
Ex-communist ⫺1.06 ⫺1.21 ⫺0.50 ⫺0.63 ⫺0.51 ⫺1.08
(1998–2001) (0.16)** (0.23)** (0.20)* (0.17)** (0.19)** (0.17)**
ISSP data ⫺0.154 ⫺0.32 0.32 0.19 ⫺0.63 —
(0.088) (0.13)* (0.09)** (0.08)* (0.11)**
Gallup data ⫺0.038 — — — — —
(0.076)
Eastern religion ⫺2.23 ⫺2.13 0.26 ⫺0.20 ⫺1.92 —
fraction† (0.26)** (0.42)** (0.36) (0.26) (0.30)**
Hindu fraction ⫺1.41 ⫺2.09 ⫺1.40 ⫺1.90 ⫺0.95 —
(0.53)** (0.68)** (0.61)* (0.46)** (0.66)
Jewish fraction ⫺2.13 ⫺1.79 ⫺0.64 ⫺1.19 ⫺1.53 —
(0.52)** (0.57)** (0.44) (0.36)** (0.56)**
Muslim fraction ⫺0.73 ⫺0.09 2.37 1.43 0.55 —
(0.22)** (0.39) (0.29)** (0.25)** (0.25)*
Orthodox ⫺1.26 ⫺0.76 ⫺0.22 ⫺0.30 0.00 —
fraction (0.23)** (0.30)* (0.28) (0.24) (0.26)
Other Christian 0.52 1.01 2.64 2.04 1.13 —
fraction (0.68) (0.97) (0.79)** (0.64)** (0.81)
Other religion ⫺2.03 ⫺3.10 ⫺1.54 ⫺1.80 ⫺0.42 —
fraction (1.10) (2.61) (1.24) (1.05) (1.92)
Protestant ⫺1.93 ⫺1.03 ⫺1.48 ⫺0.52 ⫺0.90 —
fraction (0.20)** (0.30)** (0.24)** (0.21)* (0.21)**
Dummy for 2000 — — — — ⫺0.19 ⫺0.19
(0.08) (0.08)
Sources WV81, WV90, WV81, WV81, WV81, Barrett for
WV90, IS91, IS98, WV90, WV90, WV90, 1970 and
IS91, WV00 IS91, IS91, IS91, 2000
WV95, WV95, WV95, WV95,
IS98, IS98, IS98, IS98,
GA99, WV00 WV00 WV00
WV00
Number of 81, 258 63, 127 76, 197 77, 202 74, 202 81, 142
countries and
total
observations
Table 2— continued
Determinants of Religious Participation and Beliefs
(cells show estimated coefficients with standard errors in parentheses)
Monthly Consider
attendance Weekly self as Religious
Explanatory at formal personal Belief in Belief in religious fraction of
variable services prayer hell afterlife person population
Number of 22, 37, 21, 31, 15, 29, 21, 34, 15, 26, 34, 15, 21, 39, 14, 62, 80
observations 39, 27, 48, 52 37, 29, 61 37, 29, 61 38, 29, 61
for each 64
equation
R 2 for each .80, .57, .61, .71, .66, .46, .66, .51, .61, .47, .49, .61
equation .68, .73, .58, .65 .63, .63, .68, .36, .52, .44,
.68, .69, .60, .74 .43, .62 .47, .56
.69
†Buddhist plus other eastern religions.

*p ⬍ 0.05, **p ⬍ 0.01.
Notes: In columns 1 through 5, each system has 4 to 7 equations, corresponding to observations on the
dependent variables at 4 to 7 points in time: 1981– 84, called 1981 (World Values Survey data mostly for
1981, supplemented by information from Gallup surveys for a few countries); 1990 –93, called 1990
(WVS data mostly for 1990, plus observations on some variables for Greece in 1987 from Eurodim);
1990 –93, called 1991 (International Social Survey Program data mostly for 1991); 1995–97, called 1995
(WVS data mostly for 1995 or 1996); 1998 –2000, called 1998 (ISSP data mostly for 1998); 1999 (Gallup
Millennium Survey); and 1999 –2003, called 2000 (WVS data). The Gallup data cover only participation
in formal religious services. The prayer question is from 1990 and 2000 WVS and 1991 and 1998 ISSP.
The dependent variables are population averages for countries for (1) attendance at formal religious
services at least monthly, (2) personal prayer at least weekly; (3) belief in hell, (4) belief in an afterlife,
and (5) self-identification as religious. The measured value is the fraction of people participating, the
fraction who hold the belief, or the fraction who consider themselves religious. The form of each
dependent variable is log[ x/(1.02 ⫺ x)], where x is the fraction of persons participating or believing
or considering themselves religious. In column 6, the dependent variable is computed from the fraction
of persons adhering to some religion, according to Barrett, Kurian and Johnson (2001). The log of real
per capita GDP, from Heston, Summers and Aten (2002), is for 1980 in the 1981 equation, 1990 in the
equations for 1990 and 1991, and 1995 in the equations for 1995–2000. The religious adherence shares
and the indicator of religious pluralism (discussed in the notes to Table 1) are for 1970 in the 1981
equations and for 2000 in the other equations. The dummy variable for state religion is for 1970 and that
for state regulation of religion is for the 1970s (see the notes to Table 1). The dummy for the presence
of a communist regime applies to the pre-1990 period. The coefficients in the 1995 equation and the
1998 –2000 equations are different from those in the earlier equations; thereby, we can compute effects
from ex-communism. The dummy for the use of ISSP data applies to the 1991 and 1998 equations and
that for Gallup applies to the 1999 equation (entering only for attendance at religious services). The
coefficients shown in each cell come from joint estimation that pools all of the data from different
surveys at different points in time. Columns 1 through 5 use 4 to 7 survey sources (on varying numbers
of countries), and column 6 uses information on religion status at two points in time. Countries are
weighted equally, irrespective of size. Error terms for a given country from different survey sources and
different points in time are allowed to be correlated. Constant terms, not shown, are included for each
system. The constants vary by survey type (WVS, ISSP, Gallup) but not over time for a given type. Each
system treats the log of per capita GDP as endogenous and uses two instruments: absolute degrees
latitude and land-locked status.
In another study, we took a political-economy approach to the determination

of state religion (Barro and McCleary, 2005b). Key factors were concentration of
persons in the main religion; country size; present and past communism; and a
country’s long-ago history of state religion. We did not find important effects on the
probability of state religion from per capita GDP; the composition of religion adher-
ence; or legal structure, such as the extent of constraints on the chief executive. These
results leave open the possibility that other sources of differences in religiosity could
influence the probability of state religion and of state regulation of religion.
One striking result from Table 2 is that per capita GDP has a significantly negative
effect on all of the religiosity indicators.10 This finding supports the secularization view
as well as the rational-choice perspective of Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975). An irony in this
finding is that the proponents of secularization have been in retreat over the last couple
decades; for example, Berger (1996) recanted his previous stance.
One observation that boosted the arguments of the nonsecularists is that the rich
United States has maintained high levels of religiosity over time—Table 3 shows that
the United States is a substantial outlier in the systems estimated in Table 2. Another
aspect of the debate is that secularists, such as Hume, were unreasonably extreme,
arguing counterfactually that religion would rapidly disappear as a significant social
force. More accurately, secularization can be seen as a gradual tendency. In this
context, Iannaccone (2003) uses International Social Survey Program retrospective
information to construct time series back to the 1920s on participation in formal
religious services for 30 countries. He observes that a steady pattern of diminished
participation—secularization in this sense—applies only to a few countries, such as
Britain, France and Germany. However, no countries show a pattern of steady increase
in participation, and the overall pattern is reduced participation over time.
To quantify our findings, start at sample means in 2000 (shown in Table 1) and
consider an increase of one standard deviation in the log of per capita GDP (by
0.96). In this case, GDP per capita rises from $7,940 (roughly the position of Russia
in 2000) to $20,700 (roughly the position of Italy). Based on our results in Table 2,
this increase in per capita GDP is estimated to lower monthly attendance at formal
religious services by 0.17 (from 0.41 to 0.24), weekly prayer by 0.23 (from 0.57 to
0.34), and belief in hell by 0.16 (from 0.43 to 0.27).
Another finding from Table 2 is that state religion is positively related to
attendance at formal religious services and with beliefs in hell and an afterlife
(columns 1, 3, 4). These results apply for a given regulatory setup and a given
degree of religious pluralism. Our interpretation is that the subsidy element from
state religion motivates more participation, which, in turn, instills greater beliefs.
State religion is, however, not significantly related to the extent of personal prayer
(column 2). That is, organized religion does not show up as a clear substitute or
complement for individual prayer. Given the positive coefficients for beliefs, it is
surprising that state religion is unrelated to the extent to which people self-identify
10
This finding still applies if we do not use instrumental variables to correct for the potential endoge-
neity of per capita GDP. For example, for monthly church attendance in Table 2, column 1, the
estimated coefficient on the log of per capita GDP becomes – 0.720 (s.e. ⫽ 0.073). For belief in hell in
column 3, the estimated coefficient on the log of per capita GDP becomes – 0.671 (s.e. ⫽ 0.096).
Inglehart and Baker (2000) also report negative effects of per capita GDP on religiosity in systems
estimated without instrumental variables.
as religious (column 5). However, state religion is positively related in column 6 to

the fraction of the population that Barrett classifies as adhering to some religion.
For a given status of state religion, Table 2 shows that government regulation
of the religion market is negatively related to all of the religiosity indicators. This
pattern applies even to personal prayer, which was not significantly related to the
presence of state religion.
Some of the patterns found for the state religion and regulation variables
could reflect reverse causation from religiosity to governmental institutions and
policies. However, it is unclear why these reverse effects would produce positive
coefficients for state religion and negative ones for state regulation. We find it more
plausible that the coefficients reveal effects of the government variables on religi-
osity—which are plausibly positive for state religion and negative for regulation.
Table 2 shows that the extent of religious pluralism (based on patterns of
adherence among persons adhering to some religion) is positively related to
monthly attendance at formal religious services (column 1). One interpretation,
consistent with the religion market model, is that a greater variety of religions
engenders more competition (as suggested by Smith) and results, thereby, in a
religion product that appeals more to the typical consumer. However, we find no
significant effects of religious pluralism on personal prayer, religious beliefs, or
religiousness (columns 2–5).
Contemporaneous communism has a sharp negative effect on all of the religiosity
indicators—thus, at least as gauged by survey responses, these regimes were successful
at suppressing various dimensions of religion. The ex-communism variables, applying
to surveys since 1995, show how the influence of past communism changed during the
1990s. The results show a considerable rebound in religiosity, though more in beliefs
(columns 3 and 4) and religiousness (column 5) than in participation in formal
services or prayer (columns 1 and 2). Eventually, the anti-religion policies of commu-
nist governments may prove to be only temporary. We reached similar conclusions
about the negative effects of communism on state religion in Barro and McCleary
(2005b). Communist governments almost never had contemporaneous state religions
of the usual sort (except for Somalia around 1970), but many former communist
countries reinstituted official state religions between 1990 and 2001.
For patterns of religion adherence, recall that each coefficient in Table 2
should be interpreted as relative to the left-out category of Catholic. The mainly
negative coefficients show that adherents to other religions are typically less reli-
gious in terms of attendance at formal services, personal prayer and beliefs (col-
umns 1 through 4). Notable exceptions are Muslims and “other Christians” (which
include many Evangelicals). These groups are remarkably high on beliefs in hell
and an afterlife (columns 3 and 4), though not significantly higher than Catholic
in attendance and prayer (columns 1 and 2).
To get an idea of what the model explains and fails to explain, Table 3 shows
actual and fitted values for selected countries from the 2000 World Values Survey
wave. The table considers monthly attendance, personal prayer, and belief in
hell— corresponding to the systems in columns 1–3 of Table 2.
As already noted, the United States has high religiosity—and much of this behav-
ior is not captured by the model. Monthly attendance at formal services is 60 percent,
compared to the fitted value of 38 percent— corresponding values are 78 percent and
50 percent for weekly prayer and 75 percent and 46 percent for belief in hell. To
appreciate the extent to which the United States is an outlier, we can ask how much
lower U.S. per capita GDP would have to be to fit with observed religiosity, for example,
with monthly church attendance of 60 percent in 2000. The answer is that per capita
GDP would have to be one-third of its actual value: $11,200 rather than $33,300.
Two other outliers with positive residuals are Singapore (44 percent atten-
dance versus fitted of 17 percent and 79 percent belief in hell versus fitted of 41
percent) and Poland (78 percent attendance versus fitted of 34 percent and 66
percent belief in hell versus fitted of 33 percent). Among former communist
countries, Poland is unusual in being extremely religious during the communist
period and then having mild declines in religiosity after the end of communism.
The only contemporaneous communist countries in Table 3 are China (with the lowest
monthly attendance, 3 percent) and Vietnam (also with low attendance, 13 percent).
Many places in western Europe have low religiosity, and much of this behavior
is explained by the model. Denmark and Finland (and also Sweden, which is not
shown) have less than 15 percent monthly attendance rates. However, Finland is
much higher in religious belief than in attendance—31 percent for belief in hell,
not well explained by the model. This pattern of high believing relative to belong-
ing was observed by Davie (1994) to apply in modern Britain. We see something of
this pattern in Table 3—in the United Kingdom, monthly attendance at services is
20 percent, compared with belief in hell of 36 percent.
At the other end, the most religious country in western Europe is Ireland
(68 percent attendance and 53 percent belief in hell, pretty well explained by the
model). Italy and Spain are less religious than Ireland but more religious than the
United Kingdom, France and Scandinavia.
Predominantly Muslim countries exhibit strikingly high levels of belief in
hell—98 percent in Iran, 99 percent in Indonesia, 99 percent in Pakistan and
94 percent in Turkey. Heavily Muslim Nigeria (about 44 percent of the population)
also had 94 percent belief. However, the Muslim countries report more varied
experiences with respect to participation in formal religious services— only
44 percent in Turkey and 47 percent in Iran but 91 percent in Pakistan.
The varied results on participation in religious services in Muslim countries seem
to reflect differences in interpretations by survey takers and respondents in the World
Values Survey of the term “formal religious services.” In some countries, women do not
attend services at mosques. However, we have learned that, in some of the surveys, a
“yes” answer to participation in formal religious services required mosque attendance,
whereas, in others, participation in other types of services also counted as formal
participation. Hence, we get puzzling patterns of differences by gender among ten
predominantly Muslim countries in the 2000 World Values Survey. Five countries
(Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Turkey and Saudi Arabia) show much greater participation
in formal services by men than women. Another five (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia,
Iran and Pakistan) exhibit similar participation rates by gender. India, with a large
number of Muslims in an absolute sense, is similar to the latter group in showing only
Table 3
Actual and Fitted Values of Religiosity
(selected countries from World Values Survey 2000)
Monthly Weekly Belief

Country attendance Fitted prayer Fitted in hell Fitted
Canada 0.36 0.40 0.56 0.47 0.50 0.34

Chile 0.45 0.66 0.66 0.79 0.65 0.56
China 0.03 0.15 — — — —
Czech Republic 0.12 0.23 0.18 0.32 0.13 0.31
Denmark 0.12 0.13 0.20 0.34 0.10 0.16
Egypt 0.45 0.70 — — 1.00 0.97
Finland 0.14 0.11 0.40 0.30 0.31 0.14
France 0.12 0.29 0.20 0.44 0.20 0.25
Greece 0.34 0.22 0.55 0.44 0.41 0.39
Hungary 0.18 0.18 0.38 0.30 0.20 0.18
India 0.51 0.61 0.74 0.71 0.68 0.50
Indonesia 0.76 0.59 — — 1.00 0.80
Iran 0.47 0.47 0.73 0.77 0.98 0.94
Ireland 0.68 0.57 0.69 0.66 0.53 0.50
Italy 0.54 0.38 0.62 0.49 0.49 0.34
Japan 0.12 0.09 0.22 0.13 0.30 0.33
Korea (South) 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.32 — —
Lithuania 0.32 0.25 0.40 0.44 0.68 0.26
Mexico 0.75 0.61 0.80 0.81 0.75 0.47
Nigeria 0.95 0.79 — — 0.94 0.89
Pakistan 0.91 0.78 — — 1.00 0.99
Poland 0.78 0.34 0.78 0.53 0.66 0.33
Russia 0.09 0.13 0.26 0.27 0.36 0.30
Singapore 0.44 0.17 0.51 0.20 0.79 0.41
Slovak Republic 0.50 0.20 0.54 0.32 0.46 0.21
South Africa 0.68 0.58 0.82 0.74 0.60 0.62
Spain 0.36 0.54 0.39 0.66 0.36 0.46
Turkey 0.40 0.31 0.89 0.73 0.94 0.87
United Kingdom 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.37 0.36 0.30
United States 0.60 0.38 0.78 0.50 0.75 0.46
Vietnam 0.13 0.28 0.12 0.40 0.17 0.64
Notes: The table lists selected countries from the 2000 World Values Survey. The fitted values for monthly
attendance at religious services, weekly personal prayer and belief in heaven come from the systems in
columns 1 through 3 of Table 2.
a small excess of male participation over female among the Muslim population. We
think that these cross-country differences reflect more about survey procedures than
about reality, but we are still investigating. One important inference is that the reported
participation numbers from the World Values Survey likely understate the time and other
resources devoted by the overall population of Muslims to formal religious activities.
Religious Influences on Economic Growth

In the previous section, we examined evidence about how economic develop-
ment and other variables influenced religiosity. Now we turn to evidence about how
religious beliefs and participation affect economic growth.
Table 4 shows regressions in which religiosity variables are included as deter-

minants of economic growth. The forms of these systems are analogous to those
used in previous cross-country growth studies, described in Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2004, Ch. 12). The dependent variable, the growth rate of real per capita GDP, is
observed over three ten-year periods: 1965–75, 1975– 85 and 1985–95. The systems
include several explanatory variables aside from religiosity measures. These vari-
ables (not shown in the table) are the log of per capita GDP at the start of each
period; initial values of life expectancy and years of school attainment; a measure
of international openness; the growth rate of the terms of trade; indicators of rule
of law and democracy; the log of the fertility rate; and the ratio of investment to GDP.
The two religiosity variables are those described before for monthly attendance
at formal religious services and belief in hell. Results are similar if weekly atten-
dance is used instead of monthly attendance and if belief in heaven or an afterlife
is substituted for belief in hell. However, we get insignificant coefficients on the
religiosity variables if we replace belief in hell by belief in god or by whether people
self-identify as religious. Thus, as suggested by parts of our theoretical analysis,
beliefs related to an afterlife appear to be crucial as economic influences. Some of
the regressions add an eight-way breakdown of religion adherence among people
adhering to some religion. In these classifications, Catholic is the left-out category,
and the coefficients should be interpreted as effects relative to those for Catholic.
Because of data limitations, Buddhist and other Eastern religions were again
combined into a single category.
The estimation uses instrumental variables to allow for the possible endoge-
neity of the religiosity variables—monthly attendance at formal religious services
and belief in hell—with respect to economic growth. We use as instruments
(arguably) exogenous variables that were found before to influence religiosity: the
dummy variables for state religion and state regulation of religion; the religious
pluralism indicator; and the religion adherence shares among persons adhering to
some religion. The estimation effectively replaces the two religiosity variables with
fitted values from first-stage regressions. These first-stage equations have atten-
dance at formal religious services or belief in hell as the dependent variable. The
independent variables are the instruments and the other explanatory variables
(which are treated as exogenous). The idea of this instrumental variable procedure
is to isolate effects of religiosity on economic growth, rather than the reverse. The
estimation gives equal weight to each country.
The strongest results—in Table 4, column 2—include the two religiosity
variables and the religion adherence shares. The central finding is that belief in
hell has a significantly positive coefficient, whereas monthly attendance has a
significantly negative coefficient.11 We get similar results if we replace belief in hell
11
If we do not use instrumental variables to correct for the potential endogeneity of the religiosity
variables, the results are qualitatively similar. However, the magnitudes of the coefficients are smaller
than those in Table 4, column 2: 0.0079 (s.e. ⫽ 0.0022) for belief in hell and – 0.0065 (s.e. ⫽ 0.0020)
for monthly attendance at formal religious services.
Table 4
Regressions for Economic Growth: 1965–75, 1975– 85, 1985–95
(standard errors in parentheses)
Explanatory variable a (1) (2) (3)
Belief in hell 0.0036* (0.0015) 0.0121** (0.0043) —

Monthly attendance ⫺0.0052** (0.0019) ⫺0.0127** (0.0043) —
p-value for belief and 0.002** 0.006** —
attendance jointly
Eastern religion shareb — ⫺0.010 (0.012) 0.022* (0.007)
Hindu share — ⫺0.019 (0.013) ⫺0.020 (0.012)
Jewish share — 0.002 (0.013) 0.018 (0.011)
Muslim share — ⫺0.036* (0.015) 0.002 (0.006)
Other Christian share — ⫺0.017 (0.019) ⫺0.011 (0.015)
Orthodox share — ⫺0.006 (0.010) 0.011 (0.008)
Other religion share — 0.015 (0.023) 0.024 (0.020)
Protestant share — ⫺0.016* (0.008) ⫺0.003 (0.005)
p-value for religion shares — 0.004** 0.004**
jointly
Number of countries and 53, 153 53, 153 53, 153
total observations
Number of observations 48, 53, 52 48, 53, 52 48, 53, 52
for each period
R2 for each period .58, .61, .37 .61, .63, .45 .66, .51, .49
a
Other explanatory variables, described below, were included, but coefficients are not shown.
b
Buddist plus other eastern religions.
*p ⬍ .05, **p ⬍ .01.
Notes: The dependent variables are the growth rates of real per capita GDP over 1965–75, 1975– 85 and
1985–95. The explanatory variables not shown are the log of per capita GDP in 1965, 1975 and 1985;
years of male secondary and higher school attainment in 1965, 1975 and 1985; reciprocals of life
expectancy at age one in 1960, 1970 and 1980; average ratios over each period of investment to GDP;
the log of the total fertility rate in 1960, 1970 and 1980; average ratios for each period of exports plus
imports to GDP, filtered for the usual relation of this ratio to the logs of population and area; the growth
rate of the terms of trade over each period, interacted with the average ratio of exports plus imports to
GDP; the average of the Political Risk Services indicator of the rule of law (the value for 1982 or 1985
appears in the first two equations); and the average for each period of the Freedom House measure of
democracy (electoral rights) and its square. Columns 2 and 3 include the adherence shares for 1970
(among persons adhering to some religion) for the eight religion groups shown. The Catholic share is
the omitted category. The samples for all three columns are the same. Separate constants are included
for each period. For data sources, see the text.
The coefficients shown in each cell come from joint estimation that pools all of the data on economic
growth from different periods (for varying numbers of countries). Countries are weighted equally,
irrespective of size. Error terms for a given country from different periods are allowed to be correlated.
Each system treats the two religiosity variables—monthly attendance at formal religious services and
belief in hell—as endogenous. The instruments are dummy variables for the presence of a state religion
and state regulation of religion, the eight religion adherence shares for 1970, and the pluralism
indicator for religious adherence in 1970.
by belief in heaven or an afterlife. Thus, our emphasis is on afterlife beliefs, rather

than on the distinction between the stick from hell versus the carrot from heaven.
We also get the pattern of a positive coefficient on belief and a negative
coefficient on attendance in Table 4, column 1, which excludes the religion
adherence shares. However, the coefficients on the two religiosity variables in
column 1 are smaller in magnitude and less statistically significant than their
counterparts in column 2. In either case, our central finding is that higher believing
relative to belonging encourages economic growth. To put it another way, growth
is enhanced when the religion sector is unusually productive in the sense that
output (belief related to an afterlife) is high compared to input (attendance).
Given beliefs, more time and resources spent on formal religion can be viewed as
a drain on resources, which detracts from market output (GDP).
The results do not imply that participation in formal religious services is
necessarily negative in a full sense for economic growth. This relation depends on
the extent to which greater attendance at services instills higher beliefs, that is, on
a “religion production function,” which we have not yet estimated. However, if we
consider overall differences in religiosity— cross-country variations in belief and
attendance when we assume the typical positive relation between these two highly
correlated variables—the relation with growth turns out to be weak.
The results accord with Weber’s emphasis on religion as an influence on
beliefs and, thereby, on individual traits and values. In particular, religion does not
seem to operate as a social organization that enhances productive social capital and
networking. In that scenario, we would anticipate a positive relation between
growth and participation in formal services, rather than the negative relation found
in the data. Thus, the special aspect of religion is belief formation.
In Table 4, column 2, the eight religion adherence shares are jointly highly
significant—the p-value for joint significance is 0.004. Recall that each individual
coefficient should be interpreted as relative to the left-out category of Catholic
adherence. Among the individual effects, the most striking result is the significantly
negative coefficient on Muslim adherence. The coefficient on Protestant adher-
ence is also negative and marginally significant—perhaps Weber would be sur-
prised. None of the other coefficients are individually significantly different from
zero.
Many previous studies, including Barro (1997) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny (1999), have attempted to isolate effects of religion adherence
on economic, political and legal outcomes. These studies did not include measures
of religiosity, such as the extent of religious belief and the rate of attendance at
formal religious services. Column 3 of Table 4 shows our results for economic
growth when we follow this earlier practice and omit the two religiosity variables.
The eight religion shares are again jointly statistically significant with a p-value of
0.004. However, the pattern of coefficients differs from those found in column 2.
Specifically, the coefficients on Muslim and Protestant adherence are now close to
zero, and the only individually significant coefficient is the positive one on Eastern
religions. In terms of failing to isolate significant differences among Catholic,
Protestant and Muslim adherence, the results in column 3 are similar to those
reported by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999, Table 5) for
their specifications that include per capita GDP as an explanatory variable.
If we consider all three columns in Table 4, our conclusion is that, to under-
stand the link from religion to economic growth, it is important to include
measures of religiosity (gauged, in our case, by beliefs and participation) along with
measures of religion types (gauged by adherence shares). The religiosity variables

in column 1 are not sufficient because the meaning of religious beliefs and the
significance of formal religious services vary across religions. For example, the
results in Table 2 bring out some of the differences by religion types in the extent
of reported beliefs in hell and monthly attendance at formal religious services. By
conditioning on the composition of religion adherence in column 2 of Table 4, we
are holding fixed cross-religion differences in levels of beliefs and participation.
Because not all of these differences affect economic growth the same way, we are
able to isolate more clearly the growth effects from beliefs and participation, per se.
That is, the coefficients of these variables indicate how growth responds when
beliefs and participation vary across countries or time for a given type of religion.
We have been trying to understand the significantly negative coefficient on
Muslim adherence in Table 4, column 2. Mechanically, we get this result because,
first, in column 3, the growth effect from Muslim adherence, per se, is close to zero.
Second, although Muslim countries tend to be highly religious overall, they are
particularly high on religious beliefs—such as belief in hell— compared to stated
monthly attendance at formal religious services. The pattern of coefficients on the
belief and attendance variables in column 1 predicts accordingly that the Muslim
countries would grow at unusually high rates—a pattern not found in the data. The
negative coefficient on Muslim adherence in column 2 essentially corrects for this
error. That is, the high reported believing relative to attending in Muslim countries
is not delivering the usual positive impetus to growth.
One possible channel for a negative growth effect from Muslim adherence is
that governments of predominantly Muslim countries tend to employ legal and
regulatory systems that discourage economic activity. Kuran (2004) emphasizes this
possibility, particularly because of legal structures that restrict contracts, credit,
insurance and corporate ownership. We attempted to assess this channel by using
variables from Fox and Sandler (2003) concerning the interplay between religion
and state. Unfortunately, the data do not cover directly the concepts stressed by
Kuran—the closest measure is a dummy variable for whether religion has a sub-
stantial effect on a country’s laws and regulations.12 We used the earliest date
available, around 1990. When we add this variable to the system in column 2 of
Table 4, we get a coefficient that is essentially zero (⫺0.001, s.e. ⫽ 0.006), and the
coefficient of the Muslim adherence variable is virtually unchanged. If we add the
religious-laws variable to the system in column 1, which excludes the religion
adherence shares, we get a more negative coefficient (⫺0.008, s.e. ⫽ 0.005), which
is still not significantly different from zero. Thus, the results fail to confirm the
conjecture that the negative estimated effect of Muslim adherence on economic
growth operates through legal and regulatory practices. However, the results may
be weak because the available data do not adequately capture cross-country differ-
ences in the legal-regulatory influences from religion.
12
We also considered the Fox–Sandler indicators for religious mandates on business closings and for
mandatory religious education in public schools. These variables lack any explanatory power for
economic growth.
Another possible explanation builds on our earlier observation that, particu-

larly because of gender differences in practices and survey procedures, the mea-
sures of attendance at formal religious services understate the time and other
resources spent on religious activity in Muslim countries. We have tried to correct
for these problems by using information on male participation only, by considering
the incidence of very high attendance (more than once per week), and by using
information on time spent at personal prayer (available, however, for only about
half the Muslim countries). We still get the result that growth is inversely related to
Muslim adherence, holding fixed the religiosity variables. Despite these findings,
we still think that an important factor is systematic understatement in the surveys of
the time devoted to religion in Muslim countries. That is, we think that believing
and belonging are both very high, and believing is probably not high relative to
belonging.
Religious Influence on Individual Traits

We have preliminary results aimed at evaluating the proposition that religious
beliefs enhance economic growth by shaping individual traits and values. We used
the World Values Survey waves for 2000 and 1995 to get responses to three
questions related to traits stressed by Weber: work ethic, honesty, and thrift. For
work ethic, we used the fraction of persons indicating that they thought that valuing
hard work was an important trait for children to learn at home. For honesty, we
used the “trust” question used in previous studies, such as Glaeser, Laibson,
Scheinkman and Soutter (2000). This question is: “Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be trusted or that you needed to be very careful in dealing
with people.” Our assumption is that a person trusts other people when they are, in
fact, more honest. For thrift, we used the fraction of persons indicating that “thrift,
saving money and things” was an important trait for children to learn at home.
A cross-sectional ordinary least squares regression for 78 countries with the
work-ethic indicator as the dependent variable is (with standard errors in paren-
theses):
work ethic ⫽ 1.20 ⫹ 0.200 (belief in hell) ⫺ 0.091 (log per capita GDP)
共0.28 共0.098兲共0.027兲
⫹ 0.307 (ex-communist), R 2 ⫽ 0.55.

共0.052兲
This regression suggests that greater belief in hell instills (or goes along with)
stronger work ethic. (The results are a little weaker if belief in hell is replaced by
belief in heaven or an afterlife.) Also interesting is that work ethic declines
significantly with the log of per capita GDP but is significantly higher (for given per
capita GDP and religiosity) in former communist countries. The results are much
weaker for the other two traits considered. For trust, the only statistically significant
coefficient is a positive one for the log of per capita GDP, and the R 2 is only 0.21.
For thrift, the only significant coefficient is a positive one for ex-communism, and
the R 2 is only 0.13. Thus, Weber may have been right in emphasizing the religion
link with work ethic.
Concluding Observations
We have focused on macroeconomic aspects of the interplay between religion

and political economy. Thus, our empirical work relied on survey information,
aggregated to the country level, on religious beliefs related to an afterlife and on
participation in formal religious services and personal prayer. Some of our evi-
dence concerned effects on religiosity from economic development, government
institutions, and the composition of religion adherence. In the other direction, we
assessed influences from religion on economic growth. We stressed growth effects
from religious beliefs and participation, but we also considered the composition of
religion adherence across the major religions.
Future research could usefully extend our findings in a number of directions.
One extension would be to use Fox and Sandler’s (2003) data to sort out the effects
on organized religion from governmental regulations, subsidies and prohibitions.
Other work we have been pursuing takes a political-economy approach to explain
the presence or absence of state religions (Barro and McCleary, 2005b). We are also
assessing the dynamic influences of communism on religion adherence, including
nonreligion, and on religious beliefs and participation.
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Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 20, Number 2—Spring 2006 —Pages 49 –72

Religion and Economy

Rachel M. McCleary and Robert J. Barro

R eligion has a two-way interaction with political economy. With religion

Religion as a Dependent Variable

Theories of religion as a dependent variable break down into demand-side and

y Rachel M. McCleary is Director, Project on Religion, Political Economy, and Society,

Religion as an Independent Variable

Salvation and Economic Incentives in the World Religions

Beliefs about salvation in the major world religions—Hinduism, Buddhism, Chris-

personal assurance motivates believers to continue to become more perfect in their

Quantitative Analysis of International Data on Religion and

Our quantitative, cross-country research, applied previously in Barro and

International Data on Religiosity

Weekly or more attendance at formal services 0.31 (0.25)

Log(real per capita GDP) 8.455 (0.959) 8.982 (0.962)

Buddhist 0.041 (0.156) 0.038 (0.142)

Log of per capita ⫺0.797 ⫺0.992 ⫺0.727 ⫺0.417 ⫺0.481 ⫺0.505

†Buddhist plus other eastern religions.

In another study, we took a political-economy approach to the determination

as religious (column 5). However, state religion is positively related in column 6 to

Monthly Weekly Belief

Canada 0.36 0.40 0.56 0.47 0.50 0.34

Religious Influences on Economic Growth

Table 4 shows regressions in which religiosity variables are included as deter-

Explanatory variable a (1) (2) (3)

Belief in hell 0.0036* (0.0015) 0.0121** (0.0043) —

by belief in heaven or an afterlife. Thus, our emphasis is on afterlife beliefs, rather

measures of religion types (gauged by adherence shares). The religiosity variables

Another possible explanation builds on our earlier observation that, particu-

Religious Influence on Individual Traits

⫹ 0.307 (ex-communist), R 2 ⫽ 0.55.

We have focused on macroeconomic aspects of the interplay between religion

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