GIOS-SAMAR, INC. v.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS AND CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES
A. While petitioner asserts that the foregoing arguments involve legal (as opposed
to factual) issues, our examination of the petition shows otherwise. As will be
demonstrated shortly, petitioner's arguments against the constitutionality of the
bundling of the Projects are inextricably intertwined with underlying questions
of fact, the determination of which require the reception of evidence. This Court,
however, is not a trier of fact. We cannot resolve these factual issues at the first
instance. For this reason, we DISMISS the petition.
1. Petitioner claims that the bundling of the Projects violates the
constitutional provisions on monopolies and combinations in restraint of
trade under Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution.
 The grant of a concession agreement to an entity, as a winning bidder, for
the exclusive development, operation, and maintenance of any or all of the
Projects, does not by itself create a monopoly violative of the provisions of
the Constitution. Otherwise stated, while the grant may result in a
monopoly, it is a type of monopoly not violative of law. This is the essence
of the policy decision of the Government to enter into concessions with the
private sector to build, maintain and operate what would have otherwise
been government-operated services, such as airports. In any case, the law
itself provides for built-in protections to safeguard the public interest,
foremost of which is to require public bidding.
 In any event, the Constitution provides that the State may, by law, prohibit
or regulate monopolies when the public interest so requires. Petitioner has
failed to point to any provision in the law, which specifically prohibits the
bundling of bids, a detail supplied by the respondent DOTC as
implementing agency for the PPP program for airpm1s.
 Here, petitioner has not alleged ultimate facts to support its claim that
bundling will create a monopoly, in violation of the Constitution. By merely
stating legal conclusions, petitioner did not present any sufficient allegation
upon which the Court could grant the relief petitioner prayed for. In Zuñiga-
-Santos v. Santos-Gran,[44] we held that "[a] pleading should state the
ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as
distinguished from mere conclusions of fact, or conclusions of law. General
allegations that a contract is valid or legal, or is just, fair, and reasonable,
are mere conclusions of law. Likewise, allegations that a contract is void,
voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without
stating facts showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law." [45] The
present action should thus be dismissed on the ground of failure to state
cause of action.
 Even granting that the petition sufficiently pleads a cause of action for the
foregoing violations, there is a need to receive evidence to test the premises
of petitioner's conclusions.
 To illustrate, applying the facts and claims relative to the violation of the
proscription against monopolies, what RA No. 10667, in fact, prohibits and
punishes is the situation where: (1) an entity, having been granted an
exclusive franchise to maintain and operate one or more airports, attains a
dominant position in that market; and (2) abuses such dominant position by
engaging in prohibited conduct, i.e., acts that substantially prevent, restrict
or lessen competition in market of airport development, operations and
maintenance. Thus, for petitioner to succeed in asserting that such a
prohibited situation legally obtains, it must first establish, by evidence, that
indeed: (1) the relevant market is that of airport development, maintenance,
and operation (under the facts-based criteria enumerated in Section 24 of
RA No. 10667); (2) the entity has achieved a dominant position (under the
facts-based criteria enumerated in Section 27 of RA No. 10667) in that
relevant market; and (3) the entity commits acts constituting abuse of
dominant position (under the facts based criteria enumerated in Section 27
of RA No. 10667).
 In addition, to support the legal conclusion that bundling is an anti-
competitive agreement, there must be evidence that: (1) the relevant
market is that of airport development, maintenance, and operation (under
the facts-based criterion enumerated in Section 24 of RA No. 10667); (2)
bundling causes, or will cause, actual or potential adverse impact on the
competition in that relevant market; (3) said impact is substantial and
outweighs the actual or potential efficiency gains that results from bundling;
and (4) the totality of evidence shows that the winning bidder, more likely
than not engaged, in anti-competitive conduct. The Court, however, is still
not a trier of facts. Petitioner should have brought the challenge before a
tribunal, specially equipped to resolve the factual and legal issues presented.
2. We now jointly discuss petitioner's remaining allegations, namely, that
bundling of the Projects: (i) violates the anti-dummy law and the
constitutional provision allegedly giving citizens the opportunity to invest in
public utilities; (ii) is in grave abuse of discretion; and (iii) enables
companies with shaky financial backgrounds to participate in the Projects.
 Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Dummy Law, was enacted to limit the enjoyment of certain economic
activities to Filipino citizens or corporations. Section 2 of such law provides
for the prohibition on the simulation of minimum capital stock.
 For liability for violation of Section 2 to attach, it must first be established
that there is a law limiting or reserving the enjoyment or exercise of a right,
franchise, privilege, or business to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least a certain percentage of which is owned
by such citizens.[50] Moreover, it must be shown by evidence that a
corporation or association falsely simulated the existence of the minimum
required Filipino stock or capital ownership to enjoy or exercise the right,
franchise, privilege, or business.
 In this case, petitioner failed to allege ultimate facts showing how the
bundling of the Projects violated the Anti-Dummy Law. It did not identify
what corporation or association falsely simulated the composition of its
stock ownership. Moreover, it did not allege that there is a law limiting,
reserving, or requiring that infrastructure or development projects must be
awarded only to corporations, a certain percentage of the capital of which is
exclusively owned by Filipinos. Executive Order (EO) No. 65, even
exempts contracts for infrastructure/development projects covered by the
BOT Law from the 40% foreign ownership limitation. For the same reasons
above, petitioner's allegation that bundling violated Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution - which prescribes a 60% Filipino ownership
requirement for franchises, certificate, or for the operation of public utilities
- must be rejected.
 Petitioner's argument that, bundling of the Projects gave shady companies
direct access to the Projects, also raises questions of fact. Foremost,
petitioner does not identify these "shady companies." Even assuming that
petitioner is referring to any or all of the five companies who have been pre-
qualified to bid in the projects, its assertion that these companies
are not financially able to undertake the project raises a question of fact,
financial ability being a pre-qualification requirement. As already stated
earlier, such question is one which this Court is ill-equipped to resolve.
 Finally, the allegation that bundling is in grave abuse of discretion is a
conclusion of law. As shown, no facts were even alleged to show which
specific law was violated by the decision to bundle the Projects.
 In short, these three above arguments of petitioner must be dismissed for
failure to sufficiently plead a cause of action. Even assuming that
petitioner's causes of action were properly alleged, the resolution of said
issues would still require the determination of factual issues which this
Court simply cannot undertake.
 In fine, while this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the
RTC and the CA in the issuance of writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus (extraordinary
writs), direct recourse to this Court is proper only to seek resolution of
questions of law. Save for the single specific instance provided by the
Constitution under Section 18, Article VII, cases the resolution of which
depends on the determination of questions of fact cannot be brought directly
before the Court because we are not a trier of facts. We are not equipped,
either by structure or rule, to receive and evaluate evidence in the first
instance; these are the primary functions of the lower courts or regulatory
agencies. This is the raison d'etre behind the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
It operates as a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable this
Court to focus on the more fundamental tasks assigned to it by the
Constitution. It is a bright-line rule which cannot be brushed aside by an
invocation of the transcendental importance or constitutional dimension of
the issue or cause raised.
B. For a better understanding of our ruling today, we review below, in light of the
Court's fundamental constitutional tasks, the constitutional and statutory
evolution of the Court's original and concurrent jurisdiction, and its interplay
with related doctrines, pronouncements, and even the Court's own rules, as
follows:
a. The Court's original and concurrent jurisdiction;
b. Direct recourse to the Court under the Angara model;
c. The transcendental importance doctrine;
d. The Court is not a trier of facts;
e. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts;
f. The Court's expanded jurisdiction, social rights, and the Court's
constitutional rule-making power under the 1987 Constitution;
g. Exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts: The case of The Diocese
of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections;
h. Hierarchy of courts as a constitutional imperative; and
i. Hierarchy of courts as a filtering mechanism.
I. THE COURT’S ORIGINAL AND CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
II. DIRECT RECOURSE TO THE COURT UNDER THE ANGARA
MODEL
III. THE TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE DOCTRINE
IV. THE COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF FACTS
V. THE DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS
VI. THE COURTS EXPANDED JURISDICTION
VII. EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS
VIII. HIERARCHY OF COURTS AS A CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPERATIVE
IX. HIERARCHY OF COURTS AS A FILTERING MECHANISM
 VIRGINIA JABALDE Y JAMANDRON v PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Procedural aspect.
A. Jabalde posits that in her case, the act of inflicting injuries, however minute
they were, is punishable under the RPC particularly Article 266(1) which
defines slight physical injuries; hence, she should be punished under the
RPC and not under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. The Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) pointed out in its Comment filed on May 24,
2011 that since the issue was just raised for the first time on appeal by
Jabalde, this is already barred by estoppel citing the cases of People v.
Francisco and People v. Lazaro, Jr. The cases cited by the OSG do not
apply in this case. In Francisco, the appellant assailed the order of the trial
court for failing to ascertain the voluntariness of his plea of guilt for the
records show neither proof nor a transcript of the proceedings that the
appellant indeed voluntarily made a guilty plea and that he fully understood
its import. The appellant also maintained that he was not given the
opportunity to present evidence and that the case was submitted for decision
immediately after the prosecution filed its offer of evidence. In Lazaro, the
appellant raised the buy-bust team's alleged non-compliance with Section
21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In both cases, this Court held that issues
raised for the first time on appeal are barred by estoppel.
1. However, the reliance on the foregoing cases is misplaced due to different
factual antecedents. Here, Jabalde postulates that the acts complained of
do not fall within the definition of R.A. No. 7610 and therefore, she should
not be convicted on the basis of the said law.
 Here, Jabalde questions the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 on the factual
circumstances of the case and is correct in claiming that the instant petition
raises pure question of law and not question of fact as being argued by the
OSG. In Cucueco v. CA, the Court discussed the distinction between
questions of law and questions of fact.
- The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact has long
been settled. There is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts, and which does not
call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a "question of fact"
when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the
question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is
a question of law.
- In a case involving a "question of law," the resolution of the issue must
rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. If the query
requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence
or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each
other, the issue in that query is factual.
- The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the
appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather,
it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without
reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of
law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.
 In the case on hand, Jabalde neither questions the veracity or the falsehood
of the alleged facts nor the sufficiency of the evidence, but the appreciation
of R.A. No. 7610 on the factual circumstances of the case. Jabalde is simply
correct in raising the question of law in the instant petition.
Substantive aspect.
A. On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 in the case at bar, the Court
agrees with the contention of Jabalde in her Reply to OSG's Comment that the
acts complained of do not fall within the definition of the said law.
 In the recent case of Bongalon v. People, the Court expounded the
definition of "child abuse" being referred to in R.A. No. 7610. In that case,
therein petitioner was similarly charged, tried, and convicted by the lower
courts with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. The
Court held that only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable
doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be
punished as child abuse, otherwise, it is punished under the RPC, to wit:
- Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA
to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand
and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding that his
acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-quoted
provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that
his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic
worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby
intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the
laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment
and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly
concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had
just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of
his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that
was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
  Jabalde was accused of slapping and striking Lin, hitting the latter on his
nape, and immediately thereafter, choking the said offended party causing
the latter to sustain injuries. However, the records of the case do not show
that Jabalde intended to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of Lin as a human being.
 The laying of the hands on Lin was an offshoot of Jabalde's emotional
outrage after being informed that her daughter's head was punctured, and
whom she thought was already dead. In fact, her vision got blurred and she
fainted. When she returned into consciousness, she sat on her chair in front
of the board for about five to ten minutes. Moreover, the testimony of the
examining physician, Dr. Muñoz, belied the accusation that Jabalde, with
cruelty and with intent, abused, maltreated and injured Lin.
 It would be unforeseeable that Jabalde acted with cruelty when
prosecution's witness herself testified that the abrasions suffered by Lin
were just "mildly inflicted." If Jabalde indeed intended to abuse, maltreat
and injure Lin, she would have easily hurt the 7-year-old boy with heavy
blows.
  The spontaneity of the acts of Jabalde against Lin is just a product of the
instinctive reaction of a mother to rescue her own child from harm and
danger as manifested only by mild abrasions, scratches, or scrapes suffered
by Lin, thus, negating any intention on inflicting physical injuries. Having
lost the strength of her mind, she lacked that specific intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. In fine, the essential
element of intent was not established with the prescribed degree of proof
required for a successful prosecution under Section 10(a), Article VI of
R.A. No. 7610.
B. What crime, then, did Jabalde commit?
Jabalde is liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266(2) of the RPC.
 Although it is found out, as discussed hereinabove, that Jabalde lacked the
intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the
child as a human being as required under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A.
No. 7610, her acts of laying hands against Lin showed the essential element
of intent which is a prerequisite in all crimes punishable under the RPC.
IN RE: CORRECTION/ADJUSTMENT OF PENALTY PURSUANT TO
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10951, IN RELATION TO HERNAN V.
SANDIGANBAYAN – ROLANDO ELBANBUENA Y MARFIL
G.R. No. 237721, July 31, 2018
A. Petitioner Elbanbuena worked as a Disbursing Officer of Alingilan National
High School in Alingilan, Bacolod. He was charged with four counts of
malversation of public funds through falsification of a public document under
Articles 217 and 171 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
After trial, Elbanbuena was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged in the Information. Since Elbanbuena did not appeal the ruling, it
became final and executory on August 10, 2000. On January 9, 2003,
Elbanbuena started serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa
City. On August 29, 2017, RA No. 10951 was promulgated. It amended Act No.
3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code, and reduced the penalties for
certain crimes. Pertinently, Section 40 of RA No. 10951.
1. Recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 x x x which accordingly
reduced the penalty applicable to the crime charged herein is an example
of an exceptional circumstance.
 On December 5, 2017, this Court issued its ruling in Hernan v.
Sandiganbayan.
- The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land. When, however,
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable, the Court may sit  en banc and give
due regard to such exceptional circumstance warranting the relaxation
of the doctrine of immutability. 
- Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, the Court have here a
novel situation wherein the judgment convicting the accused, petitioner
herein, has already become final and executory and yet the penalty
imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage of said law.
- Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may
suffer as well as a possible multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the
Court deems it proper to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of
Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan.
- For as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent legislation shall
find application regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the
time when the judgment of conviction is rendered and even if service of
sentence has already begun. The accused, in these applicable instances,
shall be entitled to the benefits of the new law warranting him to serve
a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has already begun serving his
previous sentence, and said service already accomplishes the term of
the modified sentence. In the latter case, moreover, the Court, in the
 interest of justice and expediency, further directs the appropriate filing
of an action before the Court that seeks the reopening of the case rather
than an original petition filed for a similar purpose.
- Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of
the instant amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and
favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the
reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is
to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties
to be imposed.
 As held by this Court in Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, the passage of RA No.
10951 is an exceptional circumstance which warrants not only the re-
opening of an already terminated case, but also the recall of an Entry of
Judgment for purposes of modifying the penalty to be served. Thus,
in Hernan, this Court re-opened the case for the sole purpose of re-
computing the proper sentence to be imposed in accordance with RA No.
10951. In contrast, petitioner Elbanbuena here seeks not only a modification
of his sentence in accordance with RA No. 10951; he also seeks immediate
release from confinement on account of his alleged full service of the re-
computed sentence. The determination of whether he is entitled to
immediate release, however, would necessarily involve ascertaining, among
others, the actual length of time Elbanbuena has actually been in
confinement and whether time allowance for good conduct should be
allowed. Such an exercise would, at the first instance, be better undertaken
by a trial court, which is relatively more equipped to make findings
of both fact and law.
B. The Court, in the interest of justice and efficiency, resolves to issue the
following guidelines:
I. Scope.
These guidelines shall govern the procedure for actions seeking (1) the modification,
based on the amendments introduced by RA No. 10951, of penalties imposed by
final judgments; and, (2) the immediate release of the petitioner-convict on account
of full service of the penalty/penalties, as modified.
II. Who may file.
The Public Attorney's Office, the concerned inmate, or his/her
counsel/representative, may file the petition.
III. Where to file.
The petition shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising territorial
jurisdiction over the locality where the petitioner-convict is confined. The case shall
be raffled and referred to the branch to which it is assigned within three (3) days
from the filing of the petition.
IV. Pleadings.
(A) Pleadings allowed. - The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the petition
and the comment from the OSG. No motions for extension of time, or other
dilatory motions for postponement, shall be allowed. The petition must
contain a certified true copy of the Decision sought to be modified and,
where applicable, the mittimus and/or a certification from the Bureau of
Corrections as to the length of the sentence already served by petitioner-
convict.
(B) Verification.- The petition must be in writing and verified by the petitioner-
convict himself.
V. Comment by the OSG.
Within ten (10) days from notice, the OSG shall file its comment to the petition.
VI. Effect of failure to file comment.
Should the OSG fail to file the comment within the period provided, the court, motu
proprio, or upon motion of the petitioner-convict, shall render judgment as may be
warranted.
VII. Judgment of the court.
To avoid any prolonged imprisonment, the court shall promulgate judgment no later
than ten (10) calendar days after the lapse of the period to file comment. The
judgment shall set forth the following:
a. The penalty/penalties imposable in accordance with RA No. 10951;
b. Where proper, the length of time the petitioner-convict has been in
confinement (and whether time allowance for good conduct should be
allowed); and
c. Whether the petitioner-convict is entitled to immediate release due to
complete service of his sentence/s, as modified in accordance with RA No.
10951.
The judgment of the court shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to the
filing before the Supreme Court of a special civil action under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court where there is showing of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
VIII. Applicability of the regular rules.
The Rules of Court shall apply to the special cases herein provided in a suppletory
capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent therewith.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v MANALO
G.R. No. 221029 April 24, 2018
A. The Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino
citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the
recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese
court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry "
in order that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said
Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her;
[and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered
and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.
1. Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property
relation, respectively.
 In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the
joint custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US
citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was
only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court
dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others,
that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing
in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the
divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In
ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit but not to
enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
- Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not
because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree
violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his
Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability. Van Dron
v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a
Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we
dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged
post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the
foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this
jurisdiction.
 Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a
complaint was filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his
Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a
conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the same.
- There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in
any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What
he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding
in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.
- It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage.
- To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner
has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject
to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code
cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights
to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
 In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the
Filipino spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines
is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al. and Medina v.
Koike.
 There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings.
When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues
of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in a likewise
acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of
absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual
obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is
severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the
former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
B. The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal
status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the
divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as
she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said
that that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of
the law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The
Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it
fit to lift the same.
1. Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."  both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there
 Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that
there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not
demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the
Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We
put words in the mouth of lawmakers.
 Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be
interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by
the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when
to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the
act. Law have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to
defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes.
 To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it
was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a
corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
 Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such
principle, found under Article 15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and
unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a
testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover,
blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would
cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals
whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to
enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are
constitutional.
 Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same
principle applies with respect to the acts of the President which have the
force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case,
We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential
requisites of the equal protection clause. Particularly, the limitation of the
provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is
unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical
classification.
 A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a
Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and
substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike,
are political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as
varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino
national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More
importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against
another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien
against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the
national law of the foreigner.
 On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who
obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse . In
the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos
who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances
surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both
are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely
on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce
proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor
to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
C. It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26
encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the
indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating
divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.
1. The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
 First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was
sworn to support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the
presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence,
it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome
by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong, that a person
takes ordinary care of his concerns, that acquiescence resulted from a belief
that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, that a man
and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage, and that the law has been obeyed. It is
 whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the
part of a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead
of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into
out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or
profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively
more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are more often the
victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to
prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national.
 The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State. Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce.
 The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
a foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be
read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional
provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the
State is equally mandated to actively promote its total development. It is
also obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. To Our mind, the State cannot
effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien
spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children are almost
always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence.
 A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than
good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign
divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or
her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any
subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be
considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born
out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as
illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences,
not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive
interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of
inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is
meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by
marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in
arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.
 Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the
other remains bound to it.
 Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal
import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of
the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so
long as they come within its spirit or intent.
D. The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by
granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered
by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
1. Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of foreign country.
 Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice. The fact of
divorce must still first be proven. Before a a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
- Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree
purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of foreign country.
- Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the
seal of his office.
 In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
- In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the
1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2)
the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate
General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance
of Certificate of Divorce by the Petitioner and the Japanese national.
Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48
(b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the
subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize
the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.
  If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce
decree is rendered admissible a written act of the foreign court. As it
appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG;
neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity
of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.
2. Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
 The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact
or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material defendants have the
burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters.
 It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x
x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
 Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent
Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to
remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family
relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to
know by reason of their judicial function.
PEOPLE V ADALIA
G.R. No. 235990, January 22, 2020
A. In the main, appellant asserts that there was no direct evidence to prove that the
charge of infanticide against her, hence, she should have been acquitted.
1. The absence alone of direct evidence against an accused does not per
se compel a finding of innocence. Circumstantial evidence may be offered
to take the place of direct evidence, especially in cases involving crimes
which by their nature are usually committed in utmost secrecy.
 People v. Pentecostes decreed that circumstantial evidence is by no means a
"weaker" form of evidence vis-a-vis direct evidence.
- Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not indispensable to
criminal prosecutions; a contrary rule would render convictions
virtually impossible given that most crimes, by their very nature, are
purposely committed in seclusion and away from eyewitnesses. Thus,
our rules on evidence and jurisprudence allow the conviction of an
accused through circumstantial evidence alone, provided that the
following requisites concur:
o there is more than one circumstance;
o the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and
o the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
 Simply put, an accused may be convicted when the circumstances
established form an unbroken chain leading to one fair reasonable
conclusion and pointing to the accused - to the exclusion of all others - as
the guilty person.
 More, it is baffling why appellant vehemently opposed the exhumation of
the child's body when, as she claimed, she was not guilty. If she truly had
nothing to hide, then exhumation of the child and the conduct of DNA
testing would not bother her. In fact, the conduct of DNA testing would
even be beneficial to her plea of not guilty and her persistent denial that she
was the mother of the child found floating on the Arabe creek, in case the
result show that she had no relations with the infant.
 Notably, too, it could not be just a coincidence that after the trial court
ordered for the exhumation of the child, its remains suddenly disappeared
from the grave. One thing for sure, there would be no one more interested in
stealing and hiding the remains of the child other than appellant herself,
who was the one on trial for the death of that child and who would be the
most adversely affected should a DNA be done and its result turn out to be
positive. She would also be the only one to benefit from the loss of the
child's remains from the grave because it meant that DNA test could never
take place ever.
 The chain of events heretofore stated leads to no other conclusion but that
appellant was pregnant and gave birth to a child whom she killed at birth
because she and her mother believed the child belonged to an "evil spirit."
After killing the child, she threw it into the Arabe Creek.
 To emphasize, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were all
unrefuted.
 The prosecution witnesses may not be medical experts, but they saw
appellant's tummy growing big like a pregnant woman. They saw the
inculpatory actuations of appellant and her mother before and after she gave
birth. They, too, heard what appellant and her mother uttered on several
occasions pertaining to her pregnancy, her giving birth to the child, and her
over-all behavior during the period material to this case. From what they
observed and heard from appellant and her mother, these prosecution
witnesses need not be medical experts to get a grasp of what was really
going on with appellant.
 witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial
 Appellant, though, harps on the initial conclusion of Dr. Futalan that she court are given the highest degree of respect. These findings will
was not pregnant. But, this initial conclusion was due to appellant who fed not be ordinarily disturbed by an appellate court absent any clear
misleading information to Dr. Futalan, who, on the basis thereof, was also showing that the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or
misled about appellant's real physical condition. misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance
which could very well affect the outcome of the
 Only when Dr. Futalan physically examined appellant on July 20, 2010 did case. Inconsistencies or contradictions in the testimony of the
the latter admit that her last menstrual period was actually in October 2009. victim do not affect the veracity of the testimony if the
By that time, appellant had more signs of pregnancy and delivery of a inconsistencies do not pertain to material points. 
child, i.e., her breasts were engorged and they excreted milk, her abdomen
had "linea negro" which appears during pregnancy, the appearance of C. Appellant claims, however, that should her conviction be affirmed here, the
appellant's cervix was compatible to three (3) months gestation, her vaginal lesser penalty of prision correccional, not reclusion perpetua, should be imposed
wall was very lax, and there was a discharge of foul-smelling blood. This on her. She asserts that as the prosecution itself had purportedly narrated, she
time, Dr. Futalan('s) concluded that appellant had delivered a baby two (2) committed the crime only because she wanted to conceal her dishonor.
to three (3) days prior.
1. The argument utterly lacks merit.
B. Appellant speculates that the prosecution failed to prove that the child was born
alive. According to her, the child could have been born dead.   There is absolutely no evidence on record showing that appellant killed her
child supposedly to conceal her dishonor for being an unwed mother or a
1. This is a negative pregnant. Appellant is denying and admitting a fact at the woman who bore a child although she did not have a boyfriend. This
same time. If this is not an admission of guilt, what is? alleged circumstance, not being found on the record cannot be used to
benefit appellant by reducing the imposable penalty from reclusion
- At any rate, two (2) of appellant's neighbors heard a baby crying from the perpetua to prision correccional.
shanty of appellant's family. Ranie Japon even saw appellant and her
mother inside said shanty with bloodied rags around them. Again, appellant
did not present any countervailing proof that the baby was still born. Sans GUERRERO v COURT OF APPEALS
any evidence to the contrary, the trial court aptly found the testimonies of G.R. No. 107211 June 28, 1996
the prosecution witnesses credible. It is settled that the trial court's factual
findings, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are entitled to
great respect and generally should not be disturbed on appeal unless certain
substantial facts were overlooked which, if considered, may affect the
outcome of the case. People v. Collamat, et al:
- In cases where the issue rests on the credibility of witnesses, as in
this case, it is important to emphasize the well-settled rule that
"appellate courts accord the highest respect to the assessment made
by the trial court because of the trial judge's unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor,
conduct and attitude under grueling examination."

 We explained in Reyes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals that the findings of the trial

court will not be overturned absent any clear showing that it
had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances
of weight or substance that could have altered the outcome of the case, viz.:
- Also, the issue hinges on credibility of witnesses. We have
consistently adhered to the rule that where the culpability or
innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue of credibility of