Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Bioetica Crestina in Europa
Bioetica Crestina in Europa
doi:10.1093/cb/cbp003
PAUL T. SCHOTSMANS
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
I. INTRODUCTION
Address correspondence to: Paul T. Schotsmans, Professor of Medical Ethics, Centre for
Biomedical Ethics and Law, Faculteit Geneeskunde, Kapucijnenvoer 35/3-bus 7001, BE-3000
Leuven, Belgium. E-mail: Paul.Schotsmans@med.kuleuven.be
© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of The Journal of Christian Bioethics, Inc.
All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
The creation of the Institut Borja de Bioètica by the Catalan Jesuit Francesc
Abel in Barcelona in 1985 is certainly one of the earliest “achievements” of
continental European Bioethics. As a Jesuit Father, medical doctor (gyne-
cologist), and manager of a large hospital in Barcelona, Abel became inter-
ested in the ethical aspects of new developments in gynecology. He followed
an intensive training in the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown Uni-
versity (Washington, DC, USA), where he found excellent academic compan-
ions in the Roman Catholic medical doctors John Collins Harvey and Edmund
Pellegrino. His interest in bioethics—as this may be the case for many of his
Roman Catholic colleagues—is also linked with debates within the Roman
Catholic Church on how to ethically evaluate new medical developments
around the beginning and end of human life. Highly sensitive issues like
contraception (since the Encyclical Humanae Vitae in 1968 by Paul VI),
abortion, artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization (linked to the Instruction
Donum Vitae in 1987 by the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith) and end
of life decision making (see for e.g., the Declaration on Euthanasia in 1980),
etc., are still being discussed by Roman Catholic bioethicists. The need to
create centers of bioethics for thorough reflection and clarification was there-
fore urgent. The Catalan Center played a pioneering role for several similar
centers in Italy (Rome, Milano, Palermo, etc.), Portugal (Lissabon, Coimbra),
France (like the Centre Sèvres in Paris, where Jesuit Father Patrick Verspieren
was and still is extremely influential), and the Centre d’Ethique Médicale at
the Catholic University of Lille (with the priests Charles Lefèvre and Bruno
Cadoré, as well as the nun Marie-Louise Lamau). In Holland, the Catholic
University of Nijmegen and in Belgium two Catholic Universities (of Leuven
headed.” But Principlism is still not without its defenders: B. Andrew Lustig,
David DeGrazia, and Beauchamp and Childress themselves have all responded
to these criticisms, rejecting its supporting argumentation. In an overview of
this debate by Davis (1995), he concludes by observing that neither side in the
debate over Principlism has succeeded in carrying its case. The debate centers
clearly on the notion of a moral theory and whether Principlism is an adequate
substitute for moral theory in resolving biomedical conflicts. Although the de-
bate on Principlism is still going on, the impact of this approach remains im-
portant. In my view, it strengthens the secularization of the medical profession.
By secularization, I refer to the divorce of the profession from those values that
make health care a fully human service: medicine is more and more restricted
to a purely technical profession and does no longer invest in real encounters
with patients. An approach like Principlism flourishes therefore mainly in a
market-driven health care system, like the one in the United States.
The dominant position of the principle of autonomy is another factor that
helps to explain the success of Principlism, even in what traditionally was sub-
sumed under “medical ethics.” The principle of respect for the autonomy of
the patient indeed reflects the high priority accorded to individual autonomy
in Anglo-American casuistry; it transforms the bioethical discourse into a
discourse about “bio-law,” rather than about bioethics. It is easy to see why the
secularization of medicine feeds off of an absolute notion of patient autonomy.
When autonomy is radicalized, very little thought is given to the values that
ought to inform and guide the use of autonomy. Given such a vacuum, the
sheer fact that the choice is the patient’s tends to be viewed as the sole right-
making condition of this choice. Correctly, in my view, McCormick (1994) is
of the opinion that this trivializes human choice. Indeed, Anglo-American Prin-
ciplism has favored a development that reduces the physician to a technologi-
cal tool for the patient, conscripted to do the patient’s bidding for a price.
bioethics and bio-law. This means that a ‘friendship model’ based on close
encounters and prudential relationships between health care personnel and
patients precedes the ‘contractual rights model’ of bio-law” (I, 70). For Chris-
tian bioethics, this implies that many professionals react extremely critically
on the radicalization of autonomy: a fully ethical understanding of the medi-
cal relationship as a covenant is for them the leading orientation for develop-
ing a well-balanced ethical approach to medicine.
such a way that not only the rich and privileged but also the poor and the
unemployed may enter the health care institutions with an equal access to
standard medical treatment. This kind of solidarity, based on the dignity of
the human person, protects those human persons whose existence is threat-
ened by circumstances beyond their own control, particularly natural fate or
unfair social structures. Care services for persons who are unable to care for
themselves because of psychological handicaps, for example, or Alzheimer
disease, psychiatric disorders, or mental retardation, should have priority.
Christian social and bioethics has collaborated intensively with socialist
movements to realize this kind of humane society.
The justice of social institutions is reflected in the attempts to counter the
lack of opportunity caused by unpredictable bad luck and misfortune over
which the person has no meaningful control. To the extent that disease, dis-
ability, or injury cause considerable and significant disadvantages and restrict
a person’s capacity to fulfill or pursue his or her individual life projects, jus-
tice demands the use of public health care resources to counter these morally
arbitrary disadvantages and to restore to persons a fair chance to pursue their
life plans, given his or her talents and skills (Denier and Meulenbergs 2002).
This solidarity-based approach is incomprehensible for an ethics based on
individualism, and as I observe regularly, almost incomprehensible for Anglo-
American observers of European health care. European bioethics applies this
approach, in particular, as a kind of prevention against a too strongly market-
driven approach in health care. But of course, the enormous costs of the
welfare state also create their typical problems. Still, the issue of the alloca-
tion of scarce resources takes a radically different form, if one approaches it
from the side of solidarity, rather than from an endorsement of the market.
NOTES
1. To be sure, in the United States, eminent Christian scholars like Richard McCormick, James
Gustafson, or Charles Curran have enriched bioethics by their fundamental moral philosophical and
theological backgrounds. They had a great influence on bioethical debates in the Christian communities
all over the world. But America’s main bioethical influence in Europe was a secularizing one, as linked
to the work of Beauchamp and Childress (1st ed., 1974, 6th ed., 2009).
2. Zbigniew Szawarski from the Institute of Philosophy at the Warsaw University in Poland de-
scribes his experience in the Hastings Center as follows: “I think that the Hastings Center is the best place
in the world to learn this bioethical culture. It seems to me that the most valuable thing that foreign visi-
tors with other social and political traditions may learn here is the art of creative cooperation among
people with different moral, religious, political and professional backgrounds. And this is great.” (Hast-
ings Center Report 1988: 18, Number 3: cover page). The Institute for Health Ethics of Maastricht in the
Netherlands (with Maurice de Wachter as Director) published in the eighties several bioethical contribu-
tions in line with the ideas of Beauchamp and Childress: see for example de Wert and de Wachter (1980),
Magi k uw genenpaspoort? (May I Have Your Gene Passport?).
3. The Journal of Medical Ethics started in 1975 and followed closely the developments in the United
States. In his editorial on twenty years Journal of Medical Ethics, the editor in chief Raanan Gillon describes
how the journal should remain free from religious influences: this entails “a transdisciplinary embrace of
any reasoned viewpoint, regardless of its provenance” (Journal of Medical Ethics 1995; 21: 3–4, 3).
4. Several bioethics centers in Holland (like the ones at the Universities of Rotterdam and Amster-
dam) also imported Principlism into the European scene (see for e.g., Heleen Dupuis, the first academic
professor in bioethics of Holland, and the health care law expert H. Leenen who translated the respect
for the principle of autonomy of the patient not only as self-determination but also as a “right to self-
disposal”). They thus laid the groundwork for legislation on abortion and euthanasia in the Low Countries
(see Leenen, 1988, Handboek Gezondheidsrecht).
5. Edouard Boné was the secretary of the Catholic Schools of Medicine Network inside the Inter-
national Federation of Catholic Universities. He prophetically observed that bioethics was one of the main
concerns for that intercontinental network, as it pursued the dialogue with the Roman Magisterium.
6. In 1985, I was for the first time invited to assist such a meeting in Milano (with John Mahoney,
John Collins Harvey, Richard McCormick, Francesc Abel, and Cardinal Martini) to discuss the ethical im-
plications of the abortion of anencephalic babies.
7. We will therefore refer to this publication by simply mentioning the volume and the pages.
8. As no one else, Levinas was capable of philosophically clarifying the healing relationship. In his
second major work, Autrement qu’être (1974), Levinas affirms … that the “one is keeper of his brother”
… When Cain asks after the murder of his brother “Am I my brother’s keeper? (Gen. 4, 9),” we must
understand this literally: we are already (by God) thus linked with each other that we owe it to each other
to link ourselves—actively and creatively—to the other (Burggraeve, 2008, 1–22, 4).
9. The editors of this volume refer to their personal critical remarks on the Convention.
10. The Belgian Advisory Committee on Bioethics developed four options in their first opinion on
Euthanasia Legislation (1997): the first and the second one were purely based on the principle of “self-
disposal.” The majority in the Belgian Parliament has followed these options in the final redaction of
the Law. See the Web site of the Belgian Advisory Committee on Bioethics (www.health.fgov.be/bio-
eth). See also the publication of Schotsmans and Meulenbergs (2005) on Euthanasia and Palliative Care
in the Low Countries, essentially the chapter on the comparison of the Dutch and the Belgian Eutha-
nasia Act (Adams & Nys) and the one on “The Sanctity of Autonomy?” by Meulenbergs and
Schotsmans.
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