BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, GR No.

127685, 1998-07-23
Facts:
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to... legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected
zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger
barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997.
On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as... members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee,
are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining its implementation.
Petitioner contends:
"A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES
A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE
LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308
IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC
FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH
WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION."
Respondents counter-argue:
A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY
BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY.[3]
Issues:
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is
understandable
Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of
the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing
in... scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates
their right to privacy.
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as
an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to
be let alone.
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several
provisions of our Constitution.[33] It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights:
"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law."
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:[34]
"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to... be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
x ... x x.
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as... may be provided by law.
x ... x x.
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."
Ruling:
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from
various sources-- governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc.[88] In the case at bar, the threat
comes from the executive... branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender
their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services.
Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent will... fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No.
308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
Principles:
right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized... men
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority,
under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them."[8] The Constitution, as the will of the people
in their... original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines.[9]
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive.[10] The legislative body
possesses plenary power... for all purposes of civil government.[11] Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage
and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.[12] In fine,
except as limited by the
Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of
general concern or common interest.[13]
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws.[14] The executive power
is vested in the President.[15] It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the... laws.[16] It is
the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.[17]
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a
whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department.[18] He has control
over the executive department,... bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the
functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials.[19]
Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the... duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the
maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices
under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.[20]
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by
proper governmental organs.[21] It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency
and check the official conduct of his... agents.[22] To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and
regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered
by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.-- Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental
operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out
the legislative... policy
REPUBLIC v. DRUGMAKER’S LABORATORIES, GR No. 190837, 2014-03-05
Facts:
The FDA[3] was created pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 3720,[4] otherwise known as the "Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act," primarily in order "to establish safety or efficacy standards and quality measures for foods, drugs
and devices,... and cosmetic product[s]."... the Department of Health (DOH), thru then-Secretary Alfredo R.A.
Bengzon, issued Administrative Order No. (AO) 67, s. 1989, entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on
Registration of Pharmaceutical Products."
Among others, it required drug manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine products with the FDA before
they may release the same to the market for sale.
In this relation, a satisfactory bioavailability[6]/bioequivalence[7]
(BA/BE) test is needed for a manufacturer to secure a CPR for these products.
However, the implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement was put on hold because there was no local
facility capable of conducting the same.
The issuance of Circular No. 1, s. 1997[8] resumed the FDA's implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement
with the establishment of BA/BE testing facilities in the country. Thereafter, the FDA issued Circular No. 8, s.
1997[9] which provided additional implementation details... concerning the BA/BE testing requirement on drug
products.
Respondents manufacture and trade a "multisource pharmaceutical product"[11] with the generic name of
rifampicin[12] branded as
Refam... for the treatment of adults and children... suffering from pulmonary and extra-pulmonary tuberculosis.
respondents applied for and were issued a CPR for such drug, valid for five (5) years
At the time of the CPR's... issuance, Refam did not undergo BA/BE testing since there was still no facility capable of
conducting BA/BE testing.
respondents applied for and were granted numerous yearly renewals of their CPR for Refam... albeit with the
condition that they submit satisfactory BA/BE test results for said drug.
Accordingly, respondents engaged the services of the University of the Philippines' (Manila) Department of
Pharmacology and Toxicology, College of Medicine to conduct BA/BE testing on Refam, the results of which were
submitted to the FDA.
In... turn, the FDA sent a letter... stating that Refam is "not bioequivalent with the reference drug."
This notwithstanding, the FDA still revalidated respondents' CPR for Refam two (2) more times,... the second of
which came with a warning that no more further revalidations shall be granted until respondents submit
satisfactory BA/BE test results for Refam.
Instead of submitting satisfactory BA/BE test results for Refam, respondents filed a petition for prohibition and
annulment of Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 before the RTC, alleging that it is the DOH, and not the FDA, which was
granted the authority to issue and... implement rules concerning RA 3720.
They further averred that that the non-renewal of the CPR due to failure to submit... satisfactory BA/BE test
results would not only affect Refam, but their other products as well.
During the pendency of the case, RA 9711,[21] otherwise known as the "Food and Drug Administration [FDA] Act
of 2009," was enacted into law.
the RTC ruled in favor of respondents, and thereby declared Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 null and void, ordered
the issuance of writs of permanent injunction and prohibition against the FDA in implementing the... aforesaid
circulars, and directed the FDA to issue CPRs in favor of respondents' products.
The RTC held that there is nothing in RA 3720 which granted either the FDA the authority to issue and implement
the subject circulars, or the Secretary of Health the authority to delegate his powers to the FDA.
Aggrieved, the FDA sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition
The FDA contends that it has the authority to issue Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 as it is the agency mandated by
law to administer and enforce laws, including rules and regulations issued by the DOH, that pertain to the
registration of pharmaceutical products.
Issues:
whether or not the FDA may validly issue and implement Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997.
whether or not the aforesaid circulars partake of administrative rules and regulations and, as such,... must comply
with the requirements of the law for its issuance.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers only if there exists a law which
delegates these powers to them.
Accordingly, the rules so promulgated must be within the confines of the granting statute and must involve no
discretion as to what the... law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement
of the policy set out in the law itself, so as to conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and, as an adjunct,
the doctrine of non-delegability of legislative power.
An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule, or a contingent rule.
Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation and designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof.[31] They usually implement existing law, imposing general, extra-statutory
obligations pursuant to authority properly delegated by Congress[32] and effect a change in existing law or policy
which affects individual rights and... obligations.
interpretative rules are intended to interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulations under which the
administrative body operates. Their purpose or objective is merely to construe the statute being... administered
and purport to do no more than interpret the statute.
contingent rules are those issued by an administrative authority based on the existence of certain facts or things
upon which the enforcement of the law depends.
In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by Executive Order No.
292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987," on prior notice, hearing, and publication in
order to be valid and binding, except when the same is... merely an interpretative rule. This is because "[w]hen an
administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare
issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.
When, on the... other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate
or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those
governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly... affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter
to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law."
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that RA 3720, as amended by Executive Order No. 175, s. 1987[37] prohibits,
inter alia, the manufacture and sale of pharmaceutical products without obtaining the proper CPR from the FDA.
In this regard, the FDA has been deputized by the same law to accept applications for registration of
pharmaceuticals and, after due course, grant or reject such applications.
the said law expressly authorized the Secretary of Health, upon... the recommendation of the FDA Director, to
issue rules and regulations that pertain to the registration of pharmaceutical products.
In accordance with his rule-making power under RA 3720, the Secretary of Health issued AO 67, s. 1989
AO 67, s. 1989, required, among others, that certain... pharmaceutical products undergo BA/BE testing prior to the
issuance of CPR,... Despite the fact that the BA/BE testing requirement was already in place... its implementation
was indefinitely shelved due to lack of facilities capable of conducting the same.
It was only sometime... when technological... advances in the country paved the way for the establishment of
BA/BE testing facilities, thus allowing the rule's enforcement.
Owing to these developments, the FDA (then, the BFAD) issued Circular No. 1, s. 1997
A careful scrutiny of the foregoing issuances would reveal that AO 67, s. 1989 is actually the rule that originally
introduced the BA/BE testing requirement
As such, it is... considered an administrative regulation a legislative rule to be exact issued by the Secretary of
Health in consonance with the express authority granted to him by RA 3720
Considering that neither party contested the validity of its issuance, the Court deems that AO 67, s. 1989 complied
with the requirements of prior hearing, notice, and publication pursuant to the presumption of regularity
accorded to the government... in the exercise of its official duties.
On the other hand, Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 cannot be considered as administrative regulations because they
do not: (a) implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof; (b) interpret, clarify, or explain
existing statutory regulations under which the FDA... operates; and/or (c) ascertain the existence of certain facts
or things upon which the enforcement of RA 3720 depends.
In fact, the only purpose of these circulars is for the FDA to administer and supervise the implementation of the
provisions of AO 67, s. 1989
Therefore, the FDA has sufficient authority to issue the said circulars and since they would not affect the
substantive rights of the parties that they seek to govern as... they are not, strictly speaking, administrative
regulations in the first place no prior hearing, consultation, and publication are needed for their validity.
In sum, the Court holds that Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 are valid issuances and binding to all concerned parties,
including the respondents in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

MIRASOL VS. DPWH

Facts: Petitioners filed for TRO for DPWH Administrative Order 1, Series of 1968 (prohibiting bicycle, tricycle,
pedicab, motorcycle or any vehicle (not motorized) to drive in limited access facilities) and DPWH Department
Order 74, Series of 1993 (Declaration of the North Luzon Expressway from Balintawak to Tabang and the South
Luzon Expressway from Nichols to Alabang as Limited Access Facilities). Whilst this is pending, DPWH acting thru
TRB issued Department Order 123 allowing motorcycles with engine displacement of 400 cubic centimeters
inside limited access facilities. Petitioners assail the DPWH’s failure to provide “scientific” and “objective” data on
the danger of having motorcycles plying our highways. They attack this exercise of police power as baseless and
unwarranted. Trial court dismissed the petition but declared DO 123 invalid.
Issue: Whether AO1 and DO 123 are unconstitutional on the ground of violating equal protection law?
Decision: Petition partly granted. DO 74 / 215 / 123 declared void and AO 1 valid. The sole standard in measuring
its exercise is reasonableness. What is “reasonable” is not subject to exact definition or scientific formulation. No
all-embracing test of reasonableness exists for its determination rests upon human judgment applied to the facts
and circumstances of each particular case. We find that AO 1 does not impose unreasonable restrictions. It merely
outlines several precautionary measures, to which toll way users must adhere. These rules were designed to
ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic within limited access facilities.
DPWH has no authority to regulate limited access highways since EO 546 has devolved this function to the DOTC.
Thus, DO 123 is void for want of authority of the DPWH to promulgate it.
CIR VS. CA
Good Law Landmark
FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 119761, August 29, 1996 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER, VS.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("CIR") disputes the decision, dated 31 March 1995, of respondent Court
of Appeals[1] affirming the 10th August 1994 decision and the 11th October 1994 resolution of the Court of Tax
Appeals[2] ("CTA") in C.T.A. Case No. 5015, entitled "Fortune Tobacco Corporation vs. Liwayway Vinzons-Chato in
her capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue."

The facts, by and large, are not in dispute.

Fortune Tobacco Corporation ("Fortune Tobacco") is engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes.

On various dates, the Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate certificates of trademark
registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes. In a letter, dated 06 January 1987, of then
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr., to Deputy Minister Ramon Diaz of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, "the initial position of the Commission was to classify 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and
'More' as foreign brands since they were listed in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies.
However, Fortune Tobacco changed the names of 'Hope' to Hope Luxury' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby
removing the said brands from the foreign brand category. Proof was also submitted to the Bureau (of Internal
Revenue ['BIR']) that 'Champion' was an original Fortune Tobacco Corporation register and therefore a local
brand."[3] Ad Valorem taxes were imposed on these brands,[4] at the following rates:

A bill, which later became Republic Act ("RA") No. 7654, [6] was enacted, on 10 June 1993, by the legislature and
signed into law, on 14 June 1993, by the President of the Philippines. The new law became effective on 03 July
1993. It amended Section 142(c)(1) of the National Internal Revenue Code ("NIRC") to read; as follows:

"SEC. 142. Cigars and Cigarettes. -

"x x x x x x x x x.
"(c) Cigarettes packed by machine. - There shall be levied, assessed and collected on cigarettes packed by machine a
tax at the rates prescribed below based on the constructive manufacturer's wholesale price or the actual
manufacturer's wholesale price, whichever is higher:

"(1) On locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at fifty-five percent (55%) or the
exportation of which is not authorized by contract or otherwise, fifty-five (55%) provided that the minimum tax shall
not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack.

"(2).On other locally manufactured cigarettes, forty-five percent (45%) provided that the minimum tax shall not be
less than Three Pesos (P3.00) per pack.

"x x x x x x x x x.
"When the registered manufacturer's wholesale price or the actual manufacturer's wholesale price whichever is
higher of existing brands of cigarettes, including the amounts intended to cover the taxes, of cigarettes packed in
twenties does not exceed Four Pesos and eighty centavos (P4.80) per pack, the rate shall be twenty percent
(20%)."[7] (Italics supplied.)
About a month after the enactment and two (2) days before the effectivity of RA 7654, Revenue Memorandum
Circular No. 37-93 ("RMC 37-93"), was issued by the BIR the full text of which expressed:

"REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS
KAGAWARAN NG PANANALAPI
KAWANIHAN NG RENTAS INTERNAS
July 1, 1993

REVENUE MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 37-93

SUBJECT : Reclassification of Cigarettes Subject to Excise Tax

TO : All Internal Revenue Officers and Others Concerned.

"In view of the issues raised on whether 'HOPE,' 'MORE' and 'CHAMPION' cigarettes which are locally manufactured
are appropriately considered as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand, this Office is compelled to
review the previous rulings on the matter.

"Section 142(c)(1) National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6956, provides:

"'On locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand, fifty-five percent (55%) Provided, That this rate shall
apply regardless of whether or not the right to use or title to the foreign brand was sold or transferred by its owner to
the local manufacturer. Whenever it has to be determined whether or not a cigarette bears a foreign brand, the
listing of brands manufactured in foreign countries appearing in the current World Tobacco Directory shall govern."

"Under the foregoing, the test for imposition of the 55% Ad Valorem tax on cigarettes is that the locally manufactured
cigarettes bear a foreign brand regardless of whether or not the right to use or title to the foreign brand was sold or
transferred by its owner to the local manufacturer. The brand must be originally owned by a foreign manufacturer or
producer. If ownership of the cigarette brand is, however, not definitely determinable, 'x x x the listing of brands
manufactured in foreign countries appearing in the current World Tobacco Directory shall govern. x x x'

"'HOPE' is listed in the World Tobacco Directory as being manufactured by (a) Japan Tobacco, Japan and (b) Fortune
Tobacco, Philippines. 'MORE' is listed in the said directory as being manufactured by: (a) Fills de Julia Reig, Andorra;
(b) Rothmans, Australia; (c) RJR-Macdonald, Canada; (d) Rettig-Strenberg, Finland; (e) Karellas, Greece; (f) R.J.
Reynolds, Malaysia; (g) Rothmans, New Zealand; (h) Fortune Tobacco, Philippines; (i) R.J. Reynolds, Puerto Rico; (j)
R.J. Reynolds, Spain; (k) Tabacalera, Spain; (l) R.J. Reynolds, Switzerland; and (m) R.J. Reynolds, USA. 'Champion' is
registered in the said directory as being manufactured by (a) Commonwealth Bangladesh; (b) Sudan, Brazil; (c)
Japan Tobacco, Japan; (d) Fortune Tobacco, Philippines; (e) Haggar, Sudan; and (f) Tabac Reunies, Switzerland.

"Since there is no showing who among the above-listed manufacturers of the cigarettes bearing the said brands are
the real owner/s thereof, then it follows that the same shall be considered foreign brand for purposes of determining
the Ad Valorem tax pursuant to Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code. As held in BIR Ruling No. 410-88,
dated August 24, 1988, 'in cases where it cannot be established or there is dearth of evidence as to whether a brand is
foreign or not, resort to the World Tobacco Directory should be made.'

"In view of the foregoing, the aforesaid brands of cigarettes, viz: 'HOPE,' 'MORE' and 'CHAMPION' being
manufactured by Fortune Tobacco Corporation are hereby considered locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a
foreign brand subject to the 55% Ad Valorem tax on cigarettes.

"Any ruling inconsistent herewith is revoked or modified accordingly.

(SGD) LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO

Commissioner"
On 02 July 1993, at about 17:50 hours, BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr., sent via telefax a copy of
RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular. On 15 July 1993, Fortune Tobacco
received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93.

In a letter, dated 19 July 1993, addressed to the appellate division of the BIR, Fortune Tobacco, requested for a
review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37-93. The request was denied on 29 July 1993. The following day, or
on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for Ad Valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00.

On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA. [8]

On 10 August 1994, the CTA upheld the position of Fortune Tobacco and adjudged:

"WHEREFORE, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 reclassifying the brands of cigarettes, viz: `HOPE,' `MORE'
and `CHAMPION' being manufactured by Fortune Tobacco Corporation as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a
foreign brand subject to the 55% Ad Valorem tax on cigarettes is found to be defective, invalid and unenforceable,
such that when R.A. No. 7654 took effect on July 3, 1993, the brands in question were not CURRENTLY CLASSIFIED
AND TAXED at 55% pursuant to Section 1142(c)(1) of the Tax Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7654 and were therefore
still classified as other locally manufactured cigarettes and taxed at 45% or 20% as the case may be.

"Accordingly, the deficiency Ad Valorem tax assessment issued on petitioner Fortune Tobacco Corporation in the
amount of P9,598,334.00, exclusive of surcharge and interest, is hereby canceled for lack of legal basis.

"Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue is hereby enjoined from collecting the deficiency tax assessment made
and issued on petitioner in relation to the implementation of RMC No. 37-93.

"SO ORDERED." [9]

In its resolution, dated 11 October 1994, the CTA dismissed for lack of merit the motion for reconsideration.

The CIR forthwith filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, questioning the CTA's 10th August 1994
decision and 11th October 1994 resolution. On 31 March 1993, the appellate court's Special Thirteenth Division
affirmed in all respects the assailed decision and resolution.

In the instant petition, the Solicitor General argues: That -

"I. RMC 37-93 IS A RULING OR OPINION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE INTERPRETING THE
PROVISIONS OF THE TAX CODE.

"II. BEING AN INTERPRETATIVE RULING OR OPINION, THE PUBLICATION OF RMC 37-93, FILING OF COPIES
THEREOF WITH THE UP LAW CENTER AND PRIOR HEARING ARE NOT NECESSARY TO ITS VALIDITY, EFFECTIVITY
AND ENFORCEABILITY.

"III. PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED OR RMC 37-93 ON JULY 2, 1993.

"IV. RMC 37-93 IS NOT DISCRIMINATORY SINCE IT APPLIES TO ALL LOCALLY MANUFACTURED CIGARETTES
SIMILARLY SITUATED AS 'HOPE,' 'MORE' AND 'CHAMPION' CIGARETTES.

"V. PETITIONER WAS NOT LEGALLY PROSCRIBED FROM RECLASSIFYING HOPE,' MORE' AND CHAMPION'
CIGARETTES BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF R.A. NO. 7654.
"VI. SINCE RMC 37-93 IS AN INTERPRETATIVE RULE, THE INQUIRY IS NOT INTO ITS VALIDITY, EFFECTIVITY OR
ENFORCEABILITY BUT INTO ITS CORRECTNESS OR PROPRIETY; RMC 37-93 IS CORRECT." [10]
In fine, petitioner opines that RMC 37-93 is merely an interpretative ruling of the BIR which can thus become
effective without any prior need for notice and hearing, nor publication, and that its issuance is not discriminatory
since it would apply under similar circumstances to all locally manufactured cigarettes.

The Court must sustain both the appellate court and the tax court.

Petitioner stresses on the wide and ample authority of the BIR in the issuance of rulings for the effective
implementation of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Let it be made clear that such authority
of the Commissioner is not here doubted. Like any other government agency, however, the CIR may not disregard
legal requirements or applicable principles in the exercise of its quasi-legislative powers.

Let us first distinguish between two kinds of administrative issuances - a legislative rule and an interpretative
rule.

In Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc., vs. Department of Finance Secretary, [11] the Court
expressed:

"x x x a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is generally
required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing. In this connection, the Administrative Code of
1987 provides:

"Public Participation. - If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate
notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of
any rule.

"(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a
newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.

"(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

"In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to
the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing." [12]
It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability
needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has
already prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the
means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or
increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a
chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of
law.

A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it has been issued, convinces us
that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure (revoking in the process the previous holdings
of past Commissioners) or merely as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and
most importantly, been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion" within the
classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby have them covered by RA
7654. Specifically, the new law would have its amendatory provisions applied to locally manufactured cigarettes
which at the time of its effectivity were not so classified as bearing foreign brands. Prior to the issuance of the
questioned circular, "Hope Luxury," "Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes were in the category of locally
manufactured cigarettes not bearing foreign brand subject to 45% Ad Valorem tax. Hence, without RMC 37-93, the
enactment of RA 7654, would have had no new tax rate consequence on private respondent's products. Evidently,
in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes within the scope of the amendatory
law and subject them to an increased tax rate, the now disputed RMC 37-93 had to be issued. In so doing, the BIR
not simply interpreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the
requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored.

Indeed, the BIR itself, in its RMC 10-86, has observed and provided:

"RMC NO. 10-86

Effectivity of Internal Revenue Rules and Regulations

"It has been observed that one of the problem areas bearing on compliance with Internal Revenue Tax rules and
regulations is lack or insufficiency of due notice to the tax paying public. Unless there is due notice, due compliance
therewith may not be reasonably expected. And most importantly, their strict enforcement could possibly suffer from
legal infirmity in the light of the constitutional provision on `due process of law' and the essence of the Civil Code
provision concerning effectivity of laws, whereby due notice is a basic requirement (Sec. 1, Art. IV, Constitution; Art. 2,
New Civil Code).

"In order that there shall be a just enforcement of rules and regulations, in conformity with the basic element of due
process, the following procedures are hereby prescribed for the drafting, issuance and implementation of the said
Revenue Tax Issuances:

"(1). This Circular shall apply only to (a) Revenue Regulations; (b) Revenue Audit Memorandum Orders; and
(c) Revenue Memorandum Circulars and Revenue Memorandum Orders bearing on internal revenue tax rules and
regulations.

"(2). Except when the law otherwise expressly provides, the aforesaid internal revenue tax issuances shall not begin to
be operative until after due notice thereof may be fairly presumed.

"Due notice of the said issuances may be fairly presumed only after the following procedures have been taken:

"xxx xxx xxx"(5). Strict compliance with the foregoing procedures is enjoined." [13]
Nothing on record could tell us that it was either impossible or impracticable for the BIR to observe and comply
with the above requirements before giving effect to its questioned circular.

Not insignificantly, RMC 37-93 might have likewise infringed on uniformity of taxation.

Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1, of the 1987 Constitution mandates taxation to be uniform and equitable.
Uniformity requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike or put on
equal footing both in privileges and liabilities.[14] Thus, all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class
must be taxed at the same rate[15] and the tax must operate with the same force and effect in every place where
the subject may be found.

Apparently, RMC 37-93 would only apply to "Hope Luxury," Premium More" and "Champion" cigarettes and,
unless petitioner would be willing to concede to the submission of private respondent that the circular should, as
in fact my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Bellosillo so expresses in his separate opinion, be
considered adjudicatory in nature and thus violative of due process following the Ang Tibay[16] doctrine, the
measure suffers from lack of uniformity of taxation. In its decision, the CTA has keenly noted that other cigarettes
bearing foreign brands have not been similarly included within the scope of the circular, such as -

"1. Locally manufactured by ALHAMBRA INDUSTRIES, INC.

(a) `PALM TREE' is listed as manufactured by office of Monopoly, Korea (Exhibit `R')

"2. Locally manufactured by LA SUERTE CIGAR and CIGARETTE COMPANY

(a) `GOLDEN KEY' is listed being manufactured by United Tobacco, Pakistan (Exhibit `S')

(b) `CANNON' is listed as being manufactured by Alpha Tobacco, Bangladesh (Exhibit `T')

"3. Locally manufactured by LA PERLA INDUSTRIES, INC.

(a) `WHITE HORSE' is listed as being manufactured by Rothman's, Malaysia (Exhibit `U')

(b) `RIGHT' is listed as being manufactured by SVENSKA, Tobaks, Sweden (Exhibit `V-1')

"4. Locally manufactured by MIGHTY CORPORATION

(a) 'WHITE HORSE' is listed as being manufactured by Rothman's, Malaysia (Exhibit 'U-1')

"5. Locally manufactured by STERLING TOBACCO CORPORATION

(a) UNION' is listed as being manufactured by Sumatra Tobacco, Indonesia and Brown and Williamson, USA (Exhibit
'U-3')

(b) WINNER' is listed as being manufactured by Alpha Tobacco, Bangladesh; Nanyang, Hongkong; Joo Lan, Malaysia;
Pakistan Tobacco Co., Pakistan; Premier Tobacco, Pakistan and Haggar, Sudan (Exhibit 'U-4')." [17]
The court quoted at length from the transcript of the hearing conducted on 10 August 1993 by the Committee on
Ways and Means of the House of Representatives; viz:

"THE CHAIRMAN. So you have specific information on Fortune Tobacco alone. You don't have specific information on
other tobacco manufacturers. Now, there are other brands which are similarly situated. They are locally
manufactured bearing foreign brands. And may I enumerate to you all these brands, which are also listed in the
World Tobacco Directory x x x. Why were these brands not reclassified at 55 if your want to give a level playing field
to foreign manufacturers?

"MS. CHATO. Mr. Chairman, in fact, we have already prepared a Revenue Memorandum Circular that was supposed to
come after RMC No. 37-93 which have really named specifically the list of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a
foreign brand for excise tax purposes and includes all these brands that you mentioned at 55 percent except that at
that time, when we had to come up with this, we were forced to study the brands of Hope, More and Champion
because we were given documents that would indicate the that these brands were actually being claimed or patented
in other countries because we went by Revenue Memorandum Circular 1488 and we wanted to give some rationality
to how it came about but we couldn't find the rationale there. And we really found based on our own interpretation
that the only test that is given by that existing law would be registration in the World Tobacco Directory. So we came
out with this proposed revenue memorandum circular which we forwarded to the Secretary of Finance except that at
that point in time, we went by the Republic Act 7654 in Section 1 which amended Section 142, C-1, it said, that on
locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55 percent. So we were saying that when
this law took effect in July 3 and if we are going to come up with this revenue circular thereafter, then I think our
action would really be subject to question but we feel that . . . Memorandum Circular Number 37-93 would really
cover even similarly situated brands. And in fact, it was really because of the study, the short time that we were given
to study the matter that we could not include all the rest of the other brands that would have been really classified as
foreign brand if we went by the law itself. I am sure that by the reading of the law, you would without that ruling by
Commissioner Tan they would really have been included in the definition or in the classification of foregoing brands.
These brands that you referred to or just read to us and in fact just for your information, we really came out with a
proposed revenue memorandum circular for those brands. (Italics supplied)

"Exhibit 'FF-2-C', pp. V-5 TO V-6, VI-1 to VI-3).

"x x x x x x x x x.
"MS. CHATO. x x x But I do agree with you now that it cannot and in fact that is why I felt that we . . . I wanted to come
up with a more extensive coverage and precisely why I asked that revenue memorandum circular that would cover all
those similarly situated would be prepared but because of the lack of time and I came out with a study of RA 7654, it
would not have been possible to really come up with the reclassification or the proper classification of all brands that
are listed there. x x x' (italics supplied) (Exhibit 'FF-2d', page IX-1)

"x x x x x x x x x.
"HON. DIAZ. But did you not consider that there are similarly situated?

"MS. CHATO. That is precisely why, Sir, after we have come up with this Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93, the
other brands came about the would have also clarified RMC 37-93 by I was saying really because of the fact that I was
just recently appointed and the lack of time, the period that was allotted to us to come up with the right actions on
the matter, we were really caught by the July 3 deadline. But in fact, We have already prepared a revenue
memorandum circular clarifying with the other . . . does not yet, would have been a list of locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing a foreign brand for excise tax purposes which would include all the other brands that were
mentioned by the Honorable Chairman. (Italics supplied) (Exhibit 'FF-2-d,' par. IX-4)."[18]
All taken, the Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and effective
administrative issuance.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, sustaining that of the Court of Tax Appeals, is AFFIRMED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to
be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative
orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be
the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word
“shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not
been published have no force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their
publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make
the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to
the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature.
To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of
the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of
a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.
Case Digest: ASTEC vs. ERC

G.R. No. 192117 : September 18, 2012

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN TAGALOG ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES, INC. (ASTEC),

BATANGAS I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (BATELEC I), QUEZON I ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC. (QUEZELCO I), and QUEZON II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
(QUEZELCO II), Petitioners, v. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Respondent. x

------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 192118 : September 18, 2012

CENTRAL LUZON ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC. (CLEA) and PAMPANGA

RURAL ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE, INC. (PRESCO), Petitioners, v. ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION, Respondent.

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners Batangas I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BATELEC I), Quezon I Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(QUEZELCO I), Quezon II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (QUEZELCO II) and Pampanga Rural Electric Service
Cooperative, Inc. (PRESCO) are rural electric cooperatives established under P.D. No. 269.
BATELEC I, QUEZELCO I and QUEZELCO II are members of the Association of Southern Tagalog Electric
Cooperatives, Inc. (ASTEC). PRESCO is a member of the Central Luzon Electric Cooperatives Association,
Inc. (CLECA). BATELEC I, et al. are engaged in the distribution of electricity.

On 8 December 1994, R.A. No. 7832 or the Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials
Pilferage Act of 1994 was enacted. The law imposed a cap on the recoverable rate of system loss that may
be charged by rural electric cooperatives to their consumers. The IRR of R.A. No. 7832 required every
rural electric cooperative to file with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), on or before 30 September
1995, an application for approval of an amended Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) Clause
incorporating the cap on the recoverable rate of system loss to be included in its schedule of rates.

On 8 June 2001, R.A. No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) was also
enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA abolished the ERB, and created the Energy Regulatory Commission
(ERC). The ERC issued an Order which provides that rural electric cooperatives should only recover
from their members and patrons the actual cost of power purchased from power suppliers. The ERC
also ordered BATELEC, et al. to refund their respective over-recoveries to end-users. In addition, the
ERC also adopted the new "grossed-up factor mechanism" in the computation of the over-recoveries
of the electric cooperatives to be remitted to their consumers.

Thus, BATELEC I, et al. moved to reconsider the said orders but the ERC denied the same. On appeal,
the CA upheld the validity of the ERC Orders.

Hence, this petition. BATELEC I, et al. aver that these ERC Orders are invalid for lack of publication,
non-submission to the U.P. Law Center, and for their retroactive application.
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed orders are invalid for non-publication, non-submission to the U.P.
Law Center and for their retroactivity?
HELD: The petition is partly

meritorious. CIVIL LAW:

publication of laws

Procedural due process demands that administrative rules and regulations be

published in order to be effective. In Tada v. Tuvera, this Court articulated the
fundamental requirement of publication, thus: "We hold therefore that all statutes,
including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
also to a valid delegation."

There are, however, several exceptions to the requirement of publication. First, an

interpretative regulation does not require publication in order to be effective. The
applicability of an interpretative regulation "needs nothing further than its bare
issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed." It "adds nothing to the law" and "does not affect the substantial rights of
any person." Second, a regulation that is merely internal in nature does not require
publication for its effectivity. It seeks to regulate only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the general
public. Third, a letter of instruction issued by an administrative agency concerning rules
or guidelines to
be followed by subordinates in the performance of their duties does not require
publication in order to be effective.

The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power
suppliers are interpretative regulations. Publication is not necessary for the effectivity of
the policy guidelines. As interpretative regulations, the policy guidelines of the ERC on
the treatment of discounts extended by
power suppliers are also not required to be filed with the U.P. Law Center in order to
be effective.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, this Court recognized the basic rule "that no statute,
decree, ordinance, rule or regulation (or even policy) shall be given retrospective
effect unless explicitly stated so." A law is retrospective if it "takes away or impairs
vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a
new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or consideration
already past." The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended
by power suppliers are not retrospective. The policy guidelines did not take away or
impair any vested rights of the rural electric cooperatives. Furthermore, the policy
guidelines of the ERC did not create a new obligation and impose a new duty, nor did it
attach a new disability.

However, the grossed-up factor mechanism amends the IRR of R.A. No. 7832 as it serves
as an additional numerical standard that must be observed and applied by rural electric
cooperatives in the implementation of the PPA. In light of these, the grossed-up factor
mechanism does not merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 or its IRR.It is also not merely
internal in nature. The grossed-up factor mechanism amends the IRR by
providing an additional numerical standard that must be observed and applied in
 the implementation of the PPA. The grossed-up factor mechanism is therefore an
administrative rule that should be published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center in
order to be effective.

As previously stated, it does not appear from the records that the grossed-up factor
mechanism was
published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center. Thus, it is ineffective and may not
serve as a basis for the computation of over-recoveries. The portions of the over-
recoveries arising from the application of the mechanism are therefore invalid.
Furthermore, the application of the grossed-up factor mechanism to
periods of PPA implementation prior to its publication and disclosure renders the said
mechanism invalid for having been applied retroactively.

PARTLY GRANTED

SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA

SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA

judicial power and judicial function

Teodoro Santiago was a Grade 6 pupil at Sero Elem. School. He was adjudged 3rd Honors
(3rd placer). 3 days before graduation, Teodoro and his parents sought the invalidation of the
ranking of honor students. They filed a CERTIORARI case against the principal and teachers
who composed the committee on rating honors.

They contend that the committee acted with grave abuse of official discretion because they claim
that
o the 1st and 2nd placers had never been a close rival of Santiago before, except in Grade 5 only.
o That Santiago was a consistent honor student from Grade 1 to 5
o that the 1st placer was coached and tutored by grade 6 teachers during the summer (gaining
unfair advantage)
o The committee was composed only of Grade 6 teachers.
o That some teachers gave Santos a 75% with an intention to pull him to a much lower rank
o That in the Honors Certificate in Grade 1, the word “first place” was erased and replaced with
“second place”
o That the Principal and district supervisors merely passed the buck to each other to delay his
grievances.
The respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and that even assuming it was
proper, the question has become academic (because the graduation already proceeded).

Respondents also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the
Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions. (under Rule 65,
certiorari is a remedy against judicial functions)

ISSUE: may judicial function be exercised in this case? What is judicial power?

SC:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial
function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action
for certiorari to exist, (TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A TRIBUNAL OR BOARD EXERCISES
JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS)

1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for
hearing and determination. , and

2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a
decision.

3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or
at least the not the legislative nor the executive)

It maybe said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the
legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.

The phrase judicial power is defined:

• as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.
• authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when
the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of
adjudication.
• The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them.
• The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.
The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial
bodies in the performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives
rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights
are made, and the controversy ensuring therefrom is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board
clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the
respective rights of contending parties.

There is nothing about any rule of law that provides for when teachers sit down to assess
individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors. Worse still, the
petitioners have not presented the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual for Teachers
which was allegedly violated by the Committee.

The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges.
And for that matter, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar
competitions.

ANG TIBAY V. CHR -CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

ANG TIBAY(Represented by Toribio) & NWB v. CIR & NLU G.R. No. L-46496 February 27,
1940

FACTS:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to an alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his
employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off
as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival
labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company
dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right to a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. The Court granted a new trial. Thus, the Solicitor General, arguing
for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.

The petitioner has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Labor Union (respondent) is entitled to a new trial.

HELD:

YES. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which
they attached to their petition with the Supreme Court, were evidence so inaccessible to them at
the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to
have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.

Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered
(said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which
were not previously accessible but already existing).

The Supreme Court also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly
bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply with the requirements of due
process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:

(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision.
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons
for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.

Therefore, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire
record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it
reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove.

CASIMIRO VS. TANDOG

Not Cited Recently
SECOND DIVISION G.R. NO. 146137, June 08, 2005 HAYDEE C. CASIMIRO, IN HER CAPACITY AS
MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF SAN JOSE, ROMBLON, PROVINCE OF ROMBLON, PETITIONER, VS.
FILIPINO T. TANDOG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SAN JOSE, ROMBLON,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] dated 31 May 2000 of the Court of
Appeals and its Resolution dated 21 November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 46952, which affirmed in
toto Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 973602 dated 12 August 1997. The said CSC
Resolution affirmed the Decision of Municipal Mayor Filipino Tandog of San Jose, Romblon,
finding petitioner Haydee Casimiro guilty of dishonesty and ordering her dismissal 3from the
service.

The relevant antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:

Petitioner Haydee Casimiro began her service in the government as assessment clerk in the
Office of the Treasurer of San Jose, Romblon. In August 1983, she was appointed Municipal
Assessor.

On 04 September 1996, Administrative Officer II Nelson M. Andres, submitted a report[2] based

on an investigation he conducted into alleged irregularities in the office of petitioner Casimero.
The report spoke of an anomalous cancellation of Tax Declarations No. 0236 in the name of
Teodulo Matillano and the issuance of a new one in the name of petitioner's brother Ulysses
Cawaling and Tax Declarations No. 0380 and No. 0376 in the name of Antipas San Sebastian and
the issuance of new ones in favor of petitioner's brother-in-law Marcelo Molina.
Immediately thereafter, respondent Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. 13[3] dated
06 September 1996, placing the petitioner under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days.
Three (3) days later, Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. 15, directing petitioner to
answer the charge of irregularities in her office. In her answer,[4] petitioner denied the alleged
irregularities claiming, in essence, that the cancellation of the tax declaration in favor of her
brother Ulysses Cawaling was done prior to her assumption to office as municipal assessor, and
that she issued new tax declarations in favor of her brother-in-law Marcelo Molina by virtue of
a deed of sale executed by Antipas San Sebastian in Molina's favor.

On 23 October 1996, thru Memorandum Order No. 17,[5] respondent Mayor extended
petitioner's preventive suspension for another thirty (30) days effective 24 October 1996 to
give him more time to verify and collate evidence relative to the alleged irregularities.

On 28 October 1996, Memorandum Order No. 18[6] was issued by respondent Mayor directing
petitioner to answer in writing the affidavit-complaint of Noraida San Sebastian Cesar and
Teodulo Matillano. Noraida San Sebastian Cesar[7] alleged that Tax Declarations No. 0380 and
No. 0376 covering parcels of land owned by her parents were transferred in the name of a
certain Marcelo Molina, petitioner's brother-in-law, without the necessary documents. Noraida
Cesar further claimed that Marcelo Molina had not yet paid the full purchase price of the land
covered by the said Tax Declarations. For his part, Teodulo Matillano claimed[8] that he never
executed a deed of absolute sale over the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 0236 in
favor of Ulysses Cawaling, petitioner's brother.

In response to Memorandum Order No. 18, petitioner submitted a letter[9] dated 29 October
1996, stating that with respect to the complaint of Noraida San Sebastian Cesar, she had already
explained her side in the letter dated 26 September 1996. As to the complaint of Teodulo
Matillano, she alleged that it was a certain Lilia Barrientos who executed a deed of absolute sale
over the parcel of land subject of the complaint in favor of her brother, Ulysses Cawaling.

Not satisfied, respondent Mayor created a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter.
After a series of hearings, the committee, on 22 November 1996, submitted its
report[10] recommending petitioner's separation from service, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

Evaluating the facts above portrayed, it is clearly shown that Municipal Assessor Haydee Casimero
is guilty of malperformance of duty and gross dishonesty to the prejudice of the taxpayers of San
Jose, Romblon who are making possible the payments of her salary and other allowances.
Consequently, we are unanimously recommending her separation from service.
Based on the above recommendation, respondent Mayor issued Administrative Order No.
1[11] dated 25 November 1996 dismissing petitioner, thus:

Upon unanimous recommendations of the fact finding committee Chairmained (sic) by Municipal
Administrator Nelson M. Andres, finding you (Haydee C. Casimero) guilty of Dishonesty and
Malperformance of duty as Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon, copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex "A" and made as integral part hereof, you are hereby ordered separated from
service as Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon, effective upon request hereof.
Undeterred by that setback, petitioner appealed to the CSC, which affirmed[12] respondent
Mayor's order of dismissal. A motion for reconsideration[13] was filed, but the same was
denied.[14]

Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated her case to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently affirmed
the CSC decision.[15] Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Petitioner now comes to us raising the lone issue[16] of whether or not petitioner was afforded
procedural and substantive due process when she was terminated from her employment as
Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon. An underpinning query is: Was petitioner afforded an
impartial and fair treatment? She specifically points to bias and partiality on the members of
the fact-finding committee. She avers that Lorna Tandog Vilasenor, a member of the fact-finding
committee, is the sister of respondent Mayor. She further alludes that while the committee
chairman, Nelson M. Andres, was appointed by the respondent Mayor to the position of
Administrative Officer II only on 01 August 1996, no sooner was he given the chairmanship of
the Committee. Further the affiants-complainants were not presented for cross examination.

We find the present petition bereft of merit.

The first clause of Section 1 of Article III of the Bill of Rights states that:

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, . . . .
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that
there is deprivation of life, liberty and property and such deprivation is done without proper
observance of due process. When one speaks of due process, however, a distinction must be
made between matters of procedure and matters of substance.

In essence, procedural due process "refers to the method or manner by which the law is
enforced."[17]

The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a
real opportunity to be heard.[18] In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar,
procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[19] "To be heard" does not mean
only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural
due process.[20]

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the
following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which
may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's
rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties
affected.[21]

In the case at bar, what appears in the record is that a hearing was conducted on 01 October
1996, which petitioner attended and where she answered questions propounded by the
members of the fact-finding committee. Records further show that the petitioner was accorded
every opportunity to present her side. She filed her answer to the formal charge against her.
After a careful evaluation of evidence adduced, the committee rendered a decision, which was
affirmed by the CSC and the Court of Appeals, upon a move to review the same by the
petitioner. Indeed, she has even brought the matter to this Court for final adjudication.

Kinship alone does not establish bias and partiality.[22] Bias and partiality cannot be presumed.
In administrative proceedings, no less than substantial proof is required.[23] Mere allegation is
not equivalent to proof.[24] Mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. There should be hard
evidence to prove it, as well as manifest showing of bias and partiality stemming from an
extrajudicial source or some other basis.[25] Thus, in the case at bar, there must be convincing
proof to show that the members of the fact-finding committee unjustifiably leaned in favor of
one party over the other. In addition to palpable error that may be inferred from the decision
itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias.[26] The petitioner miserably failed to
substantiate her allegations. In effect, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
prevails.[27]

Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the
complainants were never presented for cross examination. In administrative proceedings,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process
cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.[28]

Nothing on record shows that she asked for cross examination. In our view, petitioner cannot
argue that she has been deprived of due process merely because no cross examination took
place. Again, it is well to note that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move
for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the present case, the record
clearly shows that petitioner not only filed her letter-answer, she also filed a motion for
reconsideration of the recommendation of the committee dated 22 November 1996. The
essence of due process in the administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one side
or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[29]

The Court finds far little basis to petitioner's protestations that she was deprived of due process
of law and that the investigation conducted was far from impartial and fair.

As to the substantive due process, it is obvious to us that what petitioner means is that the
assailed decision was not supported by competent and credible evidence.[30]

The law requires that the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative
cases is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.[31]

Well-entrenched is the rule that substantial proof, and not clear and convincing evidence or
proof beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient basis for the imposition of any disciplinary action
upon an employee. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the employer has
reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his
participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded by his
position.[32]

In the case at bar, there is substantial evidence to prove petitioner's dismissal.

Two alleged irregularities provided the dismissal from service of herein petitioner:

1. The cancellation of complainant Teodulo Matillano's tax declaration and the issuance of a
new one in favor of petitioner's brother Ulysses Cawaling; and

2. The cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of complainant Noraida San Sebastian
Cesar's parent in favor of petitioner's brother-in-law, Marcelo Molina.
On these points, we quote, with approval, the findings of the Court of Appeals for being
supported by evidence on record.

Going first to the alleged irregularity accompanying the issuance of tax declarations in favor of
petitioner's brother Ulysses Cawaling, the former's asseverations that she had nothing to do with
the processing of the subject tax declarations is simply unacceptable. As municipal assessor, one of
petitioner's duties was to keep a correct record of all transfers, leases and mortgages of real
property (par. [4] f, Sec. 159, Article VI, Chapter 3, Title II, Book II of the Local Government Code)
within her jurisdiction. Thus, even if petitioner had no hand in the processing of her brother's tax
declaration, she should have seen to it that the records pertaining thereto are in order.
Furthermore, the annotation on her brother's tax declaration that the same property is also
declared in the name of another person and that all of them are paying the realty taxes thereon
should have cautioned petitioner to take the necessary steps to set records right. Under par. [4] h,
(ibid.) the municipal assessors, in such a situation, are suppose to cancel assessments, in case
several assessments have been made for the same property, except the one properly made, but if
any assessee or his representative shall object to the cancellation of the assessment made in his
name, such assessment shall not be cancelled but the fact shall be noted on the tax declaration and
assessment rolls and other property books of records. Preference, however, shall be given to the
assessment of the person who has the best title to the property, or in default thereof, of the person
who has possession of the property (id.). On this score alone, petitioner is already liable for gross
neglect of duty, which is also penalized by dismissal at the first offense (Sec. 22 [b], Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rule [supra]).

Secondly, petitioner's vacillation on whether it was Teodulo Matillano or Leticia Barrientos

Berbano who executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of her brother Ulysses Cawaling further
weakens her defense. Petitioner, in her written answer, claimed that both Teodulo Matillano and
Ulysses Cawaling have deeds of absolute sale over the same parcel of land (vide par. [4], Annex
"G," supra). In the course of investigation, however, petitioner claimed before the investigating
body that Teodulo Matillano executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of her brother (vide, p. 8,
Annex "N," supra). Thereafter petitioner claimed that it was a certain Leticia Barrientos Berbano
who executed the deed of absolute sale in favor of her brother (vide, Annex "J," supra). . . .

With respect to the irregularity involving the tax declarations of petitioner's brother-in-law,
Marcelo Molina, no better evidence can be presented to support petitioner's dismissal for
dishonesty than the questioned tax declarations themselves (vide, pp. 87 & 88, ibid.). Both tax
declarations indicated that the declarations therein where subscribed to under oath by the
declarant before herein petitioner on August 15, 1996, in effect canceling Antipaz San Sebastian's
tax declaration on even date. However, the same tax declarations indicate that the taxes due
thereon (i.e., land tax, transfer tax & capital gain tax) were paid only in October of the same year
or two months after the tax declarations have already been issued in favor of petitioner's brother-
in-law. Under Article 224 [b] of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code, no tax declaration shall be cancelled and a new one issued in lieu thereof unless the transfer
tax has first been paid.

The issuance of new tax declarations in favor of petitioner's brother and brother-in-law effectively
cancels the tax declarations of the complainants. Article 299[c] of the Rules of Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code, provides that:
"In addition to the notice of transfer, the previous property owner shall likewise surrendered to
the provincial, city, or municipal assessor concerned, the tax declaration covering the subject
property in order that the same maybe cancelled from the assessment records of the LGU. x x x."
Thus, the tax declaration of complainants Noraida San Sebastian and Teodulo Matillano must first
be surrendered before herein petitioner could effectively cancel their respective tax declarations
and issue new ones in favor of her brother and brother-in-law. Unfortunately, herein petitioner
failed to present the complainants' cancelled tax declarations. She did not even allege that the
same had been surrendered to her for cancellation.[33]
In addition, petitioner admitted using the deed of sale allegedly executed by Lilia Barrientos in
favor of Cawaling in transferring the Tax Declaration in the name of her brother Ulysses
Cawaling. However, glaring in the record is the admission by the petitioner in her
petition[34] and memorandum[35] that the property was still under litigation, as both Matillano
and Barrientos continue to take their claims over it. Clearly, therefore, she had no right, or
reason, to pre-empt judgment on who is the lot's rightful owner who can legally dispose the
same. Prudence dictates that, under the situation, she should have refrained from taking any
course of action pending the court's final determination of this matter.

In Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Rilloza,[36] dishonesty was understood to

imply a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity."
Dishonesty is considered as a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292
and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws. It is beyond cavil that petitioner's acts displayed want
of honesty.

IN ALL, we affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is guilty of acts of
dishonesty. Her acts of cancelling the tax declarations of Antipas San Sebastian and Teodulo
Matillano in favor of her close relatives without complying with the requirements set under the
law constitute grave acts of dishonesty.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 31
May 2000 and its subsequent Resolution dated 21 November 2000, dismissing petitioner from
service, are hereby AFFIRMED. With costs.

SO ORDERED.

99 Phil. 497

MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by Judge E.
Soriano dated February 12, 1955, granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant
Leonardo Castro and dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff Eduardo Brillantes. For
a statement of the facts of the case we adopt that made by the trial court which we reproduce
below:
It appears that on December 1, 1953, the plaintiff filed a complaint against
the defendant before the Wage Administration Service for the recovery of alleged unpaid
salary and overtime pay, the said case bearing No. C-1046; that on February 15, 1954; the
plaintiff and the defendant entered into an arbitration agreement whereby they agreed "1.
That they submit their case to the Wage Administration Service for investigation"; and "2.
That they bind themselves to abide by whatever decision this Office may render on the case
and that they recognize said decision to be final and conclusive"; that in accordance with the
said agreement, the parties, assisted by their respective counsel, adduced evidence before
the Wage Administrative Service; that on May 31, 1954, the latter rendered a
decision containing its findings and the following dispositive parts "wherefore, considering
the evidence presented, the claim for overtime and underpayment is hereby dismissed but the
respondent is adjudged to pay to the claimant the amount of fifty pesos and eighty-eight
centavos (P50.88) corresponding to his salary for services rendered in the month of
November, 1953 and to deposit the same within five (5) days from receipt thereof"; that no
appeal was taken from the said decision, and that on November 10, 1954, the plaintiff filed a
complaint against the defendant with this Court over the same subject-matter and cause of
action litigated between them before, and decided by, the Wage Administration Service, (pp.
22-23, Record on Appeal.)
In support of its order of dismissal, the trial court made the following observation and
conclusions which we quote with favor:
It is evident that the aforesaid decision rendered by the Hearing Officer of
the Wage Administration Service was pursuant to" the authority granted to the Secretary of
Labor to "delegate any or all of his powers in the administration or enforcement of the
Minimum Wage Law to the Chief of the WAS, who may act personally or through duly
authorized representative" Republic Act No. 602, The Minimum Wage Law, section 12
(e). Section 7 of the same Act also pertinently provides that "Any person aggrieved by an
order of the Secretary of Labor issued under this Act may obtain a review of such order in the
Supreme Court by filing in such court within fifteen (15) days after the entry and publication
of such order a written petition praying that the order of the Secretary of
Labor be modified or set aside in whole or in part * *.*." The jurisdiction of the Wage
Administration Service to render the aforesaid decision, as well as the remedy of the
aggrieved party against such a decision, is impliedly recognized by the Supreme Court in
Gonzales vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor, et als., ' G. R. No. L-6409, wherein it was said: "The point
raised by the Solicitor General on behalf of the respondent Secretary of Labor that
petitioner's remedy is to appeal to the President of the Philippines
is not well taken. Section 7 of the law creating the WAS (Rep. Act No. 602) expressly
authorized any person aggrieved by an order of the Secretary of Labor to obtain a review of
such order in the Supreme Court." In view of the failure of the herein plaintiff to avail himself
of the remedy marked out by said Section 7 of Republic Act No. 602 within the time therein
specified, the aforesaid decision of the Wage1 Administration Service became final .
and conclusive, not only by clear implication but also by express agreement of the parties
"That they bind themselves to abide by whatever decision this Office (WAS) may render on
the case, and that they recognize said decision to be final and conclusive". To permit the
herein plaintiff to institute the present case before this Court, atfer the same had been finally
aad conclusively decided by the Wage Administration Service, is therefore to allow him to go
back on his own solemn agreement, to set at naught the provisions of Republic Act No. 602; and
to encourage duplication of work, if not conflicting judgments, by authorizing a party first to
file his case with the Wage Administration Service and thereafter, in case of
an adverse decision, to refile the same case with the Court of First Instance. This could not
have been the legislator's intention in the enactment of Republic Act No. 602. (pp. 23-24,
Record on Appeal.)
Attorney Manuel Y. Macias counsel for appellant in his brief concedes that the decision
rendered by the hearing officer of the WAS is an order "issued pursuant to Section 7, above-
quoted, of the Minimum Wage Law in relation to Section 12 (a) which authorizes delegation by
the Secretary of Labor of his powers in the administration or enforcement of the Minimum
Wage Law to the Chief of the Wage Administrative Service." He, however, contends that the
right to go to the Supreme Court for review of said order granted by Section 7 of the
Minimum Wage Law is not exclusive, because according to him, under said Section 7 the
review, by this Tribunal is limited to questions of law and that the findings of fact contained
in the appealed decision must be accepted. This is not entirely correct. The findings of fact
made by the Secretary of Labor or his delegate are accepted and are conclusive only if
supported by substantial evidence. So that plaintiff could well have appealed from the decision
of the WAS to this Tribunal, even on question of fact, if he was prepared and in a position to
show that the findings of fact of the WAS were not supported by substantial evidence. Then
counsel for appellant, referring to the hearing officer of the WAS and his decision, says the
following:
Appellant cannot accept the findings of fact in the 'decision' of the Hearing Officer of the Wage
Administration Service because they are not merely contrary to the facts but a scandalous
distortion of them with no other end in view but to favor appellee, the respondent
employer. The Hearing Officer, to promote this' end, callously ignored appellant's
evidence. His so called 'decision' is a mockery of justice, and absolute nullity for which no fair
minded citizen can have any respect, (p. 5, Appellant's Brief.)
And of Judge Soriano who dismissed plaintiff's complaint, the same counsel comments thus:
The court a quo refused to perform the functions of a trial court and rendered the foregoing
ruling without any evidence having been first presented pro or con. It decided an issue in
favor of one party and against the other upon the mere representations of the favored party
and refused absolutely to hear the other. The court a quo's act in so doing is a plain violation of
the right to due process p. 8,.Appellant's Brief.)
The above is couched in strong and disrespectful language unbecoming a lawyer who is
an officer of the court, and highly improper in referring to an administrative official authorized
to render decisions and especially to a Judge of the Court of First Instance. If plaintiff-appellant
and his counsel were dissatisfied with the findings of the hearing officer of the WAS; if they
believed that the findings were a distortion of the facts as contained in the evidence, they
should have appealed from said decision to this Tribunal. And if they were really convinced
that said hearing officer of the WAS delibeartely distorted the facts to favor the employer, they
should have prepared charges of partiality and malfeasance and lodged the same with the
proper authorities for investigation. Now is neither the time nor the occasion
to air said grievance, assuming for the moment that it is real and well founded. And as to the
reference to the trial court, said court merely acted upon the motion to dismiss. It considered
the complaint and the motion to dismiss. That was enough. There was no need for the
presentation of any evidence. So, the action of the trial court was proper and warranted; which
cannot be said of the comment and observations of counsel above reproduced. Said
counsel is hereby admonished to use more temperate and respectful language and observe
more proper conduct in the future.
We fully agree with the trial court in its order dismissing the complaint on the ground that the
action is barred by prior judgment. There is no question that the complaint filed by plaintiff-
appellant with the WAS may be regarded as a suit by one party against another to enforce a
right; that the WAS in entertaining said suit, hearing the parties and deciding the case acted
as a quasi-judicial body and the proceedings before it were quasi-judicial proceedings, and
conducted in accordance with law, and so was the decision rendered. Not only this, but the
parties before the commencement of the proceedings signed an agreement whereby they
submitted their case to the WAS, binding themselves by whatever decision the WAS may
render on the same, and that they recognized the decision to be final and conclusive. After
signing that agreement or pledge, plaintiff-appellant may not now be heard to say that the
decision reridered by the WAS has no legal effect on him. Besides, even assuming that
despite the agreement the decision did not automatically become final, still plaintiff's failure to
appeal therefrom to the Supreme Court as provided by the Minimum Wage Law (Rep., Act
602) rendered it final and conclusive and served as a bar to another action between the same
parties involving the same subject matter and cause of action and the same issues.
In the case of Penalosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 314, we held:
"* * * 'a judgment rendered * * * by a court of competent jurisdiction on the .merits, is a
bar to any future suit between the same parties or their privies upon the same cause of action
so long as it remains unreserved;' or in the language of Mr. Justice Field in the opinion just
cited:
"It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in
privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or
defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which migh have been
offered for that purpose."'
And in the case of Tejedor vs. Palet, 61 Phil. 494, 502-503, we equally held:
"'The rule is often stated in general terms that a judgment is conclusive not only upon
the questions actually contested and determined, but upon all matters which might have
been litgated and decided in that suit; and this is undoubtedly true of all matters properly
belonging to the subject of the controversy and within the scope of the issues. * * *' " (citing
34 C. J., pp. 909-911.)
The authorities above cited on res adjucata refer to decisions rendered by the courts. Are they
applicable to decisions of a quasi-judicial body like the Wage Administration Service (WAS)
? The answer is in the affirmative, as may be seen from the following authorities:
"The rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by
competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public,
executive, or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the
judgments of courts having general judicial powers. This rule has been recognized as applying
to the decisions of road or highway commissioners, commissioners of motor
transportation, boards of audit, county boards, tax commissioners, boards, or officers, the
federal trade commission, school commissioners, police commissioners, sewers
commissioners, land commissioners or officers, collector of customs, referees in bankruptcy'
court commissioners, boards or other tribunals administering workmen's compensation acts,
and other like officers and boards. However, a particular decision or determination may not be
conclusive, as where it was not a judicial, as distinguished from a legislative, executive, or
ministerial, determination, or the matter was not within the jurisdiction of the officer or board.
* * *" (50 C. J. S., Judgments, Sec. 690, pp. 148-149).

* * * There are, however, cases in which the doctrine of res judicata has been held applicable to
judicial acts of public, executive, or administrative officers and boards. in this connection, it has
been declared that whenever a final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on
the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error
or a certiori, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata." (30 Am. jur., Judgments,
Sec. 164, p. 910). (Italics Supplied).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA v. HILARION U. JARENCIO, GR No. L-29274, 1975-11-27

Facts:
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative
Code,[1] the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7,... 1966.[2]
Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities:[3]
To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions,
smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are
prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to submit... proper
recommendations to the President of the Philippines.
"e. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and
3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of
unlawfully amassed wealth . . .
"h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints
against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute
the proper charges with the appropriate agency.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers
of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code,
including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum,... administer
oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.[4]... petitioner Agency draws its
subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4 para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood,
empowered it to "summon witnesses, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the
investigation"
Issues:
whether the Agency, acting thru its officials enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its
conduct of fact-finding investigations.
Ruling:
There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon
sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in
anomalous transactions[23] fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and... that the
information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed
to be in possession,[24] is reasonably relevant to the investigations.
Principles:
administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether
or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown[16] and even
before the issuance of a complaint.[17] It... is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a
specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant
to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose
When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it,
too may... take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of law.[21] In
sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is
(1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite;... and (3) the
information is reasonably relevant.[22]
NESTLE PHILIPPINES v. UNIWIDE SALES, GR No. 174674, 2010-10-20
Facts:
respondents filed in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a petition for declaration of
suspension of payment, formation and appointment of rehabilitation receiver, and approval of
rehabilitation plan.
approved the petition
Interim Receivership Committee filed a rehabilitation plan in the SEC.
Interim Receivership Committee filed in the SEC an Amended Rehabilitation Plan (ARP). The
ARP took into account the planned entry of Casino Guichard Perrachon
SEC approved... the Interim Receivership Committee filed in the SEC a Second Amendment to
the Rehabilitation Plan (SARP) in view of Casino Guichard Perrachon's withdrawal.
approved
Petitioners, as unsecured creditors of respondents, appealed to the SEC... praying that the 23
December 2002 Order approving the SARP be set aside and a new one be issued directing the
Interim Receivership Committee, in consultation with all the unsecured creditors, to... improve
the terms and conditions of the SARP.
the SEC denied petitioners' appeal for lack of merit.
Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit
In reviewing administrative decisions, the findings of fact made therein must be respected as
long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or
preponderant;... that the administrative decision in matters within the executive jurisdiction
can only be set aside on proof of grave... abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.
a Revised Third Amendment to the Rehabilitation Plan (revised
TARP).
A majority of the secured creditors strongly opposed
Hearing Panel directed respondents to show cause why the rehabilitation case should not be
terminated considering that the rehabilitation plan had undergone several revisions.
denied
Respondents then filed in the SEC a petition for certiorari... the Hearing Panel disapproved the
revised TARP and terminated the rehabilitation case as a consequence.
respondents filed another petition appealing the Hearing Panel's 13 January 2010 Resolution.
Considering the pendency of SEC En Banc Case No. 12-09-183 and SEC En Banc Case No. 01-10-
193, recently filed in the SEC, involving the very same rehabilitation case subject of this
petition, the present petition has been rendered premature.
Issues:
whether the SARP should be revoked and the rehabilitation proceedings terminated.
whether the SARP should be revoked and the rehabilitation... proceedings terminated, would be
premature.
Ruling:
The Court thus defers to the competence and expertise of the SEC to determine whether, given
the supervening events in this case, the SARP is no longer capable of... implementation and
whether the rehabilitation case should be terminated as a consequence.
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a
controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative
tribunal to... determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
In other words, if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized
training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before resort to the court is had even if the matter may well be
within... the latter's proper jurisdiction.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining
whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency
has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding...
before the court.[
It is not for this Court to intrude, at this stage of the rehabilitation proceedings, into the primary
administrative jurisdiction of the SEC on a matter requiring its technical expertise.
we are constrained to dismiss this petition for prematurity.
Principles:
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a
controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative
tribunal to... determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE v. ANANIAS D. SELUDO, GR No. 173840, 2012-04-25

Facts:
As members of the Board of Directors (BOD) of the petitioner Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(SAMELCO II), an electric cooperative providing electric service to all members-consumers in
all municipalities within the Second Congressional District of the Province... of Samar,
individual petitioners passed Resolution No. 5 [Series] of 2005 on January 22, 2005.
The said resolution disallowed the private respondent to attend succeeding meetings of the
BOD effective February 2005 until the end of his term as director. The same resolution also
disqualified him for one (1) term to run as a candidate for director in the upcoming district...
elections.
Convinced that his rights as a director of petitioner SAMELCO II had been curtailed by the
subject board resolution, private respondent filed an Urgent Petition for Prohibition against
petitioner SAMELCO II, impleading individual petitioners as directors thereof, in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Calbiga, Samar. The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No. C-2005-
1085 and was raffled to Branch 33 of the said court x x x.
In his petition, private respondent prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 5, [Series] of
2005, contending that it was issued without any legal and factual bases.
In their answer to the petition for prohibition, individual petitioners raised the affirmative
defense of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case. Individual
petitioners assert that, since the matter involved an electric cooperative, SAMELCO II,... primary
jurisdiction is vested on the National Electrification Administration (NEA).
Issues:
IN ITS INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED LEGAL ERRORS IN LIMITING THE
DOCTRINE TO "CERTAIN MATTERS IN CONTROVERSIES INVOLVING SPECIALIZED DISPUTES"
AND IN UPHOLDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT
OVER THE URGENT PETITION FOR PROHIBITION FILED BY RESPONDENT SELUDO ON THE
GROUND THAT THE ISSUES RAISED THEREIN "DO NOT REQUIRE THE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE
OF THE NEA"
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN SUSTAINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL
COURT, COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW BY HOLDING THAT "A PERUSAL OF THE LAW
CREATING THE NEA DISCLOSES THAT THE NEA WAS NOT GRANTED THE POWER TO HEAR
AND DECIDE CASES INVOLVING THE VALIDITY OF BOARD
RESOLUTIONS UNSEATING ANY MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS" AND THAT
"NEITHER WAS IT GRANTED JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION
OR MANDAMUS."... who between the RTC and the NEA has primary jurisdiction over the
question of the validity of the Board Resolution issued by
SAMELCO II.
Ruling:
Section 10, Chapter II of P.D. No. 269, as amended by Section 5 of P.D. No. 1645, provides:
Section 5. Section 10, Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 10. Enforcement Powers and Remedies. - In the exercise of its power of supervision and
control over electric cooperatives and other borrower, supervised or controlled entities, the
NEA is empowered to issue orders, rules and regulations and motu... proprio or upon petition of
third parties, to conduct investigations, referenda and other similar actions in all matters
affecting said electric cooperatives and other borrower, or supervised or controlled entities.
In addition, Subsection (a), Section 24, Chapter III of P.D. No. 269, as amended by Section 7 of
P.D. No. 1645, states:
Section 7. Subsection (a), Section 24, Chapter III of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Section 24. Board of Directors. - (a) The Management of a Cooperative shall be vested in its
Board, subject to the supervision and control of NEA which shall have the right to be
represented and to participate in all Board meetings and deliberations and to approve all...
policies and resolutions.
A comparison of the original provisions of Sections 10 and 24 of P.D. No. 269 and the
amendatory provisions under Sections 5 and 7 of P.D. No. 1645 would readily show that the
intention of the framers of the amendatory law is to broaden the powers of the NEA.
A clear proof of such expanded powers is that, unlike P.D. No. 269, P.D. No. 1645 expressly
provides for the authority of the NEA to exercise supervision and control over electric
cooperatives. In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of
an... officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.[5] If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.[6] Control, on the... other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
A careful reading of the above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 1645 clearly show that, pursuant to
its power of supervision and control, the NEA is granted the authority to conduct
investigations and other similar actions as well as to issue orders, rules and... regulations with
respect to all matters affecting electric cooperatives. Certainly, the matter as to the validity of
the resolution issued by the Board of Directors of SAMELCO II, which practically removed
respondent from his position as a member of the Board of Directors... and further disqualified
him to run as such in the ensuing election, is a matter which affects the said electric cooperative
and, thus, comes within the ambit of the powers of the NEA as expressed in Sections 5 and 7 of
P.D. No. 1645.
It may not be amiss to reiterate the prevailing rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,...
has been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency.[9] In such a case,
the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its... view or, if the parties would not be
unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.
Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. The Court, in a long line of cases,[11] has held that before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition... that he avail himself of all administrative
processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy... must be exhausted first before the court's
power of judicial review can be sought.[12] The premature resort to the court is fatal to one's
cause of action.[13] Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may... be
dismissed for lack of cause of action.
True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are
subject to certain exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party
invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,...
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that
will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so
small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved... is
purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial
intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue...
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l)
in quo warranto proceedings.