Statutory Construction 2003 Agpalo

STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
By
Ruben E Agpalo
Fifth Edition
2003
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter I
STATUTES
A. IN GENERAL
1.01. Laws, generally . . . .

1.02. Statutes, generally ... ************enson
1.03. Permanent and temporary statutes ...

Other classes of statutes e**s*****et*p* ************** 3
1.04.
Manner of referring to statutes
3
1.05. . .
B. ENACTMENT OF STATUTES
3
1.06 Legislative power, generally..
1.07. Congress' legislative power..
1.08. Procedural requirements, generally 4
1.09. Passage of b i .
1.10. Appropriations and revenue bills .. * Pe*°***9°°*°*°*°
1.11. Authentication of b i l l s . . 8
1.12. Unimpeachability of legislative journals.o******** 8
1.13. Enrolled bill ... * * * * * * * * * * * * e o * * * «
9
1.14. Withdrawal of authentication, effect of... °°**°°°°"
10
C. PARTS OF STATUTES
1.15 Title of statute. ************** 11

1.16. Purposes of requirement .... 11
How requirement construed.. 12
1.17
1.18. When there is compliance
12
with requirement..
1.19 When requirement not applicable 14
vii
E
t
S. S. 2.
to title not authorized.. 80
3.03. When resurt 3.39.
When contemporaneous construction
Preamble .... .
* * * * " " * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ' * t . * *
80 disregarded... "****''***'******************* ****°*"'******

116
3.04. of rule.. ****°*'"************°°******** 81 Erroneous contemporaneous construction does
Illustration
3.05. text... 82 .40.
.06
Context of whole **°*****'**********°'********
not preclude correction nor create rights;
Punctuation m a r k s . .o a d * * i * a * * * * * * * * 83 excepLIONB **********"***********************"************ 1.16
3.07. 84 118
Illustrative examples..
3.08. 85 3.41. Legislative interpretation... 119
Capitalization of letters.. ***************
L e g i s l a t i v e a p p r o v a l .************°**********************
.
3.09. 86 3.42.
Headnotes or epigraphs...si***************************** Reenactment..
******'*********************°*°*****'°** ***
120
3.10. 87 3.43.
Lingual text . . . . . 121
3.11. 3.44. Stare deCLS1s.. * ******'*********** ***********'******"**
Intent or spirit of law . . .

************** 88
.12. 89
3.1 l'olicy of law... Chapter IV
or mischief to be suppressed... 90
3.14. Purpose of law
Dictionaries.. .**e*********neesasons*********************
91 ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE
3.15. 92
3.16. Corsequences of various constructions... FROM, LANGUAGE OF STATUTE
Presumptions.. si *.s*******. 93
3.17
A. LITERAL INTERPRETATION
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
124
93 4.01. Literal meaning or plain-meaning rule
Generally..
********************** ************°******°******°********°****** 126
3.18 What constitutes legislative history..
Ae***ste********* 94 4.02. Dura lex sed lex ...
3.19 94.
3.20. President's message to legislature.. *************ae*oeeods*
95 B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL

3.21 Explanatory note.... ********** *s66adsa*******0*0dre*ees**
96 INTERPRETATION
3.22. Legislative debates, views and deliberations ..
Reports of commission8 isissisan*si 98
3.23 98 Statute must be capable of interpretation,
3.24 Prior laws from which statute is based.. i 4.03. 128
3.25. Change in phraseology by amendments.. 101. otherwise inoperative.. *************
law.. 131
3.26. Amendment by deletion... 102 4.04. What is within the spirit is within the ****
105 133
3.27. Exceptions to the rule. *1990494 ***e***************4*99** 4.05. Literal import must yield to intent . .
106 Limitation of rule. 134

3.28. Adopted statutes,
************9 *PRM*9*9*****p********943494********
107
4.06. ******'******°'*°°*
134
3.29 Limitations of rule.. 4.07. Construction to accomplish purpose,. * * * * * * * * * * *
107 136
3.30. Principles of common lawiusi oiooo ******
4.08. Illustration of rule.
.* ***************""**************
Conditions at time of enactment.. 108 When reason of law ceases, law itself ceases. 141
3.31 ******
4.09.
3.32. History of the times
**tt*********9* 108 .10. Supplying legislative omission. ************************
143
Correcting clerical errors.. 144
4.11.
C. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION Illustration of rule..
144
4.12.
******°**
147
109 4.13. Qualification of rule.. *********
3.3 Generally.. ************'*****e 4 *****'*************

4.14 Construction to avoid absurdity 147
3.34. Executive construction, generally; kinds of **** 110 152
4.15. Construction to avoid injustice. *******"** *'"
3.35. Weight accorded to contemporaneous Construction to avoid danger to public
construction.. *einssopnste************** 111 4.16. 156
3..36. Weight accorded to usage and practice ....ss** 114 interest *******************************°****°'**°****°****°°'*.
Construction in favor of right and justice ****

157
3.37. Construction of rules and regulations. 114 4.17.
159
3.38. Reasons why contemporaneous construction 4.18. Surplusage and superfluity disregarded...
160
4.19. Redundant words may be rejected
* * * * * ' * * * * * * * * * * * ' * *
s gven much weight . . . *** 115
X1
description
word or false How identical terms in same statute
missing .10.
Oiscure or 161 189
4.20. preclude
construction.... construed '***********************************
may not law. 161

from rigid
application of *****'*
5.11.
Meaning of word qualified by purpose
4.21
Exemption 162 190
the i m p o s s i b l e . . . .
****'**''********
******* ***.*** ****** ******** *** ""
Law does
not require
163
ofstatute.
4.22 of words.
' ' * * * * * * * * * * ' * * * * * *
Word or phrase construed in relation to other

Number and gender 5.12. 191
4.28. provision8. *****'"**************"*
* * * * * *
196
C. IMPLICATIONS
5.13 Meaning of term dictated by context. ************
197
Where the law does not distinguish
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
. . .
5.14 199
164 Illustration of rule.. ******** ** ********°'**
Doctrine of necessary
implication... * * * ' * * * ' ' * ' * * *
5.15 204
4.24. 166 Disjunetive and conjunetive words.. *******".
from a right . *****'**' *********
.16
4.25. Remedy implied 167
Grant of jurisdiction..
*****"******************°'******
4.26.
What may be implied
from grant B. ASSOCIATED WORDS
4.27. ' * * * ° * * * * * * * * * * * ° * * * * * * *
168
of jurisdiction... incidental power. *******
169 206
includes sociis
*
4.28. Grant of power excludes 172 5.17. Noscitur a ******* *

***********************
208
Grant of power greater power. ****°******°*°*°°
Application of rule. *******************°**************'**** *
4.29 should not be

5.18. 213
implied
*********
4.30. What is 19.

Ejusdem g e n e r i s*************************
.
173 215
against the law
*****
*e*******************"*******"*****
. . .
Illustration of rule..
funds 5.20. *******
218
Authority to charge against public Limitations of ejusdem generis..
* * * * * * *
4.31 174 5.21. 222

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
*******************
be ****************
may not implied..... e*****
5.22.
from prohibition... 174 223
4.32. Illegality of act implied *******
5.23.
Negative-opposite doctrine .. *****°*********** *********°*****
224
175
Application expressio unius rule.
Exceptions to the rule.. oiiogaeou
4.33 of
*****************
5.24. 228
4.34 What cannot be done directly cannot be Limitations of rule *************:******************° ******
176 5.25. 231

done indirectly. *********************************°e°
Doctrine of casus omissus. *****
There should be no penalty for compliance 5.2 ********°******

232
4.35. 5.27. Doctrine antecedent.
of last 232
with law... 176
Illustration of rule.
* * ** * * * * * * * * * * *
**********#9*4*rm*
torn*a*****
5.28 234
.
5.29. Qualification of the doctrine .
****"
234
Chapter V Reddendo singula singulis * ****
5.30.
.
INTERPRETATION OF WORDS
yY Pi C. PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONSS
ANDPHRASES
AND SAVING CLAUSES
A. IN GENERAL 236
Tt 1 *****s****** ** **********************
5.31. Provisos, generally 287

5.01. Generally. 177 6.32. Proviso may enlarge scope of law... ..
238
6.02. Statutory definition..***************'**""****'********'**"*"""***, 177 6.88. Proviso as additional leginlation... 238
4**************d**********
5.03. Qualification of rule. 179 What proviso qualifies ..

***r**oapnooerstaso**ntoa********s 5.34. 240
5.04 Words construed in their ordinary sense. 180 5. Exception to the rule . A**a*******
*************
5.05. General words construed generally. proviso and

183 5.36. Repugnancy between 240
5.06. Applieation of rule... 184 main provision . . * * * * *
* * * * * *
..a*ea*****
**°
****°****
***************" 241
5.07. Generic term includes Exceptious, generally . .
things that 5.37. 242
arise thereafter....
toupoe ******* *** ******* 185 5.38. Bxception and proviso distinguished. 242
5.08 Words with commercial or trade **°********°*°**
186 llustration of exception

meaning..
*****'********
5.39. 245
5.09 Words with technical or Saving c l a u s e .*
.*.* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ° * * * * * * * * ° ' * * * * * *
legal meaning. 187 5.40.
xii ii
Chapter. VI
6.27. Qualification of the rule.. *******+****************** *********
283
Adopted statutes 283
CONSTRUED AS WHOLE AND
6.28. *** *** **4***********'**°****
STATUTE
TO OTHER STATUTEs
IN RELATION Chapter VII
CONSTRUED AS WHOLE STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
A. STATUTE
. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ° * * * * * * * q t * * *
247 A. IN GENERAL
Generally.
6.01. ascertained irom
statute as whole... 247
Intent 285
6.02.
context as controlling guide..... 250 7.01 Generully.. ***********t***( **os*pose***°"*********
6.03 Purpose or 285
to statute as a whole . . .
251 7.02. Strict construction, generally... * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ' * * * ° * * * * * * *
6.04 Giving effect 286

provisions reconciled... 252 7.03 Liberal construction, defined. ************************
6.05. Apparently conflicting 286

provisions 7.04. Liberal construction applied, generally...
6.06. Special and general Construction to promote social justice **********. 287
in same statute . . 256 7.05.
Construction as not to render provision 7.06. Construction taking into consideration general
6.07. welfare 288
nugatory..
256 or growth of civilization .
Reason for the rule
. . . ***°**'********°'**" 257
6.08. 257 B. STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED
6.09 Qualification of rule... **********
Construction as to give life to l a w . . *** 258
6.10. Penal stalutes, generally. 289
Construction to avoid surplusage... 261 7.07. ******************** ********
6.1 7.08. Penal statutes strictly construed..

****************** 289
Application of rule... ****************
262
.12. 7.09. Reason why penal statutes are
.13. Statute and its amendments construed 291
together . . . 264 strictly construed. ********
292
7.10. Acis mala in se and mala prohibita... ******°*°'
7.11. Application of rule. g*o****** ****************, 293

IN RELATION TO 295
B. STATUTE CONSTRUED 7.12. Limitation of rule ....
CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES .13. Statutes in derogation of rights. 296
7.14. Statutes authorizing expropriations... 297
Statute construed in harmony with 7.15. Statutes granting privileges..
***********e. *******°*" 297
6.14. 265 Legislative grants to local government units. 298
the Constitution... sD0********** ********************°
268
7.1
Statutory grounds for removal of officials. 298
6.15. Statutes in pari materia. 39*s9*******************'
268
7.17 299
How statutes in pari materia
conetrued... 7.18. Naturalization laws..
******'"****
6.16. 300
Reasons whylaws on same subject 7.19 Statutes imposing taxes and customs duties.
6.17. 271 301
are reconciled ...*gorgeheeg iiopeyp"***14*1** 7.20. Statutes granting tax exemptions . ***°*************
272 Qualification of rule. . 306

6.18. Where harmonization is impossible,. es 7.21. *********
272 7.22. Statutes concerning the sovereign.. *******" 306

6.19. lllustration of the r u l e . . 276 7.23 Statutes authorizing suits against
General and special statutes...
6.20. 279 307
Reason for the rule .. the government..
6.21. 279 7.24 Statutes prescribing formalities of will.. *****'
308
6.22. Qualifications of the rule.. . ' te
309
280 7.25. Exceptions and provisos.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
******
* * * * * * * ' '
***
*****
6.23 Referenee statutes..

281
6.24 Supplemental statutes.. 281 C. STATUT ZS LIBERALLY CONSTRUED
6.25 Reenacted statutes .
6 26 Aduption of contemporaneous 283 26 General social legislation. *'*****'''******
310
**********'''
construction...
General welfare clause.. 311 8.15. Election laws on conduct of election..
7.27. 342
Grant of power to local governments.....
312 8.16. Election laws on
qualification
7.28.
Statutes granting taxing power.... *****
314 and disqualification..
7.29. 343
prescribing prescriptive period
*********************** ************
8.17. Statutes prescribing
7.30. Statutes
to collect lUxes ...n********** 315 8.18.
qualifications for office
Statutes relating to assessment
. . 344
penalties for nonpayment 8.19. Statutes concerning public auction of taxes... 344
7.51. Statutes imposing sale ...
345
of tax 316
7.32. Election laws. * **********"*****"******"****
316 C. DIRECTORY STATUTES
7.33. Amnesty proclamations.... *********** °"*****"**** 319
7.34 Statutes prescribing prescriptions of crimes. 320 .20. Statutes prescribing guidance for officers. 345
7.35.
Aduption statutes . 321 8.21. Statutes prescribing manner
7.36.
Veteran änd pension laws .. 321 of judicial action
7.37. Rules of Court. 326
. ********************************** 345
8.22. Statutes requiring rendition of decision
7.38. 0ther statutes 327 within prescribed period 346
.. *********°******
8.23. Constitutional time provision directory.. *****?***°°***° 348

Chapter VIII
MANDAToRY AND DIRECTORY Chapter X

STATUTES PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE
STATUTES
A. IN GENERAL
A. IN GENERAL
8.01. Generally..
******************************************* pa*satnegpae 329
8.02. Mandatory and directory statutes, generally. 329 9.01 Prospective and retroactive statutes,
.03. When statute is mandatory directory..
or ********°* 330 defined ...
****************************°°* *** 351
8.04 Test to determine nature of statute ********4********* 332 9.02. Laws operate prospectively, generally.. ******* 352
8.05 Language used... ***
833 9.0 Presumption against retroactivity.. 355
8.06. Use of "shall" or "must". 333 9.04. Words or phrases indicating prospectivity **********°* 355
8.07. Use of "may.****************' ***********a***4*******4** 335 9.05. Retroactive statutes, generally . .***a***s*****e**** 356
8.08. When "shall" is construed as "may"
and vice versa . . .
335 B. STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT
e*******************"*
8.09 Use of negative, prohibitory or
exclusive
terms. 337 9.06. Penal statutes, generally..********** ******************* 357
*** ******;°****°**°*******
9.07. Ex post facto law . *i********
. * *********
357
B. MANDATORY STATUTES 9.08. Bill of attainder *. . .*******a*t******n**m***o****************** 358
9.09. When penal laws applied retroactively.*******:******** 359
8.10. Statutes conferring power .. 9.10 Statutes substantive in nature.. 361
*****' 337 e***n o*e*****
8.11. Slututes grunting benefits.. 338 9.11. Effects on pending actions. 362
* *****
8.12. Statutes preseribing jurisdictional 9.12 Qualification of rule. *e*na*********** **********
363
Statutes affecting vested 364
requirements... 338
.13 rights..
8.13. Statutes prescribing time 9.14. Statutes affecting obligations of contract 366
take action
°****°**
to
to 9.15. Illustration of rule. 367
or
appeal **********'a******* **************** 339
8.14 Statutes .16. Repealing and amendatory acts 368
prescribing procedural requirements.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * e * *
341
Xvii
xvi
9999
Proceedings of
the convention .*
** .*.* * * * * ' * * * * " ' " * * * * * *
446
11.08. and writings....
Contemporaneous
construction 450
11.09.
Previous laws
and judicial rulings . . . . .
451
11.10.
in phraseology.. 451
11.11. Changes
constructions. 452
11.12. Consequences of alternative
Constitution construed as
a whole. * * * * * * * * * * * 453
11.13.
Mandatory or directory... 455
11.14.
Prospective or retroactive... 456
Chapter
***********°******
11.15.
11.16. Applicability of rules of statutory
construction... 458
11.17. Generally,constitutional provisions STATUTES
are self-executing. ***** 467
Glossary of Maxims.. ************************************** 471 A. IN GENERAL

Subject Index... **********°************ 475
1.01. Laws, generally.

Law in its jural and generic sense refers to the whole body or
rule of
system of law. In its jural and concrete sense, law means a
conduct formulated and made obligatory by legitimate power of the
state. It includes statutes enacted by the legislature, presidential
decrees and executive orders issued by the President in the exer-
cise of his legislative power, other presidential issuances in the
exurcise of his ordinance power, rulings of the Supreme Court con-
administra-
struing the law, rules and regulations promulgated by
tive or executive offñcers pursuant to a delegated power, and ordi-
nances passed by sanggunians of local government units.
1.02. Statutes, generally.

A statute is an act of the legislature as an organized body,
expressed in the form, and passed according to the procedure,
re-
constitute it part of the law of the land. Statutes

quired to as
enacted the legislature are those passed by the Philippine Com-

by
mission, the Philippine Legislature, the Batasang Pambansa, and
' the.Congress of the Philippines. Other laws which are of the same
category and binding force as statutes are presidential decrees is
sued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power dur-
Constitution' and
ing the period of martial law under the 1973
Garcia-Padilla v.
Legaspi v Miuistry of Finance, 115 SCRA 418 (1982); un Elections. 62
Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 61388, April 20, 1983, Aquino v. Comnission
SCRA 275 (1975
S T A T U T O R Y CONSITRUCTIONN
STATUTEs
B Enactrnent of Statutes
the President in the excrcise of his legis must the statute intended to
executive orders
issued by by nuture temporury in character,
so
the revolutionary period under the Frecdon be. A limit in time to tide
over a passing trouble may
lative power durig meet it,
law that may not be upheld as a permanent one."
Constitution. justify a
Statutes may either

bepublic or private. A public stutute. is
or the whole community, AA
one which
affects the public at large 1.04. 0ther clas6es of statutes.
to a specific person or
satute is one which applhes only prospective
be or
private private depends on In respect their application, statutes may
o
But whether a statute is public or
to their operation, de
subject. retroactiye. They may also be, according
substance rather than on form. substantive, remedial, and
claratory, curative, mandatory, directory,
into general, special and be affirmative or nega-
Public statutes may be classified penal. In respect to their forms, they may
law is one which applies to the whole state
local laws. A general tive
and operates throughout the state alike upon
all the people or all of
embraces a class of subjects or places and
a class." lt is one which Manner of referring to statutes.
to suchh 1.05.
does not omil any subject or place naturally belonging numbered
cluss. special
A Jaw is one which relutes to purticular persons or passed by the legislature are consecutively
Statutes
that enacted them. Stat-
things of a class or to a particular community, individual.or thing. and identificd by the respective authorities
utes passed by the Philippine

Commission and the Philippine Leg-
A local law is one whuse operation.is contined to a specific place or
locality. A municipai ordinance is an example of a local law islature from 1901 to 1935 are identified as Public Acts. The laws
referred
enacted during the Commonwealth from 1936 o 1946
are
of
to as Commonwealth Acts, while those passed by the Congress
1.03. Permanent and temporary statutes. 1987
the Philippines from 1946 to 1972 and from 1987 under the
the
According to its duration, a statute may be permanent or Constitution are known as Republic Acts. Laws promulgated by
Presiden-
temporary, A perinanent statute is one whose operation is not lim- Batasang Pambansa are referred to as Batas Pambansa.
ited in duration but continues until repealed. It does not terminate tiul decrees and executive orders issued by the President in the
by the lapse of a fixed period or by the occurrence of an event. exercise of his legislative power are also serially numbered. Apart
Neither disuse nor custom or practice to the contrary operates to from its serial number, a statute may also be referred to by its title.
render it ineffective or inoperative. (4tids 7 cirk.to u
A temporary statute is a etatute whose duration is for a lim- B. ENACTMENT OF STATUTES

ived period of time fixed in the statute itself or whose life ceases
upon the huppening of an event. Where a statute provides that it
shall be in force for a definite period, it terminates at the end of 1.06. Legislative power, generally.
such period." Where a statute is designed to meet an emergency, it
ends upon the cessation of such
Legislative power is the power to make, alier and repeal laws.
emergency. Since an emergency is Under the Constitution, legislative power is vested in Congress,"
Under the 1973 and Freedom Constitutions, the President of the
Philippines used to exercise legislative power in the form of Presi
Sec 1, Proclamution No. 3, March 25,

1986, known as Freedom Constilution.
P'eoplev.
Palnua, G.R. No. 44119, March 31, 1977, 76 SCRA 243.
Valera v. Tuason, 80 Phil. 823 (1948).
Valera Tuason, supra.
v
"Homeowners Assn. of the Phils.
2:3979, Aug 30, 1968, 24 SCRA B56.
v. Municipal Board of Manila, G.R. No.
People v. Palma, supra. ccena v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52265, June 28, 19%0, 9
Art 7, ivil Code.
SCRA 755.
Esprtu v
Cipriano, G.R. No. 32743, Feb. 15, 1974, 55 SCRA 533 Art. VI, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution.
(1974).
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
6 STATUTES 1
B. Enactment of Statutes
a m e n d m e n t s shall have
been acied
After the
and amendments. second reading. A bill approved on Appropriations and revenue bills.
bill will de voted on 1.10.
upon, the calendar of bills for third
be included in the The procedure for the enactment of ordinary bills applies to
second reading shall second reading
the bitB as approved on
reading. On Third Reading, the enactnent of appropriations and revenue measures. However,
vote by yeas and nays.
for final they can only originate from the lower House, but the Senate may
will be submitted
by one House i8 transmit. propose or concur with the amendments.3 Moreover, appropria-
The bill approved on Third Reading follow substan- tions bills are subject to the follovwing restrictions or qualitications,
for cóncurrence, which will
ted to the other House
route as a bill originally
filed with it, If the other as provided in the Constitution
tially the same
without amend1nent, the bill is passed by
House approves the bil The Congress may not increase the appropriations rec
same will be transmitted
to. the. President, for ommended by the President for the operation of the Government as
Congress und the
amendments and
action. If the other House introduces specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of prepara-
appropriate with said amend-
does not agree
the House from which it originated tion of the budget shal be prescribed by law."
the. Canference (lemmit
ments, the differences will be setlled by 2. "No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the
thereon
Les of both Chambers, whOse report or reconmendation
will iave to be approved by both
Houses in order that it will be general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some
considered Congress and thereafier sent to the President
passed by
particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment
shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it
for action. relates."
Con-
The Constitution provides that "le]very bill passed by the 3. The procedure in approving approprietions for the Con-
shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President.
gress gress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropria-
f he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto
it
where it
tions for the other departments and agencies."
and return the same with his objections to the House
its Journal 4. A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose
originated, which shall enter the objections at large in
and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two- for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised bya
it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by corresponding revenue proposal therein."
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and. if approved by two- 5. "No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of ap-
thirds uf all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In propriations; however,the Presídent, the President of the Senate,
all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas
or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against
shall the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the
be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days law for their
after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as appropriations respective
offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations."
if he had signed it.2 In other words, a bill passed by Congress
6.
becomes a law in either of three ways, namely: (1) when the Presi- Diacretionary funds appropriated for particular oficials
shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by
dent signs it; (2) when the President does not sign nor communi-
cate his veto of the bill within thirty days after his receipt thereof, approprinte vouchers and subject ta such guidelines as
may be
and prescribed by law."
(3) when
vote of all its
the vetoed bill is repassed
by Congress by two-thirds
Members, each House voting Beparately.
3Art. VI, Sec 24, ibiul.

"Art VI, Sec. 2701), ibid.
Art V1, Sec. 25, ibid.
STATUTORY ONSTRUCTION
STAIUTEs
B Enactment of Statutes
the Congress shall have

end of any fiscal year, reasons of public policy require
I, by the 1or the ensuing fiscal to legislative records. "Imperative:
7. should rest upon public memoriale of
appropriation8
bill
the general that the authenticity of laws
fiscal year
failed to pass
appropriations
law for the preceding character. They should be public
because all
the most pernanent
the general remain in force and effect should be permanent, that
and shall
required to conform to them; they
year,
deemed reenacted the Congress." are
declared to
shall be bill is passed by íaith of what has been
until the general
appropriations rights acquired tuday upon the of
tomorrow, or at some remote period
to veto any purticu. be Jaw shall not be destroyed
shall have the power individuals.""
The President tariff bill, but the in the memory uf
8
appropriation, revenue, or i e , by 1arta resling only
in an
lar item or items items to which he does not ob.
affect the item or
veto shail not
1.13. Enrolled bill.
J e c t . "25
The bill as passed by Congresa,

authenticated by the Speaker
the President is known
as
Authentication of bills. and Senate President and approved by the text
I.11. the principle of the enrolled bill,
when the bill is the enrolled bil. Under
in Congress ends is deemed importing
absolute
The lawmaking process is indispensable to of the act as passed and approved
It is this approval that the courts.3
approved by the body. verity and is binding on
bill is sent to the Presi.
bill. Before an approved conclusive not only of its provi-
the validity of the the Constitution, jthe bill The enrolled copy of a bill is
consideration as required by
dent for his authentication devised is the sign- due enactment. Not even ciaims that a pro-
of sions but also of its
is authenticsted. The system invalid because the requisite
and the Senate President
of the printed copy of posed constitutional
amendment was
ing by the Speaker been obtained or that certain provi-
President that the bill being had not
the votes for its approval
the approved bill, to signify
to
been "smuggled" in the printing of the bill
legislature and is sions of a statute had
presented to him has been duly approved by the court to iook behind the
proceedings
have moved or persuaded the
rejection to have the doc-
ready for his approval
or Attenpts
of a co-equal branch of the government.
trine re-examined or relaxed
has so far failed.32
Unimpeachability of legislative journais. accorded conclusive verity
1.12. The reason why an enrolled bill is
House shall keep. a bill carries on its face a solemn
The Constitution requires that "MeJach lies in the fact that the enro!led
of the gov-
Journal of its proceedings, and
from time to time publish the same, a s s u r a n c e by the legislative
and executive departments
affect national secu- with the duty of rnacting and e x
excepting such parts as may,
in its judgment, ernment, charged respectively
the request of passed by the assembly. The respect
and the yeasand nays on any question shall, at ecuting the laws, that it was
rity; The departments requires the judicial
one-fifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal."27 due to co-equal and independent
to matters that are that assurance, and to accept, as having
Journa! is regarded as conclusive with respect department to act upon
be recorded theren. With respect to
authenticated."
required by the Constitution to passed the assembly, all bills duly
the Jour-
other matters,in the absence of evidence to the cContrary,
effect.23
nals have also been accorded conclusive
records contained in the,.legislative journals

are
Entries or Morales v. Subido, G.R. Ne, 29658,
policy U.S. Pons, 34 Phil. 729, 735 (1916);
declared conclusive upon the courts. Considerations of publie v.
Feb. 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 131
led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and unimpeachability SOMorales v. Subido, supra. Chemical Co., Inc. v.
Phil. 1 (1947); Casco Phil.
"Mabanag v lopez Vito, 78 Subido, G.R. No.
i R No 17931, Fob. 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 347; Murales v.
(Gimonoz,
Feb. 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 181.
29658, 630 (1994);
Tblentin0 v. Secretary of Finance,
54 SCAD 671, 235 SCRA
#Art. VI, Sec. 27(2), ibid.
(1997).
85 SCAD 680, 277 SCRA 268
Astorga v. Villegas, G.R. No. 23475, April 30, 1974, 56 SCRA 714. Arroyo v. De Venecia,
Art. VI, Sec. 1614), 1987 Constitution. "Morules v. Subido, 8upra.
"Arroyo v. De Venecia, 85 SCAD 680, 277 SCRA 268 (1997).
STATUTE8 11
C.Parts of Statute
behind the enrolled act to discove what
Courts cannot go
The respect due to the ranches of gover
other brar
ture, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted
really happened. act the faith and credit whatt of and did not accordingly become a law37
ment demands that courts upon the
ofñcers of the said branches attest to as the oflicial acts of thooir
courts would bo cast in th
respective departments. Otherwise, C. PARTS OF STATUTESentlrtE
role a sleuth trying to determine whut
unenviable and unwanted of
act ually did happen
in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with cons
quent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. For ir
1.15. Title of statute.
there be danger that officials concerned may impose upon the peo- Act
The Constitution provides that "every bill passed by Congress
ple an act that was never passed in the form in which it is Dro.
served in the published statutes, there will be much greater danger shall embrace only one subject which shali be expressed in the title
of permitting the validity of a legislative enactment to be queg. thereof."4 This provision is mandatory, and a law enacted in viola-
tioned by evidence furnished by the general endorsements made by tion thereof is unconstitutional.3 The constitutional provision con-
clerks upon bills previous to their final passage and enrollment,4 tains dual limitations upon the legislature. First, the legislature is
Hence, if there haes been any mistalke in the printing of the bill to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogene
before it was certified by the officer of the assembly and approved ous subjects. Second, the title of the bill is to be
couched in a
by the chief executive, the remedy is by amendment by enacting a language sullicient to notify the legislators and the public and
urative iegislation, not by judicial decree. those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.0
The legislative journals and the enrolled bill are both conclu-
sive upon the courts. However, where there is a 1.16. Purposes of requirement.
tween the journal and the enrolled
discrepancy be-
bill, the latter as a rule prevails The principal purpose of the constitutional requirement that
over the former,
particularly with respect to matters not expressly every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
required to be entered into the legislative journal.36 in its title is to apprise the legislators of the object, nature and
scope of the provisions of the bil, and to prevent the enactment
1.14. Withdrawal of authentication, effect of. into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and
study of the legislators. It is to prohibit duplicity in legislation,
The Speaker and the
President may withdraw their the title of which completely fails to apprise the legislators or the
tures from the signa
signed bill where there is serious and substantial public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its provi
discrepancy between the text of the bill as deliberated the sions. In other words, the aims of the constitutional requirement
lature and shown by the in legis-
journal and
withdrawal renders the bill without that of the enrolled bill. Such
are: "First, to prevent hodgepodge or log-roliing legislation; second,
attestation and nullifies its to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature, by means of
8tatus As_an enrolled
accorded absolute veritybill.
In euch a provisions in bills of which the title gave no information, and which
case, the bill is
noonger
as regards its text and the entries
journal should be consulted. And where in the
substantial amendments were the journal discloses that
ahy
co
not introduced and approved but were
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for SAstorga v. Villegas, G.R. No. 23475, April 30, 1974, 56 SCRA 714.
signa- Art. VI, Sec. 261), 1987 Constitution.
Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676 (1926); Phil. Conetitution Asan. v. Gimenez,
G.R. No. 23326, Dec. 18, 1965, 15 SCRA 479.
"Morales
v.
Subido, G.R. No. 29658, Feb. Lidasan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 29089, Oct. 29, 1967, 21
Castu Phil. 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 131.
SCRA 347 Chemical Co., Inc. v. SCRA 496.
Gimenez, G.R. No. 17931, Feb: Librares v, Executive Secretary, a.R. No. 21505, Oct. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 261.
s*Morales 28, 1963, 7
v.
Subido, supra. lnchong v. Hernandea, 101 Phil, 1156 (1957); Municipality of Jose Panganiban
v. Shell Co. uf the Phils., G.R. No. 18349, July 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 77.
STATUTES
13
C. Parta of Statutes
and carelessly and unintentionallv

be overlooked not inconsistent with
might therefore
the. people, through such publi expressed in the title, or
so long as they are
where it indi-
to fairly apprise
adopted, and third, of the subjects o r foreign to the general
subject. It is a valid title
as is usually made, and
proceedings the nature, scope conpequences
cation of legislative by petition or other cates in broad but clear terms,
are being heard thereon,
of the legislation that of the law and ita operations.50
shall desire."
that the legislature employ
so
wise, if they
The Constitution does not require
be added. The titleof a statute is used of such precision as to
mir
A fourth purpose may in the title of a n enactment, language
in uscertaining legislative intent when the language of indexed or catalogued, all the
contents and the minute
as a guide The title may clarify ror, fully
express its purpose." title should meet the purpose of
the act does not clearly of a 'statute, and details of the law. It suffices if the the per-
the meaning and scope that it informs the ilegislators,
doubt or ambiguity in the constitutional demand
one subject and expressing
it in its title
of the bill, and the public, of the
limiting a statute to only sons interested in the subject and its
as an intrinsic aid to statutory con
of the proposed m e a s u r e
will strengthen its function nature, scope and consequences of the bill,
them to inquire into the body
struction.45 operation, and thus lead action thereon,
and take appropriate
study and discuss the
same
or fraud upon the legislators.1

How requirement construed. and, consequently, prevent surprises or index of the bill.52
1.17. not be catalogue
In short, the title should
a
which
to title of a bill should be of amendatory acts. A title
The constitutional requirement as These principles apply to titles
statute is a sufficient
iberally construed." It should not be given a technical interpreta- states that it is an act to amend a specifie
no: state
as to cripple or impede constitutional requirement; it need
tion. Nor should it be so narrowly construed compliance with the
as to whether the the amendatory act.5
the power of legislation." Where there is doubt the precise nature of
the subject matter of the statute, the enacted before the Coinmon-
title sufficiently expresses
in favor of the Some statutes, particularly those
the doubt and "and for other purposes."
question should be resolved against wealth, have titles ending with the words
constitutionality of the statute.43
It has been held that the phrase expresses nothing and amounts to
with the cons'itutional requirement. The
nothing as a compliance the Philippine
was frequently used by
"t phrase "for, other purposes" and its use in some stat-
1.18. Whenthere is compliance with requirement. Legislature during the American regime,
the Philippine Legislature of the
There is sufñcient compliance with the coFstitutional require- utes was due to the adoption by
in the United States.
nent if the title be comprehensive enough to reasonably
include style employed in congressional legislation
the United States Congress is not sub-
the general object which statute seeks
a to effect, without express- However, the legislation of
constitutional restriction as that embodied in the
or convenient tor ject to the same
ng each and every end and,meane, necessary Philippine Constitution.*
all the
accomplishing the object." The requirement is satisfied if
of the law related, and are germane to the subject matter
parts are
"Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676, 688 (1926). 48 SCRA 382.

Government v. Municipality of Binangonan, 32 Phil. 634 (1915). BPeople v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 32613, Dec. 27, 1972, Oct. 29, 1967, 21
oidasan v.Comnission on Elections, G.R. No. 28089,
See Secs. 3.02 and 3.03, infra.
SCRA 496
People w. Buenviaje, 47 Phil. 686 (1925); Alalayan v. National Power Corp., G.R. No. 14542, Oct. 31,
GR. No. 24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172. People v. Ferrer, supra; Corderv v. Cubatuando,
Airlines, Inc., I20 Phil.
Assn. P'hit.
1962, 6 StRA 418; Phil. Airlines Employees
y.
Cordero v. Cubatuando, G.R. No. 14542, Oct. 31, 1962, 6 SCRA 418; Tobias 628 (1964)
Abalos, 57 SCAD 419, 237 SCRA 106 (1994). 62 Phil. 461 (1935).
Manila Trading & Supply-Co. v. Reyes,
Phil. 399 (1927); CentraB Capiz
v
nsular Lunber Co. v. Court of Tux Appeals, G.R. No. 81057, Muy 29, 1981,
104 SCRA 710. Government v. El Hogar Filipino, 60
Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883 (1920).
"Cordero v. Cabatuando, supra.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 8TATUTEs
CParts of Statutes
14
the
the Senate and House
of Representatives of
not applicable. Be it enacted by of the
When requirement assembled and by authority
1.19. embrace only one subject Philippines in Legislature clause of statutes
that a bill shall Commonwealth, the enacting
The requirement embodied in the 1935 same."During the of the Philippines,"
in its title w a s enacted by the National Assembly
expressed is: "Be it
which shall be and 1987 Constitutions, the Senate anad
reenacted in the
1973 to: Be it enacted by
Constitution and be en- which w a s later changed when the a s
to bills which may thereafter in Congress
assembled,"
The requirenent
applies only and existing at the House of Representatives clause is also the
to laWs in force bicameral. The latter enacting
acted into law.
It does not apply sembly became from 1946 to 1972
and from
C o n s t i t u t i o n took
effect.55 used by the Congress
enacting clause the Batasang
The enacting ciause adopted by
time the 1935
also no application to mu 1987 up to the present. Pambansa in session
requirement has enacted by the Batasang
The constitutional
partake of the
nature of Pambansa is: "Be it clause of President.al
do not
ordinances, a s they have the force assembled." On the other hand,
the enacting
nicipal o r city National Assembly, though
they as follows: "NOW
THEREFORE, I,
laws enacted by the Decrees is worded substantiaily virtue of the powers
President of the Philippines, by
and effect of laws.56 C'ostitutinn, do hereby
decree as follow s:"
voated in m o by the the exercise of his legis-
Executive Order
issued by the President in
of title. therefore, I,
of insuficiency clause: "Now,
lative power has this enacting
Effect
.
1.20. constitutional
conform to the
title does not hereby order"
A statute whose m a n n e r to its
subject is null1
in any
requirement o r
is not related matter of a statute is not
however, the subject 1.22. Preamble.
and void.57 Where, subject mat
in its title, only
so much of therest statement or explanation
o r a find-
sufficiently expressed the in force,08 A preamble is a prefatory occasion for making

therein is void, leaving in the purpose, reason, or
ter a s is n o t
expressed from the others, ing of facts, reciting the enact
inseparable It is usually found after
the law to which it is prefixed.'
are
the invalid provisions latter59 seldom
unless former vitiates the of the law. The. legislature
before the body
which case the nullity of the ing clause and law. The r e a s o n for this
statute it enacts into
puts a, preamble to a or occasion
ibs sadutc h t u V is that the statement

embodying the purpose, reason, note.
Enacting clause. pevf contained in its explanatory
1.21.
statute written
immedi- for the enactment of the law is Orders generally ha ve
of a and Executive
clause is that part whioh the However, Presidential Decrees enacted by the leg-
The enacting istates the authority by unlike statutes
the title thereofwhich Commission con- preambles apparently becau_e, thereof of
after expound on ihe purpose
ately
enected." Laws passed
by the Philippine President of the islature in which the
members
of deliberations, n0
uct is of the note or in the c o u r s e
clause: "By authority Philippine Com- the bill in its explanatory
tain this enacting States the preamble cad the reason and purpoee of
it enacted by the United Philippine better place than in in the
United States, be
clause of statutes
enacted by the
the decree be stated. Preambles thus
play an important role
mission." The enacting be it énacted
authority of the United States, construction of Presidential Decrees.
Legislature states: "By
Legislature
Legislature."
When the Philippine clause:
enacting
by the Philippine enacted it have this
by Purview of statute.
became bicameral, laws 1.23.
which tells what
statute is that part
The purview or body of a embrace only one
of a statute should
the law is all about. The body
Phil. 642 (1957).
5People Valensoy, 101
v.
610 (1912). 16 (1918).
usento, 29 Phil. Dec. 18, 1966, P. 72, 3 ALR 394
U.S. v E»pirit G.R. No. 23326, Oil Co. v. Santa Fe"177
Continental SCRA 542; People v.
Inc. v. Gimenez, 123 SCRA EBÐ. Nov. 20, 1978, 86
Constitution Asen.,
25, 1983, Purnsima, G.R. No. 42050,
Phil. G.R. No. 42571, July People v
SCRA 663.
SCRA 479; De la
Cnuz v. Paras, Jan. 28, 1960, 95
26 L. ed. 406
(I881). Eehavez, G.R No. 47757,
v Burrage, 103 U.S 447,
Unity (1954).
Phil. 534
sn re Cunanan, 94 Code.
Administrative
7 and 8, Revised
OSe
16 STATUTES 17
Ordinances
D Presidential lssuances, Rules and
The constitutional
requirement that a bill should
orders, proclamations, memorandum orders,
memo-
subject matter. which should be expressed in its title adninistrative
matter
have only one subject no matter how di special orders. These is6 uances
where the provisions thereof, randum,circulars, and general or
is complied with to the subject and pur. have the force and effect of laws."
be, are allied and germane
verse they may
where the provisions are not President providing for rules
bill or, negatively stated, are "acts of the
Executive Orders
pose of the furtherance of, the single subject matier in the implementation or ex-
inconsistent with, but in of a general or permanent character
These should be
ecution of constitutional or statutory powers."
a statute is to divide an act President in the
The legislative practice in writing differentiated from execution orders issued by the
which is nunbered and contains a single the revolutionary period
into sections, each of exercise of his legislative power during
and comprehensive piece of legislation usu- the latter are of the same
proposition. A complex under the Freedom Constitution, for
this a short title, a policy section, defini statutes enacted by the legislaure
ally contains, in sequence,
category and binding force as
sections prescribing standards
tion section, administrative section, while the former do not have such status.
imposing sanctions for violation of its provi-
of conduct, section the President which relate.
clause, Administrative Orders are "acts of
sions, transitory provision, separability clause, repealing in pursuance of
to particular aspects of governmental operations are of the
and effectivity clause.
his duties as administrative head."ss Proclamations'
"acts
or condition of public
President fixing a date or declaring a statute
existence of which the operation of
a
1.24. Separability clause. moment or interest, upon the or-
is made to depend."* Memorandum
statute which states specific law or regulation
A separability clause is that part of a
on matters of
administrative detail
invalid, the remainder ders a r e "acts of the President
that if any provision of the act is declared subordinate temporary interest which only concerrn a par
shall not be affected thereby. It is a legislative expression of intent or of ar
Circulars
ticular officer or office of the Government."o Memorandum adminis-
that the nullity of one provision shall not invalidate the ather pro- are "acts of the President on matters relating to internal
visions of the act. Such a clause is not, however, controlling and the to the attention of all
where what. tration which the President desires to bring
courts may, in spite of it, invalidate the. whole statute departments, agencies,bureaus or offices of the
or some of the
isleft, after the void part, is not complete and workable,54 compliance."7 General or specific
Government, for information or
capacity his as
in
The presumption is that the legislature intended a statute to be "acts and commands of the President
orders are
the Philippines."2
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
effective as a whole and would not have passed it had it foreseen that
some part of it is invalid. The effect of a separability clause is
to
create in the place of such presumption the opposite of separability.85 and regulations.
1.26. Supreme Court circulars; rules
Court the power
The 1987 Constitution grants the Supreme
and enforcement of
D. PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES, RULES to "promulgate rules concerning the protection
practice, and procedure in al! courts,
AND ORDINANCES constitutional rights, pleading,
the Integrated Bar, and legal
the admission to the practice of law,
1.26. Presidential issuances.
Presidential issuances are tho8e which the President issues in

Pesigan v. Angeles, G.R. No. 64279, April 30, 1984.
the exercise of his ordinance power. They include executive orders, Administrative Code.
Sec. 2, Book II1, Title I, Chap. 2, 1987
Sec. 3, ibid.
Sec, 4, ibid.
People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 585 (1947) 70Sec. 5, ibid.
Greenblat v. Golden, 94 S02d 366, 69 ALR 2d 877 (1957). For further Sec. 6, ibid.
discussion on the subject, see Sec. 1.41, infra.
Sec. 7, óid.
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 73 L. ed. 287 (1929):
16 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 19
STATUTES
Ordiianceg
Rules and
) Fresidential IaAUanrse,
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a sim- whether the
the test is
procedural or substantive,
Court is process for
plified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, preme
procedure, that is,
the judicial
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall rule really regulaes substantive law and
for
not duties recognized by
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of proce enforcing rights and redress for a disregard
or irfrac-
justlyadministering remedy and if

dure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies sihall remain
effec cight, it is. not procedural
tion of them. Ifit Lakes away vested tive,
tive unless disapproved by the Supreme Court,"73
the rule creates rightsuch aa
the righ to appeal, it is substar
an existing right
The rule-making power of the Supreme Court as means of implementing
provided in but if it operates as a to prosecute a n
with procedure. Where
Sec. 55), Article VIII of the Constitution is
complemented by Sec. 30, then the rule deals merely procedurai, such as
the venue of appeal is
Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that: "No law shall be appeal or transferring Ormbudsman in ad-
from decisions of the
passed increasing the appelate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as decreeing that appeals
of Appeals"s or requiring
ministrative actions be made to the Court filed with the Court of
provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence." It be
has been held that astatute which provides that a decision of a that appeals from decisions of the NLRC
Appeals.
quasi-judicial bodybeappealabledirectlytothe Supreme Court,if
enacted without the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court, administrative or executive
Rules andregulations issued by the
cannotbe cffective. In such a case, the rule prescribed in Rule 43 of authorized by, law have
oflicers in accordance with, and as Ali that ypat
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on appeals from quasi-judicial force and effect of law or partake the nature of a statute.
is that the rules should be germane to
agencies to the Court of Appeals shall apply74 is required for their validity benot in
and purposes of the law; that the regulations
,
Pursuant to its rule-making power, the Supreme Court adopted the objects but conform to, the standards that the law pre
contradiction with,
the of carrying into
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and introduced new provisions scribes;7 and that they be for the sole purpose
to, modified and/or re-arranged the old provisions of, the Rules of effect the general provisions of the law." By
such regulations, the
Court from Rules 1 o 71, which now form part of the Rules of terms and provisions re
law itself cannot be extended,1 nor its
Court. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated by the stricted. Hence, in case of discrepancy or conflict between the ba-
Supreme Court in the exercise of its rule-making power. The ruBe-
BiC Tawand the regulatios iasued to implement it, the former
making power of the Supreme Court includes the power to repeal prevatts over the latter* For it is elementary principle in statutoryy
procedura. lawa such as those. which preecribe.the method of.en- construction that a statute issuperior to an administrative regula-
forcing rights or obtaining redress-for their invasion. Parts of stat- tion and the former cannot be repealed or amended by the latter
utes which deal with procedural aspects can be modified or re-
pealed by the Supreme Court by virtue of its constitutional rule-
making power, such as when it made uniform the rules on appeal Fabian v. Desierto, 98 SCAD 414, 295 SCRA 470 (1998)
from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals by repealing the "St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, 98 SCAD 435, 295 SCRA 494 (1998).
procedural provisions of R.A. No. 7902, R.A. No. 1128, 5440, and 78Victoriaa Milling Co., Ine. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555 (1962).
R.A. No. 5434.70 Director of F'orestry v. Muñoz, G.R. No. 25459, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA
I184; People v. Exconde, 101 Phil. I126 (1957); Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,
The legislature may enact laws which are substantive and 39 Phil. 660 (1919).
63 Phil. 300
procedural, but the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-
U.S. v. Tupasi Moliua, 29 Phil. (1914); People v. Santos,
119
(1938), Shell Phils, lnc. v. Central Bank, 162 SCRA 628 (1988).
making power, does not have the power to promulgate rules which Teoxon v. Buard of Administrators, G.R. No. 25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA
are substantive in nature, Whether a rule prescribed by the Su- 585; Gobantes v. Civil Service Commission, 214 SCRA 495 (1992).
s4People v. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091 (1960).
Wise& Co. v. Meer, 78 Phil. 665 (1947); People v. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091 (1960);
Art 7, l't'ode Villav Llann, G.R No 61498. Jun, 17, 1883, 120 SRA B1, 1ina
Sec. 515), Art. VIll, Constitution. v. Curinu, 2%1 SC°RA 616 (I993).
FabianPirst lepantoCeramics, Ine. CA, 49 SCAD 406, 237 8CRA B19 (1994). See
v.
Desierto, 98 SCAD 414, 295 HCRA 470
v.
China Baniing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 77 SCAD 125, 265 SCRA 327
"P'irat lajpuntu Corumes, Inc.
(1998). (1996)
v. ("A, 49 SCAD 406, 231 SCRA 30 (1994).
STATUTEs
21
20 D. Presidential Issuances, Rules
and Ordinances
summarized the rule, as follows:

The rule-making power of a public administrative agoncy is The Court in a case
delegated legislative power. It may not use the power to bridge the rules in the implementation
(T)he power to promulgate
authority to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. It may limited to what is provided for in
of a statute is necessarily
not issue rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the must be followed for an
the legislative enactment. Its terms The
provisions of the Constitution or a statute, or which are in deroga. cannot amend an Act of Congress.
adininistrative agency for regulation
tion of, or defeat, the purpose of the statute which created it. A ruler rule-making power must be confined to details
or regulation which restricts or eniarges such statute is invalid.as into effect the law as it
of the mode or proceedings to carry
extended to amend or
It has been held that while the legislature may delegate to has been enacted, and it cannot be
to embrace matters not
another branch of expand the statutory requirements or
government the power to fill in the details in the covered by the statute. If a discrepancy occurs between the
execution, enforcement or administration of law, it is essential that or regulation, it is
the
said law (a) be complete in itself--- it must set forth therein basic law and an implementing rule
the of a public ad-
policy to be executed, carried former that prevails. The rule-making power
out or implemented by the delegate, ministrative body is delegated legisiative
a power, which it
and (b) fixa standard- the limits of it by Con-
which are susficiently deter. may not use either to abridge the authority given
minate or determinable to which the delegate or to enlarge its power beyond
the
must conform in
-
the performance of his gress or the Constitution con-

functions,
be express or implied from the
The standard, which may either scope intended, Constitutiona! and statutory provisions
such a
policy and purpose of the act as a trolwhat rules and regulations may be promulgated by
whole, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject tu
specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the
under circumstances regulation by it. It may not make rules and reguations which
to ot which the are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution
or a
legislative command is to be effected It is the criterion
ya i by which legislative purpose may be carried the statute it is administering or which
out. The executive or statute, particularly
created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat the purpose
administrative officer designated may, in
pursuance of the guide-
duelaalines,promulgate the rules and regulations,8" It has been of a statute. Moreover, where the legislature had delegated to
thefollowing are adequate standards: simplicity held that an executive or administrative officers and boards authority
lic interest" public and dignity" pub- to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose,
welfare;" interests of law and order;
and equity and subetantial merit cf the justice the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have
efficient iFstruction" case; and adequate and. the eftect of extending, or which conflict with the authority.
granting statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule
making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative
body to legislate. A statutory grant of powers should not be
extended by implication beyond what may be necese ary for
Victorias Milling Co., Lnc.
v. Social
their just and reasonable execution. It is axiomatic that a rule
Conte v. COA, SCAD 16, 264 SCRA 19 Security Commission, 114 Phil. 565 (1962);
76 or regulation must bear upon, and be consistent with, the
Pelaoz Auditor General, G.R. No.(1996).
v.
provisions of thu enucting etatute if such rule or regulation is
sFree Telephone 28825, Dec. 25, 1965, 15 SCRA 569.
No. 68184, Oct. Workers Union v. to be valid."*
30, 1981, 108 SCRA Minister of Labor-and Employment, G.R.
1970, 35 SCRA 481; 757; Edu' v. Ericta, G.R. No,
Maceda v. Macaraeg, 197 32096, Oct. 24, lustrations are in order.
Balbuena v. SCRA 771 (1991).
People Secretury of Education, 110
Phil. 150 (1960).
v.
Binangonan, 36 Phil. (1917). Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328
(1939); Municipality The law on the Home Development Mutual Fund or Pag-1BIG
of Cardona
Pelaez Auditor General,
v.
v. Pund provides that waiver or suspension of coverage may be granted
Rub v.
Pruvincial Bourd supra; Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1940).
liternational Hurdwood v.ofPangil
Phil. Assn. of
Mindoro, 39 Phil. 669.
Federation
806 (1955) Colleges and Universities of Labors, 70 Phil. 602 (1940). UnitedBP Homeowner's Assn. v BEF Horaea, Inc., 109 SCAD 27, 310 SCRA
v.
Secretary of
Education, 97
304, 315-316 (1999).
Ph
STATUTE3 23
Presidential Issuances, Rules and Ord1nances
who have their own

in favor of an employer and/or employee group wn instead the word "shall" in its rules, for the word "may"
indicates
"provident/retirement and/or employee housing plans." In the exer is only directory and permis-
that the suspension of a prociamation
board of the HDMP issued rules
cise of its rule-making power, the sive in nature and operates to confer discretion*s while the word
of coverage
and regulations, providing that waiver or suspension "shall imports a command and requires the suspension
to be man-
would be in favor of those who have their own "provident/retire.
datory. The Court added that "being merely an implementing rule,
ment and housing plans, deleting the word "or' from the law. The and in
the same roust not override, but instead remain consistent
board justified such rules by saying that the "and/or" grants the Adminis-
board the option of making it both. The Court ruled that the worda harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. neither to
trative rules and regulations are intended to carry out,
and/or mean that "effect shall begiven to both the conjunctive supplant nor to modify, the law."
and and the disjunctive'or, or that one word or the othermay be
takenaccording)y as one or the other willbest effectuate the pur Administrative rule and interpretation distinguished.
posesintended by the legislature."3 By deleting the word "or" and 1.27.
leaving only "and" in the rules and regulations,the boardxceeded There is a distinction between an administrative rule or regu-
itsrule making power by amending the law, rendering said rules lation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforce-
nuli and void, for the law obviously contemplates that the exist.
ence of either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of
ment is entrusted to an administrative body. When
it
an administra-
an exemption" and "to require the existence of both plans would
tive agency promulgates rules and reguletions, "makes"
a
new
law with the force and effect of a valid law, whle when it renders
radically impose more stringent
not clearly envisioned
a
the
condition for waiver which was an opinion or gives a statement of policy,itmerely interprets a pre-
by
basic."*3 existing law. The rules promulgated pursuant to law are binding
Inanother case," the law involved was Sec. 6 of R.A. No. on the courts, even if they are not in agreement with the policy
6646, which provides in part that- 8tated therein or with its innate wisdom. On the other hand, ad-
ministrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory,
"If for any reason, a candidate is not
declared by final forit is ihe courts that finally determine what the law means.00
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes Administrative construction is not necessarily binding upon
in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and thecourts. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon raotion of set aside by the judicial departmentif there is an error of law, or
the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency abuseof power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
thereof order the suspension of the clearly conflicting with either the letter or spirit of a legislative
didate whenever the evidence proclamation of such can- enactment,o
of his isguilt strong"."
The Commission on Elections
Rules of Procedure, which issued Section 5, Rule 25 of its 1.28. Barangay ordinance.
shall be suspended provides in part that the "proclamation
notwithstanding the fact that he received the
winning nunber of votes in such election," The smallest legislative body is the sangguniang burangay. It
in the law by the word changing the word "may"
"shall" in said Rule. The Court may pass an ordinance affecting a barangay by najority vote of all
ruled that it its members. A barangay ordinance is subject to review by the
was
improper and highly irregular
for the COMELEC to have used sangguniang bayan or sangguniang panlungsod, as the case may
China
SCAD 798, 307 Banking Corp. v. Members of the Board of
148
SCRA 443 (1999), citing Agpalo, Trustees, HDMF, 106 bid., ciing R.E. Agpalo, Statutory Construetion, p. 239 (2nd ed., 1990).
Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., P: 1bid., 274 SCR p. 498.
Jbid.; Romulo, Mabanta, OVictorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Conmission, 114 Phil 555
SCRA 777 Buenaventura, Sayoc & De lo8 Angeles v. HDM,
128 SCAD 101, 333
"Grego v. COMELEC, 83(2000).
SCAD 923, 274 SCRA
(1962); Peralta v. Civil Service Cemmission, 212 SCRA 425 (1992)
Perulta v. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425 (1992)
481 (1997).
24 STATUTES 26
E Vaidity
it is consistent with law or with munie:

be, to determine whether shall be necessary for the passage of any ordinance.0 The approved
pal or city ordinance. The sangguniang panlungsod or sanggunian ordinance shall be submitted to the city mayor who, within ten
shall take action on the ordinance within thirty days fron
bayan daya from receipt thereof, shail return it with his approval or veto.
submiseion. If it does not take action within said period, the rdi. If he does not returnit within that time, it shall be deemed ap
nance will be presumed consistent with law or municipal or cit proved. The sangguniarg panlungsod may repass a vetoed ordi-
ordinance and shall be deemed approved. If it finds that the ordi nance by two-thirds vote of all the members thereof1* If the city is
nance is inconsistent with law or city or municipal ordinance, it a component city, the approved ordinance is submitted to the
shall return the same to the sangguniang barangay conçerned for sungguniang panlalawigan for review which shall take action 19
adjustment, amendment, or modif+cation, in which case the therein within thirty days, otherwise, it will be deemed valid
effectivity of the ordinance is suspended.0
1.31. Provincial ordinance.
1.29. Municipal ordinance. The sangguniang igan, as the legislative body of a
penlalau
province, may vote of a majority of the members present, zhere
by a
The power to enact municipal ordinance is lodged with the The
sangguniang bayan.10 The afirmative vate.of a"majority of the being a quorum, enact ordinances affecting the province.
ordinance is then forwarded to the governor who, within fifteen
members of the sangguniang bayan present and voting, there be. veto.
days from recéipt thereof, shall return it with his approval or
ing a quorum, shall be necessary for the passage of any.ordinance,104 If he does not return it within that time, it shall be deemed ap-
The ordinance is then submitted to the municipal mayor who,
within proved. A vetoed ordinance may be repassed by the sangguniang
ten days from receipt thereof, shal return it either with his ap- panlalauwigan by a two-thirds vote of all its members."
proval or veto. If he does not return it within that time, it shall
be
deemed approved. The sangguniang bayan may, by &wo-thirds
vote E. VALIDITY
of all members, override the veto of the mayor, in which. case it
shall become effective for all legal intents
approved ordinance is then submitted
purposes,15
and The
to the sangguniang 1.32. Presumption of constitutionality. pae wdeloc Abu
panlalawigan for review. The sangguniang panlalawigan may, in the very
within thirty daya from receipt of the Every statute is presumed valid.12 The reason lies
ordinance, invalidate it in essence of how law is enacted. Before the legislature passes a bill,
a
whole or in part, and its action shall be final. If the sangguniang" it is presumed that it has decided the measureisto be constitutional;
panlalawigan does not take action on the ordinance within thiry. and when the President approves the bill, it presumed that he
days after its submission, it shall be presumed consistent with law been convinced of its validity. It is but a decent respect due to
has
and therefore valid. 108 the wisdom, integrity, and the patriotism of the legislature, by
whom the law
which the law is passed, and the chief executive, by
1S approved, to presume of its constitutionality.s An act of thhe
1.30. City ordinance.
The power to pass city ordinance is vested in the sangguniang
panlungsod. The affirmative vote of a majority of the members of Sec. 54, 2brd
Sees. 54 und b5, ibu.
the sangguniang panlungsod present and there being a quorum,
Sec. 56, ibid.
oSec. 54, 1bid.
Secs. 54 and 65, ibid
46 SCRA 734; Morfe v.
Salas v. Jarencio, G.R. No. 29788, Aug. 30, 1970,
Commiseion on
Secs. 64 and 57, Local Government Code of 1991 22 SCRA 424; Peralta v.
(Rep.Act No. 7160). Mutue, G.R. No. 20387, Jan. 31, 1968,
uSec. 54, ibid. 82 SCIRA *O.
Elections, G.R No. 47771, March 11, 1978,
1o-]bid. Alba v E'vangelistu, 100 Phil. 683 ( 1957).
104 bid.
OsSec. 56, ibid.
STATUTES
EValidity
to be within
the President, is presumed
legisiature, approved by to defer to the
of upholding
For the responeibility such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty,
theconstitutional limitations.
not on the courts alone
but on the legislature higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity,
the Constitution rests deliberation by a colle-
which is better determined after a thorough
and executive as well. and with the of the majority of those who
to legislate law is primary, its
giate body concurrence
that every
The function of the legislature participated in its discussion." "It is also emphasized
of right and legality, and is not to with the duty of a purpose
exercise fortified by presumption court, including this Court, is charged
be interfered with lightly, nor by any judicial
conception of its wis- ful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory
dom or propriety.13 To declare a law unconstitutional, the repug. that the m e a s u r e was first carefully studied by the
executive and
law to the Constitution must be clear and unequivo- departments and determined by them to be in ac-
nancy of the the legislative
clear showing that what cordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved.
cal. To strike down a law, there must be a
the statute allows it to can be
the fundamental law condemns or prohibits,
af a law, there must be
To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality
indeed an
be done e Thus, to justify the nullification overcome only by the clearest showing that there was
a clear and unequivocal breach of

the Constitution, not a doubtful infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is
and argumentative implication. There is practically unanimity reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the
among the courts in the pronouncement that laws shall not be discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act
declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear must be struck down."120
beyond a reasonable doubt."1" All reasonable doubts should be re-

solved in favor of the constitutionality of law. To doubt is to sus-
1.33. Requisites for exercise of judieiet power.
tain.!18
The finai authority to declare a law unconstitutional is.the The court does not pas6 upon the constitutionality of a statute
Supreme Court en banc by "the concurrence of a majority of the at any time it is requested by any person and for any purpose.2
Members who actuatly took part in the deliberations on-the issues Before the court may resolve the question of constitutionality of a
statute, the following requisites should, as a rule, be present: {1),
in the case and voted thereon."19 Nonetheless, trial courts have
the existence uf an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and
jurisdiction to initially decide the issue of constitutionality of a law
substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
in appropriate cases. In this connection, the Supreme Court has plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and
aptly remarked: "In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts
are advised to act with the utmost circur speçtion; bearing in mind 4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in
order to decide the case.
the consequences of a declaration of unconecitutionality upon the
stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of pow- 1.34. Appropriate case.
ers. As the
questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legisla-,
tive the executive
or
departments, or both, it will be prudent for The cuse in which the question of conatitutionality of a stat
ute is raised must be a bona fide case, one in which it raises a
Justiciable controversy, the resolution of which the court will have
14Peralta Commission
to choose between the Constitution and the challenged statute."
v. on Elections, G.R. No. 47771, March 11, 1978, 8 Judicial power is limited only to actual controversies, as
SCRA 30 a last
1Uy Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 386 (1925).
Murfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No.
20387, Jun. 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424; Salas
Jureneo, GR. No. 29788, Aug. 30, 1972, 46 v.
SCRA 734; Tano v. Socrate8, 86 SCA
258, 278 SCRA 154 (1997). 2aDrulon' v Lam, 64 BCAD 218, 236 SCRA 136, 140 (1994).
Peralta v. Commi8sion on 'Vcente ti Sinco, Philippine Constitutlonal Law, 21nd ed. (1960),
Elections, 8upra. p., 44.
Heirs of Ordona v. Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 62245, Jan. 22, 1980, 95
Drilon v. Lim, 54 SCAD Reyes, G.R. No. 62549, Oct. 26, 1983, 125
218, 236'SCRA 136, 149 SCRA 220, SCRA 392; People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937); Phil. Conet. Assn. v.
Enriquez, 54
Art. Vill, Sec.
4(2), Constitution.
(199A).. SCAD 561, 235 SCRA 506 (1994). *
29 Muskrul v U.S., 219 U.S. 346, 55 L. ed. 246 (1911).
STATUTEs
E. Valdity
can establish that he

in the
determination of real, actual, earnoas
A citzen acquires standing only if he
resortand a necessity threatened jajury as a result of the
between litigants. has suffered some actual or
and vital controversy of government; the injury is fairly trace-
refers malter to a allegedly illegal conduct
is justiciable if it, the injury is likely to be re-
Generally, a controversy issues which able to the challernged action; and
court review. It pertuins to On the other hand, a taxpayer is
which is appropriate
for dressed by a favorable action.
of being decided on grounds
recognized constitutional issue when it
deemed to have the standing to raise
a
inherently susceplible over
jurisdiction have been disbursed in aleged
are
us8ume
by luw. Tlhe Cuurt des not automatically
before it even
in instances that is established that public funda Constitution. A taxpayer's suit is
cases brought iaw or the
actual constitutional the Court hesi. contravention of the
exercise by Congress of its
a r e ripe for resolution.
One class of càsés wherein properly brought only when there 13 an
"political questiona ihe reason.1s that politi. axing or spending power.7
tates to rule on are dependent upon the wia the constitutional-
are concerned with issues
calquestions Not every person or taxpayer can question
act or meagure being assailed who questions the valicity of
dom, notthe legality, of a particular the separation of powerg. ity of a law. The rule.is thathe person
a
or is in immediate
The political question being function
a of must show that has sustained,
the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another a statute
some direct injury as a result of its erforce
the case shows a clear need for
the courts to danger of sustaining, substantial interest in the
co-equal branch unless ment.25 He musthave a personal and
the 1987
stepin to uphold the law
and the Constitution. However,
case such that the enforcenent of the
law has caused him or wil
of judicial review by providing whether actual or threat-
Constitution expands the concept cause himn direct injury.1 Concrete injury,
serves in
that: "Tihe Judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court a dispute which
element of
be established by, law. Judicial ened, is the indispensable capable of judicial resolution.
and in such lower courts may part to cast it in a form traditionally
as,
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual

When the asserted harm is a generalized
grievance shared in sub-
power demandable and class of citizens, that
controversies involving rights which are legally stantially equal m e a s u r e by
all large or a
and to determine whether or not there has' been a' does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.
Tday enforceable, harm alone normally
challenging the validity of
a
to lack or excess ofjurisdiction Without such direct injury, the petition
grave ebuse of discretion amounting dismissed.31
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."12 law states no cause of action and should be
of the degree of interest essential

determination
give io
In the
1.35. Standing to sue. the constitutionality of a statute,
to attack
the requisite standing
1
individually affected but
Legal etanding" or locus, etandi has been defined, as, a per- the general rule is that not only persons
interest in preventing the illegal
sonal and substantial interest in the case 8uch that the party has sufticient
also taxpayers have raised taxation and may therefore ques-
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmen- expenditure of moneys by
tal act that is being challenged. The term "interest" means a mate tion the validity of laws requiring
expenditure of public moneys.1
a n action to
restrain oficials from wasting
rial interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distin- Taxpayers may bring uncoastitu-
the enforrenent of an invalid or
guished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere public funds through
incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether
a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
733 (2000).
versy as to assure concrete adverseness which sharpens the pres- 131 SCAD 710, 337 SCRA
12Gonzales v. Narvasa, 98 Phil. 409 (1956);
Sanidad
entation of issues upon which the court depends for illunination of Buutista Municipal Council of Mandaluyong,
v.
SCRA 330.
Oct. 5, 1976, 73
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 43731,
difficult constitutional question. 126 .
12People v Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937). 1983, 120

Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 69068, Jan, 27,
L z uda v.
Phl Asn of Collegen and Universities v. Sacrotary of Education, 97 Phil. SlRA S87. 98 Phil. 409 (195).
vs. Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong,
3 Bautista Dec. 18, 1965, 15
uugraud Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 131 SCAD 800, 388 SCRA 81 Phil. Constitution Assn., Inc. v. Giinenez, G.R. No. 23326,
(2000). SCRA 479
lntegrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zainora, 131 SCAD 800, 338 SCRA 8T
(2000).
STATUTES 31
E. Veudity
on the theory thos discretion, take cognizance

of
taxpayer's suit is based the for th The Supreme Court may, in its
law So-called oflicer of
state
the requirement of legal standing. In
ional funds by an
a Buit
which does not satisfy
of publhc constitutea a attitude on the
Court has adopted a liberal
act
the expenditure
not a few t a s e s , the
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
an
administering is able to craft an
purpose of such funds.
I«
lorus stund1 uf a petitioner
where the petitioner
when the
of to the people. Thus,
where the statuta issue of transcendental significance
misapplication
be entertained the public, the Court

suit will not of public funda issues raised are of paramount
importance to
A taxpayers' involve the expenditur as when the petition
does not spent in viola. aside technicalities of procedure,
being challenged tax money is being may brush the attention of
allegation that that there ja constitutional issues which deserve
where there is no the C o n s t i t u t i o n or
has udvunced
and weight as prec
provision of their seriousness, novelty
tion of a specific
fünds, or that public
money is being de the Court in view of
President for the deployment
of
the
misapplication of public
o r where petitioner
does.not seek edents, such a s the calling by National Pclice in
the Philippine
the Philippine Marines to join
purpose,
flected to any improper wasting public funds
officials concerned from
to restrain the public unconstitutional law,1as visibilitypatrols around the metropolis.
enforcement of an invalid or
through the statute involves the expenditure
of pub
But even if the challenged the misapplication of When to raise constitutionality.
is allegation concerning
lic funds or there
.36.
it does not that con-
enforcement of a n invalid law, in constitutional law is the precept
public money through will be given due course,
Well-entrenched
courts unless they
necessarily follow that the taxpayers' suit
stitutional questions will not
be entertained by
entertain the suit is a matter of raised, insisted upon, and adequately
argued.1 For
for whether or not the court will are specifically
of a law, the party
judicia! discretion.136 the court to inquire into the constitutionaiity earliest
must raise it at the
member of the Senate or of the Hlouse of
of it validity
It has been held that a raising the question must be raised in the
of a the question
Representatives has the legal standing to question the validity opportunity. Thi means that in the a n s w e r by
or petitioner, or
on an itemin an appropria- complaint or petition by piaintifï
presidential veto or a condition imposed is not raised in the plead-
defondant o r respundent If the question
tionsbill.When the veto is claimed to have been made without.or in be raised at the trial, and if not
raised
excess of the authority vested

in the President by the Constitution, it
ings, ordinariiy may
not
considered appeal.40
the in the trial, it will not be
on
of the Executive into
the issue of an impermissible intrusion
To the extent that the powers of rule requiring that the,0 4
domain of the Legislature arises. certain exceptions to the
member thereof, since There are the earliest
Congress are impaired, so is the powerof each of a statute must be raised at
of question of valid+ty nay be
his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers mtervention. The question
the institution opportunity to justify judicial trial in the lower
that institution. An act of the Executive which injures or new
of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, raised n a motion tor reconsiteration
be invalidated was not in exist
to
court, wlhere the statute sought
which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case,
ence when the complaint
was filed or during the trial.14 Tho ques
of
any member of Congress can resort to the courts.l87, raised in criminal cases at any stage
tionof validity may also be civil cases where it appears clearly
the proceedings or on appeal, in
SPhil. Constitution ABsn., Inc. v. Mathay, G.R. No. 26654, Oct. 4, 1966, 18 338 SCRA 81
Zamora, 131 SCAD 800,
3nt egrated Bur of the Philippines
v.
SCRA 300.
(2000). 27 SCRA 342.
"Pascual v. Seeretary of Publie Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960); Tan v. Macapagal, G.R. No. 26100, Feb. 28, 1969,
G.R. No. 34161, Feb. 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677. 1City of Baguio v. Marcos, G.R. No. 21879, Sept. 29, 196?, 21
v. Magno,
S a n Miguel Brewery, Inc. Phil. 192 (19i3), Robb
unlao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 62245, Jan. 22, 1980, 96 Lumber Ca. v. Del Rosario, 26
SCRA 392, Lozada Commission SCRA 292; Cadwallader-Cibon
v. on Elections, G.R. No. 59068, Jan. 27, 1983. Co. v. Benito, 62 Phil. 137 (195).
aTan v. People, 68 Phil. 320
(1939); Matondray &
v.
Macapagal, G.R. No. 34161, Feb. 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677; Gonzales V. Phil. 345 (1952).
Mureos, Phil. National Bank, 91
G.R. No. 31685, July
31;1975, 65 SCRA 624. Alunso v.
Phil Const. Assn. v.
Enriquez, 64 SCAD 561, 235 SCRA 506 (1994).
3% 33
STATUTESs
E. Velidity
determination of the question is necessary to a decision, and
that a
jurisdiction of the court below.14 raised. Such
in cases where it involves the ality, where that question is squarely and properlyconstitutional-
of
circumstances merely reinforce the presumption
constitutionality. of the law.14s
1.37. Necessity of deciding ity
will not pass upon the validity of
It is well-settled that the
court
caRe on some other grounds; it will leave 1.38. Test of constitutionality
u statute if it can decide the
Constitu-
consideration until an appropriate statute is what the
the constitutional question for The test of constitutionality of a done under the
decision upon such question is unavoidable,l« relution to what can or may be
case arises in which a tion provides in A statute may
This does not mean that to avoid a constitutional question,
the court
statute, and not by what
it has been done under it.l*
because it is not within the legislative
case on the merits. f thhe only issue is a unconstitutional
may decline to decide the be declared
establishes methods or
forms that
constitutional question which is unavoidable, the court, should or it creates or
power to enact; or effect
violates
constitutional principles; or its purpose
confront the question and decide the case on the merits.14 infringe The court may strike
basic principles.160
Nor will the court pass upon the validity of a statute where the Constitution or its something to be
unconstitutional when it allows
down a law as or when
the issue raised in the case has apparently become moot. In such fundamental law condemns or prohibits
done which the
an event, the court will dismiss the case on such ground.'6 validate a course of conduct
the effect of whieh the
it attempts to
declare a law
forbids. The court may not
specif+cally
The court may, however, relax strict compliance with the pro Constitution
constitutional.152
cedural requirements for the court to inquire into the constitution- unconstitutional on grounds other than
it is
unconstitutional because
ality of a law. Where, the,.constitutional question is of paramount A statute may also be
declared
it lacks comprehensive standards
public interest and time is of the easence in the resolution of such vague.A statute is vague when
must neces5arily.guess,
at its
question, adherence to the strict procedural standard may be re that. men of.common intelligence. statute
its application. In such inctance, the
laxed and the court, in itg diecretion, may Bquarely decide the meaning and dilter in
it violates due
And where the que=tion of validity, though apparently has Constitution in two respects:
cuse.4 is ropugnant to the
to accord the people fair notice of what conduct
become moot, has become of paramount public interest and there is process for failure in cerrying
enforcers unbridled discretion
undeniable necessity for à ruling, strong reasons of public policy to avoid; and it leaves law of the
becomes a n arbitrary flexing
may demand that its constitutionality be resolved.4 out its provisions and
government muscle.3
The fact that the validity of a statute has not been challenged or conditions may
affect the va-
for manyyears does not preclude the court from passing upon that change of circumstances
The
s0-called emergency laws
specially those
question in
an cause. Nor does the circumstance that a
appropriate lidity of some statutes, certain çontingencies. They are cieemed
statute has been accepted as valid in cases where its validity was designed specifically to meet enactment as a valid exercise
of
not raised, prevent the court from later constitutional at the time of thejr
passing on its constitution- When the court declares a statute of
such type uncon-
police power. or there have
been
the emergency has passed
stitutional because
conditions, it does so, not because
circumstances and
San Miguel Brewery, Ine. v. Magno, G.R. No. 21879, Sept. 29, 1967, 21 changes in
SCRA 292
Sutto Commission Hamilton, 30 Phil. 563
Phil. 676 (1926);, McGuire
v. on Elections, 76 Phil. 516 (1946); Go Chiong v.
Agcaoli v. Suguitan, 48
v.
Dinglasan, 79 Phil. 122 (1947). Teleron, G.t. No. 34854,

v. Miraflor, 118
Phil. 49 (1963); Pamil v.
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947) 1915), Vizarra
Cionrales v Conmmiusion on Nov. 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 413. 250 (1922)
Election», G.R. No. 27833, April 18, 1969, 27 v. Aldanesë, 43 Phil.
SCRA 835 Waller Olesen & Co., Inc.
n re Cununan, 94 Phii. 534 (1954)
Dumlao v. Commission on Jan. 31, 1968, 22 SCRA
424 (19%8).
SCRA S92, "Tnio v. Elections, G.R. No. 62245, Jan. 22, 1980, 95 Mutue, G.R. No. 20387,
Mina, G.R. No. 16 Morfe v.Santos 87 Phil. 289 (1950).
Gonzales v. Commission on29488, Dec. 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 512. 154De los v. Mallaré,
Nov. 19, 209!.
Elections, supra.
15 Estrada v C.R. No. 148560,
Sundiganbayan,
STATUTES 36
34
E. Valdity
in circum
but because the change
Constitution before a declaration
does not violate the
continued enforcement of tho presumed to be valid. Hence, its operative fact
conditions makes the "Since under o u r Constitution,
stances and 164
of nullty must be recognized. "".
Constitution or its basic principles. to test the validity of
executive acts
of the
statute violative judiciai r e v i e w exsts precisely the possibility
are: (1)I there is always
ordinances, the tests of validity in an appropriate legal proceedings, Realism compels the
With respect to (2) It must and void.
the Constitutian.or any statute; of their being declared inoperative
must not contravene be a time-lag between
not be partial or discrimina. of the thought that there could
(3) It must acceptance
not be unfair or oppressive; It must be or congressional
exercise of power
must not prohibit
but may regulate trade; (5) the initiation of such presidential it may be
(4) It In the meanwhile,
tory;
with public policy; and (6) It must not be and the final drclaration of nullity.
general and consistent at times even of chaos, if parties
productive of confusion, perhaps how-
in the meanwhile. Since,
affected w e r e left free to disobey it
unreasonable,155
mention cormmon
of government, not to
ever, the orderly processes accorded a n act
Effects of unconstitutionality. sense, require that
the presumption of validity be
1.39. be less than fair,
order of the President, it would
The generalrule is that an
unconstitutional act is not a law; it of Congress or a n
if notice of its existence as
no protection; it
affords and it may be productive of injustice, no
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it to it."i59

inoperative as though a fact be paid
creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, declaration. The
statements as to n e w judicial
it had never been passed.156 However, such broad The past cannot be erased by a
have to be
statute must not be taken effect of the subsequent ruling
as to invalidity may
the effects of unconstitutionality of a co.duct,
court in a case explained: "The with respect to particular
without qualifications. For as the considered in various aspects- claimed to have become
such a determination, is an official. Questions of rights
actual existence of a statute, prior to private and
which cannot justly be determinations deemed to have finality
operative fact and may have consequences vested, of status, of prior of the
cannot always be erased by a new judicial and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light
ignored. The past its previous applications, demand
the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may | nature both of the statute and of
declaration. The effect of difficuit of those
in various aspects- with respect to particular examination. These questions among the most
are
have to be considered
conduct, private which have engaged the attention
of courts.0
relations, individual and corporate, and particular
claimed to have become vested, of of a law has
and official. Questions of rights The rule on the eftects of unconstitutionality
and acted
status, or prior determination deemed to have finality been restated as foilows:
in the light of the nature of the
upon accordingly, of public policy effecte of a deciaration of
statute and its previous application, demand examination,"15 There are two views.on the
Prior to the declaration of nullity, the challenged statute must the unconstitutionality of a statute
this rule, as an-
have been in force and had to be complied with, until the court in The first is the.orthodos. vieuw. Under
nounced in Norton u. Shelby, an unconstitutional act, is not
a
an appropriate case declares its invalidity. Parties may have acted affords no
under it and may have changed their positions. Regard should be it imposes no duties; it
luw it confers no right;
no oftice; it is, in legal contemplation,
had to what has been done while the statute was in operation and protection, it creates
38
G.R, No. 23127, April 29, 1971,
84 Phi. 300 bDe Aylayuni v. Phil. National Bank,
4Ruther v. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68 (1963); Dinglasan v. Araneta, SCRA 429
(1949) of Malabang v. Benito, G.R. No.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 53 SCAD 367, 234 SCRA 260 Justice F'ernando concurring, Munieipality 46 SCAD
1969, 27 SCRA 545 (1969); Republie v. Court of Appeals,
1994). 28113, March 28, 212 SCRA 425
v. Civil Service Commission,
Manila Motur Co., lnc. v. Flores, 99 Phil. 738 (1956), 28, 227 SCRA 509 (1993), Perata
Chicot Country Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 US 371, 3 (1992). 227 SCRA 444 (1993).
1940,quoted in Municipaliey of Malabang v. Bernito, G.R. No. 281133, March 2 1Co v. Court of Appeals, 45 SCAD 638,
1969, 27 SCRA 533.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION STATUTES
36
E. Valdity
likewise been
is have
inoperative,
therefore stricken
ifit had not been passad. It unconstitutionality, but there we
and
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of equity
as ration of
considered never to have existed at
from the statute books and unable to simply ignore strong a
situation that
all persons are bound by th practical matter,
all. Not only the parties but fair pluy. So aleo,
even as a
may no longer
be open
declaration of unconstitutionality,
which means that no ono be described a s fait accompli subsequent
may aptly unsettled by a
invoke it nor may the courts be permitted ta
for further inquiry,
let alone to be
may therefore statute."
it in subsequent cases. It is, in other words, total nullity
a
d e c l a r a t i o n of nullity
of a goveraing
apply directors held
to a board of
The second or modern view is less stringent. Under this election of persons u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l is
Thus, the is declared
of law before the law
view, the court in passing upon the question constitutional. pursuant to a declaration of nullity.
or repeal the statute if it finds
it in' conflict until its
ity does not annul presumed valid
with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recogniz it and
determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had of conditions.
1.40. Invalidity due to change
its reasons for ignoring or unconstitutionality of
a
no existence. The court may give
to the effects of
the law, but the decision affects the parties only The general rule as is deciared invalid
disregarding to a statute that
and there is no judgment against the statute., The opinion or statutees is not applicable its validity. The
circumstances affecting
for the deter because of the change
of class of
reasons of the court may operate as a precedent belongs to the
A statute of this type
mination of other similar cases, but it does-not strike the reason is obvious.
valid at the time of
its enectment as
laws. It is deemed because the

statute from ihe.statute books, it does not repeal,,supersede, emergency
power. It
becomes invalid only
un exercise of police vioiative of the
revoke, or annul the statute. The parties.to.the suit. are con- makes its continued operation
cluded by the judgment, but no one else is bound. change of conditions
declaration of its nullity should
the
Constitution, and accordingly,
,t
and its effects applied
"The orthodox view is expressed in Article 7 of the Civil involved in the case
affect only the parties 154
the Court declared the
Ruther v. Esteban,
Code, providing that 'when the courts declare a Jaw to be prospectively. Thus, in of actions
the period of preseription
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void moratorium law suspending
change in condi-
unconstitutional on May 18,
1953 because of the
and the latter shall govern. x x X has been held
tions. Before such
date of declaration of nullity, it
"The strict view considers legislative enactment which and suspended the pe-
a
that the moratorium law was in full force
and
is declared unconstitutional as being, for all legal intents rnod of prescription of
actions.16
if it had never
purposes, a total nullity, and it is deemed as
existed. Here, of course, we refer to the law itself being per se
repugnant to the Constitution. It is not always the case, how 1.41. Partial invalidity. .
se. Thus, it may where part of a statute

is void as
ever, that a law is constitutionally faulty per general rule) is that
The the
well be valid in its general import but invalid in its applica- while another part is, valid,
repugnant to the Constitution, and be en
tion to certain factual situations. To exemplify, an otherwise invalid, may stand
valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it is
valid portion, if separable from the
allowed to operate retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases,
when it vitiates contractually vested rights. To that extent, its 611-513
retroactive application may be so declared invalid as impair 46 SCAD 28, 227. SCRA 509, pp.
6 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 32-33.
Constitutional Law, 1991,
ing the obligations of contracts. (1993), citing Isagani A. Cruz,
Barraneda v. Atienza, G.R.
No. 129176, Nov. 18, 2001.
"A judieial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may 161See Sec. 1.39, supra.
16493 Phil. 68 (1953). 119 SCRA 411; Maniia
not necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a ERepublic v. Herida, G.R,
No. 34486, Dec. 27, 1982, 1002 (1953
void act occurring prior to such declaration: Thus, in our deci- 739 (1966); Araneta v. Hill, 93 Phil.
99 Phil.
Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores,
sions on the moratorium laws, we have been constrained to Pacific Commercial Co., 95 Phil. 138 (1955).
Montillav
recognize the interim effects of said laws prior to their decla

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONN
39
STATUTES
38 E. Validity
infected the whole

law, its
clause in a
createsstatute
forced The presence of a separability that the nullity of the provisions
the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather notwithstanding, thus:
Beparability ciause effect
than complete nullity, of the statute.0" b justify this result, the resolve the total
to the final point. We
now
"We cone
of 4% tariff
valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that the imposition
of the untimely deregulation,
it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by crude oil and refined petroleum prod
differential on imported
itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the and the prohibition on preda-
ucts, the requirement ofinventory R.A. No. 8180.
The
other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and unconstitutionality of
tor pricing on the c a n be
valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. The void these offending provisions
question is whether the entire R.A.
provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the individuaily struck down without invalidating
main purpose of the act in a manner contrary to the intention of law is well stated by author Agpalo,
No. 8180. The ruling case
the legislature. The language used in the invalid part of a statute
VI2.
can have no legal effect or efficacy for any purpose whatsoever, and
what remains must express the legislative will independently of
statute is void
the void part, since the court has no power to legislate.18 The that where part of a
general rule is
the Constitution, while
another part is valid,
as repugnant to and
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a from the invalid, may stand
the valid portion, if separable a statute
statute are so mutually dependent and connected, a8 conditions, clause in
be enforced. The presence of separability intended separa-
a
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to that the legislature
creates the presumption
warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the of the statute. To justify
nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the bility, rather than complete nullity be so far independent
of the
valid portion must
this result, the
statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the that the legislature
invalid portion that it is fair to presume that it could
legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and could have enacted it by itself if it had supposed
would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some enact the other. Enough must remain to
not constitutionally
parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, which carries
make a complete, intelligible and valid statute,
conditional, or connected must fall with them.19 out the legislative intent. x x x
the parts
Tatad u Secretary of the Departm4r,pfEnare illustrates The to the general rule is that when
exception
mutually dependent and connected,
as
the exception to the general rule on the effects of partial invalidity." of a statute are so
or compensations for
In this case, the Court declared three (3) provisions of RepublicAct conditions, considerations, inducements,
intended
No. 8180, otherwise known as "An Act Deregulating the Down- each as to warrant a belief that the legislature
other,
stream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes," as unconstitutional. them as a whole, the nullit of one part will vitiate the rest.
In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional,
or
One of the issues raised is whether the nullity of the three provisions
affected the whole R.A. No. 8180, as to'render said' law connected with one another, the legislature intended the stat
enacted it
unconstitutional. On this point, the majority .of the Court ruled" ute to be carried out as a whole and would not have
unconstitu-
if one part is void, in which case if some parts are
tional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional,
or
Barrameda v. Moir, 26 Phil. 44 (1913); Governinentv. connected must fall with them.'
(1927); Lindasun v. Commiseion on Elections, G.R. No.
Springer, 50 Phil. 259
SCRA 496; Dumlao v. Commission on
28089, Oct. 25, 1967, 21 "R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause. Section 23
Elections, G.R. No. 52243, Jan. 22, 1980, 95
SCRA 392.
provides that 'if for any reason, any section or provision of this
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 US 236, 78 L. ed. 287
(1929). Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts not
Barrameda v. Moir, 25 Phil. 44
(1913); U.S. v. Rodriguez, 38 Phil. 769 shall remain in full foree and effect This
(1918), Government
v.
Springer; 60 Phil. 259
affocted thereby
(1927),
Lindasan v. Commission on Electiors, G.R. No. Beparability clause notwithstanding, we hold that the offend-
28089, Oct. 25, 1967, 21
SCRA 496.
B8 SCAD 679, 281 SCRA
ing provisions of R.A. No. 8180 so infirmed its essence. that the
330 (1997).
41
40 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 8TATT TEA
F Eort and peration
court," ther the

provisions to the regional trial
entire law has to be struck down. The on
riff court shali be appealabie affected by the
trial not
differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among th to appeal is
the 10 day period applying the
The Court ruled,
on
principal props of RA. No. 8180. Congress could not ha provision unconstitutionality
declaration of invalidityof a statute,
regulated the downstream oil industry without these provi. effect of partial
exception
the rule o n the
to
on the 10-day
period
sions. Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these provision also vitiated the provision in itseli,
that the invalidity remain cumplete
on tariff difterential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit Section 9 does not
berause unconstitutiona!
to appeul declared
fair competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere that what w a s
without the invalid portion; providing appeal
with the free interaction of market forces. R.A. No. 8180 needs itself and not just the portion
was the
whole appeal no logc in
there would be
provisions to vouchsafe free and fair competition. The need for Trial Court, and that COMELEC should
to the Regional the
these vouchsafing provisions cannot be óverstated. Before de. period to appeal to
ruling that a longer
regulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX had no real com for barangay officials.
contests
apply to election
petitors but did not have a free run of the market hecause
government controls both the pricing and non-pricing aspecta OPERATION
of the oil industry. After deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and F. EFFECT AND
CALTEX remain unthreatened by real competition yet are no 1.42. When laws take effeet.
longer subject to control by government with respect to their shali take
pricing and non-pricing decisions, The aftermath of R.A. No. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "[l}aws
witsfauc the completion of their publica-
8180 is a deregulated market where competition can be cor effect after fifteen days following
unless it is otherwise provided x x x.
rupted and where market forces can be manipulated by tion in the Official Gazette,
Book
Administrative Code
I of the 1987
Section 18, Chapter 5,
oligopolies.171 effect after fifteen (15) days foilow-
provides that "laws shall take in the Official Gazette or
in
The Court again applied the exception to the rule on the effect ing the completion of their publication it is otherwise provided."
of partial invalidity in Antonio v. COMELEC.V2 Section 9 of R.A. of general circulation, unless
a newspaper
No. 6679, which provides in part that "The decision of the municipal Court held that all laws
or metropolitan trial court (in contests relating to.the election of a lu Taiada u. Tuvera, the Supreme
or statutes, including
those of local application and private laws,
barangay official) may be appealed within ten (10) days from receipt For a law
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity.
of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the regionl trial court x which is made effective by the legislature upon its approval or on
x." In Flores u. COMELEC 173 the Súpreme Court declared said publication will violate the due
any other date without previous
provision unconstitutional, as violative of the Constitution requiring requires its publication
process clause of the Constitution which
that the Commission on Elections shall have appellate jurisdiction before it becomes binding. Thé general rule is that where the law
is
over all contests involving elective barangay officials. The issue silent as to its eflectivity or where it provides that it shall take
raised in Antonio u. COMELEC is whether the period of appeal is effect immediately or upon its approval, such law shall take eflect
still ten (10) days and not five (5days as providedfor in Sec. 22 of after fifteen (15) days from its publication in the Official Gazette
or
R.A. No. 7166 to the effect that decisions of Regional Trial, Court in newspaper of general
a circulation. However, the legislature may,
may be appealed to the Commission on Elections within five (5) by law or by the particuBar statute itsèlf, provide that it shall
take
days from receipt of the questioned decision, The petitioner in effect on a particular date or after a certain period from its publica-
Antonio u. COMELEC claimed that since the Court declared Sec. 9 tion in the, Official Gazette or in a' newspaper of general circula-
of R.A. No. 6679 unconstitutional only "insofar as it provides that tion, in which case it shall take effect as thus specifically provided,
barangay election contests decided by the municipal or metropolitan which is what the phrase "unless it is otherwise provided" Arti-
in
cle 2 of the Civil Code or in Section 18, Chapter 5, Book I of the
17]bid. 361-362.
112 SCAD 821, 315 SCRA 62 (199), citing Ruben E. Agpalo, Siatutory 14146 SCRA 446 (1986); See also Umali v. Eatanislao, 209 SCRA 450 (1992).
Construction, 1990 ed., pp, 27-28.
173184 SCRA 486 (1990).
42 STATUTES 43
EMect nand Operution
Code refers. The completion

of publicatin
1987 Administrative effectivity of statutes applies to Presidential issuances, which
means
of publication will be counted, refers
from which date the period that they should be published in the Official Gazette or in
a news-
of the Oficial Gazette or newspaper for circul
the date of release of general circulation before they become effective, except
unless the two dates coincide.176 paper
tion and not to its date, those which are merely interpretative or internal in
nature not
the rulinge i
The of Tañada v. Tuvera, supra, abandoned
case
concerning the public.81
held that laws take effect on the dat
previous cases, in which it regulations issued by administrative
was or
Generally, rules and
approval or immediately, without is
therein specified, such as upon executive officers are of two types, namely: those whose purpose
as a condition, for their
need of publication in the Official Gazette to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation
is silent as to when it shall take effect that publication to fill in the details of a statute, and those which
are nerely
publication or or
the Tañada v. Tuvera
is required for its effectivity178 The ruling in interpretative in nature or marely internal in character
not con-
case rests on the principle that before the public is bound by
general cerning ihu public. The first requires publication for its effectivity,
the provisions of the law, they must be published and the people and those
while the second does not. Interpretative regulations
officially and especially informed thereof, which is a requirement of
internal in nature, that is, concerning the personnel of
the admin-
due process of lawl" that cannot be dispensed with by the Neither
istrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
adminis-
legislature.178 is publication required of letters of instructions issued by
followed
It has been held, however, in the subsequent case of Phil. trative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
the duties.22
Veterans Bank Employees v. Vega,7
Union that phrase "unless by their subordinates in the performance of their
it is otherwise provided" provides an exception as to the date of
Rules and regulations issued by administrative or executive
effectivity of a statute, in that Congress may provide in the law details of a
officers to enforce or implement a law or to fill in the
that it shall take effect immediately upon its approval. This case take effect after fif
statute, whether they are penal or non-penal,
appears to be in conflict with the Tanada u. Tuvera case, supra, in or in a
teen days following their publication in the Official Gazette
which it was held that publication is a "must" before a statute unless the statute which author
newspaper of general circulation,
becomes effective even though it provides that it shall take effect after such
izes their issuance provides a different date of effectivity
upon its approval.
publication. In addition; such rules and regulations must comply
with the requirements of filing. The 1987 Administrative Code pro-
1.43. When Presidential vides that " ) Every agency shall file. with the University:
of. the
issuances, rules and regulations rule
certified copies. af
take effect. , i.i .
Philippines Law Center three (3) every,
it. Rules in force on the date of the effectivity_of this
The President's ordinance power includes the authority to is- adopted by that
Code which are not filed within three (3) months from
Bue executive orders, administrative orders,
randum orders, memorandum circulara, and
proclamations, mema- date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any
general or special or-i that "In addition to
ders The requirement of publication as a party or persons."154 The Code also provides law not inconsistent
for the condition other rule-making requirements provided by
with this Book, ech rule shall becume effective fifteen (16) days
7Lara v. Dl Rosario, 94 Phil. 778 from the date of filing above provided unless a different date is
as
(1954). (1954); Raymundo v, Penas, 96 Phil. 311
1Camacho v. Court of Industrial
Encarnacion, 87 Phil. 483
Relations, 80 Phil. 848 (1948); Republic v.
(1950);
Commission v. Bello, 37 SCRA 230 Mejia
v. Bolalong, 81 Phil. 486
(1948); Police 18Tanada v. Tuvera, supra.
(1971). 18Tañada v. Tuvera, supra.
TPoople v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954); Lim 8Sec. 18, Chapter 5, Book 1, 1987 Administrative Code; Peoplu
v. Que Po la
104 Phil 573 Hao Ting v. Central Bank,
(1958); Pesigan v. Angeles, G.R. No. 94 Phil. 640 (1954) Pesigan v. Angeles, G.R.
No. 64279, April 30, 1984; Joint s
1Tuñada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 64279, April 30, 1984. Committee v
446 (1986). try of Health-Ministy of Labor and Employment Accreditation
a t
"Phil. Veterans Bank

2001. Buployees Union v. Vega, G.R. No. 105364, June 28, ofAppeals, 196 SCRA 263
(1991).
Administrative Code.
Secs. 2,3, 4,5,6 ISec. 3, Chapter 2, Buok VII, 1987
and 7, Chap. 2, Title I, Book II, 1987
Administrative Code.
STATUTORY C O N S T R U C T I O N
44
8TATUTE3 46
F. Effect and Operetion
the rule in cases of imminent danger to
fixed by law, or specified in which. must be
welfare, the existence of
public health, safety and the rule. The agency shall (b) The secretary to the sanggunian concermed shall cause
expressed in a statement accompanying
make emergency rules known to per.
the posting of an ordinance or reaolution in the bulletin board at
take appropriate m e a s u r e s to the entrance of the provincial capitol and the city, municipal, or
be affected by them,"15 The requirement of
publica-
sons who may barangay hall in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the local
of the rules and regulations
tion is designed to inform the people government unit concerned not later than five (5) days after ap-
before they can be bound thereby,1
and the requirement of filing is proval thereof.
intended to have a central ofice, namely, the U.P. Law Center,
such rules The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be dissemineted
where interested persons can readily secure copies of and posted in Filipino or English and in the language or dialect
and regulations or check on their existence.
understood by the majority of the people in the local government
The publication and filing requirements are indispensable to unit concerned, arnd the secretary to the sanggunian shall record
the effectivity of rules and regulations. Both requírements must be such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of ap-
complied with, except when the law authorizing the issuance of the proval and posting.
rules and regulations dispenses with the filing requirement, in which (c)The gist of all ordinancee with penal sanctions shal! be
case publication, which cannot be dispensed withwithout violating published in a newspaper of general circulation within the province
the due process clause, will be suficient to make them effective,107 where the local legislative body concerned belongs. In the absence
of any newspaper of general circuiation within the province, post
To illustrate the rule, DMB-CCC No. 10 may be cited. This ing of such ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and
circular disallowed car plans, which were previously allowed for
offñicials of Philippine Ports officials. The Court ruled that to be cities of the province where the sanggunian of origin is situated.
effective, this circular should firat be published in the Official Ga- (d) In the case of highly urbanized and independent compo-
zette because the same was not just an interpretation or internal nent cities, the main features of the ordinance or resolution duly
regulation, but one which deprived government officials of their enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published
allowances and additional compensation. Its subsequent publica- once in a local newspapar of general circulation within the city:
tion did not cure the fatal defect of lack of
publication, nor did it Provided, That in the absence thereof, the ordinance or resolution
shall be published in any newspaper of general circulation.8
retroact to the time that the circular was first issued; it could not
apply prospectively.18
i
A highly urbanized city is a city with a minimum population
of two hundred thousand as certified by the National Census and
1.44. When local ordinance takes : , V Statistice Office and with the lateet annual income of at least fifty
effect. million pesos based on the 1991 constant prices, as certified by the.
(a) Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the resolu city.treasurer. 190
tion approving the local development

plan and public investment
program, the Bame shall take effect after ten (10) 1.45. Statutes continue in force until repealed.
date a copy thereof is days frorn the
posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of
the provincial capitol or In terms of their duration and effect, statutes may be perma-
city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the and
case may be, and in at
least two (2) other nent indefinite or temporary. Temporary stetutes are those
local government unit concerned. conspicuous places in the that, according to their provisions, are in force only for a limited
period, and they terminate upon the expiration of the term therein
stated or upon the oceurrence of certain events. No repealing stat-
16Sec. 4, supra. ute is necessary to bring a temporary law to an end. 191
1People v. Que Po Lay,
supra; Pesigan v.
Trading Corp. v. Angeles, supra.
Phil. International
(1996). Angeles, 75 8CAD 464, 263 SCRA 421 Sec. 59, Rep. Act No.
SPhil. Internal 7160.
Trading Corp. 1Sec. 452, Ibid.
v.
COA, 108 SCAD 103, 309 SCRA 177 See Sec. 1.03, supra.
(1999).
46 STATUTES
47
F Effect and Operation
permanent and inde
of the statutes are
The vast majority to the day of the
its provisions for a limited period onlu consecutive days without regard
statute is by riod of seven
nite. Unless a
or repealed by the legislature. week fron which it hegins.
it continues in force until changed
continues until changed the 30-day month,
"law once established The Civil Code adopts the 365-day year and
has been held that of
It is not changed by change or civil month. Hence,
a year is
by some competent legislative

power. not the culendar year nor the solar
nature. "There can be na if that particular year is a
of a political to be considered to have 365 days
sOvereignty," except that
even
law comes into exist. the first

the time in computing years,
leap year with an extra day in it.
lew. From
break or interregnum in the first
first-felt corporateness of a primitive
people it mu8t is reached after completing the first 365 days. After
ence with the year O1 the
of human society. Once created, it' 365th day, the first day of the second 265-day cycle begins.
last until the final disaprearance two years old. The
takes place, and when changed, it continues 365th day of the second cycle, the person
turns
persists until a change lifetime. A turns 21 years oid on
until the next change, s0 forever. Con. cycle goes on and on in a person
in such changed condition means that on his
the 365th day of khis 21st 365-day cycle. This
quest or
colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of the entire of 21 365-day cycles.
21st birthday, he has completed span
the law continues to be unchanged until the 22nd year begins. The
change of constitution, After this birthday, the 365-day cycle for his
new sovereign by legislative
act creates a change."192 next 365-day cycle
day after the 365th day is the first day of the
and he turns 22 years old on the 365th day.19"
1.46. Territorial and personal effect of statutes.
Where a statute requires the doing of an act within apecified
a
the Philippines being in

Nothing is better settied than that Nmber as days, such as ten deys, from notice, it means ten calen-
dependent end sovereign, its authority may be exercised

over its dar days and not ten working daya*
entire dominion. There is no portion thereof that is
beyond-itg
its commands The exclude-the-first and include-the-last day rule governs
power, Within its limits;
its decrees are: suprene, October 4,
the computation of a period. For instance, one year from
laws govern tharein and everyone to whom it ap first day
paramount. its 1946 is October 4, 1947,1 If by applying the rule that the
must submit to its terms. That is the extent of
its jurisdiçtion, of a
plies shall be excluded and the last day included in the computation
both territorial and personal."4 wthin which act shall be done, the last day falls on a
period an
Sunday or a holiday, the act can still be done the following day.20
ii
iti This principle does not. apply to the cornputation af the period. of
Manner of computing time.'
1.47. in
prescription of a crime, in which the rule is that if Lhe last day
S B o When law speaks are of years, months, days or nights, it shall be the period of prescription of a felony falis on a Sunday or legal
that of three hundred sixty-five days each; holiday, the information concerning said felony cannot be filed on
understood years
the next working day, as the offense has by then already pre-
has-6 months, of thirty days; days, oftwenty-four hours; and nights from
dop =4hsunset to sunrise." "Ifthe months are designated by their name, they Bcribed.01
be computed by number of days which they respectively

ichtc=Cun shall
"In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and
ta
wx
have.
he last dayincluded. Where the "week" is used as
word a meap PNB v. Court of Appeals, 41 SCAD 349, 222 SCRA 134 (1993).
ure of time and without reference to the calendar, it means a pe National Marketing Corp. v. Tecson, G.R. No. 29131, Aug. 21, 1969, 29
SCRA 70.
wGarvida v. Sales, Jr., 82 SCAD 188, 271 SCRA 767 (1997).
uVirjen Shipping & Marine Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Com
mission, G.R No. 58011, July 20, 1982, 115 SCRA 347. But see resolution promulgated
o Kin (Chan v. Valdez Tun Keh, 76 Phil. 113, 142-143 (1946).
01 Nov18, 1988
eagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 26379, Dec. Z Cervantes v. Auditor General, 91 Phil. 359 (1952).
1968 30 SCRA 968, 973, see
also Peoplev. Gonzales, G.R. No. 36409, Oct. 26, 1873, Sec. 31, Revised Adninistrative Code.
63 SCRA 476
Art 13, Civil Code. Yapdiangco v. Buencamino, G.R. No. 28841, June 24, 1983.
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION 48
A. Nature end Purpose
construction is the
meaning pnd of any form of words, while
senRe
warranted conclusions not always included in

prcoss of drawing of words to facts
direct expressions, or deternining the application
to e a technical dis-
Chapter in litigation. However, while there appears
so alike in practical
re
tinction between the two terms, they are
to have becomne almost
sults and a r e so used interchangeabiy
as
CONSTRUCTION and con
In practice or c o m m o n usage, interpretation
synonymous. signification.'
AND INTERPRETATION struction are understood as having the same
itrdi
2.03. Rules of construction, generally.

A. NATURE AND PURPOSE Rules of statutory construction are
tools used to ascertáin
are not rules of law
but meréAxioms of
legislative intent. They to
the legislature is presumed
experience." in enacting a statute, enacts a
construction. The legislature
2.01. Construction defined. know the rules of statutory construed
in case of doubt, be
and expound law with the end in view that it will,
is the art or process of discovering settled principles of interpretation.
in accordance with the
Construction
intention of the authors of the law, where that
ing the meaning and of the ambiguity in its It is said that a law which is ambiguous and deficient
is a bad
intention is rendered doubtful by reason
hard. Rules of statutory construc
the given case is not explicitly provided law. And a bad law makes cases
language or of the fact that tion help the courts resolve bad cases. Thus,
where there is ambi
for in the law.' Construction is the drawing of warranted conclu- canons of statu-
of statute, courts employ
sions respecting subjects that
ie beyond the.direct expressionof. guity in the language a
ascertain its true intent and meaning. Canons
are in the spirit, though
not within the' tory construction to
the text, conclusions which
do not, however, solve the special difficul
mechanical endeavor. Nor can it be of statutory construction
letter of the text." It is not a statute. The variables render every
"brain" machines. Because of infirmities ties in construing a particular the courts
accomplished by modern construction unique. For this reason,
in legislative drafting, inevitably problem of statutory all the light
of language and the fimited seope statute not unambiguous,
may utilize, in construing
&
of judicial
there enters into the construction of statutes the play relevantly shed upon the words and the clause
of the statu:e that
legislative 'materials3
judgment within the limits of the relev¡nt express the purpose
of the legislature.
Construction involves the exereise of choice by the judiciary 3 rules of statutory construe
The legislature sometimes adopts 10
statute." For instance, Article
tion as part of the provisions of a
Construetion and interpretation distinguished. that "In case of doubt in the interpreta
2.02. of the Civil Code provides
the lawmaking body
tion or application of laws, it is presumed that
Some authorities distinguish construction and interpretation.
It hns boun uaid thut intorpretation is the art of finding the true
Roberts Portland Water District, 126 A 112.

v.
Caltex (Phils.), Inc. v. Palomar, G.R. No. 19650, Sept. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 247, Russell Ayer, 27 SE 133.
v.
citing Black, Interpretation of Iaws, p. 1. 230 (1908).
United States v. Keitel, 63 L. ed. Land Registration
U.S. v. Farenhalt, 206 US 226, 51 L. ed. 1036 (1907). Administration of Davao, Inc. v.
*Roman Catholic Apostolic
Board, US 93, 2 L.
Local 1976, U.B.C. & J. v. National Labor
ed. 2d 1186 (1958)
Relations 357 Comission, 102 Phil.
596 (1957).
Dec. 8, 1982, 119 SCRA 48.
See Torres v. Yu, G.R. No. 42626, 97 L. ed.
Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commiseioner of Customs, G.R. No. 28463, May Credit Union Corp., 344 US 218,
1United States v. Univerwal C..T
31, 1971, 39 BCRA 268.
260 (1962).
7160.
"See Sec. 6, Rep. Act No.
48
50

4 of the Labor Coda
to prevail." Section A. Nature and Purpo0se
intended right and justice and interpretation of
in the implementation
states that "All doubts implementing rules and
including its intent. Even those
the provisions of this Code, Section 5 of Repub. only be used to clarify, not to defeat, legisiative
resolved in favor of labor." provisions
regulations, shall be the Local Government Code rules of construction which are in the form of statutory
otherwise known as defeat, rather than effec-
lic Act No. 7160, may be ignored if their employment may
of 1991 reads: tuate, legislative intent."
of the provisions of this Code, the

"In the interpretation
following rules shall apply: 2.04. Purpose or object of construction.
laws is to a s c e r
local government The cardinal rule in the interpretation of al!
"(a) Any provision on a power of a law.3 Hence, all rules of
favor, and in case of tain, and give effect o, the intent of the
unit shall be liberally interpreted in its construction or interpretation have for their sole object the a s c e r
shall be resolved in favor of devo-
doubt, any question theréon tainment of the true intent of the legislature.
The object of all
lower local government unit. Any in
lution of powers and of the of a statute i to determine legislative
existence of the'power judicial interpretation
fair and reasonable doubt as to the tent, what intention is conveyed,
either expressly or impliedly, by
shall be interpreted in favor of the local governmenit unit côn the language used, so far as it is necessary for ascertaining
whether
state of facts presented to the court comes

cerned; the particular case or
within it.5
"b) In case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue
meas-
against the local government the court in a

ure hall be construed strictly "The office of statutory interpretation," says
of the taxpayer. Any tax In the words of a well
unit enacting it, and liberally in favor case, "is to determine legislative
intent.
or relief granted 'by any local govern- of all interpretation is to uscer-
exemption, incentive known authority, 'the true object
this Code shall be to the end that it
ment unit pursuant to the provisions of tain the meaning und will of the lawmaking body,
claiming it; language, 'the purpose of all rules or
construed strictly against the person may be enforced. In varying
the true inteation of the
this Code shall be maxims' ininterprotatiot 'is to discover
"c) The general welfare provisions in law. They 'are oilý valuäible when they subserve this purpose."
more powers to local goyernment
liberally interpreted give
to
and upgrading
units in accelerating economic development
the people in the community;
the quality of life for
date' of
"(d) Rights and obligations existing on the e Cullelur uf lulernal Revenuu v. Muuila Lodge No. 761, 105 Pl il. 983
effectivity of this Code and arising out of contracts or any other (1959).
shall be Roldan v. Villarama, 69
source of prestation involving a local government unit 1Macondray & Co. v. Eustaquio, 64 Phil. 446 (1937);
Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court
the and conditions of said contracts Phil. 12 (1939); Torres v. Limjap, 66 Phil. 141 (1931);
governed by original terms
of Appeals, G.R. No. 41001, Sept. 30, 1976, 73
SCRA 162; People v. Concepcion, 44
or the law in force at the time such rights were vested;
and
Phil. 126 (1922).
103 Phil. 1051 (1957)
arising under
"Tañada v. Cuenco,
e In the resolution of controversies this Salaysay Castro, 98 Phil. 364 (1936), citing Black,
v.
Handbook on
v. Concepcion, 44 Phil
th.e Con-
Code where no legal provision or jurisprudence applies, resort struction and Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed.,
writes
p. 11;
that
People
the "function of statutory inter-
may be had to the customs and traditions in the place where 126 (1922). An authority on the subject
not to ferret
is to cure involuntary «upply inadvertensities;
mistakes and
the controversies take place." pretation to ex pres
out of unnbiguities, u poliry l»gislatora may be ulruid or unwilling
thut
invude thu »phur: of the
ie cluims hat "if it is unconstitutional for the juciciary tw
The legislature also defines, in eertain complicated statutes, as unlawful for the legislators
o shirk their own duty
and
legislature, in 1s just
the words and phrases used therein. Except as they may have been divert to the judges thhe odium of unpopular
measures. Que cadu palo aguun te su
embodied as part ofa statute, rules of statutory construction have vela, each mast should bear its
sail." Justice J.B.L. Re yes concurnng, P uple v
Gatchalian, 104 Ph1l. 676, 677 (1968).

no binding effect on the, courts. Nor are they controlling in the City of Baguio v. Marcos,
4.R. No. 26100, Feb. 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 342 352
interpretation of laws. As instruments of construction, they may and Interpretation, 2nd ed, p. 11;
82 CJs p
citing Black, Construetion
Tuñada v. Cuencu, 103 Phd. 105 (1957
Sedalha v. Smitli, i04 S.W. 15, 19;
cONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
63
52 A. Nature and Purpose
statutes should
be so
and
to be achieved;"
Legislative intent, generally. Sop that laws have ends out such ends
and p u r
2.05. s o a s not to
defeat but to carry
construed
of the law
Legislative intent is the vital part, the essence poses.22
The intent of the legislature is the law, and the key to, and the
controlling factor in, its construction or interpretation.e Intent js Legislative meaning.
the spirit which gives life to legislative enactment. t must be en. 2.07. means.
forced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with what the law, by its language,
Legislative meaning is what its limits
the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of what it c o v e r e o r embraces;
What it comprehends; does the legisla-
a s - - What
the statute when it leads away from the true intent of the legisla. a r e . When such questions
or confines m i n d ? - a r e asked,
what is being
ture and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of ture really intend? What is in its
of the law reflect
Does the language
the act.1 Hence, where a statute is susceptible of more than one sought is the legislative intent. intent and m e a n -
construction, that construction should be adopted which will most what the legislature intended? If so,
the legislative
there is' ambiguity in' the
tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the legislature. ing are, in this sense, synonymous. If
indicate the meaning
What is legislative intent? What does it comprehend? The language used in a statut3, its purpose' may intent is. The
of the language and lead to what the legislative
term "intent" includes two concepts, that of purpose and that of ascertain and give eflect to
courts, then, by judicial construction,
meaning. It has been held, however, that the ascertainment of leg. such intent.
isl'ative intent depends more on a determination of the purpose and
object of the law.2 Intent is sometimes equated with the word
2.08. Graphical illustration.
"spirit." While the terms "purpose," "meaning," "intent," and "spirit
are oftentiumes interchangeably used by the courts, they are not A graphical illustration of the term legislative intent" and its
entirely synonymous. rendnny snua: nse 3 ta. naua component concepts- that of purpose of meaning- i8
and that
Republie Act 809, otherwise known as the Sugar Act of 1952. Sec-
2.06. Legislative purpose. tion 1 of the Act provides that "in the absence of written milling
agreements between the majority of planters and the millers of
The legislative
purpose is the reason why a particular statute the unrefined
was enacted by the
sugarcane in any milling district in the Philippines,
legislature. What did the legislature intend to sugar próduced in that district from the milling by the sugar cen-
achieve or accomplish by enacting a statute? What is its tral of the sugarcane of any sugarcane planter or plantation owner,
it to prevent a mischief? Is it to create new object? Is
defects in existing laws? ls it to
rights? Is it to eliminate as well as all by-products and derivatives thereof, shall be divided
implement
mandates of the Constitution? The answer specific provisions or between them" in the proportion therein specified. Section 9 pro
to these and similar vides that "the proceeds of any increase in participation granted
questions is the purpose of the law. A legislation "is an active in the planters under this Act and above their present share shall be
strument of government which, for divided between the planter and his laborer in the plantation" in
purposes of interpreiation, means
the proportion of 60% for the laborer and 40% for the
Crur ditat furcteon this connection, the question raised is: Does
planter. In
Republic Act No. 809
1Torres v.
Linjap,
56 Phil. 141 (1931).
U.S. v. Tamparong, 31 Phil.
321
Senerillas v Hermusiaina, 100 Phil. (1915); Tamayo v. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953 (1916);
501 (1966); Hermani v.
mittee, 100. Phil. 973 (1957); Expurt Control
People v. Purisima, G.R. No. 42050, Com Litex Employees Assn. v. Eduvala, G.R. No.
SCRA 542. Nov. 20, 1978, 86 41106, Sapt. 22, 1977, 79 SCRA
88; Bocobo v. Estanislao, G.R. No.
Torres v.
Limjap, 56 Phil. 141 30458, Aug. 31, 1976, 72 SCRA 620; Fepuble
Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commisaioner of
People (1931); U.S. v. Customs, G.R. No. 28463, May 31, 197i, 3 9
Concepcion, 126 (1922); Hidalgo v. Toribio,
v.
44 Phil. 16 Phil. 85 (1910%
29, 1970, 33 SCRA SCRA 269.(1971); King v. Hernae», 114 Phil. 730 (1962); Mejia v.
105;Tuñada . Cuenco, 103 Phil. Hidalgo, G.R. No. 25326, May 497 (1948); Yeilow Tuxi &
Pasay Trans Workers Unioa v. Manila
Balalong, 31 P
USTurnbio, 15 Phil 85 (1910); U.S. v. 1051 (1957). Phil 833 (1948) Taxi Cab Ce,
General Barrameda, G.R.
v
No 29906, Jun.
Navarro, 19 Phil. 134 (1911).
30, 1976, 69 SCHA 182.
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATIGN
54
A. Nature and Purpose
of the sugarcane planters have writ literal import, if given effect,

will defeat
apply even if the majority question. Apperently, the
miller or central stipulating a shari planters' leborers a
milling agreement with the aring the purpOse of the Act, which ie to grant
the
proportion different from that provided in Section 1 of the Act, such share in the sugar produce. Considering
this purpose, the legisla-
the planter under saia the language of the
that any increase of participation granted tive meaning, which is not clearly disclosed in
will be divided between the planter and hi the laborers a share for as
milling agreement Act, is thus indicated, which is to give
of 60% for the latter and 409 the planters receive an
increased
plantation laborer in the proportion long as sugar is produced and
the legislative intent which should be given to make the Act op era-
for the former? What is n participation. The legislative intent is, thus, be-
a nilling agreemnent
effect? tive irrespective of whether there ezists
An examination of Republic Act No. 809 and the sugar industry tween the central and the sugar pianters."
as a whole shows that the planter's laborer or the so-called "sacad
statute.
had always been at the losing end in terms of wages and benefte 2.09. Matters inquired into in construing a
given him for his work and labor in the field. The planter would to ascertain the in-
In construing a statute, it is not enough
invariably blame the miller or central for this sad plight of his to see whether
tention or meaning of the statute; it is also necessary
laborer, by claiming that the central had not been giving him his in such a way es to
the intention or meaning has been expressed
rightful share in the sugar produce milled by the central, and that In short, the object of the inquiry is
as a result he was not able to adequately compensate his laborer. give it legal effect and validity. used,
not only to know what the legislature meant by the language
In the 1950s, when the long-term contracts between the millers but also to determine whether the language used sufficiently ex
and sugar planters had expired or were about to expire and nego so to speak, is made up of two
presses that meaning. The legal act,
tiations for another long-term contracts are in progress, the plant. elements-an internal and an external one; it originates in inten-
ers staged strikes and threatened not to plant cane unless they defeat
tion.and is perfected by expression. Failure of the latter may
were given bigger share in the sugar industry as a whole, the sugar
the former.4
quota commitment to the United States, and the thousands of fami
lies dependent upon the industry. To solve the problem, the Con-
2.10. Where legislative intent is ascertained.
gress enaced in effect, forced the
Republic Act No. 809 which,
planters to plant, and the centrals to mill, sugarcane by government
The primary source of legisBative intent is the statute itself.
taking over the planting and milling in the event that the planters The legislative intent has to be discovered from the four corners
of
and millers refuse to do their respective roles in the whole and not
production of the law It has to be extracted from the statute as a
Bugar ' from an isolated part or particular provision thereof." Where the
its
The purpose or reason of the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous,
législature is thus clearly shown:
to compel the continuous production of
sugar and to grant the
planters' laborers a share in the increased participation of the plant-
ers in the sugar
produce. But what about the meaning of the Act? Federation of Free Farmers v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41161, Sept. 10,
Do the words of the Act reflect such
of the phrase "in the absence of
purpose? What is the meaning 1981, 107 SCRA 352; Asosacion Agricultores de Talisay Silay, Inc. v. Talisay-Silay
written milling agreements" in Milling Co., Ine., G.R. No. 19937, Feb. 19, 1979, 88 SCRA 294.
Section 1? Does it mean that the Act is "Manila Jockey Club, luc. v. Games and Amusements Board, 107 Phil. 161
written milling agreement? What is the applicable where there
not
is a (1960).
meaning of the phrase #Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41001, Sept. 30, 1976,
any increase in participation v. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322 (1921); Regalado v. Yulo, 61 Phil.
in Section 9? Does it granted the planters under this Act 73 SCRA 162; Borromeo
éxclude written 173 (1935).
phrases will support the agreement?
of these A literal rendition Tumayo v. Geell, 36 Phil. 953 (1916); Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. City of Cebu,
cable when written argument that the Act is inappli .R No. 14626, Mach 31, 1966, 13 SCRA 449; Aisporma v. Court of Appenls, G.R
milling
planters exists, for such is agreement between the central and the No. 39419, April 12, 1982, 113 SCRA 469.
the literal
import of the provisions in
56 57
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
B. Power to Construe
must be determ
intention of the legislature
meaning and the If the statute as a whoje fo controver
law in
from the language employed." used are am construes the applicable
intent because the words The Supreme Court from doing 30
indicate the legislative resolution. It refrains
the statute, such as its leio sies which a r e ripe for judicial
and it will instead
the court may look beyond at become moot and academic
ous, in the legislative mind where the c a s e has academnic when its
history, in order to ascertain what was dismiss the caee. A case or question
is moot and
c a n be granted
what the circumstances relief
the time the statute was enacted; Were purpose has
become stale or where no practical notwithstanding
under which the action was taken; what evil, if any, WAs meant have no practical
effect." However,
or which c a n
resolve the case and
con-
also look to the purpose of the at Court may nonetheless
be redressed." The court may tat. its mootness, the yet evading
the reason or cause which induced the enan law "if it is capable of repetition,
ute to be subserved, strue the applicable its resoiution° or
ment of the law, the
mischief to be suppressed, and the poli bpecially where public interest requires be of practical
these means from wkhio review, the merits would
which dictated its passage.2 When all where rendering a decision on
the court may look int
legislative intent may be ascertained fail, value. It
the effect of the law, but not otherwise because then, interpretation The court does not,
however, interpret the law in
a vacuum.
and controverted
becomes judicial legislation.0 decides concrete
construes or applies the law as it not give legal
involved. It does
cases based onthe facts and the law as a
cases or in cases
which have become,
B. POWER TO CONSTRUE opinion on hypothetical
has been held that "laws are
inter-
It
rule, moot and academic. factual situation of
context of the peculiar
preted always in the flesh and blood and
cannot be
2.11. Construction is a judicial function. each case. Each c a s e has its own
of isolated clinical classroom princi-

The duty and power to interpret or construe a statute or the decided simply o n the basis and particu-
circumstances of time, place, event, person,
Constitution belong to the judiciary."It.18 the dutyof the legisla. ples. The circumstances and actions before, during
and after
law;.and of larly attendant
turé to mnake the law; of the executive to execute fhe the the operative fact should all
be taken in their totality
so that jus-
the judiciary to construe the law "It is emphatically province
tice can be rationally and fairly
dispensed.""
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,"2 While
the legislative and the executive departments, by enacting and
judicial construetien.
enforcing a law, respectively, may construe or interpret the law, it|
overrule
2.12. Legislature cannot
is the court that has the fînal word as to what the law means. or
to overrule the interpretation
The legislature has no power Court,
the Constitution by the Supreme
construction of a statute or function to the latter by the
for interpretation is a judicial assigned
law. While the legislature may
indicate its construc
fundamental
resolution or declaratory act, it
Veroy v. Layague, 210 SCRA 97 (1992); Allarde v. COA, 218 SCRA 227 tion of a statute in the form of a inter-
(1993); B.E. San Diego, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 446 (1993). , cannot preclude the courts from giving
the statute a different
Molina Rafferty, 38 Phil. 167
v. (1918).
wYu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385 (1925); Araneta v. Dinglasan,84 Phi pretation.38
(1949); Adong v. Cheng Seng Gee, 43 3 22); IPh ppine atral Agency
v. Collector of Customs, 51 Phil. 131 (1927); Escribana v. Avila, G.R. No. 3037%,
Sept. 12, 1978, 85 SCRA 245. 100 Phil.
568 (1993); Castro v. Tan,
Lacson v. Roque, 92 Phil. 456 (1953). 4Joya v. PC(G, 45 SCAD 186, 225 SCRA
"U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1, 6 (1922); L.8. Moon & Co. v. Hamson, 43 910 (1957).
501 (1997).
Phil. 27 (1922). $Alunan .ll Mirasol, 85 SCAD 277, 276 SCRA
v.
397 (1996).
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803); San Miguel Corp. v. Avelino, G. Malaluan COMELEC, 69 SCAD 160, 254 SCRA
v.
No. 39699, March 14, 1979, 89 SCRA Ine. LRC, 78 SCAD 580, 267 SCRA 202, 228 (1997)
69; Chinese Flour Importers' Assn. v. Pr 3Philippines Today, v.
Chinese Plour Importers' Assn
Stabilization Board, 89 Phil. 439 (1951). SEndencia v. David, 93 Phil. 696 (1953);
3 Endencia v. David, 93 Phil. 696 (1953). Price Stabilization Board, 89 Phil.
439 (1951).
58 59
ONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
B Power to Conetrue
Endencia u. David explains in detail the reasona wht

determine whether a
law is cor.stitu
legislature Supreme Court's interpratati
cannot override the stitution. Before the
court c a n
ascertain
the meaning
interpret and
the Supreme Court, constra it will have to of the Consti-
appears that in Perfecto v. Meer tionalor not, pertinent portion
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1935 Constitution to the effect t of said law, but also of the conflict
between the
not only to decide
whether there is
a
and has
members of the judiciary "shall receive such compensation as
tution in order there is, then the law will have to give way
be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their may if fiat as
two, because
"By legisiative
Con
tinuance in office," ruled that the collection of income tax fromit to be declaredininvalid
and
unconatitutíonal."
590, Congress
says
Section 13, Republic Act No. d e c r e a s e of
salaries of judicial officers is a diminution of their salaries in viol enumerated
of a judicial
officer is not
a
that taxing the salary or a s c e r

tion of the constitutional provision. Not having received such rul of interpretation
This is a clear example be dimin-
compensation. 'which shall not
ing favorably, the legislature thereafter enacted Republic Act Na tainment of the meaning
of the phrase
found in Section 9,
Article
590 by providing in Section 13 thereof that "no salary whenever their continuance in office,' officers.
ished during salaries of judicial
received by any public ofticer of the Republic of, the Philippines referring to the established
VIII of the Constitution, Constitution o r any part
shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of This act of interpreting the
Legislature may
Judiciary." If the
which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation jurisdiction of the Consti
province and
o r what a specific
portion of the
fiacd by the Cunstitution or by law." declare what a law means, ascer
have in actual
c a s e
after the courts
tution means, especiallyinterpretation and applied it in a
decision,
There is thus this situation: "The Supreme Court in a decision
tained its meaning by Under such a system,
a final
interpreting the Constitution, particularly Section 9, Article VII this would surely c a u s e confusion.
interpretation of
has held that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of based on a judicial
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a c a s e annulled
court undermined or e v e n
their collection thereof was a
because the Constitution may be
income tax on salaries, the law or of the of the law or of
the
diminution ofsuch salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitu. subsequent and different interpretation be neither
by a
department. That would
tion. Now comes the legislature and in Section 13, Republic Act Constitution by the Legislative
violative of the
fundamen-
being clearly
No. 590, says that 'no salary whenever rèceived by any public of
besides
wise nor desirable, particu-
shall bë constitutional system of government,
ficer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial oflicer) tal principles of our
considered exempt from the income tax, and proceeds to declare larly those governing
the separation of powers."
that payment of said income tax is not a diminution of his compen
aside.
may be set
sation. Can the Legislature validly do this? May the Legislatur 2.13. When judicial interpretation
declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, or a
constitutiornai provision by
The interpretation of a _tatute
|
not a decrease of his salary, after the or

specially a judicial officer, sacrösanct as to be beyond modification
the courts is not so appropriate case,
Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise?" Court itself may, in an
nullification. The Suprame
The Supreme Court ruled that the legislature cannot override previous construction
change or overrule. its
its interpretation of the constitutional provision. Explains the Court: the framers of the fundamen-
By amending the Constitution, interpretation of a
"Under our system of constitutional government, the legislauve or even nullify
a judicial
laws. The a i tal law may modify thereof. the interpretation by
the court
1s assigned the power to make and enact
provision Thus,
epartment t odparticular of the 1935 Consti
with the execution or carrving out i n Endencia v., David of Article
VILI, Section 9
ExECuve department charged
is from paying
are exempt
of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and applica tution ta the effect that judicial oflicers
tion of said laws belong exclusively to the judicial department. Anu
this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Con
Feb. 27, 1974, 56
SCRA 607.
Cf. People v. Jabinal, G.R. No 30061,
9 3 Phil. 696 (1953).
3w93 Phil. 696 (1953)
Endenea v. Duvid, 93 Phil. 696, 699, 70, 701, 702 (1963).
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUCTION AND INTEkPRETATION 61
60
because the collection of such tax wosla within the domain

income tax on their salaries buld of construction lies wholly
The provinte
violation of said constitutional provisia guuge. in the words of a
be a diminution thereof in sion where there is no ambiguity
of ambiguity" For statutes with ann
been nullified the 1973 Constitution when it specificalu
by room sor construction."
Only
has statute, there is no the subject of statutory
provided in Article XV, Section 6 that "No salary or any form af ambiguous or doubtful meaning
may be two or
condition of admitting
emolument of any public oficer oriemployee, including.constil
a
construction." Ambiguity means
than one way, or of
in more
tional ofticers, shall be exempt from payment of.income tax" Dore meanings, of being understood A statute is
at the same time.
The rule that the Supreme Court has the final word in tha referring to two or more things than one interpretation.
In
of m o r e
ambiguous if it is susceptible and give it a
interpretation or construction of a statut mrely means that tha should construe the statute
such a case, the court
legislature cannot, by law or resolution, modify or annul fhe judi meaning that is in accord
with its intent.
cial construction without modifying or repealing the very statute that "Only when
the law
which has been the subject of construction. It can, and it has done Thus, the Court in a case2 explained the court interpret. or
doubtful of meaning may
so, by amending or repealing the statute, the consequence of which is ambiguous or two or
is a condition of admitting
is that the previous judicial construction of the.statute is modified construe its intent. Ambiguity than one wey, or
of
of being understood in more
more meanings, time. A statute 1s
or set aside accordingly43 more things at
the same
reterring to two or meanings, in
it is admissible of two or m o r e possible
ambiguous if o n e of its judicial
called upon to exercise
2.14. When court may construe statute. which case, the Court is irue intent."
the law according to its
functions, which is to interpret
Language "is one of the distinctive qualities of man, especially when it is
that a statute is ambiguous
of modern thinking man. Man does feel and analyzes his intellec It has also been held well-informed persons
capable of being
understood by reasonably
tual and material experiences; but more than this he has the abil. fact that statute admits of different
The a
in either of two s e n s e s . ambiguous and
ity to articulate, and through articulation he manages, synthesizes interpretations shows that
the statute is vague and
with the
and brings forth the creation and evolution of culture, literature, correct interpretation consistent
science and law. In the process, the unceasing eftort is to say what requires that the
ascertained.53
is meant and to mean what is said. Language is rarely so free legislative intent be
from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one
construe where statute is clear.
sense. Thus, what the legislature had actually in mind is not some- 2.16. Court may not
the
times accurately reflected in the language of the statute,5 As a The first and fundamental duty of the court is to apply
comes.only after it has been
result, doubt is created as to what the statute means as to
or law.54 Construction or interpretation
whether i applies to a given situation. QConstruction is the mneans Inc:
1980, 97 SCRA 517; Resins,
by which the court clarifies the doubt to arrive at the true,intent of "Banawa Mirano, G.R. No. 24750, May 16, SCRA
754; Guevara v. Inocentes,
v.
No. 17888, Oct. 29, 1968, 25
the law.4 v. Auditor General, G.R. 1960, 16 SCRA 379.
1 G.R. No. 2657, March 15,
4Humilton v. Rutlhbone, 175
US 414, 44 L. ed. 219 (1899).
A condition sine qua non, before the court may construe or G.R. No. 36057, Jan. 31, 1984; Ong
v. Parel, 156
v. Court of Appeals,
Aparri
interpret a statute, is that there be doubt or ambiguity in its lan- SCRA 768 (1987; Veroy v. Loyague,
210 SCRA 97 (1992).
159 SCRA J69 (1988).
SDaong v. Municipal Judge,
International Dictionary, p. 66 (1961)
Webster's Third New 320 SCRA 279, 289
v. IAC, 116 SCAD 999,
oRizal Commercial Banking Corp.
Cf Quimpo v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 33052, Aug. 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 78; Victorias 952, 346 SCRA
v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 556 (1962); Salaysay v
(1999) &Del Phil. Amusement end Gaming Corp., 138
SCAD
Millng Co, Inc. Mar v.
Castro, 98 Phil. 364 (1956). 485 (2000) Ine.

1D67, 20 SCRA 1l64; Resina,
Justice Castro's concurring opinion, Phil. Constitution Assn., Inc. v. Mathay, 'olo v. Afaa, ( Ny. 220301, Aug. :30, Pacitic Oxygun &
Oct. 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 764;
GR. No. 25654, Oct. 4, 1966, 18 SCRA 300, 329 (1966). v. Auditur Generul, G.R. No. 17888, 22 SCRA 917.
G.R. No. 21881, March 1, 1968,
U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phii. 128 (1909). Acetylene v. Central Bank,
Caltex (Phils.), Ine. v. Palomar, G.R. No. 19650, Sept. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA
247.
62
rctot/cxu
is impossible or inadequate withe the court said in a case,
the "law is
demonstrated that application be harsh or onerous,.2 For as
function which the court should exercise, forie the law under the guise of interpreta-
last the law. We cannot change
it. It is the very there would tread on forbid-
less construction, be we may not
there is m o r e application and tion. Under o u r system of government,
is the function of
the law. This
more stability
in the law. den grounds; we cannot rewrite
reminded themselves,
"ours is not
that the court may
not construe a statuta Congress,"s And as the courts
It is well-settled it has been the statute, which by the way
from doubt. "Time and time again, the duty nor the power to amend in the words of
clear and free wherein to insert,
that is
this court that where the law speaks in presents no
interatitial space
repeatedly declared by. there is no room for interpretation

Cardozo,- judge-made innovations."
clear and categorical language, reflectedin

"For nothing is better settled does not appear nor is
intended or
There is only room for application." A meaning that therein by con-
than that the first and
fundamental duty of courtsis to apply tha the very language
of the statute cannot be placed
7 of P.D. No. 1716-A
to be. Fidelity to such a task with this rule, Section
not they like it struction. In accordance
law as they find it,
as sole police
is im in the exercise of its
interpretation, unless application which provides that the "EPZA,
precludes construction or zones and areas owned or
Tiu
inadequate withoutit."57 Where the law is clear and authority over the export
processing
receive and
possible or
what it says and administered by the authority,
shall have the power to
be taken to mean exactly relative to violations of penal
laws commit-
unambiguous, it must its mandate is obeyed" investigate complaints
it that the a u
has no choice but to see to owned or administered by
the court ted inside the zones and
areas
file and be deputized
the court may not intro evidence warrants, to
Where the law is free from ambiguity, thority, and when the cases before
the
where noneis provided from consid herein to prosecute the
corresponding criminal
duce exceptions or conditions laudable puz. not be construed as an exception
public welfare, or for any appropriate court or body," may to investi
erations of convenience, not contem- the authority of the Tanodbayan
it engraft înto the law qualifications to, or a limitation on, Anti-Graft Law committed by
pose: nor may violation of the
provisions by taking intQ.account.ques gate complaints for becausa there is nothing
in Section
plated," nor construe its EPZA officials within the zone
of expediency, good faith, practical utility and other similar EPZAs power "to file and be deputized x x x to
tions A statute that is
therewith."1 7 to intimate that the adjective "sole" to
to relax noncompliance exclusive and the use of
reasons s0 as
of interpretation. It should prosecut" cases is to describe its other
clear and unambiguous is not susceptible describe authority" is not employed
"pölice
be affected, even if the law may
be applied regardle88 of who may Cnse power6
decision
*
the issue is whether a
n Lapid v. Court ofAppeals,
administrative charge finding
the
Ombudsman in an
of the of one
penalty of suspension
the
respondent guilty and imposing and is not stayed by a
v. Court of executory
24 Phil. 504 (1913); Yangco is imnediately
Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, year without pay of RA.
183 (1915); Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
Relying on Sec. 27decision
the Court of Appeals.order,
First Instance of Manila, 29 Phil. Revenue v. Limpan timely appeal to
SCRA 728; Cormmissioner of Internal
provides that "Any directive or
53766, Oct. 80, 1981, 108 v. Mapa, No. 6770, which of
Investment Corp., G.R. No. 28571, July 31,
1970, 34 SCRA 148; People of public c e n s u r e or reprimand,suspension
G.R. No. 22301, Aug. 30, 1967, 20
SCRA 1164. imposing the penalty be final and unappeable"
22 8alary shall
Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Municipulity
of Naga, G.R. No. 24116, Aug. not more than one months
1968, 24 SCRA 708, 712. 764,
No. 17888, Oct. 29, 1968, 25 SCRA
Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General, G.R.
42 (1960).
767 30 SCHRA Finance Corp., 110 Phil.
v. Rehabilitation 28 SCRA 850,
Luzon Inc. v. De Garcia, G.R. No. 25659, Oct. 31, 1969,
Surety Co., 0
Nepomuceno
G.R. No. 30364, July 28, 1969,
Prisons,
Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philg.,
G.R. No. 26419, Oct. 19, 1970, Baking v. Director of
; 138 SCRA 273 (1985).
SCRA 270; Chartered Bank Enmployees Assn. v. Ople, 851.
94 Phil. 862, 864 (1954).
G.R. No. 1961 4Crisologo v. Macadaeg,
University of the Phils. Board Regents v. Auditor General,
of
sManikan v. Tanodbayan,
127 SCRA 724
(1984).
Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 5 (1969). SCAD 334 SCRA 738

815,
(2000).
G.R. No. 43766, Oct. 30, 1981, 108 BCRA 728, o128
Ramos v. Court of Appeala,
epublie v. Gu Ban Loe, 111 Phil. 805 (1961), Velauco v. Lupe4, 1 r
720
(1903).
COUSTHtUCTION ANDINTERPRETATION
S T A T U O R Y C O N S T R U C T I O N
Construe
Power to
B. as
O m b u d s m a n
Act
of the provides
for
cases, orders, direot supplelorily
to the
provisions
Act
which
disciplinary appeaie O m b u d a m a n gui3e'of
administrative
may
be d plied in the not, i n
the
and that
I n all the
Ombudsman
is nothing Courts' may include

Office of
there and
of the filing a petition application. statute
or
decisons
Court of ApPpeals) by written noti Such
suppletory
the s c o p e
of a lawmakers.
the Supreme
Court ( n o w
fron receipt of the interpretation,
eniarge
or
intended by»the or
with1n t e n
(10) days denial of the motion n o t provided whether
careles8
situstions
eruorari decision or therein enactment, W18-
or of Co of later
tse order.
directive
with Rule 45
(now Rule
43) of the Rules urt An
omission at the time
supplied
however
recnsideration the
decision imposed cunnot be judicially
that since culculated,
ruled inclusion.
Court 18 not immed: the
the s a m e Law, the
recommend
the Supreme w i t h o u t pay, dom may
therefrom sta yed
Ombudsman
of o n e (1) year the Code
suspension
appeal interposed inone respect,
and the timely
Government
while
S o l i c i t o r General th "And Local
ately e x e c u i o r y of the hat and the with
to the claim Code of 1987 o r deal
executory. As whio laws related
Rules of Civil Procedure,
Administrative
its becoming insofar a s three in

43 of the 1997 materia
there. It is a principle
Sec. 12 of Rule a r e in pari
similarity ends
the that apply
reads: public officers, where the two
statutes
The; appeal shall not c o n s t r u c t i o n that

designed for
the
Secion 12. Effect ALADpeal.
final order pr resolution sought t
statutory
particular case, that which
w a s specially
i n s t a n t case, the
judgment, to a other. In the
stay the award, otherwise the of
the Court of Appeals shall direct
over
must prevail the subject
said
could have been
case
be reviewed uniess to petitioner
as it may deem just," acts attributed before the Office of
upon such terms disciplinary proceedings
administrative before the
Government Code o r
which states:, the Local
of the Local Government Code, the President under Consid- Act.
that Sec. 68 Ombudsman under the Ombudsman
Office of the under the Om-
PendingAppeal.-An appeal shall
Section 68 Erecutionfrom however that petitioner was charged
his
becoming final and executory ering alone which should govern
not prevent the decision Act, it is this law
considered as having been placed budeman
The respondent shall be
the pendency of an ap
CR8e.7
under preventive suspension during

agency tasked to implement statute
a may
the event he wins such appeal.
In the event the appeal An administrative
peal in where its provisions' are
he shall be paid his salary and such it by expanding its meaning
results in an exoneration, not construe Bank u. Court of Appecls,t3 the
other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal," ctear and unanbiguous. In Land
Reform construed the word "deposit" in
Department of Agrarian
and thet Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 6, Section 47, par(4 Sec. 16 of Rep. Act No. 6657 to the effect
that "in case of rejection
of the Administrative Code of 1987, which reads: or no response from the landowner, upon
the deposit with a n acces-
Bible bunk designated by the DAR of the compensation
in cash o r
4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory, and in one case the penalty is suspension or re in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall require the proper
moval, the respondent shall be considered as having been un
der preventive suspension during the pendeney of the appea Register of Deeds to issue a 'Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines," to include "irust
in the event he wins an appeal,"
accounts." ln setting aside interprotation, the
such Court held that
should apply and authorize the immediate execution of the one Section 16te) of Republie Act No. 6657 was very specific in limiting
yeur auspension of respondent, the Court ruled that these prov the type of deposit to be made as compensation for the rejecting
S1ond cannot be read in Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Law. The Cour lundowera, that is, in 'cash' or in 'LBP bonds," "foreclosing any
explained:
"There is no basis in law for the proposition that ti
provisions of the 'Administrative Code' of 1987 and the
Government Code on execution
Loca 128 SCAD 815, 334 SCRA 753-764.
pending review should be a 71 SCAD 806, 258 SCRA 404 (1996).
STATUTORY CONS'TRUCTION ONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION 61
66
that would incud. sion." By statutory fiat, rulings of the court of last resort app.ying
construction
he statute itself. 1kgis
doubt as to allow an expanded
within the coverage
term 'depo8it
of the ter or interpreting a statute become part of the
This maxim means that the
opening of
'trust accounts' interpretato legis vim obtinet. legal
"when the law speaks in clear,and statute ac-
is the rule that authoritative interpretation of the Supreme Court of a
For well-settled r e a s o n for interpretation or of the dete of
there is no con quires the force of law thereof
by becoming part
a as
categorical language, establishes
struction.but oniy for application." its enact1nent, since the court's interpretation merely
statute thus con
the issue is whether bullots not signed the contemporaneous legislative intent that the
TNibanan v HRET," of election inspectors re Btrued intends to effectuate." The rulings of the Supreme
Court
at the back by
the chairman of the board because they interpret what the laws
are laws in their own right
since it violated Sec. 24 of RA. No. 7166, which reads:
toke spurious, Say or mean.'"
"Sec. 24. Signature of Chairman: at.he-back.hEvery principle of stare

Article 8 of the Civil Code expresses the
before delivering an official þallot to that when the Supreme.Court
Ballot.- In every case decisis
has
et non quieta novere. It means
once laid down a principle of law as applícable to a certain
the voter, the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectora
it to äll
shall, in the presence of the voter, affix his signature at the state of facts, it will adhere tó that principle and apply
back thereof. Failure to authenticate shall be noted in the future caseswhere the fact are substaptially the same. This prin
and shall constj. assures certainty and stability in the legal system."s
In other
minutes of the Board of Election Inspectors ciple the
263 and the interpretation by the Supreme Court placed upon
tute an election offense punishable under Sections words,
Omnibus Election Code." law has the force of law and establishes the conteraporaneous legis-
264 of the lative intent of law, which constitutes part of the law as
of the date
continues until overruled
The Couri ruled in the negative, thu_: "There is really nothing the statute is enacted. The interpretation
in favor of the parties
in the above law to the effect that a ballot which
is not so authenti. and the new doctrine is applied prespectively
faith
cated shall thereby be deemed spurious. The law merely renders who have relieved on the old doctrine and have acted in good
the BEI Chairman accountable for such failure. Thé courts may in accordunce therowith."
guise of interpretation, enlarge

not, in the of the scope a'statute As part of the legal system and until reversed by the Supreme
and embrace situations neither provided nor intended by the law. Court itself, rulings of the highest tribunal arebinding upon
infe-
makers. Where the words and phrases ofa statute.are not obscure the criteria
rior courts."" They become, to the extent applicable,
and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should that must control the actuations not only of those
called upn to
enforce obed.ence
be determined from the language employed, and where there is abide thereby but also of those duty-bound to
no ambiguity in the words, there should be no room for cons thereto.79

ruction,"70
2.16. Rulings of Supreme Court part of legal system. 1066 (1947); Endencia David, supra.
2Miranda v. Imperial, 77 Phil. v.
Caltex
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the People v. Jabinal, G.R. No. 30061, Feb. 27, 1974, 55 SCRA 607;
18 SCRA 247.
(Phils.), Inc. v. Palomar, G.R. No. 19650, Sept. 29, 1966,
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines," Senovila v. lHermosisimo, 100 Phil. 601 (1956); People
v. Jubinal, supra.
The decisions referred to are those of the Suprème Coürt, the latter Segundo, 164 SCRA 365 (1988).
5Phil. Veterans Aflairs Office v.134 SCAD 252, 340 SCRA 765 (2000).
being the tribunal that by constitutional mandate, has the fina Tung Chin Huu v. Rodriguez,
Peru v l'ebea, i R. No. 13t5:21, April 17, 2001
word in the interpretation of statute constitutional Consolidaied Union,
a or a provi National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority v. NWSA
Director of Prison8,
GR. No. 26894, Feb. 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 227 (1969); Kabigting v.
6 SCRA 281 (1962).
Caltex Phils.), Ine, v. Palonar, G.R. No. 19650, Sept. 29,
1966, 18 SCRA
89 SCAD 998, 283
SCRA 520 (1997). 247.
lbid, pp. 531-532.
"Art.8, Civil Code, Miranda
David, 93 Phil. 696 (953). v. Inperial, 77 Phil. 1066 (1947); Endencia
ONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

69
68
B. Power o Construe
retroactive effect. It appears
rulings have
no
of the principle is People u. Jabinal.
Judicial Tllustrative interpretinB
2.17.
of the high
tribunal construing a Inlaw thut the Supreme Court,
in People u.
Maearandang,"
exenpting peace
formsWhile
part of the law ruling
a judicial as of the date of its enactment, it cannot:
Nor Revised Administrative Code
be Section 879 of the
issuance of license to
vested rights, relating to the
impair will officers from the requirements provincia
if to do a previous appointed by
so a
may a judicial
retroactive effect
ruling overruling one be applied retroa
ling ruled that a person of
given possess fircarns, officer" within the
meaning
under the previous rulin governor a s
secret agent is a "peace wiühout
which a r o s e firearms even
nullify a right entitled to po8sess and carry
for the
tively so as to the law and is be prosecuted
therefore
before its abandonment. license and cannot the
the required v. Mapa,"
part of the law of th
decisions form crime of illegal poSsession
of firearms.* In People
Macarandang case
While Supreme Court of the Civil Code whick the doctrine enunciated
in the
Article 4 h court abundoned gov-
however subject to a provincal
land, they are retroactive effect unless theconcon- and held that a person appointed secret agent by tirearms
shall have no and carry
provides that
"laws lex prospicit officer" entitled to poesess
the legal maxim, e r n o r is not a "peace abandonment
provided." This is expressed in "The rationala license. In view of the express

trary is backward. without the required raised in People
v.
forward not
the law looks the question
non respicit, that retroactive an of the Macarandang doctrine, provineial
appointed secret agent byfîrearm at a
a
is based on the principle
against retroactivity divests rights that
have already become Jabinal is whether a person
of an
unlicensed
plication of a law usually hence, is unconsti. and found in possession force can be
doctrine wa[ still in
obligations of contract and
governor
or impairs the time when the Macarandang The trial
vested firearms.
of
convicted of illegal possession On
tutional.1 prosecuted and convicted him of such crime.
overruleits earlier deçi the Mapa ruling, of
abandon.or court, relying on reversed the trial
court's judgment
The Supreme Court may propertodo so. Suprene Court
statute whenever it is right and appeal, the down in x x x
Macarandung
sion construing a should be "The doctrine laid
is that courts conviction, saying:
of the law of the
land, at the
than anything else hence,
For more important "no doctrine or principle of w a s part of
the jurisprudence,
firearms in question
Constitution provides that found in possession of the
right. The decision rendered en
banc or in time appellant was
the triaB court. It is true that
the
law laid down by the Court in a the court sitting en and when he was arraigned by
in 1967, but
when a
or reversed except by in the Mapa case
division may be modified or reversing a
doctrine doctrine w a s overruled
different view is adopted,
the court modifying is overruled and a
banc."8s The ruling by acquired under such doctrine of this Court
and should not
prospectively, and rights
prospectively,
should be applied acted on the
or principle operates or rèversal may
not be the new doctrine doctrine and
prior to its modification had relied on the old
doctrine or principle apply to parties who in the canstruction and.appli.
faith thereof. This is
especially true punishability
affected thereby hecessary that the
by the Supreme laws, where it is
interpretation of a
statute cation of criminal for the guidance of
society,*
In other words, the until the latter overrules of an act be reasonabBy
foreseen
be part of the legal system on December
15,
Court remains to prospectively Appeals," it appears
that
it and the n e w doctrine

overruling the old is applied In Co u. Court of a circular holding
that "Where
have relied thereon in good
faith.85 of Justice issued or
in favor of persons who 1981, the Secretary of an arrangement
to guarantee
the check is issued as part pre-existing
whether
or not,
obligntion,
payment of an
secure the
1974, 65 sCRA 607.

Jabinal, G.R. No. 30061, Feb. 27,
People v.
v. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA

615 (1992); Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, Supra.
Benzonan
106 Phil. 713 (1959). (1958).
75 SCAD 311, 263 SCRA 222 (1996). 103 Phil. 500
(1946). See People v. Lucero, SCRA 1164.
(Phils.), Inc. v. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496
Koppel Marine Services, G.R. No. 22301, Aug.
30, 1967, 20 SCRA 607, 612.
Art. VIll, Sec. 43), 1987 Btitution; Vir-jen Shipping & Feb. 27, 1974, 66
G.R. No. 38061,
No. 58011, Nov. 18, 1983. People v. Jabinal,
Inc. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
v. 227 SCRA 444
(LH3).
v. Uy, 92 Phil. 52 (195 4 6 A D 634,
Torres v. Tun Chin, 69 Phil. 518 (1940); Talaroc
Jubinal, G.R. No. 3006t, Feb. 27, 1974, 55 SCRA 607.
People v.
Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001.
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
B Power to Conetrue
70
the contracts
estafa or violati decisions which in force when
were
liable for either held that the which the
is not criminally u. Peopley Sond had eatablished a
rule of property, upon
the drawer Court in Que were
mnde decis1ons ca
nnot
subsequent
x." The Supreme that a check ie and that
to rely,
B.P. Blg. 22 x x circular and held parties had a right
good faith under the
overruled said rights acquired in
ber 21, 1987, an obligation is nevor 8s inpair
guarantee the
pertormance of rthe. retroact 9
the ormer decisions.
issue raised in Co u. Cor
merely to statute 60 Construed by
The when to
B.P. Blg. 22. raised is
less covered by be held criminally liable nander of Appeals," theunder
issue
Benzuun u. Court
whether Co could In Sec. 119 or Com
to repurch.ase
Appeals, suprais for issuing a rubber checket count the tive-year period widow or legal
heirs
u. People, supra, applicant, his
the ruling in Que obligation, at a time when
the monwealth Act No. 141 granting of tive years
performance of an the period
guarantee the
the land within
had not been reversed. In
exon. the right to repurchase v. Angeles"
and upas v.
the Secretary of Justice In Monge
Court held that the rulin in
circular of conveyance." ourt
from date of the Supreme
criminal liability, the 1957 and 1934, respectively. from
erating Co from retroactively in accordance wih Damaso" decided in should be counted
could not bè applied held that the five-year
period of repurchase Belisario u.
Que u. People the doctrine that the actual exiat
Xi8t forecloaure sale. However, in
the prospectivity principle and the date conveyance or
of Supreme Court
is an operative fact negat. decided in 1988, the
Intermediate Appellate Court,"
nullification
of a statute prior to its invalidity. Th counted after the expira-
period should be
ence
of absolute retroactive
ruled that the five-year foreclos-
ing acceptance of a principle authority is in favor of the proposi of repurchase in extrajudicial
added that the weight of tion of the one-year period that the doctrine
that should
Court to the effect the Court held
decision in Que u.,People, supra, sale. In Benzonan, and Tupas
because
tion that the Court's
ure
enunciated in Monge
the pertormance of an that which was
Belisario and not
that
to guarantee apply is
that a check issued merely should not be involved took place prior
to
covered by B.P, Big. 22 the transactions which should be afplied
obligation is nevertheless down in the latter
case
to the prejudice of Co and other persons which was laid

given retrospective effect of the Secre prospectively.
relied on the official opinion
similarly situated, who within the scope of
such a check did not fall construing statute.
tary of Justice that Court may issue guidelines
in
2.18.
B.P. Blg. 22. bf which may tread
court adopted the princi. In construing statute,the enforçement
a issue
In Roa u. Collector of Customs, the a r e a s of constitutional
rights, the court may, but
of birth. This principle was on sensitive or restriet t
ple of jus soli or citizenship by place guidelines in applying iMo
»tatute, aet tt anlarge
the Supreme This is not judicial legis-
followed and accepted for a number of. years until delineute what tle law requires. .
sanguinis. It has to clearly law is. Thus, in People
Court abandoned it in favor of the principle of jus lation but a n act to
define what the
the
"even as we uphold
been held, however, that the abandonment by the court of jus 8oli Supreme Court said that
Ferrer,0 the overemphasize the
those who, by virtue of the princ we cannot Act,
did not divest the citizenship of validity of the
Anti-Subversion
in its enforcement, oper
ating
citizens of the
ple before its rejection, became or were declared to prop
need for prudence
and circumspection
of freedom of expression and belief.
Philippines. In another case, it has been held that "rights as it does in

the sensitive a r e a observed in any
guidelines to be
erty and benefits of investments acquired by contract in reliance AccordingBy, we issue the following
statute as construed by the Supreme Court, and which were

valid acontracts under the statute as thus interpreted when te
upon
contracts or investments were made, cannot be annulled or d" 682; Fairiold v.
Co., 92 Ala. 176, 9 So.
Farrior New Eugland Mortgage
v. (1878).
ed. 544
vested by subsequent decisions of the same court overruling the F'allatin, 100 U.S. 47,
25 L.
County of Fallat
same decisions; that as to such contracts or investments, it
will De 205 SCRA 616
(1992).
(1957).
101 Phil. 863
192 SCRA 693 (1984).
166 SCRA 101
(1988). SCRA 382 (1972).
Dec. 27, 1972, 48
G.R. No. 32613,
2154 SCRA 160 People v. F'errer,
9323 Phil. 315 (1912).
Torres v. Tun Chin, 69 Phil. 616 (1940); Talaroc v. Uy, 92 Phil. 52 (1952)) 1
Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil. 249 (1947).
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
13
72 C. Limitations on Power to Construe
well-trained
in addition to proving are
Act. The Government,
considers hostile to
him. The investigators methods and
prosecution under the fol.
m u s t ' e s t a b l i s h the
employ all the
c i r c u m s t a n c e s as may
affect liability, and seasoned in their work. They them to
extract
such Communist Party of the and has taught
study
the crimeof joining the that experience
the detainee. Most
lowing elements of
means
the case of sub. out of
(1) In what may pass for it, their constitu-
subversive organization: the truth, or a w a r e of
Philippines or any C o m m u n i s t Party of the unlettered and a r e not and
other than the' detnincos a r e
the intimidating
versive organization is overthrow e v e n if they were,
the purpose of the prganization
to tional rights. And law in such an atmos
Philippines: (a) that and to establish in this coercive presence of
the officers of the of
20 of the Bill
Government of the Philippines them into silence.
Section
the present of. a foreign overwhelms
totalitarian regime under the dominátion phere

remedy this
imbalance.
organization; and (c) that seeks to
country a
Rights
the accused joined such is arrested, it
shall be the duty
power; (b) that acts; and (2) in the case
and by overt 7. At he time a person r e a s o n for
the
he did so knowingly, willfully Communist officer to inform him of the
of the Philippines: (a) that the of the arresting if any. He
of the Communist Party which be shown the
warrant of arrest,
continues to pursue the objectives arrest and he must to remain
silent
Party of the Philippinesdeclare it to be an orgunized conspiracy for shall be informed of his constitutional rights make ocould
led Congress in 1967 to statement he might
means for the purpose that any
Government by illegal and to counsel, and have the right
the overthrow of the arrested shall
control of a foreign power; (b) that be used against
him. The person he
of placingthe country under the with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone
Party.of the Philippines; and (c) to c o m m u n i c a t e m e a n s - by telephone if

possi-
the accused joined the Communist chooses by the most expedient
that he did so knowingly; willfully
and by overt acts."10 messenger. It
shall be the responsibility
b l e - or by letter or
Art. IV of that this is accomplished.
Court construed Sec. 20, of the arresting officer
to see to it
In Morales Enrile,102 the
u. *judge-made shall be conducted
unless it be in
the 1973 Constitution,
which the Court termed as No custodial investigation arrested, by
counsel engaged by the person
issuing guidelines;'as follow8 the presence of the court upon
lawby on his behalf,
or appointed by
any person on his
detainee himself or by anyone
"5.OurConstitution provides: petition either of
the
waived but the waiver
counsel may be
to be a witness behalf. The right to
"Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled
counsel.
made with the
assistance of
under investigation for the com- shall not be valid unless herein laid
against himself. Any person in violation of the process
the right to remain silent and Any statement obtained in whole or in part,
mission of an offense shall have No force, violence, down, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory,
to counsel, and to be informed of euch right. shall be inadmissible

in evidence."14
other means which vitiates the free
threat, intimidation, any
or
confession obtained in
will shall be used against him. Any. ON POWER
in evidence. LIMITATIONS
violation of this section shal be inadmissible C.
TO CONSTRUE
his custodial investi-
"6. After a person is arrested and be
confrontation arises which at best may
gation begins, a
or otatutes.
to an army camp restrict
termed unequal. The detainee is brought 2.19. Courts may not enlarge nor
headquarters and there questioned and croS8-examined often involving

police between initiating policy,
as may be neces The vital difference
not only by one but as many investigators and merely carrying out a formu-
morale. He finds himself in a strange a decided'break
with the past, which
sary to break down his relatively n a r r o w limits within
and unfamiliar surrounding, and every person he

meets he lated policy, indicates the interpreting
courts and the extent to which
choice is rarely open to
SCRA 382, 415-416

People v Ferrer, G.R. No. 32613, Dec. 27, 1972, 48 14121 SCRA 553-554.
121 SCRA 538 (1983).
uFiloteo, Jr. Sandiganbayan, 75 SCAD 311, 263 SCRA 222 (1996).
v.
16
14 OSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
Amilationa on Power tu Cunatrue
This restricts judicial freedo

law is inescapably making law.105 application. It is
repugnant
a statute.
While statutory construction involu guess at
its meaning and differ as to its failure to
th construction of should.resist the temptation to roam at will an
to the
Constitution because it violates due process for
leave law
choice the court avoid and
notice of the conduct to
to what policy should prevail. Interpol accord persons fair provisions.
But
rely on its predilectians as
and evisceration avoided.:Comnontsenn enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out
its
cannot be
tion must be e_chewed that is to say, it
stars that should guide judicial the act must be utterly vague on its face, A "perlectly
and good-faith are the leading clause or by
construction.
construction. The search must

be for, and the end result should ba clarified by either a saving
legislation
which is
vague" act shout be distinguished from a
which is ambiguous, a s
reasonable interpretation. couched in imprecise language
o r from o n e
constructiun.
"
a r e subject to proper
interpretation, enlarge the the latter types of legislation
Courts may not, in the guise of
of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor
scope
An omission at the time of enactment of wisdom.
intended by the lawmakers. influenced by questions
cannot be judicially supplied how Courts not to be
whether careless or calculated, 2.20.
inclusion.Courts. are not to make the law; of the
ever later wisdom may recommend the It is the duty of the
Legislature
to construe the
law what they think should be in it or law; and of the Judiciary
authorized to insert into the Executive to oxecute the mandated the Consti- by
to supply what they think egisBature would have supplied ifits
the Law"i 1hin divisun uf responaibility,
us
power
to the omission, 08 one department
encroaching upon the
from
attention had been called tution, precludes the very nature of
Accordingly, since the legislature, by
even,the most arbi of the other. adequacy, wis8
They should not, by censtruction, revisenor;rewritethelawrto its function, is primarily
the judge of the necessity,
s courts may not
trary and "unfair action of the iegislature, and expediency of any iaw,
dom, reasonableness nterpret-
be the law. 109 Nor may they into account in construing
or
conform with what ihey think should take any of these
matters
which the law does not pre-

interpret înto the law a requirementlimitations ing the law."
Where statute contains no in its operation or or expe-
scribe.0 a of wisdom, justice,
where a provision of Courts do not pass upon questions
scope, courts should not engraft any. And is within their province to supervise
of legisiation, for it
not
certain transactions, it can- diency
to bounds of propriety and
common
law expressly limits its application
and keep it within the
not be extended to other transactions by interpretation.12 To do legislation a legislative
concern. Hence,
of the That is primarily and exclusively the courts merely
any of such things do
would be:to violence to the language sense.
laws do not violate the Constitution,
as long as
of whether or not thcy
are
law and to invade the legislative sphere.1l3 them regardless
interpret and apply a certain law as
harsh,
regard
Neither should courts construe statutes which are perfectly wise or salutary8 While judges
may
or
recommend to the authority
it lacks comprehen- wrong, and may
vague," As a rule, a statute may be vague when unwise or morally modification or repeal, stil,
concerned its amendment,
Bive standards.that men of comnon intelligence must necessarily department apply it and give it
must
effect
as long as said law is in force, they
as decreed by the law-making body."" wirdon c Lad
10Morales Subido, G.R. No. 29658, Nov. 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 150.
v.
G.R. No. 28463,
1Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs,
May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 268.
10"Morales v. Subido, supra. 14People v. Nuzario, 165 SCRA 186 (1988)
43 Phil. 1, 6 (1922).
10People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 657 (1950). 4U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho,
1166 (1967).
Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 (1946); Baking v. Director of Prisons, G.R.'No. nchong v. Hernundez,
101 Phil.
v. Go Bon ler,
1i1
30364, July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 850; Inchong . Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957 87 Phil. 289 (1950); Republic
D e lus Santos, v. Mallare,
v Cuenco, 103
Phil. 1051 (1967).
Palanca v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 (1920). Phil. 805 (1961); Tañada v. Carlos, 78
83 Phil. 139 (1936); Peuple
Hongkong & Shanghai Bank v. Peters, 118 Phil. 2R4 (1910). Angara v. Electoral Commission, Phil. 290 (1955); Morfe v. Mutue, G.R.
No.
Palanca v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 (1920); Hongkong & Shanghai Bank v. Lacs01, 97
Phil. 535 (1947); Quintos
SCRA 424.
v. Peters, 16 Phil. 284 (1910). 20387, Jan. 31, 1968, 22 (1951).
iRepublic Flour Mills, he. v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 28463, 88 Phil. 365, 44
People v. Limaco,
Muy 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 268; Crisologo v. Macadaeg, 94 Phil. 862 (1954).
theori.
to resolve
the merit of conflicting
Courts do not sit legislature to decide, 120 Jf
for the
harsh, a becomi
are
debatable questions unwise or
statute is
think that a particular of their own limited sn
s e n s e of decency
and a recognition
the law, in the guisa
forbid them from amending
or rewriting
or prejudices,121A
Chapter H
their own predilections
interpretation, to suit alone to correct
statute is for the legislature AIDS TO cONSTRUCTION
shortcoming of a
appropriate enactment.122
a case: "In making

vhoices, Congres
As well emphasized in
wisdom, which this Court has no authority t A. IN GENERAL
has consulted its own
reverse. Well has it

been said that courts do not
review, much less theories. That is the preroOga.
sit to resolve the merits
of conflicting
It is settled that questions regard. 3.01. Generally.
tive of the political departments. ccurt is
of statutes are not ad. ambiguous, the
ing the wisdom, morality, practicability a statute is
or
Where the meaning of inn
dressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative itself of all legitimate
aids to construction
warranted in availing statute.' These
the function belongs in our of the
and executive departments, to which order that it c a n
ascertain the true
intent
the
pegs of
scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever.way are those found in the printed
these branches decide, they are answerable:only: to their own ícon aids to construction thoee ettraieöus facts
known as. intrinsic aids,
and
statute itself, cal'ed extrinsic aids.
science and the constituents who will ultímately júdge their acts. and circumstances outside the printed page,
and not to the courts of justice.P123
3.02. Title.
case of doubt
in its
s e r v e s a s aid, in.
The title of a statute legislative will.
construction and to asçertaining
language, to its resort to its
statute is obecire, courts may
Where the meaning of a the legialative
The titla-nay-indicate
title to clear the obscurity. statute
the scope of. the. law, and.a
intent.to extend o r restriet construed io con-
doubtful import will be
couched in a language af title."The tiile can
as disclosed in its
form to the legislative intent to the meaning of
where there is doubt as
be resorted to as an aid in enacting it, and
the law or as to the
not otherwise.3
as
statute may properly
serve
of
The rule that the title
a
in this
intent carries more weight
i guide to ascertaining legislative
(U.S. Guzman, 30 Phil. 416 (1914).

v. De Phil. 883
Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40
OLorenzo v. Director of Health, 60 Phil, 595 (1927). People Rivera, 59 Pil. 235 (1933);
v.
2
of Binalonan, 32 Phil. 634 (1915). torl
Baking v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. 30364, July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 850; (1920); Government v. Municipality
Inchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1166 (1957). 105 Phil. 876 (1959). T
Commissioner of Customa v. Relunia,
2Lecson v. Roque, 92 Phil.A56 (1935); 'aaitst1At+
Cornejo.v. Naval, 54 Phil. 809 (1930). whuat1re Wirr
Mugtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 63 SCAD 367, 234 SCRA 255, 268 77
(1994)
18
AJDS TO CONSTRUCTION
79
A. In General
the constitutional, requirement that "
jurisdiction because of
whiclh shall be expressedi
bill shall embrace only onesubject ne but inadvertently omitted from the body. Parting from this
constitutional injunction makes the tit was
between title and
title thereof." This
-
no contradiction
and what may inadequatelu premise, there is, at bottom, that type
indispensable part of a statute, be body. In line with viewe herein stated,
the title belongs to
be supplied or remedied by its title, the rules or provisions
omitted in the text may as part of
of tutlos wlurh wlhould be regarded virtue of
illustrates the rule. m. expressed in the body. At the very
least, the words 'by
The case of City of Baguio Marcos u
the tit!e of the law stand in equal
when to count the forty-year Derins judicial decisions rendered' in
question raised in this case is importance to the phrase in
Section 1 thereof, 'by virtue of judicial
to file a petition for reopening of cadastral proceedings'as autho proceedings instituted."7

ized by Republic Act Na.931 covering lands that "have been, or are owned
virtue of judicial as to whether privately
about to be declared land of the public domain, by In another case, the issue resolved by
of Public Act No. 2874 was
proceedings instituted within the forty years preceding the
next lands come within the scope
examining Act No. 2874 in
title. The court ruled that
of this Act." Should the period be counted from the date a resort to its for the "title of
approval detail it was intended to apply
to public lands only,
the cadastral proceeding sought to be reopened
was
originally in- indicative of legislative intent, reads: "An Act to
1912? Or should it be counted the Act, always the public domain,
stituted in court, which was April 12, amend and compile the
laws relating to lands of
therein rendered became final, which such Act provides: "The
from the date the decision and for other purposes."
Section One of
Section Two,
was filed on Act.'
was November 25, 1922? As the petition for reopening be the Public Land
short title of this Act shall stated, reads: "The
July 25, 1961, it was filed beyond the forty-year period if the period wherein the purpose of
the Act is expressly
domain." x x
to be computed from the date the petition was originally filed shall apply to lands of the public
was provisions of the Act the words 'and for other pur
and not if it was to be counted from the date the decision became x. In o u r interpretation
of said Act,
nonexistent. Under
is "An Act to authorize the filing in the contained in its title, must
be treated as
final. The title of the law poses' That no bill shall
wherein the requirement-
proper court under
certain conditions of certain claims of title to all the authorities shall be expressed in
which subject
of land that have been declared public land, by
virtue of embrace more than one subject, words 'and for other
parcels has been considered, the
decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the title of the bill without
-
judicial have been held to be

when found in the title discarded in
the approval of this Act." The court noted that there
was an appar purposes whatsoever and have been altogether
the title and the body of the law. Never- force or effect
ent inconsistency between construing the Act."*
that the starting date to count the forty-year pe
theless, it ruled the issue raised is
whcther Executive
riod is the date the final decision was rendered.. The court
ex
In Ebarle v. Súcaldito,1°
"Outlining the procedure by which
com-
plained: Order No. 264 entitled with commis-

officials and employees
to plaintscharging government criminal actions,
to
"It recites that it authorizes court proceedings of claims sion of irregularities should
be guided" applies
can be under-
decisions, ren- investigation thereof
parcels of land declared public by virtue of judicial to the end that no preliminary
there is previous compli-
dered within forty years next preceding the approval
of this Act. taken or information
filed in court unless
In holding that said executive
Order.
That title is written in capital letters- by Congress itself; such a n c e with
said Executive
to criminal complaints,
words or titles used by administrative and not
kind of title then is not to be classed with order applies only to title speaks of commission
ruled that the "very
compilers of statutes' because it is the legislature speaking.' Ac the Supreme Court of
not e v e n by implication,
that the phrase last There is no mention,
cordingly, it is not hard to come to a deduction of irregularities."
from R.A. No. 931 by virtue of judicial decisions rendered
quoted -
SCRA 352.
G.R. No. 354355, 27
40 Phil. 883 (1920).
Central Capiz v. Ranirez,
Article VI, Sec. 26(1), 1987 Constitution. 894 (1920).
40 Phil. 883, 886,
City of Baguio v. Marcos, G.R. No. 26100, Feb. 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 344 0156 SCRA 808 (1987).
Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883 (1920).
G.R. No. 26100, Feb. 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 342.
80 81
AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
A. In General
that is to say "crimes." While "crimes" amous

criminal "offenses," well refer lawmakers a s to the
the executive order could have very the key of the statute, to open th minds of the
to "irregularities," to make itself applica. and the object
term had it
intended the mischief to be remedied,
to the m o r e specific "convicte purpose to be achieved, statute." In short, the
as "accused," of the
such technical terms to be accomplished, by the provisions
thereto, a s well a s to of the legislature. Hence,
whenever
or "acquitted." preamble sets out the intention whenever the words used therein
statute
there is ambiguity in a or
the proper
the preamble may decide
authorized. have m o r e than one meaning,
to title not statute.i" Thus, a preamble may
3.03. When resort
construction to be given to the
a law8 o r
to be a broad scope of
is clear and free from doubt, it ia restrict what otherwise appears
When the text of the statute a n element not clearly
ex-
improper to resort to
its title to make it obscure. The title may bae require,in the cornmission of a crime,
the legislative intent to make
resorted to in order to remove,
but not to create, doubt or" uncer pressed in its text." It may expres8 to be given
in which case the law has
the law apply retroactively,
intent."
tainty. retroactive so as to carry
effect, out such
pauo
3.04. Preamble. ( Aid) 1d phy a pastular jpa pas 3.05. Ilustratiqn ofrule. Argu li
A preamble is that part, of the statute written
immediately illustration of the
of People Purisima is a good
after its title, which states the purpose,reason or justification tor The case
w a s charged with violation of Presi-
expressed in the form of rule. It appears that a person the carrying
the enactment of the law. It is usually dential Decree No. 9, which penalizes,
among others,
Whereas" clauses.1" It is generally omitted in statutes passed by blunt, pointed weapon not
outside of one's residence any bladed,
or
the Philippine Commission, the Philippine

Legislature, the Na for livelihood, with inpris-
used a s a necessary tool or implement
tional Assembly, the Congress of the Philippines and the Batasang from five to ten years. The question raised is
legislative bodies 'used
onment ranging furtherance of,
Pambansa. In lieu of the preamble, these such weapon should be in
enactment of whether the carrying of lawless vio-
the explanatory note to explain the reasons for the rebellion, insurrection,
or in relation to, subversion,
statutes. The preamble is, however, extensively
used in Presiden- disorder, as a necessary
element
of his legisla- lepce, criminality, chaos or public decree is clear
issued by the President in the exercise that since the text of the
tial Decrees of the crime. It is argued
:
such element, the mere carrying of such
tive power.13 and does not prescribe
constitute a violation
a statute. Hence, weapon outside
one's residence is suficient to
The preamble is not an essential part of ruled that pursuant to the preamble which
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
of the law. The court of the decree,
where the meaning that led to the enactment
neither expand nor restrict its operation, much
less spelled out the events the desired result
preamble can
martial law in the country,
giving for namely, the state of
prevail over its text. Nor can a preamble be used as basis of Proclamation No. 1081 declaring
a state of martial law in the
a statute a meaning not apparent on its
face." insurrection, law-
subversion, rebellion,
country; and the fact that commit-
and public disorder being
While a preamble ie not; strictly speaking,a*partof.astatu
chaos
less violence, criminality,
it may, when the statuteis ambiguous,-beresortedtoolanly-tne h
aabiguity. ln this connection, it has been held that preamble
a
SCRA 542.
v. Purisima, G.R. No.
42050, Nov. 20, 1978, 86
People
Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909).
U.S. v. Go
No. 47757, Juh. 28, 1980,
95 SCRA 663; Alliance of
People v. Echavez, CR. G.R. No. 50403, Aug. 3, 1983.
of Labor,
"People v. Rivera, 69 Phil. 232 (1933); Commissioner of Customs v. Kelun Government Workers v. Ministry People v. Lidres, 108 Phil. 995 (1960).
Peoplev. Purisima, supra;
67 SCAD 78, 252 SCRA 6 (1996); Eugenio
v.
105 Phil. 875 (1959).
PNB v. Ofice of the Frestdent,
"People v. Purisima, G.R. No. 42050, Nov. 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 542, 106 (1996).
See Sec. 1.23, supra. Drilon, 67 SCAD 4, 262 SCRA
86 SCRA 542 (1978).
People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 663 (1950).
People v. Purisima, supra; People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 663 (1950).
83
82
A. In Generai
and other dea. In such

ted and abetted by the use of firearms, explosives usual or ordinary signification.
meaning different from its
of the decree is to requi dictated by the context prevails.
weapons- the clear intent and 'spirit a case, the neaning
mentioned in the preamble as an indispensable ela. etatute niust be ex-
the motivation or clause of the
ment of the crime. The court noted that the severity of the penaltu Every Bection, provision to arrive at the esfect
each othar in order
is a serious offense pounded by reference to intention of the legislature
for the violation of the decree suggests that it coniemplated by the legialature.
The
which may only be justified by associating the carrying out of such law and every part
must be ascertained
from the whole text of the
bladed or blunt weapon with any of the purposes stated in its view."
of the act is taken into
preamble.
In another case,22 the issue raised is whether a person who Punctuation marks.
3.07.
squatted on a pastural land could criminally liable for
be held
omma, a semi-colon, and a period
Punçtyations, such ae a
violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, which punishes "any per. a separa-
son who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking axe rammatical marks. theA seniovton is used to indicate than that
tion in the relation of thought, a degree greater
advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in semi-colon must have a
and what follows a
expressed by a comma; it. The c o m m a and the
occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will relation to the s a m e matter which precedes
for residential, commercial or any other purposes." The decree was for the purpose, namely, to divide
semi-colon are both used
s a m e
difference being that the
promulgated to solve the squatting problem which, according to its sentences and parts of sentences,
the only
than the
a littie m e r e pronounced
preamble, "is still a major problem in urban communities all over semi-colon makes the division
A per.od is a
a n e w idea.
the country" and because "many persons o r entities found to have c o m m a . They a r e not
used to introduce
been unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to the mark used to indicate the end of a
sentence.
affluent class." The court answered the issué in the negative and hermeneutics that purctuation marksare
It is a rule of legal
Baid that the crime may only be committed in urban communities and can never control against the intelligible
and not in agricultural or pastural lands because the preamble of aidsnt, law degrea The.reason is that punctuation
marks
meaning of written words.3 lan-
the decree shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in statute; nar are. they part, of the. English.
urban lands, more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter are pot part. of.a however, a n ambiguity in a statute which
guage. Where there is, solved be
areas made by well-to-do individuals, h , g ! y , arit may be partiall or wholiy by a punctuation nark, it may
construction of the statute. Thus, the qualifying
considered in the
confined to its last antecedent if
effect of a word or phrase may be
3.06. Context of whole'text. c o m m a from the other
antecedents."9 If
the latter is separated by a
a meaning which is reasonable
The best source from which to ascertain the legislative intent the punctuation gives the statute
is the statute itself - the words, phrases, sentences, sections, accord with the legislative will, it may be used as
and in apparent
the literal meaning of the words
clauses, provisions -- taken as a whole and in relation to one an additional argument for adopting
other. Legislative intent should accordingly be ascertained from a

consideration of the whole context of the statute and not from an
isolated part or particular provision,3 The context may circum- Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79
24People v. Chavez, 120 Phil. 1019 (1964);
scribe the meaning of a statute; it may give to a word or Phil. 461 (1967).
phrase a v. TMX Sales, Inc., 205
SCRA 184 (1992).
Comnissioner of Internal kRevenue
678 (1926).
Ageaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil.
39 Phil
678 (1926); Ia re Estate of Johnson,
*Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil.
156 (1918).
"People v. Echavez, G.R. No. 47757, Jan. 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 663; Eee also Feliciano v. Aquino, i.R,
Na 10201, Sept. 23, 1957.
Florentinu v. Phil. National Bunk, 9*
Bernardo v. People, G.R. No. 62114, Nra tiutcla, 106 Phil. 10R1 (1D60);
v
July 6, 1983.
Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 14526, March 31, 1965, l Phil. 959 (1966).
SCRA
459.
449; Aisporma v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 39419, April 12, 1982, 113 SCs
84
85
A. In General
a n argument
basod.upon punctuation al
as thus punctuated. But not hesitate toi chunge .
the courts will of the performance of
is not persuasive, and in the course
the effect intend. missal, need not be committed
to give the. statute ded
punctuation when necessary, duty by the person charged.*77
superliuo4s or 1ncorrect punctua
by the legislature, disregarding
others where necessary. n case," the issue refers to
another
the effect of a cornma
in case of
tion marks and inserting "with subsidiary imprisonment
that separates the clause sentenced to three
"is hereby
insolvency" from the preceding clause, of the law, to pay
penalties
Iilustrative examples months of arresto mayor with accessory the offended
3.08. Hundred (P500.00) pesos, to indemnify
a fine of Five
the phrase "who ma of Ten Thousand
In a case, the question raised is whether party, Mayor
Arsenio Lacson, in the sum
wil! thhe
to accept the same for such settlement," which implies (P10,000.00) peso8." The question
is: in case of insolvency,
be willing for failure to
to the effect that the holder to s e r v e subsidiary imprisonment
discretion, in the provision of law accused be required
under such decision?
for payment of obligations the fine but also the indemnity,
backpay certificate may apply the
same
pay not only make the "subsidiary
that the uae of a comma is
to
subsisting at the time of the approval
of this amendatory áet for The court held to nonpayment
of inaolveney refer not oniy
which the applicant may directly be liable to. the.goyernment or to in
imprisanment case court
to nonpayment
of the fine. The
but als0
any of its branches or instrumentalities, or
to corPorations owned of the.indemnity
is to make the phrase
"with subsi diary
added that if the intention
or controlled by the government, or to any citizeng.ef the Philip.
of inden
case of insolvency'
refer to nonpayment
in wouid have
pines or te any association or corporation organjzed under the laws
imprisonnent the ine, it
the nonpayment of
nity only and not to the offended
of the Philippines, who may be wiling to accept the, same for such omitted the c o m m a
after the phrase "to indemanify
settiement," qualifies only its last antecedent, iwhich is "any citizen of P10,C00.00 pesos,"*
Arsenio Lacson in the
amount
party, Mayor
of the Philippines or any association or corporation.organized un-
der the laws of the Philippines." The court held that there is a Capitalization of letters.
comma between the phrase "or any citizen etc." separating said 3.09.
is an aid of
capitalization of letters
phrase from the preceding ones, and this implies that the qualify. Like punctuation marks,
For instance, in a statute
construction of statute.
ing phrase applies only to its immediate antecedent, pursuant to low degree in the
made within the Philippine
Islar.ds by
which backpay certificate holders can compel government-owned which provides that "a will which is executed in
state or country,
banks to accept said certificate for payment of their obligations aeitizen or eubject, of another which ha is a'
state or country of
accordance with the law of the allowed by law of
subsisting at the time the amendatory act was approved.31 might be proved and
-oitizen o r subject, and whiçh in
.
allowed and recorcled

Similarly, where a statute authorizes the preventive suspen state .or.country, may be proved, iiex
-his'own and shall have the s a m e effect aa.
sion of an employee pending an investigation "ifthe charge against. the Philippine Islands, foree at a time
of these Islanda," in
such subordinate or employee. invoives dishonesty, oppression, or, ecuted according. to the laws States, the
still a territory of the United
grave misconeuct or neglect in the pprformance ofdaty,"ihe phrase when the Philippines was not capitalized
does
"state" and "country" are
in the performance of duty' qualifies ouly the words-grave mis, fact that the words
conduct or neglect" because, as the court explajned, "there is a
conma after the words dishonesty and oppression, thereby war
Cormejo v. Noval, 54
ranting the conclusion that only the phrase 'grave misconduct or Gurcia, 106 Phil. 1031, 1036 (1960). But see
oppression,
Nra that the phrase "neglect of duty,
v.
neglect' is qualified by the words in the performance of duty," so

that
Phil. 809 1930), where it has beon held
other for1ns of
m a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in office"
as grounds
for reinovai of
personal behavior,
"dishonesty and oppression, to warrant punishrnent or dis corruption or
linited to uhose relating to the office and
not to
public ofticers is
all antecedents.
since the "in olfice" qualifies

phrase 1975, 66 SCRA
645.
G.R. No. 21735, Sept. 5, Act No. 5465
SPeople v Subido, Penal C'ode, as
amended by Rep.
39 of the Revised of the civil liability
34Art. in c a s e of non-puyment
Florentino v. Phil. National Bank, 98 Phil: 959 (1956 elmnated subsidiury imprisonment
Supra.
S T A T U T O R Y C O N S T R U C T I O N
81
A. In eneral
is excluded from the phr. embraced therein.

United States Bettiing such
questions as are
not that the general rule for authorities is that if the

most of the
mean
country."35
But the rule accepted
by merely for,
conven-
other state or
that employees i heading-has hean iaseried it should
case,*
In another
it was
not entitled ta.
contended
the chaptero r section
ience o r reserence,
and not a r integral pert
of the statute,
unciassified service
goverunent a r e
of the ecause the use of
Constitution bec
security nut be alowed
to control interpretation."
there is
guaranteed by the and unambiguous,
of tenure a s in Sections 1 And of statute ia clear or epi-
words "Civil Service" text a
4 Where the the headings
letters in the to resort to
capital Constitution and the use
the small
of Jeti neither necessity n o r propriety
the text, especially
where
Article XII of the 1935 for interpretation of reference aids

"civil service" in the Civil Service Act indie graphs of a
s e r t i o n
c a t c h w o r d s or
for the same words o r headings
are mere The "epi-
to the classified service are protected such epigraphs
n a t u r e of the
text that follows.
that only those pertaining the general than a con-
the constitutional provision of

on security tenure, The court 8ai indicating
of a section, being
nothing more
cannot have
the
Capital "C and 'S'inth graphs, or headings, c o n t e n t s of the provision,
that there is "no validity in this argument. venient index to the in the body of the
indicatetha zords contained
words Oivil Servicewere in
used the Constitutionto effect of liniting
the operative
No capitals are used in the similar provisions of the
Code ta
of the
group.
of Article 160
text."42
indicate the system." There is "no difference between the 'use of in the heading
"another" Commnission of
word
Thus, the 160.
capitals in the former and of small letters in the lattèr: There is a
Art.
states in part: another previ
Code which
Revised Penal imposed for
reason for excluding persons in the ünclassified-ervicefrom the crime during service of penalty
5 of Article 62, any
another of Rule
benefits extended to those belonging to the classified service,P7 Besides the provisicns been convicted by
o u s offense. after having
-
shall commit a felony sentence, o r while

who
person
beginning to s e r v e such of the
before m a x i m u m period
final judgment,
3.10. Headnotes or epigraphs. shall be punished by the c a n n o t limit the text
serving the same, law for the n e w felony," crime
Headnotes, headings or epigraphs of sections of a statuteare penalty prescribed by that it is applicable only
when the n e w
accused is
convenient index to the contents to m e a n which the
of its provisions. They are pre of the article from the crime for
the
fixed to sections or chapters of 'a statute för ready reference or c o m m i t t e d is
different
old criraes a r e of
not when
the n e w and warranted
s e n t e n c e and deduction is not
classification.* In case of doubt or ambiguity in the meaning of the serving for such
such as homicide, of the text.
Secondary
law or the intention of the legislature, they may be consulted in aid s a m e kind, language
and unambiguous c o n s u l t e d to
remove,
of interpretation.39 by the plain headnotes or epigraphs, may be language of

aids, such a s the plain
limit o r control
Headings or epigraphs are not, however, entitled to much doubt n o r to
but not to create,
weight, and inferences drawn therefrom are of little value and-they the law.3
cen never
control the plain terma of the enacting-clauses, for-they
are not part, of thetaw It has been held that when a statute 3.11. Lingual text.
divided into several subjects or
18 either in English,
articles, having respective appro laws are officialtytwo
promulgated
The rule is
priate headings, it must be Philippine Buch languages.
presumed that the provisions of eacn or Filipino,
or either in
article are
controlling upon the subject thereof and Spanish
operate as a
v. Relunia,
Commissioner
of Customs
n Piii. 248 (1931);
Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 166
re
Kare v. Platon, 56
3-Unabia v. City Mayor, 99 Phil. 253 (1918). 106 Phil 875 (1959)
]bid. at Pp. 256-256. (1956). 68 Phil. 499
(1933).
(1918).
People v. Yabut,Johnaon, 39 Phil. 156, 166
n re Estate of Estate of
(1931) Johnson, 39 Phil. 156 (1918); Kare n re
Phil. 499
(1933).
v. Platon, 56, Phil. 4 4People v. Yabut, 68
G.R. No.Commiss1oner of
20805, Nov. 29, Customs
v.
Relunia, 105 Phil. 876 (1959); People v.
1965, 15 SCRA 402. Desider
STATUTORY CONSTRUOTION
88 89
A. In General
statute is officially.ro
om-
provided, where a
unless otherwise
that, text shall govern intent." For
and Spanish, the English but to its spirit
or
ulgated in English or mistake, the Spanish may stutute must be read according s t a t u t e although it is not
omission hence, a within the letter but
in case of ambiguity, however, a statuta within the spirit
is within the
consulted to explain the
English text." Where, what is
thereof, and that
which is
Stated differently,
in Spanish or
in Enghsh or
im
Filipino, within the
letter
not within the
statute. a s Inuch
is officially promulgated in which it i not within
the spirit is lawmaker is
other languages, the language the intent of the which is
with translations into the Revised Penal Coda a thing
which is within
and a thing
its transaction. Thus, within the letter; uniess
statute es if the statute
written prevails over gov. the
enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text
within within
the statute is not
of
been originally within the letter
having On the other hand, since the lawnakers,4
English text.s the intent of the in
erns as against the
within which is expressed
the English version!
of 1948 was approved in English, spirit of a
statute is that four cor-
Judiciary Act translation. The intent or
discovered within
its
thereof controls as against
its Spanish which should be legisiative
the words thereof, history.5 If
its legisBative
the national language of if n e c e s a r y , by
the
The 1987 Constitution provides that

manner,
n e r s aided, appropriate
in 8 o m e
of the 1987 is not expressed intent and sup
Section 20, Bok 1, Chap.4 intent o r spirit speculate as to
a n
the Philippines is Filipino. interpretation of a law or courts cannot by
interpretation
the law. They
cannot
Administrative Code provides:
"In the phraseology of
found in the the stat
promulgated in all the official languages, meaning not construe
ply a and then
administrative issuance in no way expressed they ivould
a n intent
control, unless otherwise specially provided, intention, for otherwise
assume
the English text shall to accomplish

the supposed legislative power.*
other mistake, the other texts ute
bounds of judicial power to usurp
of ambiguity, omission
or
In case
pass beyond the
m a y be consulted."47
3.13. Poliey oflaw.

a s c e r t a i n e d should
be given effect
3.12. intent or spirit of law. The policy of the law, ance
this mandate is to give
aw is the law itself. For this bythejudiciary.5" One way
of accomplishing wil promote
The intent or spirit of the construction that
the lead meaning, a
spirit is the.controlling fäctor, statute of doubtfu!
effect the
carry into
legislative intent or a which would
the application and interpretaticn ofa
reagon, A construction inter
public policy. in favor of that
ing star and guiding light in construction, the influence most domi evident policy of the law should be adopted
decent respect for the policy of
statute." If a statute needs would defeat it.5° A
of the act.0 The spirit, pretation which
nant in that process is
the intent or apirit
determines its construction;
a statute
rather than the letter, of
i 23 Phil. 315 (1912) 60 (1951);
Collector of Customs, Fuente, 88 Phil.
5Roa v. Trainers Assn., Inc. v. De la Peoplev.
59Manila Race Horse Dec. 28, 1968, 26 SCRA 578;
G.R. No. 26521,
Code. Villanueva v. City of Iloilo, 642.
Administrative G.R. 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 14 Phil.
Sec.15, Revised Director of Prisorns, Purisima, G.R. No.
$2050, Nov. v. Go Chico,
Phil. 172 (1948); Baking v. Phil. 316 (1912); U.S.
Pooplo v. Abilang. 82 v. Collector
of Customs, 29 Ruben E. Agpalo, Stututory
28 sCRA 850. 40 SCRA 259 (1987), citing
No. 30364, July 28, 1969, v. LAC, 150
Co. v. Golangco, 96 Phil. 824
(1954). 128 (1909); Alonzo
Traders Insurance.& Surety Construction, 1986 ed., pp.
64-66.
G.R. No. 41001, Sept. 30,
1976,
Constitution. of
Court Appeals,
"Art. XIV, Sec. 6, 1987 141 (1931 64ianila Lodge No. 761 v.
Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil.
U.S. v. Tamparong, 31 Phil. 321 (1915); Phil. b0l 73 SCRA 162. Boromeo v. Mariano,
41 Fhil. 322
Senerillas v. Hermosisima, 100 Yulo, 61 Phil. 173
(1935);
Tamayo v. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953 (1916); Regaiido .
Oct. 30,
G.R. No. 26406,
(1956).
Union v. Manila Yellow Taxi Cab C0. (1921).
Lquipment Co. v. Longad, G.R. No. 27489,
"Yellow Taxi & Pasay Trans. Workers' 4
87Automotive Parls
Terminal,
79 Phil. 96 (1947); Garcia v. Ambler, F v.
Mucabenta Duvao Stevedoring
80 Phil. 833 (1948); Ledesma v. Pictain, 1969, 30 SCHA 248,
Phil. 386 (1914). 32 SCRA 669.
81 (1904); McMicking v. Lichauco, 27 Aprl 30, 1970, Gee, 43 Phil. 43 (1922). No. 34586,
De Josus v. City of Munila, 29 Phil. 73 (1914). Adong v. Cheong Seng Court of Appeals, G.R.
v. De la Fuente, 88 Phil.
60 (1961 Franeis, 98 Phil. 32 (1956); Nilo v.
"Manila Race Horse Trainers Assn. Tinio v.
G.R. No. 25326, May a

Chi v. Go Cho, 96 Phil. 622 (1955), Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, April 12, 1984.
1970, 33 SCRA 105.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 91
90 AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
A. In General
to be
court from imputing to ita self-defentino the purpoOse
the law must s a v e the be remedied, or
the evils to liberal con-
be accomplisled, reasonable o r
not disingenuous, purpose." the law a of a
and should give The purpose
is to consas subserved, purpose.0
of the homestead law serve effectuate its and logic in a
For instance, the policy which wili best
the Public Iae
struction
under than rules of grammar
homesteader has acquired
as
important such a way
which statute i8 be read in
m o r e
the land a
the law requires " statute must
A statute
his heirs. For this reason, certaining its meaning. statute." For a
Act, for him and or any of its branches, units or projected in the and to
the Government to the purpose it is enacted
"except in favor of to give effect for which
under free patent or homestead pro from the purpose 1s
institutions, lands acquired rovi derives its vitality defeats such purpose
encumbrance or alienation from th. m a n n e r that
disregards o r sorne
to construe it in a a s s u m e
sions shall not be subject But courts

cannot
for a term of five vea the law statute to a c
the application and to nullify or destroy c o n s t r u e the
date of the approval of patent or grant" and then
of the issuance of the
purpose in
no way expressed
from and after the date not he literal purpose.
to such policy,
said provision should complish the supposed rule with cer-
effect down a general
give period should commence from
that the five-year However, where a
statute lays
rule is not ce-
construed to m e a n but from the date of general
the patent or grant, thereto, the purpose of the
the date of the issuance of the
tain exceptions to excep-
insofar as the prohibition construction to be given
for the issuance of a patent, terminative of the proper
an order intent and policy of
for otherwise the
from alienation is concerned, postponing the get. tions.
avoided by the homestead by
the law may be
ting of his patent. 3.15.Dictionaries.
used
pensions for words or phrases
the State is against double not define the
The general policy of Where a statute does words or
in construing or apPplying pension and the context in which the
the s a m e services. Hence, therein, does its purpose or
nor
courts may con-
will be so interpreted as to prevent any person
indicate their mneaning, the
gratuity laws, they in the absence of express pro-
phrases are employed or general, as aid in determining8
from receiving double compensation, Thus, a law sult dictionaries, legal, scientific, While de.i
receive double compensation. to such words or phrases."0
vision allowing him to the meaning to be assigned courts have
certain gratuity "in addition to lexicographers a r e not binding,
which grants retirable

employees
existing laws" can.
nitions given by definitions to-support
their conclu
aré entitled under in proper cases, such
other benefits to which they àdopted, or terms used in
à
double gratuity the words
to authorize the, grant
of s1on as to the meaning of the particular their dic-
not be so construed as to embrace refund where no strong r e a s o n exists why
"other benefits" which can be interpreted statute," especially
phrase value of accumulated
of the money
of contributions and payment to override the gen
not being so clear as
vacation and sick leaves
against double pensions. 12, 1978, 85 SCRA 245; Home Ins
eral policy 4Escribano v. Avila, G.R. No. 30375, Sept. 20, 1983, 123 SCRA 424.
Co. v. Eastern Shipping Lines, G.R. No. 94392, July 79 SCRA
mischief to be suppressed Asan. Eduvalu, G.R. No. 41106, Supt. 22, 1977,
v.
3.14. Purpose of law or Litux Ennployves
In construing a statute,
the object of the law orthe
purpose or
88.
Lopez v. of Appeals, 215 SCRA 512 (1992). 26 SCRA 861 (1969).
Court
rernoved or suppressed and the causes TSarcos Castillo, G.R. No. 29755, Jan. 31, 1969,
v.
mischief intended to be
of the law are important factors to be
(1935).
Regaladuv. Yulo, 61 Phil. 178 Central
which induced the enactment
Central Azucarera Don Pedo v Bank, 104 Phil. 598 (1958)
construction.5 The court must
look to the object0 32 Phil. 610 (1915); Lu Do & Lu Ym
considered in its Kuenzle & Streitf v Collector of Customs,
108 Phil. 666 (1960); Garvida v. Sales, Jr.,
82 SCAD 188, 271
Corp. v. Central Bank,
SCRA 767 (1997); Ramirez v. Court of Appeals,
64 SCAD 636, 247 SCRA 590 (1996).
72 BCRA 620. 1uzon Stevedoring Co. v. 1rinidad, 43 Phil.
803 (1922).
Bocolbo v. Estanisluo, G.R. No.
30458, Aug. 31, 1976, of the Philis., inc.
De Ponce v. Sagariu, 85 Phil. 79 (1949); Anti-Gratt League
Tinio. ¥rancis, A8 Phik32(1956).
v. Ortega, G.R. No. 33912, Sept. 11, 1980,
90 SCRA 644; People v. Rodil, G.R. No.
(1983).
Cajiuat v. Muthay, 124 BCRA 710 61 Phil. 131 (1927 35156, Nov. 20, 1981, 109 SCRA 308.
Sugur Central Agency v. Collector of Custons,
Ph Caltex (Phils.), Inc. v. Palomar, G.R.
NO.
1
v. De Guzman, 30 Phil. 416 (1915;
Sept. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 247.

B. Legislative History
adopted in the construction ae

expe-
tionary meaning.should not be the Presumptions are based on logic,
correct
interpretation. of compelling
its absence
statute.73
sense,
and in the correct
rience and common and
words in' their natural, plain. to the proper
Dictionaries generally define Where
doubts as
construc
to the contrary, of that
the law does not d reusons
s t a t u t e will be
resolved in favor
and significanee. c o n s t r u c t i o n of a matter. These
ordinary accèptance and the legislature has not intendae accord with the
presumption o n the
the words used in a statute tion which is in favor of the constitu-

meaning to those words, the Court include the presumptions
in
technical or special legal presumptions of its prospective
of the words as defined in tionality of a statute,2
of its cormpleteness,s" beneficial
adopt the ordinary meaning the lawmakers, who are ordina and justice, ofits
effective, sensible,
dictionaries. For the intention of operation," of right those against
whole," a s well
as
lexicographers, to use statut and reasonable operation
as a
in law,"
untrained philologists and
is always presumed.4
tory inconsistency and implied
repeal,57 u n n e c e s s a r y
changes
inconvenience
phraseology in such a
m a n n e r
absurdity injustice and hardship,°l

impossibility,®"
constructions. and ineffectiveness.2
3.16. Consequences of various
the various con.
In construing a statute, the consequences of B . LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
structions offered will be inquired
into as additional aid to interpra
a literal, strict, or liberal
tation.7 Will the statute be given
or expansive mean
interpretation? Will it be accorded a restrictive 3.18. Generally.
Has a later law impliedly where a
ing? Will it be construed retroactively or not? nle of statutory
well-settled
construction that
consequence there is
repealeda prior act on the same subject? What are the
It is a
or where
In construing a statute, statute is susceptible
of several interpretations
construction as compared to the other? better m e a n s of ascertaining
of one there is no
at a'reasonable and sensible ambiguity in its language, than that which is
afforded
the objective should always be to arrive intention of the legislature
full accord with the legislative intent. As a the will and investigating the
interpretation that is in statute."9 By looking at and
a construction of a statute
should be rejected that will by the history of the will be able to arrive at
general rule, legislative history of the statute,
the court
injustice or hardship;7 result in absurdity;" defeat legislatiye

court may take
cause For this purpose, the
its correct interpretation which it is
intent spirit,78 preclude' acömplishment of legislative purpose.or
or
judicial notice of the origin and history
of the statute
render certain words or phrases a urplusage;" nullify the

object,7
statute or make any of its provisions nugatory.
Lugiclafa ltbões
See Secs. 1.32, supra., 6.13, infra.
3.17. Presumptions. aSee Sec. 6.10, infra.
In construing a statute, the court may properly rely on pre 4See Sec. 9.03, infru.
chang v 14l.
to 4See Sec. 4.17, infra.
sumptions as to legislative intent. in order to resolve doubty as See Sec..6.04, etc., infra.
p e Nee. 10 24, 4/a.
See Sec. 6.15 et seq., infra.
Borromeo v.
73Lu Do & Lu Ym Corp. v. Central Bank, 108 Phil. 566 (1960); See Sec4 22, infra.
Pagay, 126 SCRA 317 (1983). See See: 4.14, infiu.
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, Nov. 19, 2001. Su Sec. 4.15, infra.
Araneta . Dinglasan, 84' Phil. 368 (1949); People v. Purisima,
G.R. No. wSee See. 4.16, infru. 823 (1948);
v. Tuason, 80 Phil.
Greenfield v. Meer, 77 Phil. 394 (1946); Valera
42050, Nov. 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 542. Canovas v. Batangas Transp. Co., G.R
Go Chico v. Martinez, 45 Phil. 266 (1923);
7Sce Sec. 4.17, infra. 612.
No. 19868, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA of
7See Sec. 4.16, infro.
ollector of Internal Revenue v. Zamora,
118 Phil. 164 (1963); Direcior
See Sec. 2.05, supra; Sec. 4.08, infra. Lands v. Abuya, 63 Ph1l. 559 (1936).
See Sec. 2.06, supra; Sec. 3.14, supru; Sec. 4.10, infra.
See Sec. 6.09, infra.
See Sec. 6.07, infra.
95
94 B Legislative History
facts which affees to

and of the ita to the legislature
construe and apply, ofthe President in response to the
called upon to thus, refer to the messages
nay, enacted
derivation, validity
and operation.s
determine legislative intent of the statute
embodied in such messages.
Presidents request
constitutes legislative history.

3.19. What
a statute refers to all
Explanatory note.
Generally speaking,
the history of 3.21.
of explanation ac
enactment into,law,l note is short exposition a lt

its inception until 18 An explanatory author o r proponent.
antecedents from
and the steps done from the t i companying a proposed
legislation by its
the bill, as
well a s
c o v e r s the period
legislature of the reason or purpose of
history is tinally.passed by-the
proper 101
it contains statements its pa ssage.

the bill is introduced auntil the bill is
enacted in respon advanced by its
author in urging
President's message if arguments is
includes the the bill, committee r or where
a statute
explanatory note
accompanying is ambiguity in a statut
Where there to
may resot
thereto, the hearings on the 8uh
investigations and public
interpretatiori,"courts
than one the
susceptible of and ascertain
more
ports of legislative debates and delibera the ambiguity

the sponsorship speech,
the explanatory note to clarify then be so
ject of the bill, and changes in phraseal the
intent of the statute.
The s t a t u t e may
the bill, its amendments purpose or internt as disclosed
in
tions concerning approval.thereof. to the purpose or
before final construed as to give
effect
involved is whether
ogy in which it undergoes Thus, where the question
of,
revision prior statute, the
a its explanatory note. law and the explanatory
based on, or is a affected or changed an existing
Ifthe statute is and judicial construction, the, various a statute enacted into law states
that
practical application at the time note to the bill
which was eventually matter
latter's events action a certain
and the contemporary to s e c u r e prompt
on
it underwent, the purpose is simpiy the
amendments
history. If the statute is the existing law,
form part of its legislative concerned and not to change
of its enactment
Anglo-American precedents or by the officer
construed to carry out
such purpose.14
And where
from, or modelled.upon, statute should be

borrowed history of such prec discussion on the
includes the note and the
foreign sources, its history of the explanatory
of the statute sought be
to examination intended
other an
statute w a s really
that a penal
and for a proper construction bill discloses indisputably
edents,
oftentimes essential
to review such legislative his m e a s u r e to cope
with the abnormal situation cre
construed, it is at the
its interpretation from such
as an emergency
for activities of seditious organization
authoritative guide ated by the subversive
tory and find decisions"of the be construed as to re
application, and the shouid
statute so
time of its passage, the
precedents, their practical precedents in the country of the crime, membership
in such seditious
and applying such an element of to
courts construing quire, as
is silent on its face as
text of the statute
organization, even if the intent.
106
order to effectuate legislative

origin.97
such requirement, in
basis for
(SONA) however, be used as
me[sage to legislature.
President's The explanatory note may not, what is ex-
3.20.
address the statute ä that is inconsistent with
meaning
that the "President shall giving a
The Constitution provides He may also appear

of its regular session.
Congress at the opening The President's address or nessage
other time."
measures. The'President's mes
before it at any 80 Phil. 843 (1948).
proposed legislutive Camacho v. Court of Industrial Relations,
legislation which, when
containa
usually (1960).
108 Phil. 995
his thinking on the propósed Cf. People Lidres, v
Libares v.
indicales Cours 1981, 103 SCRA 49;
Luna, G R. No. 34136, Feb. 24,
sage
law,follows'his 1ine of thinking oh the'matter.9 Busiana v. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 261; Puople v, (Jlurte,
enacted into Exorutivo Secretary, ti.R. No. 21606, Oct
108 Plul. 756 t1960).
National Bank, 99 Phil. 889 (1956); Nepomuceno
v. Ocampo,
huSBaga v. Phul.
416 (1915).
Ly.S. v. De Guzman, 30 Phil. 95 Phil. 292 (1954)
Tamayo v. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953 (1916). 669 ( Npoinuceno v: Ocampo, 95 Phil. 292 (1954).
U.S., 11 Phil. Purisima, G.R. No. 42050,
Ladarus, 108 Phil. 995 (1960); People
v.
U.S. v. De Guzman, 30 Phil.
416 (1915); Kepner v.
u'eople v.
Nov. 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 542.

Alzua v.Johnson, 21 Phil. 308 (1912).
Art. Vil, Sec. 23, 1987 Constitution.
Phil. 12 (1946).
Ibpacio Nueno v. Angeles, 76
97
A l D S T O C O N S T R U C T I O N
B . Legislative History
differ
might
spoke
explanatory note .i did; and those
who
of those who
spoke
of the
statuteAn
ti O those who
plain and
agreed with
s t a t e m e n t s
the text of doubt, and

not.where
if the passed is
pressed in ease is,T have
And even
as the
clarificationin
just iG other.
1 assembly, if
the'act
and not as'
to only for
in the
law"
Neither can it be used a s
icat
in n
with
each
the v i e w s
of the
effect a a
thus
enacted
the opinions
18 reflected, reflect
to be given
aPpear, nor
Accordingly,
ambiguity not of
t h a t does nt it has to be.1i3 it deliberations
read a
meaning
only by the
author o r
clear, then considered
floor
Being
wrntten
individual
members
legislators
during following in-
of a statute
m e r e expression of thethe by the of the
guage
of the bill,
the explanatory
nute i8 a
legislation and may- no authora and views
expressed
not be given
weight at
all in a n y
indicating
a
meaning ot
the
a
reasons
for the proposed intent a s exn d a bill m a y c i r c u m s t a n c e s
where
iews and meaning o r where there are
the l e g i s l a t o r s ; from
clear legislative stances:
that expressed
by i n t e n t deducible
override the than
ingly other w h e r e the from
itself.
u statute
conflicting; is free
involved
statute were
in the views
expressed
where the statute
clear; or
is not
views and deliberations.

ra such views
ambiguity. 14
of debates
Legislative debates, in the
course
3.22 actual proceedings o f . expressed by legislators

also given
deci-
themselves of the The opinions laws are not
Courts may avail
of
the construction of a ene concerning the
application of existing not a
member
assist in determining
was
to H where the legislator was
legislative body resort to the legislative could s t a t e
u t e of
doubtful meaning.* They
may
eventually w a s
delib sive weight,
especially
that e n a c t e d
said laws. All
that he
more
statutes
or
a bill which acted the assembly Where two
erations in the legislature
o n
of the law.15 different as-
meaning of provisions. Thus, wha
its his o w n
interpretation
matter were
e n a c t e d by
ascertain the subject of the other."
into law to
provision of a statute means, th relating to the
s a m
about the intent
there is doubt a s to what a
d is qualified to speak
the legislative semblies, neither courts will
to the provision during and free from
ambiguity,
mearing which w a s put be adopted.110 s t a t u t e is clear legislature,
or
liberation o r discussion o n the bill may Where the which i n f l u e n c e the

the m o t i v e s a s to the
legislators during delih not inquire into n o r indeed
in voting for its
However, the views expressei by th3
passage; not
individual members, far a s it has
meaning, o r effect are not legislators, s o
the bil>'s purpose, draftsman, o r the the supposed
erations of a bill a s to For statements mada intention of the into the law
of the law. the act.u" To read
been expressed in
would
contrulling in the interpretatiorr deliberations do not neceBsarily re where there is n o
ambiguity in it,
during floor of the legislators, the act.ls
by assemblymen to determine with intention that does not appear
in
l e t the viewa uf the
assembly. It le impossible be to supply something
act by the members
authority what construction w a s put upon an
that passed the bill, by
resorting to the
of the legislative body who did not speak may not
members thereof. Those Board, 107 Phil. 151
speeches of the 1Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and Amusement
7
(1960).
Co., Ine. v. Gimenez, G.R. No. 1971,
Feb. 28, 1963,
113Casco Phil. Chemical 52 SCRA 92; Phil. Asan.
G.R. No. 33410, July 13, 1973,
SCRA 347; Espino v. Cleofe, Insurance System, 121
Phil.
Retirues, Inc. v. Governiment Service
Phil. 657 (1950). of Government
Nov. 28, 1975, 68 SCRA
PPeople v. Garcia, 85 Executive No. Secretary, G.R. 36153,
97 SCRA 913 (1955). 1402 (1965); Legaspi v.
0TChong Yung Fa v. Gianzon, Phil. 340 (1938).
G u z m a n v. Municipality of Taytay, 65 Phil. 477 (1957); Ma-
253.
lre. Central v. Central Bank, 102
41 Phil. 125 (1920); Steel Mill, Factory
v. Chocolate
Palanca v. City of Manila,
1Song Kiat 524 (1961).
of Internal Revenue, 111 Phil.
Commissioner
162 SCRA 628 (1988).
layan Motors, Inç. v.
Bank, No. 34024, April 5, 1978, 82

SCRA 318 16Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v.
Central Ban 8upra.
1ArenasCity of San Carlos, G.R.
v. SCRA 722 11eMisanis Lumber.Co., Inc. v. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 102 Phil. 161
108 Phil. 760 (1960; De Villa v. Court of Appeals, 195
People v. Olurte, SCAD 205, 229 SCRA BU (1957).
Commission vr De Guzman, 48 107 Phil. 151
1991), National Police
1"Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and Amusements Board,
(1994) v. Government
Service Insurance (1960); Guzman Municipality of Taytay, 65 Phil. 340 (1938).
v.
"Phil. Assn. of Government Retirees, Inc, 1"Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and
Amusement Board, supra.
121 Phil. 1402 (1965); Mayon Motors,'
Inc. v. Commissioner of Internu
Systen, 13, 1978,
G.R. No. 33410, July D*|
Revenue, 111 Phil. 524 (1961); Espino v. Cleofe,
SCRA 92
99
Election
of the Revised
Reports of commissions.
3.23. that a "review of the history

said conclusion."
of laws, comnissions usually form
are court
and clarify the above
In the codification subject and to ne Code will help justify Act No.
a particular election law,
collate all laws on under the first
compile and code. Thus, special commissione P The court noted that
political
activities
the draft of the

proposed from engaging in partisan
Penal Code and the 1582, those prohibited the peace, provincial
to draft the text of the Revised Civi of the first instance, justice of
and Act
created w e r e the "judge Code of 1917,
the provisions of the code as thus enand. 1707, the
x."Act No.
Administrative
Code. In construing coumissian fiscal x x However,
Common-
refer to the reports of the that substantially of the s a m e tenor.
courts may properly 19 No. 3387 were
reads: "No justice,
pfclarifying ambiguities therein, enacted on August 22,
1938,
Elec-
drefted the code in aid wealth Act No. 357, the old Revised
x x x," from
which Section 54 of
judge, fiscal shows that in the two
taken. This legislative history omitted in the
statuto is basvd. tion Code was the peace" w e r e
8.24. Prior laws from whiich when the words justice of
instances enumeration did not carTy
the lawmaker, courts are De which preceded the
In ascertaining the intention of law, the word "judge"
"of the first instanee."
In other words,
same subject and to.investigata of the phrase phrase "of fîrst
mitted to look to prior laws on the qualification
w a s qualified by
the
This rule is speciall whenever the word "judge" however, if
the antecedents of the statuts involved. of the peace" would
follow;
of codes, revised, or compiled stat. instance," the words "justice the peace" were
applicable in the interpretation the words "justice of
laws which have been codified, compiled, or the law simply said "judge," indicates that the
utes, for the prior omitted. This pattern
of legislative phraseology
revised will show the legislative history that will clarify
the intent officer from the operation
did not intend to exclude said
of the codified or legislature comprehended in
of the law or shed light on the meaning and scope of the law and that it
considered said officer a s
revised statute.2 term "judge."124
the generic and broad
.
statute involved
allowed
Cases may be cited to illustrate the principle. In People u. In Director of Lands u. Abaya,25 the
"have been, or
Manantan, 12"
the issue raised is whether a justice of the peace is of a claim to lands that
the filing, within ten years, domain, by virtue of
included in the prohibition contained in Section 54 of the old Re declared land of the public
are about to be,
vised Election Code* which provides that "no justice, judge, fiscal, instituted" in cadastral cases. The question
judicial proceedings either from the date
treasurer, or assessor of any province x x x shall aid any candidate raised is when to count the ten-year period,
or exert any influence in any election or take part therein ex.cept.fo was rendered or
from the date judicial proceedings
the decision case. The court
resolved the issue
vote x x x." A justiçe of the peuce was prosecuted for yiolation of were instituted in the cadastral
laws on the subject. It noted that there were
said provision. He claims that Section 54 of the Code was taken by reviewing the prior two of which refer in their titles to "lands
fromSection 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which
pro four laws on the subject, decisions
land by virtue of judicial
vided: "No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treas that have been declared publie allusion. How-
two fail to make any such
urer, fiscul or asses5or of any province xxx shall aid any çandidate rendered," while the other involvd, speak
of all four laws, including the statute
xxx" und that when Section 54 omitted "justice of the peace,"the ever, the text
about to be declared land of public
of lands that "have been or
omission revealed the intention of the legislature to exclude
of the peace from its operation. In rejecting such argument
justice domain, by virtue proceedings instituted."It is
of judicial
also noted
anu that the explanatory note showed
that the intention was to author
hoding iut the word "judge" includes "justice of the peace, e have been declared public lands
lots that
ize filing of the claim to
not adopted
decisions," but such intention was
by virtue of judicialwhen it made no alteration in the language
of
by the legislature
Escalante v. Santo8, 56 Phil. 483 (1932).
30Director of Lands v. Abaya, 68 Phil. 659 (1936).
People v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 657 (1962); Go Chico v. Martinez, 45 r
115 Phil. 657 (1962).
256 (1923). 24People v. Manantan,
263 Phil. 559 (1936).
241 15 Phil. 657 (1962).
12 Rep. Act No. 180.
101
100
A I D S T O C O N S T R U C T I O N
*Bearing
the statute involved s0 as to relect such intention. It further,
the ste or by
appointment."
mind," it
cannot
be
far passcd by legisl election
that the "fact that in all four acts so the office
e i t h e r by
regard in the
title to in this of
on the subject there has been repeated and consistent refero the legislature
of mayor
because
intention as thee
the institution of judicial proceedings as this merely acting under
the
starting point io
computation of the period of ten years x xx is x x x signitio he said that a
"vice-mayor"
of the regular
incumbent
comes
only in a
tem-
disability "acts a s m a y o r
because he
temporary
sho.s beyond question the desire of the legislature to adhere t provision
and exception"
one and only method of
consistently followed he
computation date o r a r y , provisional capacity."128
since the beginning," which is from

judicial pruceeding and not from
the of the institution of
the date the judgment thereie amendments.
Change in
phraseology by
rendered.126 3.25. provision of
by a m e n d m e n t of
a
change in phraseology meaning of t h e

Salaysay v. Castro127 involves the interpretation of the phr. The intent to change
the
law indicates a legislative the amended
actually holding" in a provision which states that "any electi In construing
it originally had. provision to
provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, oth provision from that the history of the
courts may investigate of the
than the one which he is actually holding, shall be consideredther provision,
intent a s to the meaning
o r scope
re. ascertain legislative shows that a
signed from his office from the moment of filing his certificatet where the legislative history
candidacy" The issue is whether a' vice-mayor whò temporari amended law.12" Thus, amendments, each amendment
us8
statuto has undergone

several
selection of language dif-
took over the functions of the mayor following the latter's Buspen deliberate
ing different phraseology, the indicates that a
sion from office, be deemed automatically resigned as' acting mayor earlier act on the subject
fering from that of the law w a s intended, and courts should s o
upon filing his certificate of candidacy for mayor. To resolve the change in meaning of the Where
issue, the court examined the legislative history of said provisiont construe that statute as to reflect such change in nieaning.30
c o u r s e of
ascertain legislative intent. It noted,that the provision was origi the w has been amended, which requires a particular
nally Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 666 which provided that action different from the law prior to its amendment, effect
must
any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for, an be given to changes in the statutory language.131
office other than the one for which he has been lastly elected, shall
be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing Changes made by the legislature in the form of amendments
to a statute should be given effect, together with other
parts of the
of hiscertificate of candidacy." This was the situation in 1947 when
then President Roxas took office. The national elections for provin amended act. For it is not to be presumed that the
legislature, in
making such changes, was indulging merely in semantic exercise.
cial and municipal officials were held in 1940 for a term ending
Decembe, 1943. Since the rule of hold-over was not then in force, There must be some purpose in making"them which should be
ascertained and given effect.182
President Roxas appointed many local officials to these elective
llustrative of
the rule in Commissioner of Customs v. Court
positions. And to enable many local officials to continue in office Tux of
Appeals. 133 The issue raised is whether a vessel, which berths
even after they had filed their certificates of candidacy for said
at a privately owned wharf or
positions, the legislature amended Section 2 of Commonwealth Act pier, is liable for payment of the
No. 666 by substituting the phraso "which he is actually holding berthing charge under Sec. 2901 of the Tariff ane Customs Code,
for the phrase "for which he has been lastly elected," the purpose
being to give the benefitor privilege of office not
retaining only to
those who have been elected thereto but also to those
who have 125]bid., at pp. 370-371.
been appointed" or "to regular incumbents having the right and
12Salaysay v.
Custro, 98 Phil. 364
(1962). (1956); People v.
Manantan, 115 Phil. 657
150PortilloSulvani,
v.
54 Phil. 543
1 Prancisco v. Boiser, (1930).
127 SCAD
1bid. 13Akbayan v. COMELEC, G.R. No.198, 332 SCRA 792 (2000).
298 Phil. 364 (1956). 13943 SCAD 486, 224 147066,
SCRA 665, 671 (1993). Murch 26, 2001.
103
AIDS TO cONSTRUCTION
B. Legislat1ve History
off+ce of
term
of
of a of
No. 34, states that a veseel berth
intention
expiration
which, a s amended by P.D. 8a

after the manifest
stat
shali pay berthing fees. Prior to said
and the a
during shows 136 Where
any national pot" might occur
amendment
ot
that such fees be collected from an ena.
such principle.
hold-over C o m m i s s i o n e r
ment, the law provided pubic otticers, t0 the the

the issue in the negati.
suppres8
authorizing in cases
berthing "at any port." In resolving t h e legislature offenders
provision of
a the
Court noted that the word
"national" before the word"DO he ute
which
contains
the
criminal
liability
said p r o v i s i o n ,
deleting
of the
compromise
inserted i n the ämendment;

stated that such *change in ph Wag Customs to importation,
is
amended by
shows the
intent
provision of law indicates a lepioo

offenderrs
of
unlawful provision
amendment of a of Baid of the
o g by deletion
from that itlve elimination
or compromises
allow
intent o change the meaning of the provision henceforth n o t to
76)"; and held that the "insertion legislature
such cases."
nally had (Agpalo, supra, p. offthe criminal liability in formalities
and ex-
word 'port' is a clear indication of the
word 'national before the where a statute governing
which s t a t e s that
legisiative intent to change the meaning of Section 2901 e from Similarly,
containing a saving r e n d e r the
clause
will
n i e r e surplusage a s contend.at
of a will and shall not
it originaliy meant, and not
a ecution form of
attestation
and attested,"
the change 'merely affirms
what cus. by "the absence of such signed in fact
petitioner. in the s e n s e that that the will be n o
was
there c a n
if it is proven
saving clause,
toms authorities had been observinglong before the law invalid
eliminating said evidence
Wag a m e n d e d by to exclude
amended:" that it is "the duty of the
Court give meaning to
to t was
doubt that the

i n t e n t i o n of the
legislature w a s
that where
such
of the Tariff and a t t e s t a t i o n of a will, and
amendment" end *that under Section 2901 the should not be given
Presidential Decree No. 34,'onlylvesso aliunde regarding a d m i t t e d without
opposition, it
toms Code, a s amended by evidence w a s intention of the
legislature in
from private defeat the manifest
berthing a t national ports (as distinguished definition of
or
mu. effect s o a s not to s t a t u t e contains a
fees." law.138 And where a
nicipal ports) a r e liable for berthing amending the
therefrom, the
a m e n d m e n t of the s t a t u t e by
terms and exceptions definition in the
shows that the
Amendment by deletion. deleting the exceptions clearly embodied in the deleted excep-
3.26. amended act embraces everything
of. certain'words ot
As a rule, the amendment by deletion tions.139
officer
staiute indicates that the legislature,intended to change raised is whether a publie
phrases in a In Gloria v. CA,140 the issue inves-
is that the legisla suspended pending
the meaning of the etatute, for the presumption o r employee, who has
been preventively
is entitled to
had the intention been not charges against himn,
ture would not have made the deletion
administrative
tigation of the
The amended statute should his salary and other benefits during such preventive
suspension. In
to effect a change in its meaning. stated that Sec. 35 of
accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to resolving this issue in the negative, the Court
its a m e n d m e n t . 134 the old S vice Act of 1958 (R.A. No. 2269) which thenprovided
that if the respondent officer or employee is xBherated,"she shall
Where, for instance, a statute containing a
provision prohibit be restored, to his position with full pay for the period of suspen
deleting such provi-
ing the doing of certain things is amended by said things /s
sion," was amended by deleting the provision regarding payment of
Lle legislaúve intent is clear that the doing of salaries during suspension. and that said amendment is for the
bi011, Where a statute
no longer proscribed in the amended statute.15 purpose disallowing the payment of salaries for the périod of
of
a n officer to hold on to
containing a hold-over provision entitling
the expiration of his term until his s u c c e s s o r shall
his office after
have been chosen and quulified, is amended by
deleting such hold- 13Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, supra.
whien iaPeople v. Desiderio, G.R. No. 20805, Nov. 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 402.
o v e r provision and providing
for the filling up of all vacancies Suinto v. Nora, 54 Phil. 481 (1930).
13Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555
(1962).
140105
SCAD 907, 306 SCRA 287, 299 (1999), citing Ruben
of First Construction, 1990 ed, pp. 76-77. Agpalo, Statutory
12 (1946); Niere v. Court
*Tbpacio Nueno v. Angeles, 76 Phil.
SCRA 165.
stance of Negros Occ., G.R. No. 30324, Nov. 29, 1973, 54
Chico y. Martinez, 46 Phil. 266 (1923).
134 CGo
105
104 AIDS TO cONSTRUCTION
B. Legelative History
amendment by d
suspension.
should be given
The Court
a
added
construction
that this
different hat
from tha eleton
previous toit The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered
suspend any sub-
the
proper disciplining authority to 'preventively

umendment.
ordinate officer or employee under his authority
pending a n
Flavier,"" one of the is_ues raised
ref.
investigation. (Sec. 51).
In Buenaseda v.
Sec. 24 of Rep. Act No. 6770n
to
the worde-"sub
the proper interpretation of, his Deputy mav "The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted
the "Ombudsman or the phrase to reac "sus
provides in purt that under his authority Dena ordinas and 'in hi» bureeu,' leavinghiís authority
ofticer or employee under pending an
tively suspend any under this provision, the o peng any pifiçer or smployee from
It is claimed that can be deduced
an investigation." investigation x x x. The conclusion that
respondents in admin before and the words 'in
budsman can only preventively suspend inig, the deletion of the word 'subordinate'
trative cases who are employed in his oftiee, and not those whoare his bureau' after officer or employee' is that
the Corgress
or ofñices of the government in intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively 8u8
employees in other departments under invest.gation by.
his
or employee under his authority all officials and employees
view of the phrase "any officer pend in his office
of the Ombudsman extends to other publa office, irrespectiv ofwhether theyare employed
holding that the power
traceá the legislative hi or in other offices of the government."142
officers or employees as well, the Court
weight to the deletion of WOrd
tory of the statute and gave much Court ruled:
from the final version of the law. The 3.27. Exceptions to the rule.
índicates a change
The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694 of The rule that an amendment of a statute
which the statute originally had applies only
in meaning from that
the Revised Administrative Code, which dealt with preventive or when the
a bureau or when the deleted words or phrases are not surplusage
suspension and which authorized the chief of intention is clear to change the previous meaning of the old law.
ofice to 'suspend any, subordinate or employee in his bureau shown by the history
x x x' The rule does not upply where the intent, as
or under his authority pending an investigation of the enactment, is clear that the amendment is precisely
to plainly
the prior to its amendment because
"Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. express the construction of act
Adminis expressive of such construction.43
sufficiently
2266), which superseded Section 694 of the Revised its language is not
trative Code also authorized the chief of a bureau or office to In the revision or codification of statutes, neither
alteration in
'suspend any subordinate oficer or employee, in his bureau or the or addition of words in the latter
phraseology nor omission
construction of the
under his authority statute will be held, necessarily, to alter the
former act or acts. The court is only warranted in holding the
However, when the power to discipline government off when revised, to be changed, where the
constructions of a statute,
cials and employees was extended to the Civil Service Com is clear of construc
intent of the legislature to make such change
mission by the Civil Service Law of 1975 (P.D. No. 805), con is a necessity in
currently with the President, the Department Secreteries and tion, It should be remembered that.couukeasatiog
the heads of bureaus and offices, the phrase 'subordinate o the work of compilation or codification or revisian. Very frequently,
from
words which do not materially affect the sense will be omitted
ficer and employee in his bureau' was deleted, appropriate! the statute as incorporated in the code or revised statute, or that
leaving the phrase 'under his authority Therefore, Section some general idea will be expressed in brief phrases. No design of
of said law only mentions that the proper disciplining autho altering the law itself could rightly be predicated upon such modifi-
ity may preventively suspend 'any subordinate officer or eu cation of the language."
ployee under his authority pending an investigation x * *
(Sec. 41).
2lbid., pp. 653-654.
4Munoz & Co. v. Hord, 12 Phil. 624 (1909).
14Greenfield v. Meer, 77 Phil. 394 (1946).
44 SCAD 1026, 226 SCRA 645

(1993).
B. Legislative Hisory
redsons,
special
3.28. Adopted statutes.
in the United
States, unless
similar s t a t u t e s
in this' country or given
Foreign statutes
which are adopted
form part of the legislative hist
from local customs and practice require otherwise.
drawn mainly
which local laws a r e patterned
having been
evidence
the rules
rule is that where local statuteo courts, have per3ua
on
For instance,
latter.4s The general decisions of American
of the the de rule is patte.ned
copied from those of another country,
sources,
from A m e r i c a n where a local
general rule is that t he
patterned after or
those laws ara en sive effect. The the decisions of
sions of the courts in
such country construing that of another country,
then
to great
local statutesia from entitled
tled to great weight in
the interpretation of 6uch or copied construing the
rule are
and in harma courts in such country

and will generally be
followed if found reasonable the local rule.
157
in interpreting
other local statutes o n the subiect weight
withjustice, public poliey and
And the application of the adopted statute hould correspond i
fundamental points, at least, with its application in the count 3.29. Limitations of rule. îrom
which has bcen adopted
The r e a s o n is that the legislature. i The general rule that
a statute accordance with
from whence it was taken.148 be construed in
a statute which
has previously re. should
a foreign country
another country without
adopting from that of origin is not
that country, is deemed to hava it in the country of fi o m which
ceived judicial construction in the construction given and the fonign statute
and practical applica local law
adopted the statute with such construction limitations. Where the material aspects,13
where
differ in s o m e
tion in the country of origin.4 the former w a s patterned erroueous o r has not become
construction is clearly
the s t a t u t e its
own
the foreign
are adopted from, or pat. state has given
A good number of Philippine laws settled, o r where the adopting construction w a s
States or of the individual that the foreign
terned after, the laws of the United interpretation, the presumption Phil-
states of the American union, such as
the corporation law,150 the the statute no longer obtains.1
and the Rulesof
adopted with he adoption of be construed in accordance with the
tax code,161 labor laws,152 naturalization law,63 ippine laws must necessarily be deduced
For this courts have always felt themselves "bound intention of its lawmakers
and such intention may
Court.15 reason,
the United States in con- context of other legislation
law and the
by the rulings of the Supreme Court of from the language of each,
modeled upon or, bor-
Btruing and applying statutory enactments The related thereto.160
rowed from English or American originals."156 adopted statutes
thus generally construed in accordance with the constructión
are
8.80. Principles of c o m m o n law.
law a s known in Anglo-American
jurisprudence
While common founded o n
is not in force in this country,
saveonly insofar a s it is
conditions and'is not in conflict
sound principles applicable to local
2U.S. Guzman, 30 Phil. 416 (1915); Kepner v. U.S., 11 Phil. 689 (1904)."
v.
v. Meer, 78 Phil. 665 (1947); Carolina Industries,
Inc. v. CMS of the principles of the com
dWiee & Co. with existing laws, nevertheless many the
Stock Brokeruge, Ine., G.R. No. 46908, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 734.
mon law have been imported
into this jurisdiction as a result of
14Cuv.Republic, 89 Phil. 473 (1951). establishment of institutions similar to those
146bañez de Aldecoa v.. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 30 Phil. 228 (1915,
. enactment of laws and
Castle Bros. v. Go Juno, 7 Phil. 144 (1908).

Tanayo v. Gsell, 36 Phil. 953 (1916); Castle Bros. v. Go Juno, 7 Phil. 14
(1906); Cu v Republic, 89 Phil. 473 (1951); Cerezo v. Atlentic Gulf & Pacific Co.
180Phil. Education Co., Inc. v. Soriano, G.R. No. 22405, June 30, 1971, 39
Phil. 426 (1916); Carolina Industries, Inc.v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., GR. NG
46908, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 743; Wine & Co. v. Meer, 78 Phil. 665 (1947). SCRA 587.
226 (1999).
0an hong Bio v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 114 Phil. 916 (1962 16TPeople v. Pagpaguitan, 113 SCAD 36, 315 SCRA
10Wise &Co. v. Meer, 78 Phil. 655 (1947). 186People u Yadao, 94 Phil. 726 (1954).
101 Kan. 413, 166 P.
160People v. Yadao, 94 Phil. 726 (1954); State v. Chaplain,
lorus v. Sen Pedro, 102 Phil. 44 (1957).
1Cu v. Republic, 89 Phil. ^73 298. Seo Suç. 6.78, in/ra.
(1951)
Phil. National Bank v. Bondoc, G.R. No. 20236, July 30, 1965, 14 U
oDProcter & Gamble Phils. Manufacturing Corp. v. Commiseioner of Customs,
G.R. No. 24173, May 23, 1968, 23 SCRA 691 (1968).
u
770.
6 Cuyugan v. Santos, 34 Phil. 100, 107 (1916).
108 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
103
C. Contenporary Construction
of the United States. Courts may thus properly resort to co
law principles in construing doubtsul
provisions of a ,
statu it in the light of the conditions obtaining.4
It has been said
ticularly where such statute is modeled
upon Anglo-Ameriear
edents.161 However, where there is a conflict between a cominP
pret
that a s t a t u t e should not be construed in a spirit as
if it w e r e a
Generally, it may be said that
protoplasm floating around in apace.
principle and a statutory provision, the latter prevails0 in determining the meaning, intent, and purpose
of a law or consti
and
which it grew
provision, the history of the times out of
tutional
relation-
which it may berationally supposed to bear s o m e direct
8-81. Conditions at time of enactment. to
the evils intended to be remedied, and the good to be a c c o m -
ship,
Statutes do not operate in a vacuum. In plished are proper subjects of inquiry."i""
enacting a stat
the legislature is presumed to have taken into account
the
conditions of things at the time of its enactment. For this existi.
and
In addition, "law being a manifestation of social culture
reasorting into consideration the stage of
is proper, in the Lson, it progress, must be interpreted taking
interpretation of a statute, to consider the physie Buch culture and progress including all the concomitant circum-
conditions of the country and the
which must of necessity affect its circumstances then obtainin stances. It must be interpreted by drawing inspiration, not only
operation in
order to reach a from the teachings of history, from precedents and traditions, but
understanding as to the intent of the legislature, or as to the from inventions of science, discoveries of arts, ideals of thinkers,
ing of the statute.163 The court should then place itself in the mean
tion of the legislature and so construe the situa
statute as to give efet
dreams of poets, that is, all the sources from may which spring
to such intent or guidance and help to form a truthful idea of the human relations
meaning.104 regulated by the law to be interpretad and appiied: Broadminde dness
Thus, where the issue raised is whether a and vision are essential for men presiding tribunals to reach cor
petroleum
concessionaire is entitled to tax exemption even if the crude rect and just conclusions."1s* For "law is not a watertight
compart
leum it refines is petro shut off from the contact with the drama of life
imported, the court, answering the
question i ment sealed or
the affimative, ruled: *When the Petroleum which unfolds before our eyes. It is no sense a cloistered realn but
Act was passed and
which events are held up to our vision and touch
the concession
was well
was granted
known that there was then no
to
respondent under its provisions, i
a
busy state in
our elbows."16
available for the use of any refinery in Philippine crude petroleum
it obvious that the Philippines which make
Congress could not have intended that before the C. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION
exemption may be extended to a concessionaire the latter should
only refine crude petroleum produced in the
would defeat the Philippines, for thal S.33. Generally.
very objectives of the Act."165
Contemporary or practical constructions are the constructions
3.32. History of the times. placed upon statutes at the time of, or after, their enactment
executive, legislature, or judicial authorities, as well as by the
The court may look to the by those
Btate of things history. of the times, examine who, because of their invalvement in the
process of
existing when the statute was enacted, and inte knowledgeable of the intent and are legislation,
draftsmen and bill purpose of the law, such as
sponsors. Contemporary or
contemporaneous8
Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308 (1912);
U.S. v.
Guzman, 30 Phil. 416 (1915). Kepner v., U.S., 11 Phil. 669
(1
Aznar De los Santos
Yapdiangco, G.R. No. 18936, Murch 31, L965, 13 SCRA 486;
v. v.
Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 (1950).
v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 20264, Jan. 30, 1971, 37 SORA 129. Gar TWortham Walker Tox, 127 SW2d
v.
Perfecto concurring. Gomez v. 1138, 1160
Garcia v. Hipolito, 2 Phil. 732 (1903). Justicw Perfucto
Govornment Inaurance Board,(1939); quoted in Justice
78 Phil. 221, 224
64S. Go Chico, 14 Phil. (1947).
Phil. 221, 226-226 (1947). concurring. Gomez v. Government Insurance
v.
128
Gas &
Equipuiant Cu., 108 Phil. 226 (1909); Commisaioner of Customs Y. Buppori Board, 78
Commissianer of Customs v. (1960).
Caltex (Phils.), Inc., 106 Phil. 829, 85* (1969
LWortham v. Walker Tex, 127 Sw2d
1138, 1150 (1939).
111
110 C. Contemporary Construction
author
by the. by
is
invaluable the construction,
aid in
temporanea. rta, President o r the
E x e c u t i v e Secretary,
the
However, the
an reverse
construction
doubtful provisrons of law. Con expos the power to modify,

alter o r
or constrS2. the President, has secretary."*
of ambiguous lege-the
contemporary
ity of a department
tio est optima et
fortiss1ma in c o n s t r u c t i o n of a
s t a t u t e given by
the inter
law construction is
18 strongest in contemporaneous
the forn of a
The third kind of proc eding in
down in a n adversary The
generally; kinds of. pretation handed quasi-judicial power.
Executive
construction,
a n executive
officer exercising
3.34. ruling by distinction between a n interpreta-
out the
understood, and usually referred court in a c a s e pointed of a law
to
What is commonly the enforcement
construction placed officer charged with
construction is the n the tion by an executive official in a n adversary
a n executive
ofiicer called upon and that handed down by
contemporaneous
or &dministrative such a distinction
by an executive
is indeed a basis for making
of enforcing,the
sietute "There
statute. The duty proceeding: the entorce-
e x e c u t e or
administer such law because the position of a public
officer, charged with
devolves upon the executive branch ol goyorniment, necesaa the who must decide a dispute.
which
ment of a law, is different
from o n e
af its ambiguous provisions. Accord the c a s e for the side
ily calls for the interpretation If there is a fair doubt, his duty
is to pres nt
otficers generaly the ve
are
lies the responsibility of
decision.
ingly, executive and administrative which he represents, upon which
first officials to interpret the law, preparatory
to its enforcement
construction, it wili, at least it may, be
If he surrenders a plausible
These interpreiations are in the form,otrulea;anqrRgulations. Such rulings need not
surrendered forever, and yet it may be right.
circuiars, directives, opinions and.rulings."0 decision, and
havethe detachment of a judicial, o r semi-judicial
would that they should not be
There are three types of executive interpretations óf the law may properly carry bias.
It seem
The first is the construction by an-executiveror"administrative of. authoritative."175
ficer directly called to implement the law. It may be expressed or

implied. An interpretation embodied in a circular, directive or regu- S.35. Weight aocorded to contemporaneous construction.
lation is an expressed interpretation.7 A practice or mode of en-
forcement of not applying the statute to certain situations'or of Generally speaking where there is doubt as to the proper
applying it in a particular manner is an implied interpretation; it interpretation of a statute, the uniform construction placed upon it
is interpretation by usage by the exucutive or administrative officer charged with its enforce
or practice.. ment will be adopted, if necessary to resolve the doubt.17.The con
The second type. is the construçtion by the Seçretary.of dustC taennporaneou_ construction is very probably the true expression of
m his copacity us the chief legal adviser
the form of opinions issued
of the government. It is in, the legislative purpose, especially if the construction is followed for
upon request ofadministrative or ex- "a
considerable period of time."" It is thus entitled to great weight
ecutive officials who enlorce,the l¡w, In the and respect by the courts in the interpretation of
absence of judiclal ambiguous provi-
ruling on the matter and unlees reprobated by the President, the sions of law,78 and unless it is shown to be
opinions of the Secretary of Justice are generally controlling among clearly erroneous, con-
administrative and executive officials of the
government."
174Maceda v. Macaraeg, 197 SCRA 771
(1991).
i75Fishgold v. Sullivan, 154 F 2d 785 (1946).
Ph. Sugar Cernral Ageney
Collecior of Customs, 51 Phil. 131
v.
re Allen, Phii. 630
2
(903); Government v, (1927% 176Muñoz & Co. v. Hord, 12 Phil. 624 (1909); Manila
(1916) Municipality of Binungonan, 34 Pnil 618 Co. v. Board of Public Electric Railroad & Light
Utility Commissioners, 30 PhiB. 387 (1915).
See San
Miguel Corp. 1Molina v. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 167
139
v.
Inciong, G.R. No. 49774, Feb. 24, 1981, 303 S (1918); Madrígal v. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 414
(1918)
Molina 178Vera v. Cueva, G.R. No. 33693,
(1918); Phil. Long Rafferty, 38 Phil. 167 (1918),
v.
14 May 31, 1979, 90 SCRA 379; Asturias
Distance Tel. Co. v. Madrigal v. Rafferty,
38 Central, Inc. v. Conmissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 19337, Sept. 30, Sugar
(1952) Collector of Internal Revenue, yO Phil. 614 617 (1967); Tan v. 1967, 29 SCRA
Sc.83, Kevised Municipality of Pagbiluo,
887; Nestlé Philippines, Inc. v. Court of G.R. No. 14264,
April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA
Administrative Cocde. Appaals, 203 SCRA 504 (1991).
113
C C o n t e m p o r a r y C o n e t r u c t i o n
112 is
retation of stat.
illustration
interpretati.
the classical
control 136 A question
c o n s t r u c t i o n
will
abuse or
or of power widens. The
of e r r o r acceptability
Customa. collect
absence
clearly o. and its Colleckor of legally
In the
contlierea
cting
t e m p o r a n e o u s
lengthens u. can
of discretion Central all
the courts. abuse
enactm Sugar
the
government
upon
ute by or grave legislative Philippine whether a
statute
of a is by that
lack of juisdiction
the
l e t t e r or
the spirnt
the action of the
.
raised in
this cuse
for
wharfage"
required
wharves.
It appears
with
either agency,
as a charge levied and
a
governmental
180 As aptly said in
courts,18< a cane
duties
through
privately-owned
have been
charging
the duties
ing or
disturbed by truction of astatute
constru Articles
exported wharfage never owned
be years, government
when the
not twenty-six
would
that the
c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s
dut. for the

last ruled
it is whose the period the question
The principle the government, e v e n during resolving for
the executive
ofticers of
and should ordinarily o rdinarily collected
wharf. The
court
has at
all times
by great respect, troj any question be-
so firmly e
operated in
is entitled to the tax
nor guvernment
courts, is consider that
e x e c u t e it,
the
construction of the statute by the
need be cited to to suppor, edde When w e
been levied and collected by
the
that it has spent
millions
authorities
jurisdiction
that no twenty-six years
any
wharf, and of
ports
in our
fore it
owmed or operated
of wharves
in its principal reaching
and its far
i t 181 construction
interpretation of an. of pesos in the instant case
The reason
behind the rule that the accorded
great re x x the
importance of the x x Biands
out in bold
generally entries x government x
agency is the finances
of the is now
called upon
ministrative government Appealsis2n court
Inc. v. Court of this effect upon and this effect to
Nestlé Philippines, becomes very apparent, and in legal
is explained in relief and
continued
construction
owned
overthrow that long a privately
wise to
was shipped through
The rationale for the
rule relates not only to the emer hold that, because
the sugar
collect the money
in
ques
of a modern or modernizina government is not entitled to in its con-
multifarious needs whart, the acquiescence
gence of the The long
society and the
establishment of diverse administrative age tion 'as charge for wharfage.'
a
effect of such a
decision makes it
those needs; it also relata struction and the far reaching reason-
cies for addressing and satisfying of specialize court to sustain the law,
if there are any
to the accumulation
of experience and growth imperative for this x x The law
in question
charged with imple which it can be done. x
able grounds upon an act of
capabilities by the administrative agency at any time by
a particular statute. In
Asturias Sugar Central, Ine could have been repealed or changed which has
menting continued construction
Commissioner of Customs he.Coúrt stressed that exett Congress. In view of the long
vs.
been placed upon it by the government
officials, and for which they
tive officials are"presumed-to have familiarized themselva has not seen fit to repeal
with ell the conaiderations pertinent to the meaning and.p now continue, the very fact that Congress in favor of sustaining
or change the law is a very potent argument
pose of the law, and to have formed an independent, conscien the Act could have been made
tious and competent expert opinion thereon. The courts give that construction. The language of
much weight to the government agency or officials charged more and certain,
specific. but in view of its history, its long con
with the implementation of the law, their competence, exper tinuous construction, and what has been done and accomplished by
ness, experience and informed judgment, and the fact
that and under it, we are clearly of the opinion that the government is
they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret. entitled to have and:receive the money in question, even though
the sugar was shipped from a pYivate wharf.""
The weight that may be given to a contemporaneous constru
tuon ucreeasts as the period in which it is followed and observe The rule that contemporaneous construction is entitled to great
weight and respect in the interpretation of a statute is especially
true under the 1973 Constitution, where some ministers or heads of
Tamayo v. Manila Hotel Co., 101 Phil. 810 (1957).
gv. Poople's Hormesite & Housing
nre Allen, 2 Phil. 630, 640 (1903); Phil.Corp.,
162 SCRA 441 (1988)
(Gilobul Communicationa v. telova
145 BCRA S85
(1986).
M203 SCRA B04 IASMolina v. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 167
I429 SCRA 617
(1901) 161 Phil. 143 (1927).
(1918)
(1969)
Republhe v.
Sandiganbayan, 96 SCAD 842, 293 8CRA 440, 454 98. 87bid., at pp. 143-148.
AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION 115

C. Contemporary Conetruction
114
of the Bato
m i n i s t r i e s or
departments
are also
members
the e x e c u t i v e e
tasang that an administrative-ageney a s the power to interpret itsown
executive presumed that legislative: wrules and suçh interpretation becorges part of the rules.
situation, i t
In this the
Pambansa.
of the legislature,
knew
member the Baw. 1s
cial, beinga
construction-of
intent in his 3.38. Reason8 why contemporaneous construction is given

reflected that
and much weight.
practice.
accorded to usage and A number of reasons account for the great weight given by the
8.36. Weight
exposition, common usage courts to contemporaneous construction of statutes. Contempora-
of contemporaneous neous construction is entitled to great weight because it comes
The principle
under the statute,
or a course of conduct indicating from the particular branch of government called upon to imple-
and practice of great value deter in
of it, is frequently to
particular undertaking where the usage has been ac. ment the law thus conetrued.1s Executive officials are presumed
especially
mining its real meaning, concerned and has extended over have familiarized themselves with all the considerations pertinent
in by all the parties to have. formed an
quiesced
time.89 For it has been said
that the best interpreter to the meaning and purpose of thelaw and thereon,
long period of r e r u m usus. Thus, where a independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion
of the law is usage. Optimus
interpres the principle of
In other words, the factors leading the court to give
statute granted the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office addi the respect due
time of which enactment the contemporaneous construction much weight are
tional regular racing days, at the
the government agency or officials charged with the implementa-
and uniform practice was that all sweepstakes and in-
tion of the law, their competence, expertness, experience,
long, continuous
the whole day, it
draws and races were held on Sundays and during formed judgment, and the fact that they frequently are the drafters
is safe to conclude that when the legislature chose

not to specify in
of the law they interpret.196
terms how the additional sweepstakes
draws and races
express
would be held, it did not intend to disturb the then prevailing Moreover, there is the need for certainty and predictability in
as not to A
the law. statute is enacted. A regulation is issued to implemeat it.
practice and the statute should thus be so construed of events be years before the construc
change the practice.10 It will in the normal course
come before
of the statute, in the light of the regulation, will
tion will living and transac-
the courts. In the meanwhile, people go on
3.37. Construction of rules and regulations. be concluded under the statute. These circumstances
tions will
much weight to contemporaneous construc-
Rules and reguiations issued by executive or administrative argue in favor of giving
t i o n , 196
officersofpursuant to, and as authorized by, law have the force and
eftect laws,11 Recognizing this rule-making power, authorities
Sustain the principle that the interpretation by those charged with
their enforcement is entitled to
groat woight by the court in the
lutler's cunstructiou of such rules and
regulations. IL has beua hel 42 Am. Jur, 431
102 Phil. 706 (1967), citing
Guekeko v. Aruneta, Relations, G.R. No. 22764, Dec. 18, 1967, 21
SRamos v. Court of Induetrial
SCRA 722.
No. 45642, Peb. 28, 1978, 81
SCRA 1282; Salavaria v. Buenviaje, G.R. S.E. 989.
Cf. CGovernent v. Municipality of Co., 94
14Richard v. Drewry-Hughes
Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. GamesBinalonan, 32 Phil. 634 (1915). Central, Inc. v. Commissioner
of Customs, G.R. No. 19337,
(1960), Phil. Long Distance Tel. and Amusemnents 6 Asturias Sugar of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
G.R.
Co. v. Collector of Internal Board,
107 Phil 29 SCRA 617; University
(1952). Sept. 30, 1969,
Revenue, 90 Phil. o No. 28153, Jan. 28, 1971, 87
SCRA 64 (1971).
Phil. 678 (1968), citing Erwin
N.
Manila Jockoy Club, Inc. Central Bunk, 104
(1960). v. Gammes and
Amusements Board, 107 Phil. 161 uLim Huo Ting v.the'Regulations Problems, 64 Harvard Law Rev., pp. 398,
Criawald, A Sumnmary of
(1962),
Victorias
Warren Milling Co., Inc: v. Social 404.
SCRA 387 (1988).Manufacturing
Security Commission, 114
Workers Uniun v.
Bureau of Labor Phil.0
159
Relation
116 AIDS TO cONSTRUCTION
C. Contemporary Construction
officer
3.39. When contemporanoous
oonstruction disregarde the executive or
administrative
construction by an
interpreta-
construction of a statute is neithar upon
such
court should not now apply
The cont»mporaneoua therefore, the
trolling nor binding upon
the court, the duty and power to- and that, 204
a judicial function.17,The court
inter tion at
variance
therewith
congtruction creates
pret the law being primarily May contemporaneous followed,
construction, where there. is.no relied upon, and
erroneous
rule, an
disregard contemporaneous As n
ambi or thosé who inter
where the construction is clearly erroneon vested righton thepart arise from a
wrong
guity in the law, po vested right may not who8e
where strong reason to the contrary exists,20 and where the c guchconstructtom:A administrative or
executive officer
And the
has previously given the statute a
different interpretation,201 Tf a law
pretation of
an
by the law.206
18 erroneous, the same must be d
the duty is to enforce,
and not to construe,
e r r o r on the part
contemporaneous construction primary the mistake o r
clared null and void. It is the role of the judiciary to define e is n e v e r estopped by errone-
from the
and government those who benefited
Consequently, correction of
when necessary, to correct constitutional or statutory interpreta of its agents. prevent
construction may not
tion in the context of the interaction of the three branches of tha ous
contemporaneous
themselvesfrom complying the
with
e r r o r a s legal
nor excuse
government, almost always in situations where some agency of the such construction, set up such
nor c a n they
state has engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legiti. as corrected; received pursu
construction from them of what they
recovery law.20
mate area of government power. Th:as, the poliey instructions of obstacle against the application of
erroneous
the Secretary of Labor adding another group of employees as ex to, and on the basis of,
ant in the interest
admits exceptions
cluded from those entitled to holiday pay when the law itself did rule is not absolute, but where
The true in tax cases,
not so exclude them is void. An administrative interpretation which fair This is particularly
play. officers by
diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute delim of justice and addressed to internal
revenue
be-
the i n t e r p r e t a t i v e c i r cInternal
ular
Revenue is rendered necessary
its or withholds is ultra vires 202 the
Commissioner of and simple to
not too plain
the tax to be enforced is
statute taxpayer
cause circular, a
in reliance on such
Erroneous contemporaneous construction does not understand and where, of paying the tax required
3.40. with the obligation
faithfully complied to pay addi-
preclude correctionnor create rightsj exceptions, such case, the taxpayer may
not be required
by it. In had not been re
If through misapprehension of the law an executive or admin* period that said cjrculare r r o n e o u s interpre
tionaltax during the circular correcting the
istrative ofiicer called upon to implement it has erroneously ap scinded by a subsequent éstopped from
when the true government is n e v e r
rule the
plied and executed it, the error may be corrected tation, for while as a the part of its agents,
does not pre af mistake or e r r o r on
construction is ascertained. The doctrine of estoppel collecting taxes because dictate and operate to create
officer him- and good faith
clude correction of the erroneous construction by the the principles of justice
self, by his successor in office, or by the court in an appropriate exceptions thereto.209
Nor may a person be properly heard to say that
he relied
case.
53
Koppel (Phils.), Inc. v. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496 (1946); Ortua v. Encarnacion,
496 (1946).
Phil. 440 (1934). v. Yatco, 77 Phil. 100 Phil. 288 (1956).
3Koppel (Phils.), Inc. .
Regalado v. Yulo, 61, Phil. 173 (1935). 3Hilado of Internal Revenue,

v. Collector Commission, G.R.
v. Social Security
MHna v. Rafferty, 37 Phil. 545 (1918).
614 2United Christian Missionary Society Inc. v. Collector of Internal
90 Phil. E. Rodriguez,
Long Distance Tel. Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue,
Phil.
No. 26712, Dec. 27, 1969,
30 SCRA 982;
1969, 28 SCRA 1119.
(1952). Revenue, GR. No. 23041, July 31, 1975, 68 SCRA 263; Cebu
Asturias Sugar Centrai, Inc: v. Commissioner of Customs, 8upra. Mathay, G.R. No. 36153, Nov. 28,
Legaspi v.
No. 18146, March 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 672.
aChartered Bank Employees ARsn. v. Ople, 138 SCRA 273 (1985). Portland Cement Co. v. De Jesus,
G.R.
G.R. No. 52303, Oct.
Phil. Long Distance Tel. Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 il. a 74 v. Court of Tax Appeals,
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp.
(1952); Republic v. Phil. Long Distance Tel. Co., G.R. No. 18841, Jan. 27, 19b, 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142.
SRA 620
118
119
C. Contemporary Conatruction
3.41. Legislative interpretation.

The fact that the interpretation
of a statute is
prima 3.42. Legislative approval
judicial function does not preclude the legisleture, from indi
The legislature is presumed to have
full knowledge of a con-
its construction of a statute it enacts into law, It may thus n a n adminis-
o r practical construction of a statute by
temporaneous
enforcernent. The legis
in
the statute itself an interpretative or "declaratory claued trative or executiveofficer charged with its
scribing rules of construction or
indaoatung how its provisions sh approve,or ratify such contempo-
be construed." It may also define. or inction,
lature may, by action Such
the terms used in a stat construction. approval may be manifest in many
vways,
enact a declaratory act construing a previous 1aw, or pass a resnol atute, raneous
as when it reenacts a statute previously given

a contemporaneous
tion indicating its sense or
intention AS to given, statute.210 80lu. construction,1" uses words sim ar in their import to the language
tive interpretation may likewise take the form Legisa or
of an
implied acui of a n earlier law which has received a practical interpretation,1
escence to, or approval of, an
executive or judiCial construction of a amends a prior statute without, in the amending act, providing
statute.211
anything which would restrict, change or nullify the previous
con-
The legislature, in indicating its
iimit or restrict the power construction of a law, cannot temporaneous construction placed upon the prior law.217
granted to the courts by the Constit.
tion. For instance, it may not,
by defining a ter+n, make the definj Legislative ratification or adoption of a contemporaneous con-
tion conclusive not only as

regards the statute which defines struction may, also be shown by the legislature appropriating money
term but also as regards other the for the officer designated to perform atask to
pursuant an
inter-
statutes or as used
Can it validate a law
which violates elsewhere,212Nor pretation of a statute. Thus, where an administrative officer, charged
a conatitutional provision
so a8 with the implementation of a law, delegates to a hearing officer the
prevent an attack-thereon in the
shall be construed as not courts,.by, a declaration thatit authority to hear and receive evidence in an administrative case,
tion: To do so would be to
to contravene- the constitutionel.limita-| on the strength of his interpretation of the law that notwithstand-
usurp judicial prerogative.213
While legislative ing the absence of an express provision he is authorized to make
courts may Tesort to it interpretation
of a statute is not the delegation by necessary implication, the repeated appropria-
to
clarify controlling
legislative interpretation isanbiguity
in the language tionby the legislature for hearing officers not only confirms the
Such
entitled to respect,
thereof administrative construction but als0 constitutes a ratification of
the executive especially
department has similarly construed the act of the administrative officer
agent of the legislature
contemporaneous construction of the law by two the statute."tma
as an
thé Governmëntone?-the departments o inthe implementation of the law.218 "-
enactment 'and the

othery the
degislative branch responsible.fot.a Where the legislature
has notice or knowledge of a construc
enforoement- while not executivaibranch responsibie for 18 tion placed upon a statute by
an executive officer
charged with its
controlling on the judiciery,
respectful consideration. For ia entitledu implementation, without repudiating it, its silence is acquiescence
the orderly and
tation and advancement
of the law, the harmonious interpr equivalent to consent to continue the practice.219/Thereis V
ble, keep step with the other court should, when
poss legislative approval by, the legislature's failure to change implied
departments."214 standing administrative construction. It is an axiom of law a.long-
that
., Sec. 4, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 387.
People v.
Venviaje, 47 Phil. 636 1See Sec. 3.43, infra.
(1949). (1925); De Ponce 79
So Socs. 3.42, el
v.
Sagario, 85 Pnu 14In re Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918).
seq., infra. *Tanmuyo v. Manila Hotel Co., 101 Phil. 810 (1967).
v.
Cty of Munila v.
David, 93 Plil. 696 Manila Remnants Co., Inc., 100 "American Tbbacco Co. v. Director of
(1953). Phil. 796 (1957; dencis 67 SCRA 287. Patents, G:R. No. 26803, Oct. 14, 1976,
1Endencia v. David, DnG
Yra v. suprm. 21n re Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918).
Justice, 62 Phil. Albana, 62 Phil.
912 (1936); 380, S84 (1928); See 20Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of
aleo Bengson v. Customs, G.R. No. 19337,
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Secretary
Phil. 461 (9"
Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617.
121
AIDS TO CONSTRUCTiON
based
legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate, which rule here

i8
law. The
pressed in the maxim, ratihabitio mmandato aequiparatur aex interpretation
of the with the
contem
tively
acquainted
Dy an
the correctthat the legislature is especially when madeduty of
upon
the theory of a statute, with
the
3.49. Reenactment, interpretation
officer
charged
the
ntar
poraneous executive adopts
body or therefore
The most common act of legislative approval of a administrative
enforcing the law,

and contempora
contemn or why such of a
neous construction of a statute is by reenactment. administering
The r e a 3 s o n
The princi reenactment.25
the
interpretation
legislative approval by reenactment states that the reenactm of pretation upon weight in agreement
constructionis given much this case a n to
a statute, there is in
previously given a contemporaneou8 construction neous
due to the fact

that
the
legislative-
persuasive indication of the adoption by the legislature statute is executiveand to give 1
construction. Stated differently;, the construction of a

of tha between two
departnents--the
devolves upon
the judiciary to
and it operate
statute hby an of the law, however,
executive oficer called upon to implement the-statute is the meaning 226 The rule does not, ex-
with the clearly
deemed
treatment,
deferential conflict
have been adopted by the a
in evident
legislature when it which is
stantially the same language, the presumption reenacted in it fréeze a nmeaning
being that the le9ub
27
legislative intent,
pressed
lature knew of such construction when it made the
réenactmentt2 legia.
Thus, where the legislature resorts to language similar in ita i
port to the language of an earlier act which had received a practi 3.44. Stare decisis. or
interpreting a
Court applying
cal construction, it is fair to presume that the The decision of the Supreme of that s t a t
the later act with a view to the
language was used in with respect to the interpretation
statute is controlling adminis-
contemporaneous construction a ute and is of greater weight
than that of a n
executive or
given the earlier law.23 Tb make the principle of reenactment appli construction of other
statutes of
similar im-
cable, the earlier law must have been reenacted and not trative officer in the by the Su-
amended and the contemporaneous construction thereof must be

merely port. The reason is
that the interpretation of
a statute
of the statute itself and of the legal sys

preme Court
forms part
the form of regulation to implement the law and duly published entrusted with
that branch of government
and not merely administrative ruling embodiod in a letter teoa tem and comes from the law.29 It is an invaluable
aid
specified individual and not published. the duty to construe or interpret
of statutes of doubtful mean-
in the construction or interpretation
The contemporaneous construction a8 approved by the legisla ing.
ture by reenactment is accorded greater weight and respect than The legal maxim which requirea that past decisions
of the
the contemporaneous construction of the statute before its ratifica. court be followed in the adjudication of cases is known as etare
tion. It has been held that "where a statute has received a contem, decisis et non quieta movere. It means one should follow past prec
poraneous and practical interpretation,and the statute as inter
preted is reenacted, the practical interpretation is accorded greater
edents and should not disturb what has been settled. The rule
rests on the desirability of having stability-in-the-law.230 Accord
weight than it ordinarily receives, and is regarded.as presumpi ingly, a ruling of the Supréme Court as to the construction of' a law
Government v. Standard Oil Co., 20 Phil. 30 (1911); Mitsui Bussan Kaiha Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil. 32, 34-35 (1952), quoting Sutherland, Statu.
v. Manila loctric Railroud & Light Co., 39 Phil. 624 (1919). tory Construction, 5109.
ABS-CHN Brvadcasting Corp. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 52306, 0n 2 Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil. 912 (1936).
12, 1981, 108 SCHA 142; Alexander Howden & Co., Ltd. v. Collector of Internai lnterprovincial Autobus Co., Ine. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil.
Revenue, G.R. No. 19392, April 14, 1965, 18 SCRA 601; Interprovincial Autobus o 290 (1956).
nc. v. Collector of lnternal Revenre, 98 Pril. 290 (1956). z Art. 4, Civil Code; People v. Jabinal, G.R. No. 30061, Peb. 27, 1974, 55
a r e Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918), Montelibano v. Forrer, 97 Phil. 228 (1950 SCRA 607.
Alexander Howden & Co., Ltd. v. Collector of Internal Revenu>, G.R. u Endencia v Duvid, 93 Phil. 696 (1963).
19392, April 14, 1966, 18 SCRA 601. Koppel (Phils.), Inc. v. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496 (1946).
123
principle ot
stare
should be followed in subsequent cases
invofving Bimilar The
thoeti abaolute.
The
doctrine
case bas beendecided

one'way,
n other words, once a at 18sue, should
nen anoth The rule
of stare
decisis is not
adherence to
precedents.
no
matter
case. involving exactly the same

pont blind for years,
th 4
For the "Supreme Court has the constit decisis does
not mean
has been
followed
must be aban-
in the same manne,2 down,
which to law,
and applying the law i rule laid
found to be
contrary
should not appiy
tional duty not only of interpreting be, if
or
it may not and The
ance with prior doctrines but also of protecting society from cord, how
BOund
The principle of stare decisis does

the precedent
and the
laW.
rule
wantonness wrought by needle:
or
improvidence and
ess upheaval doned.
conflict between
is a any
doctrine
there abandon than
Interest reipublieo when and important
such interpretations and applications. court is to forsake more
demands that the duty of the force."38 For only
the Stateof sit violation of law in
However,
interest
finis litium." The found to be in be right.23
courts should enuu
end to litigation. else is that the abandon a precedent
anything or the
A ruling of the Supreme Court, in order that it wvin the Supreme
Court itself can change inferior court, n o r e v e n by
cannot.be done by a n the 1aw
within the doctrine of stare decisis, must be categorically sta ciated by it; it amends repeals or
the latter overruled a princi-
it must be a diran On except when
an issue expressly raised by the parties; legislature shall have
until the high tribunal are
bound to
Where the court resolved a question merely sub sileno self.0 Hence, inferior courts
ing.233 doctrine enunciated in a case, decisions all
decision does not come within the maxim of stare decisis, inso ple or Supreme Court from
whose
that
follow it. There is only courts feel
one
the question is concerned.234 Nor does an opinion expressed h their bearings. If inferior
y the should take way
way, noi upon the point in issue, fall within the maxim, for
for other courts Court is against their
merely en obiier dictum,235
such is the doctrine laid down by the Supreme
on the inatter
state theír personal opinion
of reasoning, they may doctrine and not
principle presupposes that the facts of the precedent and in accordance with the
The but must decide the case deviate from this
view." For inferior courts to
.
the which it is applied are substantially the 8ame. Wh

cese to
the facts are dissimilar, then the principle of stare decisis doea
with their personal beyond the
con
immediate con
rule will have detrimental consequences
apply
no troversy242
An obiter dictum does not also fall within the doctrine, An

obiter dictum has been defined as an
opinion expressed by a cout 1
upon question of law which is not necessary to the decision

some
the tase before it. It is a
remark made, or opinion'
expressed, by a
judge, in his decision upon a cause by-the.way, that is, inciden.
tally, and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a ,
point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or
introduced by way of illustration, or
analogy or argument. An obiter
dictum is not binding as a precedent»
ASuciated Sugar, inc, v.

25, 1982, 118 SCRA 567; Pines Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 30391, No
SCRA 65 (1993). City Educational Cénter v. NLRC, 46 SCAD 179, 221
National Power Corp. v.
SCRA 271, 298 (1996). Province of Lanao del Sur, 76 SCAD 223, 2
People Macadaeg, 91 Phil. 410
v. Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor,
Hebron v Reyes, 104 Phil.
(1952) 79 Phil. 249, 257 (1947).
23 Koppel (Phil.), Inc. v. Yatco, 77 Phil.
aPeople v. Macadaeg, 91 Phil.176410(1958). AUSee Secs. 2.12 and 2.13,
496 (1946).
Tung Chiu Hui v. Rodriguez, 134 (1952).
"Deta Motors 8CAD 252, 340 SCRA 765 'Albert v. Court of
supra.
First Instance of
Corp. Court of
v.
(2000). 23 SCRA 948. Manila, G.R. No. 26364, May 29, 1968
Appeals, 85 8CAD 40, 276 SCRA 212 1997 4Canon 18, Canons of Judicial
Ethics.
125
LANGUAGE
FROM,
ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE
OF STATUTE
A. Literal Interpretation
w h a t 1s
Hence,
it says.
to meanexactly what those
matters
Chapter V statute
must be tuken
provided in the
law cannot be extended to
not clearly
ADHERENCE TO, OR
outside its scope.
it must
be taken to
FROM, LANGUAGE OFDEPARTURE

unambiguous, LO
Where the law is
clear and choice but to s e e
and the court has no
what it says clear and
free
irom
STATUTE m e a n exactly
it that its
mandate is obeyed.
o r ambiguity,
Where the law is
there is no r o o m for
construction or
interpreta-
the.la18 Fead
doubt provided in
A. LITERAL INTERPRETATION where. what-ie not clearly. and wise, 1
tion. Thus,
construction because it
is more logical
define the
into the law by prerogative. to
be to encroach upon legislative For whether a
would legislation.6
which is judicial
wisdom of the law, is not for the courts to determine.
expedient to be
4.01. Literal meaning or statute is wise or
not a s they
think it ought
plain-meaning rule/ "jiu4 nlagrrit Courts must
administer the law,
without regard to
consequences.'
As a
general rule, the intent of the legislature to but as they find it and illustrates
tained and thereafter
given éffect is the intent
aBe
ascer
be
of National Federation of Laboru. NLRC"
The case employer that
language of the statute.' If a statute is clear, expressed in # the rule. The issue in this
case is whether or not
an
compulsory
plain and free fr
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and was compelled
to cease its operation
because. of the
of agrarian
attempted interpretation. This is what is known asapplied withn acquisition by the government
of its land for purposes
affected employees.
expressed in the maxim, inderplain-aeanin.
to its
rule or verba legis.It is reform, is liable to pay separation
pay
Art. 283 of the
animi pay, cited
or speech is the index
of intention. The rule rests on theserm The employees, claiming such separation
Article 283 provides
that the
presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a vali stat.
Labor Code in support of their claim.
of any employee"
ute correctly express its "employer may also terminate the employment
intent or will and preclude the court from notice thereof and paying separation
for reasons therein by serving
construing it differently" The iegislature is presumed to kaow.th pay to affected employees.
The Court ruled that the employees
meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and-to .have were not entitled to such separation pay
and explained why:
expreseed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the that the situation in this case
statute.' Verba legis non estrecedendum, or from the words of a Even assuming, arguendo, establishment called Patalon
were a closure of the business
statute there should be no departure. Coconut Estate of private respondents, still the petitioners/
closure con-
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when employees are not entitled to separation pay. The
Article 283 of the Labor Code is a unilateral
the words and phrases of a statute are clear and unequivocal, their templated under
meaning must be determined from the language employed and the and voluntary act on the part of the employer to close the
business establishment as may be gleaned from the wording
of the said legal provision that Phe
employer
The use of
mey also termi:
'Regalado v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 178 (1935). nate the employment of any employee due to . . .
"Bustamante v. NLRC, 76 SCAD 662, 265 SCRA 61 (1996), citing Ruben E.

pAgpalo,Espiritu
Statutory Construction (1990 ed.), p. 94.
Cipriano, G.R. No. 32742, Feb. 16, 1974, 55 SCRA 533; Globe
v.
Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 767 (1988); Dayrit v. Cruz, 165 SCRA 571
Mackay Cable & Radio Corp. v. NLRC, 206 SCRA 701 (1992) citing Agpalo, Statutory
Construction, 1990 ed., p. 94. (1988).
Rizal Commercial Benking Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 116 SCAD
Aparri v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 0057, Jan. 81, 1984. 999, 920 SCRA 279 (1999).
Director of Lands v. Abaya, 63 Phil. 569 (1936).
124 107 SCAD 713, 327 SCRA 188 (2000).
STATITORY CONSTRUCTION
127
LANGUAGE
ADiERECE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM,
OP STATUTE
A. Literal Interpretaiion
that it is diren
denotes
should be followed.
the word 'may' in a stetute,
only" The plai
ory in Its literal rneaning
n s t u r e and
generaliy permissive lain-meanin
apnlio
mean exnrtly what it saya."
non indiget.
When the
language o
c o n s t r u c t i o n is thus sPnlentia expositore
terba
statutory
legis in ble in Absoluta
explanation of it is required.
or
the words of a
statute are clear, plein the Jaw is clear,
n0
this case. Where

its literal meanin n construction
that Wnen
it must be given g elementary rule in
statutory
íree from ambiguity,
interpretation.
and It is un
of the statute a r e clear

and unequivocal,
without attempted the words and phrases emp.oyed
appied from the language
must be determined The
Article 283 of the Labor Code da their meaning
exactly what it says.
In other words,
closure of the busin not and the statute must be taken to m e a n
intent of the legisla-
situation where the ess
contemplate a as to the probable
and courts may not speculate
tablishmentis forced upon the employer forultimately ture apart fron
the words. When the law is
clear, it is not sUsceptDe
of who may
the benefit of the employees."0 It must be applied regardless
ble of interpretation.
the legislative intent must ha even if it may be
harsh or onerous
The fundamental rule thet de affected,
statute itself must be adhere. This principle
termined from the language of the to it.is still the law."
"The law may be harsh, but maxim
even though the court
is convinced by extraneous circumstane nces maxim, dura er sed lex. Another
is expressed in the legal durum est, sed ita
lex
that the legislature intended to enact something very different fro expressive of the rule is
hoc quidem perquam The
created to be cleard hard but so the law is
written.
that which it did enact. An absurdity cannot be
seripta est,,or it is exceedingly regardless
up by construction, and
hidden meanings at variance with the lan. principle requires that the
statute should be applied
be sought out. The court may not speculate asto hard harsh. If the law is clear and
guage used cannot
of-whether it is unwise, or
without
the probable intent of the legislature different from that expressed the swornduty of the eourt to apply it
free from doubt, it is it." A
in the words of the statute. To attempt to do so is a perilous under
fear or favor, to follow its mandate,
and not to tamper with
should inhibit the court
taking and is apt to lead to an amendment of a law by judicial decent regard to the legislative will
what it thinks
construction. To depart-from the meaning expressed- by-the worda from engaging in judicial legislation to change
is to aller the ztatute, to-legislate and not tointerpret." Maledicta are unrealistic statutes that
do not conform with ordinary
rewrite the law under
est expositio quae corrumpit textum, or it is dangerous construction experience or practice." Nor may the court
which is against the text.2 the guise of interpretation. For the duty of the court in
not to dispute its
interpreting a statute which is ambiguous is
wisdom; the dutyof the court is limited to inquiring into the
4.02. Dura les sed ler.
legislative and, once this is deternined, to making said
intent
intent effective." Moreover, the law is the law, and if there is
a
A statute, being the will of the legislature, should be applied
inlaw.exactly the the legislature has expréssed itself clearly in the
way
The clear, unambiguous and unequivocal
languago of a statute
preclades the court from eonstruing it and gives it no discretion but
to apply the law.3 The statute in guch a case must be taken to 4Banawa v. Mirano, G.R. No. 24750, May 16, 1980, 97 SCRA 517; Espirituv.
Cipriano, G.R. No. 32743, Feb. 15, 1974, 55 SCRA 533.
Tan Lin v. Republic, 112 Phil. 308 (1961).
Pascual,v. Pascual-Baustista, 207 SCRA 661 (1992); Fagel Tabin Agricul
Ibid, citing Agpalo, Ruben E., Statutory Construction, 1995 ed.,
107 SCAD 713, 327 SCRA, p. 263. tural Corp. v. Jacinto, 203 SCRA 189 (1991); People v. Amigo, 67 SCAD 28, 252
p. 165. SCRA 43 (1996).
Tañada v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 515 (1935).
Go v. Anti-Chinese League of the Phils., 84 Phil. 468 (1949); Gonzales v.
"Regaludo v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 173 (1935); Victoria v. COMELEC, 47 SCAD 2%
229 SCRA 269 Gonzales, 68 Phil. 67 (1933); Republie v. Go Bon Lee, 111 Phil. 805 (1961); Velasco v.
(1994). Lopez, 1 Phil. 720 (1903).
Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Cominissioner of
Customs, G.R. No. 28464, Na 9National Marketing Corp. v. 'Tecson, G.R. No. 29131, Aug. 27, 1969, 29
1, 1971, SCRA 269; Commissioner
39
of lnternal Revenue v. Limpan InvesLIne SCRA 70.
Corp., G.R. No.
28571,
Bank of the Phil., G.R. July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 148 (1970)} Quijano v. "San Diegov.Sayson, G.R. No. 16258, Aug. 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 1175; Inchong
No. 26419, Oct.
16, 1970, 35 SCRA 270; Ramos Developi
ou tof
v. Hernandez, 101 Phil., 1166 (1959).
Appeals, G.R. No. 53766, Oct. 30, v.
1981, 108 SCRA 728.
129
128 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DEPARTURE FROM,
LANGUAGE
ADHERENCE TO, OR
OF STATUTE
Interpretation
from Literal
B. Departure one.
if the
to make
need-to change, amend-or.repeal it that may. be done thros. is not at liberty
to supply
nor
the
legislative process,'not by judiciat decree.20 bugh ing,

the court
expressed in
some
appropriate
manner,
intent and sup

i n t e n t is not to its
legislative speeulate a s The court
Once the intent or meaning of the law is ascertained by ! not by
interpretation
of-the law.
court may phraseology
application of the rules of statutory consiruction, the law must the
con-
found in the and t h e n
meaning not expressed
be ply a purpose
some
in n o way fails
totally to
enforced and obeyed. It has been held that there "may be discreti may not
assume
it.23 Where a
statute
forbids
s t a t u t e to accomplish modesty
as to what a particular provision there can be none
requires; what. Btrue the sense of judicial
a meaning, a becoming
from supplying
a mean
soever as to the enforcement and
application thereof
once its
mean. express
the court
from assuming and,
consequently,
is necessarily
inopera-
ing has been ascertained. What it decrees must be followed; what it such a case,
thereto." The statute, in
ing
commands must be obeyed." üve 25 principle is San
Where the law is clear, appeals to justice and equity as justif. involving the foregoing
case Act No.
An interesting i s - w h e t h e r Rep:
cation to construe it differently are unavailing. For equity is avail. C O M E L E C * The
issue raised XVI of
Article
tiago v. Section 2,
able only in the absence of law and not its replacement. Equity statute to implement
6735 is a n adequate reads:
described as justice outside legality, whioh simply means that it Constitution, which
the 1987 Constitution may
likewise
cannot auppunt althuugh.it may supploment the law. AlNabstract S e c . 2. Amendments
to this
initiative upon
a
rules.
arguments based on equity should yield to positive Appeala the people through
be directly proposed by of the total number of
for justice and equity cannot justify disregard of the mandate of least twelve pef'centum
petition of at district must be
the law so long as it remains in forc. The applicable maxim, which of which every legislative
registered voters, t entum of the registered
and which is at least three pef
goes back to the ancient day's of the Roman jurists represented by under this section shall be
still observed is "aequitas nunquam contravenit legis."22 Equitynever No amendment
therein. of this
voters within five years following
the ratification
acts in contravention of the law. authorized thereafter.
Constitution n o r oftener
than o n c e every five years
of
for the implementation
The Congress shall provide
B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL
the exercise of this right."
INTERPRETATION Court held that Rep. Act
No. 6735 "is
The majority of the essential terms and condi-
or wanting in
Statute must be capable of interpretation, otherwige incomplete, inadequate, amendments to the Constitution is
4.03. tions insofar as initiative
on
basis
No. 6735 cannot be used a s
inoperative. concerned." It ruled that Rep. Act amendments to the
the people to propose
A statute must be capable of construction or interpretation. to implement the right of conclusion the fol-
r e a s o n s for its
the intent Constitution. It enumerated a s
The court must use every authorized means to ascertain
of the statute and give it an intelligible meaning. The courtmay lowing:
so will enabe the proponent, Sec. 2 of the
everrdepart from the language of the statute if do
to
Contrary to the assertion of
1.
it to effectuate legislative intent and purpose. However,
after such of the people under a system of
law, which provides that the "power
effort is found impossible to solve the doubt and dispel the obscu
rity of a if no judicial certainty can be had as to its mean
statute,
Yulo, 61 Phil. 173 (1935).
3Regalado v.
Demafiles v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 28396, Dec. 29, 1967, 21

SCRA 1462.
28 SCRA 80 Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and Anusements Board, 107 Phil. 151
Baking v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. 30364, July 28, 1968,
National Marketing Corp. v. Tecson, G.R. No. 29131, Aug. 27, 1969, 29 SCRA 70 (1960).
2Phil. National Bank v. Bitulok Sawmill, Inc., 23 SCRA 1366, 1377 (1968) 80 SCAD 782, 270 SCRA 106 (1997).
Aguila v. Court of First Instance of Batangas, 160 SCRA 352 (1988).

130 131
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FROM,
LANGUAGE
DEPARTURE
ADHERENCE TO, OR
OF STATUTE
Interpretatiorn
from Literal
initiative and referendum to B. Departure proces8
the electoral
reject, in whole or in part, thedirectly propose, enact, approve
as
purpose" arnd "plebiscite or re-
called for the C o n s t i t u t i o n is
approved
Constitution,laws, ordinances
resolutions passed by any legislative by which
an
i n i t i a t i v e on the
body upon
the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, compliance wi
the people." for
jected by what the petition
recognized and
guaranteed" does not suggest an initiative on amendments The law in
Section 5(b)
states
C.
should contain.
Constitution because it is silent as to amendments to th initiative on the Constitution
on the date of
tion and the word "Constitution" is neither Constitu an
9(b) of the Act fixes the

effectivity
that the
to said section. germane nor
relevant d. Section
Constitution,
which states
to the approved by
a
amendment
the the C o n s t i t u t i o n
2.While Sec. 3 includes in the three in the initiative on shall become effec-
proposition
systems of initiative votes cast in the
plebiscite
amendments to the Constitution," the law, unlike on the majority of the
tives on statutes and local legislation, did not initia tive as to the day
of the plebiscite."
provide for the con 6735 provides
sufficient
standards,
tents ofa petition for initiative on the Constitution. e. Republic Act No. c a n validly
issue
Commission o n Elections
upon
which the the iaw, found
3. While the Act provides sub-titles for national laws and as it did, to
implement
rules and regulations,
local legislation, it did not provide sub-titles for initiative on the itself and in the Constitution.
in the law
Constituliun. strict and
of the Court adopted
a
Apparently, the majority is not in

4. While the Act empowered the Commission on Elections liberal of the law, which
construction
literal rather than a
ut res magis valeat
to issue rules and regulations, which it did to implement the initia interpretatio fienda est
keeping with the maxim, as will give the thing
efficacy is
tives on the Constitution, the delegation of authority is invalid quam pereat
or that interpretation
as the rule that
provisions on initiative
because the Act is incomplete and it did not fix a sufficient stand to be adopted, a s well
their to facili-
to effectuate purposes,
ard. should be liberally construed granted
exercise by voters of the rights
tate and not to hamper the
The other members of the Court. dissented. The dissenting
thereby.27
opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno makes the following arguments
the right.
to sustain that Rep. Act No. 6735 sufficiently implements spirit is within the law.
thru in- 4.04. What is within the
of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution
as to be incapable
tiative: Language is rarely so free from ambiguity
more than one sense.
What the legislature had
thati Rep.' Act No of being used in
The majority opinion concedes reflected in the lan
actually in mind is not sometimes accurately
a.
not only initiatives to enact star
6735 was intended to cover statute, and its literal interpretation may reader it
also initiatives to amend tne guage of a
but
utes and local legislation meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or.contradiction.2" When
intent is shown not only by ne
Constitution. Such legislative this happens and following the rule that the intent or spirit of the
itself but also by the deliberations ontne
provisions of the Act
Act No. 6735. The intent
of the la law is the law itseif, resort is had to the principle that the spirit of
bill that became Rep. must be enforced even11 the law controls its letter. The principle states that a thing which is
conceded by all, i t within the intention of the statute is as much within the statute as
being clear and letter of the law andth
consistent with the strict if it were within the letter, and a thing which is within the letter of
may not be .where,a.Jaw
the mountain." Moreover, the statute is not within the statute unless it be within the inten-
ruling is a s old as interpretation, that inierpre
than one
Susceptible of m o r e the manifest inten
tend to effectuate
tion which will most
the legislature.wil be adopted." the 27Vide dissenting opinions of Justices Francisco and Panganiban in said case.
6735 defines "initiative as Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, G.R. No. 25326, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 105; Casela v.
b. Republic Act No. to the Cons Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 26754, Oct. 16, 1970, 35 SCRA 279.
amendments
power of the people to propose
through an elec
legislations
tion o r to propose and enact
133
LANGUAGE
DEPARTTURE FROM,
ADHERENCE TO, OR
OF STATUTE
on of the lawmaker, and the statute should be s0 Construes from Literal Interpretation
B Departure
effectuate its intent or purpose, advance the remedy, and construed a s to be in ac:ord
the mischief contemplated by the framers." The maxim be so
exna A law should accordingly the law.i
not repugnant to, the spirit of
of the prineiple is ratio legis, or interpretation accordingi with, and statute
spirit or reason of the law. ing to the ance

the spirit and
consider
reason of a
contradiction,
The court may
lead to absurdity,
literal meaning would lawmakers.
There
The principle has been variousiy formulated: "As a where a
clear purpose of
the
the
never
would defeat
rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a ger or were
injustice consequences
that u n d e s i r a b l e of which a
hin
prevails over the letter thereotf, and what is withir the spiristatuta is a valid presurnption
intended by a legislative
m e a s u r e , and
a
which will
construction
avoid-all-cbjec-
statute is within the statute although it is not within the susceptibie is favored, con-
statute is fairly evil and injurious
thereof, while that which is within the letter but not within wrongful,
tionable,mischievous, indefensible,
spirit of the statute is not within the statute."0 The spirit,rate 8equences.o
than the letter, of a statute determines the construction therene

and the court looks less to its words and more.to.its.context, Literal import must yield to intent.
4.05. its
ject matter, consequence and effect.3 A statute must be read a statute must yield o
meaning of a
The literal import

or
cording to its spirit and intent, and where legislative intent appar intention of the legislature
purpose or spirit. The
ently conflicts with the letter of the law, the former prevails over apparent intent, fundamental inquiry in judicial
and its purpose or object, being the of particular
lan-
the latter3 the literal interpretation
construction, control of m o r e than
o n e mean-
and a language capable

It has been held that "fa statute
is valid, it is to-have efect guage of a statute,
taken in such s e n s e as to harmonize with the
intention
according to the purpose and intent of the lawmakers. The intent is ing is to be enactment.* Verba
the purpose of the
the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of and object and effectuate to be more
contra,debent inservire, or words ought

the words. Accord-
non e
construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent. The in- intentioni,
not the intent to
subservient to the intent and
tention of the legislature in enacting a law is ihe law itself, and satisfactorily the compli-
difficult to harmonize
must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consist ingly, where it is provisions of a statute,
it is the
ent with the strict letter of a statute when it leads away from the cated and sometimes perplexing theories that which
between conflicting
duty of the court to choose
true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusion incon best accords with the spîrit
or intent of the taw
sistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit in.ihe
and always be -considered
equity should
which gives life to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes, Conscience be hedged in by the
courts are nut to
construction of a statuts. The
the proper course is to start and follow the true.intent of the legis of the statut ; the spirit and
lature and to adopt that sense which hermonizer-best literal meaning of the language
with the intendment thereof must prevail
over its letter. This rule of con-
context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent polic where adherence to the letter
of
struction is especially applicable
and object of the legislature."33
Office of
627 (1988); Phil. National Hank v.
"U.S y. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909); Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 10 34Galuba v. Laureta, 157 SCRA
SCAD 4, 262 SCRA 6 (1996).
(1957); Villanueva v. City of Iloilo, G.R. No. 26521, Dec. 28, 1968, 26 SCRA 0 the President, 67
Melchur v. Commission on Audit,
200 SCRA 704 (1991).
Matabuena v. Cervantes, G.R. No. 28771, March 31, 1971, 38 SCRA 284. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909;
Garcia v. Ambler, 4 Phil. 81 (1904);
"U.S. v.
Tañada w Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1086 (1957), citing 82 C.J.S. 613
McMicking v. Lichauco, 27 Phil. 396 (1914); Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, G.R. No. 25326,
Manila Race Horse Trainers Assn., Inc. v. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60 (130 105.
Go Chi v. Go Cho, 96 Phil. 622 (1955). May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 485 (1909); Macondray Transportation
Workers
3Tañada 3Ty Sue v. Hord, 12 Phil. Ledesma v. Pictain, 79
v.Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957); Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, G.R. No. 200 Union v. Manila Yellow Taxi Cab Co., 80 Phil. 833 (1948);
May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 105; Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315 (1912)
Phil. 95 (1947).
Torres Limjap, 66 Phil. 141, 145, 146 (1931), quoting II Sutherland, Sta
v.
ory Construction, pp. 693-695.
134 135
LANGUAGE
DEPARTURE FROM,
ADHERENCE TO, OR
OF STATUTE
Iiteral Interpretation
Dopurture from
the-sistute would resultin absurdity.and injustice," Thus, w) that gives to the
and 1 e
to its exact should be rejected
the interpretation of a statute according be followed."
A construction
does not accomplish
the
or contravene thoa statute a meaning that

import would lead to mischievous results used in a defeat
language and that tends to
w a s enacted,
would be construed accordinp a for which the statute
purpose of the legislature, it purpose
to be attained by the enactment."
sought
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter oe. the ends which
are
law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within a the letter ofa statute when to do so
Courts should not follow woudother
or
literal mneaning of its terms, so long as they come within its an the true intent ofthe.legislature
3Mould depart from of the act.
or intent.39
spirit wise yield
- c o n c l u s i o n s inconsistent
with the purpose.
which, for pur
active instrument of government
Legislation is a n have ends to achieve, and
that laws
interpretation, m e a n s out such
poses of not to defeat but to carry
4.06. Limitation of rule. they should be construed a s
so that
two statutory interpretations,
The principle that what is within the spirit of-a-statuta. ends and purposes. As between
is s e r v e s the purpose of the law should prevail."
within the statute itself although it is not within its letter appli which better
determi-
looms high in the
only whea here is anmbiguity in the language employed in the law. The r e a s o n why legislative purpose of a statute
is
and in the construction
Where the law is clear and free from ambiguity, the letter of the nation of legislative intent in the light of
statutes must be construed
law is not to be disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit, explained in a c a s e : "All thus:
has been phrased differently,
their purpose. The s a m e thought determining mean-
dominant faetor-in
The purpose of Congress isa inert
Construction to accomplish purpose. legislative words a r e not
4.07. ing. For, to paraphrase Frankfurter, at which they are
but derive vitality from the
obvious purposes
The key to open the door to what the legislatureintended for
aimed. The s a m e jurist likewise
had occasion to state: Regard
it is
which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is its pur. construction of the legislation if
its purp08es should infuse the and not merely
pose or the reuson whieh induced it to enact the statute. If the to be treated a s a working
instrument of government
statute needs construction, the most dominant in that process is
as a collection of English
words. In the sixth annual Benjamin
the purpose ofthe act.Statutes should be construed in the light of Natham Cardozo lecture delivered him, entitled "Some Reflec-
by
the theme further:
theobject to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed," tions on the Reading of Statutes,' he developed
and they should be given such construction as will advance the consideration is that legislation is more than c o m -
The generating
object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended" It is an active instrument of government which, for pur-
position.
that laws have ends to be achieved.
Where a provision or section of a statute admits of more than one poses of interpretation, means
are flexible.' Again
construction, that construction which gives effect to the evident It is in this connection that Holmes said 'words
loose thinking or
purpose sought to be attained by the enactment of the statute must it was Holmes, the last judge to give no quarter to
who said that 'the general purpose is a more im-
vague yearning,
which grammar o r formal
portant aid to the meaning than any rule
*Casela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 26764, Oct. 16, 1970, 35 SCRA 279,
282; Co v. Electoral Tribunal of House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692 (1991,
also BE T
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, G.R. No. 25326, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 105. Sanciangco v.Rono, 137 SCRA 671 (1985).
"Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court Muñoz & Co. v. Hord, 12 Phil. 624 (1909); Ty Sue v. Hord, 12 Phil. 485
of 'Tax Appeals, 100 Phil, 850 (1951).
Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957). (1909); Sarcos v. Castillo, G.R. No. 29755, Jan. 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 853; Republic
"De Josus v. City of Manils, 29 Phil.
73.(1914); Conmissioner of Flour Mills, Inc. 'v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 28463, May 31, 1971, 39
Hevenue v. Pilipinas Compania de Beguros, 107 Phil. 1056 (1960); Garcia v. Intr sCRA 269 (1971 Pouple v. Gatchalian, 104 Phil. 664 (1958) Kapatiran ng mga
4 Phil. 81
(1904); McMicking v. Lichauco, 27 Phil. 386 (1914). Amo Maglilingkod Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371 (1988); De Villa
sa
v.
WN Pictures, Inc. v. Commission on Election, 208 SCRA 420 (1992).

Phil. Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725
(1961); Peop
Purisima, G.R. No. 52050, Nov. 20,
1978, 86 SCRA 542. (1978); Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 59 SCAD 606, 242 SCRA 211 (1995).
Internal. Revenue v.
Filipinas Commissione "Salenillas v. Court of Appeuls, 169 SCRA 829 (1989).
Rivera v. Campbell, 34Compania
de Seguros, 107 Phil: 1055
Phil. 348 (1916).
(1960).
LANGUAGE
137
136 ADIIERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM,
OF STATUTE
E. Departure from ILiteral Interpretation
Holmes who chided courts who ap-
logic may lay down.'And it was
words of law wh.
or being while one may be employed
in a noncontrol position
tool to
apt to err by sticking
too closely to the
beyond them."48
where thoM that
parently is harmless he may later turn
out to be a
mere
that the
is imperative
words import a policy
that goes
further the evil designs of the employer. It attempt at
off any
Court ruled that "It is axiomaiic ihat in a m a n n e r that would stave
In another case, the law be interpreted
reasonable on, not one-
interpretation circumvention of the legislative purpose."
laws should be given a method of
which they were passed. This the issue refers to the
defeats the very purpose for In Bustamante v. NLRC dis-
the construction of statute amount of backwages, to
which an illegally
has in many cases involving computing the actual reinstatement.
interpreting a statute as to defeat would be entitled until his
cautioned against narrowly missed employee (1) to be
deducted
purpose of the legislator and'stressed that it is of the sence then three methods of computation:
There were elsewhere during
statutes so as to avoid such a deplora amount of backwages is the earnings
judiciul duty to construe from the is fixed
amount of backwages
result (of injustice or absurdity) and that therefore 'a-literal
of illegal dismissal;12the
inter theperiod or qualifications but
limited to not more than
pretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust-orlead to absu without deductions deductions from
the
full backwages or without
r e s u l t s , "49
ujutuMui three years; and (8) his actual rein-
was withheld until
time the
laborer's compensation effect, Art.
au Code took
November 1, 1974, the Labor
On
statement.
4.08 llustration of rule. 279 of which
reads:
em-
In cases of regular
"Art. 279. Security of tenure.
-
To illustrate the rule, a few cases may be cited. In King services of an

shall not terminate the
Hernandez,5" the issue raised is whether a Chinese may be em ployment, the employer when authorized by this
cause or
ployed in a noncontrol position in a retail establishment, à wholly employee except for a just dismissed from work
shall
nationalized business under Republic Act No. 1180, otherwise known Title. An employee who is unjustly seniority rights
reinstatement without loss. of
as the Retail Trade Law. The answer to the issue hinges on the beentitled to computod fivm the time
his compensa-
interpretation of Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act No. 108 (Anti and to his backwages reinstate-
from bim up sa.the timme of his
tion wa_ withheld
Dummy Law) prohibiting an alien from intervening "in the man- ment.".
agement, operation, administration or control thereof (busines the
ba.kwages prior to
wholly or partly nationalized) wkether as an officer, employee or The method of computation of above. Under
is as stated in No. 1
laborer therein x x x." It is contended that this provision does not above provision
enactment of the authorized by the Court
prohibit employment of aliens in noncontrol positions because they the computation
the abovequoted provision, has fixed the
above, even when Art. 279
do not, as such, intervene in the management, operation, adminis is as stated in No. 2 was withheld
tration or control of the retail establishment. In rejecting this arg amount of backwages from
the time his compensatjon
reinstatement. Then came Republic
his
ment, the court ruled that "when tne law says that you cannot from him up to the time of 1989 and which
employ an alien in any position pertaining to the management, which took effect on March 21,
Act No.6715, Labor Code, as follows:
operation, administration and control whether as an officer, em amended Art, 279 of the
who is
ployee, or laborer therein, it only means one thing: the employment ienure. (-An employee
"Art. 279. Security of entitled to reinstate-
of a person who is not a
Filipino citizen even in a minor or clerica from work shall be
unjustly dismissed other privileges and
or
noncontrol or
position is prohibitecd The reason is obvious: to plug ment without loss of seniority rights and
inelusive of allowances,
and to his other
any loophole close any avenue that an unecrupulous alien may
resort to flout the law or defeat its
to his ful} backwages
equivalent computed from the time
purpose, for no one can deny benefitsor their monetary
Sarcos 6Tbid., at p. 740.

v.
Castillo, G.R. No. 29755, Jan. 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 853, 876 SCAD 652, 265
SCRA 61 (1996).
Soriano v. Offshore 861. a0)
O114 Phil. 730 (1962).Shipping Manning Corp., 177 SCRA 613, 519(
and
STATUTORY CÓNSTRUCTION ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE 139
138 OF STATUTE
B. Departure from Literal Interpretation
from the
from him up to the tima ne Humption any large cattle except upon permit secured
his compensation4e withheld of his treasurer, shall be.punished x x." Thexcourt said that
2ctual reinstatement."
municipat
of two constructions:
the language of these sections fairly admits
Court to reconsider the phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be
The above amendment prompted the
It held:
sider earlier one, whereby
as limiting and restricting both the words "slaughtered' and
rulings on the computation of backwages. taken
"killed for food," which is claimed to be the correct interpretatIOn,
The Court deems it appropriate, however, to reconsider i
and the other, whereby the phrase "at the municipal slaughter
such earlier ruling on the computation of backwages as eni house" may be taken as limiting and restricting merely
the words
ciated in said Pines City Educational Center case, by nw of large
"killed for food" and "killing for food," so that the slaughter
holding that conformably with the
evident legislative intent cattle outside of the slaughterhouse without the required pernit
No. 6715, above-quoted, backwapes comes within the prohibition.
The court ruled that considering the
as expressed in Rep. Act
and object or
to be awarded to an illegally
dismíssed employee, should not whole act and keeping in mind the manifest purpose
enactment- to protect large cattle against theft
and to make
as a general rule, be diminished or reduced by the earninea the
return of such cattle to their owners,
when lost,
derived by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal dis easy recovery and
- t h e latter construction should be adopted.
It
is that the em. stolen
missal. The underlying reason for this ruling strayed or
the firet interpretation would abort he
the legality (illegality) of his dismissal,| concluded that to adopt
ployee, while litigating record of brands and marks of
identifi-
must still earn a living to support himself and
family, while provisions for registry and of such cattle
as part of the cation of large cattle, since thieves in possession
fuil backwages have to be paid by the employer evade the provisions of the law by slaughtering
them outside
dismissing his could
price or penalty.he has-to pay for. illegally the municipal slaughterhouse and thus enjoy
the fruits of their
The clear legislative intent of the amendment in construction should be avoided which
would bring
employee. wrongdoing. Such
Rep. Act No. 6715 is to give morethe benefits to workers than such result and defeat the object of the legislature sought to be
was previously given

them under Mercury Drug rule or attained by the enactment of the law
the 'deduction of earnings
elsewheré' rule. Thus, closer ad
a
the Court of
behind Rep. Act No., 6716 tt In another case,6 the issue raised-is whether
herence to the legislative policy court in the capital ofa province
points to full backwages as meaning exactly that, i.e., with lirat Instance and a municipal over the crime of libel.
Article 360 of
the earnings derived elsewhere have çoncurrent jurisdiction
o u t deducting from backwages
TK
Courts of First
the Revised Penal Code confers jurisdiction upon
concerned. employee during the period of his illega where libel was first published or
r v by the the provision calling forfu Instance of the province or city
dismiseal. In other words, over the crime of libel,
where the offended parties actually reside,
illegaliy.dismissed employeesis-clear,pleinand inconvenience or even harassment to
backwages' to must be applied without
the purpose being to prevent
and, therefore, avoid impairment of the constitu-
free fromambiguity those accused of libel so as to
Index animi sermo est. speech and press. On the
other hand, the
attemptedor etrained interpretation. tional right to freedom of
in capitals of provinces con-
involved is whether theslaug" courts
Judiciary Act grants municipal where the penalty is not more than
In U.S. v. Toribio,« the question with0u offenses
of the municipal slaughterhouse current jurisdiction in
ter of large eattle outside P6,000.00 o r both, of which
treasurer is prohibited under Seetio prision correccional o r fine not exceeding
permit by the municipal cattle shau said that to construe Article
a
1147 which provide that "no large ibel is one of such offenses. The court
30 and 33 of Act No. the Judiciary Act to m e a n that
at the municipal slauighterhou 360 of the Revised Penal Code and
be slaughtered or killed for food concerned jurisdiction in libel
cases is to
from the municipal treasurer" and municipal courts have court explained that it is fun-
except upon permit secured human defeat the purpose of the law. The
or causing to be slaughtered for
person8laughtering
SCRA 520.
Bocobo-w.-Eatanistao, G.R. No.
30458, Aug. 31, 1978, 72
94
Construction, 1990 2nd ed
bid, Pp. 70-71, citing Agpalo, Statutory 268 SCRA 497 (15
Mode Garments, Inc. v. NLRC, 79 SCAD 786,
see
also Ala
6415 Phil. 85 (1910).
140 STATUTORY ÇONSTRUCTION ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE
OF STATUTE 141
B. Departure from Literal Interpretation
damental that once the purpose law a reasonable or liberal construction which will best
or
policy
statute
ascertained or determined, the courts should give effecthas be.
of the give the
to itbeen
effectuate its purpo8e,69
giving the statute a construction that best accords

pose of the law, and rejecting such
with the Duby Two apparently conflicting provisions should be so construed
the purpose ofthe law. Thus, Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 6982
to defeat its interpretation that would tend to
realize
purpose and object. A decent respect for the policy od

a8
the legislature must save the court from imputing

provides:
to it a selk Section 12. Benefits under Republie Aet No- 809 and
defeating, if not
disingenuous purpose.
pD. No. 621, as amended. - All liens and other forms of
The Patent. Law grants the nroduction sharing in favor of the workers in the sugar industry
patentee ,the,exclusive right to
make, use and sell his patented machine, article or nder Republic Act No. 809 and Presidential Decree No. 621,
product, and
constitutes the making, using or selling by any person,
without as amended, are hereby substituted by the benefits under this
authorization from the patentee as intringement Act: Provided, That cases arising from such laws pending
in
entitling him to
damages and injunction. To achieve this purpose, the courts have the courts or administrative bodies at the time of the effectivity
evolved the doctrine of equivalents
pursuant to which infringement of this Act shall not be affected thereby,"
occurs when a device appropriates a prior
invention by incorporat while Sec. 14
thereof states:
ing its innovative coneept and, albeit with some modification and
Section 14. Non-Diminution.of Banefits. - The provi
change, performs substantially the same function in substantially
in this Act
the same way to achieve substantially the same result. The reason sions of Section 12 hereof notwithstanding, nothing
for the doctrine is that to pernit the imitation of a patented inyen- shall be construed to reduce any benefit, interest, right or
tion which does not copy any literal detail would be to convert the enjoyed by the workers at the time of the enact
participation
protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing. Such ment of this Act, and no amount recovered by any beneficiary
imitation would leave room for the unscrupulous copyist to make under this Act shall be subject to any forn. of taxation."
unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the Court ruled that
patent which, though adding nothing, would be enough to make Construing the above provisions together, the
the word "substituted" in Sec. 12 cannot be interpreted literally,
as
the copied matter outside the claim, which would thereby defeat the workers' benefits, contrary
it will reduce instaad of increasing
the purpose of the law.57 that all benefits under R.A. No.
to the purpose of the law. It ruled under R.A. No. 809 and
The purpose of Rep. Act No, 6770 is to give the Ombudsman 6982 shall be in addition to the benefits
to benefit the sugar workers
such powers as he may need to perform efficiently the task assigned PD. No. 621 because the law intended
that which better
to him by the Constitution. Such being the case, said statute should and as between two statutory interpretations,
be given such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes
and rves the purpose of the law should prevail.o
of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper
objectives
the work of the Ombudsman should. be-avoided. .08,When reason of Law ceases, law itselí ceases.
ends to be to enact a law is the
Laws are not just mero compositions, but. have which induced the legislature
achieved and that the general purpose is a more important aid ne reagon the-reason of the. law plays
a
the meaning of a law than any rule which grammar may lay down o the law. For this reason, its cessation or
nul-
It is the duty of the courts to look to the object to be accomplished,
: e role in its canetructian. Consequently,
is a fundamental principle
a o n renders the law inoperative. It
to beand shoula
subserved,
the evils to be remedied, or the purpose
and Sons, Inc., 108 SCAD
Revenue v. S.C. Johnson
,309 S c E 1 e r of Internal 886,
aSee Sec. 3.14, infra. 114 8CAD
8Gudines v. Court of Appeals, 44 SCAD 722, 226 SCRA
338 (1993).
60Planters Asso Southern Negros,
Inc. v.Ponferrada,
17 AS8ociation of
Buenaseda v. Flavier, 44 SCAD 1026, 226 SCRA 645 (1993). SCRA 4463 (1999).
SCRA
143
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ADHERENCE TO, OROF
DEPARTURE
STATUTE
FROM, LANGUAGE
142
B:Departure from Literal Interpretation
In answering the issiue in the affirmative,

the Court
that when the reason of the law caa artial law.
of statutory construction principle of ceasante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa
d applying thetermination
is expressed in the max of
the law itself ceases. This principle 1axim, ruled
that with the of martial law and the dissolution
ratione cessat et
legis, ipsa Another maxim expra
lex. reg. lex, created thereunder, the reason for the existence
cessante
est aninma or the reason of the a itarv tribunals decree itself ceased
sive of the principle is ratio legis PD. No. 39 ceased automatically and the
that the reason of the law
is its soul. It is a consecrated legal axiom This
lifeless law is a dead !aw.s*
Thereason of a statute may cease in a given situation,
is the life of the law. A of the statute sought to be
achieved
when the purpose
of reason, In such happen to be repressed is
A statute may render a prior law devoid
mav
a
or the mischief sought
the prior law, even though hy it is accomplished, of the statute itself. The
case, the later law will operate
to repeal prevented, by
an act or event independent
effect, finds
the two laws contain no conflicting proyisions. Thus, where a later such a case, though remaining
in force and
prior statute on the statute, in the law bans aliens
law has a purpose in conflict with that of a application
in the given
situation. Thus,
has lost all meaning and functiori and has no
and owning lands, the purpose
being to preserve
s a m e subject, the latter
from acquiring A sale of land
ceased to exist. Forinstance, the question raised in a case is nation's lands for future generations
of Filipinos.
be
without the the no longer
whether tenant who prereaped or prethreshed palay
a an alien, in
vio!ation of said law, may
the Agricultural Tenancy Act in favor of citizen by naturaliza
of the landlord in violation of the alien becomes a Filipino
consent
The Agricultural Tenaney questioned after thwarted but achieved
be held criminally liable therefor. the purpose of the law would not be
may
of palay on a date tion, for the land, the vendee
having
Act punishes the prereaping or prethreshing lawful the acquisition of
consent of the by making the law banning the acquisition
other than that previously set without the mutual become a Filipino;
and accordingly, mischief sought
is predicated on a share And where the
landlord and the tenant, which prohibition of land by aliens no longer applies."
been removed in given
a
the tenant and the landlord. Subse- statute has already
tenancy relationship between
to be remedied by
a situation."
was enacted, abolish such
quently, the Agricultural Land Reform Code statute may no longer apply in
tenancy. The situation, the
ing share tenancy and replacing it with leaseholdthe
court ruled that since under the leasehold system prohibition omission
against prereaping or prethreshing has no more raison d'etre be

4.10. Supplying legislative of a statute shows
that
cause the lessee is obligated to pay a fixed
rental as prescribed in literal import of the language statute in
could no Where a
that should have
been in the
the Code, the tenant who prereaped or prethreshed palay words have been omitted a s c e r t a i n a b l e from
be prosecutedfor such offense after the enactment of said intent and spirit, clearly
longer order to carry out its to make the statute
the omission
Code.4 the court may supply the
the context, or to prevent
intent of the legislature
In Comendador u De Villa, one ofthe iesues raised is whether conform to the obvious
rule is a corollary
of the principle
absurd.* This
P.D. No. 39, which withdrew the right to peremptorily challenge much a part of it
as
act from being spirit of the law is as
members of a military tribunal, had been rendered inoperative by that what is within the
which a n apparent
omission in an
Proclamation Na. 2045 proclaiming the termination of a state o pursuant to used may be
remedied
What is written literal of the language cannot,
nterpretalion purely and intent."
The court
to its avowed objective

Dy adhering
sPeople v. Almuete, G.R. No. 26661, Feb. 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 410; Lenara
De Guzman, G.R. No. 20840, Sept. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 349; Comendador v. De Yu v. Cuenco, G.R.
No. 33048,
Barbubia
200 SCRA 80 (1991). 447 (1956);
v. Giap, 96 Phil.
3Justice Perfecto concurring, Gomez v. Government Insurance Board, 78 ru VAquez SCRA 640.
April 16, 1982, 113 SCRA 647. July 30, 1982, 116
221, 224 (1947), quoting Olland, The Elements of Jurisprudence as cited in Boco
G.R. No.
30466,
45 ALR 521
(1926);
Moruzzi v. Fed.
Cult of Legalism. Velasco v. Blas, 243 P 93,
Bridge Co., ALR 407 (1938).
Ramirez v.Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 23687, June 10, 1967, 71 SCRA 231 Barrett v. Union 116 88 SChA 284.
Life & Casualty Co.. 76
P2d 320, March 31, 1971,
Poople v. Almuete, G.R. No. 26551, Feb. 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 410. cR 28771,
G.R. No.
200 SCRA 80 (1991). atabuena v. Cervantes,
ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE 145
OF STATUTE
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION B. Departure from Iiteral Interpretation
144
the court changed the phrase "collecior of
Court of Tax Appeals," mis-
to "commissioner of customs" to correct an obvious
would have supni. customs"
however, supply what it thinks the legislature in the law. The law involved is Republic Act No. 1125, creating
had its attention been called to the omission, as that would h take
Tax Appeals, which provides in Section 7 thereof that
the Court of
judicial legislation.70 Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate
the of
to review by appeal *decisions of the commissioner
jurisdiction that persons
x x." However, Section 11 of eaid law states
4.11. Correcting clerical errors. customs x
x x collector of
"adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the x
The court, in order to carry out the obvious intent of the * may file an appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals
customs x x
legislature, may correct clerical errors, mistakes or misprints which thirty days after receipt of such decision or ruling." It further
within
if uncorrected, would render the statute meaningles8, empty or from
provides that "no appeal taken to the Court shall Appeals the
of Tax
nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended operation, so long the decision of the x x x collector of custorns suspend
as the meaning intended is apparent on the face ofthe whole enact payment xx x." The court noted
that "there is really a discrepancy
ment and no specific provision is ab1ogated." 1o correct the erroror between Sections 7 and 11, for while Section 7 grants the Court of
mistake is to pravent the nullification of the statute and give it a decisions of the Commnissioner of
Tax Appeals jurisdiction to review
meaning and purpose. For it is the duty of the court to give a statute Section 11 refers to the decision of the collector of customs
Customs,
a sensible construction, one that will effectuate legislative intent that may be appealed to the tax court. Taken literally, Section 7
and avoid injustice or absurdity.73 It is its duty "to arrive at the would be empty, meaningless and unenforceable because, while it
legislative intent" and "in doing so, it should not adopt an arbitrary the Court of Tax Appeals jurisdiction to review decisions of
grants
rule under which it must be held without variance or shadow of no person affected
the commissioner of customs, under Section 11,
turning that the legislature intended to make a typographical error, by the commissioner of customs
may appeal to the tax court. The
the result of which would be to make nonsense of the act,and hot to court thus' concluded that there is a clerical error in mentioning
meant to
carry out the legislative scheme, but to destroy it."4 "collector" of customs in Section 11. "t should, as it was
under the Customs Code, the
In correcting a clerical error or obvious mistake, the court 1s be 'commissioner' of customs because
over collectors
commissioner of customs has supervision and control
not indulging in a judicial legislation. It is merely. endeavoring to
of customs and the decisions of the latter are reviewable by the
rectify and correcta.dearly clericalarror-in the wording of the law would be destroyed if the
in orderto give.due course and carry out the evident intent of the commissioner of customs, all of which
legislature. The court should and can validly do that, for what 18 literaB meaning and wording in Section 11 are given effect. The
within the intent or spirit of the law is as much a part of the law a3 legislature could not have intended this result." *It is more
Section 11 of the Act, the
if written therein.76 reasonable and logical to hold that in
legislature meant and intended to say, commissioner of customs,
of said Section.
4.12. Illustration of rule. instead of collector of customs in the first paragraph
indulging in judicial
n thus holding, the courts are not exactly to rectify and correct a
The Supreme Court has corrected They are merely endeavoring
obvious errors or mistast egislation.
Clerical error in the wording of a statute, in order to give due
apparent on the face of statutes. In
Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc" ourse and carry out the evident intention of the legislature. This,
The courts should and can validiy do. Under the rules of statutory
0People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 657 (1950); Morales v. the spirit of the law and
Nov. 29, 1968, 26 Subido, G.R. No. 23658 construction, it is not the letter but rather and which matters.
SCRA 150. that is important
ntention of the 1legislature
"Lamp v.
Phipps,
Tax Appeals, 100 Phil.
22 Phil. 456 (1912);
Rufino
Lopez urt of
850 (1967). & Sons, Inc. v. Cou
4State Ex Rel. Griffin v.
Lanp v. Phipps, Greene, 67 P 2d 996, 111 ALR 770
supra. (1937)
Lamons Yardbrough, 55 SE 2d 661, 11 ALR 2d
v.
7100 Phil. 850 (1957).
Lamp Phipps, supra; Rufino
100 Phil. 850
v.
Lopez &
717, 722 (1949).
(1957). Sons, Inc. v. Court of Ttx eals
APP
4 ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE 147
OF STATUTE
BDeparturefrom Iiteral Interpretation
according to the exact
When the nterpretation of the statute not include the Presi
would lead to absurd o r mischie.d phrase "local chief executive," which does
of its words the
iteral mport
us 13 a misnoner and the accurate genernc phrase
resulis. or would c o n t r a v e n e the
clear purpose of the legislat dent, in
the prov1B1on
refer to the
" a i u t h o r i t i e s concerned," as this phrase can
and reason, disregard should be
should be co: trued according to its spirit the governor or the mayor, a s the c a s e may be.
as far a s necessary, the letter of the law. Statutes may be extendo President,
to cover cases not within
the literal meaning of the terms, for th
the legislature in enacti
chat Qualification of rule.
which is cleariy within the intention of 4.13.
the law is a s much within the statute s s
ifit were within the lett correct to reflect the real and apparent
What the courts may
is plain and obvious. Itis.n clearly cierical
Here the e r r o r (clerical and misprint) only those which are
are
rather totarry out and giva may
to correct the act of the legislature, but give obvious mistakes, omissions, and misprints.82 They to
the true intertion of said legislature."77 errors o r correct what they think
is due
to
due course
not, in the guise of construction, circumstances,
shown by a n examination of extraneous
Ina s t a t u t e which provides that the remedy of mandamus oversight a s would be to change
the
o r adequate statute is clear and to correct it
may be availed of i f there is no other plain, speedy where the will be abrogated. To do s o
o r specific provision
remedy i n the ordinary courts of law," the word "courts" is obviously meaning of the law, domain of the legislature;
it is
law intended, which the court the law and invade the
an e r r o r o r misake, for what the is to rewrite
that the phrase in the guise of interpretation.3
should effectuate, is that it should read "course," so judicial legislation
a reference in one
should read "ordinary course of law.""s Where
a typo absurdity.
section of a statute to another by number is manifestly 4.14. Construction to avoid
the statute should correct mean-
graphical error, the courts in construing It is well-settled that courts are not to give a statute
a
its meaning."" A word construe the

the error, to prevent its nulilification and give lead to absurdities. It is their duty to
in a s t a t u t e inadvertently changed by compilers
to a meaningless ing that would to avoid such consequences.5
For Con-
as
in acts undertaken statute in such a way the aw.ss If
word, which change is inadvertently repeated absurd interpretation of
not have intended
to make changes, should be restored by
the courts so as to make gress could m o r e than o n e meaning,
a r e susceptible of
the statutes correspond with the obvious legislative intent.80 the words of a statute construction is a strong argument
of
the absurdity of the result in favor of such sensible interpretation
o n e
In Fariias u. Barba,"i the question raised is who is the ap- against its adoption*"
and
of a s t a t u t e
member Hence, general-terms
pointing power to fill a vacancy ereated by a sanggunian
the
as w avoid such result.87their application a s nat to lead to
ab-
who did not belong to any political party, under the provision of shauld lhe.so limited.in that the legislature
in-
presumed
Local Government Code which reads: "In case the permanent va It will always be
surdities.. would avoid conse-
to language which
cancy is ceused by a sanggunian member who does not belog to its
.tended exceptions
any political party, the local ehief executive shall, upon recommen
dation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person 0
fill the vacancy" The Court ruled that considering Sec. 50 of the 456(1912). Co., Inc.
Code which vests in the President, the governor and the mayor Lamp v. Phipps, 22 Phil,
Largado v. Masaganda,
115 Phil. 519 (1962);
Casco Phil. Chemical
descending order the exercise of an executive power to eppoint Feb. 28, 1963, 8CRA
7 347.
Gimenez, G.R. No. 17931, G . . No. 26406, Oct. 30,
order to fill vacancies in local councils or to suspend local officialb .
& Equipment
Co v. Liagad,
79 Phil. 95
A u t o m o t i v e Parts Ledesma v. Pictain,
Phil. 630 (1903;
30 SCRA 247; In r e Allen,
2 Imperial, 48
969, (1948);, Chartered
Bank v.
Republic, 81
Phil. 244 559 (1936); People
v. De
947 Pritchard v.Director of Lands v. Abaya, 63 Phil:
931 (1921);
Ibid., at p. 855. hi.
a n p v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456 (1912), Guzman, 90 Phil. 132 (195l). Phil. 735
(1958).
Republic, 106 In re Allen, supra.
Amons Dargani v. 48 Phil. 931 (1921)}; of the
Yardbrough, 55 SE2d 651, 11 ALR2d 717 (1949).
v. v. Imperial, supra; Bank
Bank of India Lamp v Phipps,
Dunmels V. Juhnson, 226 SW2d, 16 ALR2d 1401 (1960). Churtered 236 (1933);
v. Revilla,
69 Phil.
170 SCAD 336, 256 SCRA 396 (1996). Peuple (1924).
hl. Islands v. Herridge, 47 Phil. 57
148 ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPANTURE FROM, LANGUACE
OF 8TATUTE
B. Departure from literal Interpretation
statutes may be its provIS1On8
of this character.s Similarly, render compliance with
a.
quences tnded meaning which would

literal meaning of the he terms or a
to cover cases not within the inpossible to perform.
would lead to absurd or i that
their exact and literal import
misch
talis in ambiguis semper fienda a The well-known principles of statutory interpretation
effect
are
to the
vous results.° Interpretatio et be construed in such a way as to give
absurdum. Where there is ambiguit. statutes
must
sensible meaning o
evitetur inconveniens et and ao as to give a
avoid inconvenience and
will absurdity isch
o be intention of the legislature, and thus avoid
nonsensical or
absura
interpretation as
of thestatute
literal lan-
adopted.
thelanguage to the extent unavoidable
from the
as
results, departing Section 2 of Act
No. 3326,
Where a literal adherence to
the language a statute of would guage
of the statute. For instance,
shall begin to
run from
the appropriate word or words in part: "Prescription
produce absurd result unless amended, provides the law, and if the
violation of
has the power to supnlu the commission of the
written or omitted therein, the court.
and
the day of known at the time, from the discovery thereof
omit thewords from a statute in order to prevent an absurd result same be
not
investigation and
punish-
proceedings for its
It is presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to itts institution of judicial shows that two (2)
ele-
A literal reading of this provision of the pre-

ment." of the running
language which would avoid absurd consequences. ments must
coincide for the beginning
of the crime,
the discovery of the commission
Courts test the law by its results. Where a law appeara BCriptive period: firat, and since the latter,
institution of judicial proceedings,
arbitrary when applied in'a partieular case because of its peculiar and second, period, such literal
rule, interrupts prescriptive and
circumstances, the courts are not bound to apply it in slavish under prevailing rise to the absurd result that would begin
reading would give period
obedience to its language.* and no prescriptive
the same o c c u r r e n c e
be interrupted by
for
Courts are not to give a statute a meaning that would lead to The Court held that a "statute providing of
not have begun. statute
would is m o r e than a
absurdities. If the words of a statute are susceptible of more than defined criminal offenses after the
prescription of which the State,
one meaning, the absurdity of the result of one construction is a and constitutes an act of grace by to
repose sovereign power
of time, surrenders its
strongargument against its adoption, and in favor of such sensible lapse of a certain period of crimes is an
prescription
interpretation. The courts test the law by its result. A law should criminal act. A statute on offender." To
prosecute the the State in favor of the
of
not be interpreted
so as not to cause
injustice.There aralaws act of liberality on the part
intent and to avoid
the absurd result,
the
which are generally valid but may seem arbitrary when appliedin effectuate this legislative proceedings for
"institution of judicial
a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances.Courts are Court ruled that the phrase either disregarded as
not bound to apply them in slavish obedience to theirlanguage", and punishment" may be "until."8
its investigation the word
surplusage or should
be deemed preceded by
Courts should construe a statute to effectuate, and not to illustra-
way of
defeat, its provisions. Thus, where a term is defined in a statute, be better appreciated by
The principle may whether o r not the
the court may not construe it to exclude what is, included therein as Villaluz," the issue raised is
tion. In Oliveros u. official following a n
informa-
to restrict its scope.* Neither should they give a word in a statute a order against an elective
suspension Law filed against him, applies
meaning which would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences the Anti-Graft
tion for violation of but also to another term if the
current term of
office
not only to the of the Anti-Graft
reelection and won. Section 13
accused r u n for
sIn re Allen, 2 Phil. 630 (1903).

"Rufina laupon & Honu, Ine. v. Court
of 'Tux Appouls, 100 Plil. 866 (1967). Phil. 727 (1949).
Comuieioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales,
Inc., 205 SCRA 184 (199 Yraztosza v. Republic, 83
U.S. v. Paguirigan, 14 Phil. 450 |1909]. People v. Duque, 212
SCRA 607.
Belo v. PNB, G.R. No. 134330, March
1, 2001. /bid., 'pp. 614-615.
163.
bid. May 30, 1974,
67 SCRA
G.R. No. 34636,
bid.
"Go Ka Toc Sons & Co. v. Rice and Corn Board, 20 SCRA 147 (1967).
161
LANGUAGE
TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM,
150 ADHERENCE
OF STATUTE
from Literal Interpretation
B. Departure does
is: when
The question
under which the official was suspended, provides that
200 pezos. 200
be less than
4. exceeding
Law, if it
tional; light fine nor
or
against whom any criminal prosecution under a
menor
arresto
oflicer punishable by in ten years
public valid
information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revi Aerime It 18 argued that
the crime prescribes of 200
m a x i m u m fine
Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended fron vised Desos
prescribe?
be punished by a
punish-
the çrime may a crime and
because under Article 26,
office. Should he be convieted by final judgment, he shall lose all which i8 correctional under Article
Desos,
c o r r e c t i o n a l penalty
prescribes in ten years could not
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquit "Article 90
able by a this argument, the
court said:
9 would
ted, heshall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and 90. In
rejecting
offenses ag defined by
Article
benefits which he failed to reeeive during suspension, unlese in the intended that light months if they a r e penalized
have two if
meantime administrative proceedings haye been tiled against him
have two
prescriptive per+ods- less than P200, and ten years
a n d / o r a fine of one
The court said that thefstate's argument that the suspension order menor
"difference of only
by arresto m a x i m u m fine of
P200." The nine
was not perforce limited to petitioner's term.of office (1968-197 difference of
penalized by
a
fine would m e a n all the
and should be deemed to attach automatically to his new term the imposable the offense. And
peso in period of
m o n t h s in the prescriptive ascer-
(1972-1975) although not originally. covered nor contemplated and ten
period could not be
years prescriptive alternative
thereby is anchored on the provision of Section 13 of Republic Act is worse, the proper of the
what court decided which
and unless the not properly
do
No. 3019 that the suspended officer shall be entitled t tained until which the court could
should be imposed, be pros-
'reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to penalties then it could n o longer
had prescribed, for have wit-
receive during suspension' in the event of acquittal from the charge. if the offense lawmakers could not
absurd results the
This provision reinforces petitioner's position, that it refers to the ecuted. These offenses a s those pun-
serious
especially since m o r e prescribe, also
currentterm of the suspended officer (and not to a future unknow tingly intended, correctional penalty)
arresto mayor (a
and uncertain new term unless Supplemented by a new suspension ishable by other less grave' offenses, like
five years while
under Article 90, in e v e n shorter
order in the event ofreelection) for if his term shall have expired at defamation and slander, préscribe
in
the time of acquittal, libel and oral
he would obviously be no longer entitled to periods of time, o n e year
and six months,
respectively."102
reinstatement; otherwise, it would lead to the absurd result that a "the penalty of
suspended officer, notwithstanding the fact that his term of office the Court noted that
In People v. Reyes,108 7653 a s the maximum
R.A. No.
has long lapsed and he has been succeeded in office by others, w a s imposed by
rectusionperpetua of shabu involved, in
the offense is less
would also invoke the provision literally and claim the right to
penalty when the quantity the minimum penalty
the s a m e time a s
reinstatement and salaries and benefits upon his acquittal.""00 thai 200 grams and at involved is 200 grams o r m o r e . To
People u. Yu Haito involves theinterpretationbf Article'90'of when the.quantity of shabu

of the law a s written, Section
avoid incongruity in the application
the Revi_ed Penal Code in relation te Articles 9 and 26of the same to provide a penalty
Code. Article 90 provides that crimes "punishable by a correctional 17 of R.A. No. 7669 should be read correctly
correccional to reclusion temporal only when
penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those ranging from prision of the
the quantity involved is less
than 200 grams. It is the duty
punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years; provisions to give effect to the whole
"ibel prescribes in one" year; and light offenses prescribe in two Court to harmonize conflicting 100 Phil. 850
(Rufino Lope and Sons u. Court of Appeals,
months."Article 9 defines light offenses as those "for the commis i" law Court has the duty to give a statute its
sion of which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 1957]). Furthermore, this
intention of the legislature.
to effectuate the
200 pesos or both is
provided." Fine, on the other hand, is classineu logical construction as
provisions to give effect to
conflicting
under Article 26 into afflictive, correctional, and light; and a 1n The Court should harmonize avoid an absurd conclusion with regard to
not exceeding 6,000 the whole law. This is to
pesos but not less than 200 pesos is corre 22 Phil. 456 [1912]).
the meaning of the statute (Lamp v. Phipps,
1wIbid. at p. 173.
10199 Phil. 725 (1956). bid. at pp. 727-728.
5 5 SCAD 163, 236 SCRA 264 (1994).
152 ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE 153

OF STATUTE
B. Departure from Literal
Interpretation
x XX ous consequences. The presumption is that the legislature, in en-
be imposed on appen
determine the penalty to acting a law, did not intend to work a hardship or an opprersive
In order to
into three correspondent n
divide the amount of 199
grams result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arring
we
namely, prísion correccional, nrhe
three applicable penalties, prision ane person with a weapon to impose hardship on another.07 Ba est
mayor and
reclusion temporal." "If th shabu seized weighs accipienda interpretato quae vitio caret. That interpretation is to
be impo03ed 18 recusion temn be adopted which is free from evil or injustice.
134 to 199 grams, the penalty to
from 66 to 133 grams, the penalty t
If the shabu seized weighs weight of the shabuinval
A classic example of the applícation of the principle is Anatar
and if the
imposed is prision mayor thi8 case, a person waa charged with homicide.
to be imposed isprision correccional u Aujero.In
below 66 grams, the perialty he and his counsel, the offended party and the
Upon arraignment,
"
one of the contentions raised was tha ublic prosecutor entered into a plea bargaining whereby, with the
In Malonzo v. Zamora, an ordinan a DDroval of the judge, the information was amended to attempted
Caloocan cannot validly pass
the City Counsel of
appropriating a supplemental
budget for the purpOse of expropriat homicide and the accused pleaded guilty thereto. The plea bargain-
of land, without first adopting or updatingi ing agreement
was entered into and approved by the judge pursu-
ing a certain parcel t of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal
house rules of procedure
within, the firat 90 days followine ant to Sec. 2, Rule 116
by Secs, 50 and 52 of the Local Procedure, as amended, which allows an accused, with the consent
election of its members, as required to a lesser offense, regardless
such contention, the Supreme Court of the offended party, to plead guilty
Government Code. In rejecting included in the crime
of whether or not such offense is necessarily
ruled: jurisdiction. Charged
of house rules wouli charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesserlaw for approving the
Moreover, adoption or updating administratively for gross ignorance of the
necessarily entail work beyond
the day of the first regular the accused for the crime
plea bargaining agreement and sentencing that what he did was in
members of the Sangguniang
session. In fact, it took the of attempted homicide, the judge explained
of Caloocan City until July 23, 1998 to complete accordance with Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal
Panlungsod
rules. Does this mean that liable for gross
the task of adopting their house Procedure. In holding the judge administratively
prior thereto,the local council's hands were tied and could not ignorance.of.law, the Court ruled:
act on any other matter? That would certaínly be absurd for it "Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Crimi
would result in a hi¡tus and paralysis in the local legislative nal Procedure, amended, allows the accused in a whetheer
as
criminal
work which could not have been. intended by the law to plead guilty to a lesser offense regardless
of
semper frienda est, ut. evitotuy
case
talis in ambiguis The fact
Interpretato
inconveniens et ab8urdum. Where there is ambiguity, Bych or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged.
accused-Rodrigo Umpad
to of death of the victim for which the
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity 18 cannot by simple logic and plain com-
be adopted."10« was criminally liable, with the plea of guilty to the lesser
mon sense be reconciled
The crime of homicide as de-
4.15. Construction to avoid injustice, offense of attempted homicide.
the Revised Penal Code necessarily
fined in Article 249 of homicide does not. Concededly, hia
Ii is presumed that undesirable consequences wgre never prodúces death; attempted
case before us,
which could either
tended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of wh tus in the law exists in the 116 or to out-
2 of Rule
thestatute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will a avoid lead to a misapprehension of Section
itself recogmized by the
confusion. Such a result
was
ectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and inu right
Faur* yt'ui ita
156 SCAD 542.
163, 236 SCRA, pp. 271-272.
G.R. No. 42050,
Nov. 20, 1978, 86 SCRA
a Malonzo v. Zamora, 109 SCAD 779, 311 SCRA 224 (1999). People v. Purisima, (1995).
Jbid., p. 244, citing Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 108 (1990). 64 SCAD 563, 248 SCRA 61l
ADHERENCE O, OR DEPARTURE PROM, iANGUAGE 155
OF STATUTE
154
B Departure from Iitrral lnterpret tiun
recommended an amend within the spirit of a statute is within the 8atute, and tnis
Administrator when he resul' in
Deputy Court
his Memorandum. has to be
so
i strict adherence to the letter wouid or
ment to the provision in absurdity, injustice and contradiçtion." In the construction
bereft of solutions in into the corse
However, the law is not entirely P.D. No. ) , it becomes relc vant to inquire letler ot
a literal application of a provi the measure if a strict adherence to the
such cases. In instances where quences of
to a result so directly in is followed.
sion of law would lead to injustice
or the paragraph
of logic and everyday common
opposition with the dictates "It is to be presurned that when P.D. No. 9 was promul
sense as to be unconscionable,
the Civil Code admonisheR there was no intention
gated by the President of the Republic
judges to take principles of right
and justice at heart. In case hardship or anoppressive result, a po083ible abuse ot
to work a
of doubt the intent is to promote right and justice. Fiat justicia. or an act of oppres#ion, arming person with
one
a
the heavens fall). authority

ruat coelum. (Let right be done, though another." To illustrate such
weapon to impose hardship on
Stated differently, when a provision of law is silent or, ambigu- trial court's observâ-
result or consequence, the court cited the
ous, judges ought to invoke a
solution rsponsive to the vehe "it is not difficult to believe the nurmurings of de-
tion that or
ment urge of conscience." tained persons brought to court upon a charge of possess1on
The principle is also illustrated in People v. Purisima, 110 which bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9 that more than ever before,
heartless -now have in
involves the interpretation of Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.9. policemen-ofcourse, not all can be
tooi for extortion,
Section 3 provides that it shall be unlawful to carry outside of their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient
with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprison-
residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as fan knife, what
or a pair of
spear, bolo, balisong, barong, kris, or club, except where such articles ment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife
it from."
scissors, which only God knows where
came
are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood
and while being used in connection therewith; and any person found a valid presump-
Moreover, the court continued, "there exists
guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from were never intended by a legis-
tion that undesirable consequences
five to ten years as a military court/tribunal/commission may direct." lative measure, and that a construction
of which a statute is fairly
will avoid all objectionable, mischie-
The issue is
raised whether the act of carrying the weapor in
furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with, subversion, rebellion,
susceptible is favored, which
and injurious consequences." Thus,
vous, indefensible, wrongful, evil,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder, if the contention of the prosecution is correct, then if a person
enforce-
is a-necessary element of the offense. It is claimed that the
clear, happens to be caughtwhile on his way home by the law
literal import of the law shows that the had just
prohibited acts need not be ment ofticers carrying a kitchen knife that said person
related to subversive activities recited in the that the same may be used by one's
cook for
law is essentially malum
preamble and that the bought from a store
such will be liable for
prohibitum penalized for reasons of preparing the meals in one's home, person
policy. In rejecting such argument because it would lead to public punishment withsuch a severe penalty as imprisonment from
five
hardship and unreasonable consequences and in holding injustice,
that the to ten years under the decree." There is also "a situation where a
carrying of the prohibited weapon outside of residence must be Jaw-abiding citizen, a lawyer by profession, after gardening in his8
to subversive or
eriminal activities mentioned in the preamhlerelated
decree, the court said: of the house remembers to return the bolo used by
him to his neighbor
who lives about 30 meters or so away and while erossing the street
the bolo being carried byy
In the construction or interpretation of
a legislative meas meets a policeman. The latter upon seeing for violation of
ure- a
presidential that citizen places him under arrest and books him
is to search for
decree in these cases- the primary rule PD. No. 993). Could the presidential decree have bren conceived to
and determine the
intent and spirit of the law. results?"
Legislative intent is the produce such absurd, unreasonable and
insensible
controlling factor," for "whatever is
bid., pp. 515-516; words in
1G.R. No. 42050, parenthesis
Nov. 20, 1978, 86 SCRA supplied.
bid. at pp. 558-562.
542.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONN 157
156 ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE
OF STATUTE
B. Departure from LAteral Interpretatiun
the issue was whetho. inconvenience ind
In Ursua u. Court of Appeals," because to adopt such construction great
of name other than a person. sses interest wou!d be
isolated use, at one instance, a would result and great public
itblic hardship adjudi-
of a docunment from i government for disputes or suits already
name to secure a copy
amended, tha
agen endangered and sacrificed, rights nulli-
No. 142, have to be again Bettled, accrued or vested
as
constitutes a violation of Com. Act
Alias Law. This law provides that "Except as
a pseudonym Ant cated would
pas8ed on criminals aet aside,
and criminals might
for literary, cinema, television,

radio or other entertainmentsolely fied, sentences
escape punishment
for evidence against them might have
easily
poses and in athletic
events where the use of pseudonym is a a l r e a d y d i s a p p e a r e d , us
shall use any name difo

mally accepted practice, no person
from the one with which he was offic
registered at birth in the right and justice.
was baptized for the f
Construction in favor of
the local civil registry or with which he 4.17.
of lav, it
time or in case of an alien, with whiçh
he was registered in
In of doubt in the interpretation or application
case to
and justice
bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as ma that the lawmaking body intended right
is presumed the inclu-
have been authorized by a competent court." "The Court found tha Commission which recommended
prevail."16 The Code this rule is
the purpose of the Anti-Alias Law is to prevent confusion and frad in the Civil Code says that while
in business transactions, which is absent in the use of a different
sion of the provision that it be embodied in the Code "so
unquestionable, it is necessary when the iaw
name beionging to another person in a single instance, and accord the scales in favor of right and justice
that it may tip the determination of the
or obscure. It will strengthen
ingly held that such isolated use of a different name is not prohib is doubtful
which may apparently be authorized by
ited by the law; otherwise, there would be the undesirable conse court to avoid an injustice doubt in the
would be made interpreting the law."1" Accordingly, any
quence that an act not intended to be penalized some way of
resolved in favor of right and
It added that the law should not be given a literal construction of a statute should be
punishable.
meaning as it would lead to absurdity, contradiction andinjustiae justice.118
and defeat the clear purpose of the law, and as a statute has to be with
The fact ihat silent, obscure or insusficient
a statnta is from
construed to avoid objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrong will not justify the latter
fui, evil and injurious consequences. Lespect. t0 a question betore thecourt
thereon.13 The ancient maxim of the
declining to render judgment alterius
est neminem cum
Roman Law states: Jure naturae aequum
!
which was restated by the
4.16.Censtruetion to avoid danger to public interest: detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem, tortizeramente
non deue enriquecerse
Partidas in these terms:ninguno
It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that where principles when
con daño de otro. Courts invoke these fundamental a solution that
great inconvenience wili result, or great public interest will be obscure in order to arrive at
the statutes are silent or
endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, from a particular of conscience.20 "In balancing
would respond to the vehement urge
construction of a etatute, such construction is to be avoided. Courts to tip the scales which the
conflicting sólutions, that one perceived welfare in its probable
is
should presume that such construction was not intended by the the public
makers of the law,"3 The drafters of the law could not have i court believes will best promote
tended to create such a deplorable or impossible operation as a general rule or prineiple."11

the word "processes" in the
situation. Thus,
proclamation that "all laws regulation"
and processes" of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during 75 Phil. 113 (1945).
the Japanese occupation of the Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Teh,
country "are null and void, an
without legal effect" may not be construed to embrace 1Art. 10, Civil Code.
pru judicial Report of the Code Commission, p.
78.
76 Phil. 756 (1946).
Techankee v Director of Prisons,
Art. 9, Civil Code.
1270 SCAD 123, 256 SCRA 147 Padlla v. De Padilla,
74 Phil. 377 (1943). (1919).
718-719
(1996). Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660,
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan **Rubi v. Provincial Board of
Teh, 76 Phil. 113 (1945).
Pritchurd v. Republic, 81 Phil. 244
(1948).
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE 159
158 OF STATUTE
B Deprture from Literai Interpretation
principle is Salvacion v. Cen economically, and even if not, the questioned law still denies
A good illustration of the above
this case is whether. the doll those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable
tral Bank.12The issue raised in ar
"The intention of the questioned law may be
of a foreign tourist can be at and oppressive.
bank deposit in a Philippine bank
awarded in favor of the lat when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous
tached to satisfy the moral damages gOod
as the
ter's 12-year-old victim. The Philippine bank and the Central
rape effects producing outright injustice and inequality such
law de
Bank refused to honor the writ of attachment, invoking Sec. 8 of case before
us. x * x In fine, the application of the
in part that "for. on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that
Rep. Act No. 6426, as amended, which provides pends No.
the questioned Section 113 of the Central Bank Circular
eign currency deposits shalB be exempt from' attachment
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court, legislative body, govern-
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever" ment agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is appli-
In rejecting the contention of the banks and holding that the pecu
iar circuinstances oblaining make he law not applicable to the cable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially
accused Greg
case of the 12-year-old rape victim and that the banks should com to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like
which
Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the Civil Code
ply with the writ of execution and release the dollar deposit in
provides that "ia-CAse, 0f, doubt.in the interpretation
or
favor of the victim, the Court appied the principles of right and
application of laws,-it-is presumed that.the lawmaking body
justice to prevail over the strict and literal words of the statute: intendedright and justice.to_prevail. Ninguno n o n deue
The Court explained:
enriquecerse tortizeramente con daño de otro. Simply stated,
"Here is a child, a 12-year-old girl, who in her belief that when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those
all Americans are good and in her gesture of kindness by fundamental solutions that would respond to the venement
teaching his alleged niece the Filipino language as requested urge of conscience."]23
by the American, trustingly went with said stranger to his
apartment, and there she was raped by said American tourist
Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was detained 4.18 Surpluszge and superfuity disregarded.
therein for four (4) days. This American tourist was able to Where a yord phrase.or glause ina statute is devoid of mean-
escape from jail and avoid punishment. On the other hand, ing in relation to the çontext or intent of the statute, or where it
suggests a meaning that nullifies the statute or renders without

having received a favorable judgment in the Civil it
the child,
Case for damages in the amount of more than P1,000,000.00, , Bense, tbe word, phrase or clause may be rejected as surplusage
which amount could ailevinte the humiliation, anxiety, and and entirely ignored.12 The statute ahould be construed in accord-
beemirched reputation she had suffered and may continue to with the evident intent of the legislature without regard to
8uffer for a long, long time; and ance
Lhe rejected word, phruse or clause. 1* The rule is settled that
knowing that this person who
Wronged her has the morney, could not, however get the award Surplusage does not vitiate statute, expressed in the maxim,
a
of damages because of this
unreasonable law. This questionea 8urplusagium non noceat. Nor is the useful vitiated by the non-
law, therefore, makes futile the favorable
of damages that she and judgment and award usoful, expre8sed in tho maxim, utile per inutile non vitiatur
her parents fully deserve. x x x
worth mentioning thet RA. It 0r
1 Demafiles v. Commission on kiteotions136 illustrates the rule.
No.. 6426 was enacted in
at a time when the country's economy was in a shamble;1983 One of the issues raised in this case is whether a pre-proclamation
the foreign
investments were minimal and wne"
Was the reason
why said presumably,
etatute was enactd. But the
ti"
ties of the
present times show that the rea w
SIbid., pp. 40-45.
country has recoverc 124) Commission Elections, G.R. Ng. 28396, Dec. 29, 1967, 21
SCRA 1462. alilen
v. on
8CHA
Soe Sec. 6.11,
infra.
1286 8CAD 142, 278 BCRA Copny "Bighani" v. Pablo, 53 Phil. 886 (1928).
27 (1997). 1 SCRA 1462 (167).
160
OF STATUTE
has become moot
beeause the proclaimed win B. Departure from Literal Interpretation
election case
oath pursuant to Section
2 of Repu ad
immediately taken his nds to defeut the whole purpose of the law is to be rejected, when
that the "first mayor; vice-maveAct
No. 4870 which provides shall be. elected n he use of such word or phrase may fairly and properly be treated
councilors of the municipality of Sebaste a mere reiteration or repetition of other language in the statute,
officiale and shall have.qualifhe as
next general elections for local It itself sufiicient to carry out the intention of the legislature.
have qualified" makes the
is argued that the phrase "shall
officials begin immediately
term
after # Of
office of the first nunicipal
the argument, ruled; " A20. Obseure or missing word or false description may
proclamation. The court, rejecting not preciude construction.
provision- 'and shall have guals
view, the last portion of the fied
- is devoid of any meaning, is unmitigated Jargon in or out Courts should not and cannot always be bound by the phrase
context, and does not warrant the respondents reading that +H ology or literal meaning of a statute. They may at times disregard
term of office of the first municipal officials of Sebaste beigins loose or obscure words in order to arrive at the real meaning and
immediately after their proclamation. It is quite probable that hat spirit of the statute. Lingual imperfection in the drafting of a
is what the legislature meant. But here is a clear case of a failu statute should never be permitted to hamstring judicial search for
to express a meaning, and a becoming sense of judicial'modest legislative intent, which can otherwise be discovered. 130 Moreover,
forbids the courts from assuming and, consequently, from supplyin the fact that a sensible reading of the text of the law may show
If there is no meaning in it,' said the King in Alice in Wonderland. that some words are missing therein due to clerical error or over-
that saves a world of trouble, you know, as we needn't try to find sight does not preclude giving the statute a construction that will
earry out the intent of the law.131 Neither does false description
any Frankfurter, who himself was fond of quoting this passage,
admonishes that 'a judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of the statute which
is otherwise clear. Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpore
eniarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship
constat.
of policymaking might wisely suggest, construction must eschew
interpolation and evisceration' Accordingly, we have to g0 by the
general rule that the term of municipal officials shall begin on the 4.21 xemption from rigid application of law
first day of Jauary following theirelection,and so the assumption
uEvery rule is not. ithout an-exception. Ibi quid generaliter
of office by the respondent Galido in no way affected the basic conceditur; inest haec exceptio, si non aliquid sit contras jus basque,
issues in this case."127
which means that where anything is granted generally, this excep-
tion is implied; that nothing shall be contrary ta law and right.
4.19. Redundant worde may be rejected. Equity as well as the exceptional situations in'a case may require a
departure from the established rule.12 Compelling reasons may
Redundant words and phrases are not infrequently found in justify reading an exception to a rule even where the latter does
legislative enactments, and only the most skillfully drawn statutes not provide any.133 Where the rigorous application of the law would
are entirely free from such
defects. So, whil the general rule 18 result in preventing a fair and impartial inquiry into the actual
that every effort should be made to give some meaning to every facts of a case, the exigençies of justice demand that the general
part of a statute,2 this rule does not
impose upon the courts an Tule should yield to occasional exceptions whenever there are
imperativo obligation to give every redundant word or phrase a
special significance, contrary to the manifest intention of the legis
lature; and a
possible interpretation of a word or phrase whic"
iSalaysuy v. Castro, 98 Phil. 364 (1956).
v. Marcos, G.R. No. 26100, Feb. 28, 1969,
27 8CRA 342.
Cty of Baguio
77bid. at pp. 1465-1466.
NO.
Pritchard v. Hepublic, 81 Phil. 244 (1948); Matabreria v. Cervantes, G.R.
1aMuñoz & Co. v. Hord, 12 Phil. 624 28771, March 31, 1971, 38 SCRA 284.
(1909). Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 447.
Province of Cebu v. Intermediate
De Villa v Cüurt of Appeals, 195 SCRA 722 (1991).
163
DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE
ADHERENCE TO, OR
162 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE
Lateral nterpretation
B.Departure from observe
to
"If it shall no longer he reasonably possible
weighty reasons therefor, Otherwise, the rigor of the au dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election
the periods and dates in order
become the highest injustice summum Jus, summa inju. (CommisHion shall fix other periods and not
ncts, the voters shall
ria e n s u r e accomplishment
of the activities s o
Where strict and rigid application of la would woP to

their suffrage,"
tice, an exemption therefrom to prèvent such result on h n be deprived of
availed of, and
ian and equitable grounds is warranted, even though th of its being exercised or
presupposes the po8sibility such interpretation
import of the iaw suggests no such exemption.135 For it. i The provision must be given and
not otherwise. reasonableness
with logic, c o m m o n sense,
presumed that the legislature intended exemption to its lan that is in
a c c o r d a n c e
time c o n s t r a i n t and the s u r r o u n c i n g

Where
which would avoid injustice or oppression. And it is the dut practicality. Commission o n
Elections
y of it impossible for the
court to so construe a statute as to eftectuale such circumstances make cannct be
t e n t . 136
presum
umed i o conduct special
registration of voters, the Commission
the
do so, for the law does not require
faulted for refusing to to do the impossible
to be done; there is no obligation
impossible
4.22. Law does not require the impossible. thing,140
It is well-settled that the law does not require that the in

sible e do,37 The law obliges no one to perform an impossibil
impy of words.
4.23. Number and gender
expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossibile. 133 In ot the context
maxim of construction that when
words, there is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibili It is a statutory and
of a siatute so indicates,-worde plural înctude the singular,
in
nulla obligatio est, Hence, a statute may not be so construeda to a singular
v e r s a . A plural word in
a statute may thus apply
require compiiance with what it prescribes cannot, at the time, wioe or more
legally accomplisked. It should instead be construed in such a w person or thing, just as singuler word may embraca.two
a
Article 996 of the Civil Code which pro-
that substantial compliance with what the law requires is'su perspns.or. things. Thus, children and
cient. Thus, where the law requires that, in order that a court m vides that if a widow or widower and legitimate
descendants are left, the surviving spouse has
in the succession the
acquire jurisdiction over a petition for natiralization, the petitiu the children" applius to a situation
same share as that of each of
be published in the Official Gazette weekly, for three, times a child because "children" includes "child."14l
where there is only one
consecutively, the first requirement of which cannot be legally w
The term any "candidate" used in the Election Code comprehends
complished because the Official Gzette was not, at the time, pu to
"some candidates" or "all candidates;" "any person" is not limitedI
lished weekiy, compliance with the two other requirements wou the but is applicable as weli to two or
be deemed sufficient to enable the court to acquire jurisdiction ow any person" in singular,
more persons. A word may be construed to mnean,
and indeed it has
the naturalization case. been frequently used in its enlarged and plural of singular sense,
The statutory grant of stand-by power to the Commissiona as meaning "all," "all or every,
"each," "each or all," "every," without
Electiona on the regintratíon of voters, as provided for in Sec. 284 limitation; indefinite number or quantity, an indeterminate unit or
Republic Act No. 8436, which reads: muinber of units out of many or all, one or more as the case may be,
several, 6ome,l2
*People v. Gutierrez, 36 SCHA 172 ( 70).

Sucluir v. Court of Appesls, G.R. No. 62435, July 20, 1982, 116 SCHA 0Akbayan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147066, March 26, 2001.
Ongchengoo v. City of Zamboanga, G.R. No. 44657, Jan. 22, 1980, 95 BCHA
Meichor v. Moya, G.R. No. 36256, March 17, 1983, 121 SCRA 11.
Santilon v. Miranda, G.R. No. 19281, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 568.
Gatchalian v. Commission on Elections, G.R. N. 82560, Oct. 22, 1970, 85
a n re Allen, 2 Phil. 630 (1903). SCRA 436.
37Reyes v. Republic, 104 Phil. 889 (1958).
19811
Province of CebuPosadas,
Intermediate
v. Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 447 (1*
LaLirn Co Chui v. 47 Phil. 460 (1926).
****
165
ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE PROM, LANGUAGE
OF STATUTE
It is also a rule of statutory construction that in C. Implications
construing
statute, the masculine; but not the feminine; includes all gendera
a
is compelled by
unless the context in which the word-is used in the statuto It is
""It
i s .one which, under the circumstances,
cates otherwise.us
indi. posed,
147
able view of the statute, and the contrary of which would
absurd." Necesaityy the"great, master of
all
a rerobable and from
and logically be inferred
A fines what may properly
It includes Buch inferences as may iogi-
C.IMPLICATIONS into the statute.
things,"
what
rcad the purpose or object of the statute, from
anu b e drawn from
cally
to have intended, and from the
rislature must be presumed
h el e g i s l a t u r e
king the statute effective and operative. It ezcludes
4.24. Doctrine of necessary implication. ecessity o fmak.
beneficial or desirable. The doctrine of
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the detaile necea merely plausible, in-
ecessary implicat cation may not therefore be used to justify the
involved in its application. There is always an omission that mey what the to be wise and
s t a t u t e of to court appears
not meet-a particular situation. What is thought, at the timeof c l u s i o ni n na
within
GE it is
at the same time necessarily and logically
enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to ust, unless8
the of which, like other
Nor may the doctrine, purpose
provide for the unfoldingevents of the future. So-called gaps in the its
terms.
is to ascertain legislative intent, be employed

of
struction,
law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory rules of the object or purpose of
to s u p p o r t aann interpretation destructive
construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary be necessarily inplied from a statute should,
in
may
he law. What
implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is eny event, be consistent with, and not contrary to, the Constitution
as much a part thereof as that which is expressed..Every statute An implication which is violative of the law is
is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may or to existing laws.
unjustified or unwarranted.60
be necessary to effectuate its object and

purpose, or to make effes llustrative of the doctrine of necessary implication
is Chuz u.
tive rights, powers, privileges or juriediction grants,
which it in- The issue raised in this case is whether
cluding all such collateral and subsidiary consequences may be as Cioil Service Commission. o
employee, or one whose appointment is co-existent
a coterminous
fairly and logically inferred from its terms.145 The principle is e x duration of a government project, who has been employed
pressed in the maxim, Ex necessitate legis or from the necessity of with the retirerent
the law. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is as such for nore than two years, is entitled to early
under Section 2 of Republie Act No. 6683, which provides
is benefits
deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This so in part that the "benefits authorized under this Act shall apply
to
because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim, inn regard-
all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees,
eo quod plus sit, semper inest et minus.16
less of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecu-
"necessary implication" is one that is so strong in its
The tern tiveyears of government service as of the date of separation." An-
probability that the contrary thereof cannot reasonably be sup- swering the issue in the affirmative, the Court ruled that a
coterminous employee is no different from a casual or temporary
employee, and by necessary implication, the inclusion of the latter
1Snyder's Estate v. Denit, 72 A2d 767, 18 ALR2d 663 (1950).
in the class of government employees entitled to the benefits of the
law necessarily implies that the former should also be entitled to
I n re Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918); City of Manila v. Gomez, G.R. No. 31251,
Aug. 31, 1981, J07 SCRA 98; Escribano v. Ovilu, G.R. No. 30376, Sept. 12, 1978,
85 such benefits. The Court added that the "maxim of expresio unius
SCRA 245.
4Go v. Martinez, 45 Phil. 256 (1923); Gatchalian v. Commission on
Chico
Elections, G.R.No. 32560, Oct. 22, 1970, 36 SCRA 436; People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102
Phil. 679 (1957).
Chua v. Civil Service Comnission, 206 SCRA 65 (1992), quoting Agpalo,
irst National Bank De Berriz, 105 SE 900.
v.
614 ilbert v.Çraddock, 67 Kan. 346, 72 P 867.

Statutory Construction, pp. 118-119 (1986 ed.); See People v. Aquino, 83 Phil. U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488, 500 (1910).
(1949). Cameta v. Andanar, 95 Phil. 604 (1954).
(1986 206
ed.).
SCRA 65 (1992), quoting Agpalo, Statutory Construction, pp. 118 119
166
ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURO FROM, LANGUAGE 167
OF STATUTE
C. Implications
maxim in thi
est exclusio alterius
should not be the applicable sed without cause as shown by the fact that after
implication." dism a exonerated and found investiga-
but the doctrine of necessary guiltless of the charge of gross
tion e file
negligence filed against him and was even
recommended for
he
statement by the rein
government committee that investigated him.
from a right. In
4.25. Remedy implied other
words, his suspension and removal were
.
illegal and in viola-

where there is a right. only of the Administrative Code but of the Constitution
It is a well-settled principle that h tion not
This is expressed in the ma The court that to "remedy the evil and
ruled
is a remedy for violation
thereof.
right in favor of a pera.
axim, itself. wrong commit
ubi jus, ibi remediun. The
existence ofa ted,the least that could be done is to restore him to the office and
the part of another who which he ha
had been illegally deprived, and to include in that
implies a corresponding obligationformer to a.remedy to, assur 0 s t of
on
the remedy or redr dress payment of the salary which he would have
lates such right, and entitles its ived during this period of illegal suspension and dismissal."
therefor: The fact that the statuta
observance and vindication However, there was a lega. problem in the way to his reinstatement,
not preclude him from vindicating hi
silent as to the remedy does
from such right.
152
"Where a i whenhe was suspended and eventually dismissed, somebody was
right, for such remedy is implied a in court, said right i inted to .his position, and it was argued that to reinstate him
ted to
zen after due hearing
establishes right appoin
force and effect, The way must h uld be to remove the incumbent without cause in violation of law.
parumount and must be given
cleared for itsenforcement, and technicalities in procedure, judicial tn resolving the problem, the court resorted to a
not to make the illegally dismissed employee without a remedy. The
legal fiction, so as
as well as administrative, must give way"16

Qurt ruled that inasmuch as the employee was illegally dismissed,
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
Where the
be maintained to enforce legally speaking, his position never became vacant. Hence, there
specified circumstances, an action may was no vacancy to which the present incumbent could be perma-
such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the nently appointed, and his oceupancy of said position is temporary
subject; consequently,if there is no statute especially enacted to and does not come within the constitutional prohibition against
enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces
itself by its
dismissalwithout cause. In any event, the court added that the
own inherent potency and puissance, and
from which all legislations
incumbent's being made to leave the post to give way to the employ-
must their
take For wheze there is a right, there is rem.
bearings. ee's superior right may be considered as removal for cause.
e d y2 4
The principle is that where there is a wrong, there is a rem

4.26. Grant ofjurisdiction.
edy grant. The word "wrong
which courts of general jurisdiction can
means deprivation or violation of a right, to Settled is the rule that jurisdietionto hear and decide cas es is
is not and equivalent
"error." The principle assumes the existence of a right. Hence, where conferred only by the Constitution or by statute. IL cannot be con-
there is no right on the part who prays fora
of one or
remedy relief farred by the Rules of Court. Nor may jurisdiction"be implied from
for alleged violation thereof, the principle does not apply and no the language of a statute, in the absence of a clear legislative
relief may be granted.156 intent to that efiect.107 Thus, the power conferrad upon the Com-
Batungbakal u. National IDevelopment Co.1 is a case in point. mlusion
on by Section 196 of the 1978 Election Code to
Elections
with and
It appears that "a civil service employee was suspended and later exereise appellate jurisdiction over election cases filed
elective ofli
decided by regional trial courts involving municipal
said Commission
B does not inmply the grant of authority upon
l8sue writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus concerning
5Felipe v. Leuterio, 91 Phil. 482 (1952).
1 Batungbakal v. National Development Co., 98 Phil. 182, 193 (1953).
4Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 78 SCAD
764, 267 SCRA 408 (1997).
Felipe v. Leuterio, 91 Phil. 482 (1952), Dec. 19, 1980, 101
15493 Phil. 182 (1963). 107Pime elv. Commission on Elections, G.R, No. 53581,
SCRA 760"
T69; Dimagiba v. Heraldez, 102 Phil. 1016 (1968).
169
ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAG
168
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF STATITE
C. Implie.tions
is an incl
nd suspension being a sequel to that findings,
funetion a n d
said election cases.156 And where a statute grants a before the.court 163
special. dent to the criminal proeecution
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving offenders under 16 COu to an administrative agency
old at the time of the filing of the action, a
subsequent stayetr Statutes conferring jurisdiction its
construed to enable the.agency to discharge
defining a youthful offender as one who is over nine but belo must be iberally purpose, Thus,
duties in accordance with the legislative
years of age may not be so construed as to confer by implca 1344 to the National Housing
a s s i g n e d
the power granted by PD. No.

upon said special court the authority to try cases involving offes refund and any
ers 16 but below 21 fend Athority to hear and decide "claims involving
condominium unit buyers
years of age. filed by Bubdivision lot or
o thor
claims
he
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman"
arainst the project hear and decide
"any and all claims which
ag
are
the power to
27,What may be implied from grant of jurisdietion claims/cases
include
consequence of the
incidental to or a necessary
in the. grant of jurisdiction to the National
The grant of jurisdiction to try actions carries with it all n anecifically includedsuch as attorney's fees and other damages.164
essary and incidental powers to employ all writs, procesSeR
and Housing Authority,
other means essential to make its jurisdiction
effective very
regularly constituted court has power to do all things which a
428, Grant of power includes incidental power.
reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within thi where a general power is conferred or duty
en-
scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgment As a rule,
nécessary for the exercise of one or
and mandates, even though the court may be called to decide mat. ioined, every particular power is also. conferred.165 The off+cer in
of the other
ters which would not be within its cognizance as original causes of
the performance is conferred may thus exercise such
whose favor general power
action.oHepce, where.a .court haa jurisdiction over the main cause as are necessary to make
ineidental powers or perform such acts
of action, it can grant reliefs incidental thereto,even if they would effective. The incidental powers are those which
the power conferred
oiherwise be outside of its jürisdictton, Thus, in actions for forcible included in, and are therefore of lesser degree than
are necessarily
entry and detainer, which fall within the jurisdiction of municipal extend to other matters not embraced
the power granted. It cannot
or metropolitan trial courts, the latter can order payment of rentale therein, nor are not incidental thereto.1
even though the amount thereof exceeds the jurisdictional amouat
Illustrations may be cited to explain the rule. Thus, the power
cognizable by them, for the same is merely incidental to the pring. unless
to establish an ofice includes the authority to abolish it,
pal action.8 And a statute which provides that "any public oflicer there are constitutional provisions expressly or impliedly providing
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information otherwise.167 The constitutional provísion that "no warrant shall
under this Act (Anti-Graft Law) or under the provisions of the to be determined by the judge after
issue but upon probable cause
Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be sus examination urider oath or affirmation of the complainant and ihe
pended from ofice" necessarily implies that it is the court, and not witnesses he may produce"168 implies the grant of power to the
the executive official concerned, that can suspend the official pend:
ing determination of the criminal case, the reason being thatthe
determination ns tawhether the information is valid.is a judicial SCRA
uciano v. Provineiul Governor, G.R. No. 30306, June 20, 1969, 28
517
Inc. v. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72 (1989).
Soid Homes, People v. Gutierrez,
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936);
6Pimentel Commission .R. No. 32282, Nov. 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 172; People v. Lakandula, G.R. No. 31103,
v. on Elections, supra.
No. 44113, March 31, 1977, 76 SCRA 243. duly 20, 1983; Radiowealth, Inc. v. Agregado, 96 Phil. 429 (1950.
People v. Palana, G.R. 376 (1963),
Shioi v. Harvey, 43 Phil. 333 (1922); Suanes v. Chief Accountant of ne
Uiversity of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tux Appeals, 93 Phil.
Senate, 81 Phil. 877 (1948). Castillo v. Pajo, 103 Phil. 515 (1958).
Phil. Air Lines Employees' Assn. v. Phil. Air Lines, 120 Phil. 383 (1964) Art. I1, Soc. 2, 1987 Constitution.
Pil. Air Lines Employees' Assn. v. Phil. Air Lines, Inc., 120 Phil. oo83
(1964); Gomez v. North Camarines Lumber Co., 104 Phil. 294 (1958).
170
OF STATUTE
C. Implications
judge to conduet preliminary tnvestigationsr Where a statute.au
thorizes the temporary detail for a fixed period of a judge in.an "to assist a
wWhere the Minister of Justice appointed a lawyer
for the purpOse of "trying" caB attorney in the discharge of his duties" as
other district other than his own es, Gacal or prosecuting
the making and rendering of.a the attorney appointed has the power to sign
the power so conferred includes authorized by law, so
in a tried ,by him informations, make investigations, and conduct prosecu-

decision after the period fixed in his detáil case criminal
being necessarily implied from the authority
con-
to authorize
within the special term. For the law
does not man tions, such power
of the power to render his the duties of a public office include all those which truly
For
judge to try a case and then deprive him ferred.
are essential t o the accomplish-
decision after he has taken cognizance of it, the legislative purpose lie within'its scope, those which and
not being to make him a mere referee for another judge.l0 the'main purposes for'which the office was created,
ment of to the
incidental and collateral, germane are
those-which, although
The power to approve a license includes byi implication; even accomplishment of the principal purposes.177
if not expressly granted, the power to revoke it. By extension, thai
local governments to
power to revoke is limited by. the authority to grant the licensei The express statutory grant of power to
general
tor the welfare of their inhabitants in
from which it is derived.17 appropriáte money to withdraw unexpended money al
A statute which provides that the President "may not deport cludes the implied authority
Their statutory power to regulate telephone
"a
foreigners except upon investigation" implies the authority to ready appropriated. to establish and operate by themselves
a
service includes the power
depurt. The power to deport includes the power to order the Where a statute authorizes a city to reclaim
telephone service.
arrest of the undesirable alien after-investigation in,.order to park, the reclaimed area
extension of its
part of the s e a as
an
carry dut the deportation.173 And pending arrangements for his the s a m e character as the park,
for the power to extend
acquires
deportation, an undesirable alien may also be detained for a
cannot authorize a transaction that
is totally distinct from that
reasonable period of time, such being a necessary step in the, charter empowers the city
to
which is granted.150 And where a city
process of expulsion of undesirable aliens.174 Where a statute assessed value as annual
collect one and one-half percent of the
confers upon the President the authority to "regulate, curtail,, statute which imposes "an annual addi
realty tax, a subsequent
control and prohibit the exportation" of scrap materials, deemed value of real property
included in said authority is the power to exact royalties for the tional tax of one per centum on the assessed
the real tax regularly levied thereon under
in addition to property
permissive exportation of said materials as the consideration for
real tax shall not exceed a maximum of
the exercise of the privilege.
Generally, the power to appoint vested existing law" but the "total ordinance, levy a n
in the President includes the three per cenlum," implies that said city can, by
power to make temporary appoint
additional one-half percent real tax, following
the doctrine of neces-
ments, unless he is otherwise specifically
prohibited by law, or the sary implication.181
temporary or acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of
the by law upon a n
office filled. This is based
upon the theory that the whole inclüdes It has also been held that the power conferred
and is greäter than and regulations tò carry out
the part.176 .;'ff
administrative offricer to issue rules
called to execute includes the
The purposes of a statute he is upon
officer the performance of aa
authority to delegate to a subordinate or implied provision to the
particular absent
sunction, express any
eEscribano v. Ovila, G.R. No. 30376,
7ODelfino v. Paredes, 48 Phil. 645 Sept. 12, 1975, 85 SCRA 245.
Gordon v. Veridiano, 167 SCRA 6(1926).
17Tn re Dick, 38 Phil. (1988). Phil. 636 (1946).
41 (1918). "Lo Chum v. Ocampo, 77 G.H. No. 21906, March 31, 1966,
16 SCRA 699.
Qua
SCRA 27.
Chee Gan
v. Deportation Board, G.R. No. 10280, Lanto v. Ali Dinaporo,
(City of Davao, G.R. No. 23080, Oct. 30, 1965,
Sept. 30, 1963, PhilLung Distanco Tol. Co. v.
Tan Sin v. Deportation Board, 104 16 SCRA 244.

G.R. No. 41001, Sept. 30, 1976,
7Mare Donnelly & Augociates, Inc, v. Phil. 868 (1958). Manila Lodge No, 761 v. Court of Appeals,
7Cabiling Pabualan, 121 Phil. 1068Agregado, 95 Phil. 142 (1954). 73 8CRA 162.
v.
(1966). 87261, Aug. 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 98.

City of Manila v. Gomez, G.R. No.
ADHERENCE TO, OROF
DEPARTURE
STATUT FROM, LANGUAGE 173
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION C. Implicationa
the power to prohbit, the reason being that

i n c l u d o
be left to by prohib-
of the power and authority entrusted t .
ing, nothing woul
nugator
regulate, thereby rendering the au
contrary. The nature r e g u l a t e
by the statute may imply the grant of administrative flerim

to
(hority
necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge
of his d ity
n is inplied.should not be
the administration of the statute. This includes sub-delegatin What
against the law
sound principles of organiza Of
430
power, which has been justified by atatutory grant ot power does not include such
which demand thai those at the iop be able to concentrate t cannot be exercised incidental
heir
attenion upon the larger and more important questions of pola pover
which
without violating the Constitu-
conferring the power,
laws on the same or other
and practice and that their time be freed as far as possible.. Hon, n1. while the power to appoint
the consideration of the smsller and far less important matters
Bubject. T
ordinarily carries with it
to Buspend or remove, the constitutional restriction
wer
detail. And the power conferred upon the head of a governm

instilution to diect and supervise its operation and internal
he Po nension
against s u 8
or removal of civil service
employees except for
ministration logically entails the power to prefer charges againes
vided for by law precludes such implication,
c a u s ea s
unless the
t appointmentis e outside the civil service law189 Where a stat
erring officials of said institution and to see to it that the charo.
are properly investigated, it being an intrinsic element of the i n t
8ppOwrs
u l e e m p o
the President to appoint a public officer for a fixed
w e r t
ter unless sooner moved, the implication is that the President

nal administration of said institution.13
teriremove him without just cause as provided for by law. An
cCanal uthority to remove at pleasure cannot be deduced,
inferenti since
4.29. Grant of power excludes greatër pöwer the
existence of a defined term, ipso facto, negates such inference,
mplies a contra presumption, i.e., that the public officer
The principle that he grant of power includes all incidental hall hold office to the end of his term, subject to removal for
powers necessary to mnake the exercise thereof effective implies the
ause However, where the statute fixes the term of office to be at
exclusion of those which are greater than that conferred. Thus, the
the pleasure of the appointing power, as distinguished from a stat
constitutional grant of power of supervision in favor of the Presi
te which makes the appointed officer removable at the pleasure of
dent over local governmente"4 does not, in the absence of law to
he appointing power, the power to appoint carries with it the
that effect, include the power to suspend or remove local elective
officials, nor to direct the sorm and manner in which local elective power to remove at any time.19
officials shall perform their duties,15 they being acts of control The power to investigate officials or employees as conferred
which are greater than those of supervision,18 Similarly, the Presi- y law upona public oficer doesnot include the power to delegate
dent's power to reorganize the executive department, bureaus and
the authority to take testimony of witnesses, whose appearance
offices, as conferred upon him by law, does not embrace the author-
maybe required bythe compulsory process of subpoena. Nor does
ity to
deprive the courts ofthecertain
quasi-judicial tribunal,
jurisdiction and to transfer it to Fuch power to investigate include the power to delegate the author
a same not being germane or incidental
to the power conferred." And the power to regulate business does ity to administer oath.19
Americen Tobacco Co. v. Dircctor of Patents, G.R. No. 26803, Oct. 14, 1975,
67 SCRA 287
Esperanza Castillo, 123 Phil. 810 (1966)
v.
Phil. Long Distance Tel. Co. v. City of Davao, G.R. No. 23080, Oct. 30, 1965,
Ant. VlI, Sec. 101), 1936
Constitution in relation to Art. VII, Sec. 16, New BSCRA 244People v. Esguerra, 81 Phil. 33 (1948).
Constitution.
Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 Delos Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 (1950).
(1968); Rodriguez v. Montinola, 94 Phil. 964
(1954) Jover v, Borra, 98 Phil. 506 (1963); Cuneta v. Andanar, 95 Phil, 604 (1954).
LACson v. Roque, 92 Phil. 466 Aba v. Evangelista, 100 Phil. 683 (1957).
(1953); Jover v. Borra, 93 Phil. 506 (1953).
University of Santo Tomas' v. Board Carnelo v. Ramos, G.R. No. 17778, Nov. 30, 1952, 6 SCRA 836.
of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376 (1953).
175
ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE F'ROM, LANGUAGE
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE
174
.1 C. Implications
an-
of the constitutional restriction cannot
alien in violation
to an alien are
Authörity to charge against publio.funds.may and recover the land, for both seller and buy>r
an
4.31.
implied. .not be nul the
guilty ofhaving
same
violated the Constitution,8

It is wel-settled that unless a statute expressly,so autha
allowed. Accordingly2
no claim against public funds may be 4.33 Exceptions.to.therule.
ute may not be so construed as to authorize, by. implicai one
principle of pari delicto recognizes certain Exceptions,
charge against public funds. Thus, where statute grants The
a
or applica-
is that,it will not apply when its enforcement
privileges in favor of appointive officials and employees of the ofwhich violate an avowed fundamental policy or public interest.
ernment, the statute may not be so construed as to entitle ele an will the court may inter
rha16, although the parties suit pari delicto, where public policy
are in
officials to similar privileges.1 And where a statute requires T relief at the of one of them,
to pay a thirteenth month compensation to their fere. and grant even though the result may be
that a
ployers" employ.
ees receiving less than P1,000.00 a month, the statute maynot
not be
auires its intervention,
in equal guilt with de-
construed to include the sovereign, nor may the tern "employe efit will be derived by plaintiff who ishomestead law is.to give
be construed to embrace the government.1 yers fondant 1o For instance,
the policy of the
land for
: in the homesteader and his family a piece of
and preserve To carry out such policy, the law
for culivation.
his house andalienation of a homestead within five years following
482. liegality of act implied from probibition. nrohibits the and provides that any contract of
a
the patent
the the issuance of
Where a statute prohibits the doing act done in
of an act, conveyance in contravention
thereof shall be null and void. In a
violation thereof is by implication null and void. The prohibited act the fact that
homestead in violation of this restriction,
cannot serve as foundation of a cause of action for relief. The rulei Sle of a
are at lault, or in pari delicto, will
not prec-
expressed in the maxims: er dolo malo non oritur actio, or no, man the seller and buyer it is not
of the land by the seller or his heirs, for
can be allowed to found a claim upon'his own wrongdoing or ineg. lude recovery
competence to barter away what public policy
uity; and nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria, or within the seller's
For this reason, the purchaser, as against the
no man should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. It is seeks to preserve. than any
geller his heirs, is n0 more entitled to keep the land
or
popularly known by the maxim, in pari delicto potior est condiio
intruder.200
defendentis, 190
Another exception is that when the transaction is not illegal

Public policy requires that parties to an act prohihited by and the prohibition by law is designed
statutebe left where they are, to make the statute effective and to per se but merely prohibited
relief in favor of
cannot for the protection of one party, the court may grant
accomplish its objéct. Hence, a party to an illegal contraci
Lhe l a t t e r . 201
come to court of law and ask that his illegal ohject be carried out.
law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement; it leaves
The
the parties where it finds them. Thus, a citizen who sold his land
Macatangay v. Chairman of the Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 38728, 88 Phil. 103 (1951); Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79
Sopt. 30, 1982, 117 8CRA 291; Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor
9Cabuatan v. Uy Hoo,
and Employment, G.R.
Phil. 461 (1947).
115
No. 60403, Aug. 3, 1983. PEarnque T. Yuchengco, Inc. v. Velayo, G.R. No. 50439, July 20, 1982,
4 Macatangay v. Chairman of the Commission on Audit, supra. Development Bank of the Phile. v, Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 28774,
Alliance of Governmant Workers v. Minister of Labor and SCRA 307,;
G.R. No. 60403, Aug. 3, 1983. Employment Sept. 21, 1982, 116 SCRA 636.
Acieito De
D e los Santos v. Roman Catholic Church, 94 Phil. 405 (1954);
v.
Bough v. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 210 (1919); Cabuatan v. Uy Hoo, 88 Phil. 103
(1951); Dinglasan v. Lee Hun, 99 Phil. 427 los Santos, 95 Phi!. 887 (1954).
(1956). Barsobia v. Cuenco, G.R. No. 33048, April 16, 1982, 113 SCRA 57.
'Dinglasan v. lee Hun, 99 Phil. 427 (1956).
4.34. What cannot be done directly cannot be done inasdi

rectly.
What the law prohibits cannot, in some other way, be legal
Chapter V
accomplished. This principle is expressed in the axiom that whar
cannot, by law, be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Quan
aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum. Accora. INTERPRETATION OF WORDS
ingly, where a corporation is forbidden from doing an act, the Dro.
hibition extends to the board of directors and tö each director sena.
AND PHRASES
rately and îndividuaily. Thus, where the board of directors is pro.
hibited from granting loans to its director, a loan to a partnershin A. IN GENERAL
of which the wife of a director is a partner falls within the prohibi.
tion.2u7 Where a statute prohibits the payment of the principal obli.
gation during a fixed period, the interest thereon during the exist.
6.01. Generally.
ence of the restriction is not demandable.23
phrase used in a statute may have an ordinary,
Where a law exempts retirement benefits of a public officer or A word or
technical,
eneric, restricted, tec legal, commercial or trade meaning. It
employee from attachment, garnishment or other process, an ear. define in the statute itself, or may have previously
lier law which authorizes the governnent to withhold an amount have been
may
received a judicial construction. Which meaning should be given to a
due such officer or employee to pay his indebtedness to the govern-
in a statute depends upon what the legislature
ment should not be construed to withhold so much of his retire word or phrase
legislative intent primarily
involves ascertaining
ment benefits to pay said indebtedness because the appropriation intended. The task from extraneous and relevant
itself and secondarily,
thereof would be tantamount to garnishing or attaching the same from the statute
and, having ascertained it, construing the word or
and enabling the government, by administrative action, to do indi-. circumstances
benefits in such a way as to effectuate such intent.
rectly what it cannot do directly because the retirement phrase
are exempt from attachment, garnishment or other processes.4 thus be stated as a general rule that in interpreting
may
It
Nor can the government, under the same principle, withhold pay- the meaning and scope of a
term used in the law, a careful review
until his
ment of the retirement benefits of a public officer as well as the intendment of law,
ascer-
of the whole law involved,
accountabilities with the government shall have been cleared,
as of an
statute whole and not
tained from a consideration of the as a
such action is doing indirectly what the government is prohibited or a particular provision alone, must be made to de-
isolated part
from doing directly205 termine the real intent of the law.2
4.35. There should be no penalty for compliance with law. , 8.02. Statutory definition.
A person who complies with what a statute requires cannot, A statute sometimes defines particular words and phrases
fairness and
by implication, be penalized thereby. For "simple logic, act used therein. In such case, the legislative definition controls the
reason cannot countenance an exaction or a penaliyfor, an'
with the law."a*
faithfulty done in compliance
Phil. 79 (1949); Molina v. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 167 (1918);
Golana0nce
LAnO V. Court of
Sagario, 85
v. Appeals, G.R. No. 39050, Feb. 24, 1981, 103 SCRA S0
3People v. Concepcion, 44 Phil. 126 (1922). 82 SCAD 800, 212
(1961).
Peoples Bank and Trust Co. v. Phil. National Bank, 88 Phil. 631 lnvestigation and Security Ageney, Inc. v. NLRC,
DACruz v. Tantuico, 166 SCRA 670 (1988). SCRA 653h (1997).
2Tantuico, Jr. v. Domingo, 48 SCAD 677, 230 SCRA 391 (1994).
82.
Quimpo v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 33092, Aug. 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 13,
177
*
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES 179
178 A. In General
of any other ithout

airopractie wit) having been duly licensed to practice medicine
meaning of the statutory word, irrespectiveor liable." In a case where the issue is whether an
the word or phrase may have in its ordinary usual sense 3
nse Othe is thus criminally
comes into the country as a temporary visitor is an

wise put, where a statute defines a word or
phrase employed tho alien who
the word or phrase should not, by construcu0n, be given a dife the court said that while the term immigrant" under
"
" i m m i g r a n t , "
inition denotes an alien who comes to the Philippines

the legislature, in adopting specific definitint
a ordinary
its
meaning. For nanent residence, the Immigration Act akes its own
for permnan
deemed to have restricted the meaning

of the word within
defines a word nitionof the term, which is "any alien departing from any place
terms of the definition. When the legislature
defir
de the Philippines destined for the Philippines, other than a
in a statute, it does not usurp the courts function to interpret utsio
laws but it merely legislates what should form part of the n o n -

amigrant." The term thus includes every alien comirg int
either to reside permanently or for
the country eit mporary stay,
law
itself.
unless he can bring one of the exceptions.
nmsell within
It has been held that while a term or phrase in a statute is.
is to While definitions of terms in a statute must be given all the
be interpreted in accordance with its well-accepted meaning ney. weight due them provision in which they
in the construction of the
ertheless when the term or phrase is specifically defined in a Da are used, terms phrases
the being
or part and parcel of the whole
be given effect in their entirety as a harmonious,
ticular law, the definition must be adopted in applying and enfore. statute nust
ing such luw. Thus, Section 8(f) of Republic Act No. 1161 defined and inwgrated unit, not as a mas8 of heterogeneou
coordinated
not incongruous terms, clauses and sentences. The
"compensation" to include all remunerations, lexcept bonuses, al. And unrelated it
should be construed in the light of the context
lowances and overtime pay. This delinition was changed by the words and phrases
amendment of the law, by deleting the exceptions, The court held of the whole statute.
that such amendment shows the legislative intent that bonuses
and overtime pay must now be included Qualification of rule.
remuneration in pursuance of the amendatory law. "By virtue of
in the employee's 5.03.
"as used in this Act"
The statutory definition of a word or term is
this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law, insofar as Baid act is concerned. The definition
is controlling only or term as used
whatever prior judicial or executive construction may have been of the word
not conclusive as to the meaning
same
given to the phrase in question should give way to the clear mandate with respect to transactions that
in other statutes, particularly
of the new law. In another case, the question raised is whether a enactment of the act.12
took place prior to the
person who practiced chiropractic without haying been duly licensed definitions control the
to practice medicine may be criminally liable, for, violation of the The general rule that the statutory
words does not apply where its application
medical law. The court held that while chiropractic may not in its meaning of statutory the language of the statute,
de-
ordinary sense fall within the meaning of the term "practice of creates obvious incongruities in result of
or becomes illogical
as a
stroys one of its major purposes,"
medicine," the latter as statutorily defined clearly includes the a change in its factual
basis." In any such case, the statutory
manipulations employed in chiropractic and one who practices
People v. Venviaje, 47 Phil. 536 (1925); De Ponce v. Sagario, 85 Phil. 79 536 (1925).
People v. Venviaje, 47 Phil.
(1949); Victorias Milling Co., Ine. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. bo» 97 Phil. 913 (1955).
Chang Yung Fa v. Gianzon, No. 761, 105 Phil, 893 (1959).
(1962). Collector of Internal Revenue v. Manila Lodge
100 Phil. 795 (1957); Endencia
Kuenzle & Steiff v. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil. 510 Remnant Co., Inc.,
(1915); Chang Yourng City of Manila v. Manila
Fa v.
Giunzou, 97 Phil. 913 (L966); People v. Misamis Lumber Co., Inc.
v. Collector of Internal
Cio Ka Veuviuje, 47 I'hil. 536 (1926).,
Tue &Sons v. Rice and Corn Board, 20 SCR 147 (1967). .David, 93 Phil. 696 (1963);
De Ponce Revenue, 102 Phil. 116 (1957). 336 U.S. 198, 93 L. ed. 611
v. Sagario, 85 Phil. 79 (1949). Fruit & Steansbip Co.,
Victorius Milling Co., Inc. v. Social "Lawson v. Suwannee
Vctorias Milling Co., Inc. Social Security Commission, supra. (1949).
No. 52178, Sept. 28, 1982, 116 SCRA 755.
(1962) v. Security Commission, 114 Phil. 558, "Ernesto Court of Appeals, G.R.
»° v
131
INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES
180 A. In General
read-
and the word given a meanin Consequently, the grammatical and ordinary
definition will be disregarded r u l e s o fg r a m m a r
consequences. For instanc het its correct sense."

rufa Hlatute must presumed yield
be to
will avoid any of such results
or
Executive Orders 900 and 901 ing
statute ghould generally be given their ordinaryor
der Republic Act No. 4166 and the Words in a
defined as a planter-owner of su' they should not be given a trict o r
limited signifi-
term "sugarcane planter" is district who hasne 21 Thus, in
u s v a lm e a n i n g ; |
mill a legislative intent to that effect.

cation i n t h e .absence of
sugar
plantation within the particular tax on foreign
and reserve sugar quotas, exempts certain importations from
allocated export and/or domestic This a s t a t u t e which
hici
manufacture or prepara
statutory definition excludes
so-called emergency, non-quota.
non exchange, whic hich are actually used in the ex-
having no sugar quo thereof, that are actually the
district and accommodation planters, they
was abolished and had
of local products, forming part does notproduct
mean that
However, in 1955, the quota system ed,the phrase "forming part thereof"
change not
by me-
into the local
said that with such a should be merged
port
.
imported artic icles

le
been reintroduced. The court in or materially mixed, or
chemically
continue adhering to the previo ious process or physically
situation, it would be illogical to hanical identity; it means, in its ordinary
sense,
their legal effect." However, in a ombined, so as
to l0se its
definitions that had already lost article is needed to accomplish the export
abroad
where a statute remaina
subsequent case, it was held
that hat the imported manufactured.22 Where the word "business"
according to its clear and origina f the product locally in its
unchanged, it must be interpreted account the changes
it should be understood
staiute 18 not qualified,
mandate until the legislature taking into J5ed in a tax to embrace activities or affairs
where
situation subjected to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessar

sary nlain and ordinary meaning
or livelihood ia the motive; and in this sense, a
amendment.17
orofit is the purpose liquor at its clubhouse in
a limited
club selling
fraternal sOcial their guests, without
intention to
members and
SCale only to its "business."23 The term "present
ordinary sense. i8 not engaged in
6.04. Words construed in their obtain profit, "for those who are at least
which states that
the gen: value" in the provision of present value of
an-
In construing words and phrases used in statute,
a
years of age, lump sum payment
intent to the contrary sixty-five to be paid monthly:
eral rule is that, in the absence of legislative first five years and future annuity
nuity for the from annuity for
they should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage mean- however, That there shall be no discount
in their natural, Provided, on the date
ing.1 The words should be read and considered the first five years
of those who are sixty-five or. over
in its technical
ordinary, commonly accepted and most obvious signification, ac the law took effect,
is used in its ordinary and not
to the retired em-
cording good
to and approved usage and without resorting to forced and restricted
sense because said law
grants
his age and
or subtle construction. For words are presumed
to have been em- substantial sum for his sustenance considering
ployee should be resolved in
ployed by the lawmaker in their ordinary and common use and
in said law, being for his benefit,
any doubt from
rule, should not that the there should be no discount
acceptation." And courts, as a presume his favor. In that ordinary sense, that
words and the When statute provides
the present value of his annuity24
of a
lawmaking body does not know the meaning the
retired and paid gratuity" may at their option
persons who were
Laweon v. Suwannee Fruit & Steamship Co., 336 US 198, 93 L. ed. 61 1973, 52 SCRA 92;
Guevarra v.
(1949; Ermesto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 62178, Sept. 28, 1982, 116 SCIRA 766. OEspind Cleofe, G.R. No. 33410, July 13,
v.
16 SCHA 383.
Ernesto v. Court of Appeals, supra. Inocentes, GR. No. 25577, March 15, 1966, 598 (1954); Lo Cham v.
"Amadora v. Court Appeals, 160 SCR 316 (1988). Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. Central Bank, 104
"MustangLumber, Ine. v. Court of Appeala, 71 8CAD 166, 257 SCRA 430 Ocampo, 77 Phil. 635 (1946).
Phil. 598 (1954).
(1996), citing Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 8econd ed. (1990), p. 131, Pedro v. Central Bank, 104
Central Azucarera Don Manila Lodge No. 761, 105 Phil.
983 (1957);
Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. Central Bank, 104 Phil. 698 (1954); Etpino v. Collector of Internal Revenue v.
Cloofe, G.R, No. 33410, July 13, 1973, 62 BCRA 92 (1978); Phil. Acotylene Co. V Filipino, Inc. of Cebu, 116 Phil. 310 (1962).
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Club Insurance
Central Barik, 120 Phil. 829 Inc. v. Government Service
(1964). Phil. Assn. of Government Retirees,
uPeople v. Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352
(1923). bysten, G.R,No. June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA
20503,
610.
183
INTERPHETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES
A. In General
gratuity
the anzual r e t i r a .
contains no
definition of el-
of such ent The Revised Forestry Code included in forest
receive in lieu not coOnstrue th
elect to
the court
may
ord pay or lumber.
Whíle the former is 15
provided in
the act, yet to retire ther timber defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3,
the latter
as
personnel who are s e ter products a s
those nmilitary and ordinary of the s a m e section
in the definition
including
found in paragraph (aa)
15
for a grammatical
Or
took effect, the Processing plant

said law
"processing plant," which reads: (aa) of machine
latter." of
words excludes the machine o r combination
set-up,
Inc.
Wood
Cou.
Products, u. any
mechanical
of loga and other forest
raw
mater1a1s
in Matuguina
Integrated transferee oe A used for the processing blackboard, paper
whether
a
the tra.4 fored
raised was wallboard,
veneer, plywood,
peals, one of the issues obligations
arising from
o
into lumber, other finished wood products."
is liable for forest concessionaire
co board, pulp, paper or
concession
illegal
e n e r v a c h n i e n t into
another
Section 61 of
P.D. No. 705 provi vides the inmitted This simply m e a n s that lumber ia
a processed loE
u s e s the
or
term
." he
the transfer. the transferor forest r a w material. Clearly,
the Code
prior to or The processed copy-
all the obligations In the 1993
shall assume
an o r c o m m o n usage.
Lransferee
transferee was
not liable, lumber in its ordinary International Dictionary, lu
Court held that the general] of Webster's Third
right edition
are
the terms therein
used
timber after being pre-
or logE
cunstruing statutes, meaning which is ber is defined,
inter alia, as or
meaning, that 1s, such processed log
given their ordinary the to end ag the market. Simply put, lumber is a
they are commonly used, pared for

cribed to them when avoided. The term
'obligationat timber"
must be intent to
absurdity in the law ofSection e 8 the absence of legislative
"It is settled that in
paragraph
of the second of statute should
be
used in the final clause incurred by the used ina
those obligations words and phrases
P.D. No. 705 is construed
to mean
the contrary, meaning. And
of business. It cannot be ce ordinary, and c o m m o n usage
transferor in the ordinary course
incurred bv the
con given their plain, of timber without the required
legal docu-
or liabilities a s possession
those obligations insofar a s amended,
strued to mean
of the law, as these are 68 of PD. No. 705,
transferor as a result of transgressions ments is concerned, Section timber. Nei-
processed
the transferor, and could not have been
between r a w or
no distinction
personal obligations of makes
distinguit nec nos
distinguere
absent any moditying provision to should we. Ubi lex non
included in the term 'obligations' ther
that effect.7 l debemus, *29
the issue is'
In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,28
whether or not the word "lumber" is included in the word "timber" General words construed generally.
6.05. taken in its
as the latter is used in Sec. 68 of PD. No. 705, iwhich penalizes the a statute is to be
cutting, gathering andor collecting timber or other forest products i,i A word of general significance in it is shown that the
sense, unless
ordinary and comprehensive meaning."
without a license. In quashing the information charging
a
person word is intended to
be given a different or
restricted
provision, the trial court held that the subject verba sunt generaliter
with violation ofsaid
matter of he charge sheet is "lumber," which is neither "timber The rule is expressed in the maxim, generalia
shall be generally under-
o r what is generally spoken
intelligenda,
shall be understodd in a general
sense.
nor "other forest products." In reversing the trial court's ruling, the
Supreme Court held that the trial court gravely erred in quashing stood or genoral words A general state
est interpretandum.
the information because lumber is included in the term timber. The Generale diclum generaliter
ment is understood in a general
sense.
Court explained:
E»pino v. Cleofe, G.R. No. 33410, 1bid., pp. 448-449. 999

75 SCAD 626, 263 July 13, 1973, 63 SCRA 92. 3Calder & Co. v. U.S. 334 (1907); Malicsi
v. Collector of Internal Revenue,
SCRA 490 (1996). Phil. Acetylene Co. v.
lbid., p. 613. Phil. 596 (1956); People v. Chavez, 120 Phil. 1019 (1964);
71 SCAD Central Bank, 120 Phil. 829 (1964).
166, 257 SCRA 430 (1996).
INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES 185
A. In General
184
c e n t r a l
consisting of the legislative, executive and
g o v e r n m e n t ,
departments well as constitutional bodies, as dietin-

as
Where a word used in a statute has both a restricted arnd other governmental entities,
over the restricted
and judicial
from
local g o v e r n n
the
general meaning, the general must prevail Íshed
ynonymous with the term "The Government of

matter o r the context in which it Government," which are
less the nature of the subject Dd 1of
Republic f the Philippines"toorinclh"Philippine
limited sense is intended.31 Thu include not only the central govern-
employed clearly indicates that the nus, enough
broad governments and government-owned or con-
where a general word is used in a statute, its generic meaning nay expressions
unless the intention to do 8o i The term "product of the Philippines"

not be restricted by other words, ment rnorations.38
trolled c o r p o r a t i o n s . 3
a general word should not ho in its usual signification to mean any product
clear and manifest." In other words, be
taken
where no restriction is indicated,33 Fo should
country; hence, bran (ipa) and pollard (darak)

given a restricted meaning in the
limit the meaning of a word, it produced
imported into the country are "products of

if the legislature has intended to
produo from w h e a tt
so. That it did not, gives
have been easy for it to have done
t h e P h i l i p p i n e s . "39
would
rise to the presumption that it has
not limited nor intended to limit
the meaning of the word.* term includes things that arise thereafter.
Ceneric
signification employed in a statute should
Application of rule. A word of general of legislative intent to the contrary, to
5.06. in the absence
generaliter intelligenda, is conditions obtaining at the time of
c o n s t r u u e d
sunt
The maxim, generalia verba be
not only peculi
For instance, the word "for may normally arise after
its ap-
comprehend
by way of
illustration. enactment but those that
best understood from contrib-
Code prohibiting any foreigner rule of construction is known as progres-
eigner" in the Election
inciudes a juridical person:
The word "per. wal aG well.40 Thiswhich extends by construction the applica-
uting campaign funds corporation, unless it appears sve interpretation, all subjects o r conditions within its gerneral
son" comprehends private juridical t0
limited sense; and the word "person" tion of a statute that c o m e into existence subsequent to its
that it is used in a m o r e must be or scope
under a penal statute which is intended to inhibit a n act, purpose
legislation from becoming ephemeral
a n artificial a s well a s a natural person.3 pas8age and thus keeps said that a general rule may,
and
a person in law," that is, and transitory. It
has been
word or phrase accompa o r class of
The term judge' without any modifying in s o m e particular c a s e
be construed in its generic sense

to comprehend all frequently does, originate of the legislature at the time; but so
nying it is to
inferior courts and justices
of which is in the mind
judges of cases
the courts cannot, in
it is expressed in general language
kinds of judges, including
The word "government" used without qualifi- long as its application to these
the Supreme Court.35 limit
its implied o r generic s e n s e
and not the absence of express restrictions, within the termus
cation should be understood in In its it to ali c a s e s that come
the term "National
Government." cases, but must apply framed in
in the strict signification of o r control- and its general purpose and policy.
Hence, 8tafutes
includes government-owned and to n e w sub
implied or generic sense, it to n e w c a s e s that arise,
"National Government" refers only terms apply to
led corporations.37 The term
general time to time, and which
come within
from
Jects that are ereated, It is a rule of statutory construc-
tneir general scope and policy.
and comprehensive
that legislative e n a c t m e n t s in general
No.
Belo v. PNB, G.R.
'Marcos v. Chief of Staff, AFP, 89 Phil. 239 (1951); on to all persons,
8ub-
alike
134330, March 1, 2001. m8, proupective in operat ion, apply
Tolentino v. Catoy, 82 Phil. 300 (1948). Inc. v.
Getz Corr. of the Phils.,
Lo Cham Ocampo, 77 Phil. 635 (1946);
v.
21, 1982, 116 SCRA 86.
Court of Appeuls, G.R. No. 59823, Aug.
120 Phil. 829 (1964). 63 SCRA
4Phil. Acetylene Co. v. Central Bank, 1970, 30 No. 33022, April 22, 1976,
G.R. No. 32660, Oct. 22,
4Gatchalian v. Comnmission on Elections,
431.
ELTal Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
SCRA435. Villaluz, G.R. No. 28464, May
Phil. 297 (1948); Collector of
Customs v.
Comnissioner of Customs,
Vargas v. Rillaroza, 80
G.R. No. 34038, June 18, 1976, 71 SCRA 366. 7 39
31, 1971, cFlour Mille, Ine. v.
Sewerage Authornty SCRA 269. 30, 1971, 40

SCRA 362.
of Appeals, G.R. No. 33500, Aug.

National Waterworks &
C & C Commercial Corp.v. EDnCourt
G.R. No. 27275, Nov. 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 984.
188
STATUTORY CONsTRUCTION OF WORDS AND PHRASES
187
INTERPRETATION
A. In General
jects and business within their general under_tood, by the inm-

into existence subsequent to their purview and scope cr should be
construed as universally
passage. oming laws
porter or trader,4«
The pB1rase
Conformably with the rule, the phrase "articles of Examples may be cited to
illustrate the principle.
importation" used in the Tariff and Customs Code prohibita in its ordinary s e n s e implies parting
away with
somne
those already declared embrace nat dispose of"

to another. However, the phrase
has acquired a
prohibited at time of its adoption h

also goods and articles that
the thing, its delivery
merchants, as referring to "sell,"
so
may be the subject of activities commercial meaning among
taken in violation of subsequent und the phrase 18 used in a statute,
such as in a tax law
laws. Similarly, where a statnts that when
that no tax shall be collected on
articles which,
speaks of "any election," it means not
only election provided by lau which provides be
at the time but any election which shall have been "disposed of," it should
may, thereafter be held as wel before its taking effect,
sense." The phrase *gross value in money" is
including the election of delegates to the understood in that
tion.4 constitutional conven: another example. This-phrase
has a well-defined meaning in trade
of
or the total amount
: or commerce.
It "gross
means selling price"
which the purchaser pays to the vendor to
money or its equivalent
6.08. Words with commercial and it should be taken in this sense when em-
or
trade meaning. receive the goods,
Words and phrases, which are in common use ployed in a statute."
chants and traders, acquire trade or commercial among mer
meanings which Words with technical or legal meaning.
are generally accepted in the community in which they have been 5.09.
in
common use. When any of such words or phrases is used in a As a general rule, words that have, or have been used in, a
statute, it should not be given a new or strange interpretation, but technical sense or those that have been judiciaily construed to have
should be given such trade or commercial meaning as has been a certain meaning should be interpreted according to the sense in
generally understood among merchants." For settled is the rule which they have been previously used, although the sense may
that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, trade or vary from the strict or literal meaning of the words. " The, pre-
commercial terms, when used in a statute, are presumed to have sumption is that the language used in a statute, which has a tech-
been used in their trade or commercial sense. nical or well-known legal meaning, is used in that sense by the
egislature. 60
The rule is especially applicablé to tariff 1laws and laws pt

commerce. The understanding of words used in such statutes on The technical or legal, not the ordinary or general, meaning of
the part of traders and importers may determine the constructio0 atheword used in statute should be adopted in the construction of
a
statute, in the
to be given to the language of such types of laws. The rule preval absence of any qualification or intention to the
particularly with respect to lawa for the government of the m contrary. Thus, Section 14 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court, which
Prescribes the steps to be taken when property attached is claimed
porter. His business is regulated by them; andit is but reasonabie
that, like the language of marine policies and the terms
of the la oya person' other than the defendant or his agent, contains a
to his class, thes proviso that "nothing herein contained shall prevent-such third
of merchant, supposed to be especially applicable PErSOn from
vindicating his claim to the property by any proper
iting
"Justice Bocobo dissenting, Dioquino v. Araneta, 74 Phil. 705 (1944), C Calder & Co. v. U.s., 8 Phil. 334 (1907).
26 R.C.L, Pp. 778-778.
Asit
1Lie Petroleum Co. v. Collector of Inturnal Revenue 38 Phil. 510 (1918).
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 33500, Aug. 80, 1971, 40 SCRA 1973, 59 D:guel Corp. v. Municipal Council of Mandaue, G.R. No. 30761, July 11,
Geotina
Gatchalian
v.
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 32660, Oct. 22,1 Nu. 206l
No. 20660, June
a Republic Cement Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R.
13, 1968, 23 SCRA 967
SCRA 436. (1968).
"Asiatic Petroloum Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 38 Phil. 510 Juy 1 bUeTLko v.
Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
Municipal C'ouncil of Mandaue, G.R. No. 3076l, ** Eeplier v. U.S., 11
San Miguel Corp. v.
Phil. 669 (1904).
1973, 62 SCRA 43.
PHRASES
189
INTERPRETATION
OF WORDI AND
A. In General
action." To the argument that the phrase "proper action" limitst

date of commission
of
third party's remedy to intervening in the action in which the wri refer to the date
of conviction, not to
date of several
Desos" convicted on the s a m e
of attachment was issued, the court said that the word "acion" ha
acquired a well-defined, technical meaning as an "ordinaryBuitn the crime, so that a person
different dates but jointly
tried is not thereby
committed o n
offenses
a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the disqualified
provision,53
under said
enforcement or protection of a right, or the

prevention or redress of
a wrong," while Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court under the terms in same statute construed.
6.10. How identical
heading "Commencement of Action" states that a "civil action may in a
word or phrase repeatedly used
be commenced by filing a complaint with the proper court" "n general rule is that a
The statute.54 The
throughout the
employing the word 'commencement,' the rule clearly indicates an statutewill beur the same meaning
to it a meaning different from
action which originates an entire proceeding and puts in motion word will not be so
construed as give
substan-
in said statute.5 The samne word or
the instruments of the court calling for summons, answer, etc., and that of the same word
appearing in different parts of a statute will
not any intermediary step taken in the course of
the proceeding tially the same phrase
and consistent meaning, unless a
It would be be accorded a generally accepted
whether by the parties themselves or by a stranger.
different intention appears or is clearly expressed.5 Thus, a word
indeed if the framers of the Rules of Court should have
strange
of "intervention' or equiva or phrase one part of
in a statute is to receive the _ame interpreta-
employed the term "proper action" instead tion when used in every other part, unless it clearly appears from
lent expression if the intention had been just that. It was all the or otherwise thata different meaning is intended.5"
natural thing to say interventioni thecontext
easier, simpler and the more
asserted right of the third The reason for the rule is that a word used in a statute in a
that had been the purpose, since the
the pending suit." given sense is presumed to be used in the same sense throughout
party claimant necessarily flows out of
the law. While the rule is not, by some authorities, regarded as so
Where a
is dismissed, it is not equivalent tothe
criminal case rigid and peremptory as some of the rules of statutory construction,
technical or legal
for the latter has a it 16 nevertheless particularly applicable where in the statute the
accused being "acquitted," was accused in
a public officer who
meaning For this reason, Anti-Graft Law, which was s wOrds appear so near each other physically, and partieularly where
criminal case for violation of the 13 there ne word has a technical meaning and that meaning has been
entitled to the benefits of
Section defined in the statute.58
missed, will not be is "acquitted, he shall
officer
which provides that if a public and benefits whien Where, for instance, a statute classifies riceland in share ten-
and to his salaries
entitled to reinstatement
court ruled that the cording to average produce per hectare for the three agri-
receive during suspension." The
a finding of not B
failed to rayears next preceding the current harvest, and in another
meaning, which is
"acquitted" has a legal include a dismissal
of the et h e
IS10n of the same statute it classifies riceland in leasehold ac-
based on the merit.
It does not wneu
does not amount to
acquittal, except
all t
en
th the normal average harvest of the three preceding years,
because dismissal presented ord year" should also be understood as agricultural year and
prosecution has
after the evidence.2 The wo
dismissal c o m e s
based on insufficiency
of such
disqualifies
tlendar
that if in year; and an agricultural year represents one crop, 60
dence and is which one calendar
the probation law year two crops are raised, then that repre
previously convicted"in previously
convicted bye
than
"who have been of not less
probation persons imprisonment
n d r e d
offense punished by than two hu

judgment of a n and/or a fine of
no less Rura v. Lopena, 137 SCRA 121
o n e month
and o n e day Krivenko v. Reg (1986).
tegister of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
ailroad &Warehouse
er oran v. Katsinas, Commission, 49 NW2d 386, 27 ALR2d 1197 (1951).
Phil. 94, 99
(19biPeople of Deeda, 79 167 NE2d 38, 71 ALR2d 1108 (1959); Krivenko
v. Regis-
Ramos, 88
°
Phil. 461
Manila Horald
Publishing
Ine.
Co.,
No. 66028,
v.
July 80, 1981, 106 SCRA Z3 SCRA Ndu v. (1947).

Comunissjon
Lising, G.R. on Electiona, G.R. No. 69068, Jan. 27, 1983, 120
Malanyaon v.
84 Phil. 722 (1949).
Froe
Salico, Kyttner v. Collector of
v.
Customs, 18 Phil. 461 (1911).
190 PHRASES 191
INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND
A. In General
sents two agricultural years.*Following the same principle, th non-technical sense, its technical
or legal
term "agricultural land" in Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Con word employed therein in favor of that construction which will
stitution which states that "public agricultural land shall not ba eaning will be rejected
intent or purpose.6
alienated" except in favor of Filipino citizens, and the term "agri effectuate
cultural land" in Section 5 thereof which provides that "no private

construed in relation to other provi
or aseigned" except to F Word or phrase
agricultural land shall be transferred 6.12.
should be construed as having the same meaning sions.
pino citizens, of nationalization and that a word, phrase or provision
should
both sections being based on the same policy The general rule is
in relation to
namely, the non-transferability of agricul. in isolation but must be interpreted
having the s a m e subject, not be construed the rule that
tural lands to aliens.60 of the law. This rule is a variation of
other provisions
should be construed a s a whole, and each of its provisions
a statute the
In accordance with this rule, in construing
of statute." must be given effect.
5.11. Meaning of word qualified by purpose word recall" in the provision of the Local Government Code, thee
used in a statute may be to the o n e provision of the law
The meaning of a word or phrase Court did not confine its meaning thereof.
enact the a meaning in relation to other provisions
the which induced the legislature to alone, but gave it
qualified by purpose
a word or phrase first limitation
statute. The purpose may indicate whether to give In Claudio v. COMELEC," the issue is whether the
commercial, restricted,
or in Sec. 74 of the Local Government
period
an ordinary, popular, technical, legal, regarding the one-year
shall take place within one (1)
expansive meaning. In construing
a word or phrase, the cour Code to the effect that No recall
best with the man of office or o n e (1)
should adopt that interpretation that accords year from the date of the official's assumption
or realizes its object.®7
Where, embraces the entire
fest purpose of the statute o r promnotes year immediately preceding a regular election"
or more con etc. o r
the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two
will mos recall proceedings, such a s the preparatory recall assembly,
structions, that construction should
be adopted which only the recall election. In answering the issue that "recall" refers
effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and only to the recall election and not those proceedings prior thereto,
tend to give and a co "recall"
the statute was enacted, which may take some time, the Court construed the word
promote the object for which
struction should be rejécted which
would tend to render abort inrelation to Sec. 69 of the Code to the effect that "the power of
of the statute and to defeat the object whicn
recall shall be exercised by the registered votera of a local
other provisions
legislator sought to attain by its enactment.a3 It is thus gene gOvernment unit to which the local elective official belongs. The
of more stated that "since the power vested on the electorateis not
recognized ambiguous and capable
that ifa statute' is ourt
one construction, the literal meaning'
of the word o r phrase Uhe power to initiate recall proceedings" but the power to elect an
such meanuAnd into office, the limitations in Sec. 74 cannot be deemed to
therein may be rejected if the result of adopting
had in mind.ng
ticial
apply to
be to defeat the purpose which the legislature the entire recall
statute will be accomplished by gv proceedings.
where the purpose of a
.AWord or provision should not be construed in isolation from,
to ould be interpreted in relation to, the other provisións of a
9 6 8 , 26
#,
Proe or other statutes dealing on the same subject. The word or
G.R. No. 21488, Oct. *, not be given a meaning that will restrict or defeat,
D e la Paz v. Court of Agrarian Relations, butonshould
but should.
SCRA 479. GR
instead be onstrued to effectuate, what has been in-
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
Appea of tended in an illustration in Garcia
Muñoz & Co. Hord, 12 Plil. 624 (1909); Gelano v. Court
v. Zaffert
enacting law. This principle finds
No. 39050, Feb. 24, 1981, 103 SCRA 90.
43 Phil. 803 (1922); Molina
v.
*
Luzon Stwvedoring Co. v. Natividad, SCRA
38 Phil. 167 (1918).

Hord, 12 Phil. 485 (1909); David v. Court
of Appeals, 10 Phil. Ausn. of
Ty Sue v. Governi Retirees, Inc. v. Government Service Insurance
114 (1988). m, G.R.
n, G.R NNo. overnment
Riera Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 106 (1919). * 20503,
6126 SCAD
0 June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 610 (1965).
61,.331 SCRA 388, 404 (2000).
193
INTERPRETATION OF WOKD AND PHRASES
192 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION A. In Gieneral
entitled
when it enacted Republic Act No. 6735
y Congress Referendum
u. COMELEC," where the issue raised is whether a local reRal: An Act Providing
For a
System of Initiative and
ion 'Thus, its Section 3(a) ex-
of
a municipal council can be the subject of an initiative andro and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
resolutions as subjects of initiative on local
endum. The Constitution requires that the legislature shall Dru oressly includes
a system of initiative and referendum, whereby the
vide Section 16 states: 'Limitations
people erislations x x x. Similarly, its
directly approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passedCan Tnon Local Legislative Bodies. -
Any proposition on ordi-

the Congress, or local legislative body. Congress thereafter enacted nance or
resolution x x x.
Rep. Act No. 6735, which includes resolutions as among the subiect
of initiative. However, the Local Government Code, a later la
defines local initiative as "the process whereby the registered voten "Contrary to the submission of the respondents, the sub-
of a local government unit may directly propo8e, enact, or amend sequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991
since resolution is not included which also deals with localinitiative did not change the scope
any ordinance." It is claimed that
a
the Code did not limit the
in this definition, then the same cannot be the subject ef an initia of its coverage. More specifically,
coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone. Section 120,
tive. In rejecting this claim, the Supreme Court ruled: Chapter 2, Title IX, Book I of the Code cited by respondents
We reject respondents' narrow and literal reading of the merely defines the concept of local initiative as the legal proc-
the Constitution and
above provision for it will collide with ess whereby the registered voters of a local government unit
the pre
will subvert the intent of the lawmak>rs in enacting may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. +t does
Government Code of 1991 on initiative
visions of the Local not, however, deal with the subjects or matters that can be
and referendum. taken up in a local înitiative. It is Section 124 of the seme
not ordinances
only Code which does. It state:
The Constitution clearly includes
local initiative.
but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a
"xXX
provides in luminous language: "The
Section 32 of Article VI
for a system d "b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters
Congress shall, as early as possible, provide
therefrom,
and the exceptions which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to en
initiative and referendum,
and enact laws or act
can directly propose
whereby the people paseed by the
o r reject any
act or law or part thereof This provision clearly does not limit the
approve
legislative body x. x x.'
An act includes8
local initiative to ordinances, but to all application of
Congress or local law should be construed
in
subjects or matters
basic that a which are within the legal
resolution. x x x It is In line powers of the Sanggunians to en-
the Constitution.
not in violation of act,' which undoubtedly includes resolutions. This
harmony with and Gyarina that if
there H
interpreta-
we held in In Re tion is supported
with this postulate, the legislative, by Section 125 of the same Code which pro-
as to the meaning of Vdes: Limitations upon Sanggunians. Any
doubt o r uncertainty the enactment
provisions are obscure, or if
ordinance approved proposition or
-
the words or
constructions, that interpr
erendum as herein
through the system of initiative and ref-
susceptible of two
or more
fairly which will avoid the
effect provided shall not be repealed, modified or
tation will be adopted ded by the sanggunian concerned within six (6) months
it may be necessary, 10r
though
unconstitutionality,
even
usual or apparent impo rom the date of approval therèof x x x.' Certainly, the inclu-
the more
purpose, to
disregard n of the word proposition is inconsistent with respondentsS
the language used. 2
(i.e., res
5 0 l u
8
ves.
that only ordinances can be the subject of local initia-
command to
include acts ented x x x."68
constitutional
"The initiative was impleme
appropriate subjects of
tions) as
Lbid., pp. 290-294.

(1994).
237 SCRA 279
755 SCAD 789,
TERPRETATION OF WORDS AND
A. In General PHRASES 195
194
the question
ral products"presented
to
the court is
Corporation
the
Luaw
authorizes In a case,
includes domesticated whether the

To further illustrate, corporate for threig
a g r i c u l t
to continue as a body phrase

grown in ponds. he phrase is used in animals and
solved corporation
prosecuting Suits by or agai
a tax
defending and
TOducts from the statute which
for the purpose of payment
such produ
to a "trust fish of taxes, the
to convey all its properties purpose
exempts
ge the development of the
and during said period creditors and other b e i n gt o ence
resources of the country.
members, stockholders, that he phrase includes
the benefit of its
ruled
not only
transfer of the properties
to the trustee haie
The
court
rectly resulting vegetable sub-
from the tillage of the soil
ested persons, the stockholders. The word t o but also do-
s t a n c e s d i r e c t l y
the protection of its

creditors and
technical sense of an
uste estic and domesticated animals,
d s . The court
p o n ds.
animal
T h e s , animal products, and
fish or
not in its legal or gave the
should be understood
concept which
grOWn
in
an phrase expansive
but in its general
would bangus
m e a n t o p r o m o t e the object of the law.
appointed for the purpose, the prosecution ac.
to whom was entrusted
include a lawyer another case, the issue raised is whether the word
of sums of money against
the corporation's d ebt "con-
cases for recovery
sense is to allow sunption"is limited or broad meaning. The word is
construe the word in
its n a r r o w
such
ors, for to th statute tute which provide8 that "except as hereinafter specifi-
at the expense of another and in a
debtors to enrich themselves used atd. there shull be puid by ench merchunt and manufac-
law.0
eully exruup
defeat the purpose of the ät the. of one-third of one per centum on the
a
tax gross
to whether the Sandiganbayan is urer
of all ; goods, wares, and merchandise sold, bartered,
To resolve the question as value in
inoney
domestic consumption." The court ruled that con-

of Rep. Act No. 6975 which makas orexchanged for
regular court within the meaning of the Philippine National Pa. t r the
sidering thepurpose of the law, which is to tax all merchants
members
eriminal actions involving
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court, expressly xempted, it is reasonuble and fair to con
lice come "within the except thos
purpose of the law, which is to clude thut the legislature used the terin in its sense of use, com-
the Court considered the primary
over criminal cases in. otherwise, and not in its limited sense of total destruc-
remove from courts-martial the jurisdiction mercial or
vest it in the courts within the thing sold.72

inembers of the PNP and to tion of the
volving
the terms civil and regular courts are
judicial system. It ruled that of the rule that a construction should be rejected
llustrative
and the terr1 "reguar
used interchangeably by the legislators, which would negatu the purpose of tho law is Mottomul v. Lela
means civil courts.
"There could have "court" in Sec
courts" in Rep. Act No. 6975 Paz. The pivotal issue raised is whether the word 6.
since the primary purpose of the Eect of
been no other meaning intended tion 5 of Republic Act No. 5434, which reads: "Sec.
law is to remove from courts-martial
the jurisdiction over criminal shall not stay the award, order, ruling, decision
the courts -Appeal
Appeal.
cases involving menbers
of the PNP and to vest it in unless the officer or hody rendering the same or the
which, as or judgnent
judicial system, i.e., the civil as it may deen
courts
such terma
court, on motion, after hearing, and
within our on
are the regular
courts.
from courts-martial, of a stay granted by
contradistinguished
sys just, should provide otherwine. The propriety
Courts-martial are not courts within the Philippine judicial the ullicer or body rendering the award, order, ruling, decision or
of the government retfers to
tem, they pertain to the executive department Judgment be raised only by motion in the mail. case,"
"Regular une Court may
of Appeals or the trial court. "he Court held that th
and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power"
courts are those within the judicial department of the Government, and not to the Court of Ap
Court and such lower courts as may be estat wOrd court' refers o the trial court stated its declared objec
namely, the Supreme eals. lt ruled that "the law unequivocally decision, award, order,
lished by law," which include the Sandiganbayan created by PD
the appealed
t d appeal shall not stay bocy rendering
the
No. 1486, as amended." C is where the officer or
eXplion given
elano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 39050, Feb. 24, 1981, 103 SCRA
Molina Rafferty, 38 Phil. 167 (1916
iepublic . Asuncion, 49 SCAD 573, 231 SCRA 211 (1994; Yu Murñuz & Co v. Hord, 12 Phui 624 1O
Sandiganbayan, 82 SCAD 16, 271 SCRA 575 (1997) 167 SCRA 743,
752-753 (1990)
INTERPRE OF
WORDS AND
A. In General PHRASES 197
196
h i c h p r o v i d e s
that a arian owner of
the
covered property
marshylands or lands
with wateradjoining
should provide lands,
motion, after hearing a of banks of
same, or the court on
the law provides further other foreshore
on shore
navigable lakes border-
wise. In line with the above objective, nly for such lands or rivers
shall have
the propriety of a stay granted by
the oficer or body renderinot
le
strictly speaking, refers only to rivers adjoining his property, the
word
may be raised only by moti ion
award, order, decision or ruling a person who owns land situated and a ripar-
" r i p a r i a n ,
of Appeals correctly interDr

the main case. Hence, the
Court
broad sense as reterr1ng to anyon the banks of river,
j a no w n e r
to appeal from a decision in a

that if the adverse party intends property
used
frontage, that being the sense in

which tho te:mhaving
js be a
desires to stay the execution of thee
SEC and pending appeal oreshore lands,' "marshy lands,"
it mentions "fore is used
water
be filed with and be heard by the or "lands

sion, then the motion must cov
w h e n
to the, Court of
ered with water."7
before the party perfects its appeal

adverse
interpretation gives meaning and i ontext may also limit the
peals." "By and large, such meaning of what otherwise is a
of the laW where the need for imm Thus, the context in which
stance to the avowed purpose of broad'significatio
diacy of execution of decisions arrived at by said bodies, was ree
ecog
word
used in the Anti-Subversion Act, namely, the word
is
"knowingly,
o v e r t h r o w ,
the other hand, the contra by overt acts," rejects its metaphorical,
nized and considered imperative." "On willfully and
mandate of the law that 'appeal to "peaceful"
overthrow" by force or violence.7
sense
view would negate the express limits.its meaning
the award, order, ruling, decision or judgment an. and ich
context in which the same Lastly,
word is used in different
shall not stay the parts of a
and not the lower court or
pealed from, should the appellate court
facts, be authorized to enjoin
atute may give ita generic sense in one
part and a limited mean-
administrative body which tried the ag in another part. where
a municipal tax ordinance provides
execution thereof." hat"any owner or manager of fishponds" shall pay an annual tax
ofa fixed amount per hectare and it appears that the owner of the
context. fshponds is the government which leased ihem to a private person
5.13. Meaning of term dictated by who operates them, the word "owner" cannot be construed to in-
While ordinarily a word or term used
in a statute will be given cude the government because of the ancient principle that the
the context in which
its usual and commonly understood meaning, gOvernment is immune from taxes, and the one liable for taxes is
dictate'a different sense. The
the word or term is employed may the operator who is embraced in the word "manager."
which the word is used oftentimes determines its mean
context in
a word is to be understood in the context in
ing.4 Differently stated, materiam. Thus, 5.14. Where the law does not distinguish.
which it is used. Verba accipienda sunt secundum
in a statute which provides that the "family home extrajudicialy It is a well-recognized rule that where the law does not disin-
formed shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment, guish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
word "debts" in the context in
except" "for nonpayment of debts," the distinguere ilebemus. The rule, founded on logic, îs a corollary of
which it is used should be taken in its generic sense, i.e., obligations the prineiple thut general words and phrases in a statute should
in general. Where a law classified all lands into timber, mineral
is used
and agricultural, it is apparent that the word "agricultural" 80 SCRA
to include all lands that are neither timber
nor "Santulan v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 28021, Dec. 15, 1977,
in a broad sense 648.
mineral, such being the context in which the term is used." Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. Phil. American Forwarders, Inc., G.R. No.
Phil. v.
The context may likewise give a broad sense to a word u 25152, March 25, 1978, 69 SCRA 231.
48 SCRA
otherwise ordinarily limited meaning. For instance, in a stau ople v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 32613, Doc. 27, 1972, Rufly v. 382.
Chiof of Slaft, 76
v. Chi«f of laf, AFP 89 Phil. 239 (1961;
Phil reo
Phl. 876 (1940).
People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186 (1988). 1
14787, Jan. 28, 1961,
U.S. v. Estapia, 37 Phil. 17 (1917); Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. City of Ceb Gimenez, G.R. No.
SCRA 267;olgate-Palmolive Phils., Ine v.
121 Phil. 425 (1965). Libud udan v. Gil, G.R. No. 21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 1G oinaat
No. 25571, Murch l5,
People v. Chavez, 120 Phil. 1019 (1964). Derayunan, l. 452 (1926); Guevarra v.
Inocentes, G.R.
KriveFko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
INTERPRETATIONA. OF WORD8 AND PHRASES
In Ceneral 199
198
Illustration of rule.
natural and general significance a . 6.16.
ordinarily be accorded their be cited to
that a general term o r phrase
should not be red.he A few
cases may
illustrate the rule. Where a stat-
rule requires
distinguished from the other so as to i ta
granls
aa person
person
against whom the possession of "any land" is
into parts and o n e part ute wfully withhe held the
operalion of the law.* In other worda. ty
unlaw right to bring an action for unlawful
its exclusion from the there de
distinction in the application of a statute where tno the phra "any land" ncludes all kinds of land, whether
should be no tainer,
is indicated.5 For courts are not
authorized to distinguish we a g r i c u l t u r a l ,
residential or mineral." The phrase cannot be said to
makes distinction. They should instead administer agr clusively to public land any more than
it could be said to
the law no
as they find it and with re xclusively to
private land, the law not
law not a s they think it ought to be but out relate having made any
d i s t i n c t i o n , 9 1
Where the law authorizes the director of lands to
regard to consequences.85 file
llation
tions for cancella
the
of patents covering pubic lands on
A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law doos
not except something therefrom
d therein provid without distinguishing whether the lands
not make any exception, courts may
nless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it
gto the national or o any local government, he can do so
f the land has been ceded to a local government unit. Simi
The axiom, ubi lex non distinguit, nec non distinguere debemus larlv. where a statute exempts from the payment of realty taxes
erties owned by the Republic of the Philippines," there should
applies not only in the construction of general wordsof a expres
and
sions used in a statute but also in the interpretation rule laid no distinction between properties held in a sovereign, govern-
down therein. Thus, where the legislature has clearly laid down'à ental or political capacity and those possessed in a proprietary or
rule for one class of cases it is not readily to be supposed that, in natrimonial character so as to subject the latter to payment of
the same act, a different rule has
been prescribed for another class taxes.
of cases within the s a m e as the first. And it has been held that
courts should strive to avoid imputation of a design to distinguish Where a staute requires that
certain formalities be followed
in order that an act may be considered valid, it excludes the idea of
between cases upon a course of reasoning too unsubstantial and to
a distinction between essential and non-essential formalities and
finely draw for the regulation of the human action.88
considers all formalities essential, however insignificant they may
The principle that where the law does not distinguish, neither be in themselves or however meaningless they may be in relation
should the courts do so, assumes that the legislature made no to a particular case, for the validity of the act. Where a law does
The courts
qualification in the use of a general word or expression. not distinguish. between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the prepa-
may distinguish when there are facts
or circumstances showing
that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification,
for in ration of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or
dental cream, the' courts are not authorized to make any distinc-
Such case, the courts merely give effect to the legislative intent" tion, and must construe the words in their generic sense. Where a
Btatute allows the redemption or repurchase of a homestead prop-
28, 180
erty within five years from its "conveyance," the word "conveyance"
1966, 16 SCRA 379; Director of Lands v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 32522, Jan.
Olfato v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52749, March 31, 1981,
103 SCRA T1 elers to yoluntary and involuntary conveyances as the law did not
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. COA, 218 SCRA 203 (1993), citing R.E. ABP
Stututory Construction (1986), pp. 143-144.
Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 (1946). 16
Social Security System v. City of Bacolod, G.R.No. 35726, July 21, 1984, obles v. Zambales Chromite Co., 104 Phil. 688 (1958).
SCRA 412; Director of Lands v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 32622, Jan. 28, 1953. v. Municipality of Binalonan, 32 Phil. 634 (1916).
OVernent
Lo Chamv. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 (1946). arector of Lands v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 32522, Jan. 28, 1983.
Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720 (1903). 116
Decurity System v.
City of Bacolod, G.R. No. 36726, July 21, 1982,
Tolentino v. Catoy, 82 Phil. 300 (1948), SCRA 419
Chartered Bank of India v. Jmperial, 48 Phil. 931 (1921). 1982,. Velasco.v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720 (1903)
Social Security System v. City of Jan. 28, 1961, 1
Bacolod, G.R. No. 35726, July 21, E P a l 8CRA 9gate-Palmolive Phils., Ine. v. Gimenez, G.R. No. 14787,
SCRA 412; Garvida v. Sales, Jr., 82 SCAD 188, 271 SCRA 767 (1997), citiDg**
Statutory Construction, pp. 142-143 (1990).
SCRA 267.
200
INTERPRETATIONA. OF WORT AND PHRASES
In Ceneral 201
distinguish between the two kinds of conveyance. And whero. make such wocording
recordi is underscored by
law grats an employee "leavs of absence with pay," the phe he the of the
use
th e ilaw did not distinguish, the court should qualifier
"with pay" refers to full pay and not to half or less than full n any"
As
not.
and to all leaves of absence and not merely to sick or vacat In Ligget
olving
& Myers
the
Tbbacco Co.Collector of Internal
u.
Rev-
leaves.7 And where the !aw makes the Commission on Election 101
imposes a
interpretation
ic tax "on
specific
of a provision of the Tax Code
cigarettes
enue,
the sole judge of "all pre-proclamation controversies," the word "al containing Virginia to-
ured tobacco of seventy-one
w h i c h .
bacco and/or flue-cure

covers all pre-proclamation disputes involving national, provincial millimeters or less
ne and one-fourth kilos
made any distino or less
city and municipal officials, the law not having in length
apped i n tinfoil oil or cellophane or packed in per thousand,
tion or qualification.* SimiBarly, where the Rules provide that cartoons covered with
wax paper r in tin cans, on each
counterbond is to secure the payment of "any judgment," when paraffin
or
thousand, ten pesos;
execution is returned unsatisfied, the phrase "any judgment" in. Provided, That1 length exceeds seventy-one millimeters or the
sand
weight per thousa exceeds one and one-fourth
cludes not only final and executory judgment but also a judgment kilos, the tax shall
reased by o n e hundred per centum," the
pending appeal whose execution as ordered
i8 returned unsatisfied be question raised is
Lor in measuring the length or weight of cigarettes, filters
the Rules not having made any distinction.9° whe
.f excluded therefrom, so that the tax would come under
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200, entitled "An Act to Prohibit L general provision and not under the proviso. The court ruled
Violations of Private
and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related that the law not having distinguished between filter cigarettes and
Communications and Other Purposes," provides: "It shall be un- non-filter cigarettes, neither the executive department nor the court
authorized by all the parties to
lawful for any person, not being may distinguish one from
the hence, the tax should be
other, paid
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or aB fixed under the proviso. In Tiu San u. Republic,10 the question
any private to secretly
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, raised is whether the conviction of an applicant for naturalization
record such communication or spoken word for violation of a municipal ordinance would disqualify him irom
overhear, intercept, or
or dictagraph
by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone taking his oath as a citizen pursuant to a statute which provides
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however other. that an applicant may be allowed to take his oath as a citizen if
or detectaphone or
raised in connection with this provi
wise described." The question after two years from the promulgation of the decision granting hís
sion is whether violation thereof refers to the taping of a communi- petition for naturalization he can show that during the intervening
cation by a person other than a participant to the communication period he "has not been convicted of any offense or violation of
the
or even to the taping by a participant who did not secure government rules." The court ruled that as the law did not make
The court ruled
consent of the other party to the conversations. it illegal for any distinction between acts mala in se and those which are mala
that the provision clearly and unequivocally makes
not authorized by law, the parties to any private con prohibita, the conviction of the applicant for violation of a munici-
any person,
means ol a
pal ordinance, even if the same is malunm prohibitum, is compre-
versation to secretly record such communication by
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as
to whether the hendod within the statute and precluded the applicant from clesses
taking
be a party te oath. The phrase "convicted of any offense" indicates both
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to ot crimes are included within the purview of the law.
other than or different from those involved in the private commun"
w
cation. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized n Peralta u. Civil Service Commission,104 the issue raised is
CLher the provision of Rep. Act No, 2625 stating that govern-
Oliva v. Lamadrid, G.R. No. 23196, Oct. 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 737.
"Escosura v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., 114 Phil. 225 (1962). 03
159B1;
Olfatw v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52749, March 31, * irez v. Court of Appoals, 64 SCAD 636, 248 SCRA 590 (1996).
SCRA 741.
Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Cour, 1b0
CRA 10G.R.
10296 No. 9415,.April 22, 1957,
101 Phil. 106.
520 (1987).
Phil. 817 (1955).
Tiu San' v.
212 SCRA ublic, 96 Phil. 817 (1955).
425 433-434 (1992).
INTERPRETATIONA. OF WORDS AND PHRASES
In General 203
amber, he was deemed

of candidacy. Inautomatically resigned when
sanggunian
ment
employees are entitled
to fifteen (15) days vacation leavos
the Supreme Court sustaining
certific
his the Secretary of
of
absence with full pay and fifteen (15) days sick leaves with f he
filed
ocal ment, the,
Government, ruled: "Although
pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays in both cases that Section 13(2) of B.P. Blg. 697 admits of more than itone be
maycon-
applies only to those who have accumulated leave credits and nat
tion, taking
into sideration the nature of the
to those who have none, as construed by the Civil Service Commi struo
officials
enumerated
therein, namely, governors, positions of
sion in its policy guideline. In holding that the policy mayors, mem-
guideline ja Lhe
sanggunians barangay officials, the legisla-

of the various or
invulid, he Court ruled that the "construction by respondent Com. bers
to distinguish between elective positions
tiveintent to.
in Section
mission of R.A. No. 2626 is not in accordance with the, legislative asted to appointive pOSitions in Section 13(1) under the13(2)
Co all-
intent" 1he "law speaks of the granting of a right and the law does mbracing clause read ading 'any person holding public
not provide for a distinction between those who have accumulated nosition' is clear. t is a appointive
leave credits and those who have exhausted their leave credits in
rule in statutory construction that
t h e language of a particular section of a statute admits of
order to enjoy such right. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere wthan one construction, that construction which gives effect to
more
debemus." evident purpose and object sought to be attained by the

Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 provides that "Every can-
the
ment of the statute as a whole, must be followed."1o6 enact
didate x xx shal, within thirty (30) days after the day of the
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr.," the issue was whether
election, file x x x true and itemized statement of all contributions petitioner
who was over 21 but beloW 22 years of age was qualified to be an
and expenditures in connection with the election." As the law did
with'his
elective SK member. Section 424 of the Local Government Code
not distinguish between a candidate who pushed through provides that a member of the Kotipunan ng Kabataan must not be
candidacy and one who withdrew it, the term "every 'candidate more than 21 years. Section 428 of the same Code
must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his provides that an
elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more
campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.106 than 21 years of age on the day of his election,
On the other hand, where the intent to make distinction,ap "on the day of his election" as an additional
adding the phrase
qualification. The Su-
pears from the statute, the courts should. make the distinction. preme Court held that the
21 years of age:
petitioner was ineligible for being over
Illustrative of this rule is Section 13 of B,P, Blg, 697, which pro
vides that "1) any person holding a public appointive office or pos
"A closer look at the Local
tion x x x shall ipso facto cease in office or poaition as pf the time he Government Code will reveal
a distinction between the maximum age of a member irn the
iled his certificate of candidacy," and that "2) governors, mayors
members of the various sanggunians or barangay officiale ahal Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective
SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maxi-
on forced leave of ab;
upon the filing of candidacy, be considered
sence from office." An elective barangay captain was elected Prea n age at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to
dent of the Association of Barangay Councils and pursuant thereto e the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the
was appointed by the President as member of the Sangguntang oner hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an
Panlungsod. He thereafter ran for Congress but lost. He then wantea IVe SK official is 21 years old 'on the day of his election.
to resume his duties as member of the Sangguniang'Panlungso4 addition of the phrase 'on the day of his election' i8 an
saying that since Section (2)) of the law did not distinguish between onal qualification. The member may be more than zi
he was mere
appointive and elective member of the sanggunians, mem ge on election day or on the day he registers as
on forced leave when he ran for Congress. The Secretary of LOca
of the Katipunan Kabataan. The elective official,
overnment denied his request because: being an appoinu De ng
. 1 Iri,
1uilar v. cOMELEc, 62 SCAD 469, 245 SCRA 759 (1995).

106ar ciagco
SCAD 188,Rono,
v.
137 SCRA 671, 676, 676 (1985).
271 SCRA 767 (1997).
204 INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION A. In CGeneral 205
however, must not be more than' 21 years old on the day af

ipal judge (now municipl trial judge) to conduct "prelimi-
election. The distinction is understandable T eXamination or

investigauon may menn "and" because under
considering that
the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective
heihas the autho.
to conduct both the first
thelaw preliminary investigatíon.4 and second
SK of
stages
official than for a member of the Katipunan ng
Kabataai. The word "or" may also be used as the equivalent of "that is to
Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. (Of things dissimilar, the rule
y" giving that which precedes
it the same
is dissimilar). The courts may distinguish when there are facta significance
as that
uhich follows it. lt 18 not alway disjunctive and is sometimes
and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a
interpretative or exposiory ot the preceding word. For example,
distinction or qualification."1a8
#he word "or" in an ordinance which impoges graduated quarterly
fixed tax "based on the gross value in money or actual market
5.16. Disjunetive and conjunctive words. olue" of articles, should be construed to mean "that is to sey," so
val
that the phrase "or actual market velue" was intended to explain
word "or"is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation
The
"gross value in money."1
and independence of one thing from each of the other things enumer
ated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it The word "or" may also mean successively. This is the sense in
ordinarily implies, as a word.109
disjunetive the word "or" in
Thus, which the word "or" is used in Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Section 40 of Commonwealth Act 613, as amended, which punishes Code which states part that "the offenses of seduction,
in abduc
any individual who shall bring into or land in the Philippines or tion, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except
conceals or harbors any alien not duly admitted by any immigration upon a complaint by the offended party or her parents, grandpar
officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within
the Philip ents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has been ex
does not justify giving the word a nondisjunctive meaning,
the
pines"
words "bring into," "land," "conceals," and "harbors" being four sepa
pressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be."
and disparate
It has beentheheld that although these persons are mentioned dis-
rate acts each possessing its distinctive, different junctively, provision must be construed as meaning that the
right to institute criminal proceedings in said cases is exclusively
a n amusement tax
on
meaning.° And where a tax statute imposes
of the amuse and
gross receipts of the "proprietor, lessee, or operator successively reposed in said persons in the order in which they
that the tax are named, so that no one of them has authority to proceed if there,
ment place," the disjunctive word "or" positively implies
either the proprietor, the lessee, or the operator, as 3 any other person previously mentioned therein with legal capac-
should be paid by
the c a s e may be, singly and not by all at one and
the same time." Eyto appear and institute the action. For the right to insiitute
"or" between two. phrases aproceedings in these cases would not be reposed in the
The use of the disjunctive word ended party, her parents, grandparents and guardian, at one
that either phrase serves as qualifying phrase.1 occasioning
connotes
when ahe same time, without grave difficulties in the
The term "or" has sometimes been held to m e a n "and," tne thnistration of justice, resulting from the attempt of some of
For instance,
the spirit or context of the law so
warrants.13
a Aaersons to institute criminal proceedings contrary to the wish
Rules of Court authorizing lawsire of others; and that this was not the intention of the
word "or" in Section 2, Rule 112 of the
whersh Ecomes manifest in the light of the peculiar provision
the of-
fender and oftended
fender party is given the right to pardon
101bid., p. 783, citing Agpalo, Statutory Construction,
pp. 142-143 (1990
Katips
this extinguishes the cause of the minal action.16
Martin, G.R. No. 33487, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 430;
0People v.
People, 74 Phil. 45 (1942).
110People v. Martin, supru. 289
Manila Jockey Club, Inc., 99 Pnil SCRA 1.
"Collector of Internal Rovenue v.
a v.
Bernudez, G.R. No. 25223, May 19, 1971, 39
(1956).
126 SCAD 471, 332 SCRA 126 (2000).e 21
1078, eSun
63
SCRA GTp. v. Municipality of Mandaue, G.R.
No. 30761, July 11,
1Bautista v. Sandiganbayan, Nov. 9,
49.
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 28196, O.S. v. De la Sabta, 9
v. Bermudez, G.R. No. 25223, May 19,
1971, 39 SCRA
I
Phil. 22 (1907).
SCRA 774; Trinidad
206
INTERPRETATION OF
WORDS
B. Associated WordsAND PHRASEs
207
On the other hand, the word "and" is a conjunction no

loubt may be removed by reference to the
meaning "together with," "joined with"alon nanion words. meaning of asso-
or
défined rity
nently as
ong on i a t e d o r compa And where the
law does not define a
together with," "added to or linked to, used to conjoin word wi erein, it will be construed as
word, phrase with phrase, clause with clause. The word "and" doe word
used
simia
lar to that of words associate with or accompanied by it.72 For having a meaning
does
not mean "or"; it is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or unios in a statute is
by it 122
word or phrase used always in association
"binding together," "relating the one to the other." However, 'an other
vords or phrases, and its meaning may thus be modifiedwithor
may mean "or" as an exception
to the rule. The exception is . tricted by the latter.1 And taken by itself and in the
sorted to only when a literal interpretation would peryert the plain
abstract,
word or phras might easily convey a meaning quite different froma
intention of the legislature as gleaned from the context of the stat. actually intended.and evident when
the word or
rad with those with which 1t is
is
associated. Thus
phrase
ute or from external factors.1 an appar-
ntly general word or phrä8e may have a limited application if
The term "and/or" means that effect shall be given to both the uiewed with other companion words or phrases,124 Stated differ.
"or" or that one word or the
conjunctive "and" and the disjunctive ently, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or
or the other will best effec. give the same meaning of, words with which it is associated.
other may be taken accordingly as one
as gathered from the

tuate the purpose intended by the legislature In accordance with the principle of noscitur a socis, where
whole statute.3 The term is used to avoid a construction vwhich by
words a statute are used
most of the words in enumeration of in
an
the combination of
the of the disjunctive "or" alone will exclude
use and ordinary sense, the rest of the words should
the use of the conjunctive "and"
in their generic
several of the alternatives or by similarly be construed. Words in association should all be given
alternatives standing
will exclude the efficacy of any one of the their generic and ordinary meaning, or, if such be the legislative
alone.19 intent, their restricted and technicai sense. Some words may not be
construed in their ordinary, while others in their technical signif
is
B. ASSOCIATED WORDS cation.128 Similarly, where a word with more than one meaning
associated with words having specific or particular signification,
Dif
the former should be given a specific or particular meaning"
i.e., linited and
5.17. Noscitura sociis. i r is,fi ti! ferently put, a word with several meanings-
construed in, and given
particular broad, ordinary and technical- should be
The maxim, noscitur a sociis, statas that where,
a
words
which its companion
word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or
is equally susceptible
a
meaning consistent with, the sense in
clear an or phrases are used.128
various meanings, its correct construction may be made
is
in which it 1ound
specific by considering the company of words where a particuler
with which it is associated.120 Stated differently,
doubtful taken by itself, the obsC
meaning, (1922; Chartered
Bank of
word is obscure or of 12 Luzon Stevedor
Co, v. Trinidad, 43 Phil. 803
ndia Imperial, 48 Phil. 931 (1921)..
v.
SCRA 493 (1988);
Corp., 166
**
Schmid& Oberly, Inc. v. RJL Martinez Fishing
Assn.,. n
Buenaseda
13
v. Flavior, 44 SCAD 1026, 226 SCRA (1993).
108 Phil. 566
(1960).
1966, 13
Concurring opinion of. Justice Castro, Phil. Constitutional Lu Do & Lu Ym
Corp v. Central Bank, , March 31, SCRA
Mathay, G.R. No. 26554, Oct. 4, 1966, 18 SCRA 300, 329, 330.
12
Aboitiz hipping Corp. v. City of Cebu, G.R No. 14520ec. 15, 1977,
Dec.
80
116A.E. Davidson v. F.W. Wollworth Co., 198 SE 738, 118 ALR 1363 (10 o CRA 449; Santulan v. Executiv Secretary, G.R. No. 28021,
See Annotations, 118 ALR 1367 (1939); China Banking Corp.
v. MemD
44
648. 234 SCRA
255
367,
397 SCRA 440 63 SCAD
(1994) 2Magtajas
106 SCAD 798,
Trustees, Home Development Mutual Fund, . Pryce Properties Corp, Ine.,
(1999), quoting Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 14
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 (1945); Caltex (Phil8. als May 29,
Palomar, G.R. No. 19650, Sept. 29, 1966, 30 SCRA 247; Aisporma v.
Court of ANo Carandang Santiago, 97 Phil.
v.
94
Phil.
(1956).
Acetylene
Co., G.R.
No. 22443,
G.R. No. 39419, April 12, 1982, 113 SCRA 459; Soriano v. Sandiganbayan, u ommissioner of
1971, 39 SCRA Customs v.
65952, July 31, 1984. 70.
antulan v. cutive Secrelary, 8pra.
208
INTERPRETATION
B.
OF WORDS AND
PHRASES 209
ABsociated Wor da
rule.
5.18. Application of
rated homicide because he term refers to the specific
of the Constitution grants the andcrime
On. of
Section 13(3), Art. XI bud. frustra
ysical injuries as fined in the Revised Penal Code should
officer concerned to take appron phys atood in its technical or legal sense, and not in ite
man the power
to "Direct the
employee at fault,
or and ordinary
action against a public
official
pros
uric sense of bodily injury. The court ruled that the
or gen term
demotion, fine, censure or eal injuri
mend his removal, suspension,
therewith." Pursuant to the rul
"physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily harm or
as physical injuries, frustrated
tion, and e n s u r e compliance na
injury, such
homicide, or even death.
roscitor a sociis, the word
"suspension" in this constitutional inu court: "The article in question uses the words 'defamation,
m e sense as
the other words with wh
which fra 'physical injuries. efanation and fraud are used in
sion should be given the
s a
penalty or preVen
punitive, not as a their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the
it is associated, namely, as a
assoCiated with it, namel
tive, m e a s u r e because the other words
Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined
a r e penalties in administra
removal, demotion, fine and censure, #herein, so that these two terms 'defamation' and 'fraud' must have
particular word is equally susceptible n heen used not to impart to them any technical aeaning in the laws
tive cases. For where a
which can mean a preven.
various meanings, such as "suspension" ofthe Philippines, but in their generie sense. With this apparent
construction may be made
tive or punitive measure, its correct eircumstance in mind, 1t 13 evident that the term 'physica! injuries
the of terms in which it is found or enuld not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defi ed in
specific by considering company
with which it is associated.129 for it is difficult to believe that the Code
the Revised Penal Code used
When Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code authorized local Commission would have terms in the same article- scme in
government units to prevent or suppress "gambling and

other pro- their generic and another inits technical sense. In other worde, the
term physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury,
hibited games of chance," the word "gambling" pursuant to the rule
of noscitur a sociis should be read as referring only to illegal gam not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the
bling which, like other prohibited games of chance, must be pre lattera r e géneric terms."132
vented or suppressed and not to gambling which has, been author In Co Kim Chan v. aldez Tan Keh,3 the question invoived is
ized by specific statutes. For this reason, a local government unit whether proceedings in civil cases pending in court under the so-
has no power to prevent or suppress gambling which is authori~ed called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese
by specific law.130
military occupation of the country are affected by the proclaraation
In Carandang u. Santiago,131 the issue raised is whether an of General Douglas MacArthur issued on October 23, 1914 declar
offended party can file a separate and independent eivil action for ing that "all laws, regulations and processes of any other govern-
damages arising from physical injuries during the pendency of the ment in the than that of the said Commonwealth are
Philippines
answer hinges on
criminal action for frustrated homicide. The offended party
cated his action on Article 33 of the Civil Code which
pred null and. void and without legal effect." The or pro-
provides tha whether the term "processes" includes judicial-processes
"n cases of defamnation, fraud, and does not refer
for
physical a civil injuries, actio ceedings. The court ruled that the term "processes"
damages entirely separate and disiinct fron the criminal B
O Judicialprocesses but to the executive orders of the Chairman of
tion, nay be brought by the injured
party. Such.civil action shal the Philippine Executive Committee, ordinances promulgated by
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall re President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines and the
guire only preponderance
a of evidence." Respondent, on the othe ne and others that are of the
same
hand, claimed that the term ution itself of said Republic,

*physical injuries" does not incluu the laws and regulations with which
the word "processes
s the court cited the foliowing
30ciated. To fortify its conclusion,
license for houses, rooms,
Buenaseda Flavier, 44 SCAD 1026, 226
v, strations: "An English Act required entertainment. It was
*Magtajas v.
Pryce Propertie Corp., Lnc.; SCRA 645 (1993).
266 for public'
(1994). 53 SCAD 367, 284
SC Or buildings, kept open
13197 Phil. 94
(1955).
531bid. at pp. 96-97.
375 Phil. 371 (1945).
210
STATUTORY CONSsTRUCTION
IN'TERPRETATION OF WORDS
B. Assocated WordsAND P'HkASES
211
adjudged that the word 'entertainment' in

this connection did Donot another case, involvinga
necessarily mean a concert, dramatic performance, defamatory 8tatementsprosecution
In
In for libel, the
tissement, nor did it necessarily inmply the furnishingother
or
diuo ie whether
tem constitutes
through the medium ofquestion an am-
of food o slander or libel. Libel is committed
drink, but that, judged from its associations, it plilner *writing, printing, hthography, engraving, by'
and accommodation of the public. So where, meant
the receptin means o f
a policy of, inting, theutrical exhibition, radio, phono-
insurance is specified to the assured
marine graph,
cinematographic
and it is argued exhibition,
protect against 'artests, r 8imilar means,",
that an
straints, and detainments of all kings, princes, and people, or any
similar'
means 'similar' to
'radio." n rejecting "amplifier is a
this argument, the court
word the
'people'means the ruling governing power of the country
or
rules that
the word rrdio" should be considered
in
this significance being impressed upon it by its association
with with which it i8 ass0C1ated- writing, printing,relation
etc.
to the
all of
ave a common characteristic, namely, their
-
the words kings' or 'princes.' Again, in'a statute

relating to impris.
a a means of publication, which is not presentpermanent
na-
onment for debt, which speaks of debtors who shall be charged w in utterances
with fraud, or undue preference to one creditor to the préjudice of through an amplifier ollowing the same principle, where the
another, the word 'undue' means fraudulent. A statute of bank ord ottery is detined as a game of chance, one of the elements of
wor
ruptcy declaring that any fraudulent 'gift, transfer or delivery' of which is consideration, the term "gift enterprise" and "schene" in
property shall constitute an act of bankruptey, applies only to such e nrovision of the Postal Law making unmailable "any 1ottery,
ift, enterprise, or scheme forthe distribution of money or any real
deliveries as are in the nature of gift - such as change of the or Dersonal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind" meens
property, to the prejudice of creditors; it does not include a delivery o
Buch enterprise as will require consideration as an element

137
to a bailee for safekeeping."134
In San Miguel Corporation u. National Labor Relations Com-
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 1394 provides that the "tax
mission,13 the issue raised is whether the claim of an employee
provided for in Section One of this Act shall not be imposed against
the importation into the Philippines of. machinery and/or
raw against his employer for cash reward for submitting a process to
materials to be used by new and necessary industry x x x; machinery, eliminate defects in quality and taste of San Miguel product falls
for use of industries, miners, within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the NLRC. In hold-
equipment, accessories and spare parts,
and farmers; x x x." Is the word
"in- ing that the claim falls outside the jurisdiction of these agencies,
mining enterprises, planters Na-
dustries" used in its ordinary and generic sense,
which means en- the Court said: "The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters.and the
of capital and/or labor? tional Labor Relations Commission is outlined in Article 217 of the
terprises employing relatively large amounts law last amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 227," which
"industries" as used in the Labor Code, as
The court held that since the term
claims of workers, in-
for the second time "is classified together
with the terms 'miners, includes in paragraph 3 thereof "all money underpayment of wages,
and farmers,' the obvious legislative
or
Cluding those based on nonpayment
mining industries, planters that tend other benefits provided
intent is to confine the meaning
of the term to-activities Overtime compensation, separation pay and
manufacture such as those of
miners, min y 1aw or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees com
to produce or create or benefits." "While
and farmers." The court added that t Pensation, social security, medicare and maternity
ing enterprises, planters claims of workers,
it is not
and general meaning would lead graph 3 above refers to 'all money that
give the word an ordinary the law confine entire universe of money
claims
in that while the first part of r y to suppose that the has been
patent inconsistency, part wou against their employers
and necessary industry, another ah ASserted by workers of ArD
and exclusive jurisdiction Labor
the exemption to new
their nature
industries, regardless of fDed into the original
extend he exemption to all OrS. In should be read not in isolation
which would then be illogical.13 the first place, paragraph 3
SCRA 231
1962, 6
196. 1Pe
ople Santiago, G.R. No. 17653, May
30, 1966, 30 SCRA
1490 v.
Sept. 29,
Laws, 2nd ed., pp. No. 19660,
m
on Interpretation of llex (Phils.), Inc. v. Palomar, G.R.

7bid, at p. 377, citing Black Co.,G.R. No. 22443, May 247.
PCommissioner of Customs v. Phil. Acetylene
39 SCRA 70. "161 SCRA 719, 124, 127 (1988).
1971,
12 INT
PRETATION OF
WORDS
B. Associated WordsAND
PHRASES 213
context formed by paragraph 1 (relan.
from but rather within the tStay
shall not stay tthe award,
2 (relating to claims t order,
rendering ruling,
to unfair labor practices), paragraph Appeal
less the officer or body

ing terms and conditions
of employment), paragraph 4 (clai m
une n t
and
hearing,
hearing, and on such the samedecision
or the
or judg-
species of emplov e atter terms court, on
lating to household services, particular
a motion, it
otherwise. The ne
as
may deem
6
ployee relations), and paragraph (relating to certain activi uld provi
Tendering
the award,
of a propriety
stay granted by just,
It is evident that ther
prohibited to employees or employers). 1 to 5 and
oficer
raised only by mo1on inorder, ruling, decision or the judg
unifying element whích runs through paragraphs the main
ment may
that urt of Appeals

or totthe tria!
court. case," refers to the
is, that they all refer to cases or disputes arising
out of or
Court ruled that the "correct the maxim, noscitur Applying
connection with an employer-employee relationship. This is, in n
by reference toconstruction
a sociis,
made clear of the word
a sociis may be may be
words, a situation where the rule of noscitur court
where the court, officers, or Section 1 of R.A. No.
fully invoked in clarifying the scope of paragraph 3, and any oth bodies whose
paragraph of Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended" "
etc. arelable to the Court of
appeala decision, award,
Court, therefore, believes and s0 holds that the 'money claims e follows:
grarian Relations, Appeals,
Court of Agz
the Secretaryenumerated
are
as
workers' reíerred to in paragraph 3 of Article 217 embraces monev Commission, the Securities and of Labor, the
Registration
Exchange Com-
Land
claims which arise out of or in connection with the employer-em sion, the Social
Security Commission, the Civil
ployee relationship." the Patent Oice
Board,
and the Aeronautics
Agricultural Inventions
caid grouping, the enumeration in Section
"From sa1
Board."
In Ebarle u. Sucaldito,13 the question raised is whether E. 5 is
erived and from hich it is easy to see the word
obviously
ecutive Order No. 265, which outlines the procedure by which com 'court means
plainants charging government oficials and employees with the Court of Agrarian. Relations and not the Court of Appeals which by
commission of irregularities ahould be guided, applies to eriminal no
stretch of the:imagina can be deemed to
belong to the same
actions or complaints. Executive Order No. 265 provides, among group.
others, that"complaints against public officials and employees shal
be promptly acted upon and disposed of by the officials or authori 5.19. Ejusdemn generis.
ties concerned in accordance with pertinent laws and regulations
so that the erring officials and employees can be s0onest removed While general words or
expressions in a statute are, as a rule,
or otherwise disciplined and the innocent, exonerated or vindicated accorded their full, natural and generic sense, they will not be
in like manner, and to the end also that given such meaning if they are used in association with specific
other remedies, including
court action, may be pursued forthwith
by the interested parties, words or phrases. The general rule is that where a general word or
after administrative remedies shall have been exhausted." The court phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of
held that the executive order does not the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general
apply to criminal actions. "T
be sure, there is mention herein of court
action (being pursued word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to,
forthwith by interested parties but that does
not, so we hold, cover persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or
proceedings such as criminaB actions, which do not require a
prior class as those specifically mentioned.1 Or where general words
administrative course of action.
It will indeed be noted that the
term is folow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particu-
closely shadowed by the qualification, 'after administrative lar meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their
remedies shall have been
exhausted, which suggests civil suits
subjectto previous eadministrative actions." widest extent, but are to be held as appling only to persons or
things of the sume kind or class specifically Other-
In
Mottomul u. Dela Paz,° the mentioned
word "court" in Section 5 of question raised is whether the
Republic Act No. 5434, which reads; 40
14Go Iiaco y Hermanos v. Union Insurance Society of Canton, 40 Phil.
Mutuc v. Commis-
Bank of India v. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931 (1921);
156 SCRA 803 (1987). ehartered
sion c t i o n s , G.R. No. 32717, Nov. 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 228; Vera w. Cuevas, G.
14187 SCRA 743, 763
(1990). No.
33693, May 31, 1979, 90 SCRA 379. v.
(1954}; Republie
i t h , Bill & Co. v. Register of Deeds, 96 Phil. 53
Miguno, 189 SCRA 289 (1990).
a
INTERPRETATION OF WORDs AND PHRASES
B. Aasociated Worda
215
214
Jllustration of rule.
6.20.
describes things of particular ol. clas Where an

a n act makes unlawful the
ad
a statute
wise stated, where character, the generie,
kind acconpanied by
words of a generic
kindred nature with d
gadgets, pens, lighters, fans, distribution of electoral
"and the like," the term "ard flashlights, athietic goois
propaganda
limited to things of a
will usually be something in the so0s the
paign purpose3, said term.like" does not ernbrace
o rmaterials
unless there be
particularly enumerated, canon of statutore
tapedjingles
such inference. This o f the same kind or class being restricted ondy
of the stetute to repel the same kind o
things as those
struction 1s known as generis
ejtisdem (or
spe
to
ated.148 Similarly, where
a statute
makes the
specifically enumer
ters, and other
mos, enerators, excite, classiñcation "dyna-
cie)1
tricity for lightning or tor
machinery for the generation of
The purpose of the rule of ejusdem
generis 1s to give eflect.
to power, the pnrase "other machinery"
words, by treating the particula include steam turbines, pumps and concensers
ould not inclu
both the particular and genera! of t same class or kind of because
the general words as indicati not
words as indicating the ciass and
iters which are for the machinery
are
ting
not specifically nama
these
generate and excit
as
dynamus,
all that is embraced in said class, although ned generation of
on the ground that if th
electricity.43
by the particular words. This justified
is
term "skimmed milk in a statute which
The
intended the general terns to be used in their requires that "all
lawmaking body
restricted sense, it would not have made an enumeration of Dar
Conden skimmed
milk and all milk in whatever
forn shall be
and legibly marked on its immediate containers"
ticular subjects but would hav used only general terms.44 clearly "with the
words "This milk is not suitable for Lourishment for infants
less
The most frequent application of this rule is' found where than one year of age restricts the phrase "all m:lk in whatever
specific and generic terms of the same nature are employed in the farm" and excludes within its Scope, filled milk.5 Under a statute
for
same act, the latter foliowing the former. While in the abstract, which provides that the vice-mayor shall be entitled to assume the
general terms are to be given their natural and full signification. ofice of the mayor during the "absence, suspension or other tempo
yet where they follow specific words of like nature they take their Tary disability of the mayor," the word "absence" should be con-
meaning from the latter, and are presumed to embrace only things strued on the same sense as "suspension" and "other forms of dis-
or persons of the kind designated by them."146 The principle of ability" to mean one the mayor from exercising the
which disables
em generis is based on the proposition that had the legislature power and prerogatives of his ofice, since the phrase "other tempo-
intended the general words to be used in their generic and unre- rary disability" follows the words "absence" and "suspensicn" and is
stricted sense, it would not have enumerated the specific words. used as a modifier of the two preceding words.51 Similarly, in a
of
The presumption is that usually the minds of the legislators are statute which enumerates the grounds for removai or suspension
addressed specifically to the particularization, and accordingly the a public officer to include "neglect of duty, oppression, corruption,
general words, ihough broad enough to comprehend other fields if or other form of maladministration in office,"
the word "other" is
they stood alone, should be understood in contemplation with that the kind its antecedents to that
limited to that which is of same as
which the mind of the legislators are centered.1s7 which is related to official action and not to personal behavior.
"contract or transaction,"
And in a statute which uses the phrase
to the term
the word "transaction" must be construed as analogous
involving consideration as element,

an
Wnich precedes it,
45Murphy, Morris & Co. v. Collector of Customs, 11 Phil. 456 (1908); Allada v.
Court of Tax Appeals, 99 Phil. 604
(1956). 1970, 36 SCRA
14National Power Corp. v. Angas, 208 SCRA 542 No. 32717, Nov. 26,
(1992). Commission on Elections, G.R.
e.S. v. Santo Niño, 13 Phil. Mutuc v.
141, 142 (1909); see also Director of PubC 288. Phil. 456 (1908).
Works v. Sing Juco, 53 Phil. 205 Customs, 11
(1929). 149Mu & Co. v. Collector of
Morris SCRA 379.
Go Tiaco y 90
Hermanos v. Union 33693, May 31,
1979,
(1919; Murphy, Morris & Co. v. Collector Insurance Society of Canton, 40 Phil. 4 era v. Cuevas, G.R. No.Council of Cigara, 112 Phil. 24 (1g6l).
of Customs, 1 Phil. 456
Pnpire insurance Co. (1908). 1sahilon v. Municipal
v. Rufino, G.R. No.
437. 38268, May 31, 1979, 90 SCKA Naval, 54 Phil. 809 (1930).
Cornejo v. 31, 1984.
July
G.R. No. 65952,
aO V. Sandiganbayan,
- * -

IN'TERPRETATION OF WORDS
B. Associated WordsAND PHRASES
217
Where a law grants a court exclusive jurisdiction to obligatis

song. namely, law,
COntract, quasi-contract, torts
hear and uncement of public or crimes,"
decide "offenses or felonies conmitted by public officers and not
mere
officials.136
and em
ployees in relation to their office," the phrase "in relation to In Cobu Institute of Technology
Ople,157 one of the issues
U.
office" qualifies or restricts the offense to one which

their hether teachers hired on
contract basis are entitled to
cannot exist raised
ave benefits as
without the office, or the ofice is a constituent element of the
crime against the claim that they are
defined in the statute or one perpetuated in the performance, Be entitled because Rule v of the Iimplementing Rules and
though lafions of the Labor Code provides that "This rule (on service
mproper or irregular, of his official functions.154
In Cu Unjieng Sons, Inc. v. Board of Tax
ntive leaves) shall apply to all employees, except" "field person-
Appeals, 155 the issue a n d other employees whose pertormance is unsupervised by the
raised is whether the losses due to the war were to be
deductible employer including those who are engaged on task or contract ba-
from the gross income in 1945 when they were h e Court ruled that the phrase "those who were employed on
sustained, or in
1950 when the Philippine War Damage Commission advised ask or contract basis" should be related with "field personnel,"
that
no payment would be made for said losses. The
resolution of the anolving the rule on ejusdem generis that the generai and unlim-
issue hinges on the interpretation of the
statute which provides itedterms are restrained and limited by the particuiar terms that
that "in the case of a corporation, all losses
not charged off within the taxable year
actually sustained and they follow, and that eachers are cleariy not field personnel and
and not compensated for by aretherefore entitled to service incentive leave benefits.
insurance or otherwise." It is claimed that the assurances of re-
In Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, one
18
sponsible public officials before the end of 1945 that property own-
of the issues raised is whether the phrase "other lawful beverages"
ers would be compensated for their losses as a
result of the war in the provision which gives protection to a
manufacturer who has
sufficed to place the losses within the phrase "compensated for xx
registered with the Philippine Patent Office its duly stamped
or
x otherwise" than by insurance. The court rejected
the claim as
untenable. Said the court: "In general, the word 'otherwise.means marked bottles used for "soda water, mineral or aerated waters,
includes hard liquor.
but for, or under other circumstances x x x; in as different cider, milk, c r e a m or other lawful beverages"
manner,
the includes hard liquor, the Court stated
in another way, or other ways x x x.
However, when said term is In holding that phrase
reads 'An Act to regulate the
immediately preceded by an enumeration, it would receive an ejus that the "title of the law itself, which
casks, kegs, barrels
dem generis interpretation, or be limited in its
application by the use duly stamped or marked bottles, boxes,the legislative
of
intent
shows
rule noscitur a sociis. x x x The word
'otherwise' in law, when used and other similar containers," clearly
as a general phrase
containers
protection to all marked bottles
and of all lawful
following an enumeration of particulars, i1s Ogve
nature of their contents.
commonly interpreted in
restricted sense, as referring to such
a Deverages regardless of the
other matters as are kindred to the classes before
mentioned, re
19
the issue raised is whether
Nalional Power Corp. v. Angas,
n
ceiving an ejusdem generis interpretation x x x." In other words, Circular No. 416 which states
the vocable 'otherwise' in the clause
th judgments" in Central Bank
under Section l of Act
'compensated for by insurance to it
or otherwise' x x x should be
construed to refer to compensation X by virtue of the authority granted
known as the Usury
Law, the
No.2 amended, otherwise July 29, 1974,
due under a title analogous or similar to
insurance. Inasmuch as Mon as No. 1622 dated
the latter is a contract etary Board, in its Resolution loan or
forbearance
establishing a legal obligation, x x * 1t has interest for the

follows that in order to be deemed PIeSCribed that the rate of allowed in judgments,
the losses sustained by a
"compensated for x x x 'otherwise of
any
O n e y , goods o r
credits and the
rate
taxpayer must be covered by a
judicially
enforceable right, springing from any of the
juridical sources or
1, 1613 (1956).
100 Phil.
Appeals,
Unjieng & Sons, Inc. v. Board of Tax
07156 SCRA 629 (1987).
156
164Peuple Magallanes, 64 SCAD 968, 249 SCRA 212 (1995). 166179 SCRA 218 (1989).
155100 Phil. 1 (1956). 208 SCRA 542 (1992).
National Power Corp. v. Angas,
218
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION INTERPRETATION OF WORDS
B. Associated WordsAND PHRASES 219
in the absence of express contract as to such rate, shall be twal.

except for
r one general tern, all the items in an enumeration
refers to any judgment directing
velve to or fall under one
specific class or are of the same belong
per cent (12%) per annum," he the neration incl classes and general termsnature. Where
cludes
payment of legal interest. Applying the principle of ejusdem gener where the specific things enumeration have no well,e
in the as or
the Court held that the word "judgments" should mean only jud
ormmon characteristics and greatly differ distinguish-
ments involving loans or forbearance of money, goods or credita
these latter specific terms having restricted the meaning of "jude
l e of ejusdem generis does not apply.1653 "Thus,fromwhere
one ancthe
the term
ments" to those of the same class or the same nature as thos
Hatebilizer and tlavors 19 preceded by a number of articles classi.
ed as food or food products as weil as other items that do not
specifically enumerated. long to such classification, the term is not restricted to articles
In Republieu. Migrino, n a retired military officer wasinves din the preparation of food but should be construed in its
tigated by the Presidential Commission on Good Government generic sense to include those used in the manufacture of tooth:
(PCGG) for violation of the Anti-Graft Act in relation to Executive aate or dental cream. Conversely, if the enumerated words are
Order Nos. 1 and 2 authorizing the PCGG to recover ill-gotten all general words, the meaning of each word will be unrestricted by
wealth of the former President's "subordinates and close associ the other words, unless the context in which they are used indi-
ates" "during his administration." On the issue as to whether PCGG cates otherwise.
has jurisdiction to investigate the former military bofficer for being Nor does the rule of ejuscdem generis apply where th
in the service during the administration of the former President meration of the particular and specific words is exhaustive. If the
and was therefore his subordinate, the Court ruled that the term specific words embrace all persons or objects of the class desig
subordinate" refers only to one who enjoys close association o nated by the enumeration, the general words should include those
relation with the former President àndor his wife, and not to any comprehended in the general classification and beyond the speci-
government officer during the former President's administration, fied class. Thus, in the enumeration of the words "action or suit or
the term "close associates" having restricted the meaning of 'subor other proceeding," the words "action" and "suit" exhaust proceed-
dinates."
ings of judicial character, and the phrase "other proceeding" should
therefore include proceedings other than judicial in nature, such as
5.21. Limitations of ejusdem generis. advertisement of sale of property. For to apply the rule of ejusdem
in
As may be gathered from the cases decided by the courts, th generis is to render the phrase "other proceeding' a surplusage,
of construction that all
rule of ejusdem generis, to be applicable, requires that the following v1olation of the well-known canon statutory
Words in a statute should, if possible, be given etfect.
requisites concur: (1) a statute contains an enumeration of particu
lar and specific words, followed by a general word or phrase; (2) the statute uses a' general word, followed by an enu-
Where a
word merely
eration of specific words embraced within the general
particular and specifie words constitute a class or are of the same
kind; (3) the enumeration of the particular and specifie words is restrict the mean-
mples, the enumeration does not thereby class
not exhaustive or is not merely by examples; and (4) there is no include others of the
same
indication of legislative intent to give the general words Or the general word, but should instance, where a
siatute
or phra gh not enumerated therein. For
a broader meaning.161 metal, glass, or
otner
nions "containers, such as casks, large

The general rule that general term may be restrained Dy
a
specific words associated with it is applicable only to cases wherc
1
Jan. 28, 1961,
G.R. No. 14787,
182ColgateaUe-Palmolive Phil., Inc. v. Jimenez,
Phil. 267. G.R. No. 33471,
Jan. 31,
160189 SCRA 289 (1990). Appeals,
101Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 33471, JaR.
31, 10Com
om1nissioner of
1972, 43 SCRA
istoms v. Court of Tax
1972, 43 SCRA 192; Asturias

Sugar Central, 192. upra.
Inc. Sec. 6.11, infra.
30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617; People v. Commissioner CustoIm 164Colgate-Palmol
No. 19337, Sept. v. of live Phils., Inc. v.
Jimenez,
(1936). See
So 442
Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352
(1 185Ga n a n d l e r , 174
Miss. 815,
165
INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION B. Associated Words 221
220
a
therefor o r who are entitled to carry the same under
term while the. the provisions
receptacles," the word
"container"is a general is Act." It is argued that following the rule of ejusdenm generis,
does not limit the mean
meration is merely by examples,
which
aning ofthi5
the other deadly weapon
phrase "ou does not include an unlicensed
term "container." The
general word may thus include oth ther this
revolver In rejecting argument, the court said that the rule of
of the
.
containers, such as jute bags. generis

"is resorted to only for the purpose of determining
ejusdem
does not require the rejection f intent of the legislature was in enacting the law. If that
The rule of ejusdem generis in what the the other parts of the law, and such
intended merely as an aid
general terms entirely.
The rule is
in conne. intent early appears from
manifested is contrary to the result which would
the legislature and is taken
intention of intent thus cle
ascertaining the rule should not he
of construction.67 The by the application of the rule of ejusdem generis, the
tion with the other rules
reached
to defeat the intent be In this case, the proviso of the Act clearly
as would operate must give way
given such wide application must yield to the manifest latter in the view of the legislature, the carrying of an
or purpose of the
law. Its application indicates that
where, on consideration of the would be a violation of the Act. By the proviso,
intent of the legislature.1s Thus,
revolve
unlicensed
and the purpose sought, it appears that nifested its intention to include in the prohibition weapons
whole law on the subject t mani
words to go beyond the class blancas therein specified."173
the legislature intended the general than
other armas
and particular words in the enumera-
designated by the specific Inc. Court of Appeals,7 the
In short, the rule of ejusdem generis Cagayan Valley Enterprises,
v.
tion, the rule does not apply.1s* a
used to carry out, not to Republic Act No. 623, as
that the legislative intent of
is not of universal application; should be Court held
it
law. 170 Act No. 5700, as shown by its title, is to give
defeat, the intent or purpose of the amended by Republic bottles and containers of ali
resorted to for the purposeof protection to all registered marked
The rule of ejusdem generis is their contents, and for
the legislature is in enacting a
law. lawful beverages regardless of the nature of
determining what the intent of and such this reason, the words "other lawful beverages"
in the provision
from other parts of the law,
If that intent clearly appears will which grants such protection to "persons engaged or licensed to
intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the resuit which soda water, min-
selling of
must
engage in the manufacture, bottling,
the rule or
be reached by applying the rule
of ejusdem generis,
other lawfu! bever-
171 eral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream or
give in favor of the legislative intent. as those specifi
be limited to the same kind or class
way
the principle that ages" may not
In U.S. v. Santo Niño,172 which illustrates their general sense to in-
should not be so applied as to defeat legislative
cally mentioned but should be taken in
ejusdem generis ciude not only soft drinks but also hard liquor.
of an unlicensea
intent, the question raised is whether the carrying Social Security
revolver concealed in the person constitutes a violation of a statute
n Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila u.
which reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person to carry
concealea the rule of ejusdem
om.mission, a religious institution invoking
176
about his person any bowie, knife, direck, dagger, kris, or other in the term "employer" as
ers claimed, that it is not included or juridical, domestic or
deadly weapon: Provided, That this prohibition shall not apply
firearms in the possession of persons who have secured a
license Orly defined as "any person, natural trade, business, indus
who in the Philippines any
carried
,try, undertaking, services of
uses the
or activi of any kind and
employment,
another person who is under his orders a s regard the branches
1Asturias Sugar Central, Inc.
Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617.
v. Commissioner of Customa, G.R. No. 1930 except the Governme and any of its political subdivisions,
controlled by
*
owned or
wColgate-Palmolive Phils., Inc. v. Jimenez, G.R. No. 14787, Jan. 28, 1961, nstrument
SCRA 267. talities, including corporations "employer" should
1Genetao Commercial Corp. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615 (19%0% Eovernment." It is ntended that the term
People v.Echaves, G.R. No. 47757, Jan. 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 163 (1980).
6City of Manila v. Lyric Music House, Inc., 62 Phil. 125 (1935).
170People v. Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352 (1923).
7 Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc.
7213 Phil. 141 (1909).
v. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 218 1989).
(190 3bid. at
p. 142.
179 SCRA 218 (1989). SCRA 10(198l)
0045, Jan. 20, 1961, 1
222
INTERPRETATION OF WORDS
B. Associated WordsAND PHRASES
223
be limited to those who carry an "undertaking or activity whic

exceptis.17 A maximn of recognized utility
the element of profit or gain" because the phrase activitv is the rule
kind" in the definition is preceded by the words "any trade
press
exception, exemption or
saving excludes others 150that the ex-
Still another variation ot the rule the

industry, undertaking." The court rejected such contenti is axion
class implies the that
ness,
pression
of one or more things of
of o n e or
a
the ex-
said that the "rule of ejusdem generis applies only where tho n o texpressed, though all would have been exciusion of al!
even
where the plain purpose and implied had nore
uncertainty. It is not controlling The rule is based on the
b e e nexpressed.
tent of the legislature would thereby

be hindered and defeat the minds of the parties usually are fact that in human
experi-
addressed specially to the
comprehensive to include reliin larization, and that the
The definition is "sufficiently giouE
and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit
and mrehend other fields if generalities, though broad enough
to comprehen they stood alone, are used in contem-
that it contains exceptiane plation of hat upon which the minds of the
"this is nmade more evident by the fact ns in parties
not included."
are
centered."
which said institutions or entities are rhe rule of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius and its varia-
n a r e canons ot restrictive interpretation. They are based
on
unius est erclusio alterius. H a
he rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind.
5.22. Expressio Thev are predicated upon ones own voluntary act and not upon
that the expret
It is a settled rule of statutory construction #hat of others. hey proceed from the premise that the legisla-
mention of one person, thing, or consequence inmplies the exclusion re wouid not have made specified enumerations in a statute had
the familiar maxim, expressio the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms
of all others. The rule is expressed in
tothose expressly mentioned.They are opposite the doctrine of
unius est exclusio alterius,176 iecessary implication 184
exclusio alterius is formulated
The rule of expressio unius est
of the rule is the principle that
in a number of ways. One variation
end to that which is implied. Expressum 5.23. Negative-opposite doctrine.
what is expressed puts an
facit cessare tacitum.177 Thus,
where a statute, by its terms, is The principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation
is implied is also known as negative-opposite doctrine or
or be extended to other matters,178
construction, argumentum a contrario. The case of Chung Fook u. Whitel85 illus-
Another variation of the rule is the
canon that a general e trates this doctrine. The statute involved in this case exempts the
therefrom implies that those whieh wife of a naturalized American from detention for treatment in a
pression followed by exceptions
the gen hospital, who is afflicted with a contagious disease. In denying
a
do not fall under the exceptions come
within the scope of
mus native-born American
eral expression. Stated differently, a thing not being excepted petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a
rue
be regarded as coming within
the purview of the general non
casibus
expressed in the maxim: exceptio firmmat regulam in
Dec. 28, 1968, 26 SCRA 576;
Villanueva City of Iloilo, G.R. No. 26521,
v.
SCRA 143
No. 18276, Jan. 12, 1967, 19
odges v. Municipal Board of Iloilo, G.R. Co., Inc., G.R. No. 59463, Nov.
usProvince of Nueva Ecija y. Imperial Mining
Lao Oh Kim v. Reyes, 103 F 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 632.
175Canlas v. Republic, 103 Phil. 712 (1958); 167 (1915).
1139 (1958); People v. Aquino, 83 Phil. 614 (1949);
Escribano v. Avila, G. 7re Estate of Enriquez, 29 Phil. G.R. No. 38268, May 31,
1979, 90 SCRA
G.R. No. 24736, Oct. 3, "0 Empire Insurance Co. v. Rufino,
SCRA 245; People v. Lantin,
30375, Sept. 12, 1978, 85 437
30 SCRA 81; Manila Lodge No. 761 . Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41001, n 96 ulso coneurring opinion of
Justice
(1947)% sce
73 SCRA 162; Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 47750, Feb. 29, 10 bora v. Gavino, 79 Phil. 421
1976, No. 0400 ena, Brodett v. De la Rosa, 77 Phil. 758 (1940)
SCRA 448; Lerum v.Cruz, 87 Phil. 652 (1950); Velasco v. Blas, G.R. SCAD 486, 224 SCRA 66Q (1993),
Ommissioner Customs v. CTA, 43
of
30, 1982, 115 SCRA 540. g Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed., 1990. pp. 1bU- 101
G.R. No. 32743, Feb. 15, 1974, 55 SCRA 533. nta
Bspiritu v. Cipriano,
OHongkong & Shanghai Bank v. Peters, 16 Phil. 824 (1910); Cona sSee Sec. 4.24, suprd.
Carnation Phils., Inc., 145 SCRA 268 (1986). 5264 U.S. 443 (1924)
224
INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES 225
citizen on behalf B. Associated Words
treatment of a of his wife who was detained

contagious disease, the court in a hospital.
tive-opposite doctrine tory enumeration ot the
cimes which cannot be prosecuted de oficio,
only to the wife by stating that the resorted to the n namely, adultery, concubinage, seduction, rape, or acts of lascivi-
of a
late the words naturalized citizen and statute
that it plainly relas
1ness, implies that all other crirmes, such as a slanderous impu-
and a woman had
tive function. "native-born citizen" without that per5On 15 a prostitute or that a m a n
a
cannot inte +ation
remarital relations, can be prosecuted de oficio.189
usurping the legia
The Chung Fook i Where statute has authorized a city to lease or sell the
a
casehas been criticized
negative-opposite doctrine or the for
applying th northern portion of a reclaimed area along the bay, the city has no
ower to dispose of the southern part thereof. When the Labor
chanical-technical tool that works expressio unius rule as a Code provides that "al money claims accruing prior to the effectivity
in favor injustice
naturalized citizens. The criticism isnative-born
of to
citizen
me
ofthis Code shall be filed with the appropriate entities established
cation. The court should not without
have disregarded the justis. nder this Code within one (1) year from the date of such effectivity"
plication is productive of injustice not intended doctrine, as its an. it inplies that labor cases not involving money claims do not comne
and should have used instead the by the legislatue within such proviSion but under the law in force when the cause of
tion, so as to justify the extension of doctrine of necessary implice action accrued.Pursuant to. the rule thát a person who is inter-
of the wife of a the benefits of the law in favor ested "under a deed, will, contract, or other written instzument,
citizens are
native-born citizen, for naturalized and native-borm
both citizens and the legislature is not supposed to
and whose rights are attected by a statute or ordinance, may bring
discriinate against native-born citizens. an action to determine any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his
rights or duties thereunder," the subject matter of such action must
5.24. Application of expressio unius rule. refer to a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or to a
statute or ordinance, and not to other matters, in order to warrant
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its
corol declaratory relief, such other matters not being mentioned therein
lary canons are generally used in the construction of statütes grant being deemed excluded.17 Where a statute enumerates the barrios
ing powers, creating rights and remedies, restricting common rights, that comprise a city, the non-inclusion of a
and imposing penalties and forfeitures, as well as those statutes particular barrio in that
city in the enumeration raises the conclusion that the statute abol-
which are strictly construed. ished said barrio part of the
as
city.
Pursuant to the expressio unius rule, where a statute direcis If a statute enumerates the
things upon which it is to operate,
the performance of certain acts by a particular person or class
or
everything else must necessarily, and by implication, be excluded.193
otherwise or by a
persons, it implies that it shall not be done
a law whicn
Thus, taxes due the
that "all claims for government,
not being mentioned in the rule
different person or class of persons.6 Accordingly, money against the decedent, arising from con-
the who may bring actions for quo tracts, express or implied, whether the same be
specifically designates persons
In actions due, not due, or
warranto excludes from others such actions.
bringing contingent,
last
all claims for funeral
expenses and expenses for the
for libel, the statute which provides that "preliminary investiga
De
sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the
x shall
tions of criminal actions
for written defamation x x
or city f+scal of
the province or
cEy
conducted by the provincial
capital of the province where
court of the city or
by the municipal other municipal cours People v. Lantin,
instituted" precludes all G.R. No. 24735, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 81.
such actions may be And the stat
such preliminary investigations.188 Danila
73 SCRA 162. Lodge No. 761 v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 41001, Sept. 30, 1976,
from conducting
191Sar
19T s . Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 47750, Feb. 29, 1980, 96 SCRA 448.
Lerum v.
85 SCRA 245. 195Cent Cruz,
SCRA 6
87 Phil. 652
(1950).
al Barrio v. City Treasurer
30375, Sept. 12, 1978, of Davao, G.R. No. 25811, April 3, 1968,
Avila, G.R. No. 23
18SEscribano v.
5 Phil. 18 (1905).
Acosta v. Flor,
1SSEscribano v. Avila, supra.
226 INTERPRETATION OF WORDS
AND P:IRASES
B. Aasociated Words 227
time limit in the

decedent, must be filed within the notie
tice, in tthe
red by law to be in noncompetitive service those which
wise they are barred forever," are deemed excluded
tion of the rule, and such taxes can still be recovered even
from thne
from the
opet.
are policy-dete
eterminir ning,priroarily confidential and
highly technical
or
1re and
enumerate those in the
claims against the estate withthoug non-competitive including as
the same are not presented as ecretaries of governors and mayors, the clear intent is that
in the notice, so long as they have not pres rataries of governors and mayors fall under the assist
prescribed period an fr by making an enumeration, the competitive
under the Tax Code.134 Where a statute which changed the fon legislature is presumed
into a city provides that the in
Serv to exclude those not
intended
government of a municipality to have
would.have included them in the
enumerated, for otherwise it
bent mayor, vice-mayor and members of the municipal board shal enumeration.200
continue in office until the expiration of their terms, all other mu Tn another case,* the Court
ruled that since the port of
offices were deemed abolished."h And where the legislatus :lawan is not listed in the list of national ports, said port is a
nicipal
has deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice., a port, in accordance with the maxim, expressio unius est
mun
when a co-owner is given the right of legal redemption within thirty clusio alterius. It added: "Where a statute,
by its terms, is ex
in case the other o gsly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
days from notice in writing by the vendor construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the
owners sells his share in the co-owined property, that method t
premise that ihe legislature would not have made specifed
giving notice must be deemed exclusive and notice sent by the enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to reatrict its
vendee is thus ineffective.196
meaning and to contine its terms to those expressly mentioned
Under the Local Autonomy Act, local governments are given
are specifically
(Agpalo, Statutory Construetion, 2nd Ed., 1990, p. 160-161)"
broad powers to tax everything, except those, which In an action to recover insurance proceeds under an accident
the
mentioned therein. If a subject matter does not come within insurence poliey arising from death of the insured from murder,
such subject matteris
exceptions, an ordinance imposing tax on
a
the policy expressly enumerated ten (10) circumstances wherein no
to come within the broad taxing power, in
accordance with
deemed iability attaches to the insurance company for injury, disability or
the maxim, exceptio firmat regulam in exceptis."" Ac
casibus non
loss suffered by the insured. The insurance company disclaimed
silica excavated
cordingly, a municipal ordinance imposing a tax on liability since death resulting from murder was impliedly excluded
within the
within the municipality, it being conceded not falling in the insurance policy because the cause of death of the insured
exceptions, is a valid exercise of its taxing power.
198 Similarly,
where and intentional act,
the disqualineu was not accidental but rather a deliberateaccident insurance. in
the Probation Law expressly enumerates persons
benefits o excluded by the very nature of a personal
to avail of its benefits, the clear intent is to allow the holding the insurance company liable, the Court held that the "prin-
probation to those not included in the enumeration.199

And wherea unius exclusio alterius- the mention of one
statute enumerates the subject or things on which it is to operan e of expressio est
in
ng implies the exclusion another thing- is x xx applicable
of
it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those since murder and assault, not having
been
ex
stant case
expressly mentioned. Thus, where the law provides that positohose By 1ncluded in the enumeration of the circumstances that would
in the government belong to the competitive service, except t cannot be considered by
i ability in said insurance policy insurance company from
ication to discharg
the' petitioner
the insured.
liability
for any injury, disability or loss suffered by
Thus, the fail company to include
Vera v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 31364, March 30, 1979, 86 SOCRA 199. ure of the petitioner insurance risks
n Mendenilla v. Omandia, G.R. No. 178993, une 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 636.
962, 4 SCRA ng rom murder assault among the prohibited
or
**
Butte v. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc., G.R. No. 15499, Feb. 28, 1962,
526
TVillanueva v. City of Iloilo, G.R. No. 26521, Dec. 28, 1968, 26 SC 5, 14 see Phil. Petroler
Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Roxas, Palawan, G.R. No. 20125,

SCRA 660.
July 20, * oSamsonV
v. Oil IndustryCourt of Appeals,
145 SCRA 654
SCRA
(1986);
433 (1986).
Commission, 145
224 SCRA 665,
18Santos v. Pano, 120 SCRA 8 (1983).
670 93).
22S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASEs 229
B. Associated Words
leads inevitably to the conclusion that it did not 1e plainly

plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.20 The rule,
;
intend the
exempt itself from liability for such death.202
to
limit or
. efeat
not
being
to what is
inflexiblenor a mechanical or technical tool, must yield
early a legislative intent,
In Centeno
Villalon-Pornillos,ts the issue is
v.
solicitation for religious purposes, i.e., renovation of a whethther the The maxim, expreS510 unius est exclusio alterius, is no more
out first securing a chureh
permit from the Regional Office conco th than an auxiliary rule of interpretation to be other
ignored where
the Department of Social
Services, constitutes a violation o circun stances
indicate that the enumeration was not intended to
No. 1564, making ita criminal ofYense for any.person 207 Thus, where the rule enumerates the provisions
e x c l u s i v e . 207
receive contributions for charitable or "to soli be
out securing such

public welfare purpoSes which are applicable to proceedings in municipal trial courts in
permit. The resolution of the issue depern with eases falling within their jurisdictions, the fact that the provision
whether the phrase "charitable x x x ends
purposes" includes a relici
purpose. The Court ruled in the negative, by making the date of maling a pleading as shown by the post office
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, thus: applying the mai repistry receipt notthemean
datethat
of filing
as in court is not one of those
X\m, merated does it is not applicable to proceedings
It will be observed that the 1987 municipal trial courts. The reason is that there are circum-
as several other
statutes, treat the words Constitution, as al
well
charitable) and rel
stances indicating that the enumeration is not intended to be ex
clusive, as shown by the fact that to exclude the provision and
gious' separately and independently, of
word 'charitable' is only one of each other. Thus, tha others not mentioned therein would be productive of undesirsble
Section 28(3), Article VI of thethree descriptive words used in consequences not intended by its framers, and disruptive of the
that 'charitable Constitution,
institutions, churches and
which provides principle that uniformity of rules is desigmed to simplify procedures
and all lands,
buildings and improvements, parsonages
and exclusively used for
x xx
actually, directly
in all courts,208
religious, charitable or educational

purposes shall be exempt from
Nor does the maxim,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, ap-
taxation. x x x ply where the enumeration is
by way of example or to remove
That these doubts only.20 The case of Gomez u.
legislative enactments specifically spelled out
'charitable' and 'religious' Ventura210 jillustrates this ex-
in an ception to the rule. The issue in this case is whether
dential Decree No. 1564 enumeration, whereas Presi tion by a physician of the prescrip
welfare merely stated "charitable or public opium for a patient whose physical condition
purposes, only goes to show that the did not require the use of
such
law in question never framers of the
intended to include solicitations conduct" as to justify revocation ofdrug constitutes "unprofessional
gious purposes within its for reli- tice. Counsel for the the physician's license to
coverage. Otherwise, there is physician contends prac-
reason why it would not have no merates five instances that since the statute
so stated enu-
expressly."4 of which refers
to the
constituting "unprofessional conduct," none
same cannot be a valid prescription
5.25 of opium on such
Limitations of rule. ground for the patient, the
license, in accordance with the revocation of the
The rule of rule of physician's
law. It is a mere expressio unius est exclusio alterius is Such contention, the court said: "It expressio unius. In rejecting
tooi of not a rule 0 cannot be seriously
statutory that aside
from the five
taining the
legislative intent. It construction
Like other rules is not of
or a means of
asce examples specified, there contended
can be no other
of universal
statutory construction, application.
it cannot be usea
C.J.S. Escribano
668. v.
Avila, G.R. No. 30376, Sept. 12, 1978,
inman General 85 SCRA 245, eiting
498. Insurance Corp. v. Court of Gomez Ventura, 54
v.
$2
Appeals, 213 SCRA 493, **97.
55 SCAD
100, 236 sCRA 197.
34]bid., pp. 203-204. 6Cribano Avila, G.R.Phil.
v.
726 (1930).
No. 30375, Sept. 12,
Manabat Aquino, 92 Phil.
v.
1025 (1953).
1978, 85 SCRA
245.
Gomez Ventura, 54 Phil. 726
*154
v.
Phil. 726 (1930).
(1930).
INTERPRETATION OP WORDS AND PHRASES 231
B. Associated Word
the rule of unius est

conduct of a physician deemed 'unprofessional. Nor can it interpreted as exclusive, following expressio
d therefore preclude the majority members ot
vincingly argued that the legislature intended to wipe out o e x c l u s i o a l t e r i u s
forms of'unprofessional'conduct therefor deemed grounds excinil from transacting business should the mayor, vice-mayor
the
cation of licenses. The maxim expressio unius est erclusio ol the ncilor receiving the largest number of votes boycott exclu-
andmeeting. However, to construe the enumeration as
should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative
the maxim would lead to inconvenience, hardshipP
c o u n c i l
and shouid not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated n to apply

sservice, as it would place in the hands of these
or
Bive
of the legislature. It does not apply when words are mentian to public
injury
the legisla-
way of example or to remove doubts. If, therefore, thera and
officials an instrument to defeat the law vesting
unprofessional conduct not specified in the law, with more exista three
power
municipal council by merely boycotting or refus-
m
in the
the sions of the council. Hence, the maxim should
tive
does the crininal use of opium remain a specific cause for re ing to attend
tion of the license."211 evoca» b e

and the statute construed tojmean that should these
d i s r e g a r d e d
officials be unable to discharge theír duties for, any reason,

The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius does nott alsq three ceiving the next highest number of votés can pre-
thecouncilor
apply in case a statute appears upon its face to linit the operak
ration gide over the sessions of the council,2i6
of its provision to particular persons or things by enumeratin
them, but no reason exists why other persons or things.not last analysis, the quéstion as to whether the express
I nthe
or excludes all others
enumerated should not have been included and manifestinjust numeration of things, persons consequences
will follow by not including them.2 In other words, the maxim nat. mentioned depends upon legislative intent. The maxim is re-
intention of the
not applicable if there is some special reason mentioning for ona sorted to as a guide in ascertaining the probable
the legislative intent shows that the enumera-
thing and none for mentioning another which is otherwise within lawmaker.217 Where
the statute, so that the absence of any mention of such other will the maxim does not apply218
tion is not exclusive,
not exclude it.213
For instance, adherence to the legal maxim should be rejected 5.26. Doctrine of casus omissus.
if its application will result in incongruities or a violation of the
The rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est states that
equal protection clause of the Constitution.214
i
a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be
The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius may be held to have been omitted intentionally: The principle proceeds
disregarded if adherence thereto would cause inconvenience, hard from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing
ship, and injury to the public interest.15 For instance, wherea has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In other words,
statute provides that the "majority of the (municipal) council electe the maxim operates and applies only if and when the omission has
shall constitute a quorum to do business," which "shall be presided been clearly established, and in such a case what is omitted in the
by the mayor," and another statute requires that the vice-mayor, or enumeration may not, by construction, be included therein.213 The
in his place, the councilor who obtained the largest number court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the omission
votes, should perform the duties of the mayor in the event of the
latter's temporary incapacity, this enumeration would ordinarily
even though the omission may have resulted from inadvertence or
Decause the case in question was not foreseen or contemplated.20
211Ibid. at pp. 732-734.

1People v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 627 (1962); City of Manila v. iyric M 216bid.
62149, Tabora v. Gavino, 79 Phil. 421 (1949).
House, Inc., 62 Phil. 125 (1935); Olfato v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 04*
March 31, 1981, 103 SCRA 741. scribano v. Avila, G.R. No. 30375, Sept. 12, 1978, 85 SCRA 245; Tabora v.
iting89
scribano v. Avila, G.R. No. 30375, Sept. 12, 1978, 85 SCRA 245, citng Ma Phil. 421 (1949); Olfato v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52749,
C.JS. 670 March 31, 1981, 103 SCRA 741.
Chua v. Civil Service Commission, 206 SCRA 65 (1992). People v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 657 (1962)
davellano v. Tayo, G.R. No. 18919, Dec. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA Cartwrite v. Cartwr 40 A2d 30, 155 ALR 1088 (1944).
1042(i
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CRPRETATION OF wORDS AND
B. Associated Words
PHRASEs
233
oniissus does not apply where it cultivates the land

belonging
of casus i to.
o u s e h o l d ,
The rule the mediate farm

phrase
thishown
did not intend to exd le the essed by
that the legislature person,
If such legislative intent is8 o
other, of the tenant,and such other household" as m"members
emhn
family
person or of
object from the enumeration. SOn or
indicated, the court may supply
the omission if to do so wdearl
the
relate
or not,
who a r e
erate the
dent Dupon dependent
him for
persons, whether
enterprise, the support and who
tha farm
out the clear intent of the legislature
and will not do violen Car
nce t uSually heip
operate
ianguage 222 ita he family

of
the tenant" includes the tenant's teTm "members of
even they are not dependent
though th« son-in-iaw, or son,
dson
nd living separately from him because theupon him for sup-
support" refersqialifying
last antecedent.
who are dependent upon
port.
Doctrine of him for
5.27. phrase
Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modifv n namely, "such to
other person or solely
last its
and because in thepersons, wtether related
antecedent,
the words or phrases to which they are immediately assóeia tenant o r not"
which are distantly or rematat
to the absence of
the court will not a ciear and
They do not qualify words or phrasés categorica.l imperative, construa statutes in a
located 23 In other words, in the absence of legislative intent to th inconsistent with the rational
unity of the Filipino family.227
and phrases must
contrary, preferential and qualifying words, De Ta Florentino,
Philippine National 2ank,2 the
v.
applied only to their immediate or last antecedent, and not to t he holders of backpay certiicates can question
other remote or preceding words or &ssociation of words. This ruleot raisedwhether compel gov-
nnment-owned banks to accept said certificates in
legal hermeneutics is commonly known as the doctrine of last ante der's obligations to the bank. A
payment of the
statute provides that the holder
ceden Simply stated, the doctrine means that a qualifying word
or phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest anteced. of backpay certificate may apply the same for payment of "obliga-
a
ent.225 The maxim expressive of this rule is ad proximum antecedeng fions subsisting at the time of the approval of this amendatory act
fiat relatio nisi impediatur sententia, or relative words refer to the for which the applicant may directly be liable to the government or
nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise requires. to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or to corporations owned
or controlled by the government, or to any citizens of the Philip-
The use of a comma to separate an antecedent from the rest
pines or to any association or corporation organized under the laws
exerts a dominant influence in the application of the doctrine of
of the Philippines, who may be wiling to accept the same for such
last antecedent. Thus, it has been held that the qualifying effect of
a modifying word or phrase will be confined to its immediate ante settlement." The Philippine National Bank, a government-owned
cedent if the latter is separated by a comma from the other ante bank, contends that the phrase "who may be willing to accept the
same for such settlement," which implies diseretion, qualifies cor
cedents.226
porations owned or controlled by the government and it cannot
Therefore be compelled to accept such backpay certificáte in pay-
5.28. Illustration of rule. of it. The court, invoking the
the holder's obligation with
ment
of last antecedent, ruled that the phrase qualifies oniy its
Where a statute defines the word "tenant" as a
"person wh Octrine
himself and with the aid available from within his immediate 1ar a8E antecedent, namely, "any citizen of the Philippines or assoc1aIt
Philippines."
OT
noted
corporation organized under the laws of the
a t there is a comma before the phrase "or to any citizen
2
People v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 657 (1962). one which thereby
2 Norwille v. State Tax Commission, 97 P2d 937, 126 ALR 1318 (190. *
ineparatingsaid phrase from the proceeding
detailed discussion on the subject, see Sec. 4.10, supra.
Felipe v. De la Cruz, 99 Phil. 940 (1956); Tirona v. Cudiamat, G. mplies that the qualifying phrase applies only tocertificate
t e hold-
21235, May 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 264. Cdent. Accordinglv, the court held that backpay
hota
Lional
22Pangilinan v. Alvendia, 101 Phil. 794 (1957); Florentino v. Phil. Nat
Bank, 98 Phil. 959 (1956).
225Roldan v. Villaroman, 69 Phil. 12 (1939). 98
ank,
Nera w Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 (1960); Florencio v. Phil. National Ba (1957).
Phil. 959 (1956).
Pangilinan
98
v. endia, 101 Phil. 794
Phil. 959
(1956)
NTERPRETATION OF WORDS
AND PHRASES
B. ABsociated Worde 235
234
which it appears by context most

t h es u l j e
to which it is most applicable 213

c
appropriately re-
ers can compel government-owned banks
to accept saidsaid certi.
certificates l a t e da n d
for pay1nent of their obligations with

the bank. People v. Tun Tumani24
illustrates the
applicaiion of
One of
singula singulis. O questions raised in this case isreddendo
the
when to
the 15-day
riod within which to
period
5.29. Qualisication of the doctrine. appeal a
judgment of con-
c o u n t
action
action whether from the date
criminal
The doctrine of last antecedent is subject to the exception . iction in

a
rom
o r fror the date of receipt of the of promuiga-
judgment notice of judg-
where the intention of the law is to apply the phrase to all anto tion of
ment. Section 6, Rule 122 of the Rules cf Court
ents embraced in the provision, the same should be made exten taken within fifteen (15) days from provides that "an
appealm u stt be
to the whole. The principle of last antecedent is merely an ai promulgation or
gment or order appealed frorm." In holding
of the judg,
tice period shou that the.
the construction of statutes and will not be adhered to wher -day ould be counted from the
tension to a more remote antecedent is clearly required by a
promulgation and not
n- receipt of copy of the judgment, the court said: "The word
sideration of the entire act. Slight indication of legislative intent. from
omulgation in.in Section 6 should be construed as
t so referring to 'judg
to extend the relative term is sufficient."" Nor does the doctri the word 'notice' should be
twhile construed as referring to
apply where the intention is not to qualify the antecedent at all 20 uction is sanctioned by the rule of reddendo
ment;
forder That construç
Thus, it has been held that the word "and in the phraso singulis, "285 In another case, which involves the question
facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of devell Snwhether
to
a Chinese holding a noncontrol position in a retail
as
opment, x xx which are offered and indicated in the approve establishment, whichis a wholly nationalized business, comes within
subdivision or condominium plans" indicates that the words which rohibition against aliens intervening "in the management,
are offered and indicated in the subdivision or condominium plang' tion. administration
operati
or control thereof
(nationalized or partly
refer not only to "other forms of development" but also to "facilities, enterprise), whethe as an officer, employee or laborer
improvements, infrastructures"because "and" is not meant to sepa
nationalized
#herein." the court ruled that the words "management, operation,
rate words but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union, in administration or control," followed by the phrase "whether as an
accordance with the rule, ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi officer, employee or laborer therein" signify, following the rule of
impediatur sententia or relative words refer to the nearest anteced. reddendo singula singulis, that the entire scope of personnel activ
ent, unless it be prevented by the context.231 ity, including that of laborers, is covered by the prohibition against
.
employment of aliens. It added that by reading the words "man

6.30. Reddendo singula singult8. i'i
agement, operation, administration or control," in connection with
. the positions therein enumerated, one cannot draw any other con-
A variation of the doctrine of last antecedent is the rule of
clusion than that they cover the entire range of employment.
reddendo singula singulis. The maxim means referring each to each;
referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let InAmadora u. Court of Appeals,23 one of the issues raised is
each be put in its proper place, that is, the whether Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which states that "Lastly,
words should be taken
distributively.232 As a rule of statutory construction, reddendo singula teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trade shall be li-
singulis requires that the antecedents and consequences should be able for damages caused by their pupils and students or appren-
read distributively to the effect that each word is to be applied to
King . Hernaez, 114 Phil. 730 (1962), citing 2 Sutherland, Statutory Cens
2"Roldan Villaroman, 69 Phil. 12 (1939); Cornejo
v. truction, Sec. 4819.
(1930); Ochate v. Deling, 105 Phil. 384 v. Naval, 54 Phil. su8
230Heras Teehankee
(1959).
Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756
v.
GR.No. 22160, Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 153 (1974).
2351bid. at p. 157.
231Mapa v. Arroyo, 175 SCRA 76 (1989). (1946). 236 v. Hernaez, 114 Phil. 730 (1962).
People
C.J.S. 175.
v. Tamani, G.R. No. 22160, Jan.
21, 1974, 55 SCRA 153, citing 2971
DCRA 315 (1988); sce Pasco v. Court of First Instance ef Bulacen,
160
SCRA 70
o
SCRA 784 (1988).
236
INTERPRETATION
C. Provis08,
OP WORDS AND
PHPASES 237
Excaptions and Saving Ciausts
tices so longthey remain in their custody"
as
academic as well as non-academic. The
applies to all sch. se to which it 13 as3ociated a
proviso. What determines
Supreme Court ruled: "
O r
the school is academic whethether a clause 13 a proviso is its substance rather than its form.
rather ihan technical ms any of the fun.ctions of a proviso, then it will be
ture, responsibility for the tort committed or vocational in
by the student will egarded as Ssuch, irTespective of what word or phrase is used to
tach to the ieacher in
charge of such student, following introduce it.. in short, it is a question of legislative
intent.
. 242
provision. This is the general

rule. In case of the the
arts and trades, it is the head establishments at
thereof, and only he,
held liabie as an (who) shall h 5.32. Proviso may enlarge scope of law.
exception to the
teachers in general shall be liable general
rule. In other
for the acts of words It has been held that "even though the primary purpose of the
except where the school is technical in nature, in their students proviso is to the general language of a
limit restrain
or the statute,
the head thereof who shall be answerable. which case it i legislature, unfortunately, does not always use it with technical
reddendo singula singulis, teachers' shouldFollowing the canons ot
correctness; consequently, where its use creates an ambiguity, it is
apply to the words
'pu
pils and students' and heads of establishments of the duty of the court to ascertain the legislative intention, ihrough
to the words arts and trades resort to the usual rules of construction applicable to statuies gen-
'apprentices."
erally and give it effect even though the statute is thereby en-
larged, or the provision made to assume the force of independent
C. PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS enactment and although a proviso as such has no existence apart
AND SAVING CALAUSES from which it is designed to limit or qualify."2
A proviso may thus enlarge, instead of restrict or iimit, what
5.31. Provisos, generally. otherwise is a phrase of limited import had there been no proviso
qualifying it. For instance, a statute provides that "it shall be un-
Generaily, the office of a proviso
is either to limit the applica
tion of the enacting clause, section, or provision of a statute, or to lawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie,
except something therefrom, or to qualify or restrain its generality knife, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: Provided, That this
provision shall not apply to firearms in the possession of persons
or
to exclude some possible ground of misinterpretation of it, as
extending to cases not intended by. the legislature to be brought
who have secured a license therefor.or who are entitied to same
under the provisions of this Act." It is claimed that under this

its The common and usual role of à proviso to
within purview3 is
restrain or qualify the generality of the enacting clause or section
provision, an unlicensed firearm concealed about the person does
to which it refers. Its primary purpose is to limit or restrict239the not come with the phrase "other deadly weapon," following the rule
general language or operation of the statute, not to enlargeit. o eusdem generis. The court said that such contention might be
enable had there been no proviso which, in excepting from the
A proviso is commonly found at the end of a section, or prov prohbition the carrying of a licensed firearm, clearly implies that
sion of a statute, and is introduced, as a rule, by the word "Pro unicensed firearm is included in the phrase "other deadly
VIdea." A proviso may also be introduced by some other words o eapon. The court added that in this case, the proviso of the act
phrases, such as "but nothing herein" which is nevertheless in tn eply indieates that in the view of the legislature, the carrying of
nature of a proviso and should be construed as such.240 The useo censed revolver would be a violation of the Act. By the proviso
the word "provided" does not, however, necessarily make the clauso
manifested its intention
ther than the
int to include in the prohibition weapons
armas blancas therein speci
of
Minis v. United States, 15 Pet 445, 10 L. ed. 791 (1838); Chartered Bank
India mperial, 48 Phil. 931 (1921); U.S. v. Santo Niño, 13 Phil. 141 (1
Arenas v. City of San Carlos, G.R. No.
34024, April 5, 1978, 82 SCRA 318.
4M ectric Co. v. Public Utilities Employees'Assn.,
79 Phil. 409 (1947).
C Compania de Seguros, 107
Chartered Bank of India v. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931 (1921);
Mariano, 41 Phil. 322 (1921). Borroi
eo
*Commissioner
Phil. 1055,, of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas
Construction, pp. 604-605.
49 a960), citing E.T, Crawford, Statutory
240Borromeo v. Mariano, supra. V.Santo Niño, 13 Phil. 141 (1909).
238
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASEs 239
C.Proviso8, Exceptions and Saving Clause8
5.33. Proviso as additional wheat flour instead of being

of allocat
cating the
A proviso legislation. t h a n
the
t h a t t h
function
Control Commission was assigned to the
may also nssignedto the Import
tion. Thus, it has been assume the role of an Rehabilitation and Trade Administration. If the intent
proviso is to
held that the "usual
limit and
additional 1. Philippine H eh
to exempt wheat flour from the provisions of the Act,

statute that which generalities and primary of of
t h el a w .
have been placed in the section containing the

otherwise would beexclude
proviso would.
from the
sometimes mean simply additional within its terms.scope af tbe Provlause 247 Similarly, where an earlier section of a statute
repealing clause,3" Similarlu
fied purpose expressed in the Buti

legislation. A clear and una roviso, which is not embodied in a later section thereot,
contajns
uld, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary,
opening
statute comprising several subdivisions statement of a section theprovi should
to qualify only the section to which it has been appended.
trolling and limiting a proviso attached has been construed as be
confine
h a dt h e intent
been to apply it to both sections, or words would
where the to one of the for
proviso, if segregated therefronm, would subdivisi erted

been inserte therein to make that intent clear.248
reverse of what it mean
the limitation."24 necessarily implied when read in connection t
exactly have
In Flores u. Miranda," the contention of petitioner that ap-

wit hthe Public Service Com1nission of the sale of a public
was not necessary becausê of the proviso in Section
Pro vehicle
5.34. What Act No. 146 was rejected, aid Section 20
proviso qualifies. 2 0p fC o m m o n w e a l t h
shal
The general rule is that the eading
in parttha thatit be unlawful for any public service
ofice of the proviso qualifies o o r for
he owner, lessee or
the operator thereof, without the
modifies only the phrase immediately jehicle approval ana
oreyious nd authority of the Commission previously had
limits the generality of the clause thatpreceding it or restrains
o
t o sell, alienate, x X * its property, franchise, certificate,
proviso is to be construed with referenceit toimmediately follows.
the immediately nrivilege, or right, or any part thereof; x x x Provided, however,
ceding part of the provision, to which it is pre herein contained shall be construed to prevent the
statute itself or
attached, and not to
the
That nothing
fransaction from being negotiated or completed before its approval
other sections thereof.245 It
to
should
that which directly precedes it, or to the section
be confined t
to which it has t fo prevent the sale, alienation, or lease by any public service of
been appended, unless it clearly any of its property 1n
the ordinary course of business." The Su-
appears that the legislature in
tended it to have a wider scope.246 nreme Court held that "the proviso x x x means only that the sale
Ilustrative of the rule is the proviso in Section 15 of Republie Without the required approval is still yalid and binding between
theparties" and the "phrase in the ordinary course of business x x
Act No. 426 which states: "Any existing law,
executive order or xcould not have been intended to include the sale of the vehicle
regulation to the contrary notwithstanding, no government office, itself, but at most may refer only to such property that may be
ageney, or instrumentality except the Import Control Commission
shall allocate the import quota among the various importers
copceivably disposed of by the carrier in the ordinary cöurse of its
buisiness, like junked equipment."
Provided, That the Philippine Rehabilitation and Trade Admi
I n another case, one of the issues raised is whether the pro-
nistration shall have exclusive power and authority to determine
ánd regulate the allocation of wheat flour among importers." To the vjso introduced by the phrase "Provided, That" qualifies both project
employees and casual employees, or only the latter, in the provision
argument that this proviso excluded wheat flour from the scopeof
the Act itself, the court said that the proviso can only refer tothe wifph states: "x x x except where the employment has fixed fora
it and have other meaning Specifie project or undertaking the completion or termination of
clause immediately preccding can no
Ruling
Chartered Bank of India v. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931, 948 (1921), citing inese Flour Importers Assn. v. Price Stabilization Board, 89 Phil. 469
Case Law, Vol. 3, par. 18, p. 179.
Chinese Flour Importers Ássn. v. Price Stabilization Board, 89 Phil. 46
(1951).
(1951); Arenas v. City of San Carlos, G.R. No. 24024, April 6, 1978,
82 SCRA 318, Collector of Internal Revenue v. Angeles, 101 Phil. 1026 (1957).
105 Phil. 266,
246Collector Revenue v. Angeles, 101 Phil. 1026 (1957).
of Internal
'
270-271 (1959).
INTERPRETATION
C.
OF
Provisos, ExceptionsWORDS AND PHRASES
and Saving Clauses 241
which has been determined at the the engagement

time of
employee or where the work or services to be performed is sease
of however, an. irreconcilable
the main provisic sion of
contlict
or
repugnancy between a proviso
in nature and the employmnent is for the duration of the sea
and
later portion of the
statute,
a
statute prevails,
that which is a
unless there is alecated in a
inteni to thecor contrary or such construction
will destroy legislative
"An empioyment shall be deemed to be casual ifit is not covered
the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who h tute itself.252 The latter provision, the whole
rendered at least one year service, whether such service is contihas S whether a
proviso or not, is
oreference because it 1s the latest
ous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respes the legislation.253 expression of the intent of
to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall
continue while such actually exists." It was held that the provisa Exceptions, generally.
refers only to. casual employees: "In the case of Mercado, Sr D8 5.37.
National Labor Relations Commission, this Court ruled that the An exception consists of that which would
proviso in the second paragraph of Article 280 relates only to casual cluded in the otherwise be in-
provision from which it is excepted.54 It is clause a
employees and is not applicable to those who fall within the defini. which exempts sometning rom the operation of statute a
by
pres words.It is ex-
tion of said Article's first paragraph, i.e., project employee. The generally expressed -in such words as
familiar grammatical rule is that a proviso is to be construed with *except,"
nless otherwise, and "shall not.apply," and such similar words as
reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to a used to take out of the enactment
which it is attached, and not to other sections thereof, unless the otherwise be part of its subject matter.23something
However,
which would
an exception
clear legislative intent is to restrict or quelify only the phrase need not be introduced by the words "except" or "unless." An
excep-
immediately preceding the proviso but also earlier provisions of the tion will be construed as such if it removes something from the
statute or even the statute itself as a whole. No such intention is operation of a provision of law.286
observable in Article 280 of the Labor Code."260
The function of an exception
is neither to color nor to domi-
nate nor to destroy the general
rule. It is often said that an
5.35. Exception to the rule. excep-
tion confirms the general rule. It should not be construed to qualify
the words or phrases constituting the general
The rule that a proviso should be construed to qualify only the rule 27
immediately preceding part of the séction to which it is attached is It is weli-settled that the
express mention of exceptions oper-
true only if no contrary legisiative intent is indicated. Where the ates to exclude other exceptions; and conversely, those which are
egislative intent is to restrain or qualify not only the phrase im- not within the enumerated exceptions are deemed included in the
mediately preceding it but also earlier provisions of the statute or general rule.258 Thus, where a statute expressly excepts certain
even the statute itself as a whole, then the proviso will be con
matters from the operation of the statute, the implication is that
strued in that manner, in order that the intent of the law may be
c a r r i e d out. 251 hout such exception the matter comes within the general rule.
nat is why there is need for the express exception.3 And a thing
Deing excepted, it must be regarded as coming within the pur.
6.36. Repugnaney between proviso and main provision.
A proviso should be so construed as to harmonize, and not to
Tepeal or destroy, the main provision of the statute. Where there is,. 252Bo
5oTromeo v. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322 (1921).
1978, 82 SCRA 318.
5renas v. City of San Carlo8, G.R. No. 34024, April 5,
hartered Bank of India v. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931 (1921
409 (1947).
230ALU-TUCP v. NLRC, Assn., 79 Phil.
64 SCAD 49, 234 SCRA 678, 688 (1994). Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Employecs'
25Pendon v. Diasnes,
"Arenas City of San Carlos, G.R. No. 34024,
v.
5, 1978, 82 SCRA 8
91 Phil. 848 (1952).
Commissioner of Lnternal Revenue v. Filipinas CompaniaApril
de Seguros, 107 1055 257He
Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76
Phil. 756 (1946).
(1960). Fm ALR2d 797 (1961). Sec. 5.21,
V . Reed, 170 A2d 419, 91 359 (1952). See
supra.
ervantes v. Central Bank, 91 Phil.
242 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION INTERPRETATION
C. Provis0s,
OF WORDS
AND PHRASES 243
Exceptiorns and Saving Clauses
view of the general rule, expressed in the maxim, erceptio firme uneration: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall
lic utilities
r e g u l a r
mat apply to publie

performing some public service such a8
regulam in casibus non exceptis, 300 not a
supplying gas,
gas, eleci electricity, power, water,
or
providing means of trans-
Exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but renso
son-
communication." The question raised is whether Ma-
ably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairla portoetric Co., which is a public utility company
is liable to pay an additional compensation supplying
elec-
irly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor ofthe genera
nila.
of twenty-five
provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is trici m of the regular remuneration in favor of those
tablished by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the
es per ed to work during Sundays and legal holidays. Inemployees
resolving
former nor add to the latter by implication.2 T Stion in the negative, the court held: "Said Section 4 con-
the u
of two parts: the first, which is the enactment clause, prohib-
the
sists
erson, firm
or corporation, business
its a
establishment or place or
5.38. Exception and proviso distinguished. from compelling an employee or laborer to work
center of labor fro
An exception differs from a proviso. An exception exempts
ring Sundays and legal holidays, unless the former pays the
tter an additional sum ot at least twenty-five per centum of his
something absolutely from the operation_ of a statute, by express
words in the enacting clause.:A proviso defeats its operation condi. l a r remuneration, and: the second part, which is an exception,
tionally. An exception takes out of the statute something that oth- empts public utilities performing some publicservice x x x from
erwise would be a part of the subject matter of it. A proviso avoids Hheprohibition established in the enactment clause. As appellant is
i e utility that supplies electricity and provides means of trans-
them by way of defeasance or excuse. An exception is generally a Ortation to the þublic, it is evident that the appellant is exempt
part of the enaciment itself, absolutely excluding from its operation from the qualified prohibition established in the enactment clause,
some subject or thing that otherwise would fall within its scope. and may compel its employees or laborers to work during Sundays
But when the enactment is modified by engrafting upon it a new and legal holidays without paying them said extra compensation.
provision, by way of amendment, providing conditionally for a new To hold that the exception or second part of Section 4 only exempts
case, it is in the nature ofa proviso.262 public utilities mentioned therein from the prohibition to compel
employees or laborers to work during those days, is to make an
However, as earlier noted, one of the functions of a proviso is
sense, an exception to a general rule that does not exist, because the prohibi-
to except something from an
enacting clause. In this tion in the enactment clause is not an absolute prohibition to com-
exception and a proviso are similar.253
pel a laborer or employee to work during Sundays and legal holi-
days. The prohibition to compel a laborer or employee to work
5.39. Illustration of exception. during those days is qualified by the clause. unless he is paid an
An illustration additional sum of at least twenty-five per centum of his regular
of the application of an exception is Manila remuneration, which is inseparable from the prohibition which they
Electric Co. Public Utilities Employees' Association,3 which in-
u.
volves the interpretation of Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. qualify and of which they are part and parcel. The second portion
although it
444 which reads: "No person, firm, or corporation, business estab- Of Section 4 is in reality an exception, and not isa proviso
elemental that an
lishment or place or center of labor shall compel an employee or ntroduced by the word 'provided,' and it
something which would other
laborer to work during Sundays and legal holidays, unless he 1s exception takes out of an enactment,
paid an additional sum of at least twenty-five per centumm of his Wise be a part of the subject matter ofit."
it is claimed that the
n 7olentino v. Secretary of Finance,20
Clause in the provision of Art. VI, Sec. 26(2) of the 1987
OFodges v. Municipal Board of lloilo, 19 SCRA 28 (1967).
20 Samson v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 654 (1986).
20Rowell v. Janurin, 151 N.Y. 60, 45 N.E. 398.
2053Chartered Bank of India v. Innperial, 48 Phil. 931 (1921). 1bid., at pp. 411-4112.
54 SCAD 671, 235 SCRA 630 (1994).
26479 Phil. 409 (1947).
244
Constitution, which
INTERPRETATION
C. Provis0s,
OF WORDS
AND PHRASES
Excoptiona
become a law unless itreads: "No bill passed by either and Saving Clauses 245
and printed copies has passed three Houe

its Members three thereof in its final form readings on 8eparato nal by the President. Construing the two
have been para that "absolute pardon for ciauses together, the
dent certifies to the days before its passage, except distrih sted ta couT otitnent or more was8
any crime for which one
meted out year
when the
public calamity or necessity of its immediate enactment
o fimpriso
rights. When the penalty is lessrestores the prisoner to his
ent, namely, the emergency," qualifies only its to ma
p o l i t i c
than one year,

ation
does ttach, except when the crime
not atta disqualifi-
distribution
three days from its final of the nearest
printed bill in its finalante
C a t i
oroperty, in which case the committed is one

again prisoner has to have a
separate days. The passage, and not the three form
d o n . "269
par-
dent certifies to theCourt ruled: "The phrase 'except whenreadings.On Another mple of the rule
that an
Art. VI, Sec. 26(2) necessity of its immediate the Fras
enactment, sdced by the word "except or "unless" exception need not be
can become a law: qualifies the two stated conditions beforeetea bial nle 270 The issue raised in this case is is Gorospe u. Court of
) the bill has
mail after the five-day period whether actual receipt of
Appeals.
days, and (ii) it has been passecd three

readings on separata registered ma:
provided for in Section 8,
printed
three days before it is finally in its
final form and distribute Rule 27 of
the ules of Court, which states that "service by regis-
less' clause must be read in approved "In other words, the un teredmail is compl upon actual receipt by the addressee;
but if
the two are really relation to the fails to claim his mail from the post office within five
coordinate clauses of the "except clause, because days
date of first notice of the postmaster, the service shall from
strue the 'except' clause as same
simply dispensing withsentence.
quirement in the 'unless' clause
To con
the second re
fect at the expiraion of such time," is the date from whichtake to
eount the prescriptive period to comply with certain
days before final approval) would(i.e., printing and distribution three
not only violate the
requirements.
The Supreme Court ruled that the service is completed on the fifth
mar. It would also negate the
very premise of the
rules of gram dav after the first notice, even if he actually received the mail
necessity securing the immediate enactment of a
of 'except clause: nths later." "Indeed, the structure of the sentence
bill which permits no
ather inference. 'The second part is separated by a semicolon,
certified in order to meet a
publie calamity or emergency."267 is hegins with but' which
and
The rule that indicates that the following is an exception
an
exception need not be introduced to the rule enunciated in the first that service is
"except" or "unless" is illustrated in Pendon Diasnes.288by the word actual receipt." completed upon
raised is whether a person convicted of a
v.
The issue
who was granted absolute crime against property,
vote. The law involved
pardon by the President, is entitled to 6,40. Saving ciause.
provides that a person shall not be qualified
to vote "who has been sentenced A saving clause is a clause in
by final judgment to suffer one a provision
oper-of law which
year or more of imprisonment, such ates to except from the effect of the law what the clause
disability not having been to provides,71
removed by plenary pardon," or "who has been declared by final or save something which would otherwise be lost.272 It is usually
used to except or save
judgment guilty of any crime against property." The court ruled something from the effect of a
statute. Thus, the legislature, in repealing a statute, mayrepeal
of a
that, by the terms of the first clause, two exceptions are provided, in the preserve,
form of saving clause, the right
namely, a person penalized by less than one year, and a perso a of the state to
prosecute
granted an absolute pardon; and the second clause creates an ex and punish offenses committed in violation of the repealed law.**
Where
ception to the first, but not to the second, exception, namely, that a existing procedure is altered or substituted by another, it is
person convicted of a crime against property cannot vote irrespec
tive of the length of sentence meted out, unless given absolue
291bid. at p. 852.
270106 Phil. 1144, 1148
(1959).
Bautistau v. Fule, 85 Phil. 391 (1950).
a5]bid., pp. 664-665. aez de Aldecou Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 30 Phil. 228 (1915).
v.
26891 Phil. 848 (1952). Prisopa 57 Plil.hang Wing v. U.S., 40 Phil. 1046 (1910); Lagrimas Director of
Prisons, v.
247 (1932).
246
the old law

usual to save those proceedings pending under at t
time the new law takes effect, by means
of a saving clause7 e
construed in the light of the int.
Chapter VI
A saving clause should be
or purpose which the legislature had in mind in providing it
statute, the principal consideration being to etfectuate such int STAT E CONSTRUED AS WHOLE
a liberal or st
out such purpose. It should be given
or carry
construction depending upon the kind of interpretation that shona
strict AND IN RELATION TO OTHER
uld,
considering its nature, be given to the
statute as a whole.
STATUTES
A. STATUTE CONSTRUED AS WHOLE
6.01. Generaliy.
statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and
A
imated
is
by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each
section ould
shou be construed in connection with
part or every other
atrt and sectiorn so. as to produce a harmonious whole. It is not
1i
aroper to.confine the attention of one section to be construed. It is
.
always an unsafe way of construing a statute to divide it byya
Drocess of etymological dissertation, into separate words, and then
apply to each, thus 8eparated from its context, some
particular
definitions given by lexicographers, and then reconstruct the stat
ute upon the basis of these definitions.
In other words, the whole and every
part of a statute should
be construed together3
6.02. Intent ascertained from statute as whole.

The intent or meaning of a statute should be ascertained from
the statute taken as a whole and not from an isolated part or
otto v. Sotto, 43 Phil. 688 (1922), citing Sutherland on Statutory Construc-

K35 D ed, Sec. 386; Araneta v. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709 (1956); Tamayo v. Gsell,
Phil. 958 (1916).
fational Tobacco dm. v. COA, 110 SCAD 353, 311 SCRA 755 (1999), citing
ftuben
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1986 ed, p. 181.
]bañez de Aldecoa v.
Honglkong & Shanghai Bank, 30 Phil. 228 (1915).
1916).
247
248
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AT CONSTRUED AS WHOLE AND IN RELATION 249
TO OTHER STATUTES
A. Statute Construed a::
Whole
provision thereof.3
the statute as a The legislative meaning is to be f viewed together with other provisions."9 And the details
whole. Its may contain regu!lations restricting the extent of the
every part of a statute is to clauses are not to be extractod from
p l i c a t i o n
contaji
may
part
other part and be construed segregated

with reference
of one
general expre,
ion used in another part of the same act." For
every word and phrase in t instance,the
phrase "device or arrangement" in the provision that
text. This is so connection with it unlawful for any persun, not being authorized by all the
because the law is the best shall
be
unlawt
Optima statuti interpretatrix expositor it any private communication

ipsum statutum. The best it of spoken word to tap any
to . or
est
preter of a statute is the statute intinter partieable or by using any other device or
arrangement, to
itself." wire or
ntercept, or record such communication or spo

It has been held gecreuyhy using such device commonly known
that in the proper
to inquire into the interpretation of statutes h or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tapedictaphone
as
it is not ken or
permissible
the legislative motives which recorder, or
body, except insofar as such motives influenes dicta therwise described, cannot be construed in to isolation
the statute itself. are
disclosed include "extension jon of a telephone
unit" or a "party
line," but should
ted in relation to the words
instead be interpreted
The court in "tap," "to
verhear, intercept or|record," which wouid thus restrict thesecretly
lar
explained the rule in detail: "The parti,
a case
mean-
words, clauses phrases and
should not be studied as
Over
ing of
the phrase as
excluding "extension of telephone unit" or
and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part ofdetache
the stat.
06 ine" because such words require that there be either a
physi-
ute must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parta Pteruption
cal int through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of
and in order to produce a order to overhear,
harmonious whole. A a device in intercept, or record the spoken words."
construed as to harmonize and give effect to allitsstatute must go
be
provisions when- Tn National Tobacco Adm. U. COA," the issue
ever possible. The meaning of the raised was
law, it must be borne in mind, is ather educational assistance benefit given to individuals
not to be extracted from any single part, portion or section or
from anactment of R.A. No. 6758 should continue to be received byprior
them.
to
isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences but from a gen This issue depends upon the proper interpretation of the first
eral consideration or view of the act as a whole. Every ofa sentence of Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 6758, which states that "such
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. Thie
part additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as other be
means that every part of the statute must be considered together determined by the DBM shall be deemed included may in the
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of standardized salary rates herein prescribed," -and the second
"Por Sentence of said Sec. 12, which provides that "Such
the whole enactment, not separately and independently" talken compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received
other additional
in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning by
when incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not
quite different from the one actually intended and evident integrated into the standard
salary rates shall continue to be authorized."
associ
the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is the first sentence is a The Court rulecd that
have limited ap- "catch-all provision" that refers to
ated. Thus, an apparent general provision may a
while the second sentence allowances,
refers to benefits in the nature of financial
Ssistance and not allowance. The
Court cited rules of statutory
construetion to explain its
Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals,
SManila
G.R. No. 41001, Sept. 30, 1976, conclusion, thus:
41 Phil. 322 (1921).
SCRA 162; Borromeo v. Mariano,
Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. City
of Cebu "Cardinal is the rule in
Tamayo v. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953 (1916);
Sanciangco v. Rono, 137 SCRA b partieular words, clauses and statutory construction 'that the
G.R. No. 14526, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 449;
TMX Sales, Inc., 205 SCRA
184 (1992. phrase should not be studied as
(1985);Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
47 Phii. 249 (1925).
Lopez v. El Hogar Filipino, Court of Appeals,
20
Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (Southb) Assn., Inc. v.

Construction, 3rd ed., p. 197. SCRA Aboitiz.
449, 458 Shipuing Corp. v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 14526, March 31, 1965, 13
opez v. (1965).
SCRA 681 (1997), citing Agpalo, Statutory 138 SCAD 952,
346 SC
Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp.,
v. El
Mar
Del
Hogar ilipino, 47 Phil. 249 (1926).
iaanan v. Intermedi8
485 (2000). No. 39419, April 12, 1982,
113 SCRA 45
Aisporma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. SCAD 353, diate Appllate Court, 145 SCRA 112 (1986).
466-467 (1982).
311 SCRA 755 (1999).
250 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION STATUTE CONSTRUED AS WHOLE AND IN RELATION 251
TO OTHER STATUTES
A. Statute Construed as Whole
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole d e

me
all its parts harmonize with each other, and render them
part of the statute must be considered in fixing the mean every consistent with its SCope and object.1
of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious wh

A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and Giving effect to statute as a whole.
effect to all its provisions whenever possible: And the rule
6.04
a statute is enacted in whole and not in parts or
Because
that statute must be construed as a whole requires that
-
seetions,which implies that one part is as important as the other,

apparently conflicting provisions should be reconciled and hanar should be construed and given effect as a whole. A
monized, if possible. It is likewise a basic precept in statutory the statute
or section which-is unclear by itself may be made cleàr by
construction that the intent of the legislature is the contro. provision
ling factor in the interpretation of the subject statute,3 With reading and construing it in relation to the whole statute. Accord-
ingly, in order to properly and intelligently construe a provision or
these rules and the foregoing distinction elaborated
upon, it is Section of a statute, understand its meaning and scope, and apply
evident that the two seemingly irreconcilable propositions are itto an actual ca_e, the courts should consider the whole act it
susceptible to perfect harmony. Accordingly, the Court con-
cludes that under the aforesaid 'eatch-all provision, the legis self1 In words, every part of a statute shouid be given effect
other
lative intent is just to include the fringe benefits which are in because a statute is enacted as an integrated measure and not as a
hodgepodge of conilicting provisions."
i
the naiure of allowances and since the benefit under contro

versy is not in the same category, it is safe to hold that subject riotIneonstruing a statute, courts "have to take the thought con
educational assistance is not one of the firinge benefits within veyed by the statute as a whole; construe the constituent parts
the contemplation of the first sentence of but
Section 12 rathe together; ascertain the legislative intent from the whole act; con-
of the second sentence of Section 12, in relation to Section 17 sider each and every provision thereof in the light of the general
of R.A. No. 6758 x xx."l4 purpose of the statute; and endeavor to make every part effective,
harmonious, and sensible."18 Courts should adopt a construetion
that will give effect to every part ofa statute, if at all possible. This
6.03. Purpose or context as controlling guide. rule is expressed in the maxim, ut res magis valeat quam pereat or
A statute must always be construed as a whole, and the par
that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole
ticular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is usualy of the statute- its every word.9 Hence, where a statute is sus-
be ascertained from the context, the nature of the subject trea ceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt
and the purpose or intention of the body which enacted or framet such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the
the statute. In other words, statutes must receive a reasonab
construction, reference being had to their controlling purpose, to a
their provisions, force and effect being given not narrowly to i
lated and disjoined clauses, but to their spirit, broadly taking Sotto v. Sotto, 43 Phil. 688 (1922), citing Sutherland on Statytory Construe'
their provisions together in one rational view. Neither grammaia lon, 2nd ed., Sec. 368; Araneta v. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709 (1956).
construction nor the letter of the statute nor its rhetorical tra DLMaddumba Ozaeta, 82
v. Phil. 345 (1948); Lopez v. El Hogar Filipino, 47
Phil. 249 (1925).
work should be permitted to defeat its clear and definite purpos
NILRC, 46 SCAD 442, 228 SCRA
stat
MM Promotions & Management, Inc. v.
be gathered from the whole act, comparing part with part. A 129 (1993).
ssible,
ute must receive such reasonable construction if poss 170, 193 (1966);
as will, U.P Rpuie
. Reyes, G.R. No. 22550, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA
O
Regents v. Auditor General, G.R. No. 19617, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 5,
19100u
19 (1969).
A Dec. 21, 1965, 15 SCRA 514 (1965);
U.S. eda Florentino, G.R. No. 23800,
v.
83, 38 Phil. JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. v. NLRC,

Citing Ruben Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., 46 SCAn 37 17 (1917);
4110 pp. 181, Io SCAD 492, 228
SCAD 353, 311 SCRA, p. 767. SCRA 129 (1993).
252 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION STATUTE CONSTRUBD AS WHOLE AND IN RELATION 253
T0 OTHER STATUTES
provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with so

s o construing a
con.
statute that the statute will be given effect
o. .
only by
other.20 whole.
25
as
a
In JMM Promotions & Management, lnc. u. Accordingly, the courts, when confronted with apparently
NLRC" tho. should endeavor to reconcile them instead of
flicting statutes
provisions of the POEA rules are involved: (1) a provision whick
outright the invalidity of one against the other. Courts
c o n f l i
requires cash or surety bond as a requirement for perfectino. eclaring

decl.
should harmonize ithem, if this is possible, because they are equally
appeal; (2) another provision which requires cash bond and sure an of the same legislature. 25
bond to answer for all valid and legal claims against the the handiwork
and (3) another provision which requires the amount to be
emplover. the issue raised is whether
placed In Republic u. Court of Appeals,"
in escrow to answer for claims of recruited workers. It is claimed ving claims for just compensation under Fep. Act No.
in cases involvir
that the appeal cash or surety bond should not be required as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,
for C&57, otherwise knowndecision of the provincial adjudicator to the
perfection of appeal from a decision of the POEA because the anDeal the
re from
eruitment agency has already posted bonds and escrow money. In nARAB must first be made before a landowner can resort to the
rejecting such contention, the Court ruled: "Under the petitioner' Reoional Trial Court under Sec. 57. The Republic and the Land
and they cite Sec. 50 which
interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the afore Bank sustain the afirmative propositionwith
mentioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier reads that: "The DAR is hereby vested primary jurisdiction to
bonds and escrow money it has posted, The petitioner would in determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the imple-
exclu-
redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements mentation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Sections4 and 17. The rule is that a construction that would render Sive jurisdiction
a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently in Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)." They
for the taking of lands is
consistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as argue that the fixing of just compensation
a matter involving the implementation
of agrarian reform within
parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole."2
the contemplation of the provision. They invoke Sec. 16(f), which
6.05. Apparently conflicting provisions reconciled.

provides that "any party who disagrees to the decision fof the DARI final
may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for
The rule that a statute must be construed and given effectas determination of just compensation," as
confirming their
tion of Sec. 50. The Court held that the contention has no merit:
construc
a whole requires that apparently conflicting provisions should be
reconciled and harmonized, if at all possible. The various prov "It is true that Sec. 50 grants the DAR primary juris-
sions should be read together so that all may, if possible, have ther diction to determine and adjudicate 'agrarian reform matters
due and conjoint effect, without repugnancy or inconsistency A
the provisions, even if apparently contradictory, should be allowed and exclusive original jurisdiction over 'all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling
to stand and given effect by reconciling them.24 The statute must under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agricul-
18
be so construed as to prevent a conflict between parts of it. For it ure and the Department of Environment and Natural Re
sources. It is also true, however, that Sec. 57 provides
xxx
exclusive
he Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and of just
20Javellana v. Tayo, G.R. No. 18919, Dec. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 1042 (1962 Jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination
Radiola-Tbshiba Phil., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 199 SCRA 373 (197*
citing Agpalo, Statutory Construction, p. 182.
46 SCAD 492, 228 SCRA 129 (1993).
22Ibid., p. 138.
Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138 (1922). People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679 (1957).March
Araneta v Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709 (1956). 28 Akbayan COMELEC, .R. No. 147066,
. 26, 2001.
76 SCAD 741, 263 SCRA 758 (1996).
sTATUTE CONSTRUED AS WHOLE AND IN RELATION
TO OTHER STATUTES 255
A. Statute Construed as
Whole
compensation to landowners, and the prosecution ofall uhe adverse claim shall be effective for
nal offenses under this Act. x x x The provision of Secrimi. days from the date of registration.
a period of thirty
must be construed in harmony with this proviSion by çConsid
At first blush, the provision in question would seem to
ering cases involving the determination of just compensati
Testrict the effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days. But
and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excentod the above provision cannot and should not be treaied sepa-
from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed rately, but should be read in relation to the sentence follow
there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR is an admini ing, which reads:
trative agency which cannot be granted jurisdietion over cas
of eminent domain (tor such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) aAfter the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse
claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor
and "over criminal cases" because "the valuation of property
in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which by the party in interest.'
cannot be vested in administrative agencies xxx, "Tf the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to
ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty days,
Sajonas u. Court of Appeais,2 involves the issue as to what then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing
period an adverse claim annotated at the back of a transfer certifi
caveat to clariy and completè the rule. For then, no adverse
cate of title is effective, which in-turn dependsupon theinterpreta claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically termi
tion of Sec. 70 of PD. No. 1529, which reads in part: "The advers nated by mere lapse of time, the law would not have required
claim shali be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of the
party in interest to do a useless act.
registration. Áfter the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse
claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by XX X
the party in interest: Provided, however, That after cancellation, no "It should be noted that the law employs the phrase may
second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered
be cancelled,' which obviously indicates x xx that the court
of a duy
by the same claimant." In holding that the effectivity adverse claim xx
annotated adverse claim does not lapse after thirty days bu may or may not order the cancellation of an a
1or X. It will therefore depend upon the evidence at proper hear
by the court in a verified petition filed
continues until cancelled
ing for the court to determine whether it will order the can-
the purpose, the Court applied the rules of statutory construction
cellation of the adverse claim or not.
thus:
"It construing the law aforesaid, care should be take
that every part thereof be given effect and a construction d law for a hearing where
provides
"The reason why the
could render a provision inoperative should be avoided, a be threshed out is to
Lhe validity of the adverse claim is to to be heard, pro
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever pos TOrd the adverse claimant an opportunity
ble as parts of a harmonious whole. For taken in solituae claimed interest can
Terent Vidin
h venue where the propriety ofhis determining
word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite ai
from the one actually intended and evident when a wo 1n
Eestablished or revoked, all for the purpose of the title arising
at encumbrance on
phrase is considered with those with which it is associate f he existence of any is in line with
the provision
u such adverse claim. This
an
ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscriptio"

adverse claim, we must read the law in its entirety. Se mmediately following: second
cancellation, no
three, paragraph two of Section 70 of PD. No. 1529 prov rovided, however That after 30
claimant."
adverse claim shall be registered by the same
26Ibid., pp. 762-763.

2971 SCAD 542, 258 SCRA 79 (1996). lbid, pp. 95-98.
256 WHOLE AND IN RELATION
257
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION STAT UTE CONSTRUED AS
TO OTHER STATUTES
Whole
A. Statute Construed as
The most general and

6.06. Special and general provisions in same as means to effect
the purpose of the law.
statute, section may be qualified and liinited by con-
ntte terms of
one
Where there is a particular or contained in another so that all may
stand
special provision and a genera ditions a n d exception[
provision in the same statute and the latter in its most
sive sense would overrule the comprehen. t o g e l h e r35
former, the particular or special t

vision must be operative and the general
provision must be taken for the rule.
to affect only the other parts
of the statute to which it may G.08.
Reason
erly apply. In other words, the particular or special provisionropis The construction
that requires that apparently conflicting pro-
if at all possible,
construed as an exception to the general provision. In this statute be reconciled and harmonized,
way, all visions of a
the provisions are given effect.S1 should be so cornstrued as not to nullify an-
and that a provision has enacted
on the presumption that the legislature
other, is based consistent with
whose provisions are in harmony and
Construction as not to render provision nugatory. a statute
6.07. intentions in the same statute are
each other and that contlicting
Another corollary of the rule that the whole statute should, if in statutes is of
neyer supposed or. regarded.* For "consistency
possible,be given effect is that a provision of a statute should be so prime importance. All laws are presumed to be consistent with
construed as not to nullify or render nugatory another provision of each other. In interpreting statutes, courts are hidebound by the
the same statute.32 rule that theirs to reconcile and to harmonize; and if possible, to
is
known as "The Real avoid inconsistency and repugnancy; to give the laws a conjoint,
Thus, Sec. 24 of P.D. No. 464, otherwise not discordant effect."37
which provides the effective date of assessment
Property Tax Code," and made applicable
or r e - a s s e s s m e n t
of property subject to tax
which covers other property subject
25 thereof 6.09. Qualification of rule.
protectively, and Sec. together and
back taxes, should be construed
to a s s e s s m e n t and to provision If notwithstanding efforts,
Section 24 is the only applicable one part of a statute cannot be
both given effect, for "if the payment of the correct reconciled or harmonized with another part without nulifying one
has eluded
in c a s e s where a taxpayer in this case, n favor
of the other, the court
for m o r e than
nine (9) years, as should, in construing the statute,
amount of taxes
464 which' requires
the payment of back choose one which will best effectuate the legislative intent. The
25 of P.D. No.
Section
rendered superfluous
and nugatory."s rle i8 that, where absolute harmony between parts of a statute is
taxes will be
maxim, Interpretatio
fiena eonstrably
least
not possible, the court must
reject that one which is
expressed in the
The principle is which m e a n s that
a law shou accord with the general plan of the whole statute. However,
est ut res magis valeat quam
pereat,
rather than destroying re no such ground for choice between inharmonious
be
view to upholding destroy u provi-
be interpreted
with a
not be construed to rsections, the latter provision or
section, being the last
One portion of a statute should
render a provision inoperative ESS1on
ormer to
of the legislative wil1, must, in construction, vacate the
construction that would should be haru the extent of the
other. A
ineffective
should be avoided.34 The provisions
should be construed togeu repugnancy. It has been held that in
if possible; they
nized and reconciled, *****
Banco
Nue Phil.Chartered
86
350 (1950);Bank of India v. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931 (1921);
U8, Nov. People v. Palmon,
23, 1966,Ilocos
Cassion v.
Phil. 138 (1922); Nort
orte Electric Co., Inc. v.
Apostol, 44 Municipality of Laoag, G.R. No.
L950).3People v. Garcia,
& Co. 18 SCRA
Lichauco
v.
0 SCRA
708.
Phil. 560 (1951). 664 (1958). SCAD 62,
210 rcin, 85 Phil. 651
Filipino, 89 104 Phil. 1950); Araneta Concepcion, 99 Phil. 350
SCRA TUP.
v.
Gatchalian, Appeals, 81
SPeople v.
Central
Board of Assessment People
Board
6, 19 (19 of Regents
Sesbreno
360 (1997).
v.
18919, Dec. 29, 1962,

6 SCRA 1042, (1969).
chauco & Co. v.
Auditor
V.
General,
G.R. No. Oct. 19617, 31, 1969, 30
G.R. No.
Tayo,
34Javellana v.
(1997).
Ape
postol, 44 Phil. 138 (1922).
SCRA 633
Derilo, 271
STATUTE CONSTRUED AS
TO OTHER WHOLE
AND IN
STATUTES
258 .
Statute Construed
RELATION 259
as Who
hola
conílict
between two
provisions of th
Sme and pr'
ctical
oonstruction*"
construction3 as
will give life to them,
frequently held to
violer to if it
of
irreconcilable
ithout doing reason." can be
case
of position is Conversely,
statute, the
last in order
intent of the legislature- is
revail, dosO construed as to allow the doing of
a law should
unless it clearly
aPpears
that the
s t a t u t e states that the
hep ited b y l a w , 1 Or So interpreted as to
an
aford
act which is
prohib-
a provision of a ter
a s
afford an
wise.3 Thus,
where
of six members t o d of
;
compliance with its
ance with
terms, create an opportunity to
medical e x a m i n e r s
shall be composed
m o r e than twelva ap. travene t h lain words of the law."
defeat inconsistency, or con-
-eat, or that Interpretatio fienda est ut res
list of not
pointed by the President from a
Medical Associati es
submitted by the
Philippine
magis valec
is to be
interpretation a3 will give the
adopted.
approved and statute allows
the reappointmen" efficacy
thing
of the s a m e
a later provision reappointed by the D.O
members whose terms
expired, a person
r e c o m m e n d e e s of the Philin
Tn construing staute, Courts
a snould start with the assump-
dent need not be in the list of at
tion t h a t the legislature did not do a thing in the enactment of vain
Medical Association.0 tatute. It is presumed that the law enacted by the
laws or nroud between two is plete by itself, that the legislature did perform itslegislature
funetion
Where there is apparent conflict
the s a m e subject matter and thn
he; vel, and
intended
that it inte to impart to its enactment such mean a
sions of a law which refer to w i l render it operative and etfective." It is a
stand together by a fair and general princi-
cannot be harmonized and made to
passage, amona nle embodied in the maxim, ut res magis ualeat quam pereat, that
reasonabie interpretation, the circumstances ot their he courts should, if reasonably possible to do so without violence
construction, should be inquired into to determine
other aids to #Athe spirit and language of an act, so interpret a statute as to give
which should prevail. For instance, Rep. Act
Noi631 granted letter
while Rep. Act No. 1800. it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should,
carriers a P1.00 post allowance per day,
post allowances for letter if nossible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being
general appropriations act, prescribed construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nulliied, destroyed,
of PO.50 each day. In hold.
carriers and special delivery messengers
not entitled to PO.50 in addition.to emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant,
ing that letter carriers were
meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory Accordingly, in case of doubt

s
P1.00 under Rep. Act No. 1631, the Court

took into account the fact
Act or obscurity, that construction as
will avoid any of such results and
that at the time the P0.50 post allowance was proposed, Rep.
1631 had not been enacted, indicating the legislative
intent not to as will instead make it fully operative and effective will be given
addition to what
grant letter carriers the P0.50 post allowance in the statute.49
the
had been provided in Rep. Act No. 1631, and the fact that lustrative of the rule is Paras v. COMELEC 50
The issue
subsequent appropriations act granted letter carriers and special the interpretation of the phrase "regu-
raised in this case refers to
delivery messengers post allowances of P1.00 and P0.50. each day, in Sec. 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991
respectively. In this instance, the earlier law was made to preval lar local election,"
over the later law.41 ih
No. 37684, Sept.

Instance of Zamboanga, G.R.
6.10. Construction Arabay, Inc. v. Court of First
as to give life to law. 10, 1975, 66 SCRA 617 (1975).
Laws must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends Gonzales v. De Dios, 88 Phil. 770 (1951).
108 Phil. 400 (1960).
for which they are enacted. They should be so given reasonabie Uy Ha v. City Mayor of Manila, Commissioner of Customs,
Inc.
G.R. No. 19337,
t u r i a s Sugar Central,
v.
dept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617 (1969). 97 SCRA 591 (1980); Astu
38019, May 16, 1980, 19337, Sept. 30,
0ople . Martin, G.R. No. Commissioner of Customs,
G.R. No.
Inc. v.
969, 29 Sc G.R. No. 19337,

Cuyegkeng v. Cruz, 91 of Customs,
Phil. 882 (1952).
108 Phil., 1147 (1960); Montenegro v. Castanedy Commissioner
Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v.

No. 3E019, May
Cuyegkeng dept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617 Martin, G.R.
v. Cruz, 108 Phil.
1147 (1960). (1969). (1909); People
v,
Manila Letter Carriers' Assn. v. Auditor

General, 108 Phil. G05 (1960 hico, 14 Phil. 128
2o Cham v.
Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 16, 1980, 97 S
80, 97 o
SCRA
591 (1930)
(1946).
76 SCAD 40, 264 SCRA 49 (1996).
cYTATUTE CONSTRUED AS
WHOLE AND IN
TO OTHER STATUTES RELATION 261
which states that "Any elective local official may be the subiect. dmonish against a too-literal reading of the law
recall election only once during his term of office for loss of
"Wetrict, rather than fulfill
to constrict its
purpose end defeat
as this is apt
authors. hat
Tha intention is usually found the intention
dence" and No recall shali take place within one (1) year from ofits spirit that vivifieth5
not in the letter that
killeth but in the
date of the official's assumption of oftice or one (1) year
imme
ately preceding a regular local election." The question is wheth Another illustration of the rule is Lalican v.
the phrase "regular local election" includes the SK election raised is whe
Vergara.2 The
hether the possession of "lumber" without
which ue the re-
set by Rep. Act No. 780S to be held
very three years from Mar ired legal documents is punishable under Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705,
1996, while the regular local election was held in May 1995, al amended, which provides that "any person who shall x xx possess
every three years thereafter. Pursuant to Sec. 74 of the Code, there hor or other forest products without the legal documents as
would be recal! election from May 1995 to May 1996 nor from
no required under existing forest laws and regulations shall be pun-
May 1997 to May 1998, except from May 1996 to May 1997. If the ished with penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
SK election which was scheduled in May. 1996 is included in the Revised Penal Code." Respondent claimed that since the word "lum-
phrase regular lecal election," there would be no recall election her" is not mentioned in the lw, he cannot be held criminally
from May 1996 to May 1997, which'would mean that there woul ieble for his possession of lumber withöut ihe required legal docu-
be no recal election at all, rendering the recall provision nugatory ments. In brushing aside such argument, the Court ruled that to
The Court ruled ihat to construe the phrase "regular local election' exclude possession 1umber' from the acts penaized in Sec. 68
of
as including SK elections, "no recal election can be conducted ren would certainly enasculate the law itself. A law should not be so
dering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code construed as to aliow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law,
nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance
Tt held that it would be more in keeping with the intent of the
with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain
recali pruvision of the Code to construe regular local election as one
referring to an election where the office held by the local elective words of the law. After all, the phrase forest products' is broad
manufactured
official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is
in Sec. 68 would merely resuit in
electorate." It added that this construction is in accordance with timber. Hence,
to mention lumber
the rule that in the "interpretation of a statute, the Court should tautology"3
start with the assumption that the iegislature intended to enact an
effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have
done a 6.11. Construction to avoid surplusage.
vain thing in the enactment ofa statute. An
interpretation
if possible, be avoided under which a statute or
shou rule that should be given effect
statute
as a whole
provision be The a
as to make
no part or
construed is defeated, or as otherwise that the statute be so construed
expressed, nullified, destroye ures the statuie
Each and every part of
emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignitiean rOvsion thereof a surplusage. in relation to the rest. It
shou given its due effect and meaning
meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. x x x It is likewise a basie
precept in statutory construction that a statute should be ine
a legal provision
whenever possible,
must not
ho Settled that surplusage, and,

ccordingly,
preted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the to be a useless or having
no
interpretao hoCOstrued as
nothing to
of adding
the law
of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragre ningless in the sense
a word be so
construed as
(b) thereof, should not be in etfect Nor should

conflict with the Constitutional
date of Section 3 of Article X of the local
whatsoever therein.
Constitution to 'enact a nd
government code which shall provide for a more responsIvea
wusAn
Tbid., pp. 54-55.

accountable local government structure instituted throu sys 202.
rough .
p.
22,76 SCRA 518. 3rd ed. (1995),
tem of 104 Phil.
decentralization with effective mechanisms of
Construction,
initia- Gatchalian,
tve, and referendum xx x. recall, Sbid., p. 527, citing Agpalo, Statutory (1954); People v.
of Instance
541Jyytengsu v. Republic lic, 95

Phil. 890 Court of Firat
pretation of the law leads toMoreover, petitioner's too literale

inter
Niere v. 4.18,
166. See Sec.
b64 (1958): Mejia Bv. aBalalong, 81 Phil.
l a l o n g ,8
497 (1948);
54 SCRA
nance. Thus, in a absurdity which we cannot O Negros Occiden 30324,
29, 1973,
Nov.
case, the Court made the 8upra.
N o .
following adm
TAT UTE CONSTRUED ASWBiGIE AD IN RELATIO
262 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION TO OTHER STATUTES 263
A. Statute (Construed as Wnole
f
Charter of the
th City of LaCarlota, which provides in
Section 1
to render other words or phrases associated with it serve no Dun thereof that the "Mayor shall appoint the city
treasurer, the city
pose. This means that all efforts should be exerted to give ome fficer, the chief of police and fire department, end other
health
meaning to
every word or phrase used in a statute. For the legisln. heads and other ployees of such city department as may be
ture, in enacting a iaw, is presumed to have used the word or ed." The question raised is: Does the
phrase for a purpose. In short, the legislature, in enacting a stat.
city mayor have the
ver to appointint a city engineer pursuant to such law? The court
ute, is supposed not to insert a provision which is unnecessary and
wered the stion in the negative and said that the pBrase
a surplusage.56 heads.and other employees of such departments as may
"andotherwhom the mayor can appoint, refers to the heads of
be created,
ity departments that may be created after the law took effect, and
6.12. Application of rule.
des not embrace the city engneer. To rule otherwise is to render
Some cases may be cited to illustrate the rule. In Mejia u the first conjunction "and" before the words "fire department" a
Balalong.57 the issue raised refers to the interpretation of Section all.
88 of the City Charter of Dagupan Citys* which reads: "The city superfluity and without meaning at
government provided for in this charter shall be organized on such In Uytengsu v. Republic," the issue involved is whether the
a date as may be fixed by the President of the Philippines and upon requirement for naturalization that the applicant wil reside con-
tinuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the peti-
the qualification of the city mayor and the appointment or ciection
of the members of the municipal board. Pending the next general tion up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship refers
election and municipal officials, the offices of the members of the' to actual residence or merely to legal residence or domicile. The
board shall be filied by the appointment of the President of the court held that such requirement refers to actuai or physical resi-
Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments" dence because to construe it otherwise is to render the clause a
Should the phrase "next general election" be the next one after the surplusage. Said the court: "It should be aoted that to become a
creation or coming into existence of the city, which is the
law took effect, or should it be the next one after the organization
date the citizen of the Philippines by naturalization, one must reside therein
of the city government by Presidential proclamation? The court

for not less than 10 years, except in some cases inspecial which 5
years of residence is sufficient (Sections 2 and 3, Commonwealth
ruled that the phrase refers to the next general election after the Act No. 473). Pursuant to the provision abeve-qugted, he must also
city came into being and not the one after its organization by Presi- file an application stating thereia, among other things, that he has
dential proclamation. "To hold that the next general elections to the qualification required' by the law. Inasmuch as these qualiica-
which the law refers are those to be held after the date of the fions include the residence requirements already referred to, it
organization of the city government, set by the President, would follows that the applicant must prove that he is a resident of the
make the alternative provision for the election of the members o application, but
the ppines at the time, not only of the filing of the is
board
nugatory or superfluous, because on the date set
organization of the government of the City of Dagupan, there would
for t s hearing. If the residence thus required
the actual or
otherwise known as legal residence
never be members of the
Municipal Board elected."69 retive permanent home,
In Niere
dOmicile, then the applicant must be domiciled in the Philip-Section 7 of
u. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental," the both dates. Consequently, when Common-
law involved is Wa
Nealth Act No. 473 imposes upon the applicant the duty to state n
Republic Act No. 4585, otherwise known as
n
o r n application 'that he will reside continuously thetoFni
1n
refer merely the

a e intervening period, it cannot
need of or
uninterrupted domicile or legal domicileirrespective
sJavellana v. Kintanar, G.R. No. 33169, residence,
bMcGee v. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 627. actnol is obligatory
i81 Phil. 497 (1948). (1954). aence, for said legal residence
or
b"Republic Act No. 170.

Mejia v. Balalong, 81 Phil. 497, 501 (1948).
OG.R. No. 30324, Nov.
29, 1973, 54 SCRA 165. 95 Phil. 890
(1954).
TE
CONSTRUED AS WHOLE
AND IN
TO OTHER S.ATUTES
Construsd in
RELATION 265
B. Statute Relation t
Constitution and Other
Statutes
under the law, even in the absence of the requirement
contained in
applie to
ade
the
the
construction of a
statute and ita
said clause, and it is well-settled that. whenever
possible, a legal
by the
legislature in the iorm amendments
should be given eirect, ogether with ofother
Chang
prevision must not be so construed as to be a useless surplusa statut
amendments to a
act. It is not to be parts of the
and. accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of adding
nothing to
amende
presumed that the legislature,
the law or having no effect whatsoever thereon. This consequence ingsuch
changes, dulging mere 3emantic exercise.in mak
was
in
must be some purpose in making then, which should There
may be avoided only by construing the clause in question as de be
manding actual residence in the Philippines from the filing of the tained and given effect.65 asce
Cer
petition for naturalization to its determination by the court."e2 Che statute and 1ts amendment should
be read
together and
In Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals,63 the law in. Larmonized.3 For
instance, a city charter provides that "the mu
volved is Pablic Act 1360, which authorized the City of Manila to inal board shall have a
secretary who shall be
appointed by it to
reclaim a portion of Manila Bay, to form part of the Luneta exten. nave during the term ot ofticee ot the members thereof" The charter
sion and stipulated that the reclaimed land "shall be property of later amended by providing that the *vice-mayor sha!l appoint
the City of Manila." The Act also provided that the City of Manila 1mnlovees of the board who may be suspended or
removed in
is hereby authorized to set aside a portion thereof at the north end accordance with law.Tne amendmeat should be harmonized and
eonstrued with the earlier provision of the charter to the end that
for a hotel site and either to lease or sell the same." The question is
eaid provision and the amendment are both given effect. As thus
whether said reclaimed land is patrimonial land or of public do- Construed with this end in view, the power of the vice-mayor to
minion inter.ded for public use. The answer to the question would
make appointment pursuant to the amendatory act is limited to
determine the m a i n issue of whether the sale of a portion of the the appointment of all employees of the board other than the board
reclaimed a r e a without legislative authorization is null and void. secretary who is to be appointed by the board itself."
of
The court held that if the land is patrimonial, it can be disposed
without statutory authorization. The Act uses the phrase "is hereby
authorized." To authorize means to empower, to give a right to act, B. STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION
To hold
and "hereby" m e a n s by means of this statute o r action." TO CONSTITUTION AND OTHER
which can be dis
that the reclaimed land is patrimonial property, STATUTES
posed of without statutory authorization, is to render the provision
author-
of the law to the effect that the City of Manila "is hereby
And to so con- 6.14. Censtitution.
ized to lease or sell" a portion thereof superfluous. Staiute construed in harmony with the
to render the phrase superfluous would violate
strue the statute a s
all laws
the elementary rule of legal hermeneutics that effect
must be given AS the Constitution is the fundamental law to which
to every word, clause, and sentence of the statute and that a stat. are subservient, a statute should not be interpreted independently
that part thereof becomes inopera ot the Consti tution. The statute should be construed in harmony
ute must be so interpreted no
a n d not in violation of, the fundamental law. The legisla-
tive.
6.13. Statute and its amendments construed together. ***"
be harmonized and
to People v. Garcia,
85 Phil. 651 (1950). 1963, 7 SCRA
The rule that all parts of a statute are
Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
18080, April 22,
reconciled so that effect may be given to each and every part thereo 670; Collector
olleet of hee v.
10963, April 30,
1963, 7 SCRA 8/2.
nternal Revenue, G.R. No.
Sople v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 651 (1950).
15 SCRA 514.
Dec. 21, 1965,
Florentino, G.R. No. 23800, Revenue, 90 Phil.
aPhil. Long s t a n c e Telephone Co.
of Internal
v. Collector 71
v. Fugoso, 80
Phil.
7bid., at p. 893. 452); He 104 Phil. 175 (1958);

Prinmicias
citing Aspalo,
Oeyes, 279 (1994),
237 SCRA
G.R. No. 41001, Sept. 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 162 (1976). Statuutory C1a v.
COMELEC, 55 SCAD 789,
Construci 2nd 1990 ed., p. 189.
ATUTE CONSTRUBD AS STATUTES
TO OTHER WEOLE
AND IN RELATION
26 267
B.
te
Stait Construed in Kelation to
Constitution and Other Statutes
athtruction that wili bring it within the

ntendment of the law should lean towardsfundamental
ture, in enacting a statute, is presumed to have adhered
Jaw E v e y inte.
constitutional limitations. Courts should accordingly pres he hould favor that construction
its validity,
it was the intention ofthe legislature to enact a valid, sensible and the
court
which it the gives
chance of survi viving the test of
just law and one which operates no fiurther than may be ne and greater
o an elermentary,
constitutionality.7
*It may
be
saidto fundamental, and a universal rule of
to effectuate the specific purpose of the law9 onstruct applied when considering constitutional
it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that a stak.
questions, that
is susceptible of two constructions one of
a law which will
shouid be construed whenever possible in a manner that will a maintai and the othe destroy it, the couris will always adopt the
when
law can be so construed as to

conflict with the Constitution.70 The statute must be read and Whenever a uphold it, it will
un
derstood in the light of such provisions ot the constitution as ma
former.
so
#11ed al
although
c o n s t r u e d
the construction so adopted does not ap-
be another
bear on the subject so as to harmonize the former with the lat
pear
to be as
natural
ven be justified in
construction."7
disregarding the
For this reason,
more usual and
and avoid their conflicting with each other, It should not be ean
apparent import of th language used in the statute and in strain-
c o u
strued in such a way as will give rise to, a constatutional doubt

Nor should it be interpreted in such a manner as will render ita the dinary meaning of words to avert any collusion or repug-
ing the statute
application violative of a constitutional inhibition." Under the same betweenw provides and what the Constitu
nancy
principle, the constitutionality of a statute should not be prejudiced requires, the ective being to reach an
interpretation, if at
tion that is free from constitutional defect.9 Stated differ-
by applying the statute in a manner that will render it unconstitu all possible,
tional.73 The statute should instead be interpreted to assure ils if there is doubt or uncertainty as to the
meaning of the
ently,
in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitu-
legislature, if the words or provisions are obscure, or if the enact
being
tional command or prescription. It should be given a construction
nent is fairly susceptiblk
of two or more constructions, that inter
that is in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law. Dretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect of unconsti.
be
even though may
to
Where a statute is reasonably susceptible of two construc- utionality, it
the more usual or apparent import of the language
necessary, for this purpose,
tions, one constitutional and the other unconstitutional, that con-
disregard
the court cannot, in order to bring statute
struction in favor of its constitutionality shall be adopted,5 and the employed."0 However, a
construction that will render it invalid rejected.76 To save the stat within the fundamental law, amend it by construction.*
ute from a declaration of unconstitutionality, it must be given a Conformably with the rule that a law or phrase should be so
any of
Construed as not to collide with or violate the ConstitutioninorArticle
i
its precepts, the phrase "unless it is otherwise provided"
shall take effect after
0n re Ctuarina, 24 Phil. 37 (1913). 2of the Civil Code which provides that "laws
Miguel Corp. Aveino.G..
TTeehankeev. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945); San v.
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
No. 39699, March 14, 1979, 89 SCRA 69; Automotive Parts & Equipment Co. * must be construed
Lingad, G.R. No. 26406, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 248, Sanchez y. Lyon Constructi0, Oihcial Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided"
o refer to the date of effectivity of the law and not to the require
87 Phil. 309 (1950); In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37 (1913).
event be dispensed
Abellana v. Marave, G.R. No. 27760, May 29, 1974, 57 SCR 106.
People v. Zeta, 98 Phil. 143 (1955). nt of publication itself, which cannot in any to make laws effective
AssOsacion Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc. v. Talisay-Silay Milling Co»
wth by the For the legislature
legislature.
Inc., G.R. No. 19937, Feb. 19, 1979, 88 SCRA 294.
Mutue v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 32717, Nov. 26, 1970, 36 SCa
March 14, 1979, 89 SCRA 69;
228 J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc, v. Land Tenure Adm., G.R. No. 21064, Feb. 18, 1970, iguel Corp. Avelino, G.R. No, 39699,
Sanch n
v. 138 SCRA
SCRA 413; American Bible Society v. Galman v. Pamaran,
City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957). Lyon Construction, 87 Phil. 309 1950);
Alba v. Evangelista, 100 Phil. 683 (1957); Maddumba v. Ozaeta, 82 Pnil (1985).
(1948); Benguet Exploration, Inc. v. Department
of Agriculture and Natura y Cong Yu v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 415 (10 26, 1970, 36
SCRA
8Ources, G.R. No. 29534, Feb. 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 285 (1977); De la Cruz v. Para Mutuc v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 32717, Nov.
G.R. No. 42591, July 25, 1983, 123 228; Galman v.
SCRA 569.
AssOSacion Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc. v. Talisay-Silay Miling Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294 (1985).
Inc., G.R. No. 19937, Feb. 19,
1979, 88 SCRA 294. r e Guarina, 24 Phil. 37, 47 (1913). 1059 (1926).
SIYu 271 U.S. 500, 70
L. ed. I0o
gng w Trinidad,
a'TATUTE CONSTRUED AS WHOLE AND IN RELATIO
STATUToRY CONSTRUCTION TO OTEIER STATUTES 269
268 .Construed in Kelation to
n Statute onstituiion and Other Statutes
as in oCtive issuances
executive is of
prime
upon approval or on any other date without previous publicati
utes
showing
showing to the Contrary, ail
importance, and, in the
of a
laws
to collide with or violate the due process clause of the Constit
sence
consistentwith.each other. Where it i
are
presumed to be
pOssib.e to do so, it is the
which requires publication of a law before it becomes binding ris. in the construction ot
in
duty
of c o u r t s , statuies, io harmonize and
where the law merely provides that it shall take eftect imm concile them, and adopt a construction of a statutory
ately, it means that it shall take effect after fifteen dava mmedi. and reconciles it with other provision
from
w h i c hh a r m o n i z e s
statutory provisions.7
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it provides a difen
tated differently, every statute should be construed in such a
date of effectivity from publication in the Official Gazette orin
way
that will harmonize iu with existing laws. To interpret and do
newspaper of general publication, in which case it shall take efte
e1ch as to harmonize laws
a way with laws is the best method
as thus otherwise provided.52 o fi n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to at

6.16. Statutes in pari materia. trin the purpose of an express national policy. For the assumption
Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same a that whenever the legi8lature enacts a law, it has in mind the
orevious statutes relating to the same subject matter, and in the
person or thing, or have the same purpose or object, or cover the
ahsence of any express repeal or amendment, the new stàtute is
same specific or particular subject matter3 The later statute may deemed enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in
specifically refer to the prior statutes. However, the fact that no
referenceis made to the prior law does not mean that the two laws those prior statutes.Provisions in
an
act which
are omitted in
are not in pari materia. It is sufficient, in order that they may be another act relative to the same subject matier will be applied in a
considered in pari materia, that the two or more statutes relate to proceeding uoder the act, other not
when
inconsistent with its
purpose. Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are to
the same specific subject matter. Conversely, two or more laws
are
materia if they refer to different specific matters, al- be compared with the new provisions, and if possible by reasonable
not in pari
though they both fall under the same broad subject.85 construction, both to be construed that effect is given to every
provision of each. Statutes in pari materia, although in apparent
are as far as reasonably possible construed to be in har-
conflict,
6.16. How statutes in pari materia construed. mony with each other.° Similarly, every new statute should be
construed in connection with those already existing in relationand
to
The rule is that a should be so construed
statute not only to
be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize
reasonable
the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and int SEand together, if they can be done by any fair and est optimus
ligible system. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare mterpretation.3 Interpretare et concordare leges legibus,
concordare leges legibus optimus interpretandi modus, or eve which that the best method of inter-
est 2zerpretandi modus, means
other laws.
statute must be so construed and harmonized with other
as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.6 Consistency in sta
statute retation is that which makes laws consistent with
when confronted with apparently con-
ardingly, courts ofjustice, them instead of de-
gStatutes, should endeavor to reconcile
62Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986).

City of Naga v. Agna, G.R. No. 36049, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 285; Baga8
1hternational Trading Corp. v. Angeles, 75 SCAD 464,
263 SCRA 421
v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 41631, Dec. 17, 1876, 74 SCRA 306. (1996).:
overnment v. Municipality of Binangonan, 32 Phii. 643 (1915).
SFlores v. San Pedro, 102 Phil. 44 (1957). anila Jockey Club, Inc. v. CA, 300 SCRA 181 (19.
Republic v. Asuncion, 49 SCAD 573, 231 SCRA 211, citing Ruben E. A2 Corona Court of Appeals, supr.
v.
Waterworks &
Seweruge Autiority,
Statutory Construction, p. 192 (2nd ed., 1990); Cabada v. Alunan Il, 78 Dned. C& C Commercia Corp. v. National
G.R 0. mercial citing
Sutherland,
Statutory
260 SCRA 838 (1996), citing Ruben E.
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1 SCRA 27275, Nov. 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 984,
1990); Velera v. Tuason, 80 Phil. 823 (1948); Corona v. Court
378 (1992), citing Agpalo,
of Appeals, zi Censtruction,
City
Vol. 2, PP. 530-532. 1976, 71
SCRA 176,.
Statutory Construction, p. 192. N v. Agna, G.R. No. 36049, May 31,
STATUTE cONSTRUED AS
TO OTHER WHOLE AND IN
STATUTES
270
in
PELATION 271
B. Statute
Construed
Ialation to
Statutes
Where twr more statutes on the
against the other. Courts sh.
of one and under dissimilarsame subject were enacted
fferent t i n e s
claring outright the invalidity because they are equall interpretation should circumstances or condi-
harmonize them, if this is possible, ly the at
tions,t h e i r
aliar to each
conditions peculiar rdance withtth
handiwork of the same legislature.? ces or
each, in order that the
cond
htcum.
harmonized o r better understood.
erstood.T er statutes
in case,3 thus: be to This rule is
The Court sums up the rule distingue
tempora et based on the
concordabis jura,
maxim:
oid legal and you will harmonize lau or distin-

"(W)e ruled that statutes in part materia should be h times
g u i s h
to atain the purpose

of an express
ssed In cases involviinvolving harmonization of two or
construed together iaws relating
national policy. the same subjec carhiect matter, the usual question ismore
whether the
"On the assumption that whenever the legislature ena
acts repealed the earlier statute. A later
impliedly amended or
stat-
ute will not, however, be construed as repealing
act
mind the previous statutes relating tofh

the prior act or acts on
a provision it has in of any in the abser of words to that effect, unless
same subject matter,
it is held that in the absence the same subject
there
the new
therein, provision Wa
a n irreconcilabi
ble repugnancy between them or unless
or amendment the new
express repeal lawis evidentl intended to supersede all prior acts on the
with the legislative policy embodied in thosa matter
enacted in accord comprise itself the sole and complete
be construed together system of
all should in this connection is that in legislation
and to
prior statutes, and they subject,96 The rule
s4
are omitted in another act relating on, the
case of doubt,
Provisions in an act which will be resolved against
be. applied in a proceeding doubt implied amendment or repeal
to the same subject matter will the
in favor of harmoni. of all the laws on the subject." And
inconsistent with its purpose
under the other act when not ming that
assuming that there is an implied amendment, the latter statute
to the same subject matter are to be
Prior statutes relating so construed as to modify the prior law on the subject
and if possible by reasonable uld be no
compared with the new provisions, that effect is given to frther than may be necessary to efect the specific purpose of the
construction, both are to be construed
pari materia, although in
latter enactment.9a
of such. Statutes in
every provision construed
as reasonably possible
far
apparent conflict, are
so
to be in harmony with
each other" 6.17. Reasons wvhy laws on same subject are reconciled.
the construction of a particular stat In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have
It has been held that "in
of any of its provisions, all acts relat been aware of, and have taken
into account, prior laws on the
ute, or in the interpretation should body cannot be said to have
the same general purpose subject of legislation.s The lawmaking
ing to the s a m e subject, having
or
law. The
intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems
one on
as together constituting
be read in connection with it, legislation law
the history of the the same subject, or to leave in force provisions
of a prior
endeavor should be made by tracing
ascertain the uniform and consistent purpose of which may thwart and overthrow the will of
the legislature. Such a
on the subject, to
with idle ceremony, and
the legislature, or to discover how
the policy of the legislature result would render legislation a useless and
or modified from
reference to the subject matter has been changed subject the iaws to uncertainty and unintelligibility.00
With this in view, therefore, it is proper to
time to time. purpose
session of the legislature,
consider not only acts pa_sed at the same Phil. 225
sessions, and even Co., 108
but also acts passed at prior and subsequent ommissioner of Customs v. Superior Gas & Equipment
those which have been repealed."* (1960). 71 SCRA 176.
36049, May 31, 1976,
ity of Naga v. Agua, G.R. No. (1960). See Sec. 10.24, infra.
People v. Olarte, 108 Phil. 756
In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37 (1913). No. 761 . Court of
Manila Lodge of
Lacso
V Roque, 92 Phil. 456 (1953); Roman Catholic Administraion
Gordon v. Veridiano II, 167 SCRA 51 (1988).
sVda. de Urbano v. GSIS, G.R. No. 137904, Oct. 19, 2001.
Appeal
Davao, Inc. O , 41001,Sept. 30, 1976, 731, 72;
102 Phil. 696 (1957).
(1926); St v. Land Registration Commission, 74 SCRA J06.
Old Homestead Bakery v. Marsh, 75 Cal. App. 247, 242 P 749 10
No. 41631, Dec.
17, 1976,
also Valera . Tuason, 80 Phil. 823 (1948). EaSing v. Ramirez, G.R.
272 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION eTATUTE CONSTRUED AS WHOLE
TO OTHER AND IN
STATUTES RELATION 273
tatute Construed in
elauon to
Statutes in pari materia should be read and construed established for persons Statutes
the asylums thus
gether because enactments of the saine legislature on the to permitted to without first obtaining afflicted, who shall not be
subject are supposed to form part of one uniform system: same late court" and another statute which permission
requires that
of the same
statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earllater ion oft h e . irector of Health, "when in the opin-
for the insanepatient
any in any
enactments and in the passage of its acts, the legislature is
other place is government hospi-
av be released without temporarily or permanently
tal, or
posed to have in mind the existing legislations on the subject an cured
shall notify the

danger, he may discharge such
to have enacted its new act with reference thereto. Having thus atient, and z
judge of the Court
in pau red the confinement by order of of First Instance
mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject maten the court," are laws in
whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to have
ter, noteria and should therefore be
construed
effect to both. As thus construed together, so as to
enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative polieu
an
together,
Bn that the release of the patient can be madethe two statutes
embodied in those prior statutes and, unless there is an express
m
thecourt and the only with the
approval of both Director of Health. In this
repeal of the old laws, they all should be construed together. In sense,
construing them, the old statutes relating to the same matter should one statute cômplinents the other 104
be compared with the new provisions and if possible, by reasonable In King v.

Hernaez, it
was held that Republic Act No. 1180,
construction, both should be construed that effect may be given to therwise known as the Ketail Trade Nationalization Act, implies
every provision of each.101 that the nationalization of the retail trade is merely confined to its
ownership and not to management, control or operation. Neverthe-
E leas, the court said that this apparent flaw in the law cannot be
6.18. Where harmonization is impossible. availed of by an unscrupulous alien as a convenient pretext to flout
If two or more laws on the same subject cannot possibly be the law or subvert its nationalistic purpose, for in pari materia with
reconciled or harmonized, one has to give way in favor of the other such law is Commonwealth Act No. 108, otherwise known as the
There cannot be two conflicting laws on the same subject. Either Anti-Dummy Law, which punishes "acts of evasion of the lawsof
nationalization of certain rights, franchises or privileges," such as
the two laws are reconciled and harmonized or, if they canno, the
the employment of aliens in wholly or
earlier one must yield to the later one, it being the later expression partly nationalized businesses.
of legislative will,102 InDialdas u. Perdices,106 it appears that an alien who operated
a retail store in Cebu pursuant to law, decided to close his Cebu
store and transfer it to Dumaguete. The retail trade law authorizes
6.19. Illustration of the rule.
Where a statute provides that the "mayor shall hold office for
an alien, who on May 15, 1954 is actually engaged in retail, to
continue to engage therein until his voluntary retirement from
four years unless sooner removed," the phrase "unless sooner re Such business, but not to establish or open additional stores or
moved" should be read in relation to removal statutes and con branches for retail business. On the other hand, Section 199 of the
strued to mean that the mayor cannot be removed during his term ax Code provides that any business for which the privilege tax
except for cause as provided by law and after due process, since the has been paid may be removed and continued in any other place
the
legislature is presumed to have such removal statutes in mind nout payment of additional tax. The question is whether
when it employed the phrase,10 A statute which directs that "when transfer by the alien of his retail store from Cebu to Dumaguete
can be Considered business. The
the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law defines as a voluntary retirement from
as a grave felony, the court shall order his confinement in one
o
aleo Paamo v. Ravina,
Phil. 775 (1930); see
01City of Naga
Agna,v. G.R. No.
36049, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 176 64 Phil.
: n Oh Foo v. Concepcion, 64
378 (1930).
City of Naga v. Agna, supra; Erana v. Vergel de Dios, 85 Phil. 17 (1941 105114 Phil. 730 (1962).
acson v. Roque, 92 Phil. 456 (1953). 0"101 Phil. 756 (1957).
STATUTE CONSTRUED AS WIHOLE AND IN RELATION 275
TO OTHER STATUTES
eConstrued in Relaion to
Constitution and Other Statutes
274
cc. 45. Finality of disciplinary action. -The
discipli-
nary action imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be final
affirmative and held thas end executory: rouded, That a disciplinary action imposed
trial court answered the question in the hy the regional director or by the PLEB involving demotion or
the transfer of business to another province is prohibited by th
retail trade law. The Supreme Court ruled otherwise and said that amissalfrom the service may be appealed to the regional
of the Tax Code are in pari
ppellate board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy
the retail trade law and Section 199
"overlooked entirely, however. of the notice of decision: Provided, further, That the discipli-
materia. It stated that the trial court
Internal Revenue Code x nary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving demo
the clear provision of Section 199 of the tion or dismissal may be appealed to the National Appellate
either expressly or impliedly by
x which has not been repealed
Republic Act No. 1180." The legality

of such transfer, therefore, Board within ten (10) days from receipt thereof: Provided,
can in no wise be questioned and consequently petitioner's business furthermore, Thatshall
the decide
regionaltheor nationalwithin
appellate board, as
as a new one in contempla. the case may be, appeal (60)sixty days
in Dumaguete should not be considered
aforesaid Republic Act No. 1180."
tion of the from receipt of the notice of appeal: Provided, finally, That
National Watérworks & Sewer failure of the regional appellate board to act on the appeal
In C & C Commercial Corp. v. within said period shall render the decision final and executory
the issue refers to the interpretation of two stat. without prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal by eithe
age Authority,107
that preference be made in the purchase and use of
utes requiring
Act No. 912 in
Secrétary."
party with the iiliti,
Philippine-made materials and products. Republic the DILG Act of 1990
Section 2 provides that "in the construction or. repair work aeThe Court said that"Section 45 of within
materials that if a RAB fails to decide an appeal
undertaken by the Government, x x x Philippine-made specifically provides decision
whenever available, practical and usable x x x shall the reglementary period of sixty (60) days, the appealed
and products, to the
work x x x." On the other becomes final and executory without, however, prejudice
be used in said construction or repair of the DILG.
otherwise known as the Flag to the Secretary
hand, Commonwealth Act No. 138, right of the aggrieved party to appeal the availability of
native in the purchase of articles by
products preference The said provision is, however, silent as regards
Law, gives within the
decision rendered by a RAB
or controlled
government-owned appeal from
the Government, including an a
45 cannot be con-
been advanced that since This in Section
corporations. The argument has reglementary period. x x x gap
within
138 expressly includes purchases by decisions of the RAB rendered
Commonwealth Act No.
No. 912 merely srued to prohibit appeals from of the section is
government-owned companies while Republic Act reglementary period, for while the epigraph
the
repair by the Government, governmen there is nothing therein

relates to construction or
WOrded inality of Disciplinary Action, Complementary laws on
owned or controlled corporations have been excepted from the explicitly bars any further appeal.
the cour must then be in-
operation of the later statute. In rejecting such argument, sCapline of government officials and employees of
statutes in pari materia, they should be construe with the mandate the
said that being red into considering that in conformity
objective- to give preference to locally produceu in scope and civilian in
to attain the same
Onstitution that the PNP must be national the reorganized DiLi.
materials in purchases, works or projects of the Government-tnE it is
now a part, as a bureau,
of
er, in Section
accomplishment of which will be defeated if government-owned o Ao
within the definition of
the civil service
controlled corporations are excluded from the operation of RepuDi 2011 t ialls Constitution. x x x
In view then ot the
the
Act No. 912. afa c l e IX-B of theSection 45 of the DILG Act of 1990,
orementioned gaj in and regulations
In Cabada v. Alunan I11,108 the issue is whether or not a
provisions of the Civil Service Law and theuntrules
in the light of the
imposimg
appeal lies from the decision of regional appellate board
disciplinary action against a member of the Philippine Nationa implementing
maxim terpretare
it must be taken into
c o r d a r e legibus
est optimus
interpretandi
with
or
other
harmonized
Police under Sec. 45 of Rep. Act No. 6975, which reads: every stat construed
and AS
must be s0 x
xX
statutes as Orm a uniform system
of jurisprudence.
RAB fails
if a
to
thus cons
o follows that
harmonized, it
10G.R. No. 27275, Nov. 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 984 (1967). nd
10873 SCAD 521, 260 SCRA 838 (1996).
STATUTE CONSTRUED AS
TO OTHER WHOLE AND IN
STATUTES
276 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION RELATION 277
B. Statute Construed in Relation to tConstitution and
Other Statutes
ity 114 On the other
t i r e c o m m u
a hand, special
decide an appealed casewithin sixty (60) days from receipt of tha is generall understood, is one which relates tostatute, as the term
appealed decision is deemed final and exec particular portionparticular
things ofa classllo
notice of appeal, the or to a
persons
tory, and the aggrieved party may forthwith appeal therefromt or section
s t a t e o n l y .i e
of the
the Secretary of the DILG. Likewise, if the RAB has decided th
ral law and a
special law on
appeal within the sixty-day period, its lecision may still be ap. AB the same
materia and should, accordingly,
mat subject are stat-
in pari
pealed to the Secretary of the DILG."109 utes be read
ed, if possible, with view to giving effect together and
a
harmonize
In Manila Jockey Club, Ine. u. CA,"o the issue raised was who to both. The
that where here are two acts, one of
the
was entitled to "breakages", which refers to the fraction of ten ule is which is special and
and the other general
centavos from dividend of winning horse racè tickets. Republic Act particular which, if standing alone, would
No. 309 as amended by R.A. No. 6631 and R.A. No. 6632 is silent
the same matter and thus conflict with the
pecial must prevail1 since it evinces the special act, the
on the matter, but the practice is to use breakages for anti-bookie
5 arly than that of a general statute andlegislative intent more
must be taken as
drive and other sale promotions of activities of the horse racing in
dad to constitute an exception to
club. Thereafter, Executive Orders Nos. 88 and 89 allocated the tenched rule in the construction ofthestatute
general act.7 It "is an
that a subsequent
breakages to beneficiaries therein speeified. The Court ruled that act. treating a subject 1n general terms and not expressly
R.A. No. 309, as amended, and- the Executive Orders should be contra
dieting the provisions ot a priOr special statute, is not to be
harmonized, and as thus harmonized, all breakages derived from ad intended to affect the more particular and specifieconsid-
all races on any race day should be distributed and allocated in provi
accordance with the Executive Orders because "No law can be viewed sions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to con-
strue it in order to give its words any
meaning at all. Hence, where
in a condition of isolation or as the beginning of a new legal system.
A supplemental law becomes an addition to the existing statutes, there two acts or provisions,
are one of which is special and
par-
or section thereof,; and its effect is not
to change in any way the ticular and certainly includes the matter in question, and the gen-
of the latter but merely to extend the operation thereof, eral, which, if standing alone, would include the same matter, thus
provisions
or give additional power to enforce
its provisions, as the case may conflict with the special act or provision, the special act must be
to
be. In enacting particular statute, legislators are presumed
a taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general act, as
exist
have full knowledge and to have taken full cognizance of the the legislature is not presumed to have intended a conflict."a The
ing laws on the same subject or those relating thereto."il1 fact that one law is special and the other general creates a pre-
sumption that the special act is to be considered as remaining an
6.20. General and special statutes. exception of thhe general act, one as a general law of the land and
the other as the law of the
A general statute is a statute which applies to all of the pe0 particular case.1
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or
ple of the state or to all of a particular class of persons in the state
or auter the general act does not change the principle. Where the
with equal force.12 It is one which embraces a class of subjects
places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging
to such class,3 It is one of universal application affecting the en-
'Bagatsing imirez, G.R. No. 41631, Dec. 17, 1976, 74
.
SCRA 306.
1oValera v. Tuason, 80. hil. 823 (1948).
/9 U.S. v. Serapio, 23 Phil. 584 (1912).
0 bid., pp. 844-848, citing Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 192 (21 De Jesus People, G.R. No.
Co. v. Apostol, 44 Phil, 138 (1922);
& v.
ed., 1990). 61998, Chauco

Feb. 22, 1983, 120
10300 SCRA 181 (1998). SCRA 760.
1Tbid., p. 195. of iarcia v. Pascual, 113 Phil. 632, 635 (1932), citing Black Interpretation
Laws, pp.
on
1U.S. v. Serapio, 23 Phil. 584 (1912). 328-329.

No. 21516, April 29, 1966, 16
Valera Tuason, 80 Phil. 823 (1948); Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. 3171 SCRA Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. City of Butuan, G.R.Dec.
758; Bagatsir 17, 1976, 74 SCRA 306;
Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 190 (1971). Ramirez, G.R. No. 41631,
ilroad Co. v. Rafferty, 40 Phil. 224 (1919).
ailroad
STATUTE CONSTRU AS
278 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION TO OTHER VHOLE AND IN
STATUTES
B. Statute Construed in Relation to
RELATION 279
Conatitution and Other
special law is later, it wil1 be regarded as an exception to, or
Code,
ministrative Code
generala law, which authorizes the
a Statutes
qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act i
.
the Philippines to execute lease contrect President of
belonging to
the Republic,123 relating to real property
later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an excen
tion to itsterms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implica
t i o n . 120 Reason for the rule.
6.21.
Thus, P.D. No. 959, as amended, which confers upon the reason for the rule
he
ntion to the general law onthat
a
special law is considered an
National Housing Authority exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide excep the same
cases involving unsound real estate business practices and claima
in passing a law of special character subject is that the legisla-
has its attention
involving refund and any other claims against land developers he Special facts and directed
nded to meet.Circumstances which the
The special act is
prevail over B.P. Blg. 129 which grants Regional Trial Courts genera
l legisiature considers and makes
jurisdiction over such cases, even when the latter was enacted later circumstances the
the of provisions
than the former because B.P. Blg. 129 is a general law and PD. No. having specially considered all theparticular
facts and
case. The
legislature
957, as amended, is a special law.?
circumstances in the
rticular case in enacting the special law, it wil!
at the legislature, by adopting.a general act not be considered
P.D. No. 1869 authorized the PAGCOR to centralize and
regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea
sions repugnant to the provisions or the special containing
act and
provi
within Philippine territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, the
making any mention of its intention to amend or modify thewithout
act, intended to amend, repeal or modify said act 124 special
Local Government Code of 1991, a later law, empowers local
government units to enact ordinances to prevent and suppress
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." The Court ruled 6.22. Qualiications of the rule.
that these two statutes should be harmonized. "On the assumption The rule that the general law must
of a conflict between P.D. No. 1869 and the Code, the proper action yield to the special law in
the specific and particular subject embraced in
the latter, irrespec-
is not to uphold one and annul the other but to effect give to both tive of the date of passage of the
special law, is not absolute. One
by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case before exception is that where the legislature clearly intended the later
us. The proper solution of the problem at hand is to hold that
under the Local Government Code, iocal government units may general enactment to cover the whole subject and to repeal all prior
laws inconsistent therewith, the
(and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within general law prevails over a special
their territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. No law on the subject. In such case, there is a repeal of the special
law 125
1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be read into the
Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally. effective and
mutually complementary."122 Another exception to the principle is where the special law
nerely establishes a general rule while the general law creates a
Where two statutes are of equal theoretical application toa pecific and special rule, in which case the general law prevails
Over the
particular case, the one designed therefor specially should preva special law, 126 The principle that a special law on a subject
In accordance with this rule, Republic Act No. 776 which empowe .
the general manager of the Civil Aeronautics Administration 0

lease real property under its administration prevails over the Ad"
123Le 282 (1988).
12 za V. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA
Manila
126]
Railroad Co. v. Rafferty, 40 Phil. z24
70. CO . Civil Aeronautics Board, G.R. No. 32979,
Feb. 29, 1972, 43
Se dissenting opinion, Villena v. Roque, 93 Phil. 370, 373 (1953), citing CRA
. De la
670; Gaerlan v. Catubig, G.R. No. 23964, June 1, 1966, 17 SCRA 376, Manuel
C.J. 1056-1058.
121Solid Homes, Inc. v. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72 (1989).
Fuente, 92 Phil. 302 (1952). SCRA 276. See
20Cityinfro
Sec. 10.28, of Manila v. o, G.R. No. 23052,
Jan. 29, 1968, 22
Magtajas v. Pryee Properties Corp., Inc., 53 SCAD 367, 234 SCRA 260, * Teotic
detailed discussion as to when later general law repeals
a
a
(1994) prior Or
special law on the sanme subject.
CATUTE CONSTRUED AS WHOLE AND IN RELATION
TO OTHER STATUTES 281
280 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ,atute Construed in elalion to
Coratitution and Other Statutes
131
o fM a n i l a ,1 3 1
Another exampie 1s the Science
Stamp Tax Act which
science stamp tax "shall
t h a t the
prevails over a general law on the same subject presupposes t orovides be collected at the
time, in the same ner and subject to the same penaltiessame
as
the general law refers to the subject in general and the special that
l
documentary stam imposed under the
treats the same subject in particular. The rule does not apply wl Code, as amended." This reterence znakes National Internal for
the penalties Revenue
viola-
the situation is reversed, that is, the general law treats the subier tion of'the documentary stamp tax provisiona of the National Inter-
in particular and the special law refers to it in general. In
over the special law in the evo
R e v e n u e Code,
a amended, part of the Science
situation, the general law prevails
two laws.127
ent
al
that
ne who has in his possession counterfeit Stamp Tax Act,
science stamps
of repugnancy or conflict between the so
with the same
can
b epunished- penalty as that imposed for posses-
of counterfi documentary stamps.132
sion
6.23. Reference statutes
A reference statute is a statute which refers to other statutes Supplemental statutes.
6.24.
and makes them applicable to the subject of legislation. It is incor.
reference. The adoption
A Supplemental act i3
one intended to supply defñciencies in
poration in a statute of another statute by an existing statute end to add, to compl te, or extend the statute
of a statute by reference makes it as imuch a part of the adopting
full, Reference without changing or mocitying its briginai text. The original stat
statute as if it had been incorporated therein in ute and the suppleimentai act should be read and construed to-
used to avoid encumbering the statute books
statutes are frequently gether to make an intelligible whole. 133
of repetition, and they have been recognized as an
unnecessary
the absence of constitutional
approved method of legislation, in
restrictions.128 6.25. Reenacted statutes.
The adoption by reference of a statute that was previously A statute which reenacts a previous statute or the provisions
revives the statute. The adoption takes
the adopted stat thereof is known as a reenacted statute. A reenactment is one in
repealed include subse-
and does not which the provisions of an eariier statute are reproduced in the
ute a s it exists at the time of adoption
modification of the statute so taken, unless it same or substantially the same words.4 The reenactment may
quent changes or
does so expressly.129 also be made by reference. Thus, where a statute provides that all
construed as to harmonize laws not inconsistent with the provisions thereof are deemed incor-
A reference statute should be so
statute. A construction that
porated and made integral parts thereof by reference, such previ-
with, and give effect to, the adopted
reference is not ous laws on the same subject matter are deemed reenacted.135
will render meaningless an adopted statute by
No. 409 (Revised
favored.30 For instance, Section 49 of Republic Act It is presumed that the legislature knows a construction which
that the "aid of a s s e s s o r s in the trial o
Charter of Manila) provides nas been given by the courts to a statute which has been reenacted
invoked in
any civil or criminal
action x x x within the City may be Dy it. The reenactment is a legislative expression of intention to
the m a n n e r provided in the Code of Civil Procedure." The pertinent
00pt the construction as well as the language of the prior act. It is
of the Code of Civil Procedure a r e thus incorporated
provisioms CCOrdingly a settled rule of statutory construction that' when a
Republic Act No. 409 by reference and shall, if properly invoked, De

in the l
followed in the prosecution of a civil or criminal action
Timicias v. Ocampo, 93 Phil. 446 (1953).

eople v. Martin, G.R. No. 38019, May 16, 1980, 97 SCRA D
74 SCRA 306 (19 1287 (1939); F'irst State
Bagatsing v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 41636, Dec. 17, 1976, 8019,
No.
Bank ofLost
ShelbyCreek School v. York, 21 NE2d 58, 127 ALR
631 (1919).
PTinicias v. Ocampo, 93 Phil. 446 (1953); People v. Martin,
G.R. 2o 1347
8 ALR
.Y Sottineu Country Bank, 185 P 162, Tax Commission, 259 NW
May 16, 1980, 97 SCRA 591 (1980). 700, Phil. 41 (1918); Dykes v. Wisconsin
Heath, 144
S. 98 ,8
ALR 1332
Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 82 L. ed, 858 (1938); Re . (1935).
36 L. ed. 358 (1892).
190, 41 L. ed. 399 (l6
135L.azaro v.
Commission on lections, 123 Phil. 907
(1966).
Wisconsin C.R. Co. v. United States, 164 US.
STATUTE CONSTuD AS STATUTES
TO OTHER WiOLE
AND IN RELATION 283
282 , Satute Construed in elation to
Constitution and Other Stalutes
The rule is that two statutes with a parallel

by th
thereof has been construed
scope, purpose
statute or a provision tion ainology should, each in its own field, have a like
interpre-
substantially reenacted, the lo.
a n d t e r m i n o l o g
last resort and the s a m e is nless in particular instances there is something peculiar in
uni
such construction, and tha tato
the que tion under consideration, or dissimilar in the terms of the
a s adopting
may be regarded
tion becomes a n integral
part of the reenacted statute act relating the to, requiring a different conclusion.:39
command.* In the interora the
force and esfect ofa legislative
the courts will follow the construction o
the reenacted statute,
the adopted statute previously
received.3 which 6.26.
Adoption of contemporaneous construction.
The reenactment ot a statute which has received a practical

Ferreris illustrates the apr
The case of Montelibano v.
Section 3 of the City Charter of Manila provida 0
applicatio or ntemporaneous construction by those charged with the duty of
of the rule. executing it is a persua indication of the adoption by the legis-
of the City of Manila (city fiscalh
the "prosecuting attorney
of all crimes, misdemeanors of the prior practical or executive construction, the legisla-
have charge of the prosecution
lature
violations ordinances, in the Court

of First Instane
city of the city of Manila. He shall investiga dal
of ebeing presumed to know the existence of such construction
municipal courts it made the reenactment, In copstruing the reenacted stat
and e court should take into account such prior contemporaneous
charges of crimes, misdemeanors, ant violations of ordinances
ute, the court:
onstruction and give due weight and respect to it, as the joint
prepare the necessary informations or make the, necessary com
and discharge all other dutia construction placed upon the statute by the legislature that en-
plaints against the persons accused,
upon provincial fiscals it and the executive that implements it i 4
in respect to criminal prosecutions enjoined acted
construed this provision to mean that criminal com
The court has
with the without
plaints filed by offended parties directly cannot courts be 6.27. Qualification of the rule.
the intervention of the City Fiscal of Manila legally done
in the City Char
The said provision was substantially incorporated The rule that when a judicial or contemporaneous construc-
arose as to whether a criminal given to a statute, the reenactment of the statute is
ter of Bacolod City, and the question tion has been
complaint directly filed by an offended party in the city court of generally held to be in effect a legislative adoption of the construc
The court ruled that of the construction
Bacolod City is valid in view of said provision. tion, applies only when the statute is capable
"considering that said provision of the Charter of the City of Ma- given to it and when that construction has become a settled rule of
m a n n e r above indi
nila had been consistently construed in the c o n d u c t . 142
in the Charter of the City of Bacolod,

cated, before being incorporated
latter had re
the conclusion is inevitable that the framers of the
the former with the intent of adopting also its settled 6.28. Adopted statutes.
produced
interpretation by the judicial department." The court thus held from
5 Anadopted statute is a statute patterned after, or copied
that the criminal complaint filed directly by the offended party In construing an adopted statute, it
a statute of a foreign country.
invalid and it ordered the city court to dismiss it. is proper for the court to take into consideration the construction of
well
In the Montelibano case, the provision of the City Charter o the law by the courts of the country from which it is taken,
as
tne
Manila on the prosecution of crimes by the city fiscal and
provision of the City Charter of Bacolod on the same subject a
true
identically worded. Hence, they should receive the same cons
Jur. 343.
n Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918), citing 50 Am.
re
G.R. No. 52306, Oct.
Corp. v. Court of Tax Appeals,
5N Broadcasting
12, 1981,
1
108 SCRA 142; In re Dick, supra.
a6n re Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918).
14See Sec. 3.41,
137Montelibano v. Ferrer, 97 Phil. 228 (1955). supra. United States, 22 L.
ed. 80 (1873).
13597 Phil. 228 (1955). e Dollar Savings Bank v.
as the law itself and the

practices under it, for the legislature ia
presumed tohave adopted such construction and practices with the
adoption of the law.143 The presumption does not,
however, apply to
construction given the statute subsequent to its adoption, although Chapter Vli
it has persuasive effect on the interpretation of the adopted stat
ute.144
STRICT OR LIBERAL
CONSTRUCTION
A. IN GENERAL
7,01. Generally
i, feWhether a statute is to be given a strict.or liberal construc-

tionwill depend upon the nature of the statute, the purpose tobe
subserved to be
and the mischief and a strict or liberal
remedied,
interpretation will be given a statute that will best accomplish the
end desired and effectuate legislative intent.
7.02. Strict construction, generally.

Strict construction is that construction according to the lett
of a statute, which recognizes nothing that is not expressed, takes
the language used in its exact meaing, and admits no equitable
consideration.! It does not mean giving a statute its narrowest
meaning of which it is susceptible. Nor does it mean that words
shall be so restricted as not to have their full meaning* It simply
means that the scope of a statute shall not be extended or enlarged
by implication, intendment, equitable considerationbeyond the
or
lhteral meaning of its terms." It is a close and conservative adher-
ence to the literal textual interpretation. Strict construction
ne
or
is
antithesis of liberal construction.
Priest v. Captain, 139 S.W. 204.

ummins v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 66 S.W. S20.
State v. Aetna Banking & Trust Co., 87, p. 2b0. Tel. Co., 148
Peo Union
Moore v. Western
.W. 157. Gürcia, 85 Phil. 651 (1950);
N.E. 837.
14See Sec. 3.28, supra, for a detailed discussion on the o u n t r y Co. v. Ames, 194 N.E. 157;
Warner v. King, 197
subject.
14State v. Hill, 869 P2d 363, 91 ALR 2d 750 (1962).
285
286 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION STRICT OR LIBERAL
CONSTRUCTION
A. in CGerneral
287
Liberal construction, defined. mate xercise of dicial power. The

7.03. latter is
dden by the tripartite divisic judicial
powers among thelegislation
of
p a r tnonts
Liberal construction means such equitable construction as m e n t s of
enlarge the letter of a statute to accomplish its intended purpos8 government,

the
executive, the
three de.
carry out its intent, or promote justice. It does not mean enlarrge
judicial.12 legisiative and the
ment of a provision which is clear, unambiguous and free fro ABtatute may not be liberally construed
to read into it
doubt, for a statute which is plain and elear is not subject to con. ing which its clear and plain language some
inter cannot prevail against therejects. The rule of liberal
struction. Nor does it mean that the words should be foreed out of
their natural meaning. Liberal construetion is that construction
t h e l a w 13
categorical provisions of
which expands the meaning of a statute to meet cases which are
clearly within the spirit or reason thereof or within the evil which 7.05. Construction to promote social justice.
the statute was designed to remedy, or which gives a statute its
generally accepted meaning to the end that the most comprehen
The principles
of social justice as
enshrined in the Constitu-
tion should Be taken into account the
application thereof may be accorded, wthout being inconsist in interpretation and
ent with its language or doing violence to any of its terms In tion of laws. The mandáte on social justiceapplica-
constitutional is ad-
short, liberal construction means that the words should receive a dressed not only to the legislature but also to the two other branches
of government. An authority on the subject writes:
fair and reasonable interpretation, so as to attain the intent, spirit i
and purpose of the law. "It (social justice mandate) is meant for
the three depart-
ments: the legislative, executive, and
judicial, because the iatter
two are no less than the
7.04. Liberal construction applied, generally. agencies of the state than the first. For
what use would it be for the National
Where a statute is ambiguous and capable of more than one
Assembly to pass laws calcu
lated to enhance social justice if the executive
officials should en-
construction, the literal meaning of the words used may be rejected force them in such a way, and the courts should
if the result of adopting said meaning would be to defeat the pur give them such an
interpretation, as to defeat social justice? Certainly, this
principle
pose of the law.10 Instead, the statute will be given a liberal inter ofsocial justice in our Constitution as generously conceived andso
pretation so as to save the statute from obliteration. No rule of tersely phrased, was not included in the funäamental law as a
construction is better accredited than that which is expressed m mere popular gesture. It was meant to be a vital, articulate, com-
the Latin maxim, ut res magis valeat quam pereat." By libera peling principle of public policy. It should be observed in the inter
construction, the court from the language used, the subject mattel, Pretation not only of future legislations, but also of all laws already
and the purpose of the legislature will be able to find out the tr exIsting on November 15, 1935. It was intended to change the
meaning of the statute. There is a sharp distinction, however, DE o our laws, present and future. Thus, all the laws which on
tween construction of this nature and the act of the court in en
Breat historic event when the Commonwealth of the Philip-
grafting upon a law something which it believes ought to have ber
embraced therein. The former is liberal construction and is a
legiu HWas born, were susceptible of two interpretations- strict or
liberal, against or in favor of social justice- now have to be con-
strue
broadly in order to promote and achieve socialjustice."
Causey v. Guilford Country, 135 S.E. 40.
See Sec. 2.15, supra.
th,
Crescent City v. Griffin, 87 P2d 414; Maryland Casualty Co.
S.W. 2nd 913.
v.
adada v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 515 (1935).
Laurence v. McCalmont, 43 U.S. 426, 11 L. ed. 316 (1844). eople v. Castillo, SCAD 692, 337 SCRA
176 (2000).
concurring opinion;
1Riera v. Pal1norali, 40 Phil. 105 (1919).
"Javellana v. Nuñez, 40 Phil. 761 (1920).
Bocoba, Cult
Legalism, quoted
in Justice
Perfecto's
lnent Insurance Board, 78 Phil. 221, 225 (1947).

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION STRICT OR LIBERAL
288 B. Statutes StrictlyCONSTRUCTION
Construed 289
7.06.
Construction taking into consideration general . .
el
B. STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED
fare or growth of civilization.
Some authorities advocate a construction which seeks an 7.07.Penal statutes, generally.

ex
pansive application of statutes to attain the general welfare. Penal statutes refer to those laws
construction is based on the maxim, salus populi est supremaThig
u by which
nased for violation or
transgressionof punishments are
their provisions.1 Penal
Thus, statutes enacted for the public good are to be constru tutes are those
acts of the
legislature which prohibit certain
liberally. Statuta pro publico commodo late interpretantur acts and establish penalties for their
authority on the subject expounds on this type of construction. crimes, treat oftheir nature and violation; those that define or
"There is for me in all cases a principle of statutory construeti The test employed it a statute is provide for their
penal is whetherpunishment.
not to be found in the books, but which for the Philippine Islands ia imposed for the a
penalty is
punishment of a
wTong to the public or for the
all-important. In the resolution of all questions, I begin with these redress of an
injury to an
individual." Strictly and
queries: What is for the best interest of the Filipino people? How ing, penal or criminal law are those which properiy speak-
under the law can the progress of the Philippine Islands be an offense committed against the state, and impose punishment for
which the
advanced? From this viewpoint, whici as a matter of fact is herein tiye has the power to pardon. in common use, however,chief execu-
this sense
in accord with the logical interpretation of the law, there is but one has been enlarged to include within the term "penal
possible result- to assist the legislature in its enactment ofthe statutes which command or prohibit certain acts, andstatutes" all
law and the executive in its enforcement of the law by a judicial establish
penalties for their violation, and even those which, without ex-
interpretation which will make legislative intention and executive
pressly prohibiting certain
acts, impose a penalty upon their com-
action effective."16 mission.21 A statute which decrees the forfeiture in favor of the
state of unexplained wealth acquired by a
Another authority thinks along similar lines: "The statute in public official while in
office is criminal in nature.22
general has two, articulate organs for lawmaking purposes the
the
legislature and the tribunal. The first organ makes new law,
it
second attests and confirms old law, though under cover of doing 7.08. Penal statutes strictly construed.
introduces many new principles. For statutes and judicial decisions
: I t is a well-known rule of legal hermeneuties that penal or
alike come into being and grow out of the same common
supreme good of society. It is a consecrated legal axiom that the
roots, tne criminal laws are strictly construed against the State and liberaly
in
reason of the law is the life of the law. The reason lies in the soil o favor of the accused.23 This means that penal statutes cannot be
the common welfare. Consequently, if the judge limits himselr w enlarged or extended by intendment, implication, or any equitabie
the printed pages of the statute, and does not go out into the opu consideration.24 And the court must not bring eases within the pro-
vS1on of a statute that are not clearly embraced by it, nor by a
spaces of actuality and dig down deep into his common soil, hea
in his noble 16
calling, and becomes subservient to formalism.
It has also been held that statutes must be interpreted iuar
int aroza v. Ariaga, G.R. No. 23848, Oct. 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 717.
light of the growth of civilization and varying«conditions. The ubido v, Sandiganbayan, 78 SCAD 104, 266 SCRA 379 (1997).
his head shou
pretation that "if the man is too long for the bed, new uenaseda Flavier, 44
v. SCAD 1026, 226 (1993).
SCRA645
be a
Lorenzo v. Posadas, 64 Phil. 353 (1937).
chopped off rather than enlarge the old bed or purchase 22Cabalv. Kapunan 116 Phil. 1361 (1962).
one" should not be
given such statutes." 66 SCRA 546; People
Yu
Jai, 99People
Phil. 725v. (1956);
Subido, G.R. v.
pleNo. 21734, Sept.
v. Elkanish, 5, 1975,
90 Phil. 53 (1951); Suy Sui v. People, 92
Phil. 684(1953); People 37 Phil. 17 (1917); People v. Jaeson, 54 Phil. 176
Justice Malcoln dissenting, U.S. v. Estapia, 37 Phil. 26, 29 (117) (1929); Peop urisima,Estapia,
v.
G.R. No. 42050, Nov. 20, 1978,

86 SCRA 642; Peoplo
v.
78 Ph "Terrado, G.R. No. 2

Justice Perfecto concurring, Gomez v. Government Insurance
221, 224 (1947). Nov. 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648.
Teople v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 651 (1950).
Enriquez v. A.S. Watson & Co., 22 Phil.
623, 637, 638 (1912).
290
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
291
B. Statutes Strictly Construed
narrow, technical, or forced construction exclude cases 30

As the ccourt
As the ourt said in a case:
"Statutes then being penall
are obviously within its provision." Thus, where a from from it that legislature,
vith
construed wit) such strictness
izes the commission of an act on certain statute must
be
as to carefully safeguard
specific occasions. itpenal of the defendant and at the same time the
not be construed to
penalize it on all occasions.26 can the r
obvious intent ention of the legislature. If the language be preserve
plain, it will
The nstrued as it.reads, and the words of the statute given their
language of a penal statute cannot be enlarged if aambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in
the ordinary meaning of its terms in order to carry into ha. oeyond meaning;
m
general purpose for which the statute was enacted. effect th

full of the defenda
dant than it would if the statute were remedial.
Only th favor
c a s e s , it
rill endeavor
will toeffect substantial
persons, offenses, and penalties clearly included,
sonable doubt, will be considered within the beyond anv-those
rea.
both justice."31
T the interpretation of a penal statute, the rule is to subject
ute. They must come clearly within both the operation
of the stat
spirit and the letter af reful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to
the statute, and where there is a reasonable. safeguard
it the rights of the acused. If the statute is ambiguous and
doubt, it
h must
resolved in favor of the person accused of violating the a d m i t s t w o r e a s o nable
ab but contradictory
other words, no person should be brought within the
statute" n constructions,
that
whichn
terms of a erates in favor of à party accused under its provision is to be
statute who is not clearly within them, nor should any act
be pra ferred. The principle is that açts in and of themselves innocent
nounced eriininal which is not clearly made so by the d lawful cannot be eld to be criminal unless there is a clear and
statute23
unequivocal expression. of the legislative intent to make
For instance, Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 7659, which amended A them such.
335 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that the death Whatever is not plainly within the provisions of a penal statute
penalty lor should be regarded as without its intendment. Thus, sinee P.D. No.
rape may be imposed if the "offender is a parent, ascendant, step.
1564, which punishes a person who solicits or receives contribution
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
for "charitable or public welfare purposes" without any permit first
third civii degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the
secured from the Department of Social Services, did not include
victim." This provision cannot be extended to apply to an offender
religious purposes" in the acts punishable, the law cannot be con-
who is not the common law spouse of the parent of the victim, but
is the common-law husband of the girl's grandmother becausehe is strued to punish the solicitation of contributions for religious pur-
not one of those enumerated therein. For "Courts must not bring poses, such as for the repair or renovation of a church, for while
cases within the provision of the law which are not clearly embraced "charitable purposes" include "religious purposes," not all charita-
ble purposes include religious purposes; hence,
by it. No act can be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made following the rule
so by statute; so, too, no person who is not clearly within the terms that penal laws should be strictly construed and what is not
clearly
included as punishable is excluded, the term "charitable" should be
of a statute can be brought within them. Any reasonable doubt
must be resolved in favor of the accused."23 strictly construed so as to exclude solicitation for "religious" pur-
poses in the scope of the law.2
The rule that penal statutes are strictly construed does no
mean that every penal law must be so narrowly construed as
itself; it merely means that they are not
to be con 7.09. Reason
defeat the law
ot the why penal statutes
strictly construed.
are
strued s0 strictly as to nullify or destroy the obvious purpose The reason for the rule that penal statutes are construed
Cy against the State and liberally in favor of the accused is
679 (190
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 48 L. ed. a W is tender in favor of the rights of an individual; the
256 (1940
(1917); Go Chico v. Martinez, 45 Phil.
U.S. v. Estapia, 37 Phil. 17 Statutory Construe
People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 651 (1950), citing Crawford,
tion, pp. 460-462. Phil. 347
v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243 (1917); U.S.
v. Madrigal, 27 U.S. v. Go
U.S. U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909).
14
(1914). Chico, Phil. 128, 141 (1909), eiting Bollers v. Outing Co., 175
170-171 (1998), citing AgPa 262, 265; see also
People vs. Atop, 91 SCAD 561, 286 SCRA 163, 545.
Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., 208 People v. ubido, G.R. No. 21734, Sept. 5, 1975, 66 SCRA
32Centeno v. Villalon-Porn 55 sCAD 100, 236 SCRA 197 (1994).
292 sTRICT OR LIBERAL
CONSTRUCTION 293
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION B. Statutes Strictly Construed
Application
of rule.
object is to establish a certain rule by 7.11.
would be safe, and conformity to which manl
the discretion of the court limited.
o r u l e that no person should be brought within the terms of
of strict I ho is not clearly within them, nor should an act be
construction is not to enable a guilty personThetonn a atute
al which is not clearly made so by the statute
punishment through a technicality but to provide s
mber of cases. Thus, in accordance with the
has
tion of forbidden acts.33 a
precise de been applied
efini ich penalizes a "person assisting a claimant" in

7.10.
ith the latter's claim for veterans benefit, who shall
Acts mala in se and mala conn
collect a fee
fee therefor exceeding twenty pesos per claim or shall
prohibita.
The general rule is that a such fee ibefore the claim is actually paid, does not,
penal statute will not be collect
ze
strictly
"one who offers to assist, but does not
to make the commission of certain construed construed, pénalize
assist,"
regard to the
prohibited acts
intent of the doer, unless there is criminal withou latter not bei clearly within the terms of the law.38 Where a
the
clear
contrary. In other words, to constitute a legislativa
a atte penalizes a store owner who sells commodities beyond the
intent to the
intent must combine with an act. Actus non crime, evi tail ceiling price fixed by law, the ambiguity in the executive
facit reum nisi mens sit order ssifying the same commodity into two classes and fixing
rea, the act itself does not make a
man guilty unless his intention Fferent ceiling prices for each cla8s, pursuant to which ihe price
were so. Actus me invito factus"ron est meus
me against my will is not actus,'an act done b of
g0ods sold by a store owner is less than the price in one class but
my act.4 are than that of the other class, should be resolved in favor of the
. ii more
In acts mala in se, such acCused, as to render him not liable for violation of the law9 Where
as those penalized under the Revised
Penal Code, criminal intent, apart from the act itself, is a Statute punishes a person "who fraudulently represents the weight
required,
but in those which are mala prohibita the only inquiry is, has the or measure of anything to be greater or less than it is," the act of a
law been violated. Whether a statute is to be so construed Derson who violates such law cannot be imputed to that of another
depends
upon the intent of the legislature, taking into consideration the as to hold the latter liable therefor even without his knowledge or
nature of the offense, the purpose to be accomplished and such consent to the act of the former.0 Where selling "lave" tickets is
other factors as will throw light upon the meaning of the lan- not prohibited, a person who sold such tickets could not be held
guage.3 Such words as "voluntarily," "knowingly" or "willfully' im criminally liable therefor. Where a crime is punishable both by
part criminal intent as a prerequisite.35 Where a statute plainly the Revised Penal Code and by a special law, èach of which pre-
prohibits an act to be done and uses no word implying that the gcribes a different prescriptive period, one longer than the other,
is the shorter period should apply as to whether the crime has al-
prohibited act shall be done knowingly or willfully,
done, the statute implies the guilty intent, although the offender
and theact
ready prescribed, as it is more favorable to the accused.2
was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law he
violated.
Where the language is plain and positive, and the offense is not The language of penal statutes has been frequently narrowed
where the letter includes situations inconsistent with the legisla-
made to depend upon the positive, willful intent and purpose, noth-
ing is left to interpretation." ve purpose,3 Thus, the language of a statute which penalizes thea
re carrying outside of residence of bladed weapons, such as
Anite or bolo, not in
connection with one's work or occupation, with
86 SCRA 542; Paanan P'eople Yadao, 94 Phil.

People v. Purisima, G.R. No. 42050, Nov. 20, 1978, "
v.
726 (1954).
Court of Appeals, Suy v. People, 92 Phil. 684 (1953).
IntermediateAppellate Court, 145 SCRA 112 (1986); Ursua v.
SCAD 123, 256 147 (1996). U.S. v. Madrigal, 27 Phil. 347 (1914).
SU.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910). People v. Garcia, 94 Phil. 814 (1956).
S5U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909). 42Pec .
U.S. v. Ah Chong, supra; People v. Salazar, 106 Phil. 221 (1959). ple Terreda, G.R. No. 23625, Nov. 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648.
Teople v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 637
$7U.S. v. Go Chico, supra. (1962).
294 STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION B. Statutes Strictly Construed 295
ate in
private individual who has in his
charge any of the public
a very heavy penalty ranging from five to ten years of
imnri.
clear.
A
r Oroperty enumerated therein and conmits any of the acts
ment, has been narrowed and strictly construed as to ineun
an additional element of the crime, the efined in
any of he
the
provisions Chapter Four, Title Seven of the
of
carrying of the weano should likewise be penalized with the same penalty meted to
furtherance of rebellion, insurrection subversion, such beinu
or RPC,
ficers.
erring public office Nowhere in this provision is
evil sought
to be remedied prevented by the statute as discl 0 n is it expressed
expressed or
private individual fallin

or
in its preamble.4 losed implied
that a falling under said Article 222 is to
deemed a
public officer"6
be
The rule that a penal statute should be so construed
strictness so as to safeguard the rights of the defendant with
cation in Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan. The question is plifinds an 7.12.
Limitation of rule.
whether a The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is
private person can be considered a public officer by reason of hie
being designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a deposi. 4he only factor in the interpretatiorn of criminal laws. The
rule
a s an' additional factor to be
tory of distrained property, so as to make the conversion thereo rely serves considered as an aid in
the crime of malversation falling within the jurisdiction of agoertaining the meaning of penal laws. A strict construction should
the nat be permitted to defeat the intent, policy, and purpose of the
Sandiganbayan. The Court ruled in the thus:
negative, "Howevet statute. The court should consider the spirit and reason of a stat-
we find no provision in the NIRC constituting
such person public
a
where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
officer by reason of such requirement. The BIR's power
authorizing tte
a private individual to act as a depository cannot be stretched to iniustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law, for strict
include the power to appoint him as a public officer. The prosecu construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction
tion argues that 'Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code x x x de- as to deprive it of the meaning intended."
fines the individuals covered by the term 'officers'under Article 217 Where penal statute is
a
capable of two interpretations, one
x x x' of the same Code. And accordingly, since Azarcon became 'a
which will operate to exempt an accused from liability for violation
depository of the truck seized by the BIR he also became a publiec thereof and another which will give effect to the manifest intent of
officer who can be prosecuted under Article
217 x xx.
The Court is the statute and promote its object, the latter
interpretation should
not persuaded. Article 222 of the RPC reads: Officers included in be adopted. The rule that penal statutes
the preceding provisions. The provisions of this chapter shall should be strictly con-
strued against the state and liberally in favor of the accused will
apply to private individuals who, in capacity whatever, haveor
any not justify such construction as will defeat the object of the law
charge of any insular, provincial, or municipal funds, revenues, 80ught to be attained.48 For although penal statutes are to be strictly
property and to any administrator or depository of funds or prop construed, they are not to be so strictly construed as to defeat the
erty attached, seized or deposited by public authority, even if such ov1ous purpose of the legislature. Thus, a law which punishes the
property belongs to a private individual'xxx Legislative intentis ahsplay of flags "used during" the insurrection against the United
determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the E s may not be so construed as to exempt from criminal liability
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is appieu
according to its express terms, and interpretation would be re 4person wBlo displays a replica of said flag because said replica is
0 he one "used" during the rebellion, for to so construe it is to
Sorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impo5"
ythe statute altogether. The rules of interpretation are rules
sible or absurd or would lead to an
injustice This is particula Construction, not destruction."
observed in the interpretation of penal statutes which "must
construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the ng
ofthe defendant x x x. The language of the foregoing provisi0
Pen Construction, 1990, p. 209.
eople v. 61-763,
664 (1958).
eiting Agpalo, Statutory
Manantan, 115 Phil. 637 (1962); People v. Gatchalian, 104 Phil
People v. Purisima, G.R. No. 42050, Nov. 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 542(1978 S.
4U.S. v. Toribio,
v.
4579 SCAD 954, 268 SCRA 747 (1997).
151Phil. 85 (1910); U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909).
Go Chico,
supra.
296 STATUTORY CONSsTRUCTION STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
B. Statutes Strict'y Construed
291
Moreover, the rule that penal statutes are to be strict the other of which would not do so, the latter construction
and
so as to allow full enjoyment of such fundamental

strued against the State applies only where the law is amhi
and there is doubt as to its the law is
on
ple be adopted
unambiguous,
meaning. Where cleaug
the rule does not apply. For instance, where and
ight.67
ute requires that an employer shall pay a minimum wage a

Statutes authorizing expropriations.
less than a specified amount and punishes any person who will not 7.14
violates any of its provisions, the fact that the nonpayment ofs The
nower of eminent domain is essentially legislative in na-
minimum wage is not specifically declared unlawful, unliko 8 The legislature may not, however, by itself, exercise such
other ture.56
ga law directly expropriating a particular land

prohibited acts therein mentioned, does not mean that an yer
er by enacting
pow
ntt of just compensation thereof.5° It may del-
who pays his employees less than the preseribed minimum wageis
not liable criminally, for the nonpayment of the minimum wage
and
ixing the
egate
amoun
the power, by law subject to hearing as to just compensation,

is
the very act sought to be enjoined by the law and to strictly Con to the President,co 00 local government units, or a public utility com-
strue it by saying that such act is not criminally punishable is ta n Statutes expropriating or authorizing the expropriation of
defeat the object of the law, which is to provide a rockbottom wage ODerty are strietly construed against the expropriating authority
to be observed by all employers.50 iberally in favor of property owners. The reason is that the
fexercise of the.right of eminent domain, whether by the State, or
h its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private
7.13. Statutes in derogation of rights.
rights, and the rule in thatofcase is that the authority must be
People in a republican state enjoy certain rights, which are
either inherent or guaranteed by the Constitution or protected by
strictly construed. No apecie property is held by individuals with
greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and laws
law. However, rights are not absolute, and the state,
in the exercise more sedulously, than the right to freehold of inhabitants. When
of its police power, may enact legislations curtailing or restricting the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater purposes,
their enjoyment. As these statutes are in derogation of common or expropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the
general rights, they are generally strictly construed and rigidly plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful inter-
confined to cases clearly within their scope or purpose.1 Thus, pretation,"61
land or property
statutes authorizing the expropriation of private
the ceiling of the price of
allowing the taking of deposition,53 fixing indi- 7.15. Statutes granting privileges.
commoditiess* limiting the exercise of proprietary rights by
vidual citizens,s5 and suspending the periodof prescription of ac- Statutes granting advantages to private persons or entities
common or general rights,
and
tions,are statutes in derogation of have in many instances created special privileges or monopolies for
are accordingly construed strictly.6 the grantees and have thus been viewed with suspicion and strictly
constructions, construed. This is altogether appropriate in the majority of situa-
It has been held that of two reasonably possible
restrict fundamental right of the peo tions, for if public advantage is gained by the grant, it narrowly
one which would diminish or
6OPeople v. Gatchalian, 104 Phil. 664 (1958). SProvincial Chapter of Laguna, Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elec
(1951); Phil. Nationa
Realty Investment, Inc. v. Valderama, 84 Phil. 842 tions, G.R. No. 53460, May 27, 1983, 122 SCRA 423.
Bank v. Jacinto, 88 Phil. 376 (1951); Herrerias v. Javellana, 84
Phil. 608 (1949).
S2Arriete v. Director of Public Works, 58 Phil. 507 (1933). City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil. 349 (1919).
Nunez v. Nuñez, 53 Phil. 782 (1928).
Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89 (1987).
Herrerias v. Javellana, 84 Phil. 608 (1949). ec.64(h), Revised Administrative Code.
SCRA 440, 455-456 (199
Sec. 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337.
v. Sandiganbayan, 96 SCAD 842, 293
Republic enerio Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil. 411 (1912).
v
citing Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 212. al
Director of Public Works, 58 Phil. 507 (1933); City of Manila
v.
(1951); Phil. Naton Chinaiete v.
Realty lnvestments, Inc. v. Villanueva, 84 Phil. 842 Ommunity of Manila, 40 Phil. 349 (1919).
Bank v. Jacinto, supra.
"City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil. 349 (1919).
298 STRICT OR LIBERAL
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION B. CONSTRUCTION
Statutes Strictly 299
Construed
appears to be of secondary significance compared with the adva. Same idea: removal is to be confined
o
Convey within the limits

advan- for
it; the causes, manner and conditions
ed
fixed mustbe
tage gained by the grantee.* p r e s c r i l
with strictness; where the cause of removal is

prohibition to remove for a specified,
o u r s u e d
Strict construction requires that those who invoke a she the ecification amounts to a
different
privilege granted by a statute must comply strictly with its Dras which is a paraphr of the maxim
cause, The reason for the
sio alterius,7" Th expressio unius est
sions.6 Privilegia recipiunt largam interpretationem volunta stringent rule is said to be
consonamn concedentis, or privileges are to be interpreted in ord. exc remedy of removal 1s a drastic one and penal in nature.
ance with the will of him who grants them."" And he who fails t Injus
thao and harm to the public interest would likely emerge should
strictly comply with the will of the grantor loses such privileges h laws be not strictly interpreted against the power of
Thus, where an entity is granted a legislative franchise to operat sion or removal.73
suspen-
electric light and power, on condition that it should start operation
within a specified period, its failure to start operation within the accordance with the rule
of strict construction, where a
statute provides tthat
Drovides a public official
period resulted in the forfeiture of the franchise. For rights Or may be removed for "neglect
of duty, ession, corruption or other forms of maladministration
privileges. which exist only by virtue of statutes come into being
ficethe phrase "in office" should be construed to
only after strict compliance with all the conditions found in the
statutes.69 In the matter of rights' and privileges' granted subject to
ated grounds, in that the grounds must be suchqualify the
as affect
be applied.o" e r ' s performance of his duties as an officer and not such as
conditions, the maxim dura lex sed lex may properly M anlv his character as a private person. It
i
distinguishes be-
en the character of the man and the character of the officer, and
7.16. Legislative grants to local government units. .
limits the grounds for removal to oniy those as enumerated.74 Simi-

are grants
units larlv, where a statute outlines in detail the procedure to be taken
Legislative grants in favor of local government in the investigation, suspension or removal of a public officer, the
and hence, should be strictly construed against
of public
a nature, legislature clearly manifests a purpose to exclude other modes of
the strict interpreta.
the grantee. One compelling reason given for
tion of a public grant is that there is in
such a grant a gratuitous proceeding by other authorities under a general statute. Thus, if by
which results in an unfair statute, local elective officials are to be removed or suspended,
donation of public money or property
be should after investigation, by the provincial board,
advantage to the grantee and for that reason, grant the subject to appeal to the
restricted in favor of the public. Hence, the letter of the President, the latter has no authority on his own to conduct the
narrowly investigation and to suspend such elective local officials.75
matters which, if included,
statute should be narrowed to exclude
would defeat the policy of the legislature."
7.18. Naturalization laws.
7.17. Statutory grounds for removal of officials. It is
well-settled that laws on naturalization are strictly con-
to suspension or removal of public
Statutes relating
officials strued against an applicant for citizenship and rigidly followed and
which
are strictly construed. The rule is expressed in different ways enforced,6 The reason is that the right of an alien to become a
Cbzen by naturalization
is a statutory rather than a natural one,
National Waterworks & Sewerage Authori
o5C& C Commercial Corp. v.
984.
G.R. No. 27275, Nov. 18, 1967, 21 SCRA (1958).
6Pagdanganan Courtv. Agrarian Relations, 104 Phil. 910
of 121
6Barreto v. Tuason, 60 Phil. 888 (1926).
96 Phil. 137 (1954).
n v. Roque,
Hebron 92 Phil. 456 (1953); Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 176 1958).
Roye8, 104 Phil. 175 (1958).
Butuan Suwmill, Inc. v. Bayview Theater, Inc.,
Waterworks & Sewerage Autnor 18 ev Deling, 105 Phil. 384 (1959); Cornejo v. Naval, 54 Phil. 809 (1930).
C & C Commercial Corp. v. National
5Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 (1958); Villena v. Roque, 93! Phil. 363 (1953).
G.R. No. 27275, Nov. 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 984. 16Co
Co y
0Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. Bayview Theater, Inc.,
96 Phil. 137 (1954).
30,
76, Phil. 323 Quing Reyes v. Republic, 104 Phil. 889 (1958); Pardo Republic, 85 v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41001, Sept. 1 818 (1950).(1950); Ng v. Republ

Manila No. 761
ILodge v. ublic, 94 Phil. 366 (1954); Bautista v. Republic, 87 Phil.
73 SCRA 162.
300 STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
B. Statutes
Striçtly Construed
and it does not become Tax or customs laWs may not be extended by implication be-
lishes by competent andvested
until he files a petition
satisfactory evidence that he has allesto#
and the clear import of their language, nor their operation en-
qualifications and none to embrace matters not

yona
of the so as
specifically provided. lf a
In case of doubt, the doubt is disqualifications specified by la arged
j8rSought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he
resolved against the
his petition for naturalization is
denied.78 applicantlaw and
p e
bei taxed, however great the hardship may appear to be to the

r s o n
mlaind. On the other hand, if the government seeking to

ollect tax or customs duties cannot bring the subject within the
7.19. Statutes imposing taxes and customs
duties. letter ofthhe.law, the subject is free, howeve apparently within the
The power to tax is an incident of
sovereignty and is spir
of the law the case might otherwise appear to be.
ited in its range, unlim.
acknowledging in its very
that security against its abuse is to be found nature
no
limits, sa
The reason underlying the rule of strict construction of stat-
only in the imposing taxes or customs duties is that taxation is a destruc-
bility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the responsi. u es
nOwer which interteres with the personal and
who are to pay it. So constituency
potent is the power that it was once opined property rights
the people and takes from them a portion of their property for
that the "power tax involves the power to destroy."
to the support of the government, Accordinigly, in every case of doubt,
destructive power which interfered with the personal Taxation
and
is n
property tax statutes are construed most strongly against the government
rights of the people and takes from them a portion of their property and in favor of the taxpayer because burdens are not to be im-
for the support of the government. Accordingly, tax n0Sed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes ex-
statutes must
be construed strictly against the
of the taxpayer. 79
government
and liberally in favor pressly and clearly import.*
Where the question is whether a statute
subjects a matter, 7.20. Statutes granting tax exemptions.
property, or person to tax, the statute is to be construed strictly
against the subjection to tax liability, and it will not be construed what the people pay for civilized
Taxes are
society. They are
as imposing a tax unless it does so the lifeblood of the nation. Consequently, the law frowns
clearly, expressly and unam- against
biguously.80 A tax cannot be imposed without clear and express exemptions from tuxution. LuWs granting tax exemptions are thus
words for that purpose. The general rule of construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and
requiring adherence to
the letter in construing statutes applies with favor of the taxing authority. 'Taxation is the rule liberally in
peculiar strictness to and exemption is
tax laws and the provisions of a the exception. The burden of
taxing act are not to be extended proof rests upon the party claiming
by implication. In case of doubt, tax statutes are to be construed exemption to prove that it is in fact covered by the
most claimed. exemption so
strongly against the government and in favor of the subjects
or citizens because burdens are not to be imposed nor
be imposed beyond what statutes
presumed to The law frowns
against exemption from taxation. For this
expressly and clearly import. reason, statutes granting tax
Juris against the exemptions are construed strictissini
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing au-
Mo Yuen Tsi v. Republic, 115 Phil. 401 (1962).
Cu v. Ropublie, 115 Phil. 600 (1962).
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos, 74 SCAD 295, 261 Collector of Internal
Revenue v. Ia Tondena, Inc., 115 Phul. 841
Groe.ick &
Kuttner v. Collector of (1962)
SCRA 667 (1996), citing Agpalo, Statutory Construction (1990 ed.), p. 216; Quimpo Y. Customs, 18 Plil. 461 (191l.
ania Railroad Co. v. Collector of Customs,
Mendoza, G.R. No. 33092, Aug. 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 73; Froehlich & Kuttner v. 52 Ph1l. 950 (1929); Collector of
Collector of Customs, 18 Phil. 461 (1911); Collector of Internal a l Revenue of La Tondeia, 115 Phil. 841 (1962); Batangas
101 Phil. 1026 (1957).
Revenue v. Angeles, Cla Ireasurer, 52 Phil. 190 (1928); Comaussi0ner of Internal Transp. Co. v
Revenue
Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc. v. un
Court, 196
d Ins. Co., 148 SCRA 315 (1987); tepubiic v. Interuiedate
Appellate
Samar, G.R.No. 18924, June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA
Municipal Council of Hinabangan, SCRA 335 (1991).
416. Mactan Cebu Internat
Commissioner
SCRA 605 (1997).
of Internal Revenue
v. Court of Appeals, 82 SCAD 45, 2 SCRA 667 1996), national Airport Authority v. Marcos, 74 SCAD 245 261
sioner of Intern sl Citing Agpalo, Stututory Construction, t199) ed.), p. 217, C'omm:s
Revenu
v Mitsuhishi
M.tal C'orp,
I81 SeLA 214. 224t1990
STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION 303
302 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONN
B. Statutes Strictly Construed
thority.s6 Exemptions contained in tax statutes must process

all not be allowed against the miller's tax
nilling
construed against those claiming the exceptions." The be st except in the case of a proprietor or operator of a refined
.
rule of strict construction is to minimize the basioly due,

faciory as
provided hereunder."
and foster impartiality, fairness, and equality of
different trohe Sugar
treatment o u r t ruled that the proviso should be strictly construed
taxpayers. Accordingly, he who claims an exemption from his ng t oapply only
to raw materials and not to containers and packing
of the common burden of taxation must
justify his claim h r materials w h i hich are notraw materials; hence, the miller is entitled
ing that the legislature intended to exempt him by words
to be mistaken.ss For too credit. It explained:
exemptions from taxation are not not favoredPlain to t a x
law, nor are they presumed. They must be expressed in "Notably, the law relied upon by the BIR Commissioner
and most
unambiguous language and not left to mere im
the cle the basis for not allowing Cenvoco's tax credit is just a
as
tions.0 It has been held that in
"exemptions are never presumed.plica th. oroviso of Section 168 of the old Tax Code. The restriction
burden is on the claimant to establish however, is limited only to sales, miller's
tion and an alleged
clearly his right to exem the said proviso,
grant of exemption will be strictly constr excise taxes paid on raw materials used in the milling proc-
-and cannot be made out by
inference or but mustued
beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, implications
since taxation is be
ess.
and exemption the
intention to make an exemption oughttheto'rulabe Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as
a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed.
expressed in clear and unambiguous terms. They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and
Illustrative of the rule that tax all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provi
construed is Commissioner of Internalexemptions should be strictly
Revenue v. CA.92 The sions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is es-
raised is whether
containers and packaging materials can be issue
ited against the miller's cred.
tablished by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail
should be no tax credit
deficiency tax. The BIR claimed that there the former nor add to the latter by implication x x x (Samson
Tax Code, which reads:
pursuant to the proviso of Sec. 168 of the vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 659 [1986).
"x Xx Provided,
"The exception provided for in Section 168 of the old Tax
finally, That credit for any sales, miller's Code should thus be strictly construed. Conformably, the sales,
or excise taxes and raw matrials or
supplies used in the miller's and excise taxes paid on all other materials (except on
raw materials used in the milling process), such as the sales
taxes paid on containers and packaging materials of the milled
Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General, G.R. No.
Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. 17888, Oct. 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 764; producis under consideration, may be credited against the
v. Acting
Oct. 28, 1966, 18 Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 21841, miller's tax due therefor.
SCRA; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Guerrero, G.R.
20812, Sept. 22, 1967, 21 SCRA 180; No.
(1916); Asiatic Petroleum v. Ramos, 49 Government
Phil.
v. Monte de
Piedad, 25 Phil. 42 "It is a basic rule of interpretation that words and
phrases
338 (1929); Greenfield v. 466 (1926); House vs. Posadas, 53 Phil. in the statute, in the absence of a clear legislative intent
Meer, 77 Phil. 394 (1946).
8Union Government Co., Inc. v.
Court of Tax
used
to the contrary, should be
31, 1962, 4 SCRA 304. Appeals, G.R. No. 16809, Jan. given their
plain, ordinary and com-
*Maceda v. Macaraeg, 197 SCRA 771 non usage or meaning. (Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. CA, 157
Surigao Consolidated Mining Co., Inc.(1991).
v. Collector of
SCRA 430 [1996), citing Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construc-
No. 14878, Dec. 26, Internal Revenue, G.
1963, 9 SCRA 728.
Jai Alai Corp. v. Court of
tion, second ed. [19901, 131)."
Tax Appeals, 106 Phil.
of Internal Revenue v. 345 (1959);
Commissioner Tax exemptions cannot be created by mere implication, but
Commissioner of InternalGuerrero, G.R. No. 28812,
Revenue v. Visayan Electric Sept. 22, 1967, 21 SCRA 150 ust be clearly provided by law. In case of doubt, non-exemption is
1968, SCRA 715.
23 Co., G.R. No. 22611, May 4,
favo Thus, where
"Song Kiat Chocolate
citing Cooly on Taxation, 4th Factory v. Central Bank, 102 Phil. 477, 480 (195
P.D. No. 1955 withdrew all tax exemptions,
02]03 SCAD ed., Vol. 2, p. 1303.
720, 303 SCRA 508 (1999).
35303 SCRA, p. 515.
STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTiON 305
304 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION B. Statutes Strictly Construed
not. exempt from payment of the tax, even though said

except those embodied in the Real Property Code, a farmers i no
acted as agent of the planter or farmer as a sort of

grants certain industries real estate tax exemptions
la iy
Estate Code, the intention to limit the under teh entity iation without making any profit from the transaction,
exemption to onla cOm es the word "directly" which means without any one
use
provided in the Code and to exclude those

prescribed in otho terveningin
for
the
the
in the
law
importation and the phrase "through their coop-

is clear, in keeping with the
principle of statutory constructio inter
as
the only exception." A company engaged in packaging
.
tax exemptions are construed

strictly against taxpayers and
and ea
cannot atives
fied p e t r o l eum
u m gas is not entitled to tax exemption under a
be granted by implication. iquennich provides that tax shall not be imposed against im-
statute which
Courts may not indulge in expansive construction of machiner nery and/or raw materiais to be used in "new
into the law an exemption not therein set forth. Whereand 1stry" and machinery, equipment and spare parts
o r t a t i o n
Port
necessary indust
a stae
has granted in express terms certain
exemptions, those aretatute use
of
"industries,
miners, mining enterprises, planters and
for ," because it is not embraced in the term "industries," the
only exemptions to be considered.5 To illustrate: Where ete
exempts from special import tax, equipment "tor use of far
meaning of of which is confined to those that tend to produce or
the exemption does not extend to those used in industrias create or manufacture are, such as those of miners, mining enterprises,
at retail in gasoline stations.8 A statute
dispensing gasoli lanters and farmers, and not to its ordinary and general signifi-
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
authorizing the holdin for ifthe
term is all-inclusive and meant industries in gen-
Ofice of horse races andDta cance,
eral, there would be no point in making a separate classification
viding that the "racing club holding these rçes shall be exemnt industries,100
to new and necessary
from the payment of any municipal or national"
tax" cannot ha with respect
construed to exempt the racing club from paying income tax Ttis also settled that, as the power of taxation is a high
an
rentals paid to it for use of the race tracks and other nrerogative of sovereignty, its relinquishment is never presumed
parapherna
lia, for what the law exempts refers only to those to be paid in and any reduction or diminution thereof with respect to its mode or
connection with said races. The constitutional provision exempt. its rate must
be strictly construed, and the same must be couched
ing from taxation charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or clear and unmistakable terms in order that it may be applied.
in
convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, and nonprofit
cemeteries For instance, where a law which grants a franchise to a communi-
and all lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and cation outfit to render communications services to end users and
exclusively used for religious or charitable purposes, refers only to provides that any statute granting more favorable terms to similar
exemption from payment of taxes assessed on such properties thus iranchise holders than that of the earlier law, such as reduced rate
enumerated, as property taxes, and not from all kinds of taxes," of tax on gross receipts, will equally apply to the first franchise
Where a statute provides that the tax provided therein shall not be holder, the fact that the latter franchise holder enjoying favorable
collected on foreign exchange used for the payment of "fertilizers tax rate is licensed to operate only as "carrier's carrier" and not to
when imported by planters or farmers directly or through their offer its services to end users preclude the first franchise holder
cooperatives," the importation of fertilizers by an entity which is from the favorable tax benefits the
enjoying of later franchisee, the
neither a planter nor a farmer nor a cooperative of planters or two franchise holders not being competitors, the purpose of the
most favored treatment clause" being to place competitors on equal
footing, and the subsequent statute being strictly construed."
Benguet Corporation v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, 210 SCKA
579 (1992).
No.
Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Acting Commissioner of Customs, G.R.
21841, Oct. 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 488.
sEsso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Acting Commissioner of Custonms, supra. La Carlota Sugar Central v. Jimenez, 112 Phil. 232 (1961).
v. Phil. Acetylene Co., G.R. No. 22443, May 29,
1971, Commissioner
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Manila Jockey Club, Inc., 98 Ph. o of Customs
39 SCRA 70.
(1956) Commissioner on Audit, 146 SCRA
Lladoe v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 19201, June 16, 190 190
90, . Telegraph & Telephone Corp. v.
14 SCRA 292.
306 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION 30
B. Statutes Stric1ly Construed
7.21. Qualification of rule.

ihts and interests are strictly construed. For this reason,
ish rights and
etatutes, no matter how broad their terms are, do not em

The rule that statutes granting tax exemptions Buch s t a t
1
are tobe unless the sovereign is
construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor the Bovereign, specifically mentioned.
of t , brace ess so specified, the government does not fall within
nilarly, unless
power is not absolute. Where the provision of the law ia eln any legislation. Thus, Presidential Decree No. 851
of an
unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the court seeb ang the
terms
requires "employers' to pay a thirteenth onth salary to

legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of which
receiving a basic compensation of not more than
addition or subtraction. For where the law provides no air employees
for the granting of tax exemption,
qualial of 000.00
P1,00
a month does not embrace the Republic of the Philippines,
the court is not at liha the law not having expressiy included it within its scope.
supply one.102 For instance, a tax-free product comprehenda
free materials,103 and an exemption from all taxes on
insl.
includes those on insulating oil.10% sulators 7.23. Statutes authorizing suits against the government.
sued
The for the rule of strict construction of a
reason The Constitution provides that the "State may not be
statute prns consent."This provision reaffirms the universal rule
ing exemption does not apply in the case of tax exemptione
tax without its
that the sovereign 18 exempt from suit, in the absence of its not be-
consent
favor of the government itself or its agencies. In such
case. t. form of statute to that effect,
practical effect of an exemption is merely to reduce the amount #0 be sued usually in the a
or absolute theory but on the logical
money that has to be handled by government in the course ofi cause of any formal conception
ground that there can be no legal right as against the
operations. For these reasons, provisions granting exemptions t and practical Nullum
gOvernment agencies may be construed liberally in favor of non, authority that makes the law on which the right depends. state or
to allow suits against the
liabilityof such agencies. It tepus occurrit regi."" Moreover,
has been held that in the
property owned by the state or a city or other public corporations
case any of its agencies,
without its consent or waiver, is to subject the
with
the express exemption should not be construed with the same d state to inconvenience and loss of governmental efficiency,
than those that arise if the doc-
gree of strictness that applies to exemptions contrary to policy of adverse results far greater may
is abandoned restricted.u For these rea-
the state, since as to such property exemption is the rule and trine of nonsuability or
is
a statute whereby the state gives its consent to be sued
taxation is the exception. Thus, the statute granting the National sons,
in
Power Corporation, which is a strictly construed, and the waiver of immunity.from suit, being a
government instrumentality, exemp
tion from all forms of taxes is liberally construed, following which derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred.2 justify
To
such exemption from "all forms of taxes" embraces exemption not

only from direct but also from indirect taxes,105
106Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Iabor and Emploment,
G.R. No. 60403, Aug. 3, 1983.
7.22. Statutes concerning the sovereign. 101Chief Justice Fernando concurring, Alliance of Government
Workers v. Min-
ister of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 60403, Aug. 3, 1983.
It is an old rule of statutory construction that restrictive sta
0Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment,
utes which impose burdens on the public treasury or which dim G.R. No. 60403, Aug. 3, 1983. See Angat River Irrigation System v. Angat
River
Workers' Union, 102 Phil. 789 (1957).

109Art. XVI, Sec. 3, Constitution.
54 SCRA 83;
Republic v. Villasor, G.R. No. 30671, Nov. 28, 1973,
10Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G. hawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 51 L. ed. 834 (1907).
25602, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 520; Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Elen G.R. No. 26386, Sept. 30, 1969,
Co., G.R. No. 23623, June 30, 1977, 77 SCRA 469. PTovidence Washington Ins. Co. v. Republic, G.R. No. 27389, March
598; Switzerland General Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Republic,
uRepublic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G..
No. 4SSCRA P'aredes, 79 Phil. 819 (1948).
, 1970, 32 SCRA 227; Metropolitan Transp. Service v.
25602, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 620. inc. Customs Arrastre Service, G.R. No. 23139,
June Mobil Phil. Exploration, v.
Inc. v. Smith, Beli &
04Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. 23523,
1977, 77 SCRA 469.
Ins. & Casualty Co.,
1 9 6 6 , 18 SCRA 1127; Equitable 1967, 20 SCRA I121.
0Maceda v. Macaraeg, 197 SCRA 771 (1991).
0.
(Phils.), ine., G.R. No. 24383, Ang. 26,
STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
308 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION B. Statutes 309
Strictly Construed
dispense wit} ith such requirements.For in

suit against the state or any of its agencies, the statute confas to the formal construing statutory pro-
the right to maintain the action must be plain and positiv
the erring in regard requisites of a will, the court is
ngnt sitive, andi gions
Beeking to ascertai and apply the intent of
the legislators and not
meaning should not be left to doubt,
Thus, the law
authorizin he and the
the Bureau of Customs, an agency of the government, to la horizing that o
L
fthe testator,
the non-obser ce
latter's intention is frequently defeated
of what the statute
requires."
arrastre operations, proprietary function necessarily
a
incident
its governmental function, may not be construed to mean
that Exceptions and provisos,
state has consented to be sued, when it undertakes to
cond
nduct 725.
arrastre services itself, for damage to cargo,
As a rule, exceptions should be strictly but reasonably con
they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants,
The rule
establishing immunity from suit may not
state strue
De
circumvented by directing the action against the officers of tha and
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision
state instead of against the state itself. In such cases, the
ther than thee exceptions.Where a general rule is established by
states rath
statute with eexceptions, the court will not curtail the former nor
immunity may be validly invoked against the action as long as it o the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express
can be shown that the suit really affects the property,
rights, or
eption excludes all others,
exception exclud
although it is always proper in deter
interests of the state and not merely those of the oficer
nominally of this rule to inquire whether, in the
made party defendant, iL
mining the applicability
it accords with and
t
narticular case, reason justice. 11s
Even if the state consents, by law, to be sued, strict
tion thereof requires that the law should not be
construc The rule on execution pending appeal must be strictly con-
interpreted to sirued being an exception to the general rule. Applying this rule on
authorize garnishment of public funds to satisfy a judgment
against statutory construction, it should be interpreted only so far as the
the government, or the issuance of a writ of execution
against language thereof fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved
vernment property. Basic considerations of public forbid policy it. in favor of the general rule rather than the exceptions.19
Disbursement of public funds must be covered by the
correspond- Similarly, a statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions
ing approprintion as required by law. The furictions and public
service rendered by the state cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or to the requirement of warrant of arrest or search warrant must be
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and strictly construed. It cannot be construed liberally to extend ar-
specific objects, as appropriated by law. rests or seizures without warrant beyond the cases specifically pro-
vided or allowed by law. To do so would infringe upon personal
liberty and set back a basic right.120
7.24. Statutes prescribing formalities of will.
A preference is an exception to the general rule and it is what
Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed implies. By it, one person is given a superior right
or
in the ex- its name
ecution of wills are strictly construed. This means that a will must claim over the other. For this reason, the law as to preference
be executed in accordance with the
statutory requirements, other- should be strictly construed.21
wise it is entirely void. And the court can neither
suspend nor
Morata, 54 Phil. 481

Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Government, 45 Phil. 663 Uy Coque v. Siosa, 43 Phil. 405 (1922); Quinto v.
(1924). (1930). Commis-

C.J. Sec. 643;
Mobil Phil. Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Salaysay v. Castro, 98 Phil. 364 (1956), citing 69
Dec. 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 1120. Service, G.R. No. 23139, sioner of Internal Revenue v. CA, 103 SCAD 720, 303 SCRAU
317 SCRA 195 (1999), citing
1Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. lanters P'roducts, Inc. v. CA, 114 SCAD 886,
24548, Oct. 27, 125 SCRA 302.
16Republic v. Villasor, G.R. No. 30671, Nov. 28, 1983, gpalo, R., Statutory Construetion, 1986 ed., p. 224
Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, G.R. No. 30098, Feb.5418,SCRA
1973, 1970, 83;
31 SCRA 140 (1999).
SCRA 616 (1970). Cople v. Valdez, 104 SCAD 651, 304
Ramun v. Herridge, 47 Phil. 98 (1924).
310 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION gTRICT OR LIBERAL
C.
CONSTRUCTION
Statutes Liberally
Construe
Construed 311
A proviso should be
free fro doubt.2 Thus, where the law
interpreted consistently with the
lan grants
tive intent. In
attempt
an determine the legislative
to of holiduy pay except those therein employees
the ben-
proviso should be strictly construed. The reason is that intent elfits
es, whet monthly
peid or
rot, who are enumerated,
all
employ-
tive purpose set forth in the the leui cpted are entitle. the holiday pay, in not
among those ex-
general enactment expresses the l that all doubts the
all doubts in consonance with the prin-
lative policy and only those expressly
exempted by the proviso shosda
be freed from the operation of the statute.12 ould
tciple
h eLabor Code ole shall be resolved in favorimplementation
and
of labor and interpretation
of
tion t h a t the legislature intended to the
which would have the most
enact a valid and presump
C.
s t a t u t e
beneficial effect that its lan- permanent

STATUTES LIBERALLY CONSTRUED g u a g e p e r m i t s . 129
Las also been held that

"in
7.26. General social Code's provisions
the Labor Cod and its
carrying out and interpreting
legislation. implementing
Statutes which have been enacted to
workingm
an's welfare should be the regulations, the
primordial and paramount
implement the social consideration.
This kind of interpretation
justice andprotection-to-labor provisions of the Constitution ara the liberal and
gives meaning and sub-
known as general welfare legislations. These statutes are
construed
ance to compassionate spirit of the law as
vided for in rticle 4 of the New Labor Code which states pro-
liberally. In the interpretation of general welfare legislations, the ahts in the that 'all
courts will be guided by more than just an inquiry into the letter
the law as against its spirit and will ultimately resolve any doubi
of abor implementation and interpretation of the
Code including its implementing rules and provisions
shall be resolved in favor of iabor."i30
regulations
in favor of the persons whom the law intended to benefit. For it is
only by giving such statutes a liberal construction that the consti The rule that labor
and social welfare
tutional mandale concerning the promotion of social justice to en- kherally construed legislation should be
in favor of the laborer is based
on the
sure the well-being and economic security of the people and the that the statute is ambiguous. The liberal construction and
premise
protection to labor may be better realized.123 inter
Dretation does not apply where the labor and social legislation is
General welfare legislations which are construed liberally clear and leaves no room for
interpretation, in which case the law
include labor laws,124 tenancy laws,126 land reforn lawsl28 and has to be applied without construction 131
social security laws,127 However, while general welfare legis-
lations are construed liberally in favor of those intended to be 7.27. General welfare clause.
benefited, this principle holds true only when there is doubt or
The general welfare clause on the power of local
ambiguity in the law and not when the law itself is clear and government
has two branches. One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of
municipal authority and relates to such ordinances and regulations
a8 may be
12Salaysay v. Castro, 98 Phil. 364 (1956), citing Sutherland, Statutory Con necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred
struction, 3rd ed., Vol. 2, pp. 471-472. upon local legislative bodies by law. The sec-
123Alfanta v. Noe, G.R. No. 32362, Sept. 19, 1973, 53 SCRA 76; Hidalgo
v. Ond branch is much more
Phil.
independent of the specific functions
Hidalgo, G.R. No. 25326, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 105; Maniego v. Castelo, 101 enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem
293 (1957).
124Villavert v. Employees' Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 48605, Dec.
1980,
14, 1981, 110 SCRA 233; Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 47750, Feb. 29,
96 SCRA 448.
125Sibulo v. Altar, 83 Phil. 513. (1949). amayo v. Manila Hotel Co., 101 Phil. 810
(1957)
"Insular Bank of Asia & merica Employees' Union v. Inciong, 132 SCRA
126David v. Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 114 (1988).
Vicente v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 18241, Dec. 27, 3red Bank Employees Assn. v. Ople, 138 SCRA 273 (1985).
1963, 9 SCRA 825; Phil. Assn. of Government Retirees, Ine. v. Government Servic Hanila Electric Co. v. NLRC, 175 SCRA 277, 283 (1989).
Insurance System, G.R. No. 20503, June 30, 1966, 14 SCRA 610; Internationa Corporal v. Employees mpensation Commission, 54 SCAD 243, 235 SCRA
165 (1994).
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 205 SCRA 59 (1992).
312 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION 313
C. Statutes Iiberally Construed
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safet. The rule of construction changed with the enactment of Re
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act.
good order, co mote lic Act No.
convenience of the local government unit and the pubi12 of said Act provides in part that the "implied power ofa
and for the protection of property therein.12
inhabitanto n inhabitants thereot, Sect
rovince,
a city oor a municipality shall be liberally construed in its
fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the
The general welfare clause should be pr Any
construed liberal. favorshould be interpreted in favor of the local goverument and it
favor of the local government
units. It should be so interno ed to exist."1 This liberal construction is fortified
hall b e presumed
in case of doubt, as to give more sha
itution. "The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is to
powers to local governmon by t h e Constitu
promoting the economic condition, social welfare, and mata he fullest autonomy
wards the
of local government units. In the Dec
progress of the people in the community.* An 1aterial laration of Principles and State icies, it is stated that: "The
would limit the general welfare clause to such interpretation that A shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government
tions only as are without governmental fn state
the barrio, to ensure their fullest development as
proprietary aspects would thereby o nits especially
conmmunities." To this end, the Constitution directs the
cripple local governments in the face of the very evils that ad self-relia
clause intended to remedy. The
general welfare clause is elasti National Assembly
to
enact a local government code which may
and must be
responsive to various social conditions; it is not con. ot thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its mem-
fined within the narrow and accountable locai government
circumscription of precedents resting on hers, defining a more responsive
past conditions; it must follow the legal progress etfective system of recall, allocating among the
of a atructure with an
way of life. The very essence of the general welfare clausedemocratic
requires different local governments their powers, responsibilities, and re-
election and removal,
that it be-given a liberal
construction.15 sources and providing for their qualifications,
and duties and operation of the
term, salaries, powers, functions,
local units,'and empowered local government units 'to create its
7.28. Grant of power to local to limitations
governments. own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject as
The trend with respect to the by law."139

powers of municipal corpora may be provided
tions is from a limited
self-government to full autonomy. The inter
Following the constitutional mandate, the Batasang Pambansa
pretation of statutes affecting local governments follows such trend, enacted the Local Government Code, which provides in Section
4
from striet to liberal
interpretation. The old rule is that municipal thereof that "any power of a barangay, municipality, city or prov-
corporations, being mere creatures of the law, have only such pow- ince shall be liberally construed in its favor. Any fair and reason-
ers as are
expressly granted to them and those which are necessar- able doubt as to the exercise of power shall be interpreted in favor
ily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof,136 and that of the local government unit concerned." "The general welfare pro-
of power to them are to be construed grants
vision of this Code shall be liberally interpreted so as to give more
be resolved in favor of the national strictly
and any doubt should
social
government and against the power to local governments in promoting the economic uplift,
political subdivision concerned.137 in the community."
welfare and material progress of the people
Section 5 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
"In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the
13Phil. Long Distance
Telephone Co. following rules shall apply:
30, 1965, 15 SCRA 244.
v. City of Davao, G.R. No. 23080, Ue
a local government
Ortigas Co., Ltd. v. Feati Bank & Trust Co., G.R. No. 24670, Dec.
& a) Any provision on a power of
1979, 94 SCRA 533; Proctor & Gamble 14, unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of
PMC v. Municipality of Jagna, G.N.
24265, Dec. 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 894. *
134Sec. 12, Rep. Act No.
2264; Sec.
6Phil. Long Distance Tel. Co. v. 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337.
15 SCRA 244. City of Davao, G.R. No. 196
23080, Oct. 30, 1 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 599.
138
ee Llanto v. Dinaporo, G.R. No. 21905, March
City of Misamis 52304, Jan. 28, 1980, 95 SCRA
v.
Lumpas, G.R. No. 30727, G.R. No.
13Quimsing Lachica,
v.
112 Phil. 110 (1961).
July 15, 1975, 65 SCRA 33. 7 771.
763, 770, za v. Commission on Elections,
314
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION sTRICT OR LIBERAL
C. CONSTRUCTION
Statutes Iiberully
Construed 315
doubt, question thereon shall rstant to the strict

any
lution of powers and of the be resolved in hus oT to local construction of
legislative
lower local
fair and reasonable doubt as to
favor of.
government unit devo
of axing power
Constituti0n became
hecame effect
governinents
effective, the proviso in prevailing grant
before the new
shall be interpreted in favor of the existence of the nny statute
a
the local
nothi
in said la
law shall be
construed to providing
cerned; government unitpower
o
that
vehiclefrom the payment of any lawful and exempt any motor
con tax equitable
inposed therein will not, insular, local,
r mun icipalrate to
prope
b) In case of doubt, any tax confer
to confer by said provi
ure shall be ordinance or alone,
operate upon a city or
municipality
construed strictly against the localrevenue meas go
to levy property tax on motor vehicles kept in the city or the power
unit enacting it, and
liberally in favor of the governmeni should be a
specilic laW on the municipal-
exemption, incentive or relief granted by taxpayer. Any tav ity matier before it can so
any local tax.
142
of this Code govern,
ment unit
pursuant theto
construed strictly against theprovisions shal h The le that statutes granting local
governments the power
person claiming it; are to be astrictly construed is
"(c) The general welfare ofttaxation
a. based on the concept that
provisions in this Code shall be local overnments, unlik the sovereign state, are allocated with no
liberally interpreted to give more powers to local herent power to tax. The new Constitution has
units in accelerating
economic government provides that "Each localchanged
Constitut such
the quality of life for the development and upgrading concept. 1he
government
people in the community; unit shall have
the power to create its own sources of
revenue and
"(d) Rights and obligations ka levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limi-
existing on the date of
effectivity of this Code and arising out of contracts or any tations as the ongress may provide, consistent with the basic
source of prestation involving a local other nolicy of local autonomy. The clear implication of this provision
government unit shall be is that statutes prescribing limitations on the taxing power of local
governed by the original terms and conditions of said contracts
or the law in force at the time such government units must be strictly construed against the national
rights were vested; and
"e) In the resolution of controversies arising under this
gOvernment and liberally in favor of the local government units,
and any doubt as to the existence of the taxing power will be
Code where no legal provision or jurisprudence applies, resort
resolved in favor of the local government.
may be had to the customs and traditions in the place where
the controversies take place."140
7.30. Statutes prescribing prescriptive period to collect
taxes.
7.29. Statutes granting taxing power.
Statutes preseribing the period of limitation of action for the
Before the 1973 Constitution took effect on January 17, 1973,
collection of taxes is beneficial both to the government and its
the rule is that a local government unit, unlike the sovereign state,
is clothed with no inherent power of taxation. The charter or stat CL12ens; to the government because tax officers would be obliged to
ute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the city or act promptly in the making of assessnent, and to citizens because
aer the lapse of the period of prescription, citizens would have a
municipality cannot assume it. And the taxing power when granted
is to be construed strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising eling of security against unscrupulous tax agents who will always
find
out of the terms used in granting that power must be resolved a
excuse to inspect the books of taxpayers, not to
atter's real liability, but to take advantage of every opportu
determine
against the local government unit. Inferences, implications, and
deductions have no place in the interpretation of the taxing power t o molest peaceful, law-abiding citizens. The laws on preserip-
tàon should be interpreted liberally
in a
fa municipal corporation." a remedial measure
140Sec. 5, Rep. Act No. 7160.

Icard v. City Council of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870 (1949); City of Iloilo v. Villanueva,
ard v.
City of Council of Baguio, 83 I'hil. 870 (1949).
105 Phil. 337 (1959); Cu Unjieng v. Patstone, 42 Phil. 818 (1922). Art. X, Sec. 5, 1987 Constitution.
STRICT OR LIBERAL
316 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION C. Statutes CONSTRUCTION
Liberally 317
Construed
Generally speak election laws may be
way conducive to bringing about the beneficial purpose of affordin. divided into three
ding parts for purposes
plying the rules of statutory
a r t refers proVisions for the conductconstruction.
protection to the taxpayers.144 to the
The
of
which
elect officials are
foilow. The second elections
required to
those provisions whin candidates part cov-
7.31. Statutes imposing penalties for nonpayment of tax, t for office are
Statutes imposing penalties for nonpayment of taxes within
ird
erform. The thiro part embraces those procedural rulesrequired to
which are
esigned to
ascertain in case of dispute, the actual winner in the
the required period are liberally construed in favor of the goven Diflerent rules
and canons of
ment and strictly observed and interpreted against the taxpayer
elections,
of the election law,

statutory construction gov.
Strong reasons of publie policy support this rule. Such laws are em such provisions
intended to hasten tax payments or to punish evasions or neglect of The rules and regulations for the conduct of
elections are
duty in respect thereto. If delays in tax payment are to be con- mandatory betore the election, but when it is sought to enforce
doned for light reasons, the laws imposing penalties for delinquen- ehem after the elections they are held to be directory only, if that is
cies would be rendered nugatory, and the maintenance of the gov. nOssible, especially where, 1f they are held to be mandatory, inno-
ernment and its multifarious activities would be precarious, ag ent voters will be deprived of their votes, without any fault on
taxpayers are willing or unwilling to. pay their obligations to the their part."146 Generally, "the provisions of a statute as to the man-
state in time. The imperatives of publie welfare will not approve of ner of conducting the details of an election are not mandatory, but
this result.145 directory merely, and irregularities in conducting an election and
counting the votes, not proceeding from any wrongful intent and
Similarly, while courts will not construction, the
enlarge, by
government's power of taxation, they will not place upon tax lawa
which deprives no legal voter of his vote, will not vitiate an election
or justify the rejeclion of the entire votes of a precinct."4 "The
so loose a construction as to permit evasions on merely fanciful and
various and numerous provisions of the election law are adopted to
insubstantial distinctions. When proper, a tax statute should be
assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the govern-
construed to avoid the possibilities of tax evasions. Construed this
ment, and not to defeat that object. When the voters have honestly
way, the statute, without resulting in injustice to the taxpayer,
becomes fair to the government146 cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified sinply because
the officers appointed, under the law to direct the election and
guard the purity of elections, have not done their duty. The law
7.32. Election laws. provides a remedy, by criminal action, against them. They should
Election laws should be reasonably and liberally construed to De prosecuted, and the will of the honest voter, as expressed through
achieve their purpose - to effectuate and safeguard the willoftne
is ballot, should be protected and upheld."10 For "innocent voters
electorate in the choice of their representatives f o r the applicatio should not be deprived of their participation in the affairs of their oftic-
of election laws involves public interest and imposes upon the Com ment for mere irregularities on the part of the election
rs, for which they are in no way responsible. A different rule
mission on Elections and the courts the imperative duty to ascer or
tain by all means within their command who is the real candidate OBreaternake the manner and method of performing a publie duty
importance than the duty itsel."151
elected by the people.147
election law which
candidates for office
are provisions of the Thus,
required comply are generally regarded as mandatory.
14Republic v. Ablaza, 108 Phil. 1105 (1960).
14Jamora v. Meer, 74 Phil. 22 (1942).
14Lorenzo v. Posadas, 64 Phil. 393 (1937). 4SLino Luna vs. Rodrigue 39 Phil. 208, 214
(1918).
OIbid. at pp.
214-216.
basco vs. Ilao, 110 Phil. 553 (1960); Purisima vs. Salonga, 15 SCKA 704 1507bid. at p. 218.
(1966); Miro vs. COMELEC, 121 SCRA De Guzman
716 (1965);
SCRA 466 (1982). 466 (1983); Rodriguez vs. COMLE 1311bid. vs. Tero,
15 SCRA
Vs.
Board of
at pp. 214-215; Lambo
Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211 (1925).
STRICT OR LIBERAL
318
C. CONSTRUCTION
Statutes Liberally
Construed 319
the provisions prescribing the qualifications of candidates. ra. tonly

no the free and
in any
way
election b u t .
intelligent
also the correct ascertainment of casting of votes in an
ing the filing of certificates of candidacy,2 defining election ofte the results
and iimiting the period within which to file election contests,nsea,
r For election ontest does not merely concern the thereof.
are
mandatory and failure to comply with such provisions are fatal andidates for an oifice. Over
and
personal interests
Moreover. where the law provides that a departure from the
thethe
of deep public hlic interest involved, the need toabove their claims is
pre. the correct expre of the will of the imperatively deter-
scribed form or statutory requirement will be tatal, such law ia electorate. Hence, a
a p p l i c a t i o n of t law that wili
mandatory. rigid
will
preclude the court from ascer
taining the popular should be rejected in favor of a liberal
The provisions of the election iaw designed to determine the thereof that will subserve such
construction
end.t Conversely, where

will of the electorate are liberally construed. The courts frown upon gid and strict application and
enforcement of provisions of the
any interpretation that would hinder in any way not only the free laetion law will safeguard popular will and prevent
and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the f Suffrage and the mandate ot the majority, the provisions transgression
correct ascertainment of the results thereof.153 Technical and proce given strict construction.162
will be
dural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an
obstacle in the choice cf their elective oficials.1 The laws and statutes governing election contests, especially
aDDreciation of baliots, must be liberally construed to the end that
Election laws intended to safeguard thewill of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be
the will of the people in
their choice of their representatives should be construed
liberally defeated by technical intirmities. Generally, the provisions of the
to achieve such purpose.155 Courts should accordingly
interpret elec- election law regarding certificates of candidacy, such as signing
tion laws in such a way as to give effect to the express will of the and swearing on the same, as well as the information required to
electorate. 16s For the application of election laws involves public be stated therein, are considered mandatory
interest and imposes upon the courts the imperative duty to ascer prior to the elections
and thereafter are regarded as merely
tain by all means within their command who is the real candidate
directory, in favor of the
candidate who obtains the majority vote, so as to give ellect to the
elected by the people. 157
will of the electorate. For where a candidate has received
popular
One of such laws is the law governing election mandate, overwhelmingly and clearly expressed, all possible doubts
should be liberaliy construed to the end that the
protests, which should be resolved in favor of the candidate's eligibility, for to rule
popular will ex
pressed in the election of public officers will not, by reason of purely otherwise is to defeat the will of the electorate.
technical objections, be defeated.158 Technicalities should not be sanc-
tioned when it will be an obstacle in the determination of the true 7.33.
will of the electorate in the choice of Amnesty proclamations.
public officials.159 The court
frowns upon any interpretation of election laws
that would render Amnesty proclamations should be liberally construed so as to
af ut their purpose, which is to encourage the return to the fold
of the
law of
those who have veered from the law. Hence, in case of
doubt 4s to whether within the aminesty proc
152Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208 certain persons come
(1918).
10Rodriguez vs. COMELEC, 119 SCRA 465.
04 Ginete Arcangel, SCRA 1178; Juliano vs. Court of Appeals,
vs. 21 20
808. > ****
166 basco v. Ilao, 110 Phil. 553 (1960). 119

Purisimu v. Salonga, G.R. No.
22335, Dec.
SCRA Rodriguez
465. Commission v. on Elections, G.R. Noa. 61545,
Dec. 27, 1982,
basco v. llao, 110 Phil. 553 (1960); De Leon31,v. Gundiz,

1965, 15 SCRA 704.
Ct.R. No. 56922,
Je Leon v. 1981, 104 SCRA 591;
Maquinay
26, 1981, 104 SCRA 951.
eza, G.R. No. Guadiz, G.R. No. 55922, May 22,
5"Miro v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 57574, April See 54230, Oct 30, 1980, 100 SCRA 702 (19801.
20, 1983. Acu
16*Macasundig v. Maenlangan, G.R. No. 22779, March 1966,
v.v.(COMELEC
Golez,122 Phil. 1129 (1966).
De Leon v, Gundiz, 31, 13 SCIs617% Punz" 289 SCRA 702 (1998).
supra.
14Sina
4,259 SCRA
V.
Mula, 315 SCRA 266 (1999); Rodriguez
v. COAIELEC, 72 CAD
296, 318 (1996).

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION STRICT OR LIBERAL
LiberallyCONSTRUCTION
320
C. Statutes ON
Construed 321
lamation, the doubt should be resolved in their favor and aat T.36. Adoption statutes.
the state. 166
statutes construed
tion statutes are
Adoption
Amnesty and pardon are synonymous, and for this reason to be ad d. This construction is in
liberally in favor of the child
grant of pardon should likewise be construed liberally in fayae that adoption statutes, being consonance
humane
with the liberal
those pardoned and strictly against the state, for where two War of t h einterest
and welfare of the child and salutary, hold
re designed to provide to be of paramount considera-
tion a n d a r e
are synonymous, the rules for interpreting one will
apply to t e tionfor the unfortunate, needy or
homes, parental care and educa
o t h e r 166
orphaned
etion society and family in the children and
the protection of
couples or persons person
Such laws allow. ildless of the
to
adopter.
7.34. Statutes prescribing preseriptions of erimes.
of parenth and give them legally a child in
experience the joys
the person of the
A statute of limitation or prescription of offenses is in dopted for the anifestation their natural
of
nature of an amnesty granted by the state, declaring that after
tha tion statutes are
accordingly given a liberal parental instincts.
a
certain time, oblivion shall be cast over the offense. Hence, statutes t o promote the noble and interpretation
of limitations are liberally construed in favor of the accused, not onlv law,69
compassionate objectives of the
because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty
and grace, but because the very existence of the statute is a recogni. Veteran and pension laws.
7.36.
tion and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, whileit
gradually wears out proofs and innocence, has assigned to it fixed Veteran and pension laws are enacted to
and positive poriods in which it destroys proofs of ilt." of men who suftered in the service for the compensate a class
and the dangers they encountered in line of
hardships they endured
Thus, in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, duty. are They
that which is most favorable to the accused is to be adopted. In
sion of gratitude to and recognition of those who rendered expres-
service
to the country by extending to them
accordance with this rule, the date from which prescription must regular monetary benefit. For
these reasons, such statutes are construed
commence under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which states their noble
liberally to the end that
that 'the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day purpose is best accomplished.70 Thus, where a statute
the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or grants pension benefits to warveterans, except those who "are
their agents should be construed, insofar as crimes of falsification actually receiving a similar pension from other government funds,"
the phrase
of public documents which are registered with the Registry of Deeds "government funds" refers to funds of the same govern-
ment and does not
preclude war veterans receiving similar pen-
are concerned, must be reckoned from the time the document is
registered and not from the time the crime is discovered, registra-
Sions from the United States
Government from enjoying the ben-
ents therein
tion being constructive notice to the whole world. The
a provided.171 And where a veteran pension law is silent
application asto the effectivity of pension awards, it shall be construed to take
of the rule on constructive notice in the construction of Art. 91 of
the Revised Penal Code would be favorable to the accused since eltect from the date it becomes due and not from the date the
the cation for pension is approved, so as to grant the pensioner
prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned witn Te
earlier, i.e., from the time the notarized deed was recorded in the benefits and to inaction on the part of the officials
discourage
Registry of Deeds.68
1aPeople Gojo, 84 Phil. 107 (1949); Tolentino v. Catoy, 82 Phil. 300 (1945
v.
10
Court of Malkinso
Duncan
G.R. No. 36309, Nov. 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 66;
v.
6Tolentino
v. Catoy, 82 Phil. 300
v. Agr
grava,
(1948) First Inst of Rizal, G.k. No. 30576, Feb. 10, 1976, 69
SCRA 293.
6People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 387 (1923); Yapdiangco v. Buencamino, G.R. li0 stance G.R. No. S7HUr,
28841, June 24, 1983; Francisco v. Court 1
Administrators, Phil. Veterans Adm. v. Bautista,
People v. Doque, 212 SCRA 607 (1992). of Appeals,
G.R. No. 45674, May 30, 10 9
27299,22,June
Administration, G.R No.
1982, 112 SCRA 59;!Del Mar Phil. Veterans
v.
166People Reyes, 175 SCRA 597 (1989).

v. 27, 197:3, 51 SCRA 340 (1973).
Del Mnr v. Phil. eterans Adninistration, aupra.
sTRICT OR LIBERAL
322
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION C. CGNSTRUCTION
Statutes Liberally 323
Construed
cali of the President
to the
who administer the law.72
However, while veteran or
i n r e s p o n s e
following the EDSA Revolution

Applyingthe liberal approach, the
are to be construed liberally, they should be pension lawa a c c e p t e e d .
Supreme Court ruled

so construed as t
is
reutance his courtesy resignation
t h a t t h e acce
of
prevent a
person from
receiving double pension or compensation. ot his term s o : to entitle him
to all
resulted in the
unless the law provides otherwise.73
Completion
that the "c
courtesy resignation" retirement benefits.
held is not
Retirement or pension laws are also liberally construed.
It
ion of law because the act resignation
iacked the clear
in
intention to
c o n t e m p l a t i o n
remedial in character, a statute Being ender his position and was a mere
creating pension or establishing manifestation of submission
retirement plan should be liberally construed and
administered in to the will
of the political authority and appointing power. It added
favor of the persons intended to be benefited the curtailment of his term
thereby. The liberal being not attributable to any
approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law ntary act on his part, equity and justice demand
that he
order that the efficiency, security and
well-being of government
in
be deemed
to have completed his term, albeit much ahead of theshould
date
employees may be enhanced.174 ated in his appoint paper, similar to that of an official
confider
primarily position whose tenure ends upon holding
The Court in Santiago v. Commission on Audit175 his
the reasons why retirement laws are explained Buperior's loss of confidence in him.
the retirees: "Retirement laws should be

liberally construed in favor of
interpreted liberally in InIn Re Application for Gratuity Benefits of
favor of the retiree because their intention is Associate Justice
to provide for suste- Efren I. Plana," the issue raised is whether Justice Plana is enti
nance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no tled to gratuity and retirement pay when, at the time his courtesy
longer has the
stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the best resignation was accepted following the EDSA revolution and estab-
years of his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation lishment of a revolutionary government under the Freedom Consti-
of a grateful government as best concretely tution on March 25, 1986, he lacked a few months to meet the
expressed in a generous age
retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his requirement for retirement under the law but had accumulated a
service. That generosity is the least he should expect now that his number of leave credits which, if added to his
work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness age at the time,
would exceed the age requirement. The
in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shad- Supreme Court, applying
the liberal approach, ruled that Justice Plana was
entitled to full
ows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his retirement benefits under the law because his accrued leave credits
task well, and was rewarded for it." would have entitled him to go on leave until well
beyond the age
In Ortiz v. Commission on Elections,1"" the question raised is requirement for retirement and thereafter he could have been enti-
whether a commissioner of the Commission on Elections is deemed tled to retire. It noted that in the executive branch, where a public
to have completed his term and entitled to full retirement benefits officer who has accumulated a
number of leave credits which, if
under the law which grants him five-year lump sum gratuity and added to his length of service, would qualify him to meet the length-
thereafter lifetime pension, who "retires from the service after having o-9ervice requirement to retire, failed to serve the required length
completed his term of office," when his courtesy resignation submitted Service for reasons beyond his control, such as physical disabil
leath or government reorganization, he would be entitled to
lhoreirement benefits under the law, in accordance with the
7Boardof Administrators Veterans Adm. ». Bautista, G.R. No. 37867, Feb. Deral
22, 1982, 112 SCRA 59. interpretation of retirement statutes.
Chavez Mathay, G.R. No. 29311, Feb. 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 776; Legaspi
v. v
stated It
doctrine.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 36153, Nov. 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 253; Borroneo V.
Government Service Insurance System, 110 Phil. 1 (1960).
tated that re Pineda,"78 the "when in the
Court clarified the Plana
liberal construction the Court
interest of
174Ortiz v. Commission on Elections, 162 CRA 812 (1988); Borromeo v.
199 SCRA 911 (1991); In Re Judge CSU
Reyes, 216 SCRA 728 (1992).
SCRA 125, 133 (1991); see also Lopez v. Court 215 SCRA
199 of Appeals,
614 (1992).
176]62 SCRA 812 (1988).
Adminiatrative Matter No. 5460, Supreme
24, 1988, see. rative
173 SCRA
Court Resolution dated Alarch
421 (1989).
B. Britanico,
S187 SCRA
469, 475 (1990).
STRICT OR LIBERAL
C. CONSTRUCTION
Statutes Literally 325
Construed
allows seeming exceptions to fixed rules" on retirement, "thera that

all be
"old-age pension shal
paid to a member who"
ar ended by appropriate "unless service
horities, retirement shall
ample reasons behind each grant of an exception. The creditina
be
accumulated leaves to make up required age or
for lack of length
for an enmpioyee of sixty-five years of
age with at
compul
sory
Tvice: Provided, That it he has less ieast fifte r

service is not done indiscriminately." "There must bo present of years offs
than
an he shall be allowed to fifteen years of
essential factor before an application under Plana or
the Britani rice,
servi continue in the service to
rulings may be granted. The Court allows a making up or compen the fifteen
On the other hand, Civil
years." O complete
Circular No. 27, series of 1990,
Service Meorandum
sating for iack of required age or service only if satisfied that th provides in part that
career of the retiree was marked by competence, integrity, and for
extension of
compulsory retirees to complete the"Any request
fifteen (15)
dedication io the public service." rs service requirement for retirement shal!
be allowed only to
rmapent appointees in the career service who are
in In re Martin,173
the issue raised is whether a justice of
the rs of the Government Service Insurance System regular mem-
Supreme Court, who availed of the disability retirement
benefits L ranted for a period not exceeding one {1) (GSIS), and shall
pursuant to the
provision that "if the reason for the retirement be year." In resolving the
.issue in the afiirmative and declaring CSC
any permanent disability contracted during his incumbency in of.
fice and prior to the date of retirement he shall receive No. 27, series of 1990, unconstitutional, the Memorandum Circular
Supreme Court ruied:
only a
gratuity equivalent to ten years 'salary and allowances aforemen- "Being remedial in character, a statute
tioned with no further annuity payable monthly during the rest sion creating a pen-
of
or
establishing
retirement plan should be
the retiree's natural life," is entitled to a monthly
lifetime pension strued and administered in favor of the personsliberally con-
intended to
after the ten-year period. Following.the liberal be benefited thereby. The liberal
interpretation of approach aim3 to achieve the
retirement laws, the Court ruled that "if at the time of retirement humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the
he was already entitled to retire under Section 1 of R.A. No. 910 security and well-being of government employees may efficiency,
and to receive his 5-year lump be en-
sum plus a lifetime pension after hanced." "There is thus no justifiable reason in not allowing
five years, his having applied for ordinary employees in the Executive Branch on a case to case
disability retirement under Section
3 of the law in order that he
may receive the 10-year lump sum basis, to continue in the service to complete the
gratuity, should not result in the forfeiture of his right to a lifetime ice requirement to avail of the 15-year serv-
pension if he should still be alive after ten (10) years from his old-age pension under Section
retirement." "The ten-year lump sum
11 of P.D. No. 1146. By limiting the extension of service to
3 of R.A. No. 910 is intended to assist
payment provided in Section only one (1) year would defeat the beneficial intendment of
the stricken retiree in meeting the retirement provisions of PD. No. 1146." "There is nothing
his hospital and doctors' bills and expenses for his
support. The law in the
original text as well as in the revised version which
is not intended to
deprive him of his lifetime pension if he is also Would serve as basis for
alive after ten years. The retirement
law aims to assist the retire providing the allowable extension
in his old age, not to period to only one (1) year. There is likewise no indication
punish him for having survived."
that Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. No. 1146 contemplates a
in Cena u. Civil Service
whether or not a government
Commission, 180 the issue raised 3 Dorderline situation where a compulsory retiree on his 65th
employee who has reached the com"
pulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who has rendered 11
Drthday has completed more than 14, but less than 15 years
9months and 6 days of years, government service, i.e., only a few months short of the l5-
continue in the service to government service, may
be allowed ear requirement which would enable him to collect an old-
to enable him to complete the 15-year service requirem pension." "The Civil Service Memorandum Circular No.
retire with the benefits of an
under Section 11, old-age pens h g in the nature of an administrative regulation must
par. (b) of PD. No. 1146. Said section
prov overned by the principle that administrative regulations
Thed under legislative authority by a particular department
178187 SCRA 477, 482
(1990).
hoDe in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should
be for
1A0211 SCRA 179 (1992). the sole purpose of
effect its general
carrying into
provisions."
STRICT OR LIBERAL
C. CONSTRUCTION
Statutes Liberally
Construed 327
7.37. Rules of Court.

t r a d i t i o n s
c
nracticaland moral
justice and common
urt frown upon
The Rules of Court, being procedural, are to be constm.
Rules o f Cour
their liberal hair-splitting

tendency
sense, the
and technicalities that do not
liberally with the end in view of realizing their purposee surhere decision with the ends of
However, where.a ot a court i8 justice."
proper and just determination of a litigation. A liberal conste the records and strict accordancesatisfactorily
with the supported by
tion of the Rules of Court requires the courts, in the exerci rules so as to justify rules, a liberal
struction of such
their functions, to act reasonably and not capriciously, und
und oenjoins warranted,
68
setting aside the decision
them to apply the rules in order to promote their object ane is not
to
assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive deto
rs literal stricture of the rules have
mination of their cases.182 While procedural laws are no other tho onstruction in the tollowing cases: been
iberal construct relaxed in favor of
(1) where a
technicalitics in their entirety, they were adopted not as ends tion will result a manifest
failure or rigid appli-
the interest of substantial miscarriage of justice; (2)
themselves for the compliance with courts have been
which orga justice will be served; (3)
ized and functions, but as means conducive to the realization of the the resolution of the emotio is
addressed solely to the soundwhere
ous discretion of the court; and
and
administration of law and justice. Technicalities, when are nof
they judicio (4) where the
injustice to the
an aid to justice, deserve scant consideration from the courts, Por adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his
this reason, the Rules of Court ahould'not bë interpreted to sacri. lessness in not compiying WIth the prescribed procedure. 189 thought
fice substantial rights of a litigant at the altar of technicalities t
the consequent impairment of the principles of justice. Nor should While litigation is not a game of
technicalities and the rules
technicalities be resorted to in derogation of the intent and purpose nrocedure should not be strictly enforced at the cost of substantialof
of the rules.155 The rules should instead be so construed as to give iustice, it does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at
litigants ample opportunity to prove their respective claims, and will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and
that a possible denial of substantial justice, due to legal technicali a8sessment of the issues and their just resolution. Procedural rules
ties, should be avoided.16 should not be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-ob-
servance may have caused prejudice to a party's substantial rights.
As well said in a case: "Lapses in the literal observance of a
Like ail rules, they are required to be followed except only for the
rule of procedure will be overlooked when they do not involve pub-
most persuasive of reasons.190
lic policy, when they arose from an honest mistake or unforeseen
accident, when they have not prejudiced the adverse party and
have not deprived the court of its authority. Conceived in the best 7.38. Other statutes.
Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law

to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for
or
18Berkenkotter v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 36629, Sept. 28, 1973, 53 SCRA Want of conformity with certain legal requirements. They are in-
228 (1973); Haberer v. Martinez, GR. No. 39386, Jan. 29, 1975, 62 SCRA 162
(1975), City of Baguio v. Marcos, G.R. No. 26100, Feb. 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 342 (1969). ended to supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain
Cabunilas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 46476, Dec. 29, 1977, 80 SCRA 706 eviis. They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that
1977) Alonso
v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315
(1910); Mitschiener v. Barrios, 76 Phil. 55 which they have designed or intended, but has failed of expected
(1946).
16Blanco v. Bernabe, 63 Phil. 124 (1936); McEntee v. Manotok, 113 Phil. 249 egal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregu-
(1961). arity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the
Cabunilas . Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 46476, Dec. 29, 1977, 80 SCRA T0
(1977).
165Berkenkotter v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 36629, Sept. 28, 1973, 53 SSCRA
228 (1973)
Case v. Jugo, 77 Phil. 517, 522 (1946).
uibuyen v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 16854, Dec. 26, 1963, 9 SCRA (19871.
(1963); Phil. Rabbit Sus Lines, Inc. v. Galauran & Pilares Const. Co., G.R. omalanta v. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 5:34
35630, Nov. 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 664 (1982). an . CA, 98 SCAD 648, 295 SCRA766(1995 No. l:38270, June 6, 2001.
19CGo Enterprises, Inc. v. CA,
G.R.
O r
Shipping
invalid. is to
enactment of the statute was Their purpose give vo
lidity to acts done that would have been invalid under existin
laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. Curative statat
by their very nature, are retroactive.
tes, Chapter Vil
Redemption laws, being remedial in nature, are to be con.
strued liberally to carry out their purpose, which 1s to enable th
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY
debtor to have his property applied to pay as many debtor's liabil
ties as possible.192 Similarly, statutes providing exemptions fro
STATUTES
execution are interpreted liberally in order to give effect to thei
beneficent and humane purpose; and to this end, any reasonabla A. IN GENERAL
doubt should be construed in favor of the exemption from exe
tion.133 Laws on attachment are also liberaly construed in order to
promote their objects and assist the parties in obtaining speedy
8.01 Generally.
justice.1s4
As instruments of credit, warehouse receipts play a very im. Etatutes may be classified either as
mandatory or
T classification is important in resolving the questiondirectory.
portant role in modern commerce, and accordingly, warehouse re. of what
fect should be given to the mandate of a statute. Will an act done
ceipt laws are given liberal construction in favor of bona fide hold. iolation of a statute render it void? Will the nonperformance of
ers of such receipts.195
what statute presCribes make the proceedings to which it relates
a
The purpose of the probation being to give first-hand offend. invalid? Will the person violating the statute be held liable therefor?
ers a second chance to maintain his place in society through the The answers to these and Similar questions depend on whether the
construed to achieve
process of reformation, it should be liberally statute is considered mandatory or merely directory
its objective. Thus, the probation law may liberally be construed by
extending the benefits thereof to any one not specifically disquali-
f i e d 196 8.02. Mandatory and directory statutes, generally.
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Consti- A mandatory statute is a statute which commands either
posi-
tution should be liberally construed for the advancement of the tively that something be done, or performed in a particular way, or
created. 197 negatively that something be not done,' leaving the person con-
purposes and objectives for which it was
cerned no
choice on the matter except to obey2 A mandatory stat-
ute is that
one contains words of command or of prohibition
the
omission follow
to which renders the proceeding to which it relates
llegal and void, or the violation of which makes the decision therem
rendered invalid. Acts executed against the provisions of manda-
19Narzales v. NLRC, G.R. No. 141959, Oct. 29, 2000, 134 SCAD 773; Zulueta
v. Asia Brewery, Inc., G.R. No. 138137, March 8, 2001.
Nuñez, 40 Phil. 761
19 Enagev. Escano, 38 Phil. 657 (1918); Javellana v. 5rehn v. Republic, G.R. No. 18566, Sept. 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 172.
(1920).
No. 28511, Aug. 22, 1968,
716. Court of First Instance of Bukidnon, G.R.
arina v.
Belen v. De Leon, G.R. No. 16412, Nov. 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 793. 24 SCRA
14Central Capiz
v. Salas, 43 Phil. 930 (1922).
Brehn v. Republic,
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Herridge, 47 Phil. 57 (1924). supra.
rovincial Treasurer of Negros Occ. Phil. 618
196Santos To v. Paño, G.R. No. 55130, Jan. 17, 1983, 120 SCRA 8.
ButSE
v. Azcona, 115 (962
Tolentino v. Alconcel, G.R. No. 63400, March
18, 1983, 121 SCRA 92.
9Buenaseda v. Flavier, 44 SCAD 1026, 226 SCRA 645 (1993). 329
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY STATUTES
A. In General
331
330
or
o
way
r the other, and the statute
one must be construed
it suith other related statutes. Words in
when the laur
prohibitory laws shall be void, except L oiven a mandatory significance inof permissive charac-
connect
tory or it
authorizes their validity." Where a
statute is mandatory, the e ter ma ve intent, and, when the terms order to effect the
between material and immaterial hrt legislati of a statute are
such that
has no power to distinguish effective to the extent of
1ot be made effed
thereof or omission to comply with what it requires. What tho giving each and all of
ór declaratio them somereasonable operation, without construing the statute as
decrees must be obeyed against pain of sanction of mandatory, such construction should be given.
thereof.
disregard
nullity of what is done in
On the other hand, the language of a
statute, however
statute which is permissive or dise.
statute is a man-
A directory iscre- datory in form, may be deemed
in forn directory whenever the legislative
tionary in nature and merely outlines the act to be done in such a can est be carried out by such construction; but the
it or that its purns con
can result from ignoring
purpose
way that no injury truction of mandata atory words as
directory
should not be lightly
can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed an
adopted and never wnere 1t would in fact make a new law instead
which merel
result obtained.' A statute
substantially the same cehat Dassed by the legislature.
Whether a statute is
to act accord. mandatory
operates to confer discretion upon person, namely,
a
ordirectory depend on whether the thing directed to be done is of
dictates of his judgment and conscience and not
ing to the own
the essence of the thing required, or is a mere matter of form, and
controlled by the judgment and conscience of others, is directory
what,is a matter of essence can often be determined only by judi-
Considering the nature of a.directory statute, the nonperformance cial construction.Accordingy, when a particular provision of a stat-
of what it prescribes, though constituting in some instances an t e relates to some immaterial matter, as to which compliance with
irregularity or subjecting the official concerned to diseiplinäry or the statute is a matter of convenience rather than substance, or
administrative sanction, will not vitiate the proceedings therein
where the directious of a statute are given merely with a view to
taken. the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of business, it is generally
regarded ns directory, unless followed by words of absolute prohibi-
8.03. When statute is mandatory or directory. tion; and a regarded as directory where no substantial
statute is
rights depend it, no injury can result from ignoring it, and the
on
There is no universal rule by which directory provisions a in
statute may in all circumstances be distinguished from those which purpose of the legislature can be accomplished in a manner other
are mandatory. Neither is there an absolute test for determining than that prescribed, with substantially the same result. On the
other hand, a provision relating to the essence of the thing to be
whether a statutory direction is to be considered mandatory or done, that is, to matters of substance, is mandatory, and when a
directory. In the determination of this question, the primary object to
is to ascertain legislative intent. The legislative intent must, be Iair interpretation of a statute, which directs acts or proceedings
be done in a certain way, shows that the legislature intended a
obtained from all the surrounding circumstances, and the determ
nation does not depend on the form of the statute. Consideration compliance with such provision to he essential to the validity of the
condi
must be given to the entire statute, its object, purpose, legislative aet or proceeding, or when some antecedent and prerequisite must be
must exist prior to the exercise of the power, or
history, and the consequences which would result from construing A8 exercised, the statute
PeTOrmed before certain other powers can be
must be
regarded mandatory."
as
Art. 6, Civil Code,Buyco v. Phil. National Bank, 112 Phil. 588 (1961).
v. Court of First Instance of 8,
arina
24 SCRA 715.
Bukidnon, G.R. No. 28511, Aug. 22, 1s0
Miller v. Lakewood Housing Co., 180 NE 700, 81 ALR 1239 (1932). 10Tai
VCuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957), citing
82 C.J.S. 869-874; Portillo149
Capati v.
Ocampo, G.R. No, 28742, April 30, 1982, 113 SCRA co Salvani 54 Phil. 543 (1930):; C h a r t e r e d Bank v. National Government
Oftice,
SecuritiesCorp. v. Savellano, G.R. No. 36181, Oct. 23, 1982, 117 SCRA794; M
,
SCRA 58 (1987).
"Marcelino v. Cruz, G.R. No. 42428, March 18, 1983; Phil. Assn. of804. Labor
Phil. 1051 (1957), citing

82 C.J.S. 869-87%.
Unions v. Secretary of
Labor, G.R. No. 2228, Feb. 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 40. Fre Cuenco, 103
V.
t
332 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION MANDATORY AND
A. InDiRECTORY
Gereral STATUTES 333
8.04. Test to determine nature of statute. Language used.

8.05.
The test generally employed to determine Statutes
tos using words ot command, such as
mandatory or directory
is to ascertain the
whether a
stoi.. "should," or prohibitio
ition, such as "shall," "inust,"
follow in case what the statute requires isconsequences th i that will
"ought"
not," a r e generally regarded as "cannot," *shall not," or

forbids is performed. Does the statute
not done
or
what of ht
ommand or of mandatory. The use of words
bition indicates the legislative intent to
prescribe
to, or apart from, what it requires? Will third result in adit
a
the law mandatory17 On the other
parties suffen make
ds, Such hand, statutes using
consequence of what the person charged by the statute to fer as a or words importing as
"may per
do
m i s s i v .
ory. It has been held that the

are enerally director permissiveness,
a prescribed limit fails to do? Docs the law
give a person no within to the intention of the
mandatory or directory nature
native choice? Is what the statute prescribes a alter ture as
of
primarily from the particular
matter of substa. legis is determined
and not of form? Will there be more injury to the
publicstance statutory
provision
language
disregard of what the law provides? If the answers are in thebye thereof.18
firmative, the statute is, as a rule, mandatory; af

otherwise, itis
directory. Use of "shall" or "must"
s.06.
Whether a statutory
requirement is mandatory or directam Ac general rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute
a
depends on its effect. If no substantial rights depend on it and s that the statute 18 mandatory. It means "ought to,""must
injury can result from ignoring it; and the purpose of the legis h e n used in a statute or regulation, expresses what is man-
ture can be accomplished in a manner other than that preseribea an Trn common parlance and in its ordinary
signification, the
and substantially the same results obtained, then the statute will term "shal" is a word ot command, and one which has or which
generally be regarded as directory; but if not, it will be manda must be given a com pulsory meaning, and it is generally impera-
tory.12 #iva or mandatory. It has invariable significance to impose a duty
Similarly, statutory requirements intended for the protection which may be entorced, particularly if the public is in favor of this
of the citizens and by a disregard of which their rights are injuri. meaning or when addressed to public officials, or where public
ously affected are regarded as mandatory; they must be followed or interest is involved, or where the public or persons have rights
the acts done will be invalid. The power of the officer in such cases which ought to be exercised or enforced, unless a contrary intent
appears. The presumption is that the word "shall" in a statute is
is limited by the manner and conditions for its exercise. used in an imperative, and not in a directory, sense. If a different
A statute will not be construed as mandatory and requiring a
publie officer to act within a certain time limit even if it is couched interpretation sought, it
is must rest upon something in the char-
acler of the
legislation or in the context which will
justify a dilfer
in words of positive comnmand if it will cause hardship or injustice
ent meaing,°
a statute be
on the part of the public who is not at fault.4 Nor will
interpreted as mandatory if it will lead to absurd, impossible Like the word "shall," the term "must' or "ought" is a word of
or
mischievous consequences. The statute will instead be construed

as command. It connotes compulsion or mandatoriness.20 This rule is
directory, so as to avoid such results, without prejudice to subject
ing the officer concerned to administrative sanction for his failure
to do what the law requires.16 OBrehn v. Republic, G.R. No. 18566, Sept. 10, 1963, 9 SCRA 172.
leGuiao v. Figurao, 94 Phil. 1018 (1954); McCGee v. Republic, 94 Phil. 820
(1954).
Stanley Mueiler, v. 315 P2d 125, 71 ALR 2d 715 (1957); Brannon v. Perkey,
31 SE2d
898, 158 ALR 631 (1944).
Miller v. Lakewood Housing Co., 180 NE 700, 81 ALR 1239 (1932) OKnO v.
Rehabilitation Finance Corp., 91 Phil. 608 (1952), citing 39 Words
Crases Per. Ed., 90, 93; Boranda v. Custilo, 165 SCRA 757 (1988); Gonzales
13Lyon Alley, 32 L. ed. 899 (1889).
v.
Chavez, 205 SCRA 816 (1992).
"Querubin v. Court of Appeals, 82 Phil. 226 (1948). 29Pe
Feople v. Tamani, G.R. No. 22160, Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA I3.
Marcelino v. Cruz, G.R. No. 42428, March 18, 1983
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY STATUTES
A. In General 335
334
eirculated as nev/spapers of general circulation. These

of the word ultimatel.. read and
not, however, absolute. The inmport use of

the word "shal
all" imperative, so that
the decision in
upon a consideration of the entire provision, its natura Pna make thee
stration case which wa tried without the
the consequences that would follow from construing it on , and the land regist1
initial heaer
ing being publis ed in a newspaper of general circulation is a nui-
the other21
The wod "must" in a statute, like "shall" is not alwo. lity
perative. It may be consistent with discretion. If the lanuin Use of "may."
statute considered as a whole and with due regard toita of a 8.07.
The word nay" is an auxiliary verb showing, among others,
and object reveals that the legislature intended to use the w
portunity or possibil Under ordinary circumstances, the phrase
"must to be directory, it should be given that meaning. For i be"implies the possible existence of something.24
stance, Sec. 46 of the Corporation Code provides that: "Every "may
COr use of
poration formed under this Code, must within one (1) month after Generally speaking, the the
word "may" in a statute
receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certification of ineor denotes that it:is directory in rature. The word "may" is generally
poration by the Securities and Exchange Commission, adopt a code permissive
only and operates to confer discretion 25
of by-laws for its government not inconsistent with this Code"Tha
Court ruled that considering that Sec. 46 allows the filing of by. word "may" as used in adjective laws, such as remedial
The
laws prior to incorporation, the non-filing of the by-laws does not ites which are construed liberally, is only permissive and not
mandatory. Thus, the word "may in Sec. 63 of the Corporaion
imply the "demise" of the corporation. P.D. No. 902-A, which is in ade to the effect that "shares of stock so issued are personal
pari materia with the Corporation Code, provides in Sec. 6 theregf Droperty and may be transferred by delivery
of the certificate or
that there should be notice and hearing before the certificate of the owner" is merely permissive and indi-
registration may be cancelled by the failure to file
the by-laws. eertificates endorsed by the shares be effected in
of may a manner
intent not to the word cates that transfer
This provision shows that the legislative use
different fîrom that provided for in the law
"must" as mandatorybut merely as directory is evident and it
should be given such meaning.2
"shall" is man- 8.08. When "shall" is construed as "may" and vice versa.
One test used to determine whether the word
with what is
datory or discretionary is whether non-compliance While the ordinary acceptation of the words "shall" and "may"
results in the
required will result in the nullity of the act. If it
may be resorted to as guide in the ascertainment of the mandatory
used command. Thus, in Director it is in no wise abso-
nullity of the act, the word is as a
or directory character of statutory provisions,
of Lands v. Court of Appeals,3 the law order requires in petitions for land lute and inflexible criterion in the vast areas of law
and equity.
of the of the court setting the its nature,
registration that "upon receipt
Commissioner of Land Registration
Depending upon a consideration of the entire provision, construing
time for initial hearing, the that would follow from
in the Official ts object and the consequences
of said terms eithercon-
as
shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published
in of general circulation in the Phi one way or the other, the convertibility in statutory
Gazette and
uandatory or directory is a standard
once a newspaper recourse
requires that tne should be read as
ippines." The Court held that the law expressly Gazette bu SUruction.3" It is well-settled that the word "may"
not only in the Official
initial hearing be published
circulation because due proces
also in a newspaper of general
that the Official Gazette is not as wiae
demands it and the reality Legazpi v. Estrella, 189 SCRA 58 (1990).
SCRA 481 (1997), citing R.E. Agpalo,
o v. COMELEC, 83 SCAD 923, 274 Bersabel
v. Salvador, G.R. No. 36910,
239 (2nd ed., 1990); Cabaluna v.
July 2110Eructiun, p. 119 Phil. 20 (1963);
Encarnacion,
v. Devera, Jr., 84 SCAD 12,
274 SCRA 540 (1997). 86 S C R A 176; Dizon v.
21Gachon of Appea 105 Phil. 622 (1959). (1992).
22Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Assn.,
Inc. v. Court
an
nil. 165 (1924); Castillo v. Sian, SCRA 740
Commission,
206
SCAD 420, 276 SCRA 681 (1997). v.
Securities and Exchange
1966, 18SCRA 533.
De . M e n c i a s , G.R. No.
24583, Oct. 29,
23Supra.
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY
B. Mandatory Statutes STATUTES 337
936
lective official to the President

l o c a le x e c u t i i
"shall not
"shall" where such construction is oming final or executory." It has been prevent a
ecision from becon
necessary t0 give held that
apparent intention of the legislature. Thus, whether theeffect s.
hall" in the provision is not mandatory because
word he provision giving discretion to the there is
t h e w o r d
is to be construed as as said
mandatory and imposing a duty,. "mny to
c o n s t r u e
review-
permissive and conferring discretion, is to be
or
merely room to stáy the execution of the appealed decision and
case
determined a
from the apparent intention of the statute as ing
officials
ing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are
there is nothing
the context, as well as from the gathered of the authority to order a stay of the
language of the particularn appealed order
sion. The question in each case is
d e p r i v e d
whether, taken as a
viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances, it whola
that a purpose existed on the part of the
can be et Use of negative, prohibitory or exclusive terms.
legislature to enact a law 8.09.
mandatory in character. If it can, then it should be given a mand A negat statute is mandatory. A negative statute is one
tory effect.8 The word "may" in such a case should be takena e x p r e s s e i in negative wordso r in the form of an affirmative propo-
"must" or "shall."29 ified by the word "oniy," Baid word having the force of an
exclusionary negation.85
The word "may" will, as a rule, be construed as "shall" wher

a statuteprovides for the doing of some act which is required by The use by the legislature of negative, prohibitory or exclusive
terms or words in a statute is indicative of the legislative intent to
justice or public duty, or where it vests a public body or officer with
power and authority to take such action which concerns the publie make the statute atory. A statute or provision which contains
interest or rights of individuals,*
On the other
hand, the word rds of positive ohibition, such as "shall not," "cannot," or "ought
shall' may be construed as "may" when so required by the context t"or which is couched in negative terms importing that the act
or by the intention of the legislature. It shall be construed merely chall not
shal be done otherwise than designated is mandatory
Pro
as permissive when no public benefit or private right requires that hibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there
it be given an imperative meaning." is but one way to obey the command, "thou shall not," and that is to
ompletely refrain from doing the forbidden act37
For instance, the word "shall" in Section 2 of Republic Act No.
304 which states that "banks or other financial institutions owned
or controlled by the Government shall, subject to availability of B. MANDATORY STATUTESs
funds x x x, accept at a discount at not more than two per centum
for ten years such (backpay) certificate" implies not a mandatory,
but a discretionary, meaning because of the phrase "subject to avai- 8.10. Statutes
conferring power.
to the
ability of funds."3* Similarly, the word "shall" in the provision Statutes which confer upon a public body or officer power to
effect that a corporation violating the Corporation Law "shall, upon
such violationbeing proved, be dissolved by quo warranto proceed- perform acts which concern the public interests or rights of indi-
Viduals, are generally regarded as mandatory although the lan-
ings" has been construed as "may."33 guage used is permissive only since such statutes are construed as
Government Code
Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 7160, the Local umposing rather than conferring privileges. The power is
decision against a given
of 1991, provides that an appeal from an adverse
erces, Sr. v. Guingona, Jr., 59 SCAD 131, 241' SCRA 639 (1995).
Valdez v.
2In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37 (1913).
2"Dizon v. Encarnacion, 119 Phil. 20 (1963).
Brehn v. Tuason,
epublic,40118
Pnil. 9431442
Phil. (1920).
1963); McGee v. Republic, 94 Phil. 820
Oct. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 633; Gabrie
(1954).
DDe Mesa v. Mencias, G.R. No. 24583,
MCee v.
Encarnacion, 94 Phil. 917 (1954).
"Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.,
91 Phil. 608 (1952). De Mesa v.Republie, 94 Phil. 820 (1954).
Mencias,G.R. No. 24583, Oct. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA533; Primicias
Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corp., 8upra. acipality of Urdaneta, No. 26702, Oct. 18, 1979, 93 SCRA 462.
CGovernment v. El Hogar Filipino, 50
Phil. 399 (1927).
MANDATORY AND
DIRECTORY
B. Mandatory Statutes STATUTEs
339
not for the benefit of the public ofhcer but for that of third
It is placed with the depository to meet the demands ds of persons.
rights, will
preclude
the court from
acquiring jurisdiction
thereon null and void. It has also
or render its
to prevent a failure of justice. It is given as a
remedy to and d e c i s i o n
of the Tax Code to the effect that

been held that the
entitled to invoke its aid, and who would otherwise be rovision
before an action for
In all such cases, it is held that the intent of the aediles
legislature
iled in court, a
of tax is file written claim therefor
shall be
the Com
r e f u n d
not to devolve a mere discretion, but to impose a positive was

with
Commissioner of Internal
mandatory and failure toRevenue within
presented
and period is the
absolute duty which can be enforced.3* scribed comply with such
uirement is fatal to the action.
8.11. Statutes granting benefits.

8.13. Statutes prescribing time to take action or to
Statutes which require certain steps to be taken or certain appeal.
Statutes or rules prescribing the time for
conditions to be met before persons concerned can avail of the
actions
or to from appeal litigants to take
an adverse
benefits conferred by law are, with respect to such requirements, certain decision is
andatory.45 Such ste statutes or rules have been held as generally
considered mandatory. For this reason, failure of a person to take to the preventi of needless absolutely
the required steps or to meet the conditions will ordinarily pre
indispensable
delays and to the or-
clude him from availing of the statutory benefits. The rule is based
1And speedy discharge of business, and are a necessary inci-
on the maxim, vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt, or
nt to the proper, efficient, and orderly discharge of judicial func-
n This is the underlying reason why such statutes or rules
the laws aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights0 are
construed as mandatory® .
Potior est in tempoe, potior est in jure - he who is first in time is

preferred in right. Such statutes or rules require strict, not substantial, compli-
ance. Accordingly, they are not
waivable, nor can they be the sub
ject of agreements or stipulations by litigants.
8.12. Statutes prescribing jurisdictional requirements.
For instance, Section 187 of R.A. No. 7160 requires that the
The general rule is that statutory requirements by which courts
dissatisfied taxpayer who questions the validity or legality of a tax
or tribunals acquire jurisdiction to hear and decide particular ac
ordinance must file his appeal to the Secretary of Justice, within
tions mustbe strictly complied with before the courts or tribunals 30 days from effectivity thereof. In case the
Secretary decides the
can have authority to proceed. Hence, statutes
prescribing the var appeal, a period also of 30 days is allowed for an aggrieved party to
ous steps and methods to be taken for acquisition of jurisdiction by
go to court. But if the Secretary does not act thereon, after the
the courts or tribunals over certain matters are considered manda
60
tory" For instance, the statutory requirement of publication must apse of a
days, party
could already proceed to seek in
ourt. 'These three separate reriods are clearly given for compliance
relief
be followed before the court can acquire jurisdiction to hear pet
tions for land registration, reconstitution of title," or naturaliza a prerequisite before seeking redress in a competent court, Such
tion, so that failure to comply with such publication requirement
antiago
.Si8on,
Syjuco, Inc. v. Philippine National Bank, 86 Phil. 320 (1950);,MWSS
4 re iuarna, 24 Phil. 97 (1913) G.R. No. 40309,
Aug. 31, 1988.
-
"Mendozav. Caya, 98 Phil. 107 (1966). OZales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 14532, May 26, 1966, 14 SCRA T9
Regser of Deeds of Pampanga v. Phil. National Bank, 84 Phil. 600 (1943 Na 2 nda v. Guanzon, 92 Phil. 168 (1962), Galina v. Court of Appeals, .
"Pahsoc v. Tamondong, 43 Phil. 789 (1922) Gonzales . Court of Appe
G.R. No. 14582, May 26, 1965, 14 SCRA 79 (1963). L974, 66an. 81, 1966, 16 SCRA 141; People
v. nani, G.R. No. 22160, Jan. 21,
Sec. 23, Presidential Decree No. 1529.
SCRA 153.
1846) Shioji v. Harvey, De la Rosa, 76 Phil. 428
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 55771, NoV. 43 Phil. 333 (1922); Alvero .
"Tahanan Development Corp.
1982, 118 SCRA 27S (1982).
v.
Phil. 940 Valdez v. Ocaman, 106

Co y Quing Neyes
v. Republic, 104 Phil. 889 (1958) 106 Phil. 929 (1960); AltavasSCRA 640 (1997); Valdez v.
Acumen, Gachon v. Devera, Jr., 84 SCAD 12, 274
106 Phil. 929
(1960
60).
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY STATUTES 341
340 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION B. Mandatory Stetute
"Indeed, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, man-

statutory periods are set to prevent delays as well as enhan. Inde
datingthe
promulgation of the Rule on
Summary Procedure,
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial functions. For this h athoriz Court to
the Cou stipulate
that the period for
filing
the courts construe these provisions of statutes as mandatorv0 ca Bes covered by the Rules on
Summary Proce-
'non-extensible.
shall be
of the law and the rules concerning the
The provisions dure
ner and the period of taking appeal are mandatory and i n
"xXX
tional, compliance with which is essential to enable the apnel
court to take cognizance of the appeal. Unless the requiremen" appellat From the foregoing, it is clear that the use of the word
law are complied with, the decision of the lower
uirements
court will be ghall
in the Rule on Summary Procedure underscores the
the Rule
ton
mandatory character of the chalenged provisions. Giving the
ch
final and preclude the appellate court from acquiring jurisdis
to review it,55 The reason is that sound public policy demandat 4 directory application would subvert the nature of
isions
provisions aa
ary Procedure and defeat its

at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts as well f t h eRu objective of
administrative tribunals should becomefinal at some definite da pediting the adjudication of suits. Indeed, to admit a late
fixed by law." Interest reipublicae utsit finis litium- publie i
e xanswer,
pe as petitior
as petitioners suggest, is to put premium on dilatory
est requires that by the very nature of things there must be aninter
an end
m a n e u v e r s -
the very mischief that the Rule seeks to re

to a legal controversy.
dress. In thisi ght, petitioners' invocation of the general prin
Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court is misplaced."7
In Gachon u. Devera, Jr.o the issue is whether Sec. 6 of tho .
ciplein
Rule on Summary Procedure, which reads; "Should the defendant
fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, tho Statutes prescribing procedural requirements.
Court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintill, shall render In statutes relating to procedure, every act which is jurisdic-
judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the co anal. or of the essence of the proeeedings, or is prescribed for the
plaint and limited to what is prayed for therein," is mandatory or tional
tione
tection or benefit of
the party affected, is mandatory. A statute
directory, such that an answer filed out of time may be accepted. In hich requires a court to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular
holding that the provision is mandatory, the Court explained:
manner, follow a particular procedure, or subject to certain limita-
"The Rule on Summary Procedure,. in particular, was8 tions, is mandatory, and an act beyond those limits is void as in
promulgated for the purpose of achieving 'an expeditious and excess of jurisdiction.* Where failure to comply with certain proce
inexpensive determination of cases. For this reas6on, the Rule dural requirements will have the effect of rendering the act done in
frowns upon delays and prohibits altogether the filing of mo- connection therewith void, the statute prescribing such require-
tions for extension of time. Consistent with this reasoning is ments is regarded as manda ory," even though the language used
Section 6 of the Rule which allows the trial court to render therein is permissive in nature.61
judgment, even motu proprio, upon the failure of a defondant
to file an answer within the reglementary period.
For instance, then Section 17, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court
provided that "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extin-
guished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal repre-
Sentative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
Reyes v. COA, 105 SCAD 290, 230 SCRA 486, 492 (1999), citing Agpalo, deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as
Statutory Construction, Third Edition, 1996, p. 266.
Gutierrez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 25972, Nov. 26, 1968, 26 SCRA
Alvero v. De la Rosa, 76 Phil. 428 (1946); People v. Tamani, G.R. No. 22160,
Jun. 21, 1974, 65 SCRA 153. 7274 SCRA, p. 549.
"Antique Sawmill, 30, 1966, 17 SCHA
De Mesa v. Mencias, G.R. No. 24583, Oct. 29,
1966, 18
Burtnettv. King, 205 P2d 667, 12 ALR2d 333 (1949). SCRA dd3,
v. Ine. Zayco, G.R. No. 20061, May
v.
916; Espiritu San Miguel, 63 Phil. 616 (1936).
Government v. Del Rosario, 64 Phil. 188 (1929). iabriel v. Encarnacion, 94 Phil. 917 (1964). 1,
DE
84 SCAD 12, 274 SCRA 540 Mesa v.
Mencias, GR. No. 24583, Oct. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 633.
(1997).
STATUToRY CONSTRUCTION
ANDATORY AND DIRECTORY
3. Mandatory Statutes STATUTES
342 343
may be granted. lf the legal representative tails to apPpear wit

The variousinprovisions
election laws were of the
their
participation in the adopted to
affairs of the
said period, the court may order the opposing party to prod n a s s i s t
and not
tto defeat that
object. obie.
to defeat
When the voters govern-
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within A ment the same should
e same n the
should not be
votera have
honestly
their ballots, nullified simply because
to be specified by the court, and the representative shall inne
c a s t
under the law to

of the deceased." w di. he officers appointed direct the elections
the ballot have not done
ately appear and on behalf of the interest guard the purity and
their
this provision, because of the u s e of the permissive word l e
election
laws on the onduct of the
election mandatoryduty.5 hold To
Seems to imply that it is discret ionary
for the court to ord lection, the effect of which will be to even after
OPposing party to produce the appointment of a legal enta- violation there of, except in the cases
nullify the votes affected
tive when the legal representative of the deceased, notwitt.stand by a
gularities contrive for the very indicated, might tempt

purpose of vitiating the votes
ing procedural requirement goes to th
notice, fails to appear, the the lead to more frau than it would
very jurisdiction of the court, for "unless and until a legal ren
epre. and mig
prevent.
Pursuant to the
sentative is for him duly named and within the jurisdiction of the toregoing rule, the circumstance that the cou-
rial court, no adjudication in the cause could have been accorded pon
hearing the number or
a ballot is not detached at the time the
any validity or binding effect upon any party, in representation of ollot is voted, a5 requirea byof aw, does
not justify the court
the deceased, without trenching upon the fundamental right to a
Ding the
re
ballot. The duty
detaching the coupon is placed by
in
lw upon the election offhcials, and the voter must not be
day in court which is the very essence of the constitutionally en.
shrined guarantee of due process," and accordingly, the provision is the franchise by reason of their failure to perform suchdeprived
ar does the irregularity on the part of the election duty87
mandatory.2 officials invali-
date the ballot or deprive a candidate, who has been overwhelm
ingly elected by the electorate, of his right to ofice. The will of the
8.15. Election laws on conduct of election. electorate, in such a case, should be respected, which
can be ef
The provisions of election laws governing the conduct of elec. fected by construing the provision of the law involved as
directory.
tions and prescribing the steps election officials are required to do
in connection therewith are mandatory before the elections; how. 8.16. Election laws on
qualification and disqualification.
ever, when it is sought to enforce them after the elections, they
are
The rule that election laws
held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if
the elections
are
mandatory before but not after
they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived
of applies only to those provisions which are procedural
in nature
their votes without any fault on their part.63 It has been held that affecting the conduct of the elections as well as to those
which direct or require election officials to do
the provisions of the election law as to the conduct of the elections or
perform certain
are mandatory if enforcement is sought before election in a direct acts, the purpose of. such construction being to
tity of the ballot and preserve the sanc-
proceeding for that purpose; but after election, all should be held the
will uf the electorate."
carry out
directory only, in support of the result, unless of a character The rule does not apply to provisions of the election laws
affect an obstruction to the free and intelligent casting of the votes, prescribing the time limit to file certificates of candidacy and the
or
to the ascertainment of the result, or unless the provision aftects ualfications and disqualifications to elective office. These provi-
an essential element of the election, or unless it is
expressly ae
clared by the statute that the particular act is essential to
validity of an election, or that its omission shall render it void.
Phil, 695
695 (14na
(1924). v
Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208 (1918, De los Reyea v. Rodriguez, 46
i
De Mesu v. Mencias, G.R. No. 24583, Oct. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA633.

Lina Luna v. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208 (1918); De los Reyes v, Rodrigu
40
ardiner
De loa ReyesRomulo, 26 Phil. 521 (1914).
v.
De los Reyes v. Rodriguez, supra

v.
Phil. 595 (1924).
Rodriguez, 8upra
Elec
Gardiner Romulo,
v. 26 Phil. 521 (1914); Rodriguez v. Commiesion o See Sec.
tions, G.R. No. 61545, Dec. 27, 1982, 119 SCRA 465. 8.15, supra.
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY STATUTEs 345
C. Diructwry Statutus
sions are considered mandatory even after the elections. Thus, ned merely for the information or direction of officers or
a candidate filed his certificate of candids the beyond where 0se designed
methodical and systema modes of proceedings are merely

required by law, he is disqualified to run for the office as is n
ectory. I n o t h e r words, when the laws are intended for the pro-
cate is void." Where a candidate is, by law, disqualificd. th dir the citizens and to prevent a sacrifice of their property,
cumstance that he received the highest number of votes doed tection of
of which their righta might be, and generally would
disregard
qualify him for the office, nor does it validate his election te d a
and.
affecte they are not directory but mandatory. In
he uriously
petition for his disqualification is filed before the election but . be, sdictions,
juriisdi statutes requiring the assessor to no-
majority of
nally resolved against him thereafter, in consequence of which ha the of th assessment on his property within a pre-
taxpayer
was allowed to continue with his candidacy and to be voted, the y the
tify
is held to be mandatory, so that the assessor cannot
votes cast in his favor are considered void and he shall be ousted ribed periodassessment unless he has given proper notice.75
make a valid
from office.7
public auction sale.
Statutes concerning
8.19.
8.17. Statutes prescribing qualifications for office. public auction sale of properties and pre-
Statutes authorizing
office is of a continuing nuture and must the be followed are in derogation of property
procedure to
Eligibility tu u public BCribing and are construed, with respect to the
exist at the. commencement of the term and during the occupancy rights and due process,
or qualifications of to be mandatory. The prescribed steps must be
of the office. Statutes prescribing the eligibility prescribed procedure,
office as a rule, regarded as mandatory followed strictly; otherwise, the sale at public auction shall be void.76
persons to a public are,
at the time he assumed
This m e a n s that if a person is not qualified the
loses such eligibility or qualifications during C. DIRECTORY STATUTES
office, or if he
be ousted from office." For
continuance of his incumbency, he may
to be a lawyer, is appointed judge
instance, a person who, claiming
ousted from such position upon discovery
that he is in fact 8.20 Statutes prescribing guidance for officers.
will be
will be removed from office upon nia of oific-
not a lawyer;" and a judge There are statutory requisitions intended for guidance
disbarment as a lawyer, since remaining a lawyer of good standin do
which
erg in the conduct of business devolved upon them the requisi-
not
for the office of a judge.
is a n indispensable qualification their power or render its exercise in disregard of to
aons ineffectual. Such generally are regulations designed secure
Orler, system and dispatch in proceedings, and by disregard of
a
Statutes relating to assessment of taxes. be injuriously af-

8.18. t h e rights of parties interested may not
of a statute relating ected. Provisions of this character are not usually regarded 8
It is general rule that the provisions or
a
a r e intended for
the security words importing that
the a s s e s s m e n t of taxes,
which
the unless accompanied by negative
of taxation, or for certainy but
required shal not be done in any other manner or time

citizens, o r to insure the equality S
than that designated."
of each other's tax, a r e mandatoryi,
the nature and amount
S C R A
8:21. Statutes prescribing manner of judicial action.

Elections, G.R. No. 62366,
Jan. 22, 1960 of
Gafor v. Commission
on
103
to the manner
tes as
431 Elections, G.R. Nå. 62451, March
3081: 103 judicial actior prescribing the requirements
follow in the discharge of their
v. Commission on
March 1102. hat judges should
Tbcson Elections, G.R. No. 62390,
on
v. Commission
SCRA 671; Santos April 26, 1961, 1
Del Rosario, G.R. No. 16878, 36
SCRA 628; Sanchez v. 103 SCRA
"Aguila v. Genato, G.R.
No. 55151, March 17, 1981,
1976, 72 SCRA
11. Roxas
xas v.
(1918).
rty, 37 Phil. 967
3In r e Paruguas,
G.R. Adm. Matter, July 6, amos v. Villaverde, 88 Phil. 651 (1951).
4Viojan v. Duran, 114 Phil. 322
(1962).
Lyon Alley, 32 L. ed. 899 (1889)
v.
346 STATUToRY CONSTRUCTION
MANDATORY AND DIRFCTORY STATUTES 347
( Dirertory Slntutes
functions are, as a rule, merely directory. It should not 1. Cthe Constitution took eftect, the prevailing rule is "that
berA
in the absence of specific language to the contrary that sumed
that the legist rovisions
prescribin the period within which a decision
ture intended that the right of parties should be seriouslv legal rendered
are directory, not mandatory in nature- in the
by the failure of a court or some oficer to comply strictly ld tbe
hat a judgment promulgated after the expiration of said
statutory requirements of official action. The legislature oflen the sense
not null
and oid, although the officer who failed to com-
is with administratively in
acts statutes for the purpose of providing an orderly proced refor
n. p e r i o c
the law may lealt

be dea
consequence
the conduct of public business, but procedure is secondaT
ply with
vith unless the intention io the contrary is manifest."
in dela
portance to substantive right, and the nonobservance of such im of

his tatute specifies the time at or within which an act is to
o r body, it
dure shouid never be permitted to
affect substantive right. by a public officer is
generally held to be direc
he done time, and not mandatory, unles3 time is of the
the intention of the legislature is clearly expressed. The
tion i direct only as to the
thing to be
as to a matter which is not of the essence of the thing to be d tory
essence
of the done,
or language of the statute
the
or shows that the designation of the time
and if there is nothing to the
suggest that legislature intended ntains negative word
that limitation of power, authority or

strict compliance therewith should be essential to the validity of a
was
intended
as a li right."
decision, the decision thus rendered It is
is valid. universally hol The question as
to whether time provision is mandatory or
that statutes uf this nature are merely directory, and noncomn
ance therewith is not necessary to the validity of the
teoctory is one of legislative intent. If by the terms of the statute
proceedings,. r by necessary implicanon the judge or public official loses juris-
diction to resolve the case after the prescribed period and any
S.22. Statutes requiring rendition of decision within indement thus rendered is null and void for want of jurisdiction,
pre.
scribed period. hen the statute is mandatory." The better rule is that where a
eonstruction of a time prov1s10n as mandatory will cause great
The Constitution provides that the maximum period within injury to persons not at tault or result in a miscarriage of justice,
which a case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of avoided by construing the statute aas
its submission, shall be twenty-four months for the Supreme Court, such consequence hould be
directory, for reasons of fairness, justice and fair play require such
and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for lower
construction.83
collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts."
Each Constitutional Commission shall decide any case brought be- It has been held that a statute requiring rendition of judgment
fore it within sixty days from the date of its submission for resolu within a
specified time is generally construed to be merely directory,
tion.o so
that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment
The foregoing constitutional provisions prescribe the various on the theory that if the statute had intended such result, it would
periods within which judgment should be rendered from date o have clearly indicated it. The difference between a mandatory and a
directory provision is often made on grounds of expediency, the
submission of the case for resolution. Prior to the adoption of the Teasons being that less
injury results to the general public by disre-
Constitution, statutes also prescribed certain periods within whien garding than enforcing the letter of the law and that judges would
the eourts or tribunals should decide the cases brought before them.
Are these
ouherwise abstain from rendering decisions after the period to render
provisions mandatory? Will the court or tribunal lose thenm had lapsed because
jurisdiction after the prescribed period shall have lapsed withou they lacked jurisdiction to do so.
having decided the case? Will a decision rendered after the pre
scribed period be null and void? Yeb. 271Ph
10e Cltion of Free Labor Uuions v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 22228,
1969, 27 SCRA 40, 48-449; Tanseco v. Arteche, 57 Phil.
227 (1932).
campo v. Cabangis, 16 Phil. 626 (1910); F'uentes v. Director of Prisone
10 ruled inSee Portillo v. Salvanti, 64 Phil. 543 (1930), which was subsequently over
Phil. 22 (1924). Querulbin v. Court of.Appeals, 82 Phil. 226 (1948).
7Sec. 151), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution. Appeals,a"Murcelino v. ruz, G.R. No. 42428, March 18, 1983; terubin v. Court of
82 Phil. 226
0Sec. 7, Art. IX(A),
1987 Constitution. BRo (1948).
dez-Murcus v. COMELEC, 64 SCAD 358, 248 SCRA 300 (1995).
348
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY STATUTEs 349
C. Directory Statutes
Querubin v. Court of Appeals*" is a case in

involves a
petition challenging the point, Th: ilower courts- null and void? The Supreme Court
peals from continuing to decide anjurisdiction
other
of the Cou for
election case
Ca8 months
vu ruz8" gayve
Cruz" gave negative answers to these questions.
quired period to resolve it has expired. The statute because Ap Marcelino
involv the
in
Said the Court:
vides that appeals in election cases "shall be

decided withiPro. To date, no authoritative interpretation of the above-
months after the filing of the case in the office nted provision has been rendered by this Court., Thus, in
of the clerk ofee
The court, construing this
to impress the need for
provision, ruled that while its purn novel
proaching this We now tread upon what Mr.
question,
speedy disposal of election contea olly characterizes as very dangerous ground when they (re-
imperatively demanded by public interests, it is merely ests, n t o courts) venture to apply rules which distinguish
nature. "To dismiss an election contest or the directo directory and mandatory statutes to the provisions of a consti-
appeal
boeause the respective courts, regurdles8 ol cause or taken ther
dir
tution.
failed o render final decisions within the time limitsreason, ha
of said "In Trapp v. McCormick, a case calling for the interpre-
tions is tw defeat the administration of justice c-
upon factors bevond tation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days
the control of the parties. That would defeut the
purpose of the d within which a decree may be entered without the consent of
process of luw und would muke of the adininistrution of eaLDel, it hus been held that 'the statutory provisions which
election contests an aleatory process where the justice in
litigants, irrespec. may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting
tive of the merits of their respective claims, will be
gambling for a the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which
deadline. The dismissal in such coases will constitute a
of justice. The speedy trial required by the law would be
miscarriage relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to
turned effect the aim and purpose of the legislature or some incident
into a denial of justice."" Conformably with the foregoing of the essential act. Thus, in said case, the statute under
principle,
it has been held that the failure of judges to comply with the examination was construed merely to be directory.
injunction that they decide cases within the prercribed period from
"On this view, authorities are one in
submission inerely deprives them of their right to collect their sala Baying that... 'Stat
ries or to apply for leaves, but does not deprive them of the juris
utes requiringthe rendition
of judgment forthwith or immedi-
diction to act on the cases pending before them. ately afler the triul or verdict have been held by some courts
to be merely
directory so that noncompliance with them does
However, while the period fixed by law to resolve a case is not invalidate the
had intended such result it
judgment,
on the theory that if the statute
merely directory, it cannot be disregarded or ignored completely would clearly have indicated it.
with absolute immunity. It cannot be assumed that the law has x
included a provision that is deliberately intended to become mean "Such construction

applies equally to the
provision under consideration. In Mckell v. Schoolconstitutional
ingless and to be treated as a dead letter
Dis. of Phila-
delphia, was ruled that 'the legal distinction between
it
direc-
8.23. Constitutional time provision directory. i,
ory and mandatory laws is applicable ta
0statutorylaws. fundamental as it is
Does the Constitution alter the general rule and render time
provision to decide mandatory? ls a decision rendered beyond T Our mind, the phraseology of the
period prescribed in the Constitution twenty-four
months for the
on indicates that it falls provision in ques
within the exception rather than
-
hree
and
Supreme Court, twelve months for lower collegiate courts, general rule. By the 'unless reduced by the Su-
eme Court,' it is evidentplhrase
that the period
SuDject to
modification by this Court in
prescribed
therein
82 Phil. 226 (1948). accordance with its
1bid., at pp. 229-230
Dimsun v. Elepano, 99 Phil. 733 (1956).
Tutad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988).
GR.
R. No.
42428, Mare
arch 18, 1983, 121 SCRA 51.
350
prerogative under Section Bi5) of

tution to
'pinromulgate rules
Article X of the New
procedure all courts x"concerningAnd therepleading,
x x practic,
said provision can be no
having been incorporated for doubt t
ency, relates merely to matters reason8 of a
of
Gas Co. v. Morris procedure. Albermarie
declares that constitutional Chapter IX
&
directory and not mandatory, where provision
merely proredural. they refer toata
matttters PROSPECT AND RETROACTIVE
"In
practice, have assumed liberal stand
we
a STATUTES
spect to
provision. This Couit had at various with te
this
proper application and for meritorious times, iun
of inferior courts additional time reasons, allowed upon juda A. IN GENERAL
riod within which to deride beyond the three-month Te
cases submitted to
reason is that a
departure from said provision wouldthem. Te
less injury to the general
public than would its strict
result in and retroactive statutes, defined.
tion. To hold that
noncompliance applica
by the courts with the afore 9.01.
Prospective
said provision would result in lo8s to their application, statutes may be prospective or
the courts, through which conflictsofare
jurisdiction, would make According
ive. A prospective statute is

which operates upon facts
one
resolved, the
struments to foster unresolved causes by reason very in
retroactive
transactions that.occur after the statute takes effect, one that

merely ot or
applies to the future.' A retroactive law is a law which
having failed to render a decision within the allowed term looks and
a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new
Such an absurd situation
could not have been intended by the
framers of our fundamental law.
creates
in respect to a ransaction already past. However, a stat

disabil
"As foreseen by Mr. Henry Campbell Black in his
ta is not mnade retroactive because it draws on antecedent facts for
Con ita 0Deration, or in other words, part of the requirements for its
struction and Interpretation of the Laws, the constitutional Action and application is drawn from a time antedating its pas
provision in question should be held merely as directory. Thus,
8age.
where the contrary construction would lead to absurd, impos
For instance, a law may be made operative partly on facts
sible or mischievous consequences, it should not be followed'
that occurred prior to the effectivity of such law without being
One last point. Notwithstanding our conclusions that retroactive, such as Republic Act No. 7167 granting increased per
courts are not divested of their jurisdiction for failure to de sonal exemptions from income tax to be available thenceforth, that
cide a case within the ninety-day period, We here emphasiz is, after said Act became etfective and on or before the deadline for
the rule, for the guidance of the judges manning our courts, fling income tax returns, with respect to compensation income
within
that cases pending before their salas must be decided earned or received during the calendar
year prior to the date the
observe said rule consti. law took effect. Another
the aforementioned period. Failure to definition states: "A retroactive in a law,
tutes & ground for administrative sanction against the de legal sense, is one which takes away
this effect is required
or impairs vested rights ac-
In a certification to
fact,
faulting judge.
before judges are allowed to draw their salaries."
Laceste Santos, 56 Phil. 472 (1932);

v.
Lopez 80 Cow, 40 Phil. 997
Phil. 848 (1948);(1919).
v.
Cumacho v. Court of Industrial Relations, Magno v.
Bautista, 89 Phil. 967 (1849).
Umali v.
Estanislao, 209 SCRA 446 (1992).
bid., ul pp. 56-58.
S61
illt
352
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES 353
A. In General
*
creates a new obligation an transpiredi before its
passage. Thus, the provision of
quired under existing laws, or which
attaches a new disability in respect of tom

m a t t e
of the Local Government Code disqualifying those re

poses a new duty,
or
fice a s a result of an administrative case from run-
tions or considerations already past." moved from offio
elective itions cannot be applied retroactively to
ningfor local
a person
who was administratively removed from his
qualify of said Code from thereafter run-
9.02. Laws operate prospectively, generally. rior to the
effectiv
position elective
position.10
well-settled rule of statutory construction that

It is ning for
an
a
atutes embodied in Article 4 of
are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless The reason
for the general rule, as
to give them a retroactive efa. is at a law to guide actions

is a rule established
the intendment of the legislature ffect Civil Code,
effect until it hence, it has no applica-
is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the uage the
with nobin
to
is enacted;
ture times. This is why it is said that the
used.5 It has been held that a "sound canon of statutory construe ast but only
tion to
tion is that a statute operates prospectively, unless the legislative to the future only, and has no retroactive effect unless
looks
intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terma he legislature may have formally given that effect to the law.1
constitutio fiuturis formam imponere debet non praeteritis. A
of the statute or by necessary implication." "Putting the rule more Nona
should affect the future, not the past.
strongly, a statute ought not to receive a construction makingi new statute
so clear, strong, and imperative
retroactive, unless the words are The principle of prospectivity applies to statutes, administra-
c a n be annexed to them,
or unless the inten Ha rulings and circulars and judicial decisions. In Co u. Court of
that no other meaning
satisfied. No court will
tion of the legislature cannot be otherwise Appeals,12 the Court cited instances applying the principle of
hold statute to
a retroactive when the legislature has not said
be prospectivity, thus:
so. This has been the consistent rule." "The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or
and not retroa:tively Viamendatory, has been applied in many cases. These include:
The rule that laws operate prospectively
is embodied in Article 1Buyco u. PNB, 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that
unless the intention to the contrary appears,
4 of the Civil Code. Said article provides
that "laws shall have no Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine National
The rule is ex Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided."
respicit, or the law looks of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before
pressed in the maxim: Lex prospicil, non
de praeterito, or the effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA

forward, not backward; and lex de futuro, judex The fact that, 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that R.A. No. 2613, as amended by
law provides for the future, the judge for the past."
and that it i8: R.A. No. 3090 on June, 1991, granting inferior courts
the law is silent as to the date of its application
it shouldi
couched in the past tense does not necessarily imply that
lan-i t
jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be given
retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga vu.
have retroactive effect. A statute, despite
the generality its
in
construed as to.overreach acts, events or Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10
guage, must not be so
of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD. No.

0 752, could have no retroactive application; People u. Que Po
,
Jur. 505.
Castro Sagales, 94 Phil. 208, 210 (1935), citing 50 Arn. Nool,
v. 643
Montilla Agustinia Corp., 24 Phil. 220 (1913); Segovia
v.
v. 41 Pnila
lburan v. Lubes, 87 Phil, 234 (1950); Nupiza v. Milicio,
100 Phil. z8* 992 Satutov COMELEC, 83 SCAD 923, 274 SCRA 481 (1997), citing R.E. Agpalo,
1925);
De Garcia v. San Jose, 94 Phil. 623 (1954); Nepomuceno . Ocamp0, 113, Augi 1ofutory Construction, 254 (2nd ed., 1990).
(1954); Universal Corn Products, Inc. v. Rice and Corn Board,
G.R. No. 211
1984. (2nd ed.,"Grego
1990).v. COMELEC, supra, citing R.E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 254
34586, Aprl
17, 1967, 20 SCRA 1048; Nilo v. Court of Appeala, G.R. No.
Segovia v. Noel, supra. Aprl 2, 1984 Cow, 40 Phil. 997 (1919), Nile v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 34586,
Universul Corn Products, Ine. v. Hice and Corn Board, supra. bot v. Court fAppeals, 205 SCRA 419 (1992).
"45 SCAD 638,
Iaceste v. Santos, 56% Phil. 472 (1932). 227 SCRA 444 (1993).
354 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE
A. In General STATUTES 355
Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be con Presumption against retroactivits.
violating Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank, when tha onvicted of 9.03.
4t led
It is settled that the question of whether a statute operates
violation occurred before publication of the Circulare relroactiv only
or only
is that
prospectively
all laws
depends upon legislative intent.
Official Gazette; Baltazar u. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRAe presumption prospectively, operate
the unless
denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decree19 The is clearly, or
ry
Dressed
clearly appears
plainly and
or necessarily implied. In every case of doubt, the doubt unequivocally
eman-cipation of tenants from the bondage of the s the
P.D. No. 316, prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rica resolved against theretroactive operation of
where a atute
statu is
laws.15 Hence,
susceptible of a construction other than thatof
corn farmholdings, pending thee promulgation of rules retroactivity,i6 here a retroactive
regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo u. Court of Appe application will render the
ional, the statute will be given a
applies whetherprospective
effect
128 SCRA 519, adjudging that R.A. No. 6389 which
l a wu n c o n s t i t u t i
peration."" The presu

sumption the statute is in
personal cultivation' as a ground for the ejectment of aemoved
tenan
farm f an original enactment, an
amendment, or a repeal, 1e
cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statit
statement for retroactivity; Tac-An u. Court of Appeals, 129 The presumption against the retroactive operation of statutes
SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative ger with reference to substantive laws affecting pending
Code by R.A. No. 4252 could not be accorded retroactive efect
actions or proceeding It has accordingly been held that, unless
that R.A. N. clearly appears, no substantive statute shail be so
Ballardo u. Borromeo, 16l SCRA 500, holding the contrary
as to affect pending litigations,19
6389 should have only prospective application (see also construed retroactively
and Balatbat v. Court of
Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294
Appeals, 205 SCRA 419). 0.04. Words or phrases indicating prospectivity.
also been made to apply si Apart from the presumption that laws operate prospectively,
The prospectivity principle has
to administrative rulings and cireulars, to wit: ABS-CBN the legislature sometimes indicates its intent not to give a statute
Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA a retroactive effect on past or pending actions, matters or transac-
Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA,
circular or ruling of the Commissioner of tions. Where by its terms a statute is to apply "hereafter," or "there-
142, holding that a
effect adversely
Internal Revenue may not
be given retroactive after" or is to take effect immediately or at a fixed future date, or
cOMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling whero a statute contains, in the enacting clause, the phrase "from
Sanchez v.
to a taxpayer; Eleçtion4
that Resolution No.
90-0590 of the Commission
on
and after the passing of this Act," or employs such words as "shall
directed the holding of recall
proceedings, had no
retre haye been made" or "from and after" a designated date, the statute
197 SCRA 168, Where
which 8
u. CSC, prospective in opera*ion only20 The word "shall" in a statute
active aPplication; Romualdez s. 199
Circular No. 29,
ruled that CSC Memorandum
it per
w a s
retrospective effect so
as to entitle to
cannot be given
whose temporary appoinL okuran v. Labes, 87 Phil. 234 (1950);
People v. Zeta, 98 Phil. 143 (1955),
an employee
nent appointment Cam ollector of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 12174, Dec. 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 886
the Cireular was issued.
had expired before Oner v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc., . SCRA 27 (1988).
also been applied V
Agustinia Corp., 24 Phil. 220 (1913); Cebu Portland Cement C0.
"The principle of
prospectivity has are
Collect
themselves not ithe T O f nternal Revenue, G.R. No. 20563, Oct. 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 789(1968).
although in
judiciul docisions which, laws mean, (this bel
derbilt v. Atlantic Coast Line, R. Co., 125 S.E. 387, 52 ALR 287(1924
nevertheless
evidence of what the
Code, Ju 121 ALR armers Bank& Trust Co. v. Berks Country Real Estate, 6
National A2d 94,
New Civil 905 (1935). of Internal Reven'
why under Article 8 of the the on Commnmissioner v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107
reason o r interpreting
the laws or Phil, 1055
d e c i s i o n s applying ,
1960); Lorenzo Poaadas,v. 64 Phil. 353 (1937).

tion shall form a part of
the legal system."13 ran v. Labes, 87 Phil.
' ,
Phil.20Tbur 234 (1950).
484 (1956 V.Labes, 87 Phil. 234 (1950); Co v Collector of Internal
Revenue, 100
3bid., pp. 448-450.

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES 357

B. Statutes Givei
Prospective Effect
implies ihat the lawmakers intend the enactment to be efd
only in futuro.21 Where a statute provides that it "shall taka B. STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE
upon its approval,"2 or on the date the President shall have effect EFFECTT
a proclamation or executive order, as provided in the i88ued
statut , it
shows that the statute should have no retroactive but
tive Penal statutes, generally.
effect.23 9.06.
As a general rule, penal laws or those laws which define
offenses and prescribe penalties tor their violation operate prospec-
9.05. Retroactive statutes, generally.
Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code
,31 provides that "no
The Constitution does not prohibit the enactment of retroac! tvehall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law
tive statutes which do not impair the obligations of contract, de i t s commission." This provision is a recognition of the uni-
prive persons of property without due process of law, or diyest pr10 accepted rule that no penal law can have a retroactive
rights that have become vested,4 or which are not in the nature of ffect, which means that no act or omission shall be held to be a
ex post facto laws. However, since the general rule is that lawa erime, nor its author punished, except by virtue of a law in force at
operate prospectively, unless otherwise provided, whether a statute the time the act was committed." It is based on the well-known
will be construed as having a retroactive effert is a question' of legal maxim, nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine legis, or
legislative intent. Some statutes are, by their nature, intended to there is no crime without a penaity, and there is no penalty. with-
be retroactive, such as remedial or curative statutes*7 as well as) out a law.
statutes which create new rights.2" Where a statute expressly pro.
vides that it shall apply retroactively, or where it uses words which
9.07. Ex post facto law.
clearly indicate such intent, the problem of statutory construction
is not whether it will be construed to operate retroactively as the .The Constitution provides that no ex post facto law shall be
it says, but
clear language of the law leaves no doubt as to what enacted.3 This constitutional provision prohibits the retroactive
as applied retroactively violates any
of the application of penal laws which are in the nature of ex post facto
whether the statute
will not be
constitutional restrictions.29 If it does, then the statute laws. An ex post facto law is any of the following: (1) a law which
avoid a frontal clash
applied or construed retroactively, so as to makes criminal an act done before the psssage of the law and
Constitution and the law from being declared uncon which was innocent when done, and punishes such act; (2) a law
with the save
stitutional.30 which aggravates a crime, or makes it greater thar it was, when

committed;(3) a law which changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than that annexed to the crime when commit
Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Collector of laternal Revenue, G.R.
No. 20503,
ed; (4) alaw which alters the legal rules of evidence, and author
Oct. 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 789 (1968). conviction upon less or diflerent testimony than the law re-
de Segur08, red at the time of the commission of the offense; (5) a law which
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania
Phil. 1055 (1960).
Iburan v. Labes, 87 Phil. 234 (1950). Lmes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect
lsaac v. Tan Chuan Leong, 89 Phil. 24 (1951); Francisco
v. Certiza, . . s s penalty or deprivation ofa right for something which when
16849, Nov. 29, 1961, 3 SCRA 565. a s lawful; and (6) a law which deprives a person accused of
See Sec. 9.97, infra. RL o Some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
See Sec. 9.02, infra. protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a procla-
See Secs. 9.17 et seq., infra.
Frivaldo v. Comelec, 71 SCAD 419, 267 SCRA 727 (1996). 0e,
169
i
Santos v. Alvares, 78 Phil. 603 (1947); Radia v. Roview Commibto
SCRA 749 (1988). 2d 94,
s0Farniers National Bank & Trust Co. v. Berks Country Real Estate, b sa" ,
eople v.
Moran, 44 Phil. 387 (1923B).
121 ALR 905 (1939); People v. Zeta, 98 Phil. 143 (1955). U.S. v.
At. aet, 11 Phil. 447 (1908); People v, Moran, supra.
I11, Sec. 22, 1987
Constitution.
358 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES 359
B. Statutes Given Prospective Effect
mation of amnesty. The test as to whether the ex post fhot without judicial trial. Its essence is the substitution of a
of the at iudicial determination of guilt. The constitutional
is violated is:
Constitution sought Does the law to ha li legislative for jud
serves to implement
retroactively take from an accused any right that was repae bills of attainde
the principle of
the time as vital for the protection of life and liberty? If Ro e d
lawt
against
separation
bar
of
wers by confining the legislature to rule-making
slative us3
legislative usurpation of judicial functions.
may be regarded as ex post facto law.5 forestalling
thereby sDective, bills of attainder were employed to suppres
and
istory in perspe
Theprohibition against ex
facto
limited in
post law is unpopular caus
and political minorities, and it is against this evil
and applies only to criminal or penal matters, and not to that the constitution
hibition is directed. The singling out ofa
which concern civil proceedings generally, or which affect or nority, the
imposition of'a burden on it, a legislative
late civil or private rights or political privilege.0
Explains the w definite
and the application to past conduct suffice to
retroactive
in a case: "The act in question is not an ex post facto law, as iti COurt statute as a bill of attainder. The quirement that the
penal in its nature. It has long been settled that the phrase e stigmatizea tively and reach past conduct follows from
facto laws' is not applicable to civil laws, but to penal and eriminel
laws which punish a party for acts antecedently done whieh were ature of a
bill or attander as a legislative adjudication of
not punishable at all, or not punishable to the extent or in the

e nhuS, a bill of attainderis isthedoubly
guilt.
objectionable because of its
historic
st facto features.
This explanation for uniting
manner prescribed. In short ex post facto laws relate to penal and clause "no er post facto law or bill of
wO mischiefs in one
eriminal proceedings, which impose punishment or forfeitures, and be enacted." Accordingly, if a statute is a bill of
shall
not to civil proceedings, which affect private rights retroactively attainder
it is also an er post facto law. But if it is not a n ex post

Hence retroactive laws, which are not criminal in nature, do not
ttainder,
the r e a s o n s that establish that it is not, are persuasive
violate the prohibition against er post facto laws and may not be facto law,
it is not a bill of attainder,
held invalid unle88 obnoxious or on other constitutional grounds " that
For instance, the law which provides that "as of the date of the
the Sandiganbayon When penal laws applied retroactively.
effectivity of this decree, any case cognizable by 9.09.
where none of the accused has
within its exclusive jurisdiction It is a well-settled principle that penal laws cannot be given
is not
been arraigned shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan" retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to the accused.2
law because it is not a penal statute nor dilutes the
an ex post facto
accused.30 Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "Tplenal laws
right of appeal of the shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty
of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in
9.08. Bill of attainder. Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the applica-
bill of attainder shall be tion of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
The Constitution provides that no
convict is serving the same."3 This class of penal laws does not fall
enacted.40 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts pun
under the term ex post facto law, the enactment of which is prohib-
ited by the Constitution." The provision authorizing the retroactive
Oct. 22, 1970, 35 SCRA2
In Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., G.R.Nuñez32485,
re
No.
v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 60b81, application of penal laws favorable to the accused is one of the
exceptions to the general rule that all laws operate prospectively.
Tolentino v. Angeles, 99 Phil. 909 (1956); SCRA 457 (1986).
Pamaran, 160
Jan. 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433 (1982); Meja
v.
35Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 5upra.

March 31, 1981,
Commiesion on Elections, G.R. No. 62390,
S a n t o s v.
Elections, G.R. No. 62413,
Sept. 26, 10 People v. Ferrer; G.R. No. 32613, Dec. 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382; Montenegro v.
Geronimo v. Commiesion on
SCRA 628; stañeda, 91 Phil. 882 (1952).
107 SCRA 614.
3Concepcion v. Garcia, 64
Phil. 81, 83-84 (1929). S Macasaet, 11 Phil. 447 (1908); People v. Alcaraz, 50 Phil. 520 (1932).
Phil. 934 (1966); In Kay Villegas Kam, Santos, 66 Phil. 483 (1932); see also Art. 366 of the Revised
Penal ante
re v
s4Republic v. Fernandez, 99 Code.
supra.
Alvia v Sandiganbayan,
137 SCRA 63 (1985). eople v. Moran, 44 Phil. 387 (1923).
Sec. 22, 1987 Conetitution.
Laceste v. Santoa, 56 Phil. 472
Art. I11, (1932)
360
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION pROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES 361
PRO2 Statutes Given Prospective Effect
The rule that

are penal laws
given retroactive effect is which are favorable to the The
A l rule that an amendatory statute rendering an
ene
tment no longer illegal is given

which the right of the "founded 'on the very ncu prior
to i t s retroac-
and regards it not as state to punish and impose prinie legal a c t p ri
does not apply ifthe amendatory statute expressly pro-
but as a rule
an
exception based on political penalty is h hn ve etieit shall not apply retroactively | but only prospectively
founded on principles of consider., ive that necific date. In such instance, courts cannot give
good law justify this justico,4" "Conscienena
v i d e s
a m e n d u l o r y stutute
retroactive effect. 56
known aphorism: exception, which is contained in tu
Favorabilia sunt amplianda, the the

As one
distinguished author put it, the adiosa
restringe.wel. substantive in nature,
sentiments of humanity, and exception was inspired Statutes
accepted by science."47 by
2.10.
a law which creates, defines or
ntive law is regulates
The assumption of the A Subs
life, 1liberty or property, or the powers of agencies
rule is that
ing the liability of the accused: one in there are two lawe affe rights
or instrum
cerni
for the
me n t a l i t i e s administration of public affairs.56 Sub-
commission of the force at the time of s u b s ttantive
antiv right, and the two terms in this
trial of the criminalcrime,
and the other
during or afterththe
l a w creates
action. If during theenacted stantive

espect.are 6aid to besynonymous. The term "substantive right" is
action, a statute is passed reducing pendency of the criminal those rights which one enjoys under the
be imposed,
the degree of
penalty that ma
which includes
legal
eliminating the offense itself, removing on prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive
prisonment in case of insolvency to pay the civil subsidiary in. that part
of the law which creates, defines, and
regulates
ing grounds for mitigation or extinction of liability," prescni law
or which regulates rightsand duties which

give rise to a
prescription of the offense,50 such statute ifcriminal liability" or for rights,
cause of action, as oppose to adjective or remedial law, which
will be applied favorable to the accuBed the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for
retroactively, and the trial court before
the finality prescril
PE
of judgment or the
appellate court on appeal from such judgment VAsion; that part of the law which courts are established to
should take such 8tatute into dminieter.7 As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that
is already a final consideration. However, where there hdocláres what acts are crimes and prescribes the
judgment and the accused is serving sentence, for committing them.8
punishrment
the remedy of the accused is to
file a petition for habeas corpue,
alleging that his continued imprisonment is illegal pursuant to By its very nature and essence, substantive law
said statute and operates pro-
praying that he be forthwith released.1 sDectively.59 A substantive law may not be construed
without somehow affecting previous or past rights orretroactively
The rule that penal laws favorable to the accused shall have
hence, it should be given a strict and obligations;
retroactive effect admits of exceptions. The rule does not
apply prospective construction, in
the absence of clear, plain, and unambiguous intent
where the accused is a habitual delinquent,52 where the later to the con-
stat trary0 Thus, in the absence of a
ute
expressly provides that it shall not apply to existing actions or lays down certain requirements tocontrary intent, a statute which
be complied with before a
pending cases,3 or where the accused disregards the later law and can be brought to
court,' or freezes the amount of monthly rentalscase
invokes the prior státute under which he was prosecuted.5" In these for residential houses
during a fixed periodo2 will not be given
instances, the penal law favorable to the accused is not applied retroactive operation, such statute
retroactively but prospectively. being substantive in character.
Larga v. Rañada, 164 SCRA 18 (1988).
People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 387 (1923). Primicias Ocampo, 93 Phil. 446 (1953).
v.
Laceste v. Santos, 66 Phil. 472, 475 (1932). "Bustos Lucero, 81 v.

of Appoals, 49 SCAD405, 231Phil. 648 (1948); First Lepanto Ceramics,
People v. Subido, G.R. No. 21734, Sept. 5, 1975, 66 SCRA545. SCRA 30 (1994). Inc. v. Court
Laceste v. Santos, supra. $7364, ustos
May' 9, v. Lucoro, supra; Aquino v. Military
1975, 63 Comnisaion No. 2, G.R. No.
oPeople v. Moran, supra. . , SCRA 646.
BDirector x. Director of Prisons, 56 Phil. 692 (1932). Tolentino v. Alzate, Phil. 781 (1956).98
62Art. 22, Revised Penal Code; People v. Alcaraz, 56 Phil. 620 (1932) piritu
Tblentino v. Cipriano,
v.
G.R. No. 32743, Feb.
STavera v. Valdez, 1 Phil. 468 (1902); People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 387 (1923). Alzate, supra. 16, 1974, 55 8CRA 633.
b4Ferrer v. Pecson, 92 Phil. 172 (1952). Espiritu Cipriano, v.
supra.
:3t52 STATUTÓRY CONSTRUCTION
PROSPEcTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES 363
Where the
Comprehensive Land Reform Law granti another tribunal will
complainants tenancy rights sferring it to nut be so construed
to fishponds and
pursuant to whi tion ortransfe
action unless the statute itself so

they filed actions to assert such rights was the pending provides
subsequently
exempt fishponds from coverage of the statute, amended. as
to affect
express
prohibito words are used.* Conversely, where a
is substantive in nature as it the amnendatory l or a
less
jurisdiction over a certain case but nevertheless de-
exempts fishponds from its coveraga rt has
no
hence, in the absence of contrary legislative t from which appeal 18 taken, a statute enacted during the
law should not be
intent, the subseau cides i
of the appeal esting jurisdiction upon such trial court
given retroactive offoct as to aflect the rights of th endency
the subject m a t t e r or such case may not be
P e n a
clumunts whose uctions are pending at the ume

he exempting law over
given retroactive
was enacted. It should be to v a l i date
at the judgment of the court
given a prospective öperation and may not effect s0
as a quo, in the
affect rights claimed under the previous ofa saving clause.o Where a complaint pending in court is
law. abse hecause it did not allege Bufficient cause of action, it may
Whether
a rule is
procedural or substantive, the test is whether h e validated by a subsequent law which affects substantive
not
the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for procedural matters.71
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law jandfor Tights and not merely
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infräc The rule against the retroactive operation of statutes in gen
tion of thhem. lf it Lakes away vested right, it is not eral applies more strongly with respect to substantive laws that
procedural, If
the rule creates right such as the right to
appeal, it is substantive; affect pending actions or proceedings. Unless the contrary clearly
but if it operates as a means of and plainly appears and only when no vested rights are impaired,
implementing an existing right statutes which are substantive in character are presumed intended
then the rule deals merely with procedure. Where to prosecute an
appeal or transferring the venue of appeal is procedural, such a8 not to be applicable to pending cases and proceedings.72
decreeing that appeals from decisione of the Ombudsman in ad sdThus, law which abolished
ministrative actions be made to the Court of Appeals5 or requirinig
a
personal cultivation by a land-
owner as a ground to dispossess a tenant from his
that appeals from decisions of the NLRC be filed with the Court of would not be applied to a pending landholding
Appeals Generally, procedural rules are retroactive and are ap and decided by the trial court under appealed
which was heard case
ized a landowner to dispossess his tenant earlier law which author-

an
plicable to actions pending and undermined at the time of the
on the
passage of the procedural law,s7 while substantive laws are
cultivation of the land, absent a legislative intentground of personal
to make the law
prospective. '
applicable to pending cases.3
9.11. Effects on pending actions. 9.12.
A statute which affects substantive rights and
Qualification of rule.
not merely pr A Substantive
law will be construed as
cedural
may not be given retroactive,
matters operation so a8 1oDs if
such is the clear applicable to pending
govern pending proceedings, in the absence of a clear legislative intent of
intent to the contrary. Thus, where a court originally obtains anu nature of its purpose as the law," or if the statute, by
Be or in the exercise of police a measure to promote
BOCia
exereises jurisdiction over certain actions in accordance with tu
existing law on the subject, a later stutute restricting such jurisal
pending actions. power, is to intended apply to
buranv. Lubes, 87 Phil. 234

7 (1950).
ado Masaganda, 116 Phil.
v.
Spouses Tirona v. Alejo, G.R. No. 129319, Oct. 10, 2001.
4Fabian v. Desierto, 98 SCAD 414, 295
"Republic v. Prieto 619 (1962).
eto, G.R. No.
SCRA 470 (1998). uran v. 17946, April 30, 1963,
v.Laber
1bid. 7 SCRA 1004.
Martin Funeral Houses v. NLRC, 98 SCAD 435, 295 SCRA 494 (1995 Balatbat Court 87 Phil. 234
1rt of
Cspiritu v. Ciprianu,
(1050).
"Ruiz v. CA, 103 SCAD 832, 303 public, Appeals,
206 SCRA 419 (1992).
SCRA 637 (1999). 96 Phil. G.R. No. 32743, Feb. 16, 1974, 55 SCRA
Republic v. Samia, G.R. No. 17569, May 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 533.
Suntos v. De817 (1955). 533; THu Son v.
Co., G.R. No.Alvarez, 78B Phil.

. 503 (1947, Ortigas & Co., Lid. v. Feati Bank
24670, 14, 1979, 94 SCRA 533.
364
PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES
B. Statutes Given Prospective Effect 365
As a rule, a case must be decided in the light of the l. atute, by he terms of which it 18 retroactive, be so applied if it
exists at the time of the decision by the appellate court, wh a it slatu.
versely affects vested
rights, unsettles matters already done as
statute changing the law is intended to be retroactive and t e e requ
uired by existing law or works injustice to those affected
to pending litigations or is retroactive in effect; and this l y thereby83
true though it may result in the reversal of a judgment which

correct at the time it was rendered by the trial court. The
sile A person has no vested right in any rule of law
t o insist that it entitling
however, subject to the limitation concerning constitutional ret
tions against impairment of vested rights.76 restric- him vested right ghall
in the
remain unchanged for his benefit, nor
continued existence of a statute which
rcludes its change or repeal, nor in
any omission to legislate on a
Piular matter, a
subsequent 8tatute cannot be
applied so
9.13. Statutes affecting vested rights. ctively as to impair his right that accrued under the old retro-
law. 84
A vested right or interest may be said to mean some

r t have thus given statutes strict construction to prevent their
right or oActive operation in order that the statutes would not impair or
interest in property that has become fixed
or established and is n erfere with vested or existing rights. The principal
longer open to doubt or controversy.7 "Rights are vested when the
given the courts, however, 18 that the statute mustexplanation
by
right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the prop be so con-
erty of some particular person or persons, as a present interest
strued as to sustain its constitutionality, and prospective operation
will be presumed where a retroactive application will produce inva-
The right must be absolute, complete, and unconditional, independ. lidity.a
ent of a contingency, and a mere expectancy of future benefit ora
contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance The rule is illustrated by the abolition of the death
ofexisting laws does not constitute a vested right. So, inchoate and its subsequent re-imposition, that is, those accused ofpenalty
crimes
rights which have not been acted on are not vested."78 prior to the re-imposition of the death penalty have acquired vested
rights under the law abolishing it, as the Court in a case explained:
A statute may not be construed and applied retroactively ifit
"In the light of the discussion
impairs substantive right that has become vested, as disturbingnewor above, there is no
question that the abolition of the death penalty benefits
destroying existing right embodied in a judgment, or creating herein accused-appellants.
obligations with respect to past transactions as by establishing a Perforce, the subsequent
8ubstantive right to fundamental cause of action where none er reimposition of the death penalty will not affect them. x
isted before and making such right retroactive, or by arbitrarily X X.
recreating a new right or liability already extinguished by opera

There is no question that a
tion of law. 2 While a law creating new right in favor of a class of person has no vested
persons may be given retroactive operation, it may not be so ap right in any rule of law which entitles him to insist that
plied if the new right eollides with or impairs any vested rig t shall remain unchanged for his benefit, nor
a
has he a
"Vested right in the continued existence of a stature
acquired before the establishment of the new right."" Nor may whicih
Precludes its change or repeal, nor in any omission to
231;
egslative on a particular matter. However, a subsequent
Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 23587, June 10, 1976,
19' 71 SCRA .oLatute cannot be so applied retroactively as to impaira
Justice Feria concurring, Santos v. De Alvarez, 78 Phil. 503, 508 (1947), ciu ing 3 Am.
Jur. 668, 669.
"Buyco Phil. National Bank, 112 Phil. 588
v.
(1961). 81Rer
Cus 466 (1928nata v.
Javier,
G.R.
"Benguet Consolidated Co.
No.
v. Pineda, 98
Phil, 711, 722 (1956); AYOE (1926). 37 Phil. 571 (1918); Asiatic Petroleum v. Llanes, 49 Phiu.
46729, Nov. 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 492. 1963, 9 Co
Chavez v. Court of Agrarian Relations, G.R. No. 17814,
v.
Collector of Intern Revenue,
SCRA 412; Espejo v. Auditor General, 97 Phil. 216 (1955); China Ins.Oct. y Co. onar
100 Phil. 464 (1966).
National Plannin Commission, 100 Phil. 485 (1956).
v.
Judge of First Instance of Manila, 63 Phil. 320
(1936). evenue, 121 Phil Miaa, 76Benguet
Phil.
Consolidated
372 Mining Co. 98 Phil. 711 (1956); Laurel
v.
Pineda, v.
Rattan Art & Decorations, Inc. v. Collector of Internal Revenue
605 (1965). Ople (1946).
v.
Zeta, 98 Phil. 143 (1955).
366
DROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATJTES 367
B. Statutes
Given Prospective Effect
right that accrued under the old
law (Agpalo, Statutoru
Construction, 1986 ed., p. 264, citing 1a
interpretations of a
statute, the court should adopt
Benguet
t w o f e a s i b
Pineda, 98 Phil. 711 [19561;Consoli.

dated Mining Co. vs. will a v o i d
the; the impairment of contract.3
that which
vs. Misa, [1946)). Courts have thusLaurel
76 Phil. 372 If a contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered
statutes strict constriction to given Aubsequent legislation." Consequently, law by the
prevent their
in order that the statutes would retroactiva
a
operation not impair terms o f
hich
a transaction or
agreement would be illegal cannot
or interfere with vested or existing rights, Clearly retroactive effect so as to nullify such
trensaction or agree
b egiven.
accused-appellant's rights to be benefited by the before said law took effect. Similarly, the
importa-
m e n t e x e c u t e d
abolition of the death penalty accrued attached by certain goods without import license which
virtue of Article 22 of the Revised Penal
or
tionlaw existing at the time of
was legal under
benefit cannot be taken away from them."88
Code. This rendered
the fact that when the goods arrived there was already
the another law
shipment is not
illegal by
importation without import license. To rule
otherwise
9.14. Statutes affecting obligations of eontract.
pronfhese instances is to impair the obligations of contract.7
It is well-settled that any contract entered into must
be in Ilustratioa of rule,.
accordance with, and not repugnant to, the applicable law at the 9.16.
time of execution. Such law forms part of, and is read Tn People u. Zeta,s* it appears that
into, the pursuant to the then exist
contract even without the parties oxpresnly Nuying so,7
Laws exist ing law authorizing a lawyer to charge not moze than 5% of the
ing at the time of the execution of contracts are the ones applicable amount involved as attorneys tees in the prosecution of certain
to such transactions and not later statutes, unless the latter provide veteran's claim, a awyer entered into a contract for professional
that they shall have retroactive effect. Later statutes will not; Services on contingent basis8 and actually
rendered service to its
however, be given retroactive effect if to do so will impair the 8uccessful conclusion. Before the claim was collected, a statute was
obligation of contracts, for the Constitution prohibits the enact enacted prohibiting the collection of attorney's fecs for services ren
ment of a law impairing the obligation of contracis.9 Any law which dered in prosecuting veteran's claims. For collecting his fees
enlarge, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the ant to the contract for rofessional services, the
pursu
ecuted for violation of the statute. In
lawyer was pros-
parties nucessarily impairs that contract itself." And a statute which exonerating thelawyer, the
authorizes any deviation from the terms of the contract by postpon court said that the statute prohibiting the collection of attorney's
ing or accelerating the period of performance which it prescribes, fees cannot be applied retroactively so as to
contract for professional services and the fees adversely
affect the
imposing conditions not expressed in the contract, or dispensing themselves. The court
with those which are however minute or apparently immaterial in added that the fact that the 5% fee was
contingent and did not
their effect upon the contract, impairs the obligation," and such become absolute and unconditional
until the veteran's
statute should not therefore be applied retroactively.2 As between been collected by the claimant when the statute was claim had
grce not alter the situation. For the "distinction between
did already in
and absolute rights is not helpful and that a better view.to vested
B0People v. Patalin, Jr., 311 SCRA 186, 211-212 (1999).
te
problem is to declare those statutes attempting to affecthandle
nrique T. Yupangco, Inc. v. Velayo, G.R. No. 50439, July 20, 1982, 110
SCRA 307 (1982); Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relao
rights
V. Feau
G.R. No. 25389, June 27, 1968, 28 SCRA 1116 (1968); Ortigas & Co., Ltd.
Bank &Trust Co., G.R. No. 24670, Dec. 14, 1979, 94 SCRA 633.
Phil. Virginia Tobacco Adm. v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 34628, July 30, 1979,0 Lui Buson Kaisha v. Manila Railroad & Light Co., 39 Phil. 624 (1919).
SCRA 172 (1979). . S.V. Diaz
De la Cruz Conde, 42 Phil. 766 (1922).
Art. I11, 8Bec. 10, 1987 Constitution. 214 v.
Better Living, Inc., G.R. No. 26936, Aug. 19, 1977, 78 SCRA
,)
PU.S. v Diaz Conde, 42 Phil. 768 (1922).: Gi** U.8. Tobacco Corp, v.
Lireen V. Biddle, 8 Wheat 84, 6 L. ed. 547 (1823). S.v. Lina, 87
Diaa Conde, 42 Phil. 766Phil.
4 (1950).
People v. Zeta, 98 Phil. 143 (1955). 98 Phil. 143 (1922).
(1955).
368 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES
369
which the courts find to be unalterable, invalid as arbitrary

Example
may be given. Republic Act No. 401, which( ndoned
unreasonable, thus lacking in due process." The court conel.ind on pre-war debts from January 1, 1942 to December
terest
that the 5% fee allowed by the oid law is "not unreasonable.cluded was
amended by Republic Act No. 671 on June 16, 1951
ices were rendered thereunder to claimant's benefits. The tirh Serv. 1945,
tually reenacting the old law and providing that "if the debtor,
the fees accrued upon such rendition. Only the payment of the luntary
vever, makes volu payment of the entire
pre-war unpaid
o n or before December 31, 1952, the interest on
was contingent upon the approval
of the claim; therefore, the rio cipal obligation
obligatio corresponding from January 1, 1946 to
princa
was not contingent. For a right to accrue is one thing; enforcemen principal
such
thereof by actual payment is another. The subsequent law enacte likewise condoned."It has been held that under
after the renditivn of the services should not as a matter of simn lebtor who paid his pre-war obligation together
this a m e n d m e n t , a
justice affect the agreement, which was entered into voluntarily h interests on March 14, 1951 or before the amendment was
with the i n t e r
wed into law, is not entitled to a refund of the interest paid
theparties as expressly directed in previous the To law. apply the
new law to the case of defendant-appellant so as to deprive him of app anuary 1, 1946 to March
from
14, 1961, the date the debtor paid
the
the agreed fee would be arbitrary and unreasonable as destructive
of the inviolability of contracts, and therefore invalid as lackine in
obligation, because phrase "makes voluntary payment"
es a present or future act, thereby indicating that the intent is
de-
due process; to penalize him for collecting such fees, repugnant to t to apply the amendment retroactively; and the words "unpaid
our sense of justice."* arincioal obligation" and "condone" imply that the amendment does
natcover refund of interests paid its approval,1 Where a
before
9.16. Repealing and amendatory acts,
statute which imposes a tax on certainabusiness activities is amended
by eliminating the clause providing tax on some of such activi-
Statutes which repeal earlier or prior laws operate prospec tiee, and the amended act is further amended, after the lapze of a
intent to give them retroactive effect length of time, by restoring the very clause previously eliminated,
tively, unless the legislative the obvious legislative intent was not to impose the tax during said
clearly appears. However, although arepealing statute is intended
construed if it will impair yested period, which requires that the last amendment should not be given
to be retrvactive, it will not be so
unsettle matters that had retroactive effect so as to cover the whole period.0" Similarly, an
rights or the obligations of contract, or
been legally done under the old law.100 Repealing statutes which amendment which imposes a tax on a certain business which the
a r e penal in nature are generally applied retroactively if favorable statute prior to its amendment does not tax, may not be applied
other
to the accused, unless the contrary appears
or the accused is retroactively so as to require payment of the tax on such business
lor the period prior to the amendment.0
benefits of the repealing act.101
wise not entitled to the
While an amendment is generally

construed as becoming a In Buyeo v. Philippine National Bank,0 the question raised is
part of the original act as ifit had always been contained therein," whether petitioner Buyco can compel the Philippine National Bank
it may not be given a retroactive effect unless it is so provided
or obliga*
acept his backpay certificate in payment of his indebtedness
he bank. At the time (April 24, 1956) he offered to pay with his
to
expressly or by implication and no vested right

necessary on
tions of contract thereby impaired. In short, the general
are rule ay certificate, Republic Act No. 897 gave him the right to
of statutes also applies to amendatoy Sa1d certificate applied in payment of his obligation.
the prospective operation
acts.103 1616, 10uently,
1956 however, Republic Act No. 1576 was enacted on Bank
June
ending the rter of the Philippine Nationa!
Ibid., at pp. 147-148.

109See Sec. 9.13, supra.
101See Sec. 9.09, supra.
104San Jose v. Rehabilitation Finance Corp., 98 Phil. 38 (1955).
0People v. Garcia, 86 Phil. 651 (1951). ollector of Internal Revenue v. La Tondeña, Inc., 115 Phil. 841 (1962).
Buyco v. Phil. National Bank, 112 Phil.
588 (1961); Pacia v. Kapis8 Imperial v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 97 Phil.
112 992 (1955).
mga Manggagawa sa MRR Co., 99 Phil. 45 (1966). Phil. 588 (1961).
pROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES 371
C. Statutes Given Retroactive Effect
370
they refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying
have no authorid..
invasion;
kinds can properly administer justice.1 They include
the bank shall all
and evidence.2 As
and providing that accens
laws o f
applied to criminal
of indebtedress to the pt
petitioner Buyco' bank. For
backpay certificate
in payment 2s of Peide or regulate the step by which one who commits a
refused to accept 113
vestebackpay
the bank Jaw, L h e
Lhis punished.
that petitioner Buyc0 acquired a

r e a s o n ,
be
is to
certilicate. In holding
in payment of hi his obligation
right crime
to have his
certificate applied
have no retroactive effant the
The
neral rule that statutes are
prospective and not retro-
c o u r t said:
"LaWs shall
does not
ordinaril apply
to
procedural laws. It has been
bank, the
It is said that the law looks to the! unless active
that "a retroactive e law, in
legal sense, is one which takes
a
the contrary is provided.
the legislature muture
retroactive effect unless pairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a
held
only and has no nave

to s o m e legal provisions; that a l l duty, or attaches a new disabil-
away ation and imposes a new
formally given that effect
a s having oniy prospective operation. tatutes new obligatio
of t r a n s a c t i o considerations already past. Hence,

or
a r e to be construed
to give
unle
s in
remedial
ity,
respect
statutes or tutes relating to remedies or modes of pro-

the purpose and
decreed
them
or 18 necessarily implied f which do not reate new or take away vested rights, but
retroactive effect is expressly from cedure,
case of doubt must be resol. in ifurtherance of the remedy
or confirmation of
rights
the language used; and that every operate
These principles aIsO apply to amendmen

only do not.come within the legal conception of a retro-
existing,
against retruactive effect. ents ready rule against the retroactive operation of
1576Q does not contan any provision o r the general
of statutes. Republic Act No. active law,
gCue 114 The general rule against giving statutes retroactive
effect nor such
may, be implied from its
regarding its retroactive statut
Tha whose effect is to:impair the obligations of contract or w

language. It simply states its effectivity upon approval. operatior
therefore, has no retroactive effect,

and the presant vested rights does not prevent the apPplication of statutes to
diaturb
amendment, oceedings pending at the time of their enactment where they
caseshould be governed by the law at the time the offer in question
is amended, the neither create new
nor take away vested rights. A new statute
was mude. The rule is familiar
that after an act is presumptively applicable to all
originalact continues to be in force with regard to all rights that which deals with procedure only
had accrued prior to such
amendment."108 actions those which have accrued or are pending,118
Statutes regulating the
of the courts will be con-
procedure
Where a contract is entered into by the parties on the basis of
strued applicable to actions and undetermined at the
pending
then prevailing, the amendment of said law will not affect
as
the law
if one of the time of theeir pasruge. Procodural laws are retroactive in that sense
the terms of said contract. The rule applies even and to that extent.'"" The fact that proçedural statutes may some-
contracting parties is the government.0
how affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of proce-
C. STATUTES GIVEN RETROACTIVE dural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel
EFFECT
Subido v. Sandiganbayan, 78 SCAD 104, 266 SCRA 379 (1997), citing Ruben
9.17. Procedural laws. B Apalo, Statutory Conatruction, p. 268 (2nd ed., 1990); Primicias v. Ocampo, 93
The general rule is that laws have no retroactive effec. F. 446 (1953); Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil. 649 (1948); Lopez v. Gloria, 40 Phil. 26
(1919); People v. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 (1946).
However, there are exceptions to the general rule, such as procedui 10 osana v. Diomano, 56 Phil. 741 (1927); Bustos v. Lucero, supra.
laws and curative laws, which given retroactive operati0n.
are v. Military Commission No. 2, G.R. No. 37364, May 9, 1975, 63
BCRA Aquino
646; Bustos
Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rule5 Lucero, supra.
v.
Rtro v. Sagales, 94 Phil. 208, 210 (1953), citing 60 Am. Jur. 605.
forms of procedure of
enforcing rights or obtaining redress 1or ui Ogana v. Diomano, 66 Phil. 741 (1927).
People v: Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 (1946); Alday v. Camillon, G.R. No. 60316,
101bid., at p. 692. Ha 1983; Enrile v. Court of Firet Instance of Bulacan, 36 Phil. 574 (1917%
VD1omano, 56 Phil. 741 (1927); Guevara v. Laico, 64 Phil. 149 (193).
nsular Government v. Frank, 13 Phil. 236
Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, Inc., G.R. No.
(1909).
138137, March 8, 2001
372 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIOON
OSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES
C. Statutes Given Retroactive Effect
373
that he is adversely affected." Nor is the a iven retroactive effect as of the date of the effectivity
retroactive applicatin. thereunder,
procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable.18 "The rene of
12
that as a general rule, no vested s t a t u t e ,
right may attach to, noi

from, procedural laws." It has been held that "a of
the
a Consolidatedraised
Mining & Development Corp. Court u.
vested right in any particular renedy, and a person h 24 the questionhear andis whether trial court has been
A p p e a l s , 124
a
on the
litigant cannot in to decide a pending cas
application to the trial of his case, whether civil or crimi jvested of
sted ntroversy
jurisdiction
uponthe promulgation of PD. No. 1281 which

of any other than the
existing rules of procedure."20 inal,
a min n the Bureau of Mines orngnal and exclusive jurisdiction
mining controversies. In ans wering the question
Thus, the provision
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 in and decide m i
39 thereof prescribing that "no.record on appeal shall ction
be requird 10 afirmative, the court held: "Presidential Decree No 1981i s
to take an It does not create new rights nor take away
no
appeal" is procedural in nature and should therefore k remedial
statute.
upplied retrouctively to pending actions. Hence, the question ns de a
vested. It only operates in furtherance of a
already
that a r e
ts
whether an appeal from an adverse judgment should be dismis rights confirmation of rights already in existence. It does not
for
failure ofunder
appellant to file record appeal within
a on
thirty dave remeayin the legal purview of a prospective law. As such, it can
as required the old rules, which
question is comeretrospective application of statutes. Being procedural in
pending reso. be given reti
all.actions pending at the time of its
tion at the time Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 took effect, became shall apply to enact
ture, it pt only with respect to those cases which had already
academic upon the effectivity of said law because the law no longer
requires the filing of a record on appeal of a final and executory judgment. Wereit
and its retroactive applica attained
the character
tion removed the legal obstacle to giving due course to the ap- not so,
the purpose
which is to facilitate the immedi
of the Decree,
peal.1 A statute which transfers the jurisdiction to try certain noesolution of mining controversies by granting jurisdiction to a
cases from a court to a quasi-judicial tribunal is a remedial statute technical
more adept to the of complexities nining
that is applicable to claims that accrued before its enactment but
hady or agency
operations,
would be hwarted and rendered meaningless. Litigants
formulated and filed after it took effect, for it does not create new
nor take away vested rights. The court that has jurisdiction over a. fa mining controversy cannot be permitted to choose a forum of
claim at the time it accrued cannot validly try the claim where at ronvenience. Jurisdiction is imposed by
law and not by any of the
the time the claim is formulated and filed, the jurisdiction to try it narties to such proceedings." "Furthermore, Presidential Decree No.
has been transferred by law to a quasi-judicial tribunal, sor even 1281 is a special law and under a
well-accepted principle in statu-
law will
tory construction, the special prevail over a statute or law
aetiona peuilng in one uurt may be val»dly taken away and trana of general application. Jurisdiction having been conferred by a spe-
ferred to another and no litigant can acquire a vested right to be cial statute therefore prevails over the jurisdiction granted by a
heard by one particular court.1**
general law."
An udministrative rulo which is interpretative ofa pre-exist.
In Subicdo, Jr.u. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that "R.A.
ing statute and not declarative of certain rights with obligations
No. 7975, in further amending PD. No. 1606 as regards the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, mode of appeal, and other procedural
26 SCRA 229;
Grgorio . Court of Appralu, G.R. No. 22802, Nov. 29, 1968,
TNnio v. Mina, G.R. No. 29488, Dec. 24, 1968, 26 8CRA 616; Yakult Philippines v matters, is clearly a
procedural law, i.e., one which presoribes rules
Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 367 (1990); Atienza v. Brillantes, 60 SCAD 119,
243 and forms of procedure of enforcing rights obtaining redress for or
SCRA 32 (1996). their invasion, laws

courts
those which refer to rules of procedure by which
or
1Laurelv. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 (19465)
1Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 17666, July 30, 1965, 14
applying of all kinds can properly administer justice.
SCRA 674; Pastoriza v. Division Superintendent, 106 Phil. 216 (1959);
Aris (Phils.,
lnc. v. NLRC, 200 SCRA 246 (1991).
L2Concepcion v. Garcia, 54 Phil. 81, 83 (1929). ulty, 78 dmson Ozanam Educational Institution, Inc. v. Adamaon Univeraity Fac
179 SCRA 279
(1989).
13Alday v Camillon, G.R. No. 60316, Jan. 31, 1983. 34182 SCRA 166, 180-181
2Castro v. Sagales, 94 Phil. 208 (1963).
78
(1990).
SCAD 104, 266 SCRA 379 (1997).
PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES 375
374
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Statutes
Givern Hetroactive Effect
C.
parente in case the father or mother

Moreover, the petitioners even
suggest that it is likewise
of the presumed
oft
the expiration of four
the child, before
d e a t h
ot
or reniedial statute: one which cures curat:
the
the minority o.
of enforcing defects and adds after
of his majority.
ty On the other hand,
existing obligations. x x x All told, as a to the moe
j e d d u r i n g
a t t a i n m e n t
att!
the
t he
ode repealed Article 285 of the Civil
+repea
curative statute, R.A. No. 7975

may validly be given
procedural ea
arrs
s
fron
176
of the
Fam1ly
that the action for recognition be brought
retro0acti
t h a t
effect, there being no

impairment contractual or vested
of
A r t i c l e
nd now
requirees
alleged parent. The issue raised is whether
Statutes regulating the rights' Code,
the
l i f e t i m e
by a n illegitimate minor after the filed

procedure of the courts will be
strued as applicable to actions
uring
for
recognition
Article 285 of the Civil Code was
when
alleged parent
time of their pending and undermined at con tho
an ao
his remained pending when Article 175 of the

a n d has
death o f
passage. In that sense and to that

extent, effect ca
effect
be prosecuted considering that
where at the time the proca.
dural laws are retroactive. still in de ttook o o k effect can still
Thus, action Code
to be procedural in nature and retro-
filed, the Rules of Court provides that a w h i c h is claimed
was Family
allowed to appeal as pauper shall "petition
not be entertained
to ha Article
175,
Dplication, does not allow filing
of the action after the
appellate court," the subsequent amendment by tha active alleged paren The Court held that "the rule that a
thereto of the
the sentence implies that the appellate court is no deletino deat in matters of procedure may affect pending ac-
change
ited from entertaining longer prohib. s l a t u t o
unless the language of the act excludes them

r y
petitions to appeal as pauper litigants, and

and
is
proceedings,
not so pervasive that it may be used to vali-

may grant the petition then pending action, so O t Operation,
as long its require- before it goes into effect, since
ments are complied with.127 invalidate proceedings taken
date or invalidat
must be verned by the law regulating it at the time

edure
arises especially where vested rights may
9.18. Exceptions to the rule. L Lestion of procedure
Article 175 of the Family Code finds no
Drejudiced. Accordingly,
The rule that procedural laws are applicable to pending ac-
be
n
proper apPplicatio to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect
tions proceedings admits certain exceptions. The rule does not and, consequentially, of the
adversely a right of private responddent
or
applywhere the statute itself expressly or by both of which have been vested with
necessary implication minor child
she represent8,
providesthat pending actions are excepted from its
operation, or the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore,
where to apply it to pending proceedings would the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code
impair vested correct in applying
rights.128 Under appropriate circumstances, courts may deny the that private respondent's cause of action has not yet
retroactive application of procedural laws in the event that to do so and in holding
prescribed."
would not be feasible or would work
injustice.1s Nor may proce
dural laws be applied retroactively to pending actions
if to do so
would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the 9.19. Curative statutes.
pendence of the courts.10
inde
Curative remedial statute8 are healing acts. They are reme-
Tayag v. Court of Appeals81 illustrates the exception to the dial by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existin8
rule. Pursuant to Article 285 of the Civil Code, an obligations. The rule in regard to curative statutes is that if the
illegitimate
ninor through his guardian may file action for recognition even thing omitted o r failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect
sought to be removed o r made harmless, is something which the
legialature might have dispensed with by previous statute, it may a
do by
bid..1990)
Pp. 390-391, citing Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, pp. 268-
so a subsequent one.1
272 (2nd ed.,
2"Murtinez People, 127 SCAD 113, 332 SCRA 694 (2000).
v.
2Hosana v. Diomano, 56 Phil. 741 (1927).

regorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 22802, Nov. 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 229.
SCadwaullader v. Abeleda, G.R. No. 31927, June 25, 1980, 98 9CRA 123. Overnent v. Municip ality of Binalonan, 32 Phil. 634 (1915);
Subido v.
31Tayag v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 665, 876-676 (1992). S anbayan, 78 SCAD 104, 266 SCRA 879 (1997), citing Ruben E. Agpalo,
utory Construction,
pp. 270-271 (2nd ed., 1990 ed).
STATUTES 377
RETROACTTVE
376 PROSPECTIVE AND
Given Retroactive Effect
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION C. Statutes
widen the work-

217 of the Labor Code to
d e d AArticle
Curative statutes are amended
1 e v a n c e s by
ent for redress of 8grievances
gir
by giving
intended to supply
superfluities in existing laws,133 111, the
g o v e r n m e n
Labor Arhi
Arbiters concurrent jurisdic-
and curb certain defects, abridan No. to a n d the Labor
cess
intended to enable evils,la They
Directors
ses involving money

ional
claims. This amendment, however,
persons carry into effect that
designed and intended,
to
which they
ara e rs
t h eR e g i o
the jurisdiction of the Regional

Directors
by reason of some
but has failed of
expected legal
hava tion over
s i
where
t
her
u a t i
overlapped. As
o
a remedy, R.A. No. 6715

n
action. They make statutory disability or irregularity inconsequenea

their
ed aLabor
biters
Arb it
rticle 217 by delineating

their respective
valid that which, before the enactment own
further
the amended Art.
has
statute, was invalid.135 No. 6715, the Regional Director
a n d
of the jurisdictions. Un
isdiction over
ive original jurisc
c a s e s involving claims, provided:
Their purpose is to give a n employer or person employed
in
been invalid under existing validityas ifacts done that would have
to is presented by
exclus
service, or hou8ehelper under the Code; (2)

complied with. 136
laws, existing laws have been h o u s e h o l d
reinstatement;
eing employed, does not seek
or
domestic longer
bein
no
claimant,
mon
oney claim of the employee or househelper
The Court in Frivaldo .
COMELEC,3" restated the the aggregate
within the exclusive
of curative statutes definition 3) the
not .000.00. All other cases are
exceed P5,00
by quoting two authorities on the subject: "Ac the Labor Arbiter. E.O. No. 111 and R.A.
jurisdiction of
cording Tolentino, curative statutes are those which undertake
to
and 6 7 1 5
original
are curative statutes. A curative statute is
thereforre
e
to cure errors and irregularities, thereby
validating judicial or ad. law to válidate legal proceedings,
to cure defects in a prior
No or
ministrative proceedings, acts of public off+cers, or private deeds authorities which would otherwise be
and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended ena nts or acts of public with certain existing legal
want
ormity
of confor
consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to void for
Statutes intended to valida what otherwise are
comply with some technical requirement. They operate on condi requirements."
retroactive
being curative, will be given
tions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. d or invalid marriages,
which provides that a contract shall be presumed
Agpalo, on tho other hand, says that curative statutes are healing Hect, 141 A statute
effec
in any of the cases therein enumerated,
and
acts x x x curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing an equitable mortgage primarily to curtail evils brought about by
existing obligations x x x (and) are intended to supply defects, which is designedwith of repurchase, is remedial in nature
certain evils x xx contracts of sale right
abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb retroactively to cases arising prior to the
curative statutes are retroactive x x x (and) and will be applied
By their very nature, and to effectivity of the statute.4"
Where at the time an action is filed in
reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities has jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof
acts which would be otherwise cOurt the latter no
render valid and effective attempted clothes it with jurisdiction before the
intended."138 but a subsequent statute
ineffective for the purpose the parties statute is in the nature of a curative law with
action is decided, the
statutes are retroactive. They defect
their very nature, curative
By retroactive operation to pending proceedings and cures the
which reach back on past events the commencement of the
are forms of
retroactive legislations of lack of jurisdiction of the court at
and to render valid and effective actionJs However, where such curative statute is enacted after the
to correct e r r o r s or irregularities ineffective for the pur-
otherwise
attempted acts which
would be
cited. "E.0, has rendered judgment, which judgment is naturally void as
Court
intended.19 A few examples may be the court has at the time no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
pose the parties
Commission, 96 Phil. 119 (1964).

Securities & Exchange 1041.
a5Del Castillo v.
No. 20901, Aug. 31,
1965, 14 SCRA
134Santos v. Duata,
G.R. G.R. No. 28774, Feb.
Bank of the Phils.
276 SCRA 601
(1997). rectors, Inc. v. NLRC, 70 SCAD 512, 266 SCRA 629, 635 (1996).
Mirasol, 86 SCAD 277, Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43 (1922).
1Development
SCRA 842; Alunan 11I v.
(1989).
28, 1980, D6 174 SCRA 624 antos v. Duata, G.R. No. 20901, Aug. 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 1041. 'Oct. 30,
v. Dela Serna,
36Briad Agro Dev. Corp. 727 (1996). 270-271. 10 . Phil. American General Ins. Co., Inc., G.R. No. 60563,
Construction, 1990 ed., pp.
SCRA
13771 SCAD 413, 257 28774, Peb.
1981, 108 SCRA 717; Garcia v. Martinez, G.R. No. 47629, May 28, 1979, 90 SCRA
Agpalo, Statutory G.R. No. 331;0ron v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 52235, Oct. 28, 1980, 100 SCRA 455.
138Tbia., p. 764, citing Phils. v. Court of Appeals, SCRA 104.
Bank of the 1965, 14
Aug.
Development G.R. No. 20901,
Santos v. Duata,
28, 1980, 96 SCRA 342;
PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES
C. Statutes Given Retroactive Effect 379
the action, the enactment of the statute

conferring jurisdictis.
the court does not thereby validate the void
legislature has no power to make a judgment judgment,.144 forion
jurisdiction a valid judgment.14
rendered whe t the light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the
out
wording
the
of the preamble,
it is
preamble
unarguable that the legislative
A good example of a law which has been considered intent was precisely to give the statute retruactive operation.
a curnt (A) oactive operatio. is given to a statuie or amendment
and remedial statute as well as one which creates new Urative
new remedies, which rights An where the intent t it should so
are generally
held to be retroactive
in natim from a conside
operate clearly
appears
deration of the act as a whole, or from the terms
is P.D. No. 725, which liberalizes the
procedure of repatriation.
Frivaldou. COMELEC,16 the Court held not only P.D. No. 725 had
thereof. It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant
It is
the re-acquisition of Filipino reach back' to those persons, events and transactions
:
citizenship by administrati not
repatriation pursuant to said Decree as retroactive. rwise covered by prevaihng law and jurisprudence. And
Court: Explained tho much as it has been held that
citizenship is a political
A reading of P.D. No. 725
d civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech,
immediately shows that it tiberty of abode, the right against unreasonable searches and
creates a new right, and also provides
for a new remedy, therebv Reizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights,
filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. No. therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation
725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino to PD. No. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. I t
women
(who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to al. has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as
iens' who the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as
and couldnot, under
amended) avail of repatriation until 'after the death of their
tomake it effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted,
sO that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions,
husbands or the termination of their marital status' and who As well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied
could neither be benefited by ihe 1973 Constitution's new although the statute does not in terms 60 direct, unless to do
provision allowing 'a Filipino woman who marries an alien to
so would impair some vested right or violate some constitu
retain her Philippine citizenship x x * because 'such provision etional guaranty. This is all the more true of PD. No. 725,
of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who
which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify
had married aliens before said constitution took effect. Thus,
P.D. No. 725 granted a new right to these women-the rightto the right of repatriation granted therein.
re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital cover. A t this point, a valid question may be raised: How.can
ture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. No. 725, On the the retroactivity of PD. No. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering
other hand, said statute also provided a new
remedy and a neu that said law was enacted June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost
on
right in favor of other 'natural-born Filipin0s who (had) lost his Filipino citizenship
much later, on January 20, 1983,
and
their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?
Philippine citizenship', because prior to the promulgation ot
P.D. No. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo "While it is true that the law was already in 'effect at the
the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but me that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless,
with the ndvent of P.D. No. 725 they could now re-acquire
their i s not only the law itself (PD. No. 725) which is to'be given
the procedure of repa retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under
Philippine eitizenship under simplified
triation. S81d law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have
etroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17,
The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it
s the intention of the legislative authority that the law
4Largadu v. Masaganda, 115 Phil. 519 (1962).
4Government of Municipality of Binalonan, 32 Phil. 634 (1915). Bvi pply to past eventsi.e., situations and transactions
4071 SCAD 413, 257 SCRA 727 (1996). sing even before the law came into heing in order to
enefit e greatest number offorner Fjlipinos possible thereby
380 PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES 381
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION C. Statutes
Given Retroactive Effect
that municipal al districts organized

district. pursuant to presidential iseu-
enabling them to enjoy and exercise the tive orders and which have their respective sets of
anteed right of citizenship, and such constitutionally oisn. offhicials holding oftice at the time of the effectivity
holdins
be given the legislative intention is t.
fullest effect and expression, officials
then there is olective
municapal
all henceforth be considered as regular municipali
apply in a retroactive or tha
more reason to have the law all
ns it validates the creation of m u
curative statute,which
o ft h e Code
spective manner to events and transactions retro

situations, had been held to be an invalid
ties, i s aluo
suhc executiv orders

quent to the passage of such law. That is, the nicipalities by 150
granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 995 which can

and should
repatriation u r p a t i o n
of l e g i s l a t i v e
power,
made to take effect as of date of his be d o u b t a s to whether a

government agency,
application. As earlier Where
there 18
mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or then existing law, h a the authority to enter into a neg0-
would show a contrary intention on the part of the underthe ot
legislative ntract for the construction a government project under
t i a t e d c o n t r a c t
authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice the build-

ld-lease-and-trans scheme, the subsequent enactment of
to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from directnegotiation of contracts under
which recognizes
giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown a statute
ngement is a curative statute as all doubts and proce

that there will result the impairnment of any contractual obli. such a r t a a n
dural lapses
tha might have attended 151the negotiated contract have
gation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of sorie con t h e subsequent statute,
stitutional guaranty."l47 been cured
by
What has been given retroactive effect in Frivaldo, supra, is Limitations of rule.
9.20.
not only the law itself but also Philippine citizenship re-acquired
to said law to the date of his application for repatriation, While remedial or curative statutes are forms of retroactive
pursuant law, they will not be given retroactive effect if to do so will impair
which meant that his lack of Filipino citizenship at the time Frivaldo
registered a s a voter, o n e of which qualification
is Filipino citizen-
for gover
the obligatiornsof contract or disturb vested
administrative or curative features
Only such
of the statute as will not ad-
rights
ship, or at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy
candidate is Filipino citizenship versely affect existing rights will be given retroactive operation.13
nor, o n e of which qualification
as a
or at the time he took his

oath of office as governor, which requires The exception to the foregoing limitations of the rule is a remedial
the retroactive application of
that he be a Filipino, was cured by
lawful the purchase by an
or curative statute which is enacted as a police power measure.
his repatriation. It is similar to making Statutes of this type may be given retroactive effect even though
who is disqualified under the Constitution they impair vested rights or the obligations of contract, if the legis
alien of a piece of land, naturalization as a Fili-
latter's subsequent
to o w n land, upon the
in effect, retroacted to
the date of the ave intent is to give them retrospective operation. The reason is
tnat the constitutional
pino, the grant of which, restriction against impairment of the obli-
contract of sale.
148 Bations of contract or vested rights does not preclude the legisla-
rati Are
An example of a
curative statute is one
which confirms, from enacting statutes in the exercise of its police power, wheh
public land awarded to SOTuehow affoct contractual
fies and validates the
sale or transfer of a certain period
or vested right.*
its sale within a
which a prior law prohibits
grantee, because the former legalizes
and makes such
sale null and void, old law.*" Sec
t r a n s a c t i o n under the
o t h e r w i s e is a n invalid which provides
what
Local Government Code of 1991, SCRAp
11 a lity
(1994). of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 57 SCAD 332, 239
tion 442(d) of the
Tad v. Garcia, Jr., 60 SCAD 480, 243 SCRA
I980, 963Developme 436 (1995)
SCRA" ment Bank of the Phil. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 28774, Feb. 29,
Chong,
100 SCRA 636. * Kesolution motion for reconsideration, Sept. 21, 1982, 116
on
4"bid., pp. 755-767. Llantino v. Co Liong
D e Castro v. Tan, 129 SCRA 85 (1984);
Asiatic Petroleura Co. Lanes, 49 Phil. 466 (1920).
AOng v.
ngsako .
SCRA 592 (1990).
v. Atencio, 178
SCRA 713 (1989). 86 Gamboa, Phil. 50 (1950).
Republic
382 AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES 383
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PROSPECTIVE
C. Stuatutes
iiven tetroactuve Effect
9.21. Police power [plreseription running before the

shat already
legislations. Code providee
Code shall be governed by laws previously in
this
One limitation of the rule ity since the time this Code took effect the entire period
that
rights or the obligations of contract statutes which impair
vaat
elfect
e;but i f s
cription should elapse, the present Code
effect is that on may not be given 'ested
police power legislation. As u rule, retroaet5 orce
though by the former laws a longer period
are enacted in the statutes whit
I b ea p p l i c a b l e
dThisaccrued
provision in a sense is retroactive since it
h e r e
exercise of
tivities, are applicable not onlypolice power to regulate
to those activities or certain
prior to its effectivity which,
y h t b e r e g u i r e
that
coming into being after their passage, but als0 to thosetransactic

c a u s e
lies to a rescribed
under the new Civii Code even though the
existence.155 The reason is that the alreadvi fled, has pres
iption prescribed
under the old law has not ended
tions of contract or of vested non-impairment of the
obliu p e r i o d o f p r
a c t i o n is filed in
e s c
100
r i p t
rights must yield to the legitimat the court. It has been held that the
exercise of the power, by the he time statute of limitations to have a retroactive
legislature, to prescribe intended a
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good regulations t egaslature
order, safet existing causes, where it requires that "actions al-

and general welfare of the people.8 Any nenced before the effective date of this Act shall not be
right acquired pers
statute or under a contract is subject to the condition thatunder the period

here erein prescribed" since it applies, by such
it mav
e a d y
by
be impaired by the state in the legitimate
exercise óf its police feted causes still to be filed,15 or where it provides that
to all effe
ision,
ffect after a fixed period. since it applies to all
power, since the reservation of the essential attributes of sovereign
provisi
into
shall go
causes to be rosecuted within the fixed period
162
power, one of which is the police power, is deemed read into ever it
existing
statute or contract as a postulate of the legal order.167
has indicated thata statute re-
The fact
that the legislature
be given retroactive effect will not
prescription
should
Jating to
9.22. Statutes relating to prescription. »ih,eg y warrant giving it such operation if to do so will impair vested
The general rule is that a statute relating to prescription of rights. A
statute of limita a longer period to file an prescribing
action, being procedural in nature, applies to all actions filed after tion than that specified under the old law may not be so con-
its effectivity. In other words, such a statute is both prospeetive in irued as having a retroactive operation, even if it so provides, as
tareyive a cause that already prescribed under the old statute, for
the sense that it applies to causes that accrued and will accrue
that will impair the vested right of the person against whom the
after it took effect, and retroactive in the sense that it applies to
a statute of EaUBe is asserted.s Similarly, a statute which shortens the period
causes that accrued before its passage.8 However,
retroactive operation to causes of ac af prescription and requires that causes which accrued prior to its
limitations will not be given
to its enactment if to do so will removea effectivity be prosecuted or filed not later than a specific date may
tion that accrued prior
or disturb existing ot be construed toapply to existing causes which, pursuant to the
bar of limitation which has become complete
reasonable time to bring actions thereon, old law under which they accrued, will not prescribe until a much
claims without allowing a
Jonger period than that specified in the later enactment because
The legislature usually indicates
its intent to apply a statute the ight to bring an action is founded on law which
the Civil has become
For instance, Article 1116 of
of limitations retroactively. 8sted before the passage of the new statute of limitations.14
Service Commission, 79 Phil.

386 (1947); Santos
164Cebu Transit Co. v. Public (1949), Melchor
Co Chiong v. Guaderno, 83 Phil. 242
v. Alvarez, 78 Phil. 503 (1947); 121 SCRA 1. Nagrampa v. Nagrampa, 109 Phil. 1077 (1960).
March 17, 1983, Dec. 14,
v. Moya, G.R. No. 38266, Feati Bank & Trust Co.,
G.R. No. 24670, lones v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 17566, July 30, 1968, 14
Ltd. v. BCRA 674.
lbeOftigas & Co., 214 SCRA 475 (1992)..
v. Court of Appeals, Jnn.
1979, 94 SCRA 533; Juarez Auditwr General, G.R.
No, 19266,
5Phil. American Life
Insurance Co. v. V1lle Cooperage Co. v. Rudd, 124 SW2d 1063, 144 ALR 763 (1939).
22 SCRA 135. t1 Sgey v.
Bishop, 150 S.E. 78, 67 ALR 287 (1929).
18, 1968,
210 N.W. 622, 49 ALR
1260 (1926).
No. 17566, July 90, 1965,
14 Corales v. En1ployees8 Compensation
168Kozisek v. Brigham,
6Billones Court of Industrial
v.
Relations, G,R,
SW2d 114 ALR 763
1063,
(1989. SCRA 547; Billones v. Employees' Commisaion,
A1, Peb.
G.R. No. 44063, Feb. 27,
Compensation Commission, G.R. No.
Co. Rudd, 124 14, 1980, 96
SCRA 674; Louisville Cooperage
v.
SCRA 111.
TROACTIVE STATUTES
386
PECTIVE AND RETR
Retroactive Effect
384 Given
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PR C. Statutes
otherwise
late than March 31, 1975,
not
ruled that this provision
9.23. 6 7 The court
Labor
Apparently conflicting decisions on

f forever."167
that a c c r u e d
In Billones
prescription. l l ,b e claims for workmena
b u r r e d
such claims w e r e
not filed
compensation
Court of Industrial Relations,1 the
v. t h e ys h aII
Depa
cl
effect, e v e n if
to
for
raised is whether Section 7-A of Commonwealth uestion a p
Code took
p l y
the "prescriptive period

Act because
amended by Republic Act No. 1993, to the effect that No. 144 a8 1975,
not
as
LaMarch 31, pensation Act,
"any action
d o e s
the
ore th workmens (o
enforce any cause (i.e., nonpayment of to under the founded o n
statute"
wages or ovarti beater t h z c c r u d years" vhich "18 a right the retro-
compensation) under this Act shall be commenced within
claims
n (10)
which
(10) cannot be impaired by

thre is t" that
ten
right"
years after such cause of action accrued; vested
shall be forever barred: Provided, however,otherwise,

such action ded,
a Labor
Code.
is the
of
That actions alrepadu
commenced before the effective date of fhis Act shall not be
a n d
ca
active applic a.t i o n
the statutes respectively
rales
in-
cases,
affected and
of prescription
Co
to bring and file
by period herein prescribed" should be given
the retroactive effert shortened the period
the
B i l l o n e s
In consida
u r t considered
s h o r t
the right to prosecute the

e n e d
on existing causes. As the statute shortened the period of court
and a
o n e founded o n law
therein
the law
prescription from six to three years from the date the cause yolved
In
corales,
und der
e the old a s
of that such right to
while the court said
a c c r u e d
actions.
action accrued, it was contended that to give it retroactive efert that B i l ones,
not a vested
lo
n In under the old law is
would impair vested rights since it would operate to preclude the right.
that
accrued
is one protected by the due process

vested
prosecution of claims that accrued more than three but less than an action
t h a t t h e right
problem confronting the
cou
six years from their accrual. The court ruled that a statute of bring
it did
say
stitution. The
to bring the action whose
vested right can attach
right,
the
limitations is procedural in nature no and of
both casesis is.how
to safeguard
t h e nght
shortened by law. To
thereto nor arise therefrom. It said that when the legislature institute it has been
t o ing
commenced before the effective date period
the Corales c a s e construed the
provided that "actions already criptive
the court in
of this Act ahall not be affected by the period
herein prescribed,' it siolve t h e p r o b l e
inapplicable to the action that accrued

as
limitations
intended to apply the statute to all existing
actions filed after the of court in the Billones c a s e gave
that because the
statute
law took effect; the
effectivity of the law. The court added, however, an action and affected, one year from the
new
before the w h o s e righ

have been
within which to bring in s u e un their claims. The
statute shortened the period claimna
within which to
mandate concerning due the fect
law took
order not to violate the constitutional date the to construe statutes; it is generally
process, claimants
whose claims were injuriously
affected thereby certainly has the power to read into the law something
from the time the new has no
power
should have a reasonable period
of one year held that the court did not provide expressly o r impliedly.
On this
statute took effect within which to sue on Buch
claims. which the law itself c a s e appears to be predicated o n irmer grounds.
Corales Employees' Compensation Commission,1 basis. the Corales
However, in v.
court arrived
a s that in
Billones w a s raised but the
a similar issue Corales case is
conclusion. The question
raised in the in crininal and civil cases.
at a different which acerued under 9.24. Prescription
workmen's compensation
whether a claim for
but filed after March 31, A s a general rule, the laws on prescription of actions apply as
Compensation Act
the old.Workmen's enactment as afterwards. There
the provision of the
New Labor Code
which
well to crimes committed before the
1975 is barred by that "work a distinction between a statute of limitations
in crimi-
Workmen's Compensation
Act and requires is, however,
repealed the to the effectivity
of this nal actions and that of limitations in civil suits, as regards their
claims accruing prior
compensation offices of the
men's
filed with the appropriate
regional construction. In a civil suit, the statute is by enacted the legisla-
Code x x x shall be ture as an impartial arbiter between two contending parties. In the
construction of such statute, there is no intendment, to be made in
Tavor of either party. Neither grants the right to the other; there is
SCRA 674.
16G.R. No. 17566, July
30, 1965, 14 8 e e also
Billones v. Employees
Feb. 27, 1979, 88 SCRA 547; 96 SCRA 111,
which
eG.R. No. 44063, Feb. 14, 1980,
Commission, G.R. No. 44031,
Compensution Billones c a s e .
down in the
reiterated the doctrine laid 1 Art. 292, Labor Code.
therefore no grantor against whom no ordinary

construction to be
presumptions18 Chapter X
are
'nade.s
The rule is otherwise in
statutes of limitations concernin.
criminal cases. Here, ehe state is the grantor, surrendering by
act
AMENDMENT, REVISION,
of grace its right to prosecute or declare that the offense is
longer subject of prosecution after the prescriptive period. Such
no cODIFICATION AND REPEAL
are not only liberally are applied
statutes retroac.
construed but
tively if favorable to the accused, as well.
A. AMENDMENT
9.25. Statutes relating to appeals.

The right to appeul from an adverse judgment, other than
amend.
is statutory and may be re to
that which the Constitution grants, 10.01.
Power
to appeals is remedial or has the authority to amend, subject

to consti-
stricted o r taken away. A statute relating
and applies to pending actions in which no The legislature law. The authority to amend is
procedural in nature any ex1sting
been promulgated at the
time the statute took htional requirements, to enact, alter and repeal laws.'
Even
judgment has yet power
other statutes, may not
however be con- nart of the legislative such legislative franchises to
effect. Such statute, like nature of contracts, as
to impair vested rights. Hence, a statute statutes in the may be altered o r modified
establish and operate public utilities,
as
strued retroactively so considers the judgment
to appeal and without impairing the obligations of
which eliminates the right unilaterally,
final and unappealable,
destroys the right to by the legislature franchise is the con-
rendered in a c a s e
after the statute went into effect,70
but contract, for deemed read into the legislative
rendered that i t shall be subject to amendment, altera-
appeal a decision that has been perfected before stitutional provision
prosecute a n appeal so requires.
not the right to the right of the tion or repeal by the Congress when the common good
for in the latter case,
the passage of the law, But the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power
law and may or
vested under the
old
has become
appellant to appeal of itspower to interpret thelaw, has no to
authority amend or
not therefore
be impaired.171 a contrary, change the law,such authority being the exclusive prerogative of
intent to the the legislature."
clear legislative
In the absence
of a
for taking appeals is to
be given
shortening the period to pending proçeedings
statute
be applied its
effect and may
not
rendered atthe time of 10.02. How amendment efected.
prospective been
already for taking
judgment has the period
in which shortened an
enactment. Thus, where
a statute
days from
notice ofjudgment, Amendment means the change or modification, by addition,
thirty days
from
to fifteen
fifteen days
from no 0,or alteration, of a statute which survives in its amended
days but beyond s t a t u t e took
15
appeals effect
appeal
taken within thirty
promulgated
before the h e mendment of statute is effected by the enactment of an
judgment
tice of the
deemed seasonably perfected.
Oc n v. Conimiasion on Elections, G.R. No. 5. 265, Jan. 28, 1980, 96 SCKA
Moran, 44
Phil. 387
(1923).
Pr See.11, Art. XII, 1987
Macadaeg, 94 Constitution
(1907);
16People v.
Phil. 247
supra. Co., 9 Phil. 862 (1954); PhilippineNational Bank v. Asuncion,
Moran,
Telephone &
Telegraph No.
1People v.
46095, Nov.
"Pavon v.
Phil. Island
(1908). (1908). Cook v. Mus
23, 1977,
80 SCRA J1
Phil. 566 9 Phil. 486
v. Priolo, 9 v. Nigorra, 2d 413
(1960);
81 ALR
17Un Pak Leung 349 P2d 498,
Berliner v.
Roberts, 387
200 (1923).
35 ALR
220 P 1088,
388 MENDMENT, REVISTON, CODIFICATION AND REPEAL, 389
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION A. Amendment
payment of the annual tax in four installments. For to

amendatory act
modifying or altering some
l a w a l l o w e
e penalty on the whole amount of annual tax for late

d
ute either provisions compute t h e

expressly or impliedly. Express amendment ofis the only one installment, which would be the case if the
providing in the amendatory act that
.
payinent of.
dat med nar
n o t deemed modified, would clearly
be
of astatute are specific sections e Pprovis10n 18 unjust
amended as or provisi nenalty
and arbitr And where a statute punishing an act which is also
cated, "to read as follows:" Therecited therein° or, as isions
section or sections commonly tîndi. der the Revised Penal Code provides a penalty in terms
reproduced as amended. affected are t then
a crimeagsification and duration of the penalties as prescribed in
of the cla
such. statute is not law but an amendment
said Code, a special
10.03. Amendment by .
the
plication of the pertinent provision of the Revised Penal Code
implication. by
An amendment by
On the contrary,
implication is neither presumed nor favored 10.04.
When
amendment takes effect.
every statute should be harmonized with other effect after fifteen days following its
laws on the same subject, in the absence of
a clear inconsistency
An
act Amendatory takes
Ofñcial Gazette or newspaper of general circula-
between them." The legislative intent to amend hlication in the
a prior law
subject is
on the n. unless a date is specified therein after such publication. 12
same usually shown bystatement in the later act that
a tion,
is a part of the original act that is already in
any provision of law which is inconsistent therewith is
modified Since an amendmentit must necessarily become effective part of
force and in effect, as
accordingly." The absence of. such a provision in the statute does
law at the time the amendatory act takes effect.13
not, however, mean that the subsequent law may no longer operate the amended
to amend or modify a prior act on the same subject; it so operates
is construed, generally.
as long as there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between them" 10.05. How umendment
There is an implied amendment where a part of a prior stat- A statute and its amendment should be read together as a
ute embracing the same subject as the later act may
not be en- whole. An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the origi-
forced without nullifying the pertinent provision of the latter, in nal statute has been repealed and a new and independent act in
which event, the prior act is deemed
amended or modified to the the amended form had been adopted in its stead. In other words,
Thus, where a statute'which requires the amended act is regarded as if the statute has been originally
extent of the repugnancy.
on lands or buildings
be paid on or enacted in its amended form. The amendment becomes a part of
that the annual realty tax of the therein."
before a specified date, subject
to penalty of a percentage
is amended
the original siutute as if it had always been contained
in c a s e of delayed payment, The amendment to a section of an act should be read in connection
whole amount of tax due installments to With other sections as if all had þeen enacted in the same statute,
in four equal
payment of the tax
by authorizing the penalty provision o as far as effect should be given to all of them in
possible,
before specified dates, ana,
become due o n o r
implication in the sense furtherance of the general design of the act."
statute is deemed modified by later
the earlier installment under the
late payment of an that The provisions of the original act which are not afected by
that the penalty for on the
installment
collected and computed only anmount of
annual
and those portions of the section amended which
law will be
and not on the
whole &mendment
repealed in the amendment remain in force, while those part8
became due and unpaid, intent to change
The legislative the laer
the old statute.
tax a s provided in the penalty is clear when
which to compute
the basis o n
107 BRA T3
p o v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 33062, Aug. 31, 1981,109 SCRA 30.
696. Ople v.
Macatanda, G.R. No. 51368, Nov. 6, 1981,
No. 21485, July 25, 1966, 17 SCRA Art. 2, Civil Code.
David Dancel, G.R.
v. See Sec. 1.42,
(1949).
$Estrada v. Caeda,
84 Phil. 791 supra. v. Garcia, 85
Phil. 651 (190)
85 Phil. 651
(1950). 1rada v. Caseda, 84 Phil, 791 (1949; People
People v. Garcia, (1960). Sotto v. Sotto, 43 Phil. 688 (1922).
108 Phil. 756 (1919).
People v. Olarte, Rafferty, 40
Phil. 224
Railroad Co. v. (1920).
40 Phil. 943
Manila
v. Tuason,
Garcia Valdez
390
(ENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION AND REPEAL 391
AMEN A. Amendment
of the
section amended
deemed which are omitted
certain repealed.of In other words, where
in the with the scope of the general rule.23 Arid where a sec-
in force,portions an act an amendune exception payment of publication fees in land

with the same unchanged, such amendment re
statute requiring
Oceedings, except in cases where the value of thee

amendment. So where anmeaning and eitectportions
o f aa
are cont
j g t r a t i o n p r o c e e d i r
t i o n
they have betar exceed P50,000.00, is amended by deleting the ex-

amended amendatory
statute shall be act
provides l a n dd o e s e . it means that the Btatute as amended now requires
recited in the that an evie
to
such
portions of the existing read asas blication fees regardless of the value of the land
ptingclause,
substantially are law are retained either amendato ment t h e suppression of the excepting clause amounts to
and not as new regarded as
a continuation
a
of the
literl i nv o l v
exemption allowed under the original act 24

e d ,
enactment." For instance, where existin

provides that it shall
t h ew i t h d r a w a l .
be in force for a statute vh a

approval is amended by another period of two years which
from 10.07. Amend operates prospectively.
shall be in force for a statute which
period four years after its
of provides that its eneral rule is that an amendatory act operates
four years is to be prospec-
counted from the date the
approved and not from the date approval, tthe Tne endnent will not be construed as having a retroactive
original
tively. A n amend1
the
amendatory wasstatute was
act
enacted u
unless the contrar
a retroactive effec is necessarily implied from the language
is provided or the legislative intent to
it
10.06. n o vested right is impaired. Every ecase of doubt
give
Meaning of law changed by and only if

An amendatory act is amendment, w
olved against retroactive effect of an amendment.* Thus,
a etatute amending a tax law is silent as to whether it
construed
original statute to determine its proper by comparing it with
construction. As rule,the
whe
es retroactively, the amendment will not be given a retroac-
amended act should be given a a
effect so as to ject to tax past transactions not subject to
the law prior to its construction different from that anof tive
act.
amendment, it is for presumed that the legisla tax under the original
ture would not have
amended it had it not wanted to change its Hawever., it has been held that statutes relating to procedure
meaning." The fact that the amendment was made
rule, that prior to the
introduction of the amendment, the statute
shows, as a fn courts are appiicable to actions pending and undetermined at
had a different meaning,20 which the amendment the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that
the particulars touching which a material
changed in all Sense,28
change in the language .
of the later act exists.21 The deliberate selection of

language in the
amendatory act differing from that of the original act indicates 10.08. Effect of amendment on vested rights.
that the legislature intended a change in the law or in its meaning, An amendment will not be construed
and the court should endeavor to give effect to such intent.2 Thus, it so provides, if to do so will retroactively, even though
impair vested rights or the obligations
where a statutory definition of term containing a general rule and of contract.20 The rule is settled that
after a statute is amended,
an exception thereto is amended
by eliminating the exception, the .
legislative intent is clear that the term should now include the ,i.. ft.!w
2Victorias Milling Co., Inc. Social
Security System, 114 Phil. 555 (1962).
v.
Parras v. Land Registration
Commission, 108 Phil. 1142 (1960).
mga
Buyco v. Phil. National Bank, 112 Phil. 588 (1961); Pacia v.
16Parras Land Registration Commission, 108 Phil. 1142 (1960).
v.
85 Phil. 616 (1960.
Manggagawa sa MRR
Co., 99 Phil. 45
(1956).
Kapisanan n8
Caseda, 84 Phil. 791 (1949); People v. Garcia, ontilla v. Agustinian Corp., 24 Phil. 220
"Estrada v.
Estrada v. Caseda, supru. Molmperial v. (1919). See Sec. 9.16, supra.

Collector of Internal Revenue; G.Ri
Commissioners, 80 Phil. 387
(19165). In No. 7924, Sept. 30,
Manila Electric Co. v. Board of Utility C reconsideration,
Phil. 841 (1962).
Nov. 18, 1955; Collector of Internal Revenuev. La
1965, on
20Palanca v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 (1920). L.S w
Tbnde.a,
2U.S. v. Pashaw, 50 F. 749, 38
L. ed. 605 (1894).
26 SCRA 853; Portillo
. .Court of Appeals, 66 8CADi 749, 251 8CRA
No. 29765, Jan. 31, 1969, 235 (1960 Ful. Y. 472 National Bank, supra; Facasura v. San (1995).
2Sarcos v. Castillo, G.R.
Miguel, Inc., 114 Phil.
Salvani, 54 Phil. 543 (1930).
ODIFICATION AND REPEALL 393
ENDMENT, KEVISsION, COI
392 Revision and Cod1fication
arising out of law or contract involving Fili-

the original act claims,
The issue w a s whether the
continues to be in force with e a s employment.
prior to the amendment or regard
g moneyy
that had accrued to all

in tavor of the o v e r s e a s worker
k e r s f o r o v e r s e a
cludh
was
were contracted
under the prior act, and such
to
obligationa 1abor arbiter
try the case notwithstanding
p i n o w o
will continue to be rights or obliennat cioD of ceeded to hear and

governed by the law before its amendm0 Gecis
No. 797. The Court sustained the validity
Stated differently, rights which have becom vested ofE.O.that the labo arbiter still had the authority
ute before its amendment
may not be affected by such
under a. t h ep r o m u u l
and ruled
O. No. 797 did not
E2.0 divest the labor
as the
amendatory act should not be applied amend decision
because
the
to hear and decide the case filed by
case
the
nullify such rights.31 retroactively so as to cide authority
the rule is
of his t o its ffectivity. It explained that
vorker prior
arbite
urisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law

verseas w o r
10.09. Effect of amendment of the commencement of the action; that lawvs

jurisdiction.
on
that
inforce a t t
the time e
prospectively unless the legislative intent to

It is
well-settled that the jurisdiction of a court to applied
declared is necessarily
determined by the law in force at the time the action is try easeaio effect is expre88ly or
should oretroactive
give them retroa
Once jurisdiction to try a case is instituted a the language

used; and that the language of E.O. No.
mains with the court until the case is
acquired, that jurisdiction re. plied
from
show a n y ention to give it retroactive effect.3
finally decided
therein, In 197 did
not
the absence of a clear legislative intent
to the contrary, a sube.
quent statute amending a prior act with the effect of
divesting the 10. Effect of nullity of prior or anmendatory act.
court of jurisdiction may not be construed to 10.10.
operate to oust jura
diction that has already attached under the prior law,3 for it
wil An unconstitutional law does not in legal contem-
invalid or
be a "subversion of the judicial process to take a cause from a
court eian, generally speaking, exist." Hence, where a statute which
is invalid, nothing in effect has been amended.
ha8 a nmendod
having jurisdiction before its final decision is given." Thus, where
if complete by itself, will be considered as a n
court originally obtains and exercises jurisdiction pursuanttoan The amendatory act,
a
existing law, such jurisdiction will not be overturned and impaired aricinal or independent act.On the other hand, where the
by the subsequent amendment of the. law, unless express prohíbi mendatory act is declared unconstitutional, it is as if the amend-
tory words or words of similar import are used35 ment did not exiet, and the original statute before the attempted
The rule applies to quasi-judicial bodies. P.D. Nos. 1691 and amendment remains unaffected and in force.59
1391 vested Labor Arbiters with original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases involving employer-employee relations, including
money claims arising out of any law or contract involving Filipino
B. REVISION AND CODIFICATION
workers for o v e r s e a s employment. Pursuant to such laws, an over
seas worker filed a money claim against his recruiter,
and while 10.11. Generally.
vested the
this case was pending, E.0. No. 797 was enacted, which The legislature sometimes
enacts revised or codified
POEA with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, in specially in fields statute8,
yarious laws. The
in which the or
legislature has passedsubjects
purpose is to restate the
S3atute, simplify complicated provisions, and existing
laws into one
make the laws on the
.T
(1961).
sOBuyco v. Phil. National Bank, 112 Phil. 688 v. Phil. Nationa
Miguel, Inc., 114 Phil. 25 (1962); Buyco SCRA 281.
"Escasura v. San
rectors, Inc.
1Manila Motor Co.,NLRC,
120 v.
G.R. No. 50276, Jan. 27, 1983, z0 SCAD 612, 265
Bank, supra; People v, Butler, 21 SCRA 717, I| Ine. v. Flores, SCRA 629 (1996).
Rillaroza v. Arciaga, G.R. No. 23848, Oct. 31, 1967, People 99 Phil. 738
v.
Lim, 108 Phil. 1091 (J955).
aRillaroza v. Arciaga, supra.
56rnment
hil. 259 (1927). v. (1960).
Government v. Gale, 24 Phil. 96, 100
(1013). Agoncillo, 60 Phil, 348 (1927); Government
36Lburaan v. Labes, 87 Phil.
234 (1950). v.
Springer, 50
AMENDMENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION AND KEPEAL,
394 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION B. Revision and Codification 395
aubsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if

rule that
subject easily found. However, in the course of revision
old
or codifa.
ica- ormer
r e v i s e s the whole subject matter of the
former statute.
tion, some new provisions are inserted, some provisions are the
When both ntent and scope clearl; evince the idea of a repeal,
omitted. the phraseology is changed, and sections are
rearranged and provisions. of the prior act that are omitted
then all parts from
The problem involved is what meaning or significance may beat the revised a c t are deenmed repealed. Before there can be an
tached to any of these modifications or changes. repeal under this category, it must be the clear intent of the
im
plied
ture that the later act be the aubstitute to the prior act
legislat
10.12. Construction to harmonize different provisions." Illustrative of the rule is Mecano u. Commission on Audit
In the revision or codification of laws, the presumption is that e involved a claim for reiinbursement by a government
ör position. Con-
a l of medical and hospitalization expenses pursuant to Section
its author has maintained a consistent philosophy 99 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which authorizes
of à revised statute or code should
sequently, the different provisions the head of oftice u0 cause reimbursenent or payment of medical
and construed together. Such construction will be adopted
be read and hospital expenses of a government official in case of sickness
a s will reconcile or
harmonize the various provisions and avoid a
or injury cuused by or connected directly with the performance of
conflict between them.0 The rule is that a code is enacted as a his official duty. The Commission on Audit denied the claim on the
and is to be considered as such and
single, comprehensive statute, or provisions.' Where
there ground that the Administrative Code of 1987, which revised the oid
disconnected articles
not a s a series of Administrative Code, repealed Sec. 699 because it was omitted in
between parts of a revised
however, an
irreconcilable conflict the revised Code. In reversing the Commission on Audit and
is, in' accord with the general plan grant
statute o r a code, that which is best ing the claim, the Supreme Court ruied that the legislature did not
which, t base a choice,
circumstances upon intend, enacting the new Code, to repeal Section 599 of the old
in
or, in the absençe of
that which is later in physical
position, being the latest expression Code. By providing in its
repealing clause that "all laws, decrees,
. in i t orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with
of legislative will, will prevail.4? Code
this are hereby repealed or modified accordingly," the nev
ii
0
ode did not expressly repeal the old Code as the new Code fails to
deemed repealed.
10.18. What is omitted is uentity or designate the act or acts that are intended to be re-
codification of laws, all parts
and provis pealed.
In the revision or statute or code
are omitted in the revised
of the old laws that o r code provides
otherwn Nor can it be Baid, the Supreme Court in the Mecano case
the statute
deemed repealed, unles8 revision or coo A a t the new Code impliedly repealed Section 699. "There
The reason is that a
expressly o r impliedly.4"
nature and purpose,
intended to be
a
co Jaw Ocategories repeal by implication. The first 18 where pro-
of
Lion its
i8, by very
and an expression of
the whoelegis n the two acts on
the same subject matter are in an iTe
o n the subject d
enactment
indicates a n intent
o n the part or tutesCOntict,
an the later act to the extent of the conflict consti-
thereon, which thereby
of the old laws
that a npled repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later
provisions
lature to abrogate those
reproduced in the
revised statute or code,. p O B s
ended as athesubstitute,
whole 8ubject of the earlier and is clearly in-
one
it will perate to repeal the earlier law"
,
The repeal by revision

statute o r code
or
codification
w a s intendea
of former lawsr the
isthe
Comparing
of cover the
nor atu
two Code it is apparent that the new Code
does
ble only if the revised
complete and perfect system in 1tSel he. There are Severalto cover the entire subjectoldmatter
not Therattempt
of the old
Code which are
whole subject to be
a und in the matters treated in the
nev Code." There is no rreconcilable conflict be-
45 SCHA o CRA D
June 14, 1972,
Sanchez v. Rigos, G.R. No. 25494, No. 30364, July 28, 1908
Directorof Prisons, G.R.
Mecano
bid v.Comnission
ComuL on Audit, 216 SCRA 600 (1992).
"Baking v.
138 (1922).
'
l
ichauco & Co. v. Apostol, 44 Phil.
Phil. 208 (1936).
People v. Benuya, 61 (1948).
81 Phil. 373
Joaquin v. Navarro,
396
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ENT. HEvisION, CODIFICATION AND REPEAL
C. Repeal
397
AME
tween the two
the Codes on the matter terial chhange or omisi which clearly indicates an
provisionon of sickness
sickness benefits: "has not beenbenefits u
evioua construction of the old laws,
m a t
h a sb e e na
from the
new Code. This to44depart
been omitted is non-restatement does not restated i Ddopted,
intent
dep*
o n s t ction
, as will eftectuate such intent vwill be
deemed imply that
may relate to the same repealed. "The fact that a what
t h e n 8 u c h
is not of itself subject nmatter as that of anlater enaaa

since the new
sufficient to cause an earlier stnt existing laws.
statute may merely beimplied repeal of the prior
of
Continuation
of the old one. cumulativ or a
What is act 10.16.
be construed as a continuation of
tive purpose to necessary is a manifest continuati
uation
odification shoulo
the
effect that therepeal." The whereas clause indication of legial
of the 1987
existing statut
S. In such case, the presumption obtains that the
i n t e n d to change the law as it formerly existed.
"effectiveness
by a new Administrative of the Government will Code to th. did not
which incorporates in a be enhanced

rs
The rearrangement of sections or parts of a statute, the
ment the Code
major structural, functional and
codifie
what formerly was a single section in separate sec

or
placing
and rules of unified dor
does not evince a procedural principles
to change the operation, effect or
governance"
entirely supplant the old Code. legislative intent t tions,
does not operate
meaning
statute, unless the changes are of such nature as to manifest
the intent to cover What this
only those aspects of whereas clause shows ofthe
clearly a n d unmistak ably a legislative intent to change the former
administration, organization and government that
of the
many changes that procedure, understandablypertain to laws.9
since the enactment of transpired in the government because

the old Cod." ' * structure C. REPEAL
10.14. Change in
phraseology. 10.16. Power to repeal.
The change in Subject to constitutional limitations, the legislature has pie
that of the old laws phraseology
in the revised
statute or Code from
does not, by itself, imply that
tion of the lawmakers to it was the
inten- Dary power to repeal, abrogate. or revoke existing laws. The power
amend or change the t repeal a law is as coMplete as the power to enact one. The
old laws. For it is a construction
well-settled rule that in the revision or of the lepislature cannot in and of itself enact, irrepealable laws or limit
tion of statutes, neither an
alteration in phraseology nor codifica itsfuture legislative acts.
sion or addition of words in the later
statute shall be
the omis
ily to alter the construction of the former acts. And theheld necessar- The Supreme Court has no power to repeal laws. While it has
court is only the power to promulgate rules
warranted in holding the construction of a of procedur, it cannot in the exer
statute, when revised or cise of such power alter, change or repeal substantive laws.51
codified, to be changed, where the intent of the legislature to make
such change is clear, or the
language used in the new act plainly
requires such change of construction. It 10.17, Repeai, generally.
that condensation is a necessity in the workshould
be remembered
of revision or codifica The
tion. Very frequently, words which do not repeal of a statute is either tota!
partial, express or
will be omitted from the statute
materially affect the sense implied. A Btatute which has been totally repealed
or
is rendered re
as'incorporated in the revised voked completely, while a
statute or code, or that some general idea will be
expressed in brief partial repeal leaves the unaffected poor
phrases. No design of altering the law itself could rightly be predi
cated upon such modification of the
language."" Of course, if there See Sec. 3.26,
supra.
e Estate of Johnson, 75 Nw2d 313, 65 ALR2d
Duarte v. Dade, 92 Phil. 36 (1916). 1949 (1956).
Greenfield v. Meer, 77 Phil. 394 (1946),
citing Black on Construction ad Chua Wee Republic, G.R. No.
National v.
27731,
Interpreta tion of Laws, 2nd ed., pp. 594-696. Bank v.
Apuncion, G.R. No. 46095, Dec.April 21, 1971, 38 SCRA 409;
23, 1977, 80 SCRA 321, .
Phil.
398 REVISION, CODIFICATION AND RE 399
NDMENT,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION C. Repeal
tions of the statute in clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate

is
its repealing
force. A declaration in and
of the earlier act

clause, that a a statute, usual. one
r e p e a l
its number of
title, is
particular and specific law, identißo
lier
as
a
repealed is an express repeal; all

peals are implied repeals.52
aimilarly
clause indicates that

The failure to add a othoy reconcilable inconsistency.
the intent was not specific reno al brought about by irreconcilable repugnancy
unless a n irreconcilable to repeal any
inconsistency and repugnancyexisting Ia pealing 1 0 . 1 9 .
I m p l i e d
t a k e s place when the two statutes cover the

laws
terms of the new and old exist inn t
laws, which latter situation he
between tt
w w
mo
m a t t e r ; they
a r e . 8o clearly in consistent and
inconpat
the category of an
implied repeai.d falls nder cannot
h a t they cannot be reconciled or harmonized;
other that
subject
t
e a c h other
Laws ffect, that is, that one law cannot be
are
repealed only by the enactment of hle with
they are not repealed, nor their
violation nor
subsequent laua. e n f o r c e d w i t h o u t n u l l iifying
and both
fyin the other. To bring about an implied
cused, by disuse or customs and practice non-observance ey. later statutes should embrace the same
earlier
and
change in condition and circumstances attertothethe çontrary4 Tha Lhe the same object. In other worda, it is
have
repeal, should
passage of a la and
which necessitated the Bubject a the object of the two statutes be the same, for if the
enactment of a statute to overcome the 2cessary t h a t
difficulties brought about by such change

does that toof the
is different from refer the other, the two laws can
peal the prior law, nor make the later statute so not
operate to re f one
inconsistent with object of her, although they same subject matterSo
the prior act as to repeal it.6 stan

later enactment may relate to the same sub-
The fact that a
fact tha
natter
as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to
10.18. Repeal by implication. ject implied repeal ofthe prior act, since the new statute may
cause a n
be or a continuation of the old one.° Nor is the
cumulative
R eal by implication proceed t premise that where a

on merely
in the terms and provisions of the two statutes
statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the difference
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention fcient to create repugnancy.be
In
order to etfect a repeal by impli-
must be given effect. However, before repeal by implication will be the later statute must
tion. sO irreconcilably inconsistent and
decreed, there must be a buficient 'revelation' of the legislative renugnant with the existing 1aw that they cannot be made to recon-
and stand together. The clearest case possille must be made
intent to repeal; the intention to repeal must be clear and manifest
otherwise, at least as a general rule, the latter act is to be con before the inference of implied repeai may be drawn, for inconsist-
t15 necessary then," 6ays the courtin a
the firat act is never presumed.°
strued as a continuation of, and not a substitute for,
ency
the same, CRse,"bosiore suclh repenl is deemed to exist that it be shown that.
and will continue to apeak, so far a_ the two acts are, the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject
from the time of the first enactment.* matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. There
of repeals by implica- must be a showing of repugnaney, clear and convincing in charac-
There a r e two well-settled categories
tion. The first is where provisions
in the two acts on the same ter. The language used in the later statute must be such as to
irreconcilable conflict, the later
act to the
render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An
subject matter a r e in a n of the carlier
extent of the contlict
constitutes a n implied repeal
whole subject of the
one. The second is, if
the later act c o v e r s the
Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 80 L. ed. 351 (1935); Mecano v.
Statu
COnmission an Audit (1992), citing Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 289 (1986).
Audit, 216 SCRA 600 (1992),
citing Agpalo, Phi. American Munagement Co., Inc. . Phil. Anmerican Management Em-
6Mecano Commission on
v.
NAsan, G.R. No. 35254, Jan. 29, 1973, 49 SCRA 194; Villegas v. Subido, G.R.
289 (1986). No.
tory Construction, p. 31711, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 190.
o n Audit, supra.
Mecano v. Commission SCRA 696.
&4David v. Dancel, G.R. No.
21485, July 26, 1966, 17
plo v. Custro, 43 Phil. 842 (1922); People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887 (1922).
alera v. Tuason, 80 Phil. 823 (1943).
986 (1956).
City of Manila v. Reyes, 99 Phil. Posadas v.
National Cy
188 (1922); Cora Planters Asan., Inc. Feliciano, G.R. No. 24022, March
Apostol, 44 Phíl. 1966, 113 say
,8, 1965. v.
Lichauco & Co. v. SCRA 377.
L. ed. 861 (1936).
Bunk, 296 U.S. 497, 80
REPEAL 401
CODIFICATION AND
400 yDMENT,
REVISION,
if they
they a r e reconciled or,
Either
Bubject.
inconsistency that falls short of that
standard does
me
l a t e r l a w r e p e a l s the prior
lhe
law. Leges posteriores priores
What is needed is not embodies the principle of implied
o n
repeal.62
a manifest indication of legislative suflice
purpose
Ia
ws
annot,
rias abrogant. T his maxim
the
contrar
The fact that the terms of an r e p e a l ,7
o n Audit,ss the issue

raised is
mission
law differ is not suff+cient to create earlier and later provisions. f
Com r
v.
Revised Administrative Code has been
699 of the
Mecano
repugnance, as8 to constitute th In Section Section 699 provides:

later an implied repeal of the former. F'or instance, the ne whether Administrative Code.
Section 28 of Rep. Act No. 7166 fact the repealed by the
pertaining
of canvassers is silent as to how the
to canvassing
by boara person the ervice
in of the national govern-
when a
of a province, city,
board of canvassers ghall in the
s e rvice
vic of the government
district is so injured in the per-
prepare the certificate of canvass and as to what will be its
basi nent
municipa
or
or municipal
which details are provided in the second paragraph of Sec. 231 of duty as thereb to receive s o m e actual physical
the Omnibus Election Code, an earlier department may direct that
statute, which states that
the "respective boards of canvassers shall prepare a
f o r m a n c e
t o r wound,
the proper head of occasioned
certificate af of disability thereby
ring any period
canvass duly signed and affixed with the imprint of the thumb of absence
not m o r e thansix months, and in
the right hand of each member, supported by a statement of the hall though
be on full pay, authorize the payment
d s c r e t i o n aiso
votes and received by each candidate in each polling place and, on LCh case his
he may in subsist-
necessary transportation,
the basis thereof, shall proclaim as elected the candidates who of the medical attendance,
fees of the injured person. Absence
in the
obtained the highest number of votes cast in the province, city, nce and hospital shall be charged first against vacation leave,
municipality or barangay" and "Failure to comply with this re Case contemplated
be any.
quirement shall constitute an election offense," did not thereby ws if there
is killed o r dies of injuries
such service
impliedly repeal the second paragraph of Section 231 of the Omni. "If a person in
in line of duty, the Depart
bus Election Code and render the failure to comply with the re-
contracted
received o r sickness burial
payment of reasonable
quirement no longer an election offense, the provisions being recon
authorize the
ment Head shall o r wages in no c a s e
less
of six months' salary
cilable.63 expenses and
to the surviving spouse or dependent
thousand pesos
laws embracing the than one
Irreconcilable inconsistency between two
nullifies the reason child children of such deceased person.
exist when the later law or
s a m e subject may also with
earlier act, so that the latter loses all meaning
"In of sickness caused by or connected directly
o r purpose of the
case
a prior law is impliedly re- the line of duty, the depart
and function.d* It has been held that the performance of some act in
the r e a s o n for the earlier
act is beyond authorize the payment of the
by a later act where ment head may im his discretion
pealed necessary hospital fees.
peradventure r e m o v e d .
in the
is hased on the cardinal rule that "For employees of a city, the time
allowance and dis-
Repeal by implication inconsistent laws on the same subject be granted except
jurisprudence, two bursements contemplated above shall not
science of There cannot be two conflicting recommendation of the Municipal Board o r
Council of
cannot co-exist in o n e jurisdiction.ts uponcity; in the case of employees of a provincial government,
the
and in the
SCRA 190, 196-197; upon the recommendation of the provincial board;
Sept. 30, 1971, 41
G.R. No. 31711, case of employees of a municipal or municipal district govern-
Villegas v. Subido, Jan. 34, 1974, 65 SCRA 261. citing or
G.R. No. 23894, SCRA 17 (1996), council
Jalandoni v. Endaya, SCAD 660, 261 ment, upon the recommendation of the municipal
af Appeals, 73
Agujetas v. Court 287-288.
Construction, 1990 ed., pp.
June 10, 1976,
71 SCRA 23 municipal district mayor, as the case may be."
Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory G.R. No. 23587, SCA
Court of Appeals, Mining Corp., 202
Radio Tuba Nickel
R a m i r e z v.
Revenue v.
Commisioner of Internal Erna v. Vergel de Dios, 85 Phil. 17 (1949).
(1916).
187. 41 Phil. 567 216 SCRA 600
Smith, Bell &
Co. v. Estate of Maronilla, (1992).
943 (1920).
Tuason, 40 Phil.
G a r c i a Valdez
v.
AND REPEAL 403
E N D M E N T , ON, CODIFICATION
R E V I S I O N ,
402 C. Repeal
cumulative or a continuation of
merely be
The 1987 rmay manifest indication of
Administrative Code provides that "All
ders, rules and
stutu
What is necessary
18 a
laws, decro
n e w
regulations, or the old purpose t o repeal.

hereby repealed orportions
this Code are thereof, inconsistent. legislative p u
the
w the second category of repeal
-
held that the new modified accordingly." now

to
laws
Code did not Co
repeal Section 699 of theThe or codifying the forrmer
come
We
ofa statute revising
There are two old Cada enactment t of
atter. This is only possible if the
re-
first is where categories of repeal by e whole

subject
intended to c o v e r the whole subject
matter are in provisions
in the two acts
on the
implication.
same
The
on the w h
atute or
code was
system in itself. It is the rule that
an
irreconcilable conflict, the later
extent of the conflict
subieet vised mplete and perfect
c o m p l e t
to repeal a prior law if the

act to asequent statute is deemed
lier one. The second isconstitutes an implied repeal of the ea
be
to
former statute.
if the later act covers the the wlhole subjecL muttwr of the
r n e r r Uvises
fao 8uD
of the earlier one
and is clearly intended as whole subiet and scope clearly evince the idea of a
vises re-
ntent
both
will operate to a subestitute, of the prior act that a r e
repeal the earlier law, it When
h e n all parts
and provisions
peal, r e v i s e d .act are deemed repealed. Further-
the
"Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes o m i t t e d
from
there can be an implied repeal under this cat-
when two statutes cover the same place more, before
subject matter; they are so be the clear intent of the legislature that the
clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each it must
of the prior act.
they cannot other that egory,
the substitute
be reconciled or
harmonized;
and both cannot later act be
given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced be No. 73, s. 1991, of the Secretary of
"According to Opinion
nullifying the other. without clear is the intent to cover, only those
T.etice, what appears
that pertain to administration, organi-
"Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new AsDects government
of
because of the many
Code does not cover nor attemnpt, to cover the entire
subject
ation and procedure, understandably
in the government structure since
matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated
in
changes that transpired
the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the enactment of the RAC decades of years ago. x x x. It has
the
of the Secretary and Undersecretary
proviniona on notarion publie; the ieave law, the public bond. been held that opinions
material in the construction of statutes in pari
ing law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits un- of Justice are
der Section 699 and still others. matertaa.
"Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provi- Lastly, it is well-settled rule of statutory construçtion
sions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are thatrepeals of statutes by implication a r e not, favored., The
in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the
conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the na- legislature is presuned to know the existing laws on the sub-
ture being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the b ject and not to have enacted inçonsistent or conflicting stat-
Administrative Code of 1987. However, the COA would have utes,69
Us consider that the fact that Sectjon 699 was not restated in In Ty v. Trampe,7o the issue raised is whether P.D. No.: 921 on
the Adiniuistrative Code of 1987 meant that the same section
the real estate taxes has been repealed impliedly by Rep. Act No. 7160,
had been repeuled. It further maintained that to allow
particular provisions not restated in the n e w Code to continue otherwise krnown as the Local Government Code of 1991 on the
x. It argues,
in 8ame subject. In holding that there has been no implied repeal, the
in force argues against the Code itself. x x Court said:
effect, tlhat what is contemplated is only one Code- the Ad-
is untenable,
ministrative Code of 1987. This contention
the same
"The fact that alater enactment may relate to
earlier statute is not
of itselt
subject matter as that of an
P p . 506-508, citing Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 289 (1986).
since the 66 SCAD
Sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, 115, 250 SCRA 500 (1995).
REPEAL 405
404 REVISION,
CODIFICATION AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION A E N D M E N T ,
C. Repeal
et concordare leges
"From the above, it is clear that n the
.od iin maxim, inlerpretare nust
the two expre5sed
andi modus, i.e., every statute
extensive and laws are not e s t o p t i m u s i n t e r p r e t a
While R.A. No. mutually inclusive in their with other laws as to

brought into accord
is
7160 covers almost all scope and purnotco rule

interpreted anda
that the
governmental poBe, egibus,
jurisprudence. The fundament is
delegated to local government units all over the functione s 0
uniform system ofju
ito existing laws on
have known the
No. 921 embraces country, Pn
p r e s u m e d
be
only Metropolitan Manila n. should
conflicting statutes. Hence, all
administration of financial services Area and is limited have enacted
to the islature not to harmonize and give effect to all
in order to
the subyect a n d
the assessment and therein, especially

collection of real estate (and some
must be exertedd
local) taxes. other

"73
doubts
subject.
will not be
the
Jaws
on
of the rule
th that implied repeal
"Coming down to specifics, Sec. 9 of
PD. No. 921 requirea Anothe
example
t h e r e is a n
irreconcilable inconsistency between two
that the schedule of values of real
properties'in less
blic Act No. 7354 in relation to P.D. No.
tan Manila Area shall be the Metrópoli. l a w s is
in the districts created prepared

in part that the Postmaster
d e c r e e d
jointly by the city assessors provisio

s or
ic Act No. 7354 provides

therein; while Sec. 212 of R.A. 1697. R e p u b of the Board of Directors of the
states that the schedule shall be No. 71 subject
to t h e approval
prepared "by the provincial, General, Corporation,
shall have the power-
city and municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Philippine
Postal
Metropolitan Manila Area for the different claases of real prop pattern and the number of
to determine the stafing
erty situated in their respective local government units for their duties and responsibilities, and fix their
arsonnel, define
emoluments in accordance with the approved
com-
enuctnt by ordinunce of the #arn8gunian conçerned. x x x.
Salaries and of the Corporation."
structure
I t is obvious that harmony in the provisions is not pensation
only
possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistent with hand, Sec. 6 of P.D. No. 1597 provides that
On the other
the legislative intent and policy. x x x.7 i agencies shall report to the President,
Exemptions notwithstanding, on their position classification
In Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole," it is claimed that Sec. 19 of Rep. through the Budget Commission,
plans, policies, rates and other related details
Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act, which grants disciplinary au and compensation
as may be prescribed by the Presi-
thority to the Ombudsman to discipline elective and appointive following such specifications
on Audit denied the allowances granted
officials, except those impeachable officers, has been repealed by dent." Since the Commission
Pontal Corporation a s they w e r e not reported to
Rep. Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code, insofar as local. by the Philippin«
6 of
elective officials are concerned, because the latter is a subsequent the President thru the DBM, the issue raised is whether Sec.
law which vests disciplinary authority against elective local
officials PD. No. 1597 has been repealed by R.A. No. 7354. The Court ruled
the claim, the that there was neither express nor implied repeal of Sec. 6 of P.D.
in the various officials therein named. In rejecting
because "there is No. 1597, the two laws being reconcilable, For while the Philippine
Court ruled that both laws should be given effect
in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has Postal Corporation is allowed to fix its own personnel compens tion
nothing
repealed, whether expressly o r impliedly,
the pertinent provisions structure through its board of directors, the latter is required to
of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes
matter
on the specific in 1ollow certain standards in formulating said compensation system,
not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to conpel and the role of the DBM is merely to ensure that the action taken
question a r e
is the rule
strike down the other. Well-settled board of directors complies the requirements the of
u s to uphold o n e and
not fayored, and that courts
Yhe
law.4 with
that repeals of laws by implication
a r e
their congruent application.

The two laws
must generally a s s u m e
must be absolutely incompatible,
and a clear finding thereóf must Section 3(a) of P.D. No. 451 and Section 42 of Batas Pambansa
may be
drawn. The 021llustrate repeal by implication. Section 3(a) provides that
inference of implied repeal
surface, before the
1bid., p. 516
bid.. pp. 251-252.
SCRA 242 (1995) n a , Jr. v.
COA,
6 6 SCAD 543, 251 106 SCAD 226, 306 SCRA 693 (1999).
406
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CODIFICATION AND REPEAL 407
AMENDMENT, REVISION,
C. Repeal
"no increase in
tuition or other school acts on the same subject are revised and
approved unless sixty per centum (60%) otftees or
charges shal
the proceeds
o r a s e r i e s
of legislative
entire field of subject matter, all
coveriering the
to increase in
salaries or wages of the members is allnn lidated
into one,
former act or acts that are omitted from
of the located of the
t
Subsequently, faeul. provisioris
Batas Pambansa Blg. deemed repealed,78 The fact that the revised
Section 43ulty"
and
232 was
school shallenacted,
arts act a r e
which provides that "each comprehensive and covers the whole field of a
private
r e v i s e d
tuition and other school fees or determine its rat the all-co
is
or
code
specially if it provides that all acts incon-
charges. The rates and charo
tute
subject matter,
adopted by schools pursuant to this
provision shall be collectis
ticular
therewith
a r e repealed,
reveals the intent to establish a
and their application
use ent rules and to nullify existing laws on the sub-
or authorized,
subject rules and Te to uniform system of
lations promulgated by the Ministry of Education, Culture an 79
Sports." The issue raised is whether Section 42 of Batas Pambaneo ject."
been held that where a new statute

is intended to
Blg. 232 impliedly repealed Section 3(a) of P.D. No. 451. The CouH has alsoTt
exclusive rule on a certain subject, it repeals by impli-
held that there was implied repeal because. there are rnish the
differences between the two laws. "Under Près. Decreeirreconcilable
o n the same subject, or
where a n e w statute
old law
No. 451, the eation the matter of a n old law and adds new provi-
authority to regulate the imposition of tuition and other school fes rers the whole subject and where such law, whether it be in the
makes changes,
or charges by private schools is lodged with the Secretary of Educa sions and intended to be a
amendment o r otherwise, is evidently
tion and Culture," while under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Ble form of a n The
of the old act, it repeals the old act by implication.80
232, the private school determines "its, rate of tuition and other revision intended as a substitute
enactment on a subject matter,
Bchon fees or churges" P.D. No. 451 "provides that 60% ,of the complete
be regarded as the expression of the whole
for the old statute, may
inerenental proceeds of tuition fee increases shall be applied or law thereon, and operates as a repeal of the prior statute, although
of
used to augment the salaries and wages of members thefaeulty the two statutes a r e not repugnant.8
and other employees of the school, while B.P. Blg. 232 provides that
Ten-
the increment shall be applied or used in accordance with the reg Illustrative of the rule is the revision of the Agricultural
lations promulgated by the Ministry of Education.78 Act by the Agricultural Land Reform Code. Section 39 of the
ancy
Agricultural Tenancy Act Act No. 1199) provides that "it
(Republic
codification. shall be unlawful for either the tenant or 'andlord without mutual
10.20. Implied repeal by revision or
consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any time previous
by violation of
The legislative intent to repeal a prior law is also shown to the date set, for its threshing." While an action for
codifying the former laws On in court, the Agricultural Land
the enactment of a statute revising or
in this penal provision is pending
the whole subjectt matter. The
revised statute or code is eftect,a etorm Code superseded the Agricultural Tenancy Act, abolished
whatever is embraced in the new sta share tenancy and replaced it with leasehold tenancy. Section 39
legislative declaration that shall be di8
whatever is excluded therefrom which was based on share tenaney, was not reproduced in the
ute shall prevail and
statute or Code, as disclosed by its framework Agricultural Land Reform Code. The effect of such non-reenactment
carded. The revised intended to cover the whole
subject to be ä 18 a repeal of Section 39. For it is a rule of legal hermeneutics that
and substance, must be
the prior sta
in itself in order that an aet which purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain,
complete and perfect system the new statute wiu
which a r e not repeated in operates as a repeal of anything omitted which was contained in
utes o r parts thereof where a statute
is revised
deemed impliedly repealed."
Thus,
be
People v. Benuya, 61 Phil. 208 (1916); People v. Castro, 43 Phil. 842 (1922}
Eople
v. Ople, 156
SCRA 629 (1987).
v.
Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887 (1922).
Cebu Institute of Technology 69 SCRA
410; Peop Chinese
430 (1951). Flour porters Asan., Inc. v. Price Stabilization Board, 89
Phil.
26551, Feb. 27, 1976,
P'ople v. Almuete, G.R. No. see
Beuuya, 61
hil. 208 (1935). 33 Phil. 208
(1910% * overnment v. nicipality of Binangonan, 32 Phil. 634 (1915).
U.S. v. Palacio,
73 Phil. 51 (1941); oaquin
I n r e Guzman, Nov. 1978, 86 SCRA
413. v.
Navarro, 81 Phil. 373 (1948).
G.R. No. 34864,
Pamil v. Teleron,
408
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ohthMENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION AND REPEAL 409
C. Repeal
the old act and not

included in the act as revised. A and all matters in the section that are omitted in
statute, and evidently intended as the substitute But sti. section
are considered repealed,
for it, oertitute
original
to repeal the former the ndment
statute. The revising statute perates

legislative declaration that whatever is embracedisinin efte fect a repeal.
statute prevails and whatever is excluded the new her
forms of implied
discarded.82
therefrom shall be
10.22.
The most powerful
implicat of repeal is that which ariees
t w o laawe is expressed in the form of a universal
l a t e r of
In Tung Chin Hui v.
Rodriguea,3 the issue raised is
Sec. 18 of Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court, which whether
the
w h e n
The repugnance
oftwo statutes is more readily seen when
act is in the form of a negative proposition than when

ve.
provided
that appeal in habeas corpus cases be taken within 48 hours from
nega
rmative. There is a clear distinction
s t a t e d .in the
the.
are
notice of the judgment, has been repealed by the 1997 Ruleso bothlaws tive and negative statutes in regard to their re-
Civil Procedure, which provides in Sec. 3, Rule 41 thereof, that between
fects upon rior legislation,
which may be expressed by
a n affirmative statute does not inpliedly repeal
pealing
appeal from judgment or final order shall be taken within 15 days that while
saying
from receipt thereof, in view of the fact that the Sec. 18 of the pre unle a n intention to effect a repeal is manifest, a
the prior law
1997 Rules of Court, Rule 41 was omitted in Sec. 41 of the 1997
negative statute all
repeals conilicting provisions uniess the con-
in accordance is disclosed.87
Rules. The Court ruled that Sec. 18 was repealed, trary
intention
construction that provisions
with the well-settled rule of statutory The intent to repeal is also shown where it enacts
legislative
in the revision thereof
of a n old law that were not reproduced something in general terms and afterwards it passes another on
deemed repealed and discarded. The in affirmative language
subject the same subject, which though expressed
a r e
covering the s a m e
rule-making body, the Supreme stat
omission shows the intention
of the introduces special conditions or restrictions, the subsequent
provisions of the old laws that the former
Court in this case, to abrogate those ute will usually be considered a s repealing by implication
Code.
in the revised statute or regarding the matter covered by the subsequent act; and
more
a r e not reproduced
specially so when the later act is expressed in negative terms, as
reenactment.
where for example it prohibits a certain thing from being done, or
Repeal by where it declares that a given act shall be performed in a certain
10.21.
reenactment of the whole subjet in manner and not otherwise.
Where a statute is a
the latter disap
on the matter,
s u b s t i t u t i o n of the
previous laws r e e n a c t e d law
is deemed The express repeal of a provision of law from which an execu-
omitted in the Eive official derives his authority to enforce another provision of the
and what is comprehensive, is re
pears
entirely
reenactment,
if complete and the subject, and same law operates to repeal by implication the latter and to de-
The
the whole law
on
repealed. same
the expression of the prior law
on the ve the official of the authority to enforce it. Similarly, the en
garded as of
as an
implied repeal etment ofa statute on a subject, whose purpose or-object is u
operates
thereby Whiy opposed to that of an earlier law on the same subject,
act by provi
subject.8
specific
section of a prior which n by ereby deprives it of its reason for being, operates to repeal
amends a follows,
law
to read
as lawcation the prior law, even though the provisions of both
in the reenathe
Where
amended so
as RWS are
not
ing that the
sanme
amended
is
provision,
what is not
statute
included
is a
substitute
10r
inconsistent."
quotes the The new
deemed
repealed.
ment is
1976, 69
SCRA 410. citing Purras
alde
Valdez Registration Commissiou, 108 Phil. 1142 (1960),
Feb. 27, (2000% v.
G.R. No.
26551, SCRA
765
Tuason,40 Phil. 943 (1920)
4People v.
Almuete,
Rodriguez,
134
S C A D 262,
340
anila
ra v. Electric
rC Co. Co. Public Utilities Employees Assn., 79
v.
Phil. 409 (1947).
Hui v.
284 1142 (1960) uevas, G.R. No. 3693, May 91, 1979, 90 SCRA 379.
Tung
Chiu
Stututory
C o n s t r u c t i o n ,
Registration
1990 ed., p.
Commission,
108 Phil. Ramirez Ourt of Appeals, G.R. No. 23587, June 10, 1976, 71 SCRA 231.
Agpalo, Land (1948).
v. Phil. 373
Parras
Navarro,
81
v.
Joaquin
410 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION NDMENT, KEVISION, ODIFICATION AND REPEAL 411
C. Repeal
10.23. "All laws or matter, whether or not the pror law is a special law. With-
parts thereof which are inconsistent subject
uHe. a later general law will ordinarily not repeal a
this Act are hereby repealed or with clause, a
construed. modified accordingny outsuch ial law on the same subject, as the ltter is generally
prior a s an exception to the former." But with such clause
Statutes usually contain a
repealing clause which reged in the subsequent general law, the prior special law will
laws or parts thereby which are inconsistent with the states; "A
c o n t a i n e d
be deemed repealed, as the clause is a clear legislative intent to

this Act are hereby repealed or modified provisionsof about thut result," unlese
the general law contains a
accordingly." The questio bring saving
that may be asked is: What is the nature of
this repealing
It certainly is not an express repealing clause because it clause?
c l a u s e ,5
fails t
identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be implication not favored.
10.24. Repeal by
pealed. Rather, clause which predicates the intended repeal
it is a
upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found on It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals'
existing and prior acts of the same subject matter. Such being the of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is
case, the presumption against implied repeal and the rule on strict BHainst inconsistency or repugnancy and, accordingly, against im-
construction regarding implied repeal apply ex proprio vigore. For plied repeal." For the legislature is presumed to know the existing
laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflict-
the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws so that,
ing statutes." Hence, all efforts should be exerted to harmonize
repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper
and give effect to all laws on the subject.9 A construction which in
step is to so express it. The failure to add,a specific repealing effect will repeal a slatute altogether should, if possible, be re
clause particularly mentioning the statute to be repealed indicates
that the intent was not to repeal any existing law on the matter, jected. 10 For this reason, in case of doubt as to whether a later
statute has impliedly repealeda prior law on the same
unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the subject, the
doubt should be resolved against implied
terms of the new and the old laws. repeal.0
The court in the principle in detail explains
The circumstance that a later statute which
is inconsistent
"Repeals by implication
a case
follows
does not contain a clause not favored, and will, not be decreed
are
with a prior law on the same subject unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are
and parts thereof which are repugnant
repealing generally all laws presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full knowledge
to repeal by implica
therewith does not prevent it from operating all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to,conclude
inconsistent laws or parts thereof. It has been held tna
tion such
would not be equally repealeu
"such a clause repeals nothing that to be de
without it, the real question
without it. Either with or and irreconcu See Secs. 10.26
fundumental et seq., infra.
statuto is in
ninod iN wlwthwr the new erlan v. Catubig, G.R. No. 23964, June 1, 1966, 17
statute the subject.* Such beingt
on
anila Railryad Co. v. Rafferty, 40 Phil. 224 (1916)
SCRA 376.
able conflict with the prior
asked: What then is the significance o 518 a. gnaciu Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 49 SCAD 33, 230 SRA
rule, it nuy well be laws or parts
thereof wi (1994),
40 Phil. citing Agpalo, tatutory Construction, 1986 ed., p. 295; Valdez v. Tuason,
to the effect that "all 043
repealing clause are hereby repeaf (1920), I . American Management Co., Inc. v Phil. Anierican Man
are inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act
the presen
agement Employeus
Subida, G.R,
Fhu Assn., GR. No.
The significance is that Jan.
No. 31711, Sept.
49 SCRA 194;
36254, 29, 1973, Villegas v
or modified accordingly?" clearly Inahe 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 190 (1971); De Jesya v. People
clause in a later statute O. 61098, Feb. 22, 1983, 120
such general repealing SCRA 760.
the legislative intent
to repeal all prior
inconsistent laws , 1965,lloilo Palay & Corn.
13 SCRA
377.
rn Planters Assn., Inc. v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 24022, March
Mareh
1901) US. v. aclo,
Palaci 33 Phil. 208 (1916); Maceda v. Macaraeg, 197 SCRA 771
24022,
G.R. No. 7 1SCHA ople v. Olarte,

Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters'
Assn., Inc. v. Feliçiano,
G.R. No. 36049, May 31, 13109* wlarinarin v.
108 Phil. 766 (1960).
Nacioncena 19 Phil. 238 (1911)
13 SCRA 377; City Naga v. Agna,
of cobo v.
stanislao, G.R. No. 30458, Aug. 1, 1976, 72 SCRA 520,
8, 1965,
176. 950 (1920)
Valdez v. Tuason, 40 Phil. 943,
412
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AMENDMENT, REVISIO 1ON, CODIFICA1 AND REPEAL 413
C. Repeal
that in
passing a statute it was not intended to forbearance of money, goods or credits, as
abrogate any former law relating to some

interfere with tions involvi
loan or
ments relating to such loan or forbearance of money,

ina
nancy between the two is not matter, unless the ren or

only irreconcilable, but well a s j u d g
the Centr.
Bank Circular applies. It is only in
convincing, and flowing necessarily from the languagealso clear a credits,
where the Presidential Decree al
the later act used, unl actiong or judgments the other
fully embraces the subject nlesa Board to dip its fingera into. On
u c h t r a n s a o
unless the reason for the matter of the earlier.

earlier act is beyond or
Monetary
payment of indemnities a s damages,

moved. Hence, peradventure
every effort must be used to make all e
acts stand aa
lowed
hand, i nnn
cases requiring
with any delay in the performance of an obligation
if, by any reasonable construction, they can be in connection
loan or forbearance of money, goods or
act wll not reconciled, the
lator those involving
Civil Code applies. For the Court, this is
repeal of the earlier."12
operate as a other
than
2209 of the
Art.
and logical interpretation of the two laws.
National Power Corp. v. Angas0s illustrates the credits,
fair, reasonable, between
the application
principle that repeal or amendment by implication is not favoreda
the mos
ee any conflict Central Bank Circular No. 416

or any reason to hold that the
The issue raised is whether Central Bank Circular No. We 2209 of the Civil Code
reads:
416, which and
has
repealed tthe latter by implication."
mer
to hold that one statute has repealed another

By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 Carts are slow
of Act No. 2655, as amended, otherwise known as the URurv and they will not make such adjudication if they
implication,
Law, the Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 1622 dated an refrain from doing so,orI they can arrive at another result by
which is just and reasonable. Moreover, courts
July 29, 1974, has prescribed that the rate of interest for the construction
of one act in order to decide that it
loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the will not enlarge the meaning nor will
rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract reDeals another by implication, they adopt an interpreta-
to of repeal
adjudication by implication unless it is
as to such rate of interest, shall be twelve per cent (12%) per tion leading an
clear and explicit reason therefor can be adduced.104«
annum." inevitable and a
has impliedly repealed or amended Article 2209 of the Civil Code

10.26. As between two laws, one passed later prevails.
which states that:
As betwoen two laws on the same subject matter, which are
"Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a
in delay, the indemnity ireconcilably inconsistent, that which is passed later prevails, since
s u m of money, and the debtor incurs
shall it is the latest expression of legislative will.6 Leges posteriores
for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, ab-
the interest agreed upon, and in the priores contrarias abrogant, or later statute repeals prior ones which
be the payment of
s e n c e of stipulation, the legal
interest, which is six percent are repugmant thereto. The rule applies even if the later act is
made to take effect ahead of the earlier law. Thus, it has been held
p e r annum."
the Court ruled that

that, as between two acts, the one passed later and going into
In answering the issue in the negative, efect earlier will prevail over one passed earlier and going into
or evenamendments implication are not favored if two
by elfect later. For instance, an act passed April 16th and in force
"repeals
x x x In this case, Central Bank April 21st was held to prevail over an act passed April 9th and in
laws can be fairly reconciled. dif
Art. 2209 of the Civil Code contemplate eect
July 4th of the
Circular No. 416 and transactions. In tranBac same year. And an act going into efiect imme
situations and apply to
different
ferent
see also Smith,

216 (1916);
Bell & Co. v. Esn Nationul Power Corp. v. Angas, 208 SCRA 542 (1992).
10U.S. Palacio, 33 Phil. 208, 157 SCRA 147 (195 CS V. Averia, G.R. No. 22526, Nov. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 907; Lopez V.
v.
of Maronilla, 41 Phil.
557 (1916); Velunta v. Chief, P.C.,
76 SCAD 223,
264 SCRA
Z11
Comnmmissioner of Customs
Power Corp.
Province of Lanao del Sur,
v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
81 SCAD
ns, G.R. No. 28235, Jan. 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 327; Libares v.
National
271
21505, Oct. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 261; David v. COMELEC,
(1996). (1992).
.294. 4 sCRA 90 (1997), citing
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed.,
10208 SCRA 542, 649
414 oDIFICATION AND REPEAL 415
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ENDMENT, REVISION, Repeal
diately hàs been the terms of the general act are
into effect later.06held to ough

thou
prevail over an act
passed before but rule
applies
even
the matter by special stat-

covered the
ais to include
i ncl
Whenever two statutes of

goin
going a n d
e n o u g h
to
is eexpressed
in the maxim, generalia specialibus
ad specific o r special
are of equal different dates
theoretical application and of
contrary toh 13
d
The
e r o g a
principle
n t . A g e n e
law does not nullify
al
r a l
a
of later date
must t a particular case, the statut
enor on der
will.107 prevail, being

a later
expression of general law is
Conformably the order legislative
1aw prevails
over a
l a w3
with this rule, as between The reason why

whyy a special
ence of
credit set forth in Articles
2241 to 2245 of the of prefer
a son
ture considers and makes provision for all the cir-
and that of Article 110 of Civil Caoda case. The legislature having specially
t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r
the Labor Code, particula lar

of the
unpaid wages and other monetary claims of gving first preference ta tances
the fa
facts circumstances in the particular case
and
yield to the latter, being the law of later
the labor, former mue
nust nsidered
all o f
charter, it will not be considered
that the
enactment,108 granting a special
a general law containing provisions repug-

The later law repeals an earlier one because it is the slature, by adopting of the charter, and without making any
legislative will. It is to be presumed that the lawmakers knewlater
the ant
to the
provisions
i n t e n t i o n to amend
or modify the charter, intended
older law and intended to change it. In its of act. l14
enacting the older law, the nention
or modify the special

legislators could not have known the newer one and, to amend, repeal
not have intended to change what they did not know.hence, coul and special laws a r e read and construed together,
Under the The general
Civil Code, laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and not
the and that repugnancy between them 1s reconciled by constituting
general words, law. In other
other way around. To illustrate, Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 6679 pro he
snecial law as a n exception to the
vides that the term of barangay officials who were to be elected "on special law in the specific and particu-
eneral law yields to thelatter."o The principle applies irrespec-
the second Monday of May 1994" is five (5) years. However, the lar Bubject embraced in the law. Where the law
later Act, Rep. Act No. 7160, in Sec. 43(¢) thereof, states that the tive of the date of passage of the special special
term of office of barangay officials who were to be elected aleo on s later, it will be regarded as a qualification of the general one;
the second Monday of May 1994 is three (3) years. There being a and where the general law 1s later, the special law will be con-
clear inconsistency between the two laws, the later law fixing the BLruoed
us 1 excepliun to its terns.'ld
shall prevail.109
term barangay officials at three (3) years
of
. 10.27. Application of rule.
General law does not repeal special law, generally
10.26. The rule of generalia specialibus non derogant has been ap-
of legal hermeneutics that a plied in a number of cases involving the question as to whether a
It is a well-established principle a prior special
does not operate to repeal 8ubsequent general law has repealed a prior special law on the
general luw on a subject that the legis*
unless it clearly appears Same subject. In these cases, the court invariably ruled that the
law on the s a n e subject,°
act to modify or repeal the Bpocial law is not
lature has intended by
the later general
implied repeal 1s
inpliedly repeuled and an constitutes exception
The presumption against
earlier special a w . " and the other genera
two laws, o n e is special
of
stronger when,
Manila Railroad Co.
Rafferty, 40 Phil. 224 (1919); Commissioner of v.
72 Phil. 7
(194). aKevenue on Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 487 (1992). Inter
Co Phil. Labor Union, Lachauco & Co. v.
1Manila Trading & Supply
v.
of the Phil., 50
Phil. 490 (1927). 14De V Apostol,
a v.
44 Phil. 138 (1922).
10Herman v. Radio Corp. 206 (1989).
Court of Appeala, 195 SCRA
722 (1991).
Bank v. Cruz, 180 SCRA 1pner v.
U.S., 11 Phil. 669
(1904);
21516, 17, ril1976,29, 741966,SCRA
(1997).
l00Phil. N a t i o n a l 271 SCRA 90 Bagatsing v. Ramirez, G.R.
UDavid v.
(OMELEC, 81 SC'AD 482,
Yalera
306; Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. City of Butuan,No.G.R.
41t5,
No.
ilSee Sve. 6.20, supra. Phil. 848
Relations, 80
(1948;
a 16
Appeals, 195 SCRA 444SCRA 758; Commissioner of Internal Revenue Court of
of Industriul
138 (1922; Buu v.
pinion,Lopez v.
Caachu v. Court & Co. v. Apostol,
44 Phil.
SCRA
708.
Pinion,
(1991).
Tuason, 80
Phil. 823 (1948);
Lichauco
21516, April 29, 1966, 16 Villen
Villena v. vService Commission, 195
SCRA 777 (1991). See dissenting
Sawmill, Inc.
v. City
of Butuan,
G.R. No
Roque,
ue, 93 Phil. 370, 373 (1953).
416
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CODIPICATION
AND REPEAL 417
ssNJDMENT, KEVISION,
C. Reposl
to the
general law
unmistakable terms whenever
act.17
the
its intent to legislature failed to the
charter the
of t government corporation concerned
repeal or modiuy the indirat.. here provision
to the contrary."11
prior an exercis ain any
120
In
National pecial ailway Co. u. Collector of Internal Revenue,
whether Section 2 Pouwer
In Philippine Raile
Corp.
of Com. Act Arca,8 the question
v.
Philippine Railway Co. was granted a legisla-
the
Corporation, 120, creating the raisod s
a
railway line pursuant to Act No. 1497,
to sell
a
government-owned
electric power and to corporation, National P
Power
to
operate
eads: "In consideration of the premises and

of
fix the and empowern ranchise
which
rea
concession or franchise, there shall be paid by

collection of the
charges for
rates and
provide for
13 o f
the operation of
Section
charges shall not be service

the rates of any hilippine Government, annually, x x x a n amount
rendered:
Service Commission" subject to revisionProvided.
by
one per centum of the gross earnings of the
by Republic Actthe Phuh.
has been
amending the Public Service Actrepealedand granting the No, 26m grantee X * On
x." the other hand, Section 259 of the Internal
Commission the jurisdiction to fix the Publie Servio Revenue C o d s amended by Republic Act No. 39, provides that
utilities owned rate of lected in respect to all existing and future
operated by the government or charges
be colle
or of uli there shall
groBs earnings or receipts from the business
corporations. In answering tho issue
in the government-owed nchises, upon t h e
the law grantin a franchise tax of five per centum of
that special law, like Com. Act No. 120, negative,forthe court hela
a
covered by
case or class of providing a particular chargOs, nd
and
percentages as
are specified in the specia!
cases, is not repealed by a Buch
taxes,
rs of the corporati upon whom such franchises are conferred,
general in its terms, like Republic Act No. 2677,
subsequent statute
of the general statute are although the tem charever is higher, unless the provisions hereof preclude the
broad to include the erms
embraced in the special law, in theenough
wnnaition of a higher tax x x *." The question is whether Section
absence of a
eCase MR of the Tax Code has repealed Section 13 of Act No. 1497. The
repeal. "In the present case," said the court, "there clear intent t aurt ruled that there was no implied repeal and said that charters
appears no sueh
legislative intent to repeal or abrogate the provisions of the' earlier orBpecial laws, such as Act No. 1497, stand upon a different footing
law. From the explanatory note to House Bill No.
became Republic Act No. 2677, it was explicit that 4030, that late general laws. Once granted, a charter becomes a
private
conferred upon the Republic Service Commission over the
the juriadiction ontract and cunnot be alered
nor amended except by consent of
public all concerned, unless the right to alter or repeal is expressly reserved.
utilities operated by government-ownd or controlled The reason is that the legislature, in passing a
is to be confined to the fixing of rates of such
corporations special charter, has
public services, in its attention directed to the special facts and
order to avoid cutthroat or ruinous and unfair competition the act or charter is intended to meet. circumstances whicha
The legislature having
detrimentai to operators and to the public interests. By the nature cially considered all of the facts and spe-
of the service being rendered by the National Power Corporation, lar case in granting a special circumstances in the particu-
the charter, it will not be considered
i.e., the harnessing and then distribution and sale of electric power legislature, by adopting
a
general law that
to the consuming public, the contingency intended to be met by the repugnant to the
provisions
of the
çontaining
the
provisions
legal provision under consideration would not exist, No other tion of its intention to charter, and without any men
amend, repeal or amend
modify the charter, intended
or
conclusion appears possible, therefore, than that the authority ol modify the special act. to
the Public Service Commission under Republic Act No. 2677 over not only does not show any Section 259 of the Code
the fixing of rates of charges of public utilities owned or operated ax on existing intention to levy a higher
can only De a respecting thefranchises,
tax rates
but, on the percentage
contrary, evinces the
government-owned or controlled corporations, purpose
by Oy, the clause "whose incorporated
provisions
in the
charters,
awhich could only refer to preclude the imposition of a shown as
charters such higher

Feb. 21, 1980, 96 SUA
as
Act No. 1497.
1Sto. Domingo v. De los Angeles, G.R. No. 30135,
109 SCRA J8.
139; Gordon v. Court Appeals, G.R. No. 37831, Nov. 23, 1981,
of ]bid. at
G.R. No. 23309, Oct. 31, 1968, 25
SCRA 931. 91 Phil. pp. 935-936.
35
(1952).
418 419
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AMENDMENT,
REVISIONCODIFICATION
AND REPEAL
C. Repeal
In Laguna Lake general law and

Development there is a conilict between a a
the issue raised is:
Which agency ofAuthority
u. Court uwhere
of Appeale the special statute should prevail since it
Lake Dev.
Authority or the towns
the Government the Lagina
speci. statute,
l e g i s l a t i v e intent more clearly than the general

the region- should
exercise
and municipalities comprisin
evinces th
lav is to be taken as an exception to the

and its environs insofar as the jurisdiction over the Laguna J,ao s t
The special
a t u t e
absence of special circumstances forcing a

.
issuance of permits for general l a w in the

leges is concerned. The Laguna Lake fishery pri This | is because implied repeals are not
ute Development Authority stat onclusion.
specifically provides that the Laguna Lake Development Au.

contrary
favored a n d a s much a s possible effect must be given to all

thority shall have exclusive enactments of the legislatu A special law cannot be repealed,
of all surface water for any jurisdiction
to issue
permits for the U8e subsequent general law by mere
projects in or affecting the said region. amended or altered by a
including the operation of fishpens. On the other hand, Republie ame

i m p l i c a t i o n . " 1 2 2
Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991,

grants the mu statute provides that clerks of courts of municipal
nicipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in
Where
the municipal judge at the expense of
municipal waters. The Court ruled that the two laws should be r'sshall be appointed by
later law was enacted providing that
where
harmonized, and that the Laguna Lake Authority statute, beinga he municipality and a
paid out of the municipal funds shall

whose salaries are.
special law, must be taken as an exception to Rep. Act No. 7160, a employees
the municipal mayor, the later law cannot be said
general law, thus: be appointed by
repealed the prior law a s to vest in the municipal mayor
to have
"We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do the power to appoint municipal clerk of court, as the subsequent
not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the law should be construed to comprehend only subordinate officials
Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter
water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake re ofthe municipality and not those of the judiciary.13 A city charter
giving real estate owner a period of one year within which to re-
gion. deem a real property sold by the city for nonpayment of realty tax
of 1991 does not contain' from the date of such auction sale, being a special law, prevails
The Local Government Code
expresely repeale law granting landowners
any express provision
which categorically
there over a general a period of two years to
has to be conceded that make
the charter of the Authority. It
the legislature to repeal Republie
the redemption.4 Similarly,
the Civil Service Law on the
procedure for the suspension or removal of civil service employees
the part of
w a s no intent on of laws should
amendments. The repeal does not apply with respect to the suspension or removal of mem-
Act No. 4850 and its
be made clear and expressed.
bers of the local police force, as the Police Act, which is a special
charter of the Laguna
Jaw, governs the matter.125
conceded that the
"It has to be constitutes a special
law. Repub-
a
Lake Development Authority of 199, is
OCode
Government 0.28. When
lic Act No. 7160,
the Local c o n s t r u c t i o n that the en
special general
repeals the other.
or law
statutory
It is basic in cannot E
general law.
later legislation
which is a general law rule where a later
special law on a particular subject is repugnant
a c t m e n t of a
special law.
It is well-settled r inconsistent with, a prior general law on the same subject, a
provided for a par
a
to have repealed
construed
that 'a special
statute,
subsequeu"
TN epeal of the latter will be implied to the extent of the
in this jurisdiction not repealed by a ganey or an exception
ticular case or classof cases, is
and application, granted upon the general law. In short,
provisions
in its terms, although
statute, general o r alter
is manifest,
to repeal to include
less the intent
broad enough d., pp. 56-57.
law are
the general rcia v Pascual, 113 Phil.
terms
of the special
law.
iordon v. CoOurt of Appeals, 632
cases
e m b r a c e d in
Sto, D G.R. (1961).
No. 37831, Nov. 23, 1981, 109 SCRA 388.
g O V . De
los Angeles, G.R. No. 30135, Feb. 21, 1980, 96 SCRA
(1995).
SCRA 42
SCAD 370, 251
1266
420
AMENDM IFICATIN
REVISION, CODIR AND REPEAL 421
STATUTORY CONSTRUCIION C. Repeal
there is always shall be two percent (2%) of their gross

law. 126
a
partial repeal where the later act is
power
hund, Sec. 137 of the Local Government
e other
light, heat
a
Bpecio wceipts. O n
s t a t e s that "Notwithstanding any exemption
On the other No.
7160)
hand, whether a
subsequent general
C o d e( R . A .
lawl a w or other special
la, the province may impose a
subject has repealed or amended law on by
any
anchise, at a rate not exceeding fifty
subject by implication is a prior special act on the
a a
granted enjoying
Biness
a
question of legislative intent. The Bam tax on buBin
one
percent 1%) of the gross annul receipts x x x."
(1%b)
lative intent to (50%) f
repeal may be shown in the act itself, the leri p e r c e n t
ruled
that the phrase "notwithatanding any exemption
tory note to the bill before its
passage into law, the explana. The CCourt
ou
law or her special law" is all-encompassing and
the floor of the
legislature, 127 and the history of the twodiscussions on any
granted
by legislature intended to withdraw all tax exemptions
There is intent to repeal the earlier legislationa.a ar
C l e a r
that the
ders, and this intent is made more manifest
special law where the later d by
franchise
*hat unless otherwise

general act provides that all laws or parts thereof which are enjoy93 of the Code, when it provides
sistent therewith are repealed or incon b ySec. 1 9 3
in this code, tax exemptions

or incentives granted to or
modified accordingly,23 where the ently enjoyed by all persons, except local water districts,
provide
general law contains a provision stating that it shall apply not
withstanding any other provisions of law relating to the same mat neratives, and non-stock and non-protit hospitals and educational
itutions, are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the Code. Such
co0)
ter,130 where the general law uses words and phrases which would instit
s mention of those who are to enjoy taxX exemptions excludes
be rendered meaningless if the special law is not thereby repealed expre
mentioned,135
or modified,31 or where the later statute is so broad in its terms not expre6sly
all others
and so clear and explicit in its words as to show that it was in Gaerlan v. Catubig illustrates the principle. The question
tended to cover the whole subject and therefore to displace the aised is whether Section 12 of Republie Act No. 170, as amended,
prior statute.32 If the intention to repeal the special law is clear, the City Charter of Dagupan City, which fixed the minimum age
then the rule that the special law will be considered as an excep- qualification for members of the city council at twenty-three years,
tion to the general apply; what applies is the rule that
law does not has been repealed by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 2259 entitled
no
the.special law is deemed impliedly repealed.13 For there is An Act making elective the offices of mayor, vice-mayor and
even by implication
ofa special or councilors in chartered cities" which fixed the age qualification for
prohibition against the repeal such positions at twenty-five years. The court ruled that there was
broad law.134
specific act by a general
or
cannot be construed
to an implied repeal of Section 12 of the charter of Dagupan City
rule that a general law because the legislative intent to
The general admits of excep- repeal the charter provision is
law by implication
have repealed a special
m e r e
is manifest. For instance,

Clear from the fact that Dagupan City, unlike some cities, is not one
when the intent to repeal or alter of those cities expressly excluded by the law from its operation and
tion, a s of law or local
Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 551
provides that any provision all grantees iromthe circumstance that it provides that all acts or parts thereof
the franchise tax payable. 1or Mlch are inconsistent therewith are repealed. Moreover, the court
ordinance to the contrary, sell electric current
and
franchise to generate,
distribute
ded: "Given the fact that Dagupan City beyond
of
Ved from the exceptions, it stands
is
to reason itself that its
peradventure
17 SCRA DIO rer provision on the age limit is
Pnttheitslast statute is so broad inthereby repealed. And this,
June 30, 1966,
G.R. No. 23305,
City of Manila,
126Lagman v.
214 SCRA
(1992).
378 SCRA 2D. its terms and so clear and
Court of Appeals, Oct, 24, 1963, 9 n words so as to
8ubject, and therefore show that it was intended to cover the
(1966); Corona
v.
Secretary, G.R.
No. 21505,
Executive
L i b a r e 8 v.
Tuason, 80
Phil. 823 (1948). Feb. 29,
1972, 43 SU to displace the prior statute.
13?
128Valera v. G.R. No. 32979,
Civil
A e r o n a u t i c s Board,
June 1, 1966,
17 SCRA 376
Lichocu v. Catubig, G.R.
No. 23964,
(V999). 4City Oerment
Governnen
Gaerlan v. (1966).
Phil. 889
670 (1972); Bank, 99 of San Pablo
Phil. National (1952).
130Baga v. 92 Phil. 302
v. Reyes, 105 SCAD 144, 305 SCRA 353
Manuel v.
De la Fuente,
44 Plhil. 138
(1922).
1963, 9
SCHA 20
13
3Lichauco &
Co. v. Apostol,
Secretary,
G.R. No. 21605,
Oct. 24,
74 SCRA
308.
bid., No.at 23964,
p. 382.
June 1, 1966, 17 SCRÁ
376 (1966).
Executive Dec. 17, 1976,
L i b a r e s v.
G.R. No. 41631,
v. Ramirez,
Bagatsing
134
422 423
AND REPEAL,
CODIFICATION
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DMENT,
REVISION,
C. Repeal
AME
The court, in
ters should
yield Bagatsing Ramirez,13s explains
to
v. of r e p e a l ,
generally.
of the date
general laws affecting
Effects
ter of
city, which is a
a why city oh.
citie8 statute renders il inoperative
as
special law, in
general: Achar. The a p.
pa llo
ea f a
of
The repeal is by n o m e a n s equivalent
10.20.
superseded by a later statute,

must be read and
may be
impliedly modifiod cha takeseffect.
statute is invalid from the
date
where
the repeuing uct
into the a
is statute the repealed
it continues in the statute book
laration that
provisions. subsequent
A charter, notwithstanding controlino it
any of its
oa declarat,
O n the
co.
contrary,
the
the subject matter of which it
cities prevails over general law isimilarly partiel enactment.
l a n d touching
applicable
provision, for the to
any conflicting charter of the the repealed statute loses
that a charter ofits law the contrrary appears,
must not reas
public policy of the state.be Ainconsistent with the general law governing acts which it is
e
unless
treats; and
nd and effect a s a
chartered city is not an laws and force
sovereignty. The statute remains independen
supreme in all matters
ne of.
prior
to Its
repeal.141
local. Otherwise not undo the consequences of the

and stated, a charter
must yield to the purelnot aDDlicable
The repeal o ff .a law does
general
laws of the state. When a
charter is constitution in force, unless such result is di-
st
s ta
attu
ute whil
ter is deemed to o f Lhe
Lhe
enacted, the char
incorporate therein the general laws Dperatjon guage o r by necessary implication, except
lang1
a s it
governments. affecting local ted by

ights
express
which b e c o m e
vested when the repealed act was
the repeal of a law renders illegal what under
m a ya l f e
InPhilippine International Trading Corp. u. 142 Neither
charter COA, PITC force,
act is legal, nor, absent any legislative

intent to the
expressly exempted it from the law decreeing in
under the former law is illegal.143
classification and compensation system. On the other the position
r e p e a l e d
the
makes legal vhat
contended that the PITC charter had been hand, COA ary,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, known as the Loçal
Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 6758, which impliedly repealed by For
instance,
provides that nment was
repealed by Kepublic Act Np. 7160, known
Code,
ode of 1991, which took effect on Janu
Govern
"Section 16. Repeal of Special Salary Laws and Local Government
tions. All laws, decrees, Regula. the new Code provides that rights and
1 1992. Section 5(d) of date
executive orders, corporate char.
- -
of the effectivity of the new Code

ters, and other issuances or parts thereof, that exempt agen iations existing on the
cies from the coverage of the System, or that authorize and fix and arising out of contracts or any other source of prestation in-
olving a local government unit shall be governed by the original1
position classifications, salaries, pay rates or allowances of erms and conditions of said contrácts or the law in force at the
specified positions, or groups of officials, and employees or of
agencies, which are inconsistent with the System, including rights were vested.144
time such
the proviso under Section 2 and Section 16 of P.D. No. 985 are
hereby repealed." 10.30. On jurisdiction, generally.
The Court ruled that there was implied repeal, the legislative
1Jurisdiction t try and decide actions is determined
intent to do so being manifest. "In the case at bar, the repeal by law in force at the time the action is filed:
by the
Section 16 of R.A. No. 6758 of 'all corporate charters
that exempt Generally
neither the repeal nor the expiration of the law
speaking,
agencies from the covèrage of the System' was clear and expressed or administrative tribunal. of the authority to act on the
deprives the court
for which the law was enacted, pending
necessarily to achieve the purposes action and tofinally decide it.146 Stated differently, the general rule
Lhat is, the standardization of salaries
of all employees in government
controlled corporations to achieve 'equal pay for
owned and/or be consid-
work. Henceforth, PITC should now
substantially equal
a compensation and position S.v. Cune, 12 Phil. 241 (1908); U.S. v. Soliinan, 36
ered as covered by laws prescribing 6758."" Phil. 5 (1917).
including R.A. No. Ramos Municipality of Daet, 105 Phil. 134 (1959).
v.
classification system in the government Ramos v. Municipality of Daet,
SCRA 306 (1976).
Macasiano v. Diokno, 212 SCRAsupra.
464 (1992).
13G.R. No. 41631,
Dec. 17, 1976, 74
SCRA 0 v.
Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 24170, Dec. 16,
Comm 1968,
ornissionerNoxas
SCRA 177 (1999). Sayoc, v.
100 Phil. 448 26
139108 SCAD 103, 309 of Custonis, G.R. No. 20460,
(1956);
Bombay Department Store v.
4309 SCRA, p. 191. Sept. 30, 1985, 15 SCRA 104.
424 CODIFICATION AND REPEAL 425
NT.KEVISION,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AMENDMENT, C. Repeal
1s that where the,pendency

of the proceedings does not
a
court or during
of the jurisdiction to continue
cising jurisdiction over atribunal has already acquired and is h e law
j o n o ft h e
ommissioner ofCustoms
ettect of making the ilegal
final
tion
determination of thecontroversy, its jurisdiction to proce
cause is not affected
e. d i v e s tt h e
the
does it have the
or doe
nor
setting aside
case, the lecision of the commissioner
repealing the statute which by the new lecia esolve or of
of the law is brought about by the
unless the originally conferred an legal
p o r t a t i o nl egal expiration.
repealing statute provides otherwise, jurisditin Iff

er. I
tlhe
the
statute, the
latter may not be given retroactive
expressly or transaction effected under the
matler.
necessary implication.147 the

re repealing
action or
oy pn ofa defeat
d efe any 161
The rule that

passa
as
to
contrary is provided,
once the court so the
troversy, acquires jurisdiction over
it shall continue to exercise
e
otlt
d e
sc
ect
tt
atute,
unless unless
such jurisdiction Con-

final determination of the case and is until to try c r i m i n a l case.
it not affected by subsemi jurisdiction
legislation vesting jurisdiction over such proceedings
0.31. O nj u r i s d i
On
in anoth the jurisdiction of a court to try a crimi
tribunal admits of exceptions. A recognized ettled that
at the time the action is
exception is when th
statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect It is by the lawiin force
d e t e r m i n e d .
crininal case is acquired,

to try
intended to operate upon actions pending before its that it
is a
jurisdicti
nalcase 152 Once
the court until the case is finaily
enactment uted.
institu.
remains with
However, where such retroactive effect is not provided for, statuta that
diction
subsequen
statute anending or repealing a prior
A
altering the jurisdiction of a court cannot be applied to cases al t e r m i n e d .
which the court acquiredjurisdiction over the case with

ready pending prior to their enactment." act
under the court's jurisdiction may not operate to
of removing
The repeal or expiration of a statute, under vwhich a court o the
effect
that has already attached,1" unless the contrary
iurisdiction words are used,i* or the criminal
tribunal originally acquired jurisdiction to try and decide à ca express prohibito
provide 166
does not make its decision subsequently rendered thereon núll an s itself repcaled,
violated is
void for want of authority, unless otherwise provided," This rlé law
assumes that at the time the repeal

of the statute took effect, the otherwise.
actions, pending o r
Where the action, which accrued be 10.32. On
case is pending adjudication.
not yet been commenced is that the repeal of a statute defeats
fore the passage of the repealing act,
has The general rule
into effect, the court or including those which are still pending
or filed in court
when the repeal went actions and proceedings,
subsequently fled are based on said statute.156 The rule applies
tribunal acquires no jurisdiction
over the action which arose out of or
and void. It has been held that an appellate court,
thereon is accordingly null to cases pending appeal.
and its decision will dispose of a question ac-
the expi in reviewing a judgment on appeal,
iatent to the contrary, time 'of disposition and not
In the ubsehce of a legislative what, under the cording to the law prevailing at the
statute does not render legal
ration or repeal ofa the court or
to deprive
transaction, so as
old law, is an illegal a case involving such illegal
to act on
tribunal of the authority certain importations to be Lazaro v. Commiseioner of Customs, G.R. No. 22511, May 16, 1966, 17
law declares
Thus, where a pur
the C o m m i s s i o n e r of Customs,
transaction. A
SCRA 86.
subject to forfeiture by proceedings, the exp HRillaroza v. Arciaga, G.R. No. 23848, Oct. 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 717; Ferrer v.
illegal, initiated forfeiture cson, 92 Phil. 172 (1952); People v. Adolfo, G.R. No. 24191, March 21, 1965, 13
suant to
which the latter
SCRA 699 (1965).
America .
Veloso,Rlaroza
Insurance Co.
of North
67 SCAD v.
Arciega, supra; People v. Pegrum, 58 Phil. 715 (1933); People v.
Phil. 234 (1950);
SCRA 301. 101, SCRA 135 (1996).
262
v. Labes, 87 1966, 17
]buran
21021, May 27, SCRA 248
(1979.
ura wLabes, 87 2848,
United States
Lines Co., G.R. No.
No. 48706,
June 1979, 91
28, t.31, 1967, 21 SCRA 717. Phil. 234 (1960); Rillaroza y. Arciaga, G.R. No.
Inciong, G.R. 496 (2000), 2205,
cople v. Almuete, G.R. No. 26551, Feb. 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 410; People v.
Bengzon v. 338 SCRA 485, G.R. No.
1Alarilla v.
Sandiganbayan, Legaspi,
Tañada v. Falor, 77 Phil. 1000
Sayoc, 100
Phil. 448 (1956); Int X (1947).
R O x a s v. Philippinee,
18]. porma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 47533, Oct. 27, 1981, 108 SCRA
566. of the
13 SCRA Getz Corp.
March 31, 1965, 425 (1953); SCRA 86.
v. Reyes,
93 Phil. 116
Galang 21, 1982,
59823, Aug.
G.R. No.
Court of Appeals,
REPEAL
427
AND
CODIFICATION
REVISION,
NIDMENT,
C. Repeal
426 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Where a
illustrate the principle.
to said
the right to
use
Examples m a y b e certificates
institu-
according to the law
prevailing at the time of ives holders of backpay to government
financial
rendition obligations will n o t de-

appealed judgment. The court will, therefore, reverse a statule give their such payment
which was correct at the time it was judhe of the law

disallowing
vested under the
old law
originally rendered wher rtificate t h e r e o f whose r i g htts
s
become
to such
statute,. there has been an intermediate change in the ions, the rep
t h e i r obligations
renders such lavw certificates
to pay ben-
judgment the time the case
erroneous at
was p r i v e h
lder
o l d
e workmen's
compensation
disposed of
on appeal. Thus, if
to .
Rights tto
i
o
Rights
Compensation Act
can be
pending appeal from the judo the
right
institutions.
Workmen's
Wo
of the lower court the law is the
t h e
changed, or the statute under whi of
inancial accrued
under
the new Labor Code, although
was decided has been
repealed, the appellate court must disnne e f i t sw h i c h .
fter its repeal by Where a stat-
longer compensable.152
enforced even afte
the case under the law in force when its is
decision is rendered. "Tm illness
no
from a n adverse decision,

t h e ;right to appeal
latter,
court must conform its decision to the law then u n d e r the
existing and ma he
appellant
appellant has already perfected
therefore, reverse a judgment which was correct when pronouned gives
such
an statute
fter a n
the uppenl, n o r
ute
right to proNecute
in the
subordinate tribunal, if it appears that pending apeal a the repeal of.
not
d e n t r o y hia
decide the appealed
statute which was necessary to support the judgment of the al will c o u r t of t i e authority tu
wer
court has been withdrawn by an absolute repeal.0
'
hin he appellate
whether
of the issues raised is
Case, lus
'
one
Republic v. igrino, 0 Act No. 1379
10.33. On vested rights. fn
ecution for unexplain ined wealth under Republic
forfeited in favor of the
state any prop-
The repeal of a statute does not destroy or impair rights thal declaring
accrued and became vested under the statute before its repeal. If led an "act been unlavfully acquired by any public officer
ontit
not be con found to have the procedure therefor,
has already
any other construction is possible, the statute should erty
and providing for
strued so as to affect the rights which have vested under the old or employceThe Court ruled: "In his pleadings, private respondent
law then in force, o r as requiring the abatement

of actions instj. nrescribed. n o longer be prosecuted because of prescrip-
he may
tuted for the enforcement of such rights.68
It has been held that contends that of Rep. Act No.. 1379 which provides
statute is in force ordinarily tion. He
relies o n Section 2
rights accrued and vested while
a
to file such petition [for farfeiture of unlawfully
survive its repeal. The repeal of a statute does not operate to im that the right
within four years from the date of
pair or otherwise affect rights which
have become vested or ac acquired wealth] shall prescribe term of the
This rule is applicable alike to dismissal o r separation o r expiration of the
crued while the statute w a s in force. resignation,
to, recover He retired o n May 9, 1984, o r m o r e
to rights of action officer or employee concened.'
rights acquired under contracts and Section
for twrts, Where a n e w statute continues
in force provi than six (6) years ago. However, it must be pointed out that
damages
in formn it repeals them at the 2 of Republic Act No. 1379 should be deemed amended or repealed
sions of a n old statute, although of action created by the old statute is by Article XI, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution which provides
m o n e n t of pussage, a right
forbids the state from
not thereby destroyed.169
For the Constitution that 'the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully ac
vested rights or the
e n a c t m e n t o r repeal of a law, gquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their
impairing, by exercise of police
in the legitimate nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches,
otbligalions of contract, except
power t or
estoppel.' Considering that Sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. was
1379
71 SCRA 231
June 10, 1976, Buyco v. Phil. National Bank, G.R. No. 14406, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 682.
R a m i r e z v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 23687, 1981, 105
SCRA
of Appeals, G.R. No. 47533, Oct. 27,

*AIsporma v. Court
1979, o e s v. Ennployees' Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 46200, July 30,
92 SCRA
46200, July
ou 320.
481 Commission, G.R. No. On Pak
B i l l o n e s v. Employees' Compensation Phil. 225 (1962). (1908). Leung v. Nigorra, 9 Phil. 486 (1908); Priolo' v. Priolo, 9 Phil. 566
San Miguel, Inc., 114
Escasura v.
1979, 92 SCRA 320; SCRA 492.
No. 46729, Nov. 19, 1982, 118 64189 SCRA
Ayog v. Cusi,
G.R. 289, 302 (1990).
428 AMEND. REVISION,
CODIFICATION AND REPEAL 429
However, wheer the reenactment of the

deemed amended or him.
170
170
H
vided therein had repealed befor the preseription d

convict
is not
such that the continuity
such
s i m u l t a n e o u s
of the
lapsed insofar as for its violation from the repealed law
and
we cannot say that he private respondent isperiod pro e a l e dl a w sanction
already acquired a vested concer

the carries with it the depri-
had dllaw
a is
broken, the repeal
and
may not be igation
on
and sentence the
prejudiced by subsequent enactment." right ththat
a
the
reenacted
of its authority
ui to
court
try, convict
law prior to its repeal.171
to
v a
of
t
the
i o n
violation of the old
10.34. On contracts. perso
of penal laws.
Where a contract is entered into Effeet
of repeal
the law then by the parties on the 0 97. of penal law deprives the
obtaining, the repeal or amendment of said basis af ithout qualification
103
law will repeal violatiooncharged with a

not affect the terms of the The
ion to punish persons
contract, nor
parties thereunder.65 The rule applies evenimpair
the right of the f the jurisdictiox
to its repeal.
172
In short, where the repeal is
if one of the law prior
c o u r t
contract. old n o longer exists, prosecution of the

t h a t the crime
he
the
ing parties is the government.166
absolute,
so
u n d e r the old
law cannot be had and the action
charged where the repealing
p e r s o n
173 The same effect results

diBmissed.
10.35. Effect of repeal of tax laws. uld be the acts which constituted the offense
Bte wholly fails to penalize repealed law 174
The repeal of a tax law does not preclude the collection of penalized in the
defined and
total and absolute and the
taxes assessed under the old law before its repeal, unless
the re repeal of a penal law is
Where the
pealing statute provides otherwise.6" It has been held that the rule was penalized by a
prior law ceases to be criminal under
act which is obliterated. It is a recognized
prospective construction of statutes is applicable to stat. the previous oflense
favoring a
the new law,
tax laws. Where such statute is not made retro total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to, try,
utes which repeal rule that a
tax assessed before the repeal is
collectible afterwards with violations of the old law
active, a convict and sentence persons charged
assessment or levy wa8 the total repeal of R.A. No. 1700, as
ACcording to the law in force when the prior to the repeal,"8 Thus,
7636 entitled the
m u d e . G8 amended (the Anti-Subversion Act) by R.A. No.
accused charged with violation of R.A. No. 1700 to a dismissal of the
of. Case pending against him, as the offense no longer exists and as the
reenactment, effect total repeal has deprived the court of jurisdiction to try the case.176
10.36. Repeal and
and reenactment of a statute does
repeal The repeal of a statute which provides an indispensable ele-
have accrued under the
simultaneous
The
and liabilities which ment in the commission of a crime as defined in the Revised Penal
not affect the rights neutralizes the repeal and
reenactment
since the
original statute, interruption.6s The
rule applies Code likewise operates to deprive the court of the authority to
c o n t i n u e s the law
in force without of a penal law, Thus, eCide the case, except to dismiss it. The rule rests on the same
and r e e n a c t m e n t
the
s i m u l t a n e o u s repeal
person is charged witn Ieple as
that concerning the effect of a repeal of a penal law
to under which a
without qualification.1""
a penal law, r e e n a c t m e n t penalizing
ne
the repeal of
not preclude the
simultaneous
and its will
v i o l a t i o n thereof,
the old law, w
him under court of the
jurisdiction
same act done by the
n o r deprive .V.Cula, 12 Phil. 241 (1908); Ong Ching v. U.S., 40 Phil.
accused's
prosecution,
l e v. Almuete, G.R. No. 26551, Feb. 27, 1976, 69 SCKA 410.
1046 (1910).
v.
Court of
People Almuete, v.
13 Phil.
236 (1909); Aisporma Caurt ofFirsamayo, supru.
61 Phil. 225 (1935); Phil. Asso. of Free Labor Unions v.
v.
Frank,
481.
First Instance
17, 1923, 120 SCRA 1.
ople Pustor,of77
Rizal, G.R. No. 49580, Jan.
Government
Insular 108 SCRA

Oct. 27, 1981, (1909). v.
Phil. 236 Phil. 1000 (1947)
Appeals,
G.R. No. 47633,
Insular
Frank,
Government
13
v. Phil. 464 (1966).
Revenue,
100
Cooley,
Taxaio,
8, Vol.
People
v.
11]bid. Pinentel, 93 SCAD 310, 288 SCRA 642 (1998).
of I n t e r n a l citing
C o v.
C o v.
Collector
Collector ofInternal
Revenue,
supra,
386
(1957).
mRan Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 23687, June 10, 1976, 71 SCRA 231.
101 Phil.
of Manila,
Bible Society v. City
American
431
430 A M E N D M E N TR
, EVI
CODIFICATION AND REPEAL
offices then existing under the

The all m u n i c i p a l charter itself.15
reason for the rule is that the aboli
jshing
excepted in the
without repeal of of
fect of SaVe those
qualification a legislative act of rendering
is a
penal municipality
ffect
previously decreed as illegal, so that the

legal wha
person who committad
t h e
effect o
is as if he never repealing law,
committed an offense.78 There are, nullity of
tions to the rule. One however. it eal or
a prior law is itself re-
exception is that where the repealkin expressly repeals
1040 R e
reenacts the statute and which

which
revived unless
law
Jaw be not thereby
ized under the penalizes the same act previously Den Vhen
a repealed
shall
395,
the express repeal of B.P. Blg.
first
repealed law, the act committed before tthe pealed,t h e
law
orovided. Thus,
reenactment continues to be a crime, and No. 666 declassifying the shipbuilding
pending e 1 of PD.
e x p r e s s / y s6 0
thereby affected, although the penalty to cases are

not
which repealedied SSec. a s a publici utility, by
E.O. No. 226 did not
more favorable to the accused as be imposed is that which hich
s h i p. repair
industry
said executive order did not provide
provided either in the old or i and
No. 666, as
the new law.17 Another
exception is that where the repealing ain revive
Sec.1
1 of P.D.
contains a saving clause act
providing that pending actions shall not
be affected, the latter will continue to be
otherwise
statute is declared unconstitutional, it will
prosecuted in repealing
accordaneo the former statute. The former or old
a
Where
with the old law.180 ect of repealing
no remáin in force.184
nues to
have
tatute continu
10.38. Distinction to effect of repeal and

us
expiration of
law.
There is a difference between absolute repeal of a penal law
and expiration of a criminal statute by its own force, insofar as
their effects are concerned. In absolute repeal, the crime is obliter. t.thi,yls
ated, and the stigma of conviction of an accused for violation of the

penal law before its repeal is erased. The expiration of a penal law
by its own force does not have that effect,8
.
10.39. Effect of repeal of municipal charter.

In the absence of a provision to the contrary, the superseding
the
of the old charter by a new one has the effect of abolishing
of
offices under the old charter. The general rule is that the repeal
and puts an end to the
a charter destroys all offices under it,
functions of the incumbents. Thus, the conversion
of a municipality
statute to that effect has
into a by the passage of a charter
city or a
f
No. 58284, Nov.

Commission Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25, G.R.
Buscayno v. Military
77 Phil. 1000 (1947).
19, 1981, 109 SCRA 273; People Pastor,
v.
G.R. No. 58284, No.
Commiseion No8. 1, 2, 6 and 26,
Buscayno v. Military (1922); U.S. v.
Cuna, 1
44 Phil. 126
19, 1981, 109 SCRA 273; People Concepcion,
v.
Phil. 241 (1908).

Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25, G.R.
No. 58284,
Nox
Mendenilla Omendia, G.R.
v.
No. 17803, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 536,
60Buscayno v. Military Commission 38. DuSummit Holdings, Inc. v. CA, GR. No. 124293, Nov. 20, 2000, 137 SCAD
19, 1981, 109 SCRA 273. 801 (1967).
of Immigration, 100 Phil. Cruz
Ang Beng v. Commissioner v.
Youngberg, 66 Phil. 234 (1931).
CONSTITUTIONAI, CONSTHUCTION 433
t0
which
whi
all other laws must confortn and in accordance
law must be deterinined and all public
p r
with
e m e
which
private rights
uthority administered.3
Chapter XI
of the Philippine Constitutions.
Origin and history
CONST!ITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION The present Philippine Constitution a
is what is commonlyy
Constitution, which is
87 revision of the 1935
as the 1987
k n o w n
Wh
Constitutions. the new Constitution has super-
1973 a number of the provisions
he 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
a n d
11.01. Constitution defined. seded

in the 1987 Constitution.
r e reenacted
were
latter
of the
A constitution is a fundamental law which sets up a f How the 1935 Constitution
came about is explained in a case
government and defines and delimits the powers thereof and1those uR the Act of Congress (ot the States) of March 24, 1934,
United
of its officers, reserving to the people themselves plenary
8over naoularly known as the 1ydings-McDuffie Law, the people of the
eignty. It has also been variously defined as follows: A constitutin
Dhilinpine Islands were authorized to adopt a constitution, subject
is a fundamental law or basis
of
government, established
people in their sovereign capacity, to promote their happiness and
by tha to the conditions and qualifications prescribed in said Act. The law
distinct steps for the adoption of the constitution.
to secure their rights, property, independence and common welfare
required three
of
the drafting and approval the constitution by the
it is a written charter enacted and adopted by the people by which The first was
a government for them is established and by which the people give constitutional convention authorized to be called under the Act; the
organic and corporate form to that ideal thing, the state, for all second was the certification by the President of the United States
that the constitution so drafted and approved conformed with the
time to come. It is an instrument of a permanent nature, intended
not merely to meet existing conditions, but to govern the future. It provisions of the same Act; and the third was the ratification of the
constitution by the people of the Philippine Islands at an election
does not deal in details but enumerates general principles and or plebiscite called for the purpose of ratifying or rejecting the
general directions which are intended to apply to all new facts same. On July 30, 1934, the constitutional convention met for the
which may c o m e into being and which may be brought within those purpose of drafting a constitution, and the constitution subsequently
general principles or directions. drafted was approved by the convention on February 8, 1935. The
constitution
system of fundamental laws for the govern submitted to the President of the United States
was
A constitution is a
ance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, ab on March 18, 1935; and on March 23, 1935, the President certified
solute and unalterable except by the authority from which it ema that the Constitution conformed substantially with the provisions
nates. It is the fundamental and paranount law
of the nation. i of the Act of Congress approved March 24, 1934. On May 14, 1935,
the Constitution was
prescribes the jpermunent framework of a system of government ratified by the people."*
assigns to the different departments their respective powers an On the other
on which gover
hand, the 1973 Constitution was adopted in
duties, and establishes certain fixed principles response to popular clamor for meaningful changes in the funda-
ment is founded. The fundamental conception
is that it 18 a
ental law to meet mounting problems of the country. Accordingly,
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution
110
CHA NO.2, which was amnended by Resolution No. 4, of said body, adopted
24, 1982, D une
"LACgaspi v. Miuistry of Finance, G.R. No. 68289, July l17, 1967, calling ä convention to propose amendments to
418
et seq. (1930).
Ipz v. De lus luyo», 66 Phil. 186, 188
anila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 78 SCAD 764, 267 SCRA 408 (1997).
432 F0ople v.
Linsangan, 82 Phil. 646. 648-649 (1935).
434 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 435
the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution

amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132 lution N0 2, 8 intwnt of the
framers of the organic law and of the people
which force is to be given is that
appr
August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the fvct
to
the
ng
it.
The
intention to
expressed in the constitutional provisions
and
delegates to said convention was held on November 10 1iona is
embodied
been.saidthat the Philippine Constitution
has also
elves." It
which
the 1971 Convention began to perform its functions on n is to protect and enhance the
p u r p o s e , whi
fundamental
1971. While the Convention was in session on September 21 1 and as persons individu-
h a s o n e
as a nation collectively
the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the ent people's
interests,
of ithe Constitution should be done with a
ippines under Martial Law. On November 29, 1972, the Co Phi The
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
fundamental objective.
ally. this
approved its proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Do view to
realizing
pines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President oftha
ution construed as enduring for ages.
ippines issued Presidential Decree No. 78, submitting to the 11.04. C o n s t i t u t i
pino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the provide merely for the exi-
not intended to
public of the Philippines proposed by ihe 1971 ConstitutionalC A Constitution is to endure through a long lapse of ages,
gencies ofa few y e a r s
but is
vention, and appropriating funds therefor, as well as setti he e v e n t s of
hich a r e locked up in
whi
the inscrutable purposes of
plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the proposed Cone
stitp. the hfe the people not only at the time of
tion on January 15, 1973."s On January 17, 1973, the sident Providence.10 It governs the of
the indefinite
into future. It is neither so inflex-
issued lroclamntion No. 1102 certifying and proclaiming "lhat th its framing but far u s tu bar the adoption of novel and unorthodox
ible nor immobile
Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventyau to various crisis of human affairs. It
been ratified by an overwhelm, measures. It is adaptable
(1971) Constitutional Convention has rules for the passing hour, but principles for a n
ing majority of all the voten caet. by the members of all the BaranKays embodies not only and
future a s welI." It 18 something solid, permanent
expanding
(citizens ussenblies) tlroughout thhe Philippines, and has thereby substantial. Its stability protects the rights, liberty and property of
come into effect." Thus, uhe
1973 Constitution went into eflect On alike.12
several amendments, the lat. the rich and the p0or
January 17, 1973." lt had undergone
A constitution should be construed in the light of what actu-
in 1984.
o f which waN
continuing instrument to govern not only the present but
Constitution underwent revi ally is, a
After the EDSA Revolution, the also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the
created, which drafteda
commission
principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged
was
sions. A constitutional
on February 2,
new This new Constitution took effect
Constitution. from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a
to be
1987 and is known as the 1987 Charter. dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time,
progressive and not static.3 Its construction ought not to change
with emergencies or conditions.1 Nor should a constitution be con-
constitutional construction.
11.03. Primary purpose of strued to inflexibly identify its text with the circumstances that
construction is to
ascertaln
The primary task of constitutional constitution as er
the intent or of the framers of the
purpose
the fundamental law, and therealteru
pressed in the language of Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259, 264 (1938); People v.
As the Court aptly said in a case: Derilo,
Gold
271
assure its realization." SCRA 633 (1997).
is to give
fundamental of constitutional construction
principle Acar v. Rosal, G.R. No. 21707, March 18, 1967, 19 SCRA 625.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 20812, Sept. 22,
1967, 21 SCRA 180.
SCRA
& Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. 21064,
Feb. M.
18, 1970,Tuasun
50
1973, Foh
March 31, d ,°
aveilana v. Eaecutive Secretary, (GR No. 36142, 31 SCRA 413.
55 U.S. v. Ang Teug Ho, 43 Phil. 1 (1922).
1974, 59 SCRA 169,1064,Fet
"Aquno Eurile, G.R. No. 35538, Sept. 17,
.
4On Omm CHlholic Apostolic Administration of Davao, Inc. v. Land Registra-
.MS1 uason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. Commission, 102 Phil. 596 (1957).
199 SCRA 692 (T37*
Tibunal, O.8.
18, 1970, v. Electoral
SCRA 413; Co v. Ang Tung Ho, 43 Phil. 1 (1922).
436
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 437
inspired its adoption, for that would make

ing to the needs of the it
incapable of resnona the plain, clear and unamb1guous language of the
future. in that sense, and should not be
narrowly or pedantically, for theNeither should it be interpreted
construed
other
should be
tution
constituti construction that changes such meanin "As the Const itu-
are not
mathematical formulas prescriptions therein contained
words employed therein are but organic living institutions. given
primaril
lawyer's
a ument, its language should be
rigid answers but as not to be construed to Henca tion
is not
in the
sense that it may have in common. Its words
impressed yield fixed and tood
with the
flexibility and accommodation to enable them necessary attributes of be given
the heir ordinary meaning except where technical
to meet hould
what ver problems the future has in adequately
terms are employed."2
be given such store. The constitution

meaning and should be so applied as to should well-estabi rule that the language of the constitu-
It is a
changed conditions as they meet new or possible, should be understood in the
sense it has
arise. a much as
in constitutional provisions are
The Constitution must be viewed as ommon use and that thne words
charter of continuously operative
government. It must not be interpreted
a
t he given their ordinary meaning exceptt where technical terms
the impossible or the as
demanding are employed.2
or absurd.
impractical; or as
affecting
Courts should always endeavor to the unreasonable
Where the Constitution does not specifically define the terms
tion that would make the give such interpreta
constitutional HBed therein, they should be construed in their general and ordi-
reason, justice and the public interest," provision consistent with nary sense. Thus, since Sec. 7, Art. XII of the Constitution does
not provide a definition of the term "subsistence fishermen" in the
11.05. How provision which states that "the State shall protect the rights of
language of constitution construed. subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the pref-
Theprimary source from which to ascertain erential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both
intent or purpose is the constitutional inland and offshore" and such "protection shall
language of the constitution itself. The extend to offshore
presumption is that the words in which the constitutional fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign
sions are couched express the provi the term should be intrusion,"
objective sought to be attained.3 understood in its general and ordinary sense, to
refer to those whose catch
The words of the constitution do not have a
narrow or con their livelihood.23 yields are the irreducible minimum for
stricted meaning, but are used in a broad sense, with a view of
covering all contingencies.19 The words should as much as possible In Ordillo u. Commission
whether the sole province of IfugaoElections,4 the issue raised is
on
be understood in the sense
they have in common use and given can validly be constituted
their ordinary neaning, the
except when technical terms are employed, ordillera Autonomous Region under Section 15,
in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails" In 987 Constitution, which states that Article X of the
"There shall be created au-
nomous regions in Muslim
5ng of provinces, cities, Mindanao and in the Cordilleras con
s0n & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. 21064, ng Common and distinctive municipalities and geographical areas
Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413; Heirs of Ardova v. Reyes, G.R. No. 60549, Oct. 26, 1983,
with historical and cultural heritage,
thend
125 SCRA 220. social
framewor structures,
and
other relevant characteristics
Roman Catholic
tion Commission, Apostolic Administration of Davao, Inc.
102 Phil. 596 (1957).
v. Land Regietra- eignty as well: of this Constitution
and the national sover-
ted Pepsi-C'ola Supervisor Union (UPSU) Laguesna, 92 SCAD 760,
ines." In territorial integrity of the Republie of the Philip-
288 SCRA 15, 64
(1998)
v.
swering the issue in the ative, the Court
. M . Tuason & Co., Inc.
Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No.
that ruled
Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.
v.
2100
Dccena v: Conmission on Elections, G.R. No. 52265, Jan. 28, 1980, 95 S C peoy
ionOns, 8upra .
Derilo, 271 SCRA 633,
755.
supra. 668 (1997); Occeña v. Comnmission on
M. Tuason Co. Inc. v
& Ordillo Elec
Commission on
Land Tenure Administration, supra;
Elections, 192 SCRA 100 (1990). .Socrates, 278 SCRA 164 (1997).
Su .
upra. Commission on
Elections, 192 SCRA 100 (1992).
438
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 439
the keywords aRettled rulé that a word or phrase in

provinces, cities, It is also
one part of
areas connote that "region" is to municipalities and geographieot
be made up of more stitution is
to receive the same
interpretation when
used in
constituent unit. In itsordinary sense, "region" means
than the
c o n s
her purt,
unless it clearly appears from the context or oth-
provinces. Following the rule that the language of the two or mo every
erwise t h a t
a diflerent meaning should be applied. For instance,
as much as Constitution
possible, should be understood in the sense "Batasang Pambansa,":which means the regular national
it has i term
common use and that the words
used in constitutional
he
found in many sections of the 1973 Constitution refers to
given their ordinary meaning, except where provisions
S5embly,
are to be not to the interim,Batasang Pambansa 2
terms are technieal
employed, the province of Ifugao cannot be constituted the regul.
the Cordillera Autonomous Words which have acquired a technical meaning before they
the Constitution.
Region under Section 15, Article X of are u s e d in the
constitution must be taken in that sense when such
as thus used are construed. It may be presumed that what
rds
The reason why the of the constitutional convention had in mind when
language of the constitution the members
erally be construed in its broad and ordinary sense, should gen. they drafted the constitution are the well-known technical mean-
the contrary is indicated, is because the except when
fundamental law is not as of the words then prevailing. Indeed, certain expressions which
primarily lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in
a
ADDear in the constitution are
obviously technical, and where such
whose consciousness it should ever be present as an
condition.for the rule of law to prevail.25 important words have such use prior to the adoption of the constitution, it is
presumed that its framers and the people who ratified it have used
Where words used in a constitution have both such expressions in accordance with their technical meaning3"
restricted and
general meanings, the rule is that the general prevails
over the
restricted unless the context in which they are
indicates that the limited sense is intended.*" Thus,
employed clearly 11.06. Aids to construction, generally.
following
rule, the words "any court" used in Section 17, Article XVII ofsuch Apart from the language of the constitution as the primary
the
1935 Constitution prohibiting members of and intrinsic aid to constitutional construction, courts likewise re-
Congress from appear
sort to such extraneous aids as the history or realities existing at
ing as counsel "in any criminal case in which an officer or employee
of the Government is accused of an offense the time of the adoption of the constitution, proceedings of the
committed in relation to
his office" refer not only to civil but also to a Cconvention, changes in phraseology, prior laws and judicial deci
martial since the latter is also a court of law and
military court or court-
civil tribunal.2" On the other hand, the words "inferior justice as is any S1ons, contemporaneous constructions, and consequences of alter-
in Article VII, Section 2 of the same
courts" used native interpretation8, to shed light on and ascertain the true in-
ent or
1935 Constitution, in connec purpose of the provision being construed.
tion with the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to "re I t has been held that the most important single factor in
view on appeal, certiorari or writ of
error, as the law or Rules or
Court may provide, final fning the intention of the people from whom the constitu-
judgments of inferior courts in all crimi nanated is the language in which it is expressed. The imper
nal cases in which the
penalty.imposed is death or life imprison
ment" are intended to be used in a
fections language, however, as a vehicle for conveying meanings
restricted sense, and
ingly do not include courts-martial or military courts, for theaccora O 1 ambiguities that must he resolved by resorting to extrane-
while courts of law and latter, imp Or discovering the intent of the framers. One of the more
and do not belong to the
justice, are agencies of executive characte portant of these is a consideration of the history of the times
by the Supreme Court.28
judicial branch of government represenu when the provision was adopted. The debates of the constitutional
Convention, emporaneous construction and practical interpre
3 J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Marcos v.
Administration, 8upra.
Chief of Staff, AFP, 89 Phil. 239
(1951).
"Marcos
Ruffy v.
v. Chief of
Stafi, supra.
Chief of Staff, 76 Phil. 876 (1946).
SCRA ozada
337. Omuission on Elections, G.R. No. 59068, Jan. 27, 1983,
120
sKrivVenko v.
Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
440
441
derstanding conveyed by the language, albeit plain, of

tation by the legislative
and executive departments, especially ingand un
do not oniy portray the infiuence of current
ie provisions
long continued, may be resorted to resolve, but not to create, am of

its
but likewise the inescapable imperative
developments
any
guities. Consideration of the consequences flowing from alternati and

rooted in thehistorical background of the environ-
events
constructions of doubtful provisions constitutes an important inta rations

and thereby caused their being
pretative device. The purposes of many of the broadly-phrased con time of its adoption
the
at "as
ment
and parcel thereof,
stitutional limitations are the promotion of policies that do not lend written
as part
the framers of the Con-
themseives to definite and specific formulation. The courts have rhoexisting realities that confronted
had to define those policies and have the intent behind a constitutional provi-
often drawn
on natural
law stitutioncan help
unravel
and natural rights theories in doing so. The interpretation of a what otherwise is a vague constitutional provision may
sion. Thus,
constitution tends to respond to changing conceptions of political resort to the realities then existing. For instance,
and social values. The extent to which those extraneous aids affect larified by a
the term "incumbent President" in Section 3, Article
the judicial construction of a constitution cannot be formulated in
what does
vV on the transitory provisions of the 1973 Constitution refer?
precise rules, but their influence cannot be ignored in describing Commission on Elections*6 inquired into the
the essentiais of the process. The Court in Aquino u.
of the provision in resolving the question, thus:

factual setting
"The next issue is whether he (President Ferdinand E. Marcos)
11.07. Realities existing at time of adoption; object to be of the Philippines within the purview of
is the incumbent President
accomplished. 3 of Article XVIl on the transitory provisions of the new or
Section
While the organic law is basically for the future, couched in a 1973 Constitution. As heretofore stated, by virtue of his reelection
language that can adjust itself with the changing times, the fram- in 1969, the term of President Marcos under the 1935 Constitution
ers of the Constitution did take into account the realities existing was to terminate on December 30, 1973. The new Constitution. was
at the time of its adoption." History many a time holds the key approved by the Constitutional Convention on November 30, 1972.
that unlocks the door to understanding. For this reason, courts still during his incumbency. Being the only incumbent President of
look to the history of the times, examine the state of things existing the Philippines at the time of the approval of the new Constitution
when the constitution was framed and adopted, and interpret it in
by the Constitutional Convention, the Constitutional Convention
the light of these factors.3 had nobody in mind except President Ferdinand E. Marcos who
The Court in Legaspi u. Minister of Finance explains the shal initially convene the interim Assembly. It was the incumbent
importance of considering the historical background of the consti resident Marcos alone who issued Martial Law Proclamation No.
UOn September 21, 1972 and issued orders and decrees as well
tution in construing it, as follows: "Constitutional law is not gimply
nstructions and performed other acts as President prior to the
the literal application of the words of the charter. The ancient and PPrOval on November 30, 1972 of the new Constitution by the
familiar rule of constitutional construction that has consistenuy
maintained its intrinsic and transcendental worth is that the mea" tational Convention and prior to its ratification January on
b y the people. Consequently, since President Marcos was
th cumbent President at the time, because his term under
' C onstitution has yet to expire on December 30, 1973, the
Ronuun Catholic Apostolic Administration of Davao, Inc. v. LandKeg Law, inutional Convention, in approving the new Constitution, had
on Commission, 102 Phil, 596 (1957), citing Rottachaeffer on Constitutiona
p. 1819 (11939).
*Aquino . Coumission on Elections, G.R. No. 40004, Jun. 31, 1976, 62
A Co only him when in Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the new
276.
D On t provided that all the proclamations, orders, decrees,
pt. 12
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 20812, eurg
e
1967, 21 SCRA 180, De loa Santos v. Millare, 87 Phil, 289 (1950); SchnoCKE
v.Moran, 63 Phil. 249 (1936). 115 SCRA at pp. 429-430. Elections, G.R. No. 40004, Jan. 31, 1976, 62 SCRA
G.R. No. 68289, July 24, 1982, 116 8CRA 418. 275 (1976).
97 .
Commission on
cONSTITUTIONAl. CONSTRUCTION 443

oetica Union v. Executive Secretary," the issue raised
In Civil L
Executive
Order No.
284 dated July 25, 1987, which
and assistant secre-
instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumh. authorizes
is wh a
cabinet
cabinet member, undersecretary
President shall be part of the law of the land."
ent
tary lo h
more than two positions in the government and
and to receive the corresponding compen-
cOvernmentcorporation8 a nd
In his concurring opinion in the Aquino case, Justice Antoni Sation therelor, violate
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Consti-
put the rule this way: "The only rational way to ascertain that "the President, Vice President, Mem
the provides
meaning and intent of paragraphs 1 and of Section 3 of
Article which
tution, w h. and their deputies or assistants shall not,
XVII (Transitory provisions) of the new Constitution is to
read it of the Cabinet,
otherwise provided:in this Constitution, hold any other of

language in connection with the known conditions of affairs out
bers
unless uring
dur their tenure." In holding that Executive
which the occasion for its adoption had arisen, and then construe e m p l o y m e n t
or
fice 284 violatesconstitutional provision and is there-
said
it, if there be any doubtful expression, not in a narrow or technical Order N o .
Court examined the history of the times, the
sense, but liberally, giving effect to the whole Constitution, in order Oraearnd void, the constitutional provision was framed,
that it may accomplish the objects of its establishment. For these fore under which the
held that before the adoption of the constitutional
Cond
provisions can never be isolated from the context of its economic It

d its object. was a proliferation ot. newly-created agencies,
political and social environment."* aision "there and controlled corpora-
government-owned
Article XVIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution states' that etrmentalities and
decrees and other modes of presiden-
[t]he six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President ns created by presidential members, their deputies or assistants
Cabinet
tial issuances where head
elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchro.
nization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992." In were designated to
or sit as members of the board with the
emoluments, per diems, allowances and other
construing this provision, the Court, applying the realities of the corTesponding salaries,
Most of these instrumentalities have r e -
situation, stated that it is "a matter of public record and common prerequisites of office. offices
mained up to the present." "This practice of holding multiple
public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein in the government s o 0 n led to ubuses by unscrupulous
to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Sal- or positions of this scheme for purposes of
vador H. Laurel, and to no other persons."39 ,i public officials who took advantage
self-enrichment. In fact, the holding of multiple offices in govern-
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the in- ment w a s strongly denounced on the floor
of the Batasang
tention underlying the provision under consideration. The Court in Pambansa. This condemnation c a m e in reaction to the published
An-
construing the Constitution should bear in mind the object sought report of the Commission on Audit, entitled "1983 Summary
to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to nual Audit Report on: Government-Owned and Controlled Corpora-
be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examinedin tions, Self-Governing Boards and Commissions' which carried as
the light of the history of the times, and the conditions and circum its Figure No. 4 a "Roster of Membership Governing Boards of
slances under which object'is to
the Constitution was framed. The Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations as of December
31, 1983." "It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance
ascertain the reason the Constitution
which induced the framers of
to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought
to be with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Con-
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make stitutional Commission, convened as it was after the people suc-
the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that cessfully unseated former President Marcos, should draft into its
purpose.40 proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration which
re envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the
1 n g of multiple governmental offices and employment." "Evi
y f r o m this muve as well as in the different
phraseologies ot
362 SCRA at pp. 296-297.
31bid., p. 329.
"In re Bermudez, 145 SCRA 116, 162 (1986). "lbrd.. pp. 3206-3:31 1991 .
Civil 1iberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991).
cONSTITUT'ONAL CONSTHUCTION
45
444
einlo of the Executive Branch from the President to

the constitutional
ofli
onthe one hand, and the generality of civil
provisions in question, the intent of the framer ranking
Assistant
nt
Secretary,
immediately below Assistant Secretary down-

of the Constitution was to the rank
impose a stricter prohibition Bervants from
old any other oflice or position in the
President and his official family insofar as holding other on the other, m a y
offices. the
wards, o n t he
their
tenure."
employment in the government or elsewhere i8 concerned," "Morea oovernment
during
ver, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, ts' readinof the provisions in question
Arti, "Moreover, respondents
the Constitution inoperutive. This
cle VII with other provisions of the parts of th
Constitution on the disqualif. certain
cations of certain public officials or render to the Vice-President who, under

holding
employees from other would.
ation
applies
particularl;
to hold other office or employ-
offices or employment. Under Section 13, Article VI,
(N)o Senator observati
Article VII, is allowed

13 of but who as an elec-
or Member of the House of Representatives hold any
may other Section authorized by the Constitution,
when s o 1) of Article IX-E is absolutely
office or employment in the Government. ."Under Section 5(4). nent
Sec. 7, par. (
Article XVI, (N)o member of the armed forces in the active service blic official unde to any
o r designation in any capacity
shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in any capacity to a ible for appointment his tenure.' Surely, to say that the
position during
civilian position in the Government, including government-owned asblic office o r otherwise provided in this Constitution'
found in
or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.' Even Sec nhrase 'unless VIl has reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Articie
tion 7(2), Article IX-B, x x x provides (U)nless otherwise allowed by Section 13, Article provisions of the Con-
render meaningless the specific
law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive offi. X-B would Vice-President to become a member of the
the
cial shall hold any other office or employment in the Government stitution authorizing the Vice
act a s President without relinquishing
on disqualifications Cabinet, and to
"It is quite notable that in all these provisions the President shail not have been chosen or fails
the prohibition pertains to an Presidency where
to hold other office or employment, absurd consequence can be avoided only by
inter-
to qualify. Such
office or employment in the governmnent and government-owned
or
under consideration a s one, i.e., Section
their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is preting the two provisions
controlled corporations or the general rule and the other,
which states that "The 7, par. (1) of Article IX-B providing
the wordings of Section 13, Article VII Article VlI as constituting the exception thereto. In
of the Cabinet, and their ie., Section 13,
President, Vice-President, the Members the same m a n n e r must Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B be
con-
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this

deputies or assistants strued vis-a-vis Section 13, Article VII." "It is a well-established
Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their ten
rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Con-
the disqualification is absolute, not
ure.' In the latter provision, is to be from all the others, to be considered
in the government'. This prohibition stitution separated
being qualified by the phrase is therefore al alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject
on the President and
his official family to effectuate
imposed employ are to be brought
into view and to be so interpreted as
both public and private office or
embracing and covers the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a par-
ment.""This being the case, the qualifying
phrase 'unless other icular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
Constitution' in Section 13,
Article VII cannot
wise provided in this of the Constitution and one section is
refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 1, etectuate the whole purpose
possibly to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construc-
Constitution. To construe said qualitying
Article X-B of the 1987 otner words, the
would have us do would
render nugato the two can be made to stand together." "In
phrase a s respondents
intent and purpoee of the framers 0
af ust harmonize them, if practicable, and nmust lean in fuvor
and meaningless the manifest
stricter prohibition on the Presiden thCOstruction which will render every word operative, rather
the Constitution to impose a and assi One which may make the words idle and nugatory.
Vice-President,Members of the Cabinet, their deputies the
holding other offices or employment In at nce the evident purpose of the ftramers of the 1987 Consti-
with respect to
ants
government during their
Respondents' interpretation
tenure. tution is to impose a stricter prolibition on the President, Vice.
Section 13 of Article VII admits of
obliterate the
in
the exceptions found se
distinction so a
President,
with resp men of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
7, par.(2) of Article IX-B would the

LO
holding multiple government offices or employnment
Constitution as to when
fully set by the framers of the
446 CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
in the government constitution had in mind at the

during their tenure, the exception to this Drok vhat the
framers of the
bition must be read with rohi. and opinions expressed con-
equal severity. On its face, the languno
of Section 13, Article VII is
hight i n t o
he
debates,
interpretation.
prohibitory so that it must

i m e ,4 4
yield dditional insight on the intent

be und ticular provisions
stood as intended to be a
meaning thereof.15 Thus, on the question as to whether the sal-
cerningpartio
positive and unequivocal negation of th

privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment o rm e
members
of the judi is exempt from taxation under the
Verily, whenever the language used in the
constitution is prohibi of
constitut provision to the effect that "the salary of the Chief
tory, it is to be understood as intended to be a poOsitive the Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court and of
and un. and of
equivocal negation. The phrase 'unless otherwise provided in thi c o u r t s shall be fixed by law" and "during their
Justice
judges of lower,
Constitution' must be given a literal interpretation to refer to onl shall.not be decreased," the Court
inoffice, their salary
those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit:
continuance
interpellations and opinions expressed regard-

the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet dThe debates, in question until it was finally
the constitutional provision
under Section 3, par. (2), Article VIl; or acting as President in those ing disclosed that the true intent of the
instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VI rOved by the Commission
framers of the 1987 Constitution, adopting it, was to make the
and the Secretary of Justice being ex officio member of the Judicial the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of
members of
virtue of Section 8(1), Article VIII." salaries of
and Bar Council by but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
that intent is
construction that the intent of the framers of the
constitutioIial
11.08. Proceedings of the convention. law and of the people adopting shouid be given effect. The
organic
constitutional construction is to ascertain and there-
If the language of the constitutional provision is plain, is
it primary task in
the
neither necessary nor permissibie to resort to extrinsic aics, like ater assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of
adopion of the Constitution. It aBso be safely
records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation. people in the may
the
of the framers does not decisively ap assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
However, where the intent more than one It would be
in the text of the provision
as it admits ,of mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. x xx
pear as the
be made on extrinsic aids, such strained construction to read into the provision an exemption in
construction, reliance mnay in the convention. the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission."6
o r discussions
records of the deliberations
while a member's opin- Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Re-
It may be pointedout, however, that
Constitutional Convention is val proceedings may be
ion expressed on the floor
of the
intent. The Jurn llustrales the rule that the debates or
expressive of the people's orted to, to ascertain the intent of the framers of the Constitu-
able, it is not necessarily are less conclusive on the proper uon as to the meaning of a phrase or word used therein. The
Convention
proceedings of tlhe a r e legislative proceed:
c o n s t r u c t i o n of the
fåndamental law than
statute, for in the latter
case rehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 includes the land
secd tor raising livestock, poultry and swine within the term "agri
construction ofa
ings of the in the forme
courts seek, while
proper
is the intent of
the legislature the
of the people through the discus Condfes the the word is employed in Section 4, Article XIII of the
courts seek to
arrive at the intent The constitutuona
tion On as
rA1sed
of the
coverage land The
agrarian reform. ques
representatives. is whether the used in the Consti
S1ons and
d e l i b e r a t i o n s of their
its force from
term "agriculture" as
does not derive 1t,
Wisdom is that the Constitution
the people who ratified "
framed it, but from
convention which
intent to be arrived
at is that of
the people.*
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision
until it was1ina it4Philippi
ppine
18 SCRA 800.
Constitution Assn., Inc. v. Mathay, G.R. No. 2564, Oet. 4, 1966,
history of the into as it s M.
The convention is usually inquired Feb. 18, 10 Tuasun & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. 21064,
approved by the dan. 31, 1976, A 413, Aquino Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 40004,
v.
CHAB "Nitafan y A 272; Co v. Electoral Tribunal, 194 SCRA 692 (1991)
n . Commissioner of Interna Revenue, 152 SCRA 284, 291-292 (1987);
Munuz, 170 SCRA
107 (1989).
SCAD 800,
338 also
4People v.
v. Zanora, 131 Sarmierento v. Mison,
1 92
ntegruted
Bar of the Philippines SCRA 51, 56-58 156 SCRA 649 (1987).
134-135 (2000). (1990).
448 cONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
tution embraces raising of livestock, from the foregoing discussion that Section
poultry and swine. In aescer. "Itis
evident
taining the meaning of the term, the Court ruled:
No.
6657
which includes 'private agricultural lands
ofR.A. livestock, poultry and swine raising' in
"Ascertainment of the meaning of the II
d e v o t e t o c o m m e r c i a l .
arms' is invalid, to the extent

Constitution begins with the language of the provision of the
"commercial
of
efinition
document ito
The words used in the Constitution are to be given
the defi.
aforecited
agro-industria activities are made to be
their od
hat the
reform program of the State."
the agrarian
nary meaning except where technical terms are by
which case the significance thus attached to them
emploved in covered
COMIMELEC,45 the issue is whether the

preuei In
Montejo
v.
the power to transfer, by resolution,
has the
(J.M. Tuason & Co. u. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCB on
Elections
from one congressional district to another

413 I1970). Commission
cipalities
one or more
to Sec. 2 of the Ordinar.ce
a province, p u r s u a n t
It is in construing within Said Section 2 reads: "The
generally held that, constitutional d i s t r i c t
the 1987 Constitution.

provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, nded to to make minor
the lections is hereby empowered
mission on
in the made." In ascertaining
courts may consider the debates constitutional conven rtionment
of the reapporti
herein
tion as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the "minor adjustments," the Court relied
adjustments
meaning of the phrase

Constitution. It is true that the intent of the convention is not he C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Commission, which
revealedd
but as its proceeding was preliminary to
controlling by itself, an the proceedings of the "minor adjustments" refers only to an
the adoption by the people of the Constitution, the under fhe intent that the phrase which has been forgotten is included
what w a s meant by the terms instance where a municipality
of the composition of a congressional
district
standing of the convention as to in the
enumeration
which was the subject of the from one district to
of the constitutional provision and not to the
transfer of one municipality
long way toward explaining the under been considered a substantive o r major
another, which has
deliberation, goes a
standing of the people when they

ratified it (Aquino, Jr. u of only power to make minor the
adjustment. Being possessed substantive adjustment,
[1974]).
Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 what it decreed was a
adjustments, and
resolution void.
deliberations of the Constitutional
as
the Court declared the
The transcript of the 'agriculture'
the meaning of the word floor of the consti-
Commission of 1986 on However, while historical discussion on the
intention of the framers of The
the tutional convention is valuable, it is not necessarily decisive.
clearly shows that it
was n e v e r
industry in
include livestock and poultry of the con-
the Constitution to reform proceedings of the convention are less conclusive proper
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y - m a n d a t e d agrarian proceedings
the coverage of the struction of the fundamental law than are legislative
in the latter case, it is
program of the
Government.
01 the proper construction of a statute, since
the intent of the legislature that courts seek, while in the former,
the definition of 'agricultural
"The Committee adopted as land are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through
166 of R.A. No. 3844, ourts
defined under Section lands. the discussions and deliberations of their
land' as
but not limited to
crop representatives.
devoted to any growth, including (Record, CON
abandoned land to consult the debates and proceedings
saltbeds, fishponds,
idle and ofth e t 1s permissible reason and
11). COstitutional convention in order to arrive at the
COM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto nay benad
the apput
Committee is to limit are powerles8
of the
The intention
x (T)he
Committee conte f to en the other guides fail as said proceedings meaning is clear.
'agriculture.' x x and
s when the
tion of he word
lands a r e limited
to arable
n e terms
of the Constitution
plated that
agricultural
do not
include com
agricultural lands
and therefore, CONCOM,
able
residential lands (Records, 59 SCAD 681, 242 SCRA 415 (1995).
and J. G.R. No. 21064,
cial, industrial ministration,
Vol. III, p. 30). Feb. 18, . Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
gust 7, 1986, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.
Yera v. Avelino, 77
Phil. 192 (1946).
450
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 451
Debates in tlhe by any paramount considerations of public

the views of the coustitutional convention ure uf vulue as
not m a d e i m p e r a l i v e
individual members, and as

for their votes, but sho witns be
rejected.6
they give us no light as to indicating

it may
the reasona policy,
of delegates to the constitutional convention on or
majority who did not talk, much the views of Writings
the lareu ofthe
t) constitution, published shortly there-
whose votes at the less of the mass of the the provisjons
mental law. The polls gave that instrument the

force
citizens xplaining some persuasive force But their personal opinions ex-
proper interpretation depends more on of funda afler,have
during the
liberations stand
delib on a different footing. If
understood by the people how it was pressed them, but not duly estah
adopting it than the framers' a r e based
their opinions on factknown to
ing thereof.5 understand. is immaterial and their brethren
Kehed or judicially cognizable, it
to take their word for it. If on a matter of legal
are
not expected
11.09. their conclus10ns may not, simply on account of mem-
Contemporaneous construction and writings. hermeneutics,
bership in the convention, be a shade better in the eyes of the law66
Contemporaneous practical constructions, of specific consti
or
tutional provisions by the legislative
and executive departments,
especially if long continued, may be resorted to resolve, but not to 11.10. Previous laws and judicial rulings.
create, ambiguities.52 Where the legislature has revised a statute A constitution shall be held to be prepared and adopted in
after a constitution has been adopted, such a reference to existing statutory laws, upon the provisions of which
revision is to be
regarded as a legislative construetion that the statute so revised in detail it must depend to be set in a practical operation. Courts
conforms to the constitution.55 Though not conelusive, contempora are bound to presune that the people adopting a constitution are
neous or practical constructions are generally conceded as being familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to
entitled to great weight.54 which its provisions relate and upon which
ment and opinion in its
they express their judg-
However, the practical construction of a constitution is oflite adoption.57 Courts should take into conisid-
eration such laws in
tle if any, unless it has been uniform. As a general rule, it
construing the constitution.58
weight,
is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doc Similarly, the framers of the constitution
presumed are to be
trine uf contempuruneous construetion has any application, As a aware of prevailing judicial doctrines or rulings concerning
of a constitutional provision j8 are the subject of constitutional provisions. which
consequence, where the meaning Courts
is entitled to no weight ae such rulings into account in may properly
clear, contemporaneous construction thereof
a construing the constitutional pro
and will not be allowed to change in any way its
meaning. 1he VIB10n involved. Thus, if the framers of the
reason is that the application of the doctrine of contemporaneous nciple different from what the courts had constitution adopted a
construction is more restricted as applied
to the inte ney did so to
overrule said previously enunciated,
or practical to statu principle.
provisions than when applied by
pretation of constitutional matters committed
ne
1.11.
tory provisions, and that except as to
discretion of s o m e other
departments, cou Changes in
phraseology.
constitution itself to the
necessarily binding upon e had OVIsion
undergone of the
temporaneous
construction is not
in the judgment or uis ne
constitution are the result of proposals that
doubtful c a s e . Hence, if number of
a
courts, e v e n in a
is and its further applicaO
erroneous
revisions and changes in phraseology
court, such construction
anada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051

Ta v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 (1957).
Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary, 194
SCRA 317 (1991)
of Davuo, Inc.
v. Land e
legistra
1960).SSee Dissenting Opino (1946).

Opinion of Justice Ozaeta,
Apostolic
Administration
Perfecto v. Meer, 85 Phil. 567
Roman Catholie
102 Phil. 696

(1957).
461 (1947); Aratuc I887, 21 SCmissiuner of Internal
tion Commission,
Elections, 79 Phil. Revenu
orres v. 180; Guerrero, G.R.
nue v. No. 20812, Sept. 22,
Tan Kepner
C o n m i s s i o n on
Krivenko v.
88 SCRA 251. v.
U.S., 11 Phil. 669
Elections, G.R. No.
49705, Feb. 8, 1979,
Chim, 69 Phil. 516 (1904)
mission on
v. Millare,
87 Phil. 289 (1960). l (1940); Talaroc v. Uy, 92 Phil. 52 (1952).
54De los Santos
cONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 453
before their final them.0 Where a constitutional

adoption. These changes in
inquired into to ascertain irnsider in construing
oro-
phraseology
c t o r t oc o n s i d e r
than one interpretation, that consiruc-

the intent or mas of more
finally approved.s" However, the
susceptible
purpose of the is inpossible or mischievous Conse-
mere deletion of provisie which would.leud to absurd,
proposed provision before its final phrase fro a
tion be r e j e c t e d , * For instance, the provision of the Con-
any adoption is
conclusion. It could have been done not determinatiu must
to r ender
nd judgment within specific peri-
requiring judges
q u e n c e s
because the
constitution considered it framers nf tution
of s u b r n i s s i o n for
decision of cases" has bee
drafts of the convention superfluous. Deletions in the date
are, at best, preliminar ods
from
and not mandatory, for to construe it as manda-
prevail over the positive provisions ofnegative guides which cann.
the finally
strued as directory
tory 16 to muke
such judge lose jurisdiction over the cases in the
tion 61 adopted constit decide them within the period, which consequence
they fail to
injury to the public than when it is interpreted
event
The 1973 Constitution is,

in a number of ways, a will
cause
greate.
of most of the reenactment merely ectory. For as the Court explained, "to hold that
provisions of the 1935 Constitution. And to be
Constitution is, in many ways, a reenactment of most of thethe 198 ancompliance
nond
by the courts With the atoresaid provision would
would make the courts, through which
sions of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. For this provi result in loss of jurisdiction,
reason,
in phraseology in the new Constitution may indicate an
chanees eonflicts are resolved, the very instrument to foster unresolved
intent Causes by reason merely of having failed to render a decision within
modify or change the meaning of the old provision from which it which "absurd situation could not have been
the allowed term,"
was based, and it should thus be construed to reflect such intent the framers of our fundamental law.s
Thus, the original provision of the organic law to the effect that 'no
intended by
person shall be xxx compelled in a criminal case to be a witnes
against hinself" was changed to "no person shall be compulled to 11.13. Constitution construed as a whole.
be a witness against himself." The deletion of the phrase "in crimi. A provision of the constitution should not be construed in
nal cases" connotes no other import except to make said provision isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be interpreted
also applicable to cases other than criminal,s" Conversely, where
in the as awhole, and apparently, conflicting provisions should be recon-
there has been no change in phraseology, the reenactment ciled and harmonized in a manner that may give to all of them full
provisions of the 1935 Constitution in
new Constitution of the old force and effect.6" In other words, the constitution should be
language is a recognition that con
the s a m e o r substantially the s a m e the
strued to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself
the framers did not intend a change
in meaning; and if old alone, but in conjunction with all other
received a judicial construction the from provisions, unless the con-
provision had previously construction has
trary is so clearly provided.70
court of the land, it is preumed that such
highest the reenacted pro It is
well-established rule in constitutional construction that
a
a s integral part of
been adopted by the framers
one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from a!l the
vision.
ners, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
constructions
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
11.12. Consequences of
alternative LETpreted as to efectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
follow from
alternative consLru
Tho c o n s e q u o n c o s that may constitute an import"
doubtful c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions
tions of n Catholic
Apostolic Administration of Davao, Ine. Land Registra-
Mathay, G.R.
No. 26604
Oct. 4
Lmnission,
N lar 102 Phil. 896
(1967).
v.
Association, Inc. v.
Cruz, G.R. v.
Art. Vii, Sec. 15(1), 1987No. 42428, March 18, 1983, 121 SCRA 51.
Constitution
Philippine
1966, 18 SCRA 300.
82 Phil. 771 (1949).
88 SCRA
Marcelino v.
Constitution.
Cru«, 8upra.
Ctuongbian v. De leon, Feb. 8, 1979, Agg c u
on Elections,
A r a t u c v. Commission
G.R. No. 49706,
Perult v. Castillo, G.R. No. 17169, Nov. 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 619 (1963);
Chi 8S0 01 Elections, G.R. No. 47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30.
251.
138 SCRA 294
(1985). nongbian v. De
Leun, 82 Phil. 771 (1949).
Galman v. Pamaran, (1966); In re Dick, 38 Pnu *
S e e Montelibano v. Ferrer, 97 Phil. 228
54
cONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 455
Sections bearing on a
interpreted together asparticular subject
to effectuate the should be considere simply means is that the
stitution and one whole ndeed, what the Constitution
by any reasónable section is not to be
allowed topurpose of the
tive for filing revenue, tarift, or tax bills
x x x must come
construction, the two defeat anoth initiati xxx,

gether. In other words, the court be made
to stand
can
from
the House
of Kepresentatives
ble, and must lean must harmonize Constitution prohibit filing the in the Sen-
in favor of a
construction them, if Drak "Nor docs the
bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
every word operative, rather than which will substitute
idle and nugatory" one which may make rend, o af a
action by the Senate as a body is
the WOr fearm the House, so long as House bill. x xx."73
withheld pending receipt of the
Article VI, Sec. 24 of the 1987
appropriation, Constitution provides:
revenue or tariff
bills, bills authorizing AN directory.
public debt, bills of local application, and increase 11,14.
Mandatory or
nate exclusively in the House of private bills shall ori The established
rule is that constitutional provisions a r e to be
may propose or concur with Representatives, but the Senata onstrued as mandatory, unless by express provision or by neces-
of Finance," it was amendments." In Tolentino v.

Secretar a different intention is manifested. The difference
contended that
Rep. Act No. 7716 (VAT sary implication,
not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representativeslaw)as redi between a mandatory
and directory provision is often determined
groundsof expediency, the reason being that less injury results

quired by Art. VI, Sec. 24 because it is in fact the result of the on
consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 130. to the general publie by disregarding than by enforcing the letter of
further
It i the fundamental law.74
claimed that to be considered as having originated in the
louse, Rep. Act No. 7716 must retain the essence ofH. No. 1197, It has been held that "in the interpretation of Constitutions,
The Court rejected such interpretation of the questions arise as to whether particular sections are mandatory or
constitutional provi
sion, as follows: directory. The courts usually hesitate to declare that a constitu-
This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with,t tional provision directory merely in view
is of the tendeney of the
legislature to disregard provisions which are not said to be manda-
is not the law but the revenue bill
- -
which i required by
-
tory. Accordingly, it is the general rule to regard constitutional

the Constitution to 'originate exclusively' in the House of Rep provisions as mandatory and not to leave any discretion to the will
because a bill
resentatives. It is important to emphasize this, ofto a legislature to obey or to disregard them. This
such extensive chango8 presumption as
originating in the House may undergo mandatory quality is
usually followed unless it is unmistakably
in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole, manifest that the provisions are intended to be merely
to note is that, as he analogous rules distinguishing mandatory and directory directory.
At this point, what is important
xxx
Senate action, a distinct bill may

be produced.0 utes of
are little value in this connection and are stat-
result of the bill
and not only the whicn ng upon the provisions of a constitution." "So rarely applied in
statute - -
insist that
ion in favor of giving obligatory force to the strong
a revenue
1s the
process culminating
enactme
in the
initiated the legislative terms of the
the s a m e as the House 5C aw that it has even been said
of the law must substantially be that neither by the courts
to 'concur wi h any other
- -
would be to deny the Senate's power not only

would De
department of government nay any provision of
but also to 'propose
amendments.'It
ouses Byer
every one
ution be regardedmerely directory, but that each and
as
amendments'
of the two no of its rovisions should
Violate the coequality
of the legislutive power Sen manda be treated as
imperative and
make the House
superior to tne. e di, without reference to the
rules distinguishing between
of Congress and
in fact rectory and
mandatory statutes."
ate.
bid., pp. 661-663.
"XXX arozn14Mare no
TO2a, 80 Phil. 279Cruz, G.R. No. 42428, March 18, 1983, 121 SCRA 61; Vargas
v.
Am.7anada V. (1948). v.
SCRA 317 (1991
Union v.
Executive Secretary, 194 JJur, G86-687.
Cueneo, 103 Phil. 1051, Footnote
Civil Liberties
630 (1994).
11, Pp. 1088-1089 (1951), quot;nB
235 SCRA
754 SCAD 671,
451
The reason if
why against the accused,
provisions of the constitution, are ible in evidence
regarded mandatory is that in
as
gene
onfession
is
admissibl
before the effectivity of the New Con-

self speaks and is laying down rulesconstitution, the soverci
a obtained
and e v e n if he
after January 17, 1973,
Buch bee
een
hud
least are which for the the

B a m e
if p r e s e n t e
n o iaw gave the
lo control alike
the time beine ven
to counsel, since
Tned of his right
provisions are binding upon allgovernmernt and the eing at tution,
b e e n inform that date."79
However, the fact that the departments the of t governed ad not to be so i n f o r m e d
before
government ceused the right

failed
legislation required by the constitution legislature
to enact
the
ACCL
Art. IV, of the

1973 C o n s t i t u t i o n had been sub-
does not make necese
as
essary Section 20, Constitution. In
lature illegal or its
members de facto officers. the legi re-enacted in Sec. 12,
Art. III of the 1987
antially "Although a number
law nor the law on Neither the politieal the Court ruled:
that failure
public officers, in
particular, support Eiloteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan," made while the 1973
the view extrajudicial confessions
discharge
to
ofcases held thatin force and effect, should
automatically result mandatory
a
would duty, whatever it may be have been made with
in the forfeiture Constitution was
absence of of an office, in the the definitive ruling was enunciated only
a statute to that effect.77
the assistance of counsel,this Court, through Morales, Jr. v. Enrile,
on April 26, 1983 when
issued the guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during
custo-
11.15. Prospective or retroactive. dial in vestigation. The Court specifically ruled that "(t)he right to
The rule is that a constitution should may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
counsel
operate prospectively made with the assistance of counsel.' Thereafter, in People v.
only, unless the words employed show a clear
should have a retroactive effect. intention that it Luvendino, the Court through Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
vigorously taught: 'x x x The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver
The Supreme Court applied the
principle of prospectivity to
Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution, which reads: "No
of the right to counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a
person judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in Mo
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person rales u. Enrile and reiterated on 20 March
1985 in People v. Galit
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the xxx. While the
Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became
right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such Section 12(1) of the 1987 part of
rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means comfort to Constitution, that doctrine affords no
appellant Luvendino for the
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Any confes tions outlined in Morales and Galit requirements and restric-
sion obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmisible in do not reach waivers made
have noretroactive effect andd
evidence." The Court held that "this specific portion of this conslt ulgation of Morales."81 prior to 26 April 1983 the date of
&
prom-
tutional mandate has and should be given a prospective and not
retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a per Illuetrative
ha,
of the
where the Court rule of retroactivity is Co u. Electoral
son under investigation for the commission of an offense, who nas held that Sec. 1, Tibu-
not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inau Onstitution, which states par. 3, Art. IV of the
1987
after tne s, of Pilipino mothers, that "Those born before
missible in evidence if the same had been obtained
on January 17, 1973. Conversey
ng the age of who elect January 17,
Philippine citizenship upona
effectivity of the New Constitution majority"
v eof effect, the clear intent of
are
citizens of the
ulaoge the
rutrouctive.
Philippines, has
the framers
provision being to make it not only
as shown by the
Vargas v. Rillaroza, 80 Phil. 279 (1948). 9, 0
21 prospective but
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 28196, Nov.
"Gonzales v.
B8
SCRA 774. Cabauatan v. Uy N
6gtoto
Director of Prisons, 75 Phil. 285 (1946);
Peralta v. v.
Phil. 103 (1951); Magtoto v. Manguera, G.R. No. 37201,
Mareh 3, 197b,
So
RA 763
D* SCAD Munguera,
311, 63 SCRA
263 SCRA
Ceniza v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 62304,
Jan. 28, 1980, bid., pp. 258-260.
109
4, 12
222 (1996). (1975).
Hagonoy Water District v. NLRC, 165 SCRA 272 (1988). SCRA 692
(1991).
4 CONSTITUTIONAL, CONSTRUCTION
459
of rules of statutory const.
11.16. Applicability tru tion. oted in hirn in this
A good number of the rules of statutery constru ments are
all other officera of the

Constitution. He shal also
construction of the
constitution. In an appoint Government whose appoint
plicable to the c o n s t i t u t i o pproj not otherwise provide for by law, and
they may le employed
in construing Onstitutional provision
naiPriat
Cas ments are
be authorized by law to
appoint.The
those whom
v. Mison js a
good example ir, whiç s he may
vest the.
law, vest the appointnent of other officers Congress may,
Sarniento
Court applied a number of rules of statuto constru the Supre by law,
the P r e s i d e n t alone, in the courts, or in
lower in rank in
in
inpreme the President the heads of the de-
struing constitutional provision.
a
The issue raised ni eon partments, agenciee, cornmissions or boards.
whether the appointment of a
not Commissioner
of cane President shall have the power to make
subject to
or
confirmation by the Commission on Appoint Customs"The
ntments. ments
wThe
appoint
recess of the Congrese, whether voluntary
during the
Court ruled:
compulsory, but such appointments shall be
or
effective only
This case assumes added significg
hecause, at but
tom line, it involves a conflict between two (2)
oraisaDproved by the Commission on Appointments or un-
reat til the next adjournment of the Congress.
nents of government, the Executive and Legislative pa
ve Depart "It is readily apparent that under
ments. it also ocurs early in the,life of the 1987 the provisions of the
Constit 1987 Constitution, just quoted,
officers whom the President there
are four (4) groups of
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by t shall
exist
ence of relatively clear provisions in the Constitution. cases
exist. appoint. These four (4)
groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to
like this, we follow what the Court, speaking time,
Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose ad through
ntos stated'in Mr
are
Gole Firat, the heads of the executive
Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez," that:" ,i 1 departments, ambassa
dors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
"The fundamental principle of constitutional constno. armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval
tion is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the ficers whose
captain, and other
organie appointmenta are vested in him in this Consti
law and of the people adopting it. The tution;
is to be given is that which is
intention to which fore
embodied and expressed in the "Second, all other oficers of the Government whose
constitutional provisions themselves." ap
pointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
The Court will thus construe the applicable
constitu
tional provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or "Third, those whom the President may be authorized by
the legislative department may want
1 law to appoint;
them construed, but in
accordance with what they say and provide, "Fourth, officers lower in rank whose
appointment
itCongress may by law vest in the President alone.
the
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution says: The first group of officers is
The President shall nominateand, with the consent o consent of the Commission on clearly appointed the with
the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the Buch officers are initiated Appointments. Appointments of
executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers by nomination and, if the nonina
and consuls, or officers of the tion is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the
colonel or naval
armed forces from the rank u President appoints.
captain, and other officers whose appo
The second, third and fourth
groups of officers are
i,t1
present bone of contention. Should they be appointed by the
the
Marcelino v. Cruz, G.R. No. 42428, March 18, 1983, 121 SCRA Di; resident with or without the consent (confirmation) of the
4156SCRA 649 i6omission on Appointments? By following the accepted rule
66 Phil. 259.
(1987).
n
constitutional and statutory construction that an express
umeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it

461
those appointments to
that only
would follow
stated in the
equire
first group req the cor positiona(eo
on Appointments. Butnt
pressly
Commission
of the
mation)
rely solely on this

itutional
basic rule of constitutional
background as
construction.
cone
well agt
Need
W
not
7 x X X, and with the consent of the Commission on
shall appoint ambassadors, other public minis
refer to the historical the recore
A p p o i n t m e n t s ,
can
Commission to determino and consuls XXX."
of the 1986 Constitutional ne, with TmOre ters
the intention of the fro Uoon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides
not precision,
accuracy, if
1987 Constitution and
ting it, on mera of the
the people adoptin
appointments by the
President, under the second, hether the that
fourth groups, require the consent mation) of third and uSection 10. The President shall appoint the heads of
task, the the Com and offices the officers of the Armed Forces of the
mission on Appointments.
Again, in this followi bureaus
advice of Mr. Chief Justice

J. Abad Santos in Gold Creek Philippines from the rank of Brigadier General or Commo-
and all other
officers of the government whose appoint-
ig dore,
apropos:
nts
ment are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom
"In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a he may be authorized by law to appoirnt. However, the Batasang
constitutional provision must be presumed to have been i Pambansa may by law vest in the Prime Minister, members of
and adopted in the light and understanding of prior amed
a exist.
the
the Cabinet, Executive Committee, Courts,
Heads of Agen
ing laws and with reference to them. Courts are bou cies, Commissions, and Boards the power to appoint inferior
presume that the people adopting a constitut are famil officers in their respective offices."
with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to whish
uhus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential
its provisions relate, and upon which they express their
ment and opinion in its adoption." Barry u. Truas, 13 N. appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the Com-
mission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political
131; 99 N.W.; 769; 65 LR.A., 762.)a ' history that the power of confirmation by the Commission on
.
"It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the Appointments, under the 1935 Constitution, transformed that
1935 Constitution, it is provided that commission, many times, into a venue of "horse-trading" and
similar malpractices.
XXX
.
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and
of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power
of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the
from the rank of colonel, of the
Navy and Air Forces from the part of the legislature.
rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the "Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Con-
Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise stitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not
provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law t difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987
appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the appointnento" Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a "middle
'
in the courts, or in the Com-

inferior officers, in the President alone,
ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the
heads of departments. mission on Appointments for the first group of appointments
and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the
4) The President shall have the power to make a the second and
pointments during the recess of the Congress, but 8uch ppontment of other officers, i.e., those in officers
third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e.,
pointments shall be effective only until disapproved by u iment of lower rank.
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjourt Commission
of the Congress. Constitutional
"The proceedings in the 1986 Section 16, Article
Support this conclusion. The original text of
462 cONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 463
VII, as
1986 Constitutional
the Committee on the Exo«
proposed by
Commission, read as follow Executive of the
lows:
sion
of
a p p o i n t m e n t
made under the second sentence of the
requirement. x x X
the same
16. The president shall nominate and
s e c t i o n firom
Section
consent of a Commission on Appointn shall
nd, with the
Tt. therefore, clear that apPPOintments to the second
heads of the executive departments und bureau
ministers and consuls, or
appoint the
of mba
is,
third groups
of fficers can be made by the resident
c o n s e n t (confirmat of the Commission Ap-
dors, other public rs of the hout the
on
the rank of colonel or naval captain
armed forces from
Government whose appointment ünd al
pointments.
other officers of the

those whom he are not
and th contended by amicus curiae, Senatorptali
Neptali
otherwise provided for by law, "Tt is
m
that the:second sentence of Sec. 16, Article
authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may hu 1.y be Gonzales,
the appointment of inferior

oflicers in the
President law veat
alone, ing
the courts, or in the heads of departments."8" [Emphasis Bupin H e (the President) shall also appoint all other offic-
plied]. Bup- whose appointments are not otherwise
er
of the Government
The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its o for by law and thos whom he may be authorized by
provided
part provision in the 1935 Constitution. When +hontep law to appoint. xxx"(Emphasis supplied.)
. .
discussed on the floor of the Commission the proposed text to thhe word "also," implies that the
with particular reference
Section 16, Article VII, a feeling was manifestly expresed President shall "in like manner" appoint the offHcers men-
make the power of the Commission on Appointmenta second sentence. In other words, the President
tioned in said
presidential appointments more limited than that held h the shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence
Comnission in the 1935 Constitution. Thu_- he appoints ofiicers mentioned in the
in the same manner as
Mr. Rama: x X x May I ask that Commissioner Mons0d that is, by nomination and with the consent
first sentence,
be recognized. (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
The President: We will call Commissioner Davide later Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said sec
"Mr. Monsod: With the Chair's indulgence, I just want t ond sentence is not necessarily supportive of the conclusion he
arrives at. For, as the Solicitor General argues, the word "also"
take a few minutes of our time to lay the basis for some of the
could mean "in addition; as well; besides, too" (Webster's In-
amendments that I would like to propose to the Commitee
ternational Dictionary, p. 62, 1981 edition) which meanings
this morning. '
could, on the contrary, stres that the word "also" in said
second sentence means that the President, in addition to nomi
"On Section 16, I would like to suggest that the power nating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appoint-
ments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sen
the Commission on Appointments be limited to the department
levels of tence, can appoint without such consent (confirmation) the
heads, ambassadors, generals and so on but not to the officers mentioned in the second sentence.
bureau heads and colonels.
"Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possi-
XXX xx xxx (Emphasis supplied.) ble meanings of the word "also" as used in the context of said
In the course of the debates.on the text of Section 1, becond sentence, the Court has chosen to derive signilicance
there were two (2) major changes proposed and approved Irom the fact that the first eentence speaks of nomination by
the Commission. These were: (1) the exclusion of the appoim the President and appointments, whereas, the second sen-
ments of heads of bureaus from the requirement
of connri tence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, this
tion by the Commission on Appointments; and (2) the e use of different language in two (2) sentences proximate to
Hand's8
each other underscores, in line with Judga Learned
464 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 465
observation that "words are not pebblesin

alien
but, more so, because the recorded proceeding.j POgit heads of departm
agencies, commissions, or boards."
the.
ings
Constitutional Comnission clearly and expresslu of the tion'
in
Emphasis supplied]
differences.
justify 1986such and
argues
a law is needed to vest the appoint
that, since
officers
lower-ranked in the President alone, this im.
As a result of the innovations introduced nt of
of such a law, lower-ranked officers
Article VIl of the 1987 that, in the absence
Constitution, there are o Sec. 16, plies
appointed by he President subject to confirmation
confirmati cers whose to be
appointments require no of the have
Appointments; and, if this is so,
Commi
Appointments, even if such officers may be higher ission by
the
ommission on
officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers
as to
on
compared to some officers whose appointments in rank,
l o w e r - r a n k e d
should be appointed by the President, subject also to confir-

confirmed by the Commission on Appointments
under to b by the Commission on Appointments.
sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII.
Thus, to theira mation
appointment of the Central Bank Governor ,the
require no confir- illustrate, The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the
mation by the Commission on
bintments, third of Sec. 16, Article VII, abovequoted, merely
sentence
higher in rank than a colonel in the Armed even if h Force declares that, as to lowerranked officers, the Congress may
Philippines their appointment in the President, in the courts,

or a
consul in the Consular Service. re by law vest
orin the heads of the vafous departments, agcneies, commis-
"But these contrasts, while
initially impressive, merelb 9 gions, or boards in the government. No reaeon, however, is
underscore the purposive intention and deliberate judgmen igubmitted for the use of the word "alone" in said third sen-
of the framers of the 1987 Constitution
those officers whose appointments require the
that, except as t tence
Commission on Appointments by exprès mandate consent the
of The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of
of the first
sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments of
other officern lpsi the considered opinion, after a careful study of the delibera-
are left to the President without need of
confirmation by the wtions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of
Commission on Appointments. This conclusion is the word "alone" after the word "President" ir said third sen-
we are to presume, as we
inevitable, if tence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip
must, that the framers of the 19871
Constitution were knowledgeable of what they were doing and or lapsus in draftsmanship. It will be recalled that, in the
of the foreseeable effects thereof. lii.t
1935 Constitution, the following provision appears at the end
"Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally ofpar. 3, Section 10, Article VIl therrof-
tive or presidential in character. Limitations on or 'execu 1 xx; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of
qualifica inferior officers, in the President alone, in the couris, or in the
tions of such power should be
strictly construed against them. heads
Such limitations or qualifications
must be clearly stated in of departments."[Emphasis suppliedl.
order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence o The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears
Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is
clearly stated that appointmens iimmediately after the provisions whieh makes practicallyal
by the President to the positions therein enumerated requre presidential appointments subject to confirmation by the Com-
the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. miasion on Appointments, thus
As to the fourth group of officers whom the Presiden The President shall nominate and with the consent
can appoint, the intervenor Commission on Appointments a ofthe Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads
derscoresthe third sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII of the l301 oT the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army
Constitution, which reads: from the
rom the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces of
"The Congress may, by law,
other
rank of captain or commander, and all other officers the
appointmento
vest the
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the cour
aOvernment whose appointments are not herein provided
ONSTITUTIONAL (CONSTRUCTION 467
constitutional provisions are self-execut.

for, and those whom he may be authorized by rally,
law
. 1 7 . G e n e r a ,
In other words, since the 1935 Constitutinn

appoint ing.
rule is that
constitutional provisions are self
he provisions themselves expressly require
general
The when the
a general rule, presidential apPpointments to except
then or when, from their language or
the Commission on Appointments, the same confirr to implernent
executing,
19aationn by
35 they are merely declarations
lations
of policies and principles. A
tion saw fit, by way of an exception to such
that Congress may, however, by law vest the rule,
an to
the appointment (
Constproviailu t e n u
ecuting provision is one which is complete by itself and be-
r e ,
or enabling leg-
inferier officers (equivalent to "officers lower in sellenerative without the aid of Bupplementary
rank" supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
to in the 1987 Constitution) in the
resident alone,referred
comes
or which
However, a self-execut-
courts, or in the heads of departments. in the islatio
may be enjoyed
o r protected.
it grants the legislature from enacting laws
ight
does not preclude
In the 1987 Constitution, provision.
the con-
however, as already. ing
hich facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by
framers was pointed
out, the clear and express intent of its stitution, furtherthe operation of se!f-executing provisions, pre-
presidential appointments from exclude
firmation by the Cor their enforcement, provide a conven-
actice to be used for
nmia
sion on Appointments, except appointments to offices express scribe a
ient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determi-
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16,
Article VIL y or place reasonable sateguards
around the exercise
quently, there was no reason to use in the Conse nation thereof, and add to
third
ence o of the right. The fact that legislation may supplement or
Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the
dent" in providing that Congres8 may by law vest
word "Pres prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitu-
the appain. does not render such a provision ineffective in the
ment of lower-ranked officers in the President tional provision
a constitution of any
alone, or in the absence of such legislation. The omission from
courts, or in the heads of departments, because
the power t for remedy for enforcing right or liability is
express provision a a
appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-
by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without
need of confirmation by the Commission on executing.
Appointments, in
the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII. The rule is that in case of doubt, the Constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. Unless the
"Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should
have stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the leg
officers,
the Congress may by law vest their
appointment in the Presi
dent, in the courts, or in the heads of various departments of islature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
the government. In short, the word "alone" in the third lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by
tence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
sen
as a Simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.*
literal import from the last part of
par. 3, Section 10, Article An example of a
VII of the 1935
Constitution, appears to be redundant self-executing constitutional provision is Sec.
light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, thia 0,8econd par. of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which states
that "in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positiveinten
of national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential ar qualified Filipinos." In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,a" the issue
oinLments, except those mentioned in the first sentenc the
Sec. 16, Article
VII, are not subject to confirmaton
Commission on Appointments.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 78 SCAD 764, 267 SCRA 408 (1997).
ud., citing Cruz, lsagani A., Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., Pp. 8-10.
78 SCAD 764, 267 SCRA 408 (1997).
156 SCRA, p. 562 et seq.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 469
and from whom all gov-

Taised in connection with thi8 constitutional ilipino people
in the
provis authority emanates. In
residing nationalism, the happiness
in the sale at puble bidding of the majorit n, 18 whet
ownership The nation-state
e v g n t y
nila Hotel a qualified Filipino entity can match

ernment auth
m u s t be the goal.
the o f tho ther of the people
interpretation of any consti-
a foreigner and be entitled to the award of the nin welfare
higher p u r p o s e .
Any i
thereof. The resolution of the issue depends on ave
no
must adhere to such basic concept. Protec
sion is
whethaer the proi
can provision
while dable, is merely a policy.
self-executing or non-self-executing which
tutional
hich requir offoreig

investmenta,
nationalism."
legislation to implement it. The Court ruled that the qualifi
enah tion
It cannot override the demands of
pino entity must be given preference by
he pro it granting the
match the winning bid because the
provision
seli-executing,option to
is
On the other hand, Sec. 10,.second th
1987 Constitution is mandator
par, Art. XII
sitive command
complete in itself and which needs no further os hich j
implementing laws or rules for its elines or
enforcement. From
words the provision does not require any
legislation
in operation. It is per se judicially
stitution mandates that liln
enforceable. When toourput it
the grant ofrights, Con
and concessions ational economy and privileg
covering
the State shall give preference to qualified patrim
Filipinos, it m
just that- qualified Filipino8 shall be preferred. And heans
our Constitution declares that a' right exists in when
certain speci
fied circumstances an action may be maintained to entares
such right, notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on
the Bubject; consequently, if there is no statute
acted to enforce such constitutional right, such
especially en.
right enforves
itself by its own inherent potency and puissance,
and from
which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there
is a right, there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
"xxX
"x xx In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patre
mony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resoures
of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very wll
used the ter1n natural resources, but also to the cultural her
itage of the Filipinos.
"Manila Hotel has become a landmark- a living tesur
monial of Philippine heritage. xxX.
xXX
"Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the r Ibid., 436-437; 447-448.
BOver
ppines being a democratic and republican state, wu
GLOSSARY OF MAXIMS
Absol
sententia
expositore non indiget -When language
is clear, no explanation of it is
required. of law
AntLs me invito facLs non est meus actus -
An act done by
against my will i8 not my act. me
Aetus non facit

reum, Risi mens sit
rea- The act itself does
make a man guilty unles8 his
intention
not
were s0
Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi
Relative words refer to the nearest impediatur sententia
context otherwise requires. antecedents, unless the
Argumentum a contrario- Negative-opposite doctrine.

Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est-
omitted from an enumeration A pereon, object or thing
must be held to have been
ted intentionally. omit
'
Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex- When the

law ceases, the law itself ceases. reason of the
Contemporanea expositio est
optima et fortissima in
contemporary construction is strongest in law. lege The
- -
Distingue tempora et concordabis jura Distinguish times and

you will harmonize laws.
Dura lex sed lex
-"The law may be harsh, but that is the law.
Ejusdem generis- Of the same kind or
specie.
Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis A thing not
being excepted must be regarded 'as coming within the pur
view of the general rule.
Ex dolo malo non oritur actio- No man can be allowed to fçund a
claim upon his own
wrongdoing.
471
472 473
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION GLOSSARY O F MAXIMs
is to
Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius inconvenience and absurdity
person, thing or consequence TH will avoid
express
implies the interpretat
tation
as
exclusiomentioofn alof one

ers. he be udopted ritative interpre-
authoritative
obtinet-The
Expressum facit legis vim force of law by

cessare tacitum atio
Lgis nlerpretatic acquires the
to that which is
-
What is Gh court of a statute
implied. expressed
Ssed ation o f the
thereof.
Ex necessitate legis puts an ent becoming

a part
abrogant - A
later law repeals
-
By necessary contrarias
Falsa implication of law nosteriores prioress a m e 8ubject which is repugnant
thereto.
demonstratio non nocet, cum de Rorior law on the
for the future,
scription does not preclude corpore
constat P The law provides
ing of the statute. construction nor vitiata judex depast.
praterito-
ge de
the mean Ler
de
futuro,
for the
Favores ampliandi sunt; odia the judge forward, not backward.
- The law looks
favorable to the accused restringenda- Penal lawa wl: prospicit,
non respicit
It is dangerous
are
given retroactive efteotCh are Lex
corrumpit t e x t u m -
Generale dictum generaliter est Maledicta est
expositio quae
is against the text.
ment is understood in
interpretandum -
A general construction
which
a
general sense.
state oscitura sociis
-
Word construed with
reference to accompany-
Generalia verba sunt generaliter words.

intelligenda-- What is gena
spoken shall be generally understood. ing or
associated
generaly imponere debet non praeteritis-

constitutio futuris formam
Generalia specialibus non derogant- A Noua
A new statute should affect the future, not the past.
ify a specific or special law. general law does not No should
t nul. commodum potest de injuria propriasua
- man
Nullus wrong.
Hoc quidem perquam durum beallowed to take advantage of his
own
est, sed ita lex
exceedingly hard but so the law is written.scripta estIt Nullum crimen sine poena,
nulla poena sine legis There ia no -
penalty, and there is no penalty without a

Impossibiliun1 nulla obligatio est There is no obligation to
-
crime without a
impossible thing. do iaw.

Nullum tempus occurit regi - There can be no legal right as against
Index animi sermo est- Speech is the index
of intention. the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
In eo quod plus sit,
semper inest minus- The greater includes
et
Optiaa statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutumThe best inter
the lesser. preterof a statute is the statute itself.
Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium --
Public interest requires Optimus interpres rerum usus- The best interpreter of the law is
that by the very nature of things there must be an end to a usage.
legal controversy. Pari materia- Relating to same matter..
Interpotare et concordare legibus est optimus interpotandi modus-
Privilegia reciprint largan interpretationem voluntate consonan
Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other concedentis- Privileges aere to be interpreted in accordance
statutes as to form uniform system of law. with the will
of him who grants them. t L u i 91 a:
Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat Alaw Fotior est in
tempoe, potior est in jure He who is first in time is
-
unau
should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather preferred in right.
destroying it. uando aliquid
Tnterpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est ut eo
tletur prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum
-What is prohibited
directly is prohibited indirectly.
nconveniens et absurdum -Where there is ambiguity,
474
Ratihabito mandato
aquiparatur Lægislative-
lent to a mandate. ratificati a equiva-

Ratio legis SUBJECT INDEX
Interpretation according to spirit,

-
Ratio legis est anima pages)

legis-The reason of the law is it. are
to
Reddendo singula
(References
singulis- its 90ul

phrase or expression to Referring
each to
each; ref
put in its proper place. appropriate bject, or letringeac each Appeals, 386
Salus populi est de Appropriations and revenue
suprema lex -
The voicevoice of
of the A
supreme law. the Den
people is tha
bills, 7
Associated words, 206
Surplusagium non nocet- Surplusage does not 147
Authentication, 8
Stare decisis et non vitiate: A b s u r d i t y ,
to avoid,
Btatute, withdrawal of, 10
c o n s t r u c t i o n
quieta movere-
not disturb what has been Follow past precedenta. mala in s e
292
settled. and do Acts prokibita,
and mala rule and
Ubi jus, ibi remedium- Where there is a right, Administrative B
there is re a interpretation,
Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos - distinguished, 23 Barangay ordinance, 23

distinguere
law does not distinguish, we should debemus- Whera 106 283
not distinguish.. Adopted
Adoption statutes, 3211
statutes,
Bill of attainder, 358
Utile per inutile non vitiatur- The Bills
non-useful. useful is not vitiated bu the Aids to construction,
authentication, of, 8,
generally, 77, 439
Ut res magis valeat quam pereat 410 enrolled, 9
That construction is
to he Alllaws, meaning,construction, title, 14
sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute Alternative
every word.
-
it consequences of, 452
Amend, C
Verba accipienda sunt secundum aubjectam materiam- A wOrd ia power to, 387 'J.J
to be understood in the context in
which it is used. Amendment, Capitalization of letters, 85
Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire Words by deletion, 102 "Casus omissus pro omisso
be more subservient to the intent ought to -
by implication, 388 habendus eet", 230

and not the intent to the -
effect of nullity of, prior
words. Change in phraseology
or amendatory act, 393
Verba legis- Plain-meaning rule. effect on jurisdiction, 392 hy amendments, 101,
96, 451
etect on vested rights, 391
Vigilantibus
the
et non
dormientibus jura subveniunt- Thelaw aid - how construed, City ordinance, 24
vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. generally, 389 Clerical errors, 144
Verba legis non est recedendum- From the words ofthe statule how effected, 387 Codification, 393
there should be no departure. meaning of law Comimon law
changed, 391 -principles of, 107
prospoctivity, 389 Conditions at time of
Amnesty proclamations, 391 enactmont, 108
.
475
SUBJECT INDEX
477
476
to avoid Enacting clause, 14
Conflicting provisions, 262
-
-
injustice,
to avoid surplu 152 Enrolled bill, 9
4
legislative
power, -
to favor right
and justice261 Exception, 240 Identical terms
Congress'
Consequences of various
157 -generally, 241 -construction, 189
constructions, 92 to give life to distinguished, 242 309 Implication
to harmonize law,
-
258
different -
doctrine of necessary,
Executive construction,
whole, 453
Constitution
-
construed
as a
provision, 394 kinds of, 110 164
construed as enduring
-
to promote general Exemption, 161 299 Implied repeal, 398
for ages, 435 -by revision or
welfare, 288 Explanatory note, 95
- defined, 432 codification, 393
- how language
- to promote social justice Ex post fucto law,
357
other forms of, 409
287 unius est exclusio
-
construed, 436 Expressio

Impossibilum nulla
origin and history,
433 Contemporaneous construction alterius, 222
obligatio est, 162
-
- statute construed adoption of, 283 -application, 224

and writings, 450 - limitations, 228 Injustice,
in harmony with,264 - construction to
Constitutional constructión, 432,
a -exceptions,
erroneous, 116 116
Expropriations, 297
avoid, 152
434 In pari materia, 268
- aids to, et seq. 439 reasons why given much F
Intent
primary purpose of, 434 weight, 115 - literal import must
-prospective, 456 weight accorded to, 111 Formalities of will
yield to, 133
constitutional provision, "self -
when disregarded, 116 - statutes prescribing, 308
-or spirit of law, 88 131
executing, 467 Context, 82 196 1
Constitutionality 251us On contract, 428iimbt9z G Interpretation,
of words and
- necessity of deciding, 32 Curative statutes, 375
-
phrases,
- presumption of, 25 119i. 177
General law, 414 - statutes, 128
- requisites, et seq. 27 D General welfare clause, 311
-test, 33 General welfare legislations, 310 J
-when to raise, 31 Dictionaries, 91 TiTo General words, 183
Construction; See also Con Directory etatutes, 329 "Generalia verba sunt
temporaneous Construction Judicial construction
and interpretation,
Disjunctive and conjunetive generaliter intelligenda, 183 - legislature cannot
words, 204 Generic terni, 185 overrule, 67 .
distinguished, 48
Doctrine omissus, of casus 231 Grant of power to Judicial interpretation
as judicial function, 56 Doctrine of last antecedent, 232 local governments, 298, 312 - when may be set
as not to
render
-
nugatory, 266
provision Dura lex sed lex, 126 - excludes greater power, 172 aside, 59
- contemporary, 109 Guidelines in construing statute, Judicial power
- defined, 48 - court may issue, 71 requisites for exercise
-purpose or object, 51 of, 27

-rules of, 49 jusdem generis, 213 H Judicial rulings,
-o non-retroactivity, 68
accomplish purpose, 134 limitations, 218
to -
avoid Election laws, 16, 3. Harmonization, 272 Jurisdiction

-to avoid absurdty, 147 of election, 342
Conduct Headnotes or epigraphs, 86 grant of, 167
danger
public interest, affecting
156 qualification
and
listory of the tinmes, 108
- implications, 168
disqualification, 343
SUBJECT INDEX
N 479
L
construe, 56
Power to
Language used, 333 Naturalization laws, 299
Nature of statute,
limitations on, 73 construction to avoid
Last antecedent, 232 Preamble, 15, 80 danger to, 152
Test to
etermine, 332 PaPunctuation marks, 883
-
Prescription in criminal and civil uon marks,

Laws, 1 41 Negative-opposite Purpose, 250
-
effectivity and
operation, 41
prospectivity, 352
doctrine,
Negative, prohibitory or 223
cases, 385
Prescription of action, 384 Purpose of law or mischief

egislative approval, 119 exclusive terms, 337 Prescription of crimes
to be
suppressed, 90
Noscitur a sociis, 206 -
statutes prescribing, 320
Legislative debates,
96 Prescriptive period to collect taxes
views and deliberations,
-
statutes prescribing, 308,
Legislative
Legislative grants
ment units,
-localgovernment units, 298
295 315 Questions of wisdom,
Legislative history, 93 Obligations of contract, 366 Presidential issuances, 16, 42 courts not to be
Legislative intent, 52
Obscure or missing word President's message to influenced by, 75
or false
Ordinance, description,
ascertainment, 55 161 legislature, 94
Legislative interpretation, 118
16 Presumptions, 92 R
when, takes effect, 44
-
Prior laws from which statute

Legislative journals,-96 is based, 98 "Reddendo singula singulis,"
- unimpeachability of,8 234
P Procedural Laws, 370
Legislative meaning, 53 Reason of law, 141
Procedural requirements
Legislative omission, 143 Pari delicto generally, 4 Redemption laws, 325
Legislative power,
generally, 3 -principle of, 175 Prospective and retroactive Redundant
Reenacted
words, 160
Pari materia, 268 statutes, defined, 51, 456 gtatutes, 281
Legislative purpose, 52
Passage of bill, 5 Prospectivity, Reenactment, 120, 428
Liberal construction words or phrases
Reference statutes, 280
Penal laWs
-
application, 286, 310 Remedy implied from right,

-defined, 286 how construed, 291 indicating, 355 166
a
Lingual text, 87 - when applied Prohibition, Removal of officials,

Literal interpretation retroactively, 359 -illegality of act -
statutory grounds for,

Penal statutes, implied from, 174 298
departure from, 128 Provincial ordinance, 25 Repeal, 397
Literal meaning, 124 generally, 289, 357 Proviso
Local governnent, 312 reasons, 291 and expiration of laws,
-and main provision,
strictly construed, 289 distinguished, 430
repugnancy between, 240 by implication, , 398,
M Pension laws, 321 a s additional legislation,
409, 411
Mala in se, 292
strictly construed, 287 238
by reenactment, 408, 428
Philippine Constitutions generally, 236 -
effects, 423 et seq.
Mandatory statutes, 329, 337 (1935 and 1973) may enlarge scope of generaly, 395 et seg.
originand history, 433
anddirectory law, 237 irreconcilable incon
Btatutes, 455 Plain-meaning rule, 124 what qualifies, 238 Bistency, 399
May", 386 Police power, 382 Public funds, of municipal charter, 430
Municipal charter, 430 Policy of law, 89 authority to charge - of penal laws, 429
Municipal ordinance, 24 Power against, 174
Public interest
- of tax laws, 428
- o n jurisdiction, 423
grant of, 169
480 SUBJECT INDEX

481
law, Stare decisis, 121

ting 1aw
nullity of repealing
or
gtatu
Statutes, l et
seq. prescribing qualifica-tions U
431
power to, 397
amendatory acts, autho
essment ofof taxes
assessment taxes,
zing expropria-344
pre
for office, 344
Ubi lex
Repealing and
tion, 307 prescribing
to take
time non
distinguit nec no8
368
98
- concerning public
-
action
and to appeal,
339 distinguere debemus, 197
Reports of commissions,
Retroactive statutes, auction sale, 345
-prospective effect given, Unconstitutionality
effects of,34
generally, 356
-
conferring power, 387 355

-
invalidity due to change

Retroactivity,
- presumption against,
-construction
60,61
by courta - purpose
or context as
controlling guide, 250 of conditions, 37

body, 15 -partial invalidity, 37
356 construed
247
as
whole. a
- purview
to
or
appeals, 386 Usage and practice

Revision and codification, 393, 406 - relating
Right and justice, - continue in retroactive effect, 359, 370 weight accorded to, 114
force
-
- social legislation, 310

- construction in favor
repealed, 45 until - special, 6, 276 V
of, 157 courts may not
Rigid application of law, nor restrict, 73 enlarge - strict construction, 287
-exemption from, 161 -substantive in nature, 361 Vested right, 364, 426
enactment, 3 supplemental, 281 Veteran and pension laws, 321
Rules -
general, 256, 276

and ordinances, 17 - temporary, 2
-
-and regulations,
giving effect to, as a territorial and personal W
whole, 251 -
construed, 114 effect, 46

ules of Court, 326
grant of privileges, 297 - title, 11
-
grant taxing power, 314 Will, 308

Rulings of Supreme Court Statutory Construction, - associated, 2 0 6
part of legal system, 66

granting of benefits, 338 Applicability of rules, 458 Words,
-imposing penalties for Strict construction, 285 and
-
phrases, construed,
S non-payment of Substantive law, 361 180
tax, 316 Suits against the commercial or trade
-
in
derogation of rights, government
Saving clause, 245 296
statutes authorizing, 307 meaning, 186
Separability clause, 16 Surplusage and superfluity, 169, general, 183
"Shall" -in pari 261
materia, 268 generic, 186
-or "must", 333 intent or
meaning, 247 - identical term8, 189
nanner of judicial number and gender, 163
when construed T
ordinary meaning, 180
as
"may and vice action, 345
Tax and customs duties - statutory definition, 177
versa, 3356 -manner of referring
- technical or legal
Sovereign, to, 3 -statutes imposing, 300
Tax exemnptions, meaning, 187
statutes concerning, 306 matters inquired into in
Special and general construing, 55
-
statutes granting, 301
256, 417 provisions, -parts, 11 et seq. Taxing power,
statutes granting, 312
Special or general permanent, 2 Title, 77, 80
Spirit, 88 law, 419
-
and law, 131 prescribing jurisdictional
requirement, 338
Standing to sue, 28 prescribing procedural
requirements, 341

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Statutory Construction 2003 Agpalo

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Statutory Construction 2003 Agpalo

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STATUTORY

1.01. Laws, generally . . . .

1.03. Permanent and temporary statutes ...

1.15 Title of statute. ************** 11

80 disregarded... "****''***'******************* ****°*"'******

Intent or spirit of law . . .

95 B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL

106 Limitation of rule. 134

3.3 Generally.. ************'*****e 4 *****'*************

Construction in favor of right and justice ****

s gven much weight . . . *** 115

may not law. 161

Word or phrase construed in relation to other

4.28. Grant of power excludes 172 5.17. Noscitur a ******* *

Application of rule. *******************°**************'**** *

4.29 should not be

4.30. What is 19.

4.31 174 5.21. 222

176 5.25. 231

Doctrine of casus omissus. *****

There should be no penalty for compliance 5.2 ********°******

5.31. Provisos, generally 287

5.03. Qualification of rule. 179 What proviso qualifies ..

5.05. General words construed generally. proviso and

186 llustration of exception

legal meaning. 187 5.40.

6.04 Giving effect 286

6.05. Apparently conflicting 286

6.1 7.08. Penal statutes strictly construed..

7.11. Application of rule. g*o****** ****************, 293

272 Qualification of rule. . 306

272 7.22. Statutes concerning the sovereign.. *******" 306

6.23 Referenee statutes..

8.23. Constitutional time provision directory.. *****?***°°***° 348

MANDAToRY AND DIRECTORY Chapter X

Glossary of Maxims.. ************************************** 471 A. IN GENERAL

1.01. Laws, generally.

1.02. Statutes, generally.

constitute it part of the law of the land. Statutes

enacted the legislature are those passed by the Philippine Com-

Statutes may either

utes passed by the Philippine

A temporary statute is a etatute whose duration is for a lim- B. ENACTMENT OF STATUTES

Sec 1, Proclamution No. 3, March 25,

3Art. VI, Sec 24, ibiul.

the Congress shall have

The bill as passed by Congresa,

records contained in the,.legislative journals

and carelessly and unintentionallv

or fraud upon the legislators.1

"Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676, 688 (1926). 48 SCRA 382.

sufficiently expressed the in force,08 A preamble is a prefatory occasion for making

ibs sadutc h t u V is that the statement

1.26. Presidential issuances.

Presidential issuances are tho8e which the President issues in

justlyadministering remedy and if

summarized the rule, as follows:

the performance of his gress or the Constitution con-

who have their own

80 disregarded... "**''*'*************** °*"'******

3.3 Generally.. **********'e 4 '***********

Application of rule. *********°' *

There should be no penalty for compliance 5.2 **°

7.11. Application of rule. g*o **********, 293

8.23. Constitutional time provision directory.. ***?*°°***° 348