Systems Research and Behavioral Science
Syst. Res. 17, 311–313 (2000)
& Notes and Insights
The Whole and Main Ideas
of Systems Science
Joseph Germana*
Department of Psychology, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, USA
INTRODUCTION
According to systems science, is the science
of systems itself a system? The modest intent of
this brief essay in posing such a philosophical
question is to suggest that classical systems
science may exemplify some of its own, most
fundamental principles.
COMING TO TERMS
The term whole idea, as used here, refers to the
plan or rationale of something, i.e., `the funda-
mental reasons, or rational basis of something'.
Thus, the whole idea of systems science refers to its
active or organizing principle (`method of . . .
operation', Webster). The term is not intended to
convey the entirely comprehensive set of prin-
ciples that guide and inform systems science. The
term whole idea may be taken as roughly
synonymous with the colloquial term big idea,
while playfully alluding to the main idea of
systems science Ð the idea of `ordered whole-
ness'.
The term main idea, as used here, refers to a set
of core constructs or fundamental postulates,
which in the case of systems science essentially
includes a `complete organization of parts, a
unity, entirety, or system' (Webster), i.e., `ordered
wholeness' or `organized complexity'. In other
words, the main idea of systems science is the
* Correspondence to: Joseph Germana, Department of Psychology,
Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0436, USA.
Copyright # 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
principle of organization (one of its `fundamental
truths, laws, doctrines . . . upon which others are
based', Webster).
It would seem that the whole idea of systems
science self-replicates its main idea of `ordered
wholeness' Ð that its organizing principle and
principle of organization share a homological
relationship.
THE WHOLE IDEA OF SYSTEMS SCIENCE
The whole idea of systems science appears in
Miller's (1965) proposal to use `intersystem
generalization' as the basis for an `abstracted
science' of living systems, and, in von Bertalanf-
fy's stated aim to develop `unifying principles
running ``vertically'' through the universe of the
individual sciences' (von Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 38).
In relation to the individual or special sciences,
general systems science has advanced to a higher
level of scientific generalization or abstraction.
This relationship between systems science and
the special sciences Ð and the goal of systems
science to establish integrative super-order Ð
are conveyed well in a diagram from Laszlo
(1972) (Figure 1). Here is graphically depicted the
attempt by systems science to further generalize
the generalizations of the special sciences Ð the
induction of `second-order models' from `first-
order models', so as to represent what all systems
have in common. `If an object is a system, it
must have certain general system characteristics,
irrespective of what it is otherwise' (von Berta-
lanffy, 1968, p. 65).
Received 22 December 1997
Accepted 28 October 1998
NOTES AND INSIGHTS
Figure 1. The scientific progression from the first-order
models of the special sciences to the second-order models of
general systems science. Reprinted from Ervin Laszlo,In-
troduction to a Systems Philosophy, 1972, Figure 1,
copyright OPA (Overseas Publishers Association) N.V.,
Lausanne, Switzerland, with permission
The characteristic organization of systems
science is reflected, first, in its development of
new or broadened theoretical constructs such as
`system', `hierarchical organization', `equifinality'
(von Bertalanffy, 1968); `adaptive self-
stabilization' and `self-organization' (Laszlo,
1972); and the variety of subsystems which
process matter±energy and/or information, as
specified by Miller (1965, 1978) and, more
recently, by Miller and Miller (1993a, 1993b).
Of course, as Miller has acknowledged, the
concepts of systems science may be inspired by
those of other sciences, such as `thermo-
dynamics, information theory, cybernetics, and
systems engineering, as well as the classical
concepts appropriate to each level' (Miller,
1965, p. 234).
Furthermore, when the methodological pro-
cedures used by systems science are included,
such as the use of logical homologies and
explanations (von Bertalanffy, 1968) to generalize
across individual systems, types of systems,
system levels (Miller, 1965) Ð forming inter-
actions with the special sciences in both inductive
and deductive exchanges Ð it becomes apparent
that systems science constitutes a whole scientific
paradigm (Kuhn, 1970).
Thus, the whole idea of systems science is to
develop a scientific paradigm, superordinate to
Copyright *
c 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
312
Syst. Res.
the special sciences, which may bring their first-
order models into a higher-order synthesis. The
integrative super-order provided by systems
science would appear in the form of its abstract
representations of what all systems have in
common.
THE MAIN IDEA OF SYSTEMS SCIENCE
This whole idea of systems science is found
replicated in its main idea of `system' as some-
thing `other than the simple sum of its parts'
(Laszlo, 1972) and, pari passu, something `greater
than the sum of its parts' (Miller and Miller,
1993a, 1993b).
A system is a `set of elements standing in
interaction' (von Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 38), such
that the `constitutive characteristics (of the
system) are not explainable from the character-
istics of isolated parts. The characteristics of the
complex, therefore, compared to those of those of
the elements, appear as ``new'' or ``emergent'' '
(von Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 55). That is, the
characteristic organization of a system Ð that
which makes it `this particular case of that kind
of a system' Ð is given in the overall patterns or
whole interrelationships which emerge from the
ongoing interactions among its interdependent
parts (cf. Germana, 1989).
Furthermore, if the parts or elements of a
system are themselves taken as systems Ð there-
fore, subsystems Ð then the whole system
in question appears `greater than' as well as
`other than' the simple sum of its parts. Insofar
as the organized complexity or system incorpor-
ates its parts into a new or different, emergent
whole, it represents a superordinate level of
integration.
QUESTIONS
May the first-order models of the special
sciences be taken as elements (albeit, representa-
tional constituents) of general systems science?
Conversely, may the second-order models,
formed through the further generalization of
the special-scientific generalizations, be taken as
Syst. Res. 17, 311–313 (2000)
Joseph Germana
Syst. Res.
a superordinate level of (representational) integ-
ration which `incorporates' these `elements'?
The critical issue involved in these philo-
sophical questions seems to be whether the idea
of hierarchical or holarchical organization, as
applied to natural systems studied by the
empirical sciences, applies in the same essential
ways to conceptual or representational systems.
Are more general or abstract ideas superordinate
to more particular or concrete ones in the same
ways that cells stand superordinate to molecules
and atoms?
Ultimately, these questions may be without
resolution and serve only to arouse a reflexive
consciousness in systems scientists concerning
the ways in which our science may exemplify its
own principles.
Copyright *
c 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
The Whole and Main Ideas of Systems Science
NOTES AND INSIGHTS
REFERENCES
Germana, J. (1989). The biological significance of
behavioral learning from a systems view. Behavioral
Science 34, 228±237.
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Laszlo, E. (1972). Introduction to a Systems Philosophy,
Gordon and Breach, Lucerne.
Miller, J. G. (1965). Living systems: basic concepts.
Behavioral Science 10, 193±237.
Miller, J. G. (1978). Living Systems, McGraw-Hill,
New York.
Miller, J. L., and Miller, J. G. (1993a). Greater than
the sum of its parts. I. Matter±energy processing
subsystems. Behavioral Science 38, 1±72.
Miller, J. L., and Miller, J. G. (1993b). Greater than
the sum of its parts. II. Matter±energy processing
subsystems. Behavioral Science 38, 151±188.
von Bertalanffy, L. (1968). General System Theory,
George Braziller, New York.
Syst. Res. 17, 311–313 (2000)
313