August 30, 2022

Constitution Law 1

SECTION 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.

No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

SECTION 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the
Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.

a. On the manner of nomination and Appointment of Sectoral representatives to the House of

Representatives

Exec. Order No. 198

SECTION 1. Sectoral Representatives. – There shall be twenty-five (25) sectoral
representatives to the House of Representatives.

Nine (9) sectors shall be represented in the House of Representatives, namely: (a) labor; (b)
peasant; (c) urban poor; (d) indigenous cultural communities; (e) women; (f) youth; (g)
veterans; (h) the elderly and (i) the disabled, whose representatives shall be appointed by
the President from the nominees of their respective sectors or of a member of the sector in
the manner herein provided.

SECTION 3. Nominations. – (a) Nominations of the sectoral representatives to the House of

Representatives must be made by the organizations/s or aggroupment of members of the
sectoral groups defined in Section 2 hereof or by a member of the sector.

(b) All nominations shall be filed with the Office of the President not later than July 20, 1987.
(c) Nominations must be in writing and accompanied by the following supporting
documents, namely; (i) curriculum vitae of the nominee/s; (ii) an indication of the sector to
be represented by the nominee; (iii) an endorsement of the nominating group or individual;
and (iv) such other relevant materials as may help the appointing authority.

DELES VS. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, SEPT 4, 1989

FACTS: This regards to the civil action filed by Deles seeking to compel Commission on Appointments to
allow her to perform and discharge her duties as a member of the House of Representatives
representing the Women's Sector and to restrain CA from subjecting her appointment to the
confirmation process.
CA is against her appointment and compelled that her appointment be subjected first to them.
She questioned this saying that CA has no jurisdiction over it since Sec 7 of Art XVIII of the
Constitution states that appointment of the President does not require confirmation from the CA
to qualify her to take the seat in the House of Representatives.
SECTION 7. Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of
nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in
paragraph (2), Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the Constitution requires appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of
Rep confirmation of the Commission of Appeals

RULING: Yes, The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may
be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the
Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are
among the “other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,”
referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).

Deles' appointment was made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, p.2 which gives the President ”the
power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” The records show that Deles’
appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April
17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment
extended to her.

b. On gerrymandering
- the practice of drawing the boundaries of electoral districts in a way that gives one
political party an unfair advantage over its rivals
- term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so
contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power

CENIZA vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763 (1980)

Batas Blg 51 Sec 3 –“xxx any city now existing with an annual regular income derived from
infrastructure and general funds of not less than forty million pesos (P40,000,000.00) at the time of
the approval of this Act shall be classified as a highly urbanized city

FACTS: Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421
which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly
urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit
them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a
component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added
Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the
other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the
constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction of
voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, CEniza claim that political
and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the
Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically
known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close
to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial
officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified
their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu
City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial
officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on
substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and
regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification
amounts to a denial of equal protection.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is gerrymandering motives

HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that “The State shall guarantee and
promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities. Cezina allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis.
The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the
boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new
requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character
and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on
21 June 1969.

SECTION 9. A sub-province shall continue to exist and operate until it is converted into a regular
province or until its component municipalities are reverted to the mother province.
LOZADA VS. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337
FACTS:
Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada and Romeo B. Igot, filed a petition for mandamus to compel the
respondent COMELEC to call a special election to fill up existing vacancies in the Interim
Batasang Pambansa (1978-1984). Their petition is based on Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution, which reads: In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months
or more before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be
held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired
term.

Petitioner Lozada claims that he is a taxpayer and a bonafide elector of Cebu City and a
transient voter of Quezon City, Metro Manila, who desires to run for the position in the Batasan
Pambansa; while petitioner Romeo B. Igot alleges that, as a taxpayer, he has standing to petition
by mandamus the calling of a special election as mandated by the 1973 Constitution. As reason
for their petition, petitioners allege that they are "... deeply concerned about their duties as
citizens and desirous to uphold the constitutional mandate and rule of law ...; that they have filed
the instant petition on their own and in behalf of all other Filipinos since the subject matters are of
profound and general interest. "

"Respondent COMELEC, opposes the petition alleging, substantially, that

1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute
the action;
2) the SC has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition; and
3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan
Pambansa

ISSUE: Whether or not Special election is necessary

HELD: No. The calling of Elections only applicable to regular Batasang Pambansa. The power to
appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which
may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section
5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National
Assembly, now Batasan Pambansa, not to the Interim Batasan Pambansa, as will presently be
shown.

Even as presently constituted where the representation in the Interim Batasan Pambansa is
regional and sectoral, the need to fill up vacancies in the Body is neither imperative nor urgent.
No district or province would ever be left without representation at all, as to necessitate the filling
up of vacancies in the Interim Batasan Pambansa. There would always be adequate
representation for every province which only forms part of a certain region, especially considering
that the Body is only transitory in character.

RA 6645- December 28, 1987

AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF FILING A VACANCY IN THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

Section 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of
Representatives at least (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the
Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for
a special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an
official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the
President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus
elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be
earlier than forty-five (45) days not later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or
communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for: provided,
however, that if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special
election shall be held simultaneously with such general election.

Section 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in number sufficient for
due distribution and publication, to the Provincial of City Treasurer of each province or city
concerned, who in turn shall publish it in their respective localities by posting at least three copies
thereof in as many conspicuous places in each of their election precincts, and a copy in each of
the polling places and public markets, and in the municipal buildings.

Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two
newspapers of general circulation.

SECTION 10. All courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue to
exercise their jurisdiction, until otherwise provided by law. The provisions of the existing Rules of
Court, judiciary acts, and procedural laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
operative unless amended or repealed by the Supreme Court or the Congress.
SECTION 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an annual salary of
three hundred thousand pesos; the Vice-President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, two hundred forty
thousand pesos each; the Senators, the Members of the House of Representatives, the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions, two hundred
four thousand pesos each; and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred
eighty thousand pesos each.

PHILCONSA VS. JIMENEZ, 15 SCRA 479

FACTS:

GR L-23326,18 December 1965

Philippine Constitutional Association (PHILCONSA) vs Gimenez

Facts:The petitioners assail the validity of RA 3836 and filed this Petition for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction to restrain the Auditor General of the Philippines and the
disbursing officers of both Houses of Congress from passing in audit the payment to any former
member of the Congress of retirement and vacation gratuities.
RA 3836 is assailed on the grounds that:
(a)the provision for the retirement benefits of the members of Congress is not expressed in
the title of the bill;
(b)the provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition
on increase of salaries during their term of office;
(c)it is deemed a “selfish class legislation” because it allows members and officers of Congress to
retire after twelve (12) years of service, the retirement benefits not refundable in case of re-
election or re-instatement;
(d)the provision on vacation and sick leave commutable at the highest rate received manifest an
attempt to increase their compensation.
(e)a violation of the Constitution. RA 3836 provides under sec 1 thereof a special retirement
grant to Senators or members of the House of Representatives who are not members of
the GSIS to be, under sec 2, effective “upon its approval.” and provides benefits to its
members CA 186 establishes the GSIS and provides for both retirement and insurance benefits of
its members.
The Solicitor General questioned the locus standi of Philconsa to file the suit.
Issues:
1.Whether Philconsa has a standing to institute this action.
2.Whether or not RA 3836 falls within the prohibition embodied in Article VI, Section 14 of
the Constitution.
3.Whether or not RA 3836 violates the equal protection clause.
4.Whether or not the title of RA 3836 is germane to the subject matter expressed in the act.

RULING:
1.Yes. Philconsa, a non-profit, civic organization composed of several leaders from all walks
of life whose main objective is to uphold the principles of the Constitution, has legal
standing to institute the action as substantial taxpayers in preventing the illegal expenditure of
public funds.
2.Yes. The provisions of RA 3836 falls squarely within the prohibition set forth in Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution.
SECTION 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally
appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-
judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He
shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
3.Yes. The assailed feature in RA 3836 are patently discriminatory and therefore violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. All government officers and employees are given
only one retirement benefit irrespective of their length of service.
4.No. The title of RA 3836 is void and is not germane to the subject matter in violation of
Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution which provides that no bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill. RA 3836 is declared null and void with respect to the retirement of Members of Congress and
the elected officials thereof, as being unconstitutional.

LIGOT vs. MATHAY, 56 SCRA 82

FACTS:
● Ligot serves a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines
for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957
to December 30, 1969
● Ligot was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but was
held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this
Court's unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay1 "that the increased compensation
provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969 when the full
term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have
expired" by virtue of the constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935
Constitution which provides that "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase."

ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled with retirement gratuity on the basis of the increased salary
of P32,000 per annum. He claims that it should not have been disallowed, because at the time of
his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress "as provided by law" (under Republic
Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum

RULING:
No. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30,
1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were
prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them
prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were
permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor
General in his decision in the similar case of petitioner's colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, "Such
a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by
enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.
This was the clear teaching of Philconsa vs. Jimenez.5 In striking down Republic Act No. 3836 as
null and void insofar as it referred to the retirement of members of Congress and the elected
officials thereof for being violative of the Constitution, this Court held that "it is evident that
retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of
compensation for services of one possessing any office" and that "Republic Act No. 3836 provides
for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to
take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were
immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such
provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, section 14 of the Constitution."

SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable
by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session.
No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in
the Congress or in any committee thereof.

a. Privilege from arrest

MARTINEZ vs. MORFE

MARTINEZv MORFE GR No. L-34022

Petitioner: Manuel Martinez y Festin
Respondent: The Honorable Jesus P. Morfe of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and the City
Warden of Manila
GR No. L-34046-7
Petitioner:Fernando Bautista, Sr.
Respondents:Honorable Francisco Ma.Chanco, Presiding Judge, CFI of Baguio and Benguet
Ponente: Fernando, J.
Date: March 24, 1972

TOPIC: Violation of Parliamentary Immunity Art VI Sec 15, 1935 Constitution: “DOCTRINE
Parliamentary Immunity from arrest does not cover criminal offenses.

SHORT VERSION
Both petitioners are facing criminal charges but, as delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
they invoked the Parliamentary Immunity granted to them. They raised Art VI Sec 15 of the
Constitution and Art 145 RPC to support their claim. SC however held that the word of the
Constitution clearly does not grant immunity to criminal offenses. Parliamentary immunity only
covers civil arrests.
FACTS Both petitioners (delegates of the Constitutional Convention) are facing criminal
prosecutions (Martinez-in falsification of public document1punishable by prision mayor; Bautista-a
violation of the Revised Election Code which is punishable by not higher that prision
mayor) and both invoked parliamentary immunity by declaring Sec 15 of RA 6132 which
grants delegates of the Constitutional Convention(See Doctrine)the same privileges as that
of the members of the Congress. 1He falsified his birth in his certificate of candidacy for delegate
to the Constitutional Convention. He wrote June 20 1945 when it should be June 1946. As they
were arrested, they invoke Sec 145 of the Revised Penal Code (See notes) which makes
an arrest of a delegate/congressman a felony under certain circumstances. They also
used Sec 145 RPC to prove that the offenses they committed are covered by the Immunity
because it is not punishable by more than prision mayor. Despite the contentions, the
respondent Judges issued warrants. They are now sued for grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUES/HELD(1) WoN the petitioners are covered by the immunity

(WoN criminal offenses are covered by the immunity).-NO
(2) WoN Art 145 can be raised as a defense-NO

RATIO(1) No.The clear language of the constitution does not intend to include criminal
offenses in the grant of Immunity to the Parliamentary. The court cited the drafts and
amendments made by the 1935 convention regarding the grant of immunity. The original
provision submitted reads: “The Members of the National Assembly shall in all cases except
treason, open disturbance of public order, or other offense punishable by death or
imprisonment of not less than six years, be privileged from arrest during their attendance
at the sessions of the National Assembly, and in going to and returning from the same” This was
latter amended by the proposal of Delegate Aldeguer which states: “The Members of the
National Assembly shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the National Assembly, and in
going and returning from the same(See Notes for the list of differences) .”The phrase “treason,
felony and breach of the peace” is understood to remove criminal offenses from the
operation of the Immunity privilege. The court also emphasized that the State’s grant of
immunity to the Legislature is based on the right of self-preservation, and it is due to the fact that it
has to carry its legislative function without obstacle. But also to the fact that the same is a
part or an appendage of the State all harmful actions committed by the Legislature will
endanger the State. Thus, giving more privileges to an agent, which is the Legislature, at the
expense of the State, is not a sound policy.The purpose of the immunity is to
(2) No. The court declared Art 145 RPC as inoperative. The RPC took effect on January 1, 1932
while the 1935 constitution was enforced 3 years after. It is widely understood that,
disregarding the fact that the constitution is the fundamental law and a higher law
than a statute, newer law prevails the older one.

DECISION Petition dismissed.

NOTES> Art. 145 of the Revised Penal Code reads in full: “Violation of parliamentary immunity—The
penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall use force, intimidation,
threads, or fraud to prevent any member of the National Assembly from attending the meetings
of the Assembly or any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or
committees or divisions thereof, from expressing his opinions or casting his vote; and the penalty of
prision correccional shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall, while the
Congress is in regular or special session, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such
member has committed a crime punishable under this Code by a penalty higher than prision
mayor”> The diffence in the provision and its amendment:(1) the amendment includes felony in
the exception from the immunity(2) the amendment includes breach of peace in the exception
from the immunity(3) the amendment removed the phrase “or other offenses punishable by
death or imprisonment of not less than six years.”

b. Freedom of Speech and debate

OSMENA vs. PENDATUN, 109 Phil 863
OSMENA vs PENDATUN
Privilege of Speech and Debate
FACTS
: On June 23, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr. took the floor of his chamber to deliver a
privilege speech entitled, “A Message to Garcia.” The speech contained the following words:
“The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular
administration the free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at premium
prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity or seriousness of
a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can
come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation would
reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. . . . .”
By virtue of House Resolution No. 59, the House of Representatives formed a special
committee to investigate the allegations of bribery made by Osmeña in his speech. The
congressman was required to appear before the committee to substantiate his allegations, but he
failed to do so.
The committee then approved House Resolution No. 175, finding Osmeña guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour and suspending him from office for 15 months. The committee ended
its session on July 18, 1960. Its members, as sole respondents, already ceased to exist. Osmeña
contests House Resolution No. 175 and filed for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction in the Supreme Court. He contends that:
(1) the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the
House, he ought not to be questioned;
(2) that his speech constituted no disorderly behavior for which he could be punished; and
(3) supposing he could be questioned and discipline therefore, the House had lost the
power to do so because it had taken up other business before approving House Resolution No.
59
(4) that the House has no power under the Constitution to suspend one of its members.
ISSUE
: Whether or not the House of Representatives can discipline a member for words uttered during a
privilege speech.
HELD
: Yes. Parliamentary immunity is a fundamental privilege that is guaranteed to the legislative
body under the Constitution. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression
without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecoming a member thereof.

Rule Making Power

Congress is also empowered by the Constitution to adopt their own rules of procedure for
the orderly conduct of business, and as security against hasty action. Congress may also
waive or disregard their own house rules without court interference. The theory of separation
of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal
to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within
its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.

Discipline Members -The House has exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.
The House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only
because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter
depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best. If this Court assumed
the power to determine whether Osmeña’s speech constituted disorderly behaviour, it would
thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to
confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. Petition is hereby dismissed.

JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG, 17 SCRA 876

Jimenez vs. Cabangbang17 SCRA 876GR.NO. L-15905August 3, 1966
PARTIES:PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS: Nicanor T. Jimenez, et al.
DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE: Bartolome Cabangbang
PONENTE: Concepcion, C. J.

FACTS: On November 14, 1958, defendant Cabangbang published an open letter to the President
in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. The publication talked about the
alleged operational plans of the then Secretary of National Defense to launch his presidential
career in 1961 elections. Cabangbang's letter mentioned the names of Nicanor Jimenes and his
comrades as subordinates to the 'Planners' behind the alleged operation. They sued
Cabangbang for the crime of libel and sought financial compensation for the damages caused
by the letter. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the letter was a
privileged form of communication and that it was not libellous.

ISSUE: Whether the contested publication could be classified as a privileged form of

communication under the provisions of sec. 15, Article VI of the Constitution.

RULING: No. Under the provisions of sec. 15, Article VI of the Constitution, "speech or debate
therein" only refers to the utterances made by Congress members in the performance of their
official duties, such as delivering speeches, making statements, or casting votes in the
Congressional hall while the same is in session. It could also refer to the introduction of bills in
Congress, whether it is session or not, and other acts performed by Congress members in their
official capacity whether there was a session or not, whether inside or outside the premises of
one's office. In the case at bar, the Court ruled that Cabangbang's letter cannot be classified as
a privileged form of communication because it was published during a time when the Congress
was not in session. Moreover, the defendant was not performing his official duty as either a
member of Congress when he intended the letter to be published. Therefore, the open letter was
not privileged. Because of these reasons, Cabangbang's open letter cannot be classified as a
privileged form of communication

SECTION 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption
of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House
concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation
of which they are authors.

SECTION 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or
the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

1. ADAZA vs. PACANA, 135 SCRA 431

Singularity of Office/Position
FACTS:
Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental. He took his
oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980.
Elected vice-governor for said province was respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., who
likewise qualified for and assumed said office on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their
respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986.
March 27, 1984, respondent Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984
Batasang Pambansa elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the
ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while respondent
lost.
July 19, 1984, petitioner took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa and since then
he has discharged the functions of said office.
July 23, 1984, respondent took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25,
1984.
Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, petitioner has brought this
petition to exclude respondent therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for
a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires
on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary
system.
Petitioner further contends that respondent Pacana should be considered to have
abandoned or resigned from the position of vice-governor when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the 1984 Batas Pambansa elections; and since respondent had reverted to
the status of a mere private citizen after he lost in the Batas Pambansa elections, he could
no longer continue to serve as vice-governor, much less assume the office of governor.

ISSUES:
Whether or not a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a
Mambabatas Pambansa [MP] can exercise and discharge the functions of both offices
simultaneously.
Whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa, but
lost, can continue serving as vice-governor and subsequently succeed to the office of
governor if the said office is vacated.

HELD:

No, a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas
Pambansa [MP] cannot exercise and discharge the functions of both offices
simultaneously.

The constitutional prohibition against a member of the Batasan Pambansa from holding
any other office or employment in the government during his tenure is clear and
unambiguous. Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows: Sec 10. “A
member of the National Assembly [Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of
prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .”

The language used in the above-cited section is plain, certain and free from ambiguity. The
only exceptions mentioned therein are the offices of prime minister and cabinet member.
The wisdom or expediency of the said provision is a matter which is not within the province
of the Court to determine.

Yes, a vice-governor who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost, can
continue serving as vice-governor and subsequently succeed to the office of governor if
the said office is vacated.

The law governing the election of members of the Batasan Pambansa on May 14, 1984,
Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that "governors, mayors, members of the various
sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be
considered on forced leave of absence from office." Indubitably, respondent falls within
the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the 1984 Batasan Pambansa election he was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

PUNZALAN vs. MENDOZA, 140 SCRA 153

FACTS

Cicero Punsalan brings a petition for quo warranto and prohibition seeking the ouster of
Hon. Estelito P. Mendoza from the governorship of Pampanga. As Kilusang Bagong Lipunan
bets for the 1980 elections, Mendoza and Punsalan won for governor and vice-governor,
respectively. However, in the 1984 elections, the only KBL survivor placed fourth for the
three seats as representatives to the Batasan. Respondent, as KBL campaign manager,
tendered his resignation from the Governorship and his Cabinet post “effective at the
President’s pleasure.” Six weeks later, the President appointed him Minister of the Peace
and concurrently Member of the Batasan Pambansa. Subsequently, Mendoza again
tendered his resignation and sent a letter to the Minister of Local Government requesting
that he be considered on leave of absence” while the matter was “pending consideration
by the president.” Punsalan then took his oath as governor of Pampanga (not acting
governor) relying on a press release of Bulletin Today7. The following year, respondent
unexpectedly appeared and occupied the office. Respondent resigned from his Batasan
membership which was accepted by the President two days later.

ISSUE

Whether or not the respondent did resign from the gubernatorial seat.

HELD

NO. The tender of resignation says that it was “effective at the pleasure of the President”
meaning it was not effective immediately. Acceptance was necessary. Implied
acceptance by the President of the tender of resignation by respondent cannot be held to
have taken place as the President shelved the same pursuant to a KBL caucus
recommendation for respondent to reassume the governorship. Based on an approved
request from the Minister of Local Government to go on leave, his failure to perform his duty
for 5 months as governor cannot be considered an abandonment of office.
SECTION 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office.

1. VILLEGAS vs. LEGASPI, 113 SCRA 39

Topic: Congress members’ appearance as counsel before any court of justice (Sect 14. Art. 6)
Facts:
In 1979, a complaint for annulment of the bank checks and damages was filed by Raul Villegas
against private respondents (Vera Cruz spouses and Primitivo Cania, Jr.) before the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. An answer was filed by private respondents through their counsel, Atty.
Valentino Legaspi, a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
Petitioner “challenged” the appearance of Assemblyman Legaspi.
According to Villegas, Legaspi must be barred from appearing before any court as stated in the
constitution.
In an Order, dated February 27, 1980, Judge Burgos denied the disqualification of Assemblyman
Legaspi, as well as the Motion for Reconsideration filed thereafter. Hence, this recourse to
certiorari and Prohibition.
Issue:
The novel issue for determination is whether or not members of the Batasang Pambansa, like
Attorney Valentino L. Legaspi can appear as counsel before Courts of First Instance.
Ruling:
No. Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, reads, “No member of the
Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any Court without appellate jurisdiction….”
Since the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, before which Assemblyman Legaspi appeared
as counsel, was acting in the exercise of original jurisdiction, Legaspi must be held barred from
appearing as counsel before the said court.
Notes:
Take note that this case happened before the ratification of 1987 constitution, but even though
there may have been a little confusion with the provisions of the past constitutions regarding this
issue, the case at bar still had the same decision, which was affirmative of the prohibition of
assemblymen, members of the Batasang Pambansa to appear before the courts as counsel.
As provided for in Section 14, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, a member of congress shall not
appear PERSONALLY as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals or
quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.

2. PUYAT vs. DE GUZMAN, 113 SCRA 31

FACTS:
- Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries (IPI).
- Eustaquio Acero (Puyat’s rival) claims that the votes were not properly counted. Thereafter,
Acero filed a quo warranto case before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May
25, 1979.
- Prior to Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s group. And
during a conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. to have the parties confer
with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero.
- Puyat objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as
counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC).
- Fernandez, instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said SEC case for him to
intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner (Sixto De Guzman, Jr.) granted the motion
and in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC
case without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as
counsel in such courts or bodies?
HELD:
No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a
counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation
he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the
conference he presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so
under the constitution he instead presented himself as a party of interest which is clearly a
workaround and is clearly an act after the fact.

SECTION 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its
regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such
number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session,
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at
any time.

SECTION 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker,
by a majority vote of all its respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner,
and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member.
A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on
any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other,
adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall
be sitting.

Note: On the suspension of members of Congress by the Sandiganbayan:

1. Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan

2) REP. CEFERINO PAREDES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

The case involves a prominent politician in Mindanao, respondent Ceferino Paredes,Jr., who was
formerly the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor, and Congressman. During his
stint, Paredes applied for and was granted a free patent over a vast tract of land Lot No. 3097-A,
PLS-67, with an area of 1,391 square meters, located beside the Washington Highway in San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur. However, it was canceled because apparently, it has already been
designated and reserved as a school site.

The court found that Paredes had obtained title thereto through fraudulent misrepresentations in
his application, and somebody came forward and filed a case of perjury against him. However,
the same was dismissed on the grounds of prescription. Then again, another case was filed
against him for violation of Section 3(a) of RA3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for using
his former position as ProvincialAttorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to
favorably act on his application for patent. In all these cases, Paredes was represented by
respondent Atty.Sansaet, a practicing attorney.

Paredes, as defense, contends that he has already been charged under the same set of facts
and the same evidence where such a complaint (perjury case where he was already arraigned)
has already been dismissed. Hence, double jeopardy has already been attached. In support
hereof, Paredes presented court records and transcripts as proof of his arraignment in the perjury
case.

However, the documents were found to be falsified, in conspiracy with Paredes’ counsel and the
clerk of court where the perjury case was filed. One Teofilo Gelacio claims that no notice of
arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. Hence, another case was
filed for falsification of judicial records. It was then that respondent Sansaet offered to testify as a
state witness against his client Paredes, claiming that the latter contrived and induced him to
have the graft case dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by havinghim and co-
respondent prepare and falsify the subject documents.

But the Sandiganbayan denied the motion on the ground of attorney-client privilege since the
lawyer could not testify against his own client. In view of such a relationship, confidential matters
must have been disclosed by Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer,in his
professional capacity, and therefore privileged.

Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with
Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the
Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by order of the
Sandiganbayan.

HELD:

YES. Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution – which deals with the
power of each House of Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly behavior and
“suspend or expel a Member” by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification
that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days – is unavailing, as it
appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a
penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not
being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.

2. AVELINO vs. CUENCO, 83 Phil. 17

Summary:
Jose Avelino submitted a petition for quo warranto to the Supreme Court after Mariano Cuenco
replaced him as Senate President after he abandoned his Chair and left the session hall on
February 21, 1949. This petition was denied by the Supreme Court in votation, 6-4.

*Quo warranto is a special form of legal action used to resolve a dispute over whether a
specific person has the legal right to hold the public office that he or she occupies.

Senator Tanada had requested for a right to speak to draft charges against the then Senate
President Jose Avelino which was approved. He had submitted a written resolution of his charges
to the Secretary of the Senate before the session began.

When the Senate had reached quorum, the session still did not start, instead, Avelino requested
for the resolution of Tanada and he read it carefully and aloud. It was only after did he open the
session and used every tactic to delay and muzzle Tanada’s speech.

*QUORUM: the minimum number of people needed to hold meetings or make decisions
during certain company meetings. Most often, the quorum is considered the majority of
members within a group or organization.

In the process, disorderly conduct arose which gave Senator Pablo Angeles David to move for the
adjournment of the session which was opposed by Senator Sanidad.

Avelino left the Chair and exited the session hall so the session continued with Senate President
Pro-tempore Melecio Arranz wherein Tanada was able to deliver his speech and two resolutions
were approved which removed Avelino was ousted as Senate President and designated Senator
Mariano Cuenco as acting Senate President. Cuenco took an oath the same day.He was
recognized by the president of the Philippines

Doctrine:
Each department has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within
its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission)

In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs.
Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not
be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.

Facts:
1. During the session on February 21, 1949, Senator Tanada had been granted the right to
speak in session to talk about charges he drew up against Senate President Avelino.
2. Senate had reached quorum but the session did not start because Avelino had not yet
opened the session. Before opening it, he read the written resolution of Tanada and
 Senator Sanidad on his charges. When he finally did, he used a lot of dilatory tactics to
postpone Tanada’s speech.
3. Disorderly conduct happened so Senator David filed a motion for adjournment but it was
opposed by Senator Sanidad.
4. Avelino banged his gavel and immediately left the session hall followed by Senator David,
Senator Tirona, Senator Francisco, Senator Torres, Senator Magalona, Senator Clarin.
5. Session continued with Senator Arranz as Senate President Pro-tempore.
6. Resolution 68 (ordering the investigation of charges filed against the Senate President, Jose
Avelino) and 67 (declaring vacant the Senate President chair and designating Mariano
Cuenco as acting Senate President) were approved by the remaining senators present.
7. Mariano Cuenco took an oath and was recognized by the president of the Philippines.
8. Jose Avelino filed for a petition to declare himself the rightful Senate President and to oust
Mariano Cuenco.

Issues Ratio:
1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter? NO. In view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46
Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power
should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. Senators have the liberty to
select their officers and/or reinstate them. If Avelino wants to be the presiding officer of the
Senate, he should take it up there, not the Supreme Court.
2. Whether or not resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved? YES. The session was not
adjourned validly and there was a majority of each House to constitute a quorum to do
business despite the number of senators who walked out of the session hall so resolutions
were approved validly.
3. Whether or not the petition should be granted? NO. Because all the procedures to put a
new Senate President in place are in order and recognized by the president of the
Philippines so petition for quo warranto will not prosper.

Dispositive:
The Court by a vote of six justices against four resolved to deny the petition.

1. Avelino vs. Cuenco, 83Phil. 17 (read also the motion for reconsideration dated Mar 14,
1949)
2. In the election of Speaker of the House of Rep, is the 2nd placer automatically becomes
the Minority Floorleader by virtue of tradition?
TEDDY BAGUILAT BRAWNER vs. SPEAKER PANTALEON ALVAREZ et al. GR No. 227757, Jul 25,
2017
3. Disciplinary on erring members
OSMENA vs. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863
Journal
The Journal is the official record of proceedings of each legislative day in the House of
Representatives. The Journal records the result of every vote and who vote for or against it and
state in general terms the subject of it; therefore, the recorded votes on amendments occurring in
the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union are recorded in the Journal, but not
the proceedings. The Journal contains no verbatim debate, but instead a rendition of all the
official actions of the House, including every motion made and every vote taken.

Art. VI Sec. 16 (4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time
to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect
national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of
one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.

Dual purpose for keeping a Journal

1. Public Record
2. Official Record

Journal entry and enrolled bill theories, which is conclusive over the other?
The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent
departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all
bills authenticated in the manner stated ." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the
attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort
to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical
conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether the journals
may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.

a. US vs. PONS, 34 Phil 729

This case involves Pons and the other over the alleged importation of opium from Spain
aboard the Lopez y Lopez. They were charge with illegal importation of Opium 20 tins
containing 125 kilograms of opium of the value of P62,400 . However, Pons counsel alleged and
offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was
the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty,
was not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that,
therefore, the same is null and void

b. Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1

c. Casco Phil. Vs. GImenez, 7 Scra 347
d. Morales vs. Subido, 27 Phil. 131
e. Astorga vs. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714

5. Differentiate a REGULAR from a SPECIAL session.

SECTION 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its
regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such
number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session,
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at
any time.
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
REGINA ONGSIANGKO-REYES v. COMELEC
Regina Ongsiako Reyes filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of
Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. Joseph Tan, a registered voter and
resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition
for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the
amended petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material
misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of birth and
citizenship. Respondent alleged that the. He contended that Regina is an American citizen
and filed in February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered
evidence and amended last exhibit.

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the
petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of
her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the
COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.

On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on
June 5, 2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She
has yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 2013.

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May
14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.

Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of
member of the House of Representative.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run
for office
Discussion:

1. Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of

Representative Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election returns and qualification of the members of
House of Representative.
2. In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible
for public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the following 1)
take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the consul-
general of the Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner complied
with the requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot
be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue
of residency, the court approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen
who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin.
Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still show that he chose to
establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his
residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice. In this
case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that the petitioner renounced her American
citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of
Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-
year residency for she has never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she
remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can
substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.

Held:

The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC.
. It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the HRET insofar as the petitioner
s being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned. The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner s
certificate of candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines
who can be legally proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a continuation of the
proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an original action before the Court grounded on
more than mere error of judgment but on error of jurisdiction for grave abuse of discretion. At and after the
COMELEC En Bane decision, there is no longer any certificate cancellation matter than can go to the HRET. In
that sense, the HRET s constitutional authority opens, over the qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so
only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable step towards such membership. The
HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive,
and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has
been terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding. It will determine who should be
the Member of the House. It must be made clear though, at the risk of repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the
representation of Marinduque in the House because there is such a representative who shall sit as the HRET
proceedings are had till termination. Such representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the
terminated case of cancellation of certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner is not, cannot, be that
representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute between the parties: who shall sit in the House in
representation of Marinduque, while there is yet no HRET decision on the qualifications of the Member.

CONSTI (Group 12)

ONGSIAKO REYES vs. COMELEC
October 22, 2013 G.R. No. 207264
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
During the 2013 elections, petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes was proclaimed
the winner and took her oath of office for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives (HoR) for the lone congressional district of
Marinduque. However, prior to her proclamation, the COMELEC en banc,
acting on a petition to cancel Reyes’ Certificate of Candidacy (CoC), ruled
that petitioner does not possess Filipino citizenship and residency. Petitioner
Reyes
claims that it is the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) which has exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a member
of the HoR and COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took
cognizance of the cancellation case against her.
ISSUE:
1
W/N HRET has jurisdiction over her case.
HELD:
1
NO. The HRET has no jurisdiction over her case as COMELEC has
jurisdiction over the petitioner’s CoC, its due course or its cancellation,
which determines who can be legally proclaimed. After a COMELEC en
banc decision, no certificate cancellation can go to the HRET. The
HRET’s constitutional authority is over the HoR Members. Petitioner is
not a Member of the HoR as her proclamation has no effect due to the
prior cancellation of her CoC by the COMELEC en banc.
Notes:
1
Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.