Evangelista v.

Jarencio
November 27, 1975
Doctrine: Administrative may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether
or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the
issuance of a complaint. It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or
complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough
that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose.
Facts:
The President of the Philippines under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966 created the
Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO). He charged the agency
with the responsibility to investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft
and corruption, smuggling, lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial
to the government.
The President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee including the
power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take
testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.
On June 7, 1968, pursuant to the powers vested in the Agency, petitioner Quirico Evangelista as
Undersecretary of the agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City
Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him to be and
appear as witness at the office of the PARGO. Instead of obeying the subpoena, Manalastas filed
a Petition for prohibition and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
which was granted by the CFI of Manila, hence, this petition.
Issue / Held:
WON the Agency enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding
investigations. YES. Manalastas lost.
Ratio:
An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a
legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information
upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may require the
attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature.
The petitioner draws its subpoena power in EO No. 4 and the enabling law fixes no distinction
when and in what function the subpoena power should be exercised. The Court finds no reason
to depart from the established rule, ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
Nor could the court find merit in the argument that the subpoena power granted by Section 580
of the Revised Administrative Code is restricted under the Rules of Court to abridge its
application. The Rules of Court require that the subpoena may be issued only when a specific
case is pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in
connection with the exercise of the court’s judicial or adjudicatory functions before a non-
judicial subpoena can be issued. However, a distinction must be made that an administrative
subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. To an extent, the restrictions and
qualifications referred to in Section 580 of the RAC could mean that the restraints against
infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and
when the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear.
Administrative may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not
adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the
issuance of a complaint. It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or
complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough
that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. The purpose of the subpoena is to
discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered
evidence so justifies. The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not
dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence but can investigate merely on
suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.
The subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is:
Within the authority of the agency;
The demand is not too indefinite; and
The information is reasonably relevant.
For the case at bar, the anomalous transaction in question fall within the authority of the Agency,
and that the information sought to be elicited from Manalastas is reasonably relevant to the
investigations.
The court is not unmindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative
investigations. However, the court finds that in the present case, Manalastas is not facing any
administrative charge. He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding
investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of
submitting the assembled facts to the President or to file the corresponding charges. Since, the
only purpose of the investigation is to discover facts, any unnecessary extension of the privilege
would thus be unwise.
The respondents would also challenge the constitutionality of EO No. 4 collaterally. However,
the constitutionality of executive orders cannot be collaterally impeached. Much more when the
issue was not duly pleaded in the court below as to be acceptable for adjudication now.
WHEREFORE, Order of respondent Judge is SET ASIDE.
Fernando, J., Concurring:
United States c. Morton Salt Co., penned by Justice Jackson, “It is sufficient if the inquiry is
within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is
reasonably relevant.”
Moreover, Justice Fernando states that “if he [Manalastas] could demonstrate a failure to abide
by the constitutional mandate on search and seizure, he is not without a remedy.”
Teehankee, J., Dissenting:
While the subpoena commands Manalastas to appear as witness it is a fact shown by the very
petition at bar that the respondent is in fact and for all intents and purposes subpoenaed as a
respondent or one directly implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said sworn statements.
Therefore, respondent correctly invoked, Cabal vs. Kapunan, wherein the court through C.J.
Concepcion held that therein petitioner rightfully refused to take the witness stand against the
Presidential Committee investigating since such proceedings were in substance and effect a
criminal one, and that his position is virtually that of an accused and he therefore had the right to
remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. Pascual, Jr. v. Board of
Examiners, is also in point where the accused has the right to refuse not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but also to take the witness stand.

NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC V. UNIWIDE SALES, INC

FACTS:
In 1999, the respondent Uniwide Sales Inc. filed in the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) a petition for declaration of suspension of payment, formation and appointment of
rehabilitation receiver, and approval of rehabilitation plan. The petition was duly approved.
Thereafter, the newly appointed Interim Receivership Committee filed a rehabilitation plan in the
SEC which is anchored on return to core business of retailing; debt reduction via cash settlement
and dacion en pago; loan restructuring; waiver of penalties and charges; freezing of interest
payments; and restructuring of credit of suppliers, contractors, and private lenders. Subsequent
amendments of the said rehabilitation plan were filed before the SEC and were all approved.
Petitioners, as unsecured creditors of respondents, appealed to the SEC praying that the approval
of the rehabilitation plan be se set aside and a new one be issued directing the Interim
Receivership Committee, in consultation with all the unsecured creditors, to improve the terms
and conditions of the plan. Acting on it, the SEC denied the appeal for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction is applicable in this case
RULING: YES. First, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that from the time of the filing
in this Court of the instant petition, supervening events have unfolded substantially changing the
factual backdrop of this rehabilitation case. The Court thus defers to the competence and
expertise of the SEC to determine whether, given the supervening events in this case, the
amended rehabilitation plan is no longer capable of implementation and whether the
rehabilitation case should be terminated as a consequence.
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy
where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact. In other words, if a case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must
first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the court is had even if the
matter may well be within the latter's proper jurisdiction.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether
it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has
determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the
court.
Petition dismissed.

Teotico vs Agda Jr.

GR No. 87437, May 29, 1991
Doctrine: The Civil Service Decree, P.D. No. 807, allows transfer, detail and re-
assignment. 47 If the employee concerned believes that there is no justification therefore, he
"may appeal his case to" the Civil Service Commission. Unless otherwise ordered by the
Commission, the decision to detail an employee shall be executory. Agda invoked the appellate
jurisdiction of the Commission when he filed his Urgent Petition To Stay Implementation and
Nullify the Special Order in question with the Civil Service Commission. 48 It does not,
however, appear to Us that he exerted genuine and sincere efforts to obtain an expeditious
resolution thereof What appears to be clear is that he used its pendency as an excuse for his
refusal to comply with the memorandum of Teotico of 7 January 1988 and the routing slip
request of 11 March 1988 for the key to the safety vault.

Facts: On 2 January 1984, Honorable Cesar Lanuza, then Administrator of the Fiber
Development Authority (FIDA for short), an agency attached to the Department of Agriculture,
appointed Agda as CHIEF FIBER DEVELOPMENT OFFICER

This appointment does not indicate any specific station or place of assignment.
Under Special Order No. 29, series of 1984, dated 2 January 1984, which was to take effect
immediately and to "remain in force until revoked," Administrator Lanuza designated Agda as
"Acting Regional Administrator for FIDA Regions I and II." 4
In Special Order No. 219 dated 13 November 1987, series of 1987, Administrator Lanuza
"temporarily re-assigned" Agda, "in the interest of the service," at the main office of the
Administrator to perform special functions which may be assigned to him, and one Mr. Epitacio
Lanuza, Jr., Assistant Fiber Regional Administrator, was designated Officer in Charge of FIDA
Region I. 5
On 9 December 1987 Agda prepared for filing with the Civil Service Commission, the Secretary
of the Department of Agriculture, and the Commission on Audit an Urgent Petition To Stop
Implementation and Nullify Special Order No. 219, s. '87, alleging therein that the Special Order
is (a) devoid of legal basis as it does not preserve and maintain a status quo before the
controversy, (b) against the interest of public service considering that Epitacio Lanuza has been
cited for two cases both involving dishonesty, abuse of privileges and character unbecoming a
government official, (c) improper, inappropriate and devoid of moral justification, and (d) a
violation of Civil Service rules and regulation considering that it violates the rule on nepotism
since Epitacio Lanuza and Administrator Lanuza are cousins.

On 4 April 1988 Teotico placed Agda under preventive suspension pursuant to his Special Order
No. 74.
It likewise appears that on 13 April 1988 Agda sent a letter to the Commission on
Elections 23 inquiring if Special Order No. 219, series of 1987, of Administrator Lanuza was
referred and submitted to it for approval three days before its implementation. In a letter dated 14
April 1988, Atty. Horacio SJ Apostol, Manager of the Law Department of the Commission,
informed private respondent that "as of this date, records of the Department do not show that
aforesaid Special Order was submitted or referred to this Commission for approval." 24
On 18 April 1988 Agda filed with the court below in Civil Case No. 88-577 his Amended
Petition 25 for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction with preliminary injunction and restraining
order against Teotico and the three (3) members of the FIDA-AC alleging, in substance, that
Special Order No. 219 of 13 November 1987 issued by then Fida Administrator Lanuza is null
and void for having been issued in violation of Section 48 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Decree)
which prohibits the detail or re-assignment of civil service personnel within three months before
an election and Section 261(h) of Batas Pambansa Blg 881 (The Omnibus Election Code)

Issue: Respondent Judge clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of
Civil Case No. 88-577, in deliberately failing to act on the motion to dismiss, in issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction, and in ordering the "reinstatement" of Agda, "as Fiber Regional
Administrator, FIDA Region I, with full back wages and allowances mandated by law."
Doctrine and Held: Agda was not appointed as Fiber Regional Administrator, FIDA Region
I, but as CHIEF FIBER DEVELOPMENT OFFICER; he was not appointed to any specific
station. 42 He was merely designated as Acting Regional Administrator For FIDA Regions I and
II. 43
Not having been appointed to any specific station, he could be tranferred or assigned to any other
place by the head of office where in the opinion of the latter his services may be utilized more
effectively.
In the latest case of Department of Education, Culture and Sports, et al. vs. The Honorable Court
of Appeals, et al., 183 SCRA 555, 562, We held:
The appointment of Navarro as principal does not refer to any particular station or school. As
such, she could be assigned to any station and she is not entitled to stay permanently at any
specific school. (Bongbong vs. Parado, 57 SCRA 623). When she was assigned to the Carlos
Albert High School, it would not have been with the intention to let her stay in said school
permanently. Otherwise, her appointment would have so stated. Consequently, she may be
assigned to any station or school in Quezon City as the exigencies of public service require even
without her consent.
Moreover, it should be borne in mind that Special Order No. 29 of 2 January 1984 merely
designated Agda as Acting Regional Administrator for Regions I and II. Such being the case, the
rule enunciated in Cuadra vs.Cordova etc., 103 Phil. 391, on temporary appointments or
appointments in an acting capacity that they are terminable at the pleasure of the appointing
authority, is applicable to Agda. He can neither claim a vested right to the station to which he
was assigned nor to security of tenure thereat.

The Civil Service Decree, P.D. No. 807, allows transfer, detail and re-assignment. 47 If the
employee concerned believes that there is no justification therefore, he "may appeal his case to"
the Civil Service Commission. Unless otherwise ordered by the Commission, the decision to
detail an employee shall be executory. Agda invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the
Commission when he filed his Urgent Petition To Stay Implementation and Nullify the Special
Order in question with the Civil Service Commission. 48 It does not, however, appear to Us that
he exerted genuine and sincere efforts to obtain an expeditious resolution thereof What appears
to be clear is that he used its pendency as an excuse for his refusal to comply with the
memorandum of Teotico of 7 January 1988 and the routing slip request of 11 March 1988 for the
key to the safety vault.
Furthermore, even in the cases of transfer or detail within the probihited period prior to an
election, an aggrieved party is provided an appropriate administrative remedy. Section 6 of Rule
VI of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies provides:
Sec. 6. Except when the exigencies of the service require, an official or employee of the
government may not be ordered detailed or reassigned during the three-month period before any
local or national election, and if he believes that the order for his detail or reassignment is due to
harassment, coercion, intimidation, or other personal reasons, he may appeal the order to the
Commission. Until this is proven, however, the order is presumed to be in the interest of the
service and notwithstanding the appeal, the decision to detail or reassign him shall be executory,
but the Commission may order deferment of suspension of the detail or reassignment ex parte."
Agda made no attempt to avail of this remedy. In his Urgent Petition to Stay Implementation and
Nullify Special Order No. 219, nothing is mentioned about a violation of the ban on transfer or
detail. The reason seems too obvious. Until he filed the Amended Petition before the court below
he did not consider his re-assignment per Special Order No. 219 as a violation of the ban on
transfer or detail during the three-month period before the election.

Even if the 16 December reinstatement order should be construed to be directed against the
preventive suspension order issued by Teotico on 4 April 1988, respondent Judge clearly
capriciously breached the limits of his discretion for nowhere in his amended petition has Agda
attacked its validity or legality on any other ground than its being issued to implement Special
Order No. 219, 55 which he claims was issued in violation of the pertinent provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code and the Civil Service Decree prohibiting transfer or reassignment of
civil service officials and employees within three months before the local election of January 18,
1988. He assailed the suspension order not on the ground that Teotico does not have the
authority to file the formal charge and to preventively suspend him, but solely on the basis of his
self-serving claim that both were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion because they were meant to implement Special Order No. 219.
Lastly, We hold that both the preliminary injunction and the reinstatement order issued by
respondent Judge practically granted the main relief prayed for by Agda even before the hearing
on the case on the merits. InObias, et al., vs. Hon. Borja, et al., 136 SCRA 687, We ruled that
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction
which in effect practically granted the principal relief sought in the Mandamus case. The reason
for this is that such issuance "would, in effect, be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal
of the rule on the burden of proof since it would assume the proposition which the petitioner is
inceptively bound to prove. 
SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SAMELCO II) v. SELUDO, JR.,
G.R. No. 173840
April 25, 2012

Facts: 
Respondent Seludo is a member of SAMELCO II’s BOD. A board resolution was issued
disallowing respondent from attending meetings of the BOD effective February 2005 until the
end of his term as directed and disqualified him for one term to run as candidate for director in
the upcoming district elections. Respondent then filed an Urgent Petition for Prohibition against
SAMELCO II with the RTC in Calbiga, Samar. RTC granted a TRO in favour of Seludo
effective for 72 hours and later extended for another 17 days. Petitioners then raised an
affirmative defense of lack of lack of jurisdiction of RTC over subject matter, the same being
with the National Electrification Administration (NEA). RTC sustained its jurisdiction over the
matter, motion for reconsideration was denied. CA affirmed the RTC. .
ISSUE:
Does the NEA have primary jurisdiction over the question of the validity of the Board
Resolution issued by SAMELCO II?
RULING:
Yes, pursuant to Subsection (a), Sec. 24, Chapter III of PD 269 as amended by Sec. 7, PD 1645
clearly shows that, pursuant to its power of supervision and control, NEA is granted the authority
to conduct investigations and other similar actions as well as to issue orders, rules and
regulations with respect to all matters affecting electric cooperatives. In addition, while the RTC
has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition, the NEA, in its exercise of its power of
supervision and control, has primary jurisdiction to determine the issue of the validity of the
subject resolution. Petition granted.

SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC. VS. ABAD

G.R. No. 85502, February 24, 1992

FACTS:
The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove
and utilize timber within the concession area in Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years.
Private respondents Gilbolingo and Bugtai filed a petition with the DENR for the cancellation of
the TLA on the ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws
and regulations. The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private
respondents, in a complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner in the Regional
Trial Court of Pagadian City. The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit:
1) the court had no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted
administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibited by section 1 of
PD 605. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The petitioner then elevated the matter to the
respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without exception and pointed to the
several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent court
found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial
intervention.

ISSUE:
What is the correct application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?

HELD:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before
the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine
results in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for
the dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates
as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed
with the case as if the doctrine had been observed.

One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which
enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily
(albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the
administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular
expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their
superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that administrative
decisions are usually questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve
the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their
heavily loaded dockets.

As correctly suggested by he respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when
the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to
immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 2)
when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal;
4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6)
when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; 9) when the subject of the controversy is
private land; and 10) in quo warranto proceedings.