De Leon v.

Esguerra | 153 SCRA 602

FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected as the Barangay Captain of Brgy. Dolores, in Taytay
Rizal as well as the other petitioners in the case into their respective positions during the 1982 Barangay
Elections. On February 1987, OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra, by the authority of the Minister of Local
Government, issued a memorandum antedated to December of 1986 and designated Florentino Magno,
among others as the new officials to replace the petitioners in their respective positions.
Due to the said issuance, petitioners prayed the said memoranda to be declared null and void and
to prohibit the respondents to take over their positions in the Barangay. They maintain that pursuant to
Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982, their terms of office shall be six years commencing on
June 7, 1982 until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified, or up to June 7, 1988 and
that since the 1987 Constitution has already been ratified, the OIC Governor no longer has the authority to
replace them and to designate their successors.
The respondents on the other hand, contends that under Sec. 2, Article III of the Provisional
Constitution, that all elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall
continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year
from February 25, 1986. They maintain that terms of office of the petitioners were abolished and that they
only remained in their position because of the said provision and not because their six-year term has not
yet expired. Further they aver that the provision fixing the term of the barangay officials under the Barangay
Election Act must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the stated provision of the
Provisional Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court stated that while the antedated memorandum of February 8, 1987 is still
ostensibly within the one-year deadline stated under Sec. 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, the
same must have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading:
“This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.”
Being ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987, it effectively supersedes the Provisional
Constitution, rendering it to be inoperative and the OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article
III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Furthermore, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political
subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, and limits the President's power to "general supervision"
over local governments. Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in
part:
“The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years ...” Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law,
therefore, the term of office of six years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 5 should still
govern.
Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six years for elective
Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still
operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading:
“All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions, and other
executive issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed
or revoked.”

Act of Ratification (as discussed in Tehankee’s concurrent opinion)

The record of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully supports the
Court's judgment. It shows that the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Conunission
in unanimously approving (by thirty-five votes in favor and none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of
Transitory Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution was that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the
people. So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the
mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the
President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino
people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite."
Angara v. Electoral Commission | 63 Phil.139

FACTS:
During the September 1935 National Assembly Election for the First District of Tayabas, the
petitioner Jose A. Angara as well as the respondents, Pedro Ynsua among others were the candidates for
the members of the national Assembly. The provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as the
member-elect for having the greatest number of votes. On December 3, 1935 the National Assembly during
its session passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of those members against whom, no protest
has been filed. However, on December 8, 1935, Ynsua filed a Motion for Protest against the election of
Angara and praying that the former be declared as the elected member instead. On December 9, 1935 the
Electoral Commission, adopted a resolution that it will not consider any further protest after the said date.
Due to this, Angara filed for a Motion to Dismiss the protest of Ynsua however, the same was dismissed by
the Electoral Commission. This led Angara to file for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and
prohibit the Electoral Commission from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Ynsua.
For the part of Angara, he contends that the Constitution only confers to the Electoral Commission
solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National assembly and which does not include
the power to regulate the proceedings of said election contests which power has been reserved to the
Legislative Department of the Government or the National Assembly and further maintains that the
Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is valid and should be respected.
In behalf of the Electoral Commission, The Solicitor General filed its defense and Ynsua for himself.
They aver that that fixing the deadline for the submission of electoral protests is well within the jurisdiction
of the Electoral Commission and that the Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly could not and did not
deprive the Electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within the
time that might be set by its own rules. Furthermore, they state that the Electoral Commission is not an
inferior court and is an individual entity created by the Constitution, its decision in dismissing Angara’s
motion to dismiss the electoral protest is not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy.
2. Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction by taking
cognizance of the electoral protest against the petitioner, despite the confirmation of election National
Assembly?

RULING:
1. Yes. In the first issue regarding jurisdiction, the Supreme court stated that The Constitution itself
has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims
of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is Known as the judicial Supremacy or the power to
review under the constitution. The present controversy necessitates a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Upon principle, reason
and authority, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the present controversy for the purpose of deter mining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

2. The Electoral Commission ACTED WITHIN its Jurisdiction. The Electoral Commission is a
constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited
and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although not a power in the tripartite scheme of
government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent
organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as
if it had remained originally in the Legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as
effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in
character to limit the time within which protests entrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled
rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of
any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper
exercise of its exclusive powers to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also
in the Electoral Commission.
Bacani v. NACOCO | 100 PHIL 468

FACTS:
During the pendency of the civil case entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation,
the counsel for the defendant requested from the herein petiitoners who are the court stenographers of
Branch VI CFI of Manila, for the copy of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. The
plaiintiffs complied to the request and delivered the transcript thereof to the counsel and charged the
defendant at one peso per page for 714 pages. The defendants counsel complied and paid the same to
the two plaintiffs. Upon the inspection of the books of the defendant corporation, the Auditor General,
disallowed the payment for the plaintiffs and demanded the recovery of the same with the help of a DOJ
Circular wherein an opinion was stated that the National Coconut Corporation, , being a government entity,
was exempt from the payment of the said fees. With this, the Auditor General instructed the cashier of the
DOJ to deduct the same from the salary of the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs filed for an action before the CFI of Manila to prevent the deduction of the fees from
their salary and to secure a judicial ruling that NACOCO Is not a government entity within the purview of
Sec. 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. NACOCO on the other hand maintains that they are considered
as a government entity within the purview of Sec. 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 and is
exempted from paying the stenographer’s fees. After the trial, the CFI of Manila ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs
that NACOCO is not considered as a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court; that the payment for the copies of the stenographic notes were valid; and that the plaintiffs
are not obligated to refund the payment they already received. Due to this, NACOCO filed for an appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not National Coconut Corporation may be considered as included in the term
“Government of the Republic of the Philippines” for the purposes of the exemption of the legal fees provided
for in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court in its ruling stated that the National Coconut Corporation does not form
part of the Government of the Philippines for the reason that they do not come under the classification of
municipal or public corporation. NACOCO, while organized with the purpose of “adjusting the coconut
industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for
the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products”, a function which our
government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate
power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our
Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned. It
may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense, it is an entity
different from our government. As this Court has aptly said, “The mere fact that the Government happens
to be a majority stockholder does not make it a public corporation”. “By becoming a stockholder in the
National Coal Company, the Government divested itself of its sovereign character so far as respects the
transactions of the corporation. Unlike the Government, the corporation may be sued without its consent,
and is subject to taxation. Yet the National Coal Company remains an agency or instrumentality of
government.”
The term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” used in section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through which the functions of the government
are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political
authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local government. These
are what we call municipal corporations. They do not include government entities which are given a
corporate personality separate and distinct from the government and which are governed by the
Corporation Law. Their powers, duties and liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law and of
their corporate charters. They do not therefore come within the exemption clause prescribed in section 16,
Rule 130 of our Rules of Court.
PVTA v. CIR | 65 SCRA 416

FACTS:
In December 1996, private respondents filed a petition before the CIR seeking relief for their
overtime services, and the compensation for the same in accordance with C.A. No. 444, praying for the
differential between the amount actually paid to them and the amount allegedly due them. PVTA in turn,
denied these allegations for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. After their presentation of
evidences, the presiding judge of the respondent court rendered its decision sustained the claims of the
private respondents for their overtime services and ordered PVTA to pay the same, minus what they have
already paid to the respondents. PVTA then filed for a motion for consideration but the same was denied
en banc. Hence this Petition for Certiorari.
PVTA hinges its defense on the proposition that the CIR did not have jurisdiction as it was is
exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, discharges governmental and not
proprietary functions

RULING:
It was exercising government functions. The Supreme Court revisited first the reason why PVTA
was created and the laws that conferred its existence. Undser R.A. 2265 its purposes and objectives were
set forth where it was to promote economic security and stabilize cost and profit for local and foreign
markets among other reasons. Under its amendatory statute, R.A. 4155 in its declaration of policy that it is
declared as national policy, with respect to the local Virginia tobacco industry, to encourage the production
of local Virginia tobacco of the qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and foreign
markets, to establish this industry on an efficient and economic basis, and, to create a climate conducive
to local cigarette manufacture of the qualities desired by the consuming public, blending imported and native
Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes.
It is thus readily apparent from a cursory perusal of such statutory provisions why petitioner can
rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading case of Agricultural Credit and Cooperative
Financing Administration decision and why the objection of private respondents with its overtones of the
distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. National
Coconut Corporation is futile.
Then Chief Justice stated in the leading Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Administration decision that the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the
government are becoming obsolete. That the growing complexities of modern society, however, have
rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete.
The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called
upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than
is any private individual or group of individuals", continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be
absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
increasing social challenges of the times
Govt. of the Phil. Islands v. Monte de Piedad | 35 PHIL. 728

FACTS:
About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the
inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions of the relief of those damaged by the earthquake, which took place
in the Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863. Subsequent thereto a central relief board was appointed to
distribute the moneys thus voluntarily contributed and allotted $365,703.50 to the various sufferers named
in its resolution. By order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, a list of these allotments,
together with the names of those entitled thereto, was published in the Official Gazette of Manila. These
were later distributed up to the sum of $30,299.65, leaving a balance of $365,403.85.
Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad, the Philippine Government, by
order, directed its treasurer to turn over to the former the sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in installments
of $20,000 each and were received on the following dates: February 15, March 12, April 14, and June 2,
1883, and are still in the possession of the Monte de Piedad. On account of various petitions of the persons,
and heirs of others to whom the abovementioned allotments were made, the Philippine Islands filed a suit
against the Monte de Piedad a recover, “through the Attorney-General and in representation of the
Government of the Philippine Islands,” the $80.000, together with interest. After due trial, judgment was
entered in favor of the plaintiff.
Monte de Piedad appealed and made the following contentions: that the $80,000, given to the
Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros, were so given as a donation, and that said donation had been cleared;
that the Government of the Philippine Islands has not subrogated the Spanish Government in its rights, as
regards an important sum of money abovementioned; that the only persons who could claim to be damaged
by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors, thus, the plaintiff is not the proper party to
bring the action; that the court erred in holding in its decision that there is no title for the prescription of this
suit brought by the Insular Government against the defendant appellant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Govt. of the Philippine Islands has the personality to institute the suit under the
doctrine of parens patriae.

RULING:
Yes. The court in cited several cases like the Mormon Charch vs. United States that the Revolution
devolved on the State all the transcendent power of Parliament, and the prerogative of the crown, and gave
their Acts the same force and effect. In Fontain vs. Ravenel, the court held that he prerogatives of the crown
devolved upon the people of the States. And this power still remains with them except so fact as they have
delegated a portion of it to the Federal Government. The sovereign will is made known to us by legislative
enactment. The State as a sovereign, is the parens patriae. Quoting the statement of Chancellor Kent:
“In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to
enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public
interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.”
As well as citing Mormon Church vs. United States, supra:
“This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that
power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which
are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction
of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be exercised in
the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.”
The earthquake fund was the result or the accumulation of a great number of small contributions.
The names of the contributors do not appear in the record. Their whereabouts are unknown. They parted
with the title to their respective contributions. The beneficiaries, consisting of the original sufferers and their
heirs, could have been ascertained. They are quite numerous also. And no doubt a large number of the
original sufferers have died, leaving various heirs. It would be impracticable for them to institute an action
or actions either individually or collectively to recover the $80,000. The only course that can be satisfactorily
pursued is for the Government to again assume control of the fund and devote it to the object for which it
was originally destined.
The impracticability of pursuing a different course, however, is not the true ground upon which the
right of the Government to maintain the action rests. The true ground is that the money being given to a
charity became, in a measure, public property, only applicable, it is true, to the specific purposes to which
it was intended to be devoted, but within those limits consecrated to the public use, and became part of the
public resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the Philippine Government. (Mormon Church
vs. U. S., supra.) To deny the Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public
policy, as tending to discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of humanity and Christian benevolence
in like instances in the future.
Abra Valley College v. Aquino | 162 SCRA 106

FACTS:
The case involves Abra Valley College, a school is recognized by the government and is offering
Primary, High School and College Courses, duly incorporated with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It filed a complaint before the CFI of Abra to annul and declare void the “Notice of Seizure”
and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate
taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. The “Notice of Sale” was caused to be served upon the
petitioner by the respondent treasurers for the sale at public auction of said college lot and building. Upon
the public auction, the municipal mayor had the highest bid at P6,000.00 and a certificate of sale was
correspondingly issued to him.
Judge, Hon. Juan P. Aquino of the CFI of Abra, Branch I, ordered the respondents provincial and
municipal treasurers to deliver to the Clerk of Court the proceeds of the auction sale. Hence, Director of
Abra Valley College deposited P6,000.00 before the trial court as bond. After the parties entered into a
stipulation of facts, the court found out that the the high school and college students are housed in the main
building, the Director with his family is in the second floor of the main building; and that the annual gross
income of the school reaches more than one hundred thousand pesos.
The Provincial Fiscal and his assistant on their Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum
stated that based on evidence laws applicable, court decisions and jurisprudence, the school building and
school lot used for educational purposes of the Abra Valley College, Inc., are exempted from the payment
of taxes. However, the trial court did not agree due to the fact that the second floor was used by the director
and his family as residence and thus ruled for the government. Hence, the petitioner filed for a petition for
certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra,

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lot and building of Abra Valley College are used exclusively for educational
purposes in order to be exempted from taxation.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court cited the case of Herrera vs. Quezon City Board of Assessment Appeals
where the phrase “exclusively used for educational purposes” was clarified. To wit:
““Moreover, the exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or educational
purposes is ‘not limited to property actually indispensable’ therefor, but extends to facilities which are
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes, such as in the case of
hospitals, ‘a school for training nurses, a nurses’ home, property use to provide housing facilities for interns,
resident doctors, superintendents, and other members of the hospital staff, and recreational facilities for
student nurses, interns, and residents’ (84 CJS 6621), such as ‘athletic fields’ including ‘a firm used for the
inmates of the institution.”
The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the
Constitution. It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive
interpretation of the phrase “exclusively used for educational purposes” as provided for in Article VI, Section
22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption
extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main
purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither
contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the second floor of the main building in
the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and his family, may find justification under the
concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or primary purpose—educational, the lease
of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
considered incidental to the purpose of education.
The decision of CFI Abra is Affirmed with the modification that half of the assessed tax be returned
to the petitioner.