1|Page

3.4 Constitutionalism

 Sigre v. CA, GR 109568. Aug. 8, 2002, 387 SCRA 15

G.R. No. 109568           August 8, 2002

ROLANDO SIGRE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA Y. GONZALES, as co-administratrix of the Estate
of Matias Yusay, respondents.

x----------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 113454           August 8, 2002

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA Y. GONZALES, as co-administratrix of the Estate
of Matias Yusay, respondents.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

In a not-so-novel attempt to challenge the long-settled constitutionality of Presidential

Decree No. 27, private respondent Lilia Y. Gonzales, as co-administratrix of the Estate
of Matias Yusay, filed with the Court of Appeals on September 15, 1992, a petition for
prohibition and mandamus docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28906, seeking to prohibit the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) from accepting the leasehold rentals from Ernesto
Sigre (predecessor of petitioner Rolando Sigre), and for LBP to turn over to private
respondent the rentals previously remitted to it by Sigre. It appears that Ernesto Sigre
was private respondent's tenant in an irrigated rice land located in Barangay Naga,
Pototan, Iloilo. He was previously paying private respondent a lease rental of sixteen
(16) cavans per crop or thirty-two (32) cavans per agricultural year. In the agricultural
year of 1991-1992, Sigre stopped paying his rentals to private respondent and instead,
remitted it to the LBP pursuant to the Department of Agrarian Reform's Memorandum
Circular No. 6, Series of 1978, which set the guidelines in the payment of lease
rental/partial payment by farmer-beneficiaries under the land transfer program of P.D.
No. 27. The pertinent provision of the DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6 reads:

"A. Where the value of the land has already been established.1âwphi1.nêt

"The value of the land is established on the date the Secretary or his authorized
representative has finally approved the average gross production data
established by the BCLP or upon the signing of the LTPA by landowners and
tenant farmers concerned heretofore authorized.

"Payment of lease rentals to landowners covered by OLT shall terminate on the

date the value of the land is established. Thereafter, the tenant-farmers shall pay
their lease rentals/amortizations to the LBP or its authorized agents: provided
that in case where the value of the land is established during the month the crop
is to be harvested, the cut-off period shall take effect on the next harvest
season. With respect to cases where lease rentals paid may exceed the value of
the land, the tenant-farmers may no longer be bound to pay such rental, but it
shall be his duty to notify the landowner and the DAR Team Leader concerned of
such fact who shall ascertain immediately the veracity of the information and
thereafter resolve the matter expeditiously as possible. If the landowner shall
insist after positive ascertainment that the tenant-farmer is to pay rentals to him,
the amount equivalent to the rental insisted to be paid shall de deposited by the
tenant-farmer with the LBP or its authorized agent in his name and for his
account to be withdrawn only upon proper written authorization of the DAR
2|Page

District Officer based on the result of ascertainment or investigation."1 (Emphasis

ours)

According to private respondent, she had no notice that the DAR had already fixed the
3-year production prior to October 1972 at an average of 119.32 cavans per
hectare,2 and the value of the land was pegged at Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred
Five Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos (P13,405.67).3 Thus, the petition filed before the
Court of Appeals, assailing, not only the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6, but also
the constitutionality of P.D. 27.

The appellate court, in its decision dated March 22, 1993, gave due course to the
petition and declared Memorandum Circular No. 6 null and void.4 The LBP was directed
to return to private respondent the lease rentals paid by Sigre, while Sigre was directed
to pay the rentals directly to private respondent.5 In declaring Memorandum Circular No.
6 as null and void, the appellate court ruled that there is nothing in P.D. 27 which
sanctions the contested provision of the circular;6 that said circular is in conflict with P.D.
816 which provides that payments of lease rentals shall be made to the landowner, and
the latter, being a statute, must prevail over the circular;7 that P.D. 27 is unconstitutional
in laying down the formula for determining the cost of the land as it sets limitations on
the judicial prerogative of determining just compensation;8 and that it is no longer
applicable, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657.9

Hence, this present recourse, which is a consolidation of the separate petitions for
review filed by Rolando Sigre (who substituted his predecessor Ernesto Sigre),
docketed as G.R. No. 109568 and the LBP, docketed as G.R. No. 113454.

Petitioner Sigre, in G.R. No. 109568, alleges that:

"I

"PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT DAR MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 6,
SERIES OF 1978 RUNS COUNTER TO PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 816.

"II

"PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN RULING THAT DAR MEMORANDUM

CIRCULAR NO. 6, SERIES OF 1978 AMENDS OR EXPANDS PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 27.

"III

"PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN RULING THAT PROVISION OF

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27 ON THE FORMULA FOR DETERMINING
THE COST OF THE LAND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

"IV

"PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROVISION OF

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27 ON FIXING THE JUST COMPENSATION OF
THE LAND HAS BEEN REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657."10

Petitioner LBP, in G.R.No. 113454, claims that:

"A

"THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT MAR

CIRCULAR NO. 6 IS A VALID PIECE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND
REGULATION COVERING A SUBJECT GERMANE TO THE OBJECTS AND
PURPOSES OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27, CONFORMING TO THE
STANDARDS OF SAID LAW AND RELATING SOLELY TO CARRYING INTO
EFFECT THE GENERAL PROVISIONS OF SAID LAW.
3|Page

"B

"THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT MAR

CIRCULAR NO. 6 IS INVALID IN THAT IT SUFFERS 'IRRECONCILABLE
CONFLICT' WITH PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 816, THUS GROSSLY
DISREGARDING THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
THAT THERE IS NO 'INCONSISTENCY OR INCOMPATIBILITY' BETWEEN
MAR CIRCULAR NO. 6 AND P.D. 816.

"C

"THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT P.D. 27,

INSOFAR AS IT SETS FORT (sic) THE FORMULA FOR DETERMINING THE
VALUE OF THE RICE/CORN LAND, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, THUS
GROSSLY DISREGARDING THE EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE THAT
CONSISTENTLY RULED THAT P.D. 27 IS SUSTAINED AGAINST ALL
CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS RAISED AGAINST IT.

"D

"THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT P.D. 27 HAS

BEEN IMPLIEDLY REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657."11

Presidential Decree No. 27,12 issued on October 21, 1972 by then Pres. Ferdinand E.
Marcos, proclaimed the entire country as a "land reform area" and decreed the
emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, transferring to them the
ownership of the land they till. To achieve its purpose, the decree laid down a system
for the purchase by tenant-farmers, long recognized as the backbone of the economy,
of the lands they were tilling. Owners of rice and corn lands that exceeded the minimum
retention area were bound to sell their lands to qualified farmers at liberal terms and
subject to conditions.13 It was pursuant to said decree that the DAR issued
Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of 1978.

The Court of Appeals held that P.D. No. 27 does not sanction said Circular, particularly,
the provision stating that payment of lease rentals to landowners shall terminate on the
date the value of the land is established, after which the tenant-farmer shall pay their
lease rentals/amortizations to the LBP or its authorized agents.

We disagree. The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative bodies to

implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details. All that is
required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards
prescribed by the law.14 One such administrative regulation is DAR Memorandum
Circular No. 6. As emphasized in De Chavez v. Zobel,15 emancipation is the goal of P.D.
27., i.e., freedom from the bondage of the soil by transferring to the tenant-farmers the
ownership of the land they're tilling. As noted, however, in the whereas clauses of the
Circular, problems have been encountered in the expeditious implementation of the land
reform program, thus necessitating its promulgation, viz.:

"1. Continued payment of lease rentals directly to landowners by tenant-farmers

may result to situations wherein payments made may even exceed the actual
value of the land. x x x

"2. There is difficulty in recording lease rental payments made by tenant-farmers

to landowners specifically in cases where landowners concerned refuse to issue
acknowledgment/official receipts for payments made;

"3. Payments made by tenant-farmers to landowners after the establishment of

Farmer Amortization Schedule (FAS) through the National Computer Center
were found to be ineffectively captured or accounted for. x x x
4|Page

"4. The prolonged disagreement between parties concerned on the total

payments made by the tenant-farmers has delayed program implementations."

The rationale for the Circular was, in fact, explicitly recognized by the appellate court
when it stated that "(T)he main purpose of the circular is to make certain that the lease
rental payments of the tenant-farmer are applied to his amortizations on the purchase
price of the land. x x x The circular was meant to remedy the situation where the tenant-
farmer's lease rentals to landowner were not credited in his favor against the
determined purchase price of the land, thus making him a perpetual obligor for said
purchase price."16 Since the assailed Circular essentially sought to accomplish the noble
purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid.17 Such being the case, it has the force of law
and is entitled to great respect.18

The Court cannot see any "irreconcilable conflict" between P.D. No. 81619 and DAR
Memorandum Circular No. 6. Enacted in 1975, P.D. No. 816 provides that the tenant-
farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease rentals to the landowner until the value of the
property has been determined or agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR. On the
other hand, DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6, implemented in 1978, mandates that the
tenant-farmer shall pay to LBP the lease rental after the value of the land has been
determined.

In Curso v. Court of Appeals,20 involving the same Circular and P.D. 816, it was
categorically ruled that there is no incompatibility between these two. Thus:

"Actually, we find no inconsistency nor incompatibility between them. Of

significance are the two "whereas clauses of P.D. 816 quoted hereunder:

xxx

Clearly, under P.D. No. 816, rentals are to be paid to the landowner by the
agricultural lessee until and after the valuation of the property shall have been
determined.

In the same vein, the MAR Circular provides:

xxx

In other words, the MAR Circular merely provides guidelines in the payment of
lease rentals/amortizations in implementation of P.D. 816. Under both P.D. 816
and the MAR Circular, payment of lease rentals shall terminate on the date the
value of the land is established. Thereafter, the tenant farmers shall pay
amortizations to the Land Bank (LBP). The rentals previously paid are to be
credited as partial payment of the land transferred to tenant-farmers."21

Private respondent, however, "splits hairs," so to speak, and contends that

the Curso case is premised on the assumption that the Circular implements P.D. 816,
whereas it is expressly stated in the Circular that it was issued in implementation of P.D.
27.22 Both Memorandum Circular No. 6 and P.D. 816 were issued pursuant to and in
implementation of P.D. 27. These must not be read in isolation, but rather, in
conjunction with each other. Under P.D. 816, rental payments shall be made to the
landowner. After the value of the land has been determined/established, then the
tenant-farmers shall pay their amortizations to the LBP, as provided in DAR Circular No.
6.23 Clearly, there is no inconsistency between them. Au contraire, P.D. 816 and DAR
Circular No. 6 supplement each other insofar as it sets the guidelines for the payments
of lease rentals on the agricultural property.

Further, that P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity is a judicial fact that has
been repeatedly emphasized by this Court in a number of cases. As early as 1974, in
the aforecited case of De Chavez v. Zobel,24 P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional,
and upheld as part and parcel of the law of the land, viz.:
5|Page

"There is no doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is
emancipation. What is more, the decree is now part and parcel of the law of the
land according to the revised Constitution itself. Ejectment therefore of petitioners
is simply out of the question. That would be to set at naught an express mandate
of the Constitution. Once it has spoken, our duty is clear; obedience is
unavoidable. This is not only so because of the cardinal postulate of
constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundamental law. It is also because any
other approach would run the risk of setting at naught this basic aspiration to do
away with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with the promise and the
hope associated with an open society. To deprive petitioners of the small
landholdings in the face of a presidential decree considered ratified by the new
Constitution and precisely in accordance with its avowed objective could indeed
be contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenancy had spawned in the past
as well as the grave social problems thereby created. There can be no
justification for any other decision then whether predicated on a juridical norm or
on the traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not thwarting
fundamental policy goals."25

Thereafter, in Gonzales v. Estrella,26 which incidentally involves private respondent and

counsel in the case at bench, the Court emphatically declared that "Presidential Decree
No. 27 has survived the test of constitutionality."27

Then, in 1982, P.D. 27, once again, was stamped with judicial imprimatur in Association
of Rice & Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform
Council,28 to wit:

"x x x If as pointed out in the opening paragraph, the validity of Presidential

Decree No. 27 was assumed as early as 1974, on the first anniversary of the
present constitution, in De Chavez v. Zobel and specifically upheld in Gonzales
v. Estrella five years later, there cannot be any justification for holding that it is
unconstitutional on its face without any factual foundation."29

Further, in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of

Agrarian Reform,30 involving the constitutionality of P.D. 27, E.O. Nos. 22831 and
229,32 and R.A. 6657,33 any other assault on the validity of P.D. 27 was ultimately
foreclosed when it was declared therein that "R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No.
131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional
objections raised in the herein petition." 34

The objection that P.D. 27 is unconstitutional as it sets limitations on the judicial

prerogative of determining just compensation is bereft of merit. P.D. 27 provides:

"For the purpose of determining the cost of the land to be transferred to the
tenant-farmer pursuant to this Decree, the value of the land shall be equivalent to
two and one half (2 ½) times the average harvest of three normal crop years
immediately preceding the promulgation of this Decree;"

E.O. 228 supplemented such provision, viz.:

"SEC. 2. Henceforth, the valuation of rice and corn lands covered by P.D. 27
shall be based on the average gross production determined by the Barangay
Committee on Land Production in accordance with Department Memorandum
Circular No. 26, series of 1973 and related issuances and regulation of the
Department of Agrarian Reform. The average gross production per hectare shall
be multiplied by two and a half (2.5), the product of which shall be multiplied by
Thirty Five Pesos (P35.00), the government support price for one cavan of 50
kilos of palay on October 21, 1972, or Thirty One Pesos (P31.00), the
government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of corn on October 21, 1972,
and the amount arrived at shall be the value of the rice and corn land, as the
case may be, for the purpose of determining its cost to the farmer and
compensation to the landowner."
6|Page

The determination of just compensation under P.D. No. 27, like in Section 16 (d) of R.A.
6657 or the CARP Law, is not final or conclusive.35 This is evident from the succeeding
paragraph of Section 2 of E.O. 228:

"x x x In the event of dispute with the landowner regarding the amount of lease
rental paid by the farmer beneficiary, the Department of Agrarian Reform and the
Barangay Committee on Land Production concerned shall resolve the dispute
within thirty (30) days from its submission pursuant to Department of Agrarian
Reform Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973, and other pertinent
issuances. In the event a party questions in court the resolution of the dispute,
the landowner's compensation shall still be processed for payment and the
proceeds shall be held in trust by the Trust Department of the Land Bank in
accordance with the provisions of Section 5 hereof, pending the resolution of the
dispute before the court."

Clearly therefrom, unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation
of the property by the Barrio Committee on Land Production and the DAR, the parties
may bring the dispute to court in order to determine the appropriate amount of
compensation, a task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court.

Finally, the Court need not belabor the fact that R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law operates
distinctly from P.D. 27. R.A. 6657 covers all public and private agricultural land including
other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture as provided for in Proclamation
No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229;36 while, P.D. 27 covers rice and corn lands. On
this score, E.O. 229, which provides for the mechanism of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program, specifically states: "(P)residential Decree No. 27, as amended, shall
continue to operate with respect to rice and corn lands, covered thereunder. x x x"37 It
cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that R.A. 6657 did not repeal or supersede, in any way,
P.D. 27. And whatever provisions of P.D. 27 that are not inconsistent with R.A. 6657
shall be suppletory to the latter,38 and all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D.
27 are retained even with the passage of R.A. 6657.39

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions filed by Rolando Sigre and the Land Bank of
the Philippines are hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE and the petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
28906 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug and Kapunan,, JJ., concur.

Ynares-Santiago, JJ., no part.
7|Page

G.R. No.: 109568                                                   Ponente: Justice Austria-Martinez

Rolando Sigre vs. CA and Lilia Y. Gonzales,

as co-administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay

G.R. No.: 113454                                             Date of Promulgation: August 8, 2002

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. CA

and Lilia Y. Gonzales, as co-administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay

FACTS:
      

        Presidential Decree No. 27 issued by Pres. Ferdinand Marcos proclaimed the entire country
as a “Land Reform Area” and further decreed the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of
the soil, transferring to them ownership of the land they till.

        Sigre was Gonzales’ tenant in Iloilo and previously paid Gonzales a lease rental of 32
cavans per year which he stopped and instead started to remit lease rentals to LBP pursuant to
DAR’s memorandum circular which set the guidelines of lease rental payment by farmer-
beneficiaries under the land transfer program of PD 27.

Lilia Gonzales, acting in her capacity as co-administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay, filed a
petition for petitioner and Mandamus seeking to prohibit the Land Bank of the Philippines from
accepting leasehold rentals from Ernesto Sigre and for LBP to turn over to Gonzales the rentals
previously remitted to it by Sigre.

ISSUE:
        Is Presidential Decree No. 27 valid and constitutional?

LAW:
        Presidential Decree No. 27, issued on October 21, 1972 by then Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos,
proclaimed the entire country as a “land reform area” and decreed the emancipation of tenants
from the bondage of the soil, transferring to them the ownership of the land they till. To achieve
its purpose, the decree laid down a system for the purchase by tenant-farmers, long-recognized as
the backbone of the economy, of the lands they were tilling. Owners of rice and corn lands that
exceeded the minimum retention area were bound to sell their lands to qualified farmers at
liberal terms and subject to conditions. It was pursuant to said decree that the DAR issued
Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of 1978.

RULING/RATIO:
 

        The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative bodies to implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details. All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. One such
administrative regulation is DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. As emphasized in De Chavez v.
Zobel, emancipation is the goal of P.D. 27., i.e., freedom from the bondage of the soil by
transferring to the tenant-farmers the ownership of the land they’re tilling. As noted, however, in
8|Page

the whereas clauses of the Circular, problems have been encountered in the expeditious

implementation of the land reform program, thus necessitating its promulgation.
The rationale for the Circular was explicitly recognized by the appellate court when it stated that
“The main purpose of the circular is to make certain that the lease rental payments of the tenant-
farmer are applied to his amortizations on the purchase price of the land. . . . The circular was
meant to remedy the situation where the tenant-farmer’s lease rentals to landowner were not
credited in his favor against the determined purchase price of the land, thus making him a
perpetual obligor for said purchase price.” Since the assailed Circular essentially sought to
accomplish the noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid. Such being the case, it has the
force of law and is entitled to great respect.
9|Page

3.5 Republicanism

People v. Hernandez, GR 154218. Aug. 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 688

G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372 August 28, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs
HON. JUDGE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Br. 158,
RTC-Pasig City, ATTY. LIGAYA P. SALAYON and ATTY. ANTONIO M.
LLORENTE, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the reversal of the Joint Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
Nos. 68922 and 69703 which affirmed the Order[2] issued by respondent Judge Jose R.
Hernandez, presiding judge of Branch 158 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 118823-31, 118848-91, 118902-9063 and 119099-
204 for violation of private respondents Llorente and Salayon's right to speedy trial.

First, the facts.

The instant case stemmed from a complaint filed by Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senatorial
candidate in the May 1995 elections, against private respondents Salayon and Llorente,
Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the City Board of Canvassers of Pasig
City, and a certain Reynaldo San Juan, Campaign Manager of senatorial candidate
Juan Ponce Enrile, for allegedly decreasing Pimentel's votes in the Statement of Votes
per precinct and in the City Certificate of Canvass for Pasig City. Pimentel filed a
petition with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 133509, which sought the reversal of the
resolutions of the COMELEC dismissing his complaint for lack of probable cause. On
February 9, 2000, we promulgated our Decision in said case, granting Pimentel's
petition and ordering the COMELEC "to file forthwith with the proper [RTC] the
necessary criminal information for violation of Section 27(b) of [Republic Act] No. 6646,
[3] otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, against private respondents
Ligaya Salayon and Antonio Llorente."[4]

Pursuant thereto, the COMELEC filed a total of 321 informations for violation of Section
27(b) of R.A. No. 6646 against private respondents Llorente and Salayon on the
following dates: a) nine (9) informations were filed on August 28, 2000, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 118823-118831; b) forty-four (44) informations on August 29, 2000,
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 118848-118891; c) one hundred sixty-two (162)
informations on August 31, 2000, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 118902-119063; and
d) 106 informations on September 7, 2000, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 119099-
119204. The four sets of informations were raffled to Branches 164, 158, 153 and 69,
respectively, of the RTC of Pasig City.

Private respondent Llorente filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Consolidation[5] of

Criminal Case Nos. 118823-118831 (pending before Branch 164) with Criminal Case
Nos. 118848-118891 (pending before Branch 158). This motion was granted by Branch
164,[6] thereby consolidating the nine (9) informations pending before it with the 44
other informations pending with Branch 158.

Subsequently, private respondent Llorente filed three (3) Omnibus Motions before
Branches 158, 153 and 69 of the RTC of Pasig City, asking them: 1) to consolidate all
the cases filed against him for violation of Section 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646; 2) to declare
the multiple informations filed against him as constituting only one offense; 3) to treat
10 | P a g e

the 321 informations filed against him as only one information for violation of Section
27(b) of R.A. No. 6646; and 4) to allow him to post bail to only one information.

After finding private respondent Llorente's prayer to consolidate to be "meritorious and

there being no objection" from the prosecution, Judge Ericcio C. Ygaña of Branch 153
granted the same and remanded Criminal Case Nos. 118902-119063 to the Office of
the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City for proper disposition.[7] Similarly, Judge
Lorifel Lacap Pahimna of Branch 69 granted private respondent Llorente's motion to
consolidate, finding that "it is for the convenience of the parties that these cases
(Criminal Case Nos. 119099-119204) be consolidated with those cases pending before
Branch 158 considering that all cases involved common questions of fact and law and
the parties may have to introduce common evidence in support of their respective
positions in these cases." Judge Pahimna forwarded the cases pending before Branch
69 to Branch 158 "unless the presiding judge of said branch interposes objection to
such consolidation." Moreover, the other issues raised by private respondent Llorente
were referred to Branch 158 for appropriate action.[8]

On September 27, 2000, Senior State Prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo filed his Notice of
Appearance with Branch 158 of the RTC of Pasig City.[9] He likewise filed an Urgent
Omnibus Motion To: 1) hold in abeyance the implementation of the orders of the court
prior to his appearance as counsel; 2) remand all the cases pending before it to the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City; 3) hold in abeyance the resolution
of all motions filed by private respondent Llorente with the court; 4) order the Office of
the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City to hold in abeyance the re-raffling of all the
"dagdag-bawas" cases against private respondents; and 5) allow him ample time to
secure from the Supreme Court a transfer of venue of the cases from Pasig City to
Manila or Pasay City.[10]

Private respondent Llorente filed an Opposition (to the Prosecution's Urgent Omnibus
Motion dated 25 September 2000)[11] with Branch 158 of the RTC of Pasig City. On
December 13, 2000, petitioner, through Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo, filed with
Branch 158 of the RTC of Pasig City its Comment/Opposition to [the] Omnibus Motions
filed by Accused Llorente,[12] reiterating its prayers in its Omnibus Motion dated
September 25, 2000.

On March 2, 2001, respondent Judge issued an Order, the dispositive portion which
reads:

WHEREFORE, accused Llorente's Omnibus Motion dated September 5, 2000,

Omnibus Motion dated September 6, 2000 and Omnibus Motion dated September 8,
2000 are granted allowing the consolidation of cases against accused Llorente pending
before Branches 69, 153 and 164 of this Court with those pending before this branch.
The multiple acts alleged in the 321 Informations filed against him are declared to
constitute only one violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646. There should
then be only one information against accused Llorente. This benefit applies also to
accused Salayon. Public Prosecutor's (sic) Bagabuyo's Omnibus Motion dated
September 25, 2000 is denied.

The arraignment and pre-trial of both accused is (sic) set on March 20, 2001 at 8:30 in
the morning.

SO ORDERED.[13]

The trial court noted that during the hearing on private respondent Llorente's motion on
September 12, 2000, the prosecution, then through Director Jose P. Balbuena of the
COMELEC, was heard on the matter of consolidation of the cases and in fact gave its
consent thereto. Even the representative from the office of Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
Jr., an Atty. Luis Gana, did not register any objection thereto. In ruling that only one
information for violation of Section 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646 should have been filed, the
trial court held:
11 | P a g e

[I]n this case[,] the unity of criminal intent is manifested by the fact that the several acts
of tampering[,] while allegedly done separately over a three-day period, were
perpetuated on one single occasion which is the canvassing of the votes cast in the
May 8, 1995 elections in Pasig City, and, significantly, perpetuated only on one single
document, the SoV, a document of fifty-eight (58) pages. While there maybe several
acts of tampering, this Court could attribute only one crime against accused Llorente.
This is what the Comelec did in People vs. Maria Arsenia Garcia, et al. docketed as
Criminal Case No. 3485-A before the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan.
The multiple acts of tampering by the accused were treated by the COMELEC as one
offense or a single count of (sic) the violation of Section 27(b) of R.A. 6646. There is no
reason then why accused Llorente should be treated differently.[14]

On March 25, 2001, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the March 2, 2001
Order of the trial court.[15] Private respondent Llorente filed his Comment and
Opposition,[16] to which petitioner filed its rejoinder.[17]

In his Order[18] dated May 11, 2001, respondent Judge denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the March 2, 2001 Order and set the arraignment and pre-trial of
private respondents "on June 15, 2001 at 8:30 in the morning."

On June 15, 2001, private respondents Llorente and Salayon were arraigned and
pleaded "not guilty." Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo was absent during the
arraignment but the same nevertheless proceeded in the presence of Public Prosecutor
Jose Danilo C. Jabson, the assigned prosecutor in the trial court. The trial court held:

Both accused, assisted by their respective counsels, after having been informed of the
charge filed against them and its attending consequences, entered a plea of NOT
GUILTY.

Pursuant to the Order of March 2, 2001, the three hundred [twenty-one] (321)
informations filed against both accused were treated to be only a single offense for
which they should be made answerable. It is for this reason that both accused were
arraigned and entered their plea to a single or one information only.

Having entered their plea, set the pre-trial of this case on June 29, 2001 at 8:30 in the
morning.[19]

On June 27, 2001, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Postpone and Motion for
Reconsideration[20] of the Order dated June 15, 2001 of the trial court, asking the trial
court to nullify the arraignment of respondents for lack of notice to the prosecution. The
June 29, 2001 hearing was reset to July 6, 2001 in view of the prosecution's filing of the
Omnibus Motion to Postpone and Motion for Reconsideration. The July 6, 2001 hearing
was cancelled as Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo did not appear, a representative
having telephoned the trial court that he was indisposed. The hearing was reset to July
26, 2001.[21] However, the hearing on July 26, 2001 was again cancelled and reset to
August 2, 2001 for Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo's failure to appear, thus:

Since Prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo is again not available for today's hearing because
he is indisposed as relayed to this Court by his representative, Atty. Jay I. Dejaresco,
and through a telephone call from his secretary Orlando Nicolas, as prayed for, and
over the vehement objection of counsels for both accused, the pre-trial/trial scheduled
today is cancelled and reset on August 2, 2001 at 8:30 in the morning.

xxx

In the event that there will again be no appearance from Prosecutor Bagabuyo at the
next scheduled hearing, the Legal Department of the COMELEC shall then make its
appearance and take over the prosecution of this case.

SO ORDERED.[22]
12 | P a g e

After considering the respective positions of the prosecution and the private
respondents, the trial court issued its Order dated August 2, 2001[23] denying the
prosecution's Omnibus Motion to Postpone and Motion for Reconsideration. It found
that contrary to the prosecution's claim that it was not notified of the arraignment on
June 15, 2001, the records revealed that the Order of the trial court dated May 11, 2001
which set the date of the arraignment and pre-trial on June 15, 2001 was received by
the Department of Justice on May 17, 2001. As a consequence, the arraignment of
private respondents Llorente and Salayon proceeded as scheduled. The Motion for
Reconsideration of the trial court's March 2, 2001 Order was likewise denied for being in
the nature of a second motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading under
the Rules of Court. Despite the denial of the prosecution's motions, the pre-trial and trial
were cancelled and reset to September 4, 2001 in view of the prosecution's
manifestation that it was appealing the trial court's order to a higher court. The court
warned that "[i]n the event that the prosecution shall not be able to get any restraining
order to stop the proceedings in this case, the hearing on said date shall proceed as
scheduled."[24]

Accordingly, petitioner, through Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo, filed a petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus, Injunction with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP No. 65966. On August 16, 2001, said
petition was dismissed outright for having been filed without the participation of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in violation of Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III,
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.[25] Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, to no avail.[26] Unhindered, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of
Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari[27] with this Court on October 30, 2001,
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We granted petitioner's motion in
our Resolution dated December 12, 2001. Petitioner filed its Petition for Review on
January 10, 2002, docketed as G.R. No. 150317. We resolved to deny the petition on
January 30, 2002 for having been filed out of time and for Senior State Prosecutor
Bagabuyo's failure to sign the petition.[28] Petitioner again filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with this Court, to no avail.[29]

Meantime, in the trial court, the hearing set on September 4, 2001 did not proceed due
to Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo's absence. Another representative from the office
of Senator Pimentel, an Atty. Galimpin, appeared in court and requested for a
postponement. Again, the court received a call from the secretary of Senior State
Prosecutor Bagabuyo that the latter had his tooth extracted, hence, could not appear in
court. The trial court found this excuse quite odd since Atty. Galimpin informed the court
that he saw Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo at the Office of the Clerk of Court in the
first floor of the same building where the court sits. Private respondents moved for the
dismissal of the instant cases due to the denial of their right to speedy trial. The trial
court denied their motion and gave the prosecution the last opportunity to prosecute the
instant cases, setting the next hearings on October 3 and 15, 2001, with the admonition
that failure to proceed will be dealt with accordingly.[30]

On October 3, 2001, the prosecution refused to proceed with pre-trial and trial, giving as
reason its pending petition before the CA. Private respondent Llorente reiterated his
motion to dismiss the case on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. The trial
court granted private respondents a period of three (3) days therefrom within which to
formalize their motions to dismiss and the prosecution was also given three (3) days
from receipt of private respondents' motions within which to file its comment or
objection.[31]

Private respondent Llorente filed his Motion to Dismiss dated October 4, 2001.[32]
Before petitioner could file an opposition, it filed its Motion to Inhibit[33] dated October 5,
2001, asking Judge Hernandez to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the instant
cases and remand the same to the Clerk of Court of Pasig City for re-raffling. Later, the
prosecution likewise filed its Opposition (to [Private Respondent's Motion to] Dismiss
with Prayer to Hold in Abeyance its Resolution until after Resolution of our Motion to
Inhibit). Private respondent Llorente filed his Reply (to Prosecution's Opposition dated
October 7, 2001) and Comment-Opposition (to Prosecution's Prayer for Inhibition). The
prosecution filed its Rejoinder (to Reply to Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss with
13 | P a g e

Prayer to Hold in Abeyance its Resolution until after Resolution of our Motion to Inhibit)
and Counter-Comment (to the Opposition to Motion to Inhibit). Private respondent
Salayon filed a Manifestation dated October 6, 2001, adopting all the allegations
mentioned in the Motion to Dismiss of his co-respondent Llorente. On October 15, 2001,
the parties opted not to have a hearing after having agreed to put all their arguments in
their respective pleadings.[34]

On November 23, 2001, the trial court rendered its assailed order, the dispositive
portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss dated October 4, 2001 filed by accused Antonio
M. Llorente, adopted by co-accused Ligaya P. Salayon, is granted and this case is
dismissed. The cash bail posted by each accused is ordered released to them.

SO ORDERED.[35]

Petitioner, through Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo, then filed with

this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus[36] dated February 1,
2002 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 151461-151781.
Petitioner prayed that:

1. Upon the filing hereof, this case be consolidated with [the] Petition for Review, filed
last January 10, 2002 [with the Supreme Court], and docketed as G.R. No. 150317;

2. The Order dismissing the instant cases be recalled, set aside and the 321 criminal
cases filed against both accused Salayon and Llorente be reinstated; after which they
be arraigned for the 321 counts for the violation of Section 27(b) of R.A. 6646;

3. The Order, dated June 15, 2001, be declared as null and void and set aside;

4. All the cases that used to be pending before the respondent, Honorable RTC-158 be
ordered remanded to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle to the other branches,
except those where these cases were originally assigned to; or in the alternative,

5. An Order be issued changing venue from the City of Pasig to either Manila, Pasay or
Makati; and,

6. Plaintiff-petitioner prays for such other relief consistent with law and equity on the
matter.[37]

Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, we referred said petition to the CA
for appropriate action.[38] In the CA, the case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69703.

Meantime, on February 2, 2001, petitioner, this time through the OSG, filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 directly with the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68922. The motion having been granted,[39] petitioner,
through the OSG, filed its petition[40] contending that respondent Judge "committed
grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
order of dismissal dated November 23, 2001 allegedly on account of the speedy trial
rule."[41]

Subsequently, CA-G.R. SP Nos. 69703 and 68922 were consolidated.[42]

On July 4, 2002, the CA rendered its assailed Joint Decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 69703
and 68922, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in CA-G.R. SP No. 68922 and CA-
G.R. SP No. 69703 are hereby both DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly
DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The assailed Order dated November 23, 2001 issued by
Branch 158 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Criminal Case Nos. 118823-31;
14 | P a g e

118848-91; 118902-9063; and 119099-204, all entitled "People of the Philippines v.

Ligaya P. Salayon and Antonio M. Llorente," is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[43]

The CA noted that as to CA-G.R. SP No. 69703, Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo
filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Petition dated April 21, 2002 with the Supreme Court
despite our referral of the case to the CA. The CA held that the petition instituted by
Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo should be "effectively withdrawn" as the same was
filed without the participation of the OSG, in violation of Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title
III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. At any rate, the CA likewise found no merit
in the petition instituted by the OSG. It held that petitioner was essentially assailing an
error of judgment and not of jurisdiction, hence, its resort to a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal was
erroneous. Even assuming that petitioner's recourse was proper, the CA held that
respondent Judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he rendered his assailed Order dated November 23, 2001.
The ruling of the trial court was found to be supported by Sections 6 and 9 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Sections 9 and 13 of R.A. No. 8493 and Sections
14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. It restated the principle that "[t]he right
to speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its
salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be freed from the
anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined
within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and considerations of
whatever legitimate defense he may interpose."[44] The CA found that the cancellation
of the hearings in the trial court by the prosecution without any valid grounds was
"certainly vexatious, capricious and oppressive." Citing People v. Abaño,[45] it held that
"the dismissal of the cases following a number of postponements at the instance of the
prosecution is not an abuse of discretion." The CA likewise held that "delay resulting
from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders," as an exclusion to the
computation of the 80-day period within which to commence trial under Section 3(3),
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, should be read in harmony with Section 7 of Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere expedient of petitioner's filing
before the CA of a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65
questioning the trial court's interlocutory order did not interrupt the running of the 80-day
period. Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Section 3(7) of Rule 119 is also misplaced as
the trial court did not state in its orders granting continuance that the ends of justice in
granting the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the right of the
accused to a speedy trial. Finally, the CA pointed out that the prosecution failed to
commence with the trial even after the lapse of 122 days from the arraignment of private
respondents.

Hence, the instant petition on certiorari under Rule 45 in which petitioner raises the
following issues:

I. [WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN

HOLDING THAT THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS NOT WARRANTED INASMUCH AS
WHAT IS BEING IMPUGNED IS "AN ERROR OF JUDGMENT."

II. [WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN

UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL OF THE 321 CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.[46]

The issues to be resolved are: a) whether a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 is the proper remedy from the dismissal of the cases before the trial court on the
ground of the denial of private respondents' right to speedy trial; and b) whether the CA
erred in finding that respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the instant criminal cases against private respondents upon a finding that the
right of private respondents to speedy trial has been violated.
15 | P a g e

We shall first resolve the procedural issue.

Petitioner contends that its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA was the
proper remedy since respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he consolidated the 321 criminal cases into one
information and dismissed the "criminal case" on the ground of the denial of private
respondents' right to speedy trial, without giving the prosecution the chance to present
evidence. Citing People v. Velasco,[47] petitioner contends that the dismissal of the
"criminal case" against private respondents is tantamount to their acquittal which, as a
general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal from in the absence of a statute clearly
conferring that right. In any case, the alleged existence of the remedy of appeal does
not always foreclose the remedy of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Petitioner's remedy with the CA was correct.

Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[a]ny
party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in
double jeopardy."

As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly
conferring that right.[48] Thus, errors of judgment are not appealable by the
prosecution. Appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal of the criminal case
by the trial court may be allowed only on errors of jurisdiction when there was denial of
due process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction.[49] This is so as while it is true that
double jeopardy will attach in case the prosecution appeals a decision acquitting the
accused, an acquittal rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction does not really "acquit" and therefore does not terminate the case as
there can be no double jeopardy based on a void indictment.[50]

In the case at bar, the trial court dismissed the cases against private respondents for
the denial of their right to speedy trial. In a long line of cases, we have held that a
dismissal on the ground of the denial of the accused's right to a speedy trial will have
the effect of acquittal that would

bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense.[51] Thus, we have held
that where after such dismissal the prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the
order of dismissal and the court re-set the case for trial, the accused can successfully
claim double jeopardy as the said order was actually an acquittal, was final and cannot
be reconsidered.[52] Hence, petitioner was correct in filing a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, alleging that "respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion and/or
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of dismissal dated
November 23, 2001 allegedly on account of the speedy trial rule" as an appeal was not
available to it. Where the dismissal of the case was allegedly capricious, certiorari lies
from such order of dismissal and does not involve double jeopardy, as the petition
challenges not the correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal and such grave
abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction which prevents double jeopardy from
attaching.[53]

Having settled that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA was the proper
remedy from the dismissal of the instant cases by the trial court, the crucial issue is:
was the CA correct in ruling that a writ of certiorari was not warranted inasmuch as the
respondent Judge did not act in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in dismissing the instant cases against private respondents for the denial
of their right to speedy trial?

A writ of certiorari is warranted when 1) any tribunal, board or officer has acted without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and 2) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.[54] An act of a court or tribunal may be
considered as in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
16 | P a g e

abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a

positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.
[55]

We affirm the CA's ruling that no such grave abuse of discretion was shown to exist in
respondent Judge's dismissal of the instant cases.

The right of the accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed under Sections 14(2) and 16,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[56] In 1998, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8493,
otherwise known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998." The law provided for time limits in
order "to ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, [RTC],
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court." On
August 11, 1998, the Supreme Court issued Circular No. 38-98, the Rules Implementing
R.A. No. 8493. The provisions of said circular were adopted in the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. As to the time limit within which trial must commence after
arraignment, the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

Sec. 6, Rule 119. Extended time limit.-- Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1(g),
Rule 116 and the preceding section 1, for the first twelve-calendar-month period
following its effectivity on September 15, 1998, the time limit with respect to the period
from arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall be one hundred eighty (180)
days. For the second twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one hundred twenty
(120) days, and for the third twelve-month period, the time limit shall be eighty (80)
days.

R.A. No. 8493 and its implementing rules and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
enumerate certain reasonable delays as exclusions in the computation of the prescribed
time limits. They also provide that "no provision of law on speedy trial and no rule
implementing the same shall be interpreted as a bar to any charge of denial of speedy
trial as provided by Article III, Section 14(2), of the 1987 Constitution."[57] Thus, in spite
of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the concept
of "speedy trial" is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.[58] In
Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,[59] we held:

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case
against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the
administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in
the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a
case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. x x x

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly,

expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a
system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays
and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not
preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given
to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons;
hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily
compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length
of delay; (b) the reason for the

delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
(citations omitted)
17 | P a g e

In the cases at bar, in finding that private respondents were denied of their right to
speedy trial, respondent Judge recounted the following incidents in the trial court:

The Court considers the accused['s] arraignment of June 15, 2001 and notes that the
pre-trial was initially set on June 29, 2001. This initial setting did not proceed, as earlier,
the Prosecution, through State Prosecutor Bagabuyo, filed an Omnibus Motion to
Postpone and Motion for Reconsideration. The Court, nevertheless, set the hearing to
July 5, 2001 and gave proper notice to the Prosecution. This July 6 setting also did not
proceed as a staff of Prosecutor Bagabuyo made a telephone call with this Court
seeking for a postponement as Prosecutor Bagabuyo was not feeling well. The Court
issued its Order of July 6, 2001 setting the pre-trial again to July 26, 2001 at 8:30 a.m.
The July 26 pre-trial hearing likewise did not proceed, as Prosecutor Bagabuyo was
indisposed. This matter was relayed to this Court in a telephone call of Orlando Nicolas,
secretary of Prosecutor Bagabuyo. During the hearing, Atty. Jay I. Dejaresco, a lawyer
from the office of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, appeared and confirmed the inability of
Prosecutor Bagabuyo to appear during the pre-trial hearing. The Court also requested
Atty. Dejaresco to inform Senator Pimentel on the delay caused by the non-appearance
of the Prosecutor. The hearing was reset to August 2, 2001, the date suggested by Atty.
Dejaresco.

The August 2, 2001 hearing was held, but the Prosecution, through Prosecutor
Bagabuyo, manifested that it would question the Order of this Court dated June 15,
2001 and the Court’s Order on said date denying the Prosecution’s Motion for
Reconsideration to the Order of June 15, 2001. As requested, the Court granted the
Prosecution 30 days to file the proper petition before the higher court, and the pre-trial
and trial was reset anew to September 4, 2001. The Court [h]as impressed with the
commitment of the Prosecution that in the event no restraining order was issued to stop
the proceedings in this case, the pre-trial and trial shall proceed on September 4, 2001.
But the hearing of September 4, 2001 did not proceed on account of the absence of
Prosecutor Bagabuyo. Another representative from the office of Senator Pimentel, a
certain Atty. Rolando Galimpin, appeared and requested for another postponement.
Like before, the Court received a call from the secretary of Prosecutor Bagabuyo that
the latter had his tooth extracted and would not be in a position to appear at the hearing.
This Court found the motion for postponement odd because Atty. Galimpin informed the
Court he saw Prosecutor Bagabuyo at the Office of the Clerk of Court, which is located
at the first floor of the building where this Court sits. Even then, the Court denied the
accused['s] oral motion to dismiss and gave the Prosecution the last opportunity to
prosecute this case. The Prosecution was given two dates, October 3 and 15, 2001, the
dates Prosecutor Bagabuyo would be available as represented by Atty. Galimpin.
Despite these dates of October 3 and 15, 2001, the Prosecution still failed to proceed to
pre-trial and trial. Given the period of time to prosecute this case as above narrated, the
last opportunity on October 3 and 15, 2001, this Court resolves that this case must now
be dismissed. The accused’[s] right to speedy trial under Section 9, Rule 116 (sic) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure has been violated.[60]

Clearly, the one hundred eleven (111) days that have elapsed from the time private
respondents were arraigned on June 15, 2001 up to the filing of the Motion to Dismiss
by private respondents on the ground of the denial of their right to speedy trial on
October 4, 2001 is beyond the 80-day limit provided under the law and the rules. The
incidents that transpired before the trial court likewise show that the postponements at
the instance of the prosecution were not justified. As found by the CA:

The Court a quo has sufficiently justified its order of dismissal for failure to prosecute in
violation of the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial as mandated by
Section 14(2) and Section 16 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The right to speedy
trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary
objective being to assure that an innocent person may be freed from the anxiety and
expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever
legitimate defense he may interpose.[61]

xxx
18 | P a g e

The cancellation of the hearings by the prosecution without any valid ground is certainly
vexatious, capricious and oppressive and it has been held that the dismissal of the case
following a number of postponements at the instance of the prosecution is not an abuse
of discretion,[62] and especially taking into account the periods in Rule 119 which are
explicitly provided.[63]

Petitioner invokes the exclusions provided in Section 3(a)(3) and (f), Rule 119 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which state:

Sec. 3. Exclusions.-- The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the
time within which trial must commence:

a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused,
including but not limited to the following:

xxx

3) Delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders;

xxx

f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any court motu proprio,
or on motion of either the accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if the court
granted the continuance on the basis of its findings set forth in the order that the ends of
justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the
accused in a speedy trial.

Petitioner contends that there was no inordinate delay on the part of the prosecution to
justify a dismissal of the cases based on a violation of the private respondents' right to
speedy trial. The date of arraignment was June 15, 2001. Senior State Prosecutor
Bagabuyo filed a certiorari petition questioning the arraignment before the CA on
August 6, 2001. Thus, a total of 51 days elapsed before the filing of the CA petition. On
August 24, 2001, Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo received a copy of the CA
Resolution dismissing his petition. On September 6, 2001, he filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CA Resolution. At this point, only 64 days have passed since the
arraignment. On October 17, 2001, Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo received a copy
of the CA Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration. On October 30, 2001, he
filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition under Rule 45 with this Court. Prior
to his filing of this motion for extension, 76 days have lapsed from the date of
arraignment. This Court granted him 30 days within which to file the petition or until
December 1, 2001. Hence, when Judge Hernandez issued an Order of dismissal dated
November 23, 2001, the 80-day period mandated under Section 6 of Rule 119 has not
yet lapsed. Deducting the time it took Judge Hernandez to resolve petitioner's Omnibus
Motion to Postpone and Motion for Reconsideration dated June 27, 2001, only 41 days
had lapsed after private respondents' arraignment on June 15, 2001. Section 3 of Rule
119 provides that "delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory
orders" is excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence. This
provision is not in conflict with Section 3(f) of Rule 119 as they speak of two different
kinds of delay. If Section 3(f) is not applicable, Section 3(a) definitely is.

We are not persuaded. As correctly held by the CA, "delay resulting from extraordinary
remedies against interlocutory orders" must be read in harmony with Section 7, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court which provides that the "[p]etition [under Rule 65] shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ
of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding in the case." This was clearly spelled out by respondent Judge when, in
addition to granting a 30-day continuance in view of the manifestation of the prosecution
that it would file an appeal from the interlocutory order of the trial court with a higher
court, the trial court, in its August 2, 2001 Order, gave a warning that "[i]n the event that
the prosecution shall not be able to get any restraining order to stop the proceedings in
this case, the hearing on [September 4, 2001] shall proceed as scheduled." Despite this
warning, however, Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo did not appear for the
19 | P a g e

prosecution on the September 4, 2001 hearing set by the trial court and the court only
received a call from the secretary of said Senior State Prosecutor that the latter had his
tooth extracted and would not be in a position to appear at the hearing. What made the
manner of postponement worse was that Atty. Galimpin, the private prosecutor,
informed the trial court that he saw Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo at the Office of
the Clerk of Court, which is located at the first floor of the same building where the trial
court sits.

Petitioner's reliance on Section 3(f) of Rule 119 is also misplaced as nowhere in the
Orders granting continuance did respondent Judge set forth that his order was based on
findings that "the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest
of the public and the accused in a speedy trial," as required under the law and the Rules
of Court. To the contrary, the successive continuances granted by the trial court were
compelled by the repeated absence of the public prosecutor or his refusal to proceed
with the pre-trial and trial. The orders of the court contained repeated warnings that "[i]n
the event that there will again be no appearance from Prosecutor Bagabuyo at the next
scheduled hearing, the Legal Department of the COMELEC shall then make its
appearance and take over the prosecution of this case." In its September 4, 2001 Order
denying private respondents' oral motions to dismiss and giving the prosecution another
chance to prosecute the cases by resetting the hearings to October 3 and 15, 2001, the
trial court gave an admonition that the prosecution's failure to appear will be dealt with
accordingly. Even when Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo appeared on October 3,
2001, the prosecution refused to proceed with the pre-trial and trial of the cases on the
ground of the pendency of its petition with the CA. This, despite the fact that as early as
August 16, 2001, the CA has dismissed CA-G.R. No. SP. No. 65966 which raised the
issue of the validity of the private respondents' arraignment. As the trial court held:

The Court notes the petition for certiorari that Prosecutor Bagabuyo filed before the
Court of Appeals docketed as CA-GR SP No. 65966 questioning the propriety of [the]
June 15, 2001 Order of this Court and the Honorable Court of Appeals dated August 16,
2001 dismissed the petition outright. It also notes the resolution of the said Court dated
October 9, 2001 denying the Prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration. Given these
resolution, the Prosecution had no option under the circumstances but to proceed to
pre-trial and trial during the October 15, 2001 hearing. All and still, the Prosecution
stood on its ground not to prosecute this case and would only have itself to blame for
the dismissal of this case.[64]

Petitioner also contends in the instant petition that respondent Judge's decision
declaring the 321 Informations against private respondents for violation of Section 27(b)
of R.A. No. 6646 as only one Information, the arraignment of the accused to only one
information and his Decision dismissing the "case" against private respondents give rise
to the following questions: 1) Which one of the 321 Informations did private respondents
plead "not guilty" to? and 2) What case did Judge Hernandez dismiss when he stated
that "this case is dismissed"?

The contention is unavailing. Contrary to petitioner's claim, a reading of the June 15,
2001 Order of the trial court during arraignment leaves no room for vagueness. It states:

Pursuant to the Order of March 2, 2001, the three hundred [twenty-one] (321)
informations filed against both accused were treated to be only a single offense for
which they should be made answerable. It is for this reason that both accused were
arraigned and entered their plea to a single or one information only.[65]

What this argument reflects is petitioner's stubborn insistence not to recognize the trial
court's interlocutory Orders dated March 2, 2001 and June 15, 2001, granting private
respondent Llorente's motion to consider all the 321 informations filed against each of
them as constituting only one offense and declaring the arraignment of private
respondents to only one information, respectively. Notably, petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of this Order on March 25, 2001 has been denied by the trial court and
was denied again when re-raised by petitioner with the trial court in its Omnibus Motion
to Postpone and Motion for Reconsideration on June 27, 2001. On appeal to the CA
raising said issue, the CA dismissed the appeal for the non-participation of the OSG and
20 | P a g e

the CA likewise denied the motion for reconsideration it filed. Petitioner filed a petition
with this Court raising the same issue and was likewise denied on January 30, 2002 for
having been filed out of time. We likewise denied its Motion for Reconsideration on April
24, 2002. Hence petitioner can no longer raise the same issue in this petition. In Zarate
v. Director of Lands,[66] we held that:

A well-known legal principle is that when an appellate court has once declared the law
in a case, such declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent
appeal. The rule made by an appellate court, while it may be reversed in other cases,
cannot be departed from in subsequent proceedings in the same case. The "Law of the
Case," as applied to a former decision of an appellate court, merely expresses the
practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. Such a rule is
"necessary to enable an appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and
efficiently, which would be impossible if a question, once considered and decided by it,
were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal."
Again, the rule is necessary as a matter of policy in order to end litigation. "There would
be no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court
to listen to criticisms on their opinions, or speculate of chances from changes in its
members."

Petitioner's contention that the prosecution was clearly deprived of its day in court when
it was not afforded the right to be present during the private respondents' arraignment
and to proceed to trial cannot stand scrutiny. Again, the issue of the validity of the
arraignment of the private respondents without the presence of Senior State Prosecutor
Bagabuyo has already been established with finality in the prosecution's previous
appeal with the CA in CA-G.R. SP. No. 65966 and with this Court in G.R. No. 150317
and, thus, constitutes the law of the case between the parties. Petitioner cannot re-raise
said issue in this petition. Moreover, petitioner's failure to proceed to trial, as clearly
shown by the events that transpired in the trial court, was due to its own fault.

In order that a judgment or order of acquittal may be successfully challenged in a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the petitioner must prove that the trial court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not merely errors of judgment, but grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[67] No such grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to respondent Judge in dismissing the instant cases for the
denial of private respondents' right to speedy trial.

A last note. The first and the foremost state principle announced in our Constitution is
that "the Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them."[68] Our people express their
mighty sovereignty mainly thru the election ballot where they decide, free from any
fetter, who will represent them in government. In a representative government, the
choice by the people of who will be their voice is nothing less than sacred, hence, its
desecration is unpardonable. Regrettably, the prosecutor failed in vindicating this
constitutional principle whose wisdom has not been diminished by the erosions of time.
The lack of zealousness on the part of the prosecution to prove that the senatorial
elections held in May 1995 was marred by the condemnable practice of "dagdag-
bawas" which led to the dismissal of the criminal charges against the private
respondents cannot but be lamented. The inexplicable failure has left this Court no
alternative except to affirm the dismissal of said charges for the constitutional right of
the accused to speedy trial cannot be held hostage by the disinterest and mistakes of
the prosecution in discharging its duty.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Joint Decision dated July 4, 2002 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 68922 and 69703 is affirmed.

No cost.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
21 | P a g e

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice

on leave)

RENATO C. CORONA, ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice
22 | P a g e

People v. Hernandez
G.R. No. 154218 August 28,
2006 Rule 119 (1of 6)
FACTS
COMELEC filed a total of 321 informations for violation of Section 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646 against
Ligaya Salayon and Antonio Llorente. They were arraigned on June 15, 2001. On October 4,
2001 or after 111 days, a Motion to Dismiss was filed based on the ground of denial of right to
speedy trial (80-day limit). RTC granted the MTD. CA affirmed.
ISSUES
(1) Was there an inordinate delay on the part of the prosecution to justify a dismissal of the
cases based on a violation of the private respondents' right to speedy trial? Yes.
HELD
The right of the accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed under Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution. In 1998, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8493, otherwise known as the
"Speedy Trial Act of 1998." The law provided for time limits in order "to ensure a speedy trial of
all criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, [RTC], Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court." On August 11, 1998, the Supreme Court issued
Circular No. 38- 98, the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 8493. The provisions of said circular were
adopted in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. As to the time limit within which trial
must commence after arraignment, the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Sec. 6, Rule 119. Extended time limit.-- Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1(g),
Rule 116 and the preceding section 1, for the first twelve-calendar-month period
following its effectivity on September 15, 1998, the time limit with respect to the period
from arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall be one hundred eighty (180)
days. For the second twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one hundred twenty
(120) days, and for the third twelve-month period, the time limit shall be eighty (80)
days.
R.A. No. 8493 and its implementing rules and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
enumerate certain reasonable delays as exclusions in the computation of the prescribed time
limits. They also provide that "no provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the
same shall be interpreted as a bar to any charge of denial of speedy trial as provided by Article
III, Section 14(2), of the 1987 Constitution.” Thus, in spite of the prescribed time
limits,jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the concept of "speedy trial" is a relative
term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, we held:
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against
him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the
administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch
in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a
case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. x x x
While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly,
expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a
system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays
and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not
preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given
to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons;
hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.
23 | P a g e

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily
compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. In determining
whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the
reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the
defendant.
Petitioner invokes the exclusions provided in Section 3(a)(3) and (f), Rule 119 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which state:
Sec. 3. Exclusions.-- The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the
time within which trial must commence:
a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused,
including but not limited to the following:
3) Delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders;
f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any court motu
proprio, or on motion of either the accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if
the court granted the continuance on the basis of its findings set forth in the
order that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best
interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.
Petitioner contends that there was no inordinate delay on the part of the prosecution to justify
a dismissal of the cases based on a violation of the private respondents' right to speedy trial.
We are not persuaded. As correctly held by the CA, "delay resulting from extraordinary
remedies against interlocutory orders" must be read in harmony with Section 7, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court which provides that the "[p]etition [under Rule 65] shall not interrupt the course
of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case." This was
clearly spelled out by respondent Judge when, in addition to granting a 30-day continuance in
view of the manifestation of the prosecution that it would file an appeal from the interlocutory
order of the trial court with a higher court, the trial court, in its August 2, 2001 Order, gave a
warning that "[i]n the event that the prosecution shall not be able to get any restraining order
to stop the proceedings in this case, the hearing on [September 4, 2001] shall proceed as
scheduled." Despite this warning, however, Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo did not appear
for the prosecution on the September 4, 2001 hearing set by the trial court and the court only
received a call from the secretary of said Senior State Prosecutor that the latter had his tooth
extracted and would not be in a position to appear at the hearing. What made the manner of
postponement worse was that Atty. Galimpin, the private prosecutor, informed the trial court
that he saw Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo at the Office of the Clerk of Court, which is
located at the first floor of the same building where the trial court sits
Petitioner's reliance on Section 3(f) of Rule 119 is also misplaced as nowhere in the Orders
granting continuance did respondent Judge set forth that his order was based on findings that
“the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and
the accused in a speedy trial,” as required under the law and the Rules of Court. To the
contrary, the successive continuances granted by the trial court were compelled by the
repeated absence of the public prosecutor or his refusal to proceed with the pre-trial and trial
24 | P a g e

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.

G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:p

The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be
declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon -

(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three
successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold
such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost
Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;

(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the
votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be
deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the
most number of valid votes; or

(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly
to the position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take
over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in
the contested office has occurred"?

In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and
upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.

G.R. No. 123755

This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court
for certiorari and preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the
respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division,1 promulgated on
December 19, 19952 and another Resolution of the Comelec en banc promulgated
February 23, 19963 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On
March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition4 with the
Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from
seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the
Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. On May 1, 1995, the
25 | P a g e

Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution5 granting the petition with the
following disposition6:

WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares

that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of
Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines.
Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is canceled.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the
May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the
elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc7 affirmed the
aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.

The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and
a Certificate of Votes8 dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes
obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:

Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060

Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440

Raul R. Lee 53,304

Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925

On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition9 praying
for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.

In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on
June 29, 1995," the Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the
winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 . . ."
Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of
Sorsogon.

On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,11 docketed as SPC No.
95-317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his
own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took
his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation
under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in
September 1994 had been granted". As such, when "the said order (dated June 21,
1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at
5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of
Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases
of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-Governor - not Lee - should occupy said position of
governor.

On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was
not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having
garnered the highest number of votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office of
governor of Sorsogon"; thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore

RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.

Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of

Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being
contrary to law, he not having garnered the highest number of votes to
warrant his proclamation.
26 | P a g e

Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and,
on the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G.
Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the
highest number of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship
by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of
Sorsogon.

Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code

(B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His
Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution
immediately upon the due implementation thereof.

On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Comelec en banc in its Resolution 14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February
26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining
order, this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the
parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."

The Issues in G.R. No. 123755

Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the
following propositions"15:

First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and
substance to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with
the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and deciding said petition;

Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a

continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to
and to hold the Office of Governor;

Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the
effect thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold
the Office of Governor; and

Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the
validity of petitioner's proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon.

G.R. No. 120295

This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of
which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:

1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995,

disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8,
1995 elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";

2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995;

and

3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11,

1995 suspending the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.

The Facts and the Issue

The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However,
Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:
27 | P a g e

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of

candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)

the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not
rendered "within the period allowed by law" i.e., "not later than fifteen days before
the election."

Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition
for disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by
law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.

By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and
123755 since they are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in
the ultimate question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the
province of Sorsogon.

On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them
thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.

The Consolidated Issues

From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:

1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack
of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If
not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?

2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a

continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of
Sorsogon?

3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No.
95-317 considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest
or a quo warranto case"?

4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of
existing jurisprudence?

5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating

the assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the
governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within the period
referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days
before the elections"?

The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation

The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal
issue in this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.

The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a

qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:

Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of

the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
28 | P a g e

intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year

immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or

member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice
mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of
age on election day.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore

incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he
possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).

Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by

naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 10465422 and during
the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of
Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding
the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives" due, according
to him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt
at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and
procedural defects.

Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor
by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections,
57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was
judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and
discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote
from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the Commission on
Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed through the
third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with
no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the
previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the
validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That
he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June
30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee -- should have been
proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of
Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he
garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already
reacquired his citizenship.

En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects,
which we shall now discuss in seriatim.

First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that "then
President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions
of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or
Executive Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which
the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best
leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution", adding that in
her memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the Special Committee on
Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President
Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings
within your functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI)
No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended."23

This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics
be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is
obvious that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her
29 | P a g e

memorandum -- based on the copy furnished us by Lee -- did not categorically and/or
impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any
legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the
other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and
unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently
inconsistent that they cannot co-exist".26

The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative

enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an
exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy
addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of
applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the
1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D.
725 but left it to the first Congress -- once created -- to deal with the matter. If she had
intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring
the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in
terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the exercise of
prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any
other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being
proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory
construction but on common sense as well.

Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation
proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 .
. . (and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which "prevented a
judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his
application for repatriation with the Office of the President in Malacañang Palace on
August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the Special
Committee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee
started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the
FORM that the Committee required. Under these circumstances, it could not be said
that there was "indecent haste" in the processing of his application.

Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on
Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent,"27 the
Solicitor General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such
allegation is simply baseless as there were many others who applied and were
considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a
Manifestation28 filed on April 3, 1996.

On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the
repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that
the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such
proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under
P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In
fact, P.D.
72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to
implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not
unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into
Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who
is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was
undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his
province prior to his naturalization in the United States -- a naturalization he insists was
made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and
could not in conscience embrace -- and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-
establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to
offer once more his talent and services to his people.
30 | P a g e

So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were
granted repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of
favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of
Frivaldo's repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself, and,
failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid,
nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the
citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the
date of his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in
G.R. 10465430 which held that "both the Local Government Code and the Constitution
require that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to public office." Obviously,
however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's
naturalization was valid or not -- and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court
held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office
should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now
directly rule on.

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:

* a citizen of the Philippines;

* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . .

where he intends to be elected;

* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day
of the election;

* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least

twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time
when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must
consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and
age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public

office,31 and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that
no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and
our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge
his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of
office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very
day32 the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began -- he was
therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the
functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was
already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that
should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the
purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished
from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government
Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why
then should such qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the
filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications --
unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence -- should
thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the
time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case, on June 30, 1995.
Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the
purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not
end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that
aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the
31 | P a g e

citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and
at the start of his term.

But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument34 to
the effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the
candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section
39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of
qualification, that he be a "registered voter". And, under the law35 a "voter" must be a
citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter -- much
less a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the time of such registration.

The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If
the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent
with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship
a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason
that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER,
even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the
voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to
reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter
IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected."
It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to
be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration -- not
the actual voting -- is the core of this "qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in
this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in
the area he seeks to govern -- and not anywhere else.

Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized -- and Lee has not disputed --
that he "was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has
been sustained as valid by judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct
on May 8, 1995."36

So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo
has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992,
then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the
court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he
voted in all the previous elections including on May 8, 1995."3 7

It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be

elected.

There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from
the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any voter,
presumably including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the
ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that
authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility
arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local
Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days
after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the
issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the
very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was
already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the
afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he
unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding
elections and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage.
Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.

But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of
Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
32 | P a g e

It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions40 to this general
rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it
CREATES NEW RIGHTS.

According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public
officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their
intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with
some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are
necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo,42 on the other hand, says that curative
statutes are
"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing
obligations . . . (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing
laws, and curb certain evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are
retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to
render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the
purpose the parties intended."

On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies
or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only
operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not
come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against
the retrospective operation of statutes.43

A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides
for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D.
725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law
(C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or
the termination of their marital status" and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973
Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain
her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such provision of the new Constitution does not
apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect."
Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women -- the right to re-acquire Filipino
citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725.
On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of
other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to
re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such
former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of
naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.

The Solicitor General44 argues:

By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96
SCRA 342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14
SCRA 1041).

In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing
naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women
are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and
natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other
causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63
for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.

Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned

legal aberrations and thus its provisions are considered essentially
remedial and curative.
33 | P a g e

In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is
unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive
operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where the
intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a
whole, or from the terms thereof."45 It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant
to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by
prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a
political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode,
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined
in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D.
725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute
must be so construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted,
so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in
the future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct,
unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional
guaranty."46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions
on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.

At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725
benefit Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo
lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation
even later, on August 17, 1994?

While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an
American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be
given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on
June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor,
August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of
the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events -- i.e., situations and
transactions existing even before the law came into being -- in order to benefit the
greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and
exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative
intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more
reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations,
events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation
granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date
of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or
would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no
showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result
from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result
the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach
of some constitutional guaranty.

Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a
liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality
should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.

Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to
applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special
Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any
substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo --
having already renounced his American citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for
causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and
justice to prevail.4 7

And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and
grant applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same
were filed.48 The fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the
likelihood of prejudice to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation.
Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is possible only
where a person's repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the
34 | P a g e

government arising in connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing
only during the interregnum between application and approval, a situation that is not
present in the instant case.

And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated,
should now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in
treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his
application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession
of the nationality qualification -- whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or
the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20,
1995) would become moot.

Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter
would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been
repatriated -- i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous
registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said date.

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec.
40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective
local position?"49 We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to
hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance
and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote
that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship -- long
before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim -- when he abandoned
and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino
citizenship."50

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:51

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American
citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995.
Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government."

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that
such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of
capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse.52

The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship

a Continuing Disqualification?

Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division in
SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11,
1995 "became final and executory after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining
order having been issued by this Honorable Court.54 Hence, before Lee "was
proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and
executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's two rulings (which
Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also
become final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial
pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen absolutely and for all time
disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines."

We do not agree.

It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was
rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in
connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final
35 | P a g e

and can no longer be changed. In the words of the respondent Commission (Second
Division) in its assailed Resolution:55

The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that
Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of
the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record of any "final
judgment" of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8,
1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995
(implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R.
Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen "having been declared by
the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the
Philippines." This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in
connection with the 1992 elections.

Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a

person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by
law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held:

Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a

judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally
not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again, as the occasion demands.

The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction

Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317

Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in
SPC No. 95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be
entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
warranto case". Again, Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but
that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6,
1995 -- "beyond the 5-day reglementary period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's
"recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo warranto action."

This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the Comelec ample
power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective . . . provincial . . . officials." Instead of
dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its
constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it to say that this Court has invariably
recognized the Commission's authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of
proclamations -- of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one.58 Thus, in Mentang
vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled:

The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a

pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of
cases holding that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be
entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has been
proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs.
COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.)
This rule, however, is premised on an assumption that the proclamation is
no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office
cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of
nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs.
COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)

The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done
within ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was
filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec
correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.
36 | P a g e

The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?

Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following
reasons:

First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the fact remains that he (Lee)
was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a
second placer, . . . just that, a second placer."

In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this
Court in the aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows:

The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and
in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness
within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of
the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have
waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying
their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible
candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected.

But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:

But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been
shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known
as an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of
such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less
than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for
the office of the city Payor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying
due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet
become final and subject to the final outcome of this case.

The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this
case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when
the Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election
day as there was in both cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason
Comelec issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and
several others can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.

Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the
electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged
disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in other
words, that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their
voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-
governor -- and not Lee -- should be pro- claimed, since in losing the election, Lee was,
to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is
the emphatic teaching of Labo:

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority

votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate
cannot be deemed elected to the office.

Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired his

citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995
elections, he -- not Lee -- should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was
patently erroneous and should now be corrected.

The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the

Election Code Mandatory?
37 | P a g e

In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec
(Second Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May
11, 1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were
rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78, of the Omnibus
Election Code which reads as follows:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of

candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided after notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)

This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed
superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on
December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc63 on February 23, 1996; which both upheld his
election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for
disqualifications even after the elections, thus:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has been

declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he
is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong. (emphasis supplied)

Refutation of
Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent

In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that
President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a
suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a
suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction because the said issuance is not
a statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law.
The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo
case;64 viz., "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725,
Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by . . . repatriation". He also contends that by
allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in
effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a
non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his
repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may have been
in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did
not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the subjects of such
previous rulings.

Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question
the ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of
a false material representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then
states his disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really
have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295
that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were
invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen days before the election" as
prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the
Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646
38 | P a g e

authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the elections." In
spite of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory",
we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No.
120295". One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to
deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period prescribed
therein. The present case however deals with the period during which the Comelec
may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen
day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by the
Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the
25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.

Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual
circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that
such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even
the second Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring
citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for
purposes of determining his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is
settled. But his supervening repatriation has changed his political status -- not in 1988
or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.

Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his
repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose
American citizenship". Since our courts are charged only with the duty of determining
who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are
not Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who
are its own citizens -- not who are the citizens of other countries.65 The issue here is: the
Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not
been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such
finding is binding and final.

The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in
all three previous elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility
for being an American was publicly known". First, there is absolutely no empirical
evidence for such "public" knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be
true post facto only of the last two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now
this Court were/are still deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995
elections. How then can there be such "public" knowledge?

Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the
qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that
the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by
candidates, not merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the
latest. We see it differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official"
while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates". If the qualifications under par. (a) were
intended to apply to "candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would have
said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if
Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at election
day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in
pars. (b) to (f) far other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.

Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's
repatriation on the ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only
after taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. We do not question what the provision states. We hold however
that the provision should be understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the
applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or
repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of his
application therefor.

In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective"
in reference to Section 39 of the Local Authority Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice
39 | P a g e

Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were
already taken up rather extensively earlier in this Decision.

Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to
uphold the Rule of Law." We agree -- we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT
the issue here. The issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case
so it can be followed, so it can rule!

At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of
how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the
spirit, the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice;
in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the
voters' obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of
popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed,
to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute
unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience.

EPILOGUE

In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be
possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the
start of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to
be in full force and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed
expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have
been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial
or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and
the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to
give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he
abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his
application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up
his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of
Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should have
been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship
retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to
have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely
consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing
disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we
emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and
jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.

This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our
country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people,66 for in case of doubt,
political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely
expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot
stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:

. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the

end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections (citations omitted).67

The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and
refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the
importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our
democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral
choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would
give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective
offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge
a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic68 to constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people,
would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
40 | P a g e

traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this
undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.

In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The
Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold
him still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a
voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the
Comelec that he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent
dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But
the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as
a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled
against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh
anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context
consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine
political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of
the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty
and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and
sought to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted
for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his
certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be
overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his
nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact
and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to
re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty
to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of
justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was
assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the
world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once
more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal
interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over
and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve
to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:

(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of
the respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.

(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic.
In any event, it has no merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

Melo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concurs in the result.

Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza, J., took no part.

 
41 | P a g e

Separate Opinions

PUNO, J., concurring:

I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban which is pro-people

and pierces the myopia of legalism. Upholding the sovereign will of the people which is
the be-all and the end-all of republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure time
and its tempest.

The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this
reason, it appears as the first in our declaration of principles and state policies. Thus,
section 1 of Article II of our fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a
democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them." The same principle served as the bedrock of our 1973
and 1935 Constitutions.1 It is one of the few principles whose truth has been cherished
by the Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV of the U.S. Constitution makes it
a duty of the Federal government to guarantee to every state a "republican form of
government." With understandable fervor, the American authorities imposed
republicanism as the cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being crafted by its
Filipino framers.2

Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987 Constitution is more
people-oriented. Thus, section 4 of Article II provides as a state policy that the prime
duty of the Government is "to serve and protect the people." Section 1, Article XI also
provides that ". . . public officers . . . must at all times be accountable to the people . . ."
Sections 15 and 1 of Article XIII define the role and rights of people's organizations.
Section 5(2) of Article XVI mandates that "[t]he state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit
and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the
performance of their duty." And section 2 of Article XVII provides that "amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative . . ."
All these provisions and more are intended to breathe more life to the sovereignty of our
people.

To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions
are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our
Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be
supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to govern.3 Former Dean Vicente
Sinco4 states that an essential quality of sovereignty is legal omnipotence, viz.: "Legal
theory establishes certain essential qualities inherent in the nature of sovereignty. The
first is legal omnipotence. This means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and
absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has the power to determine exclusively
its legal competence. Its powers are original, not derivative. It is the sole judge of what it
should do at any given time."5 Citing Barker,6 he adds that a more amplified definition of
sovereignty is that of "a final power of final legal adjustment of all legal issues." The
U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same thought in the landmark case of Yick Wo
v. Hopkins,7 where it held that ". . . sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for
it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers
are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the
people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts."

In our Constitution, the people established a representative democracy as distinguished

from a pure democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz explains:8

xxx xxx xxx

A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for

the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern
themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and
42 | P a g e

renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries

who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving
for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the
option of their principal. Obviously, a republican government is a
responsible government whose officials hold and discharge their position
as a public trust and shall, according to the Constitution, "at all times be
accountable to the people" they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a
republican government it is almost needless to state, is the promotion of
the common welfare according to the will of the people themselves.

I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Davide. I agree that sovereignty
is indivisible but it need not always be exercised by the people together, all the
time.9 For this reason, the Constitution and our laws provide when the entire electorate
or only some of them can elect those who make our laws and those who execute our
laws. Thus, the entire electorate votes for our senators but only our district electorates
vote for our congressmen, only our provincial electorates vote for the members of our
provincial boards, only our city electorates vote for our city councilors, and only our
municipal electorates vote for our councilors. Also, the entire electorate votes for our
President and Vice-President but only our provincial electorates vote for our governors,
only our city electorates vote for our mayors, and only our municipal electorates vote for
our mayors. By defining and delimiting the classes of voters who can exercise the
sovereignty of the people in a given election, it cannot be claimed that said sovereignty
has been fragmented.

It is my respectful submission that the issue in the case at bar is not whether the people
of Sorsogon should be given the right to defy the law by allowing Frivaldo to sit as their
governor. Rather, the issue is: whether the will of the voters of Sorsogon clearly
choosing Frivaldo as governor ought to be given a decisive value considering
the uncertainty of the law on when a candidate ought to satisfy the qualification of
citizenship. The uncertainty of law and jurisprudence, both here and abroad, on this
legal issue cannot be denied. In the United States, 10 there are two (2) principal schools
of thought on the matter. One espouses the view that a candidate must possess the
qualifications for office at the time of his election. The other ventures the view that the
candidate should satisfy the qualifications at the time he assumes the powers of the
office. I am unaware of any Philippine decision that has squarely resolved this difficult
question of law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban adhered to the second school
of thought while Mr. Justice Davide dissents.

I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in interpreting our law on the matter for
this is vital to dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my opinion can bring about ill
effects to the State. Mr. Justice Davide's fear is based on the assumption that Frivaldo
continues to be disqualified and we cannot allow him to sit as governor without
transgressing the law. I do not concede this assumption for as stressed above, courts
have been sharply divided by this mind boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not see
how we can derogate on the sovereignty of the people by according more weight to the
votes of the people of Sorsogon.

Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of Batanes stage a rebellion, we
cannot prosecute them "because of the doctrine of people's sovereignty." With due
respect, the analogy is not appropriate. In his hypothetical case, rebellion
is concededly a crime, a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, an offense
against the sovereignty of our people. In the case at bar, it cannot be held with certitude
that the people of Sorsogon violated the law by voting for Frivaldo as governor.
Frivaldo's name was in the list of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for governor.
At that time too, Frivaldo was taking all steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. And
even our jurisprudence has not settled the issue when a candidate should possess the
qualification of citizenship. Since the meaning of the law is arguable then and now, I
cannot imagine how it will be disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance in the case at
bar in favor of the people of Sorsogon.

In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of our people should be resolutory of
the case at bar which is one of its kind, unprecedented in our political history. For three
43 | P a g e

(3) times, Frivaldo ran as governor of the province of Sorsogon. For two (2) times, he
was disqualified on the ground of citizenship. The people of Sorsogon voted for him as
their governor despite his disqualification. The people never waffled in their support for
Frivaldo. In 1988, they gave him a winning margin of 27,000; in 1992, they gave him a
winning spread of 57,000; in 1995, he posted a margin of 20,000. Clearly then, Frivaldo
is the overwhelming choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election cases, we should
strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its law with the will of the
sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must respect the will
of the people. For in the eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an enfranchised
citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate source of established
authority."11 The choice of the governed on who shall be their governor merits the
highest consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the sovereignty of
the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We
cannot fail by making the people succeed.

DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the conclusions reached by my

distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, I find myself unable to join
him.

I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldo's repatriation was void, but not on the ground
that President Corazon C. Aquino's 27 March 1987 memorandum "effectively repealed"
P.D. No. 725. In my view, the said memorandum only suspended the implementation of
the latter decree by divesting the Special Committee on Naturalization of its authority to
further act on grants of citizenship under LOI No. 270, as amended, P.D. No. 836, as
amended; P.D. No. 1379; and "any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and
regulations." A reading of the last paragraph of the memorandum can lead to no other
conclusion, thus:

In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special

Committee on Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist from
undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of
responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instruction No. 270 dated April 11,
1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated December 3, 1975,
as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978,
relative to the grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other
related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations. (emphasis
supplied)

It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only refer to those related to LOI No.
270, P.D. No. 836, and P.D. No. 1379. There is no doubt in my mind that P.D. No. 725
is one such "related law" as it involves the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by
repatriation and designates the Special Committee on Naturalization created under LOI
No. 270 to receive and act on (i.e., approve or disapprove) applications under the said
decree. The power of President Aquino to suspend these issuances by virtue of the 27
March 1987 memorandum is beyond question considering that under Section 6, Article
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, she exercised legislative power until the Congress
established therein convened on the fourth Monday of July 1987.

I disagree with the view expressed in the ponencia that the memorandum of 27 March

1987 was merely a declaration of "executive policy," and not an exercise of legislative
power. LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, P.D. No. 1379 and "any other related laws," such as
P.D. No. 725, were issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his
legislative powers -- not executive power. These laws relate to the acquisition (by
naturalization) and reacquisition (by repatriation) of Philippine citizenship, and in light of
Sections 1(4) and 3, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution (naturalization and reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship shall be in accordance with law), it is indubitable that these
subjects are a matter of legislative prerogative. In the same vein, the creation of the
44 | P a g e

Special Committee on Naturalization by LOI No. 270 and the conferment of the power to
accept and act on applications under P.D. No. 725 are clearly legislative acts.

Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist order and

the reactivation or revival of the Committee can be done only by legislative fiat, i.e., by
Congress, since the President had long lost his authority to exercise "legislative power."
Considering that Congress has not seen it fit to do so, the President cannot, in the
exercise of executive power, lift the cease and desist order nor
reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee. A multo fortiori, the Committee cannot
validly accept Frivaldo's application for repatriation and approve it.

II

Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldo's repatriation is valid, it did not "cure his lack of
citizenship." I depart from the view in the ponencia that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement
must be met, and that being the case, then it suffices that citizenship be possessed
upon commencement of the term of the office involved; therefore, since Frivaldo "re-
assumed" his Philippine citizenship at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995 and the term of office
of Governor commenced at 12:00 noon of that day, he had, therefore, complied with the
citizenship requirement.

In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of elective local

officials and not those of an elected local official. These adjectives are not synonymous,
as the ponencia seems to suggest. The first refers to the nature of the office, which
requires the process of voting by the electorate involved; while the second refers to a
victorious candidate for an elective office. The section unquestionably refers
to elective -- not elected -- local officials. It falls under Title Two entitled ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph (a)
thereof begins with the phrase "An elective local official," while paragraphs (b) to (f)
thereof speak of candidates. It reads as follows:

Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of

the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of

the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent

component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least
twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod

or sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on
election day.

(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the

sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on
election day.

(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15)

years of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election
day (emphasis supplied)
45 | P a g e

It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of

candidates for elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may the
section be construed to mean that possession of qualifications should be
reckoned from the commencement of the term of office of the elected candidate.

For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the time when the
citizenship requirement must be possessed. I submit that the requirement must be
satisfied, or that Philippine citizenship must be possessed, not merely at the
commencement of the term, but at an earlier time, the latest being election day itself.
Section 39 is not at all ambiguous nor uncertain that it meant this to be, as one basic
qualification of an elective local official is that he be "A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE
BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . . WHERE HE INTENDS TO
VOTE." This simply means that he possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right
of suffrage. The fundamental qualification for the exercise of this sovereign right is the
possession of Philippine citizenship. No less than the Constitution makes it the first
qualification, as Section 1, Article V thereof provides:

Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not

otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and
who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election. . . . (emphasis supplied)

And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881)
expressly provides for the qualifications of a voter. Thus:

Sec. 117 Qualifications of a voter. -- Every citizen of the Philippines, not

otherwise disqualified by law, eighteen years of age or over, who shall
have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the city or municipality
wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
the election, may be a registered voter. (emphasis supplied)

It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldo's election as Governor in the 1988
and 1992 elections on the ground that for lack of Philippine citizenship -- he being a
naturalized citizen of the United States of America -- he was DISQUALIFIED to be
elected as such and to serve the position (Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174
SCRA 245 [1989]; Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994]).
This disqualification inexorably nullified Frivaldo's registration as a voter and declared it
void ab initio. Our judgments therein were self-executory and no further act, e.g., a
COMELEC order to cancel his registration as a voter or the physical destruction of his
voter's certificate, was necessary for the ineffectivity. Thus, he was never considered a
registered voter for the elections of May 1992, and May 1995, as there is no showing
that Frivaldo registered anew as a voter for the latter elections. Even if he did -- in
obvious defiance of his decreed disqualification -- this did not make him a Filipino
citizen, hence it was equally void ab initio. That he filed his certificate of candidacy for
the 1995 elections and was even allowed to vote therein were of no moment. Neither
act made him a Filipino citizen nor nullified the judgments of this Court. On the contrary,
said acts made a mockery of our judgments. For the Court now to validate Frivaldo's
registration as a voter despite the judgments of disqualification is to modify the said
judgments by making their effectivity and enforceability dependent on a COMELEC
order cancelling his registration as a voter, or on the physical destruction of his
certificate of registration as a voter which, of course, was never our intention. Moreover,
to sanction Frivaldo's registration as a voter would be to sacrifice substance in favor of
form (the piece of paper that is the book of voters or list of voters or voter's ID), and abet
the COMELEC's incompetence in failing to cancel Frivaldo's registration and allowing
him to vote.

The second reason in the ponencia as to why the citizenship disqualification should be

reckoned not from the date of the election nor the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
but from the date of proclamation, is that the only available remedy to question the
ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a candidate is a petition for quo warranto which, under
46 | P a g e

Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, may be filed only within ten days from
proclamation and not earlier.

I beg to differ.

Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a candidate's

ineligibility for public office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows the filing of
a petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy on the ground that
any material representation contained therein, as required by Section 74, is false.
Section 74, in turn, requires that the person filing the certificate of candidacy must
state, inter alia, that he is eligible for the office, which means that he has all the
qualifications (including, of course, fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none of the
disqualifications as provided by law. The petition under Section 78 may be filed at any
time not later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The section
reads in full as follows:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.

This remedy was recognized in Loong vs. Commission on Elections (216 SCRA

760, 768 [1992]), where this Court held:

Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate

fails to file the petition within the 25-day period Section 78 of the Code for
whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave him completely helpless
as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by
filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation
of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code.
Section 1, Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure similarly provides
that any voter contesting the election of any regional, provincial or city
official on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the Electoral Contest
Adjudication Department. The petition may be filed within ten (10) days
from the date the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).

Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the filing of a
petition for disqualification on the ground of failure to possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided by the Constitution or by existing laws, "any day after the last day
for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation."
Sections 1 and 3 thereof provide:

Rule 25 -- Disqualification of Candidates

Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess
all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or
by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day after the
last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation.
47 | P a g e

While the validity of this rule insofar as it concerns petitions for disqualification on
the ground of lack of all qualifications may be doubtful, its invalidity is not in issue
here.

In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take up the last issue grappled within
the ponencia, viz., is Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code mandatory? The answer
is provided in Loong.

We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent Commission that

in the light of the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646, a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
filed even beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code,
as long as it is filed within a reasonable time from the discovery of the
ineligibility.

Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification case. Any candidate who

has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.

Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a

Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove
provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25-

day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for filing the appropriate
action to cancel a certificate of candidacy on account of any false
representation made therein. On the contrary, said Section 7 affirms and
reiterates Section 78 of the Code.

We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case

which may be based on grounds other than that provided under Section
78 of the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 also makes the effects
referred to in Section 6 applicable to disqualification cases filed under
Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No.
6646 is mention made of the period within which these disqualification
cases may be filed. This is because there are provisions in the Code
which supply the periods within which a petition relating to disqualification
of candidates must be filed, such as Section 78, already discussed, and
Section 253 on petitions for quo warranto.

I then disagree with the asseveration in the ponencia that Section 78 is merely directory

because Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the COMELEC to try and decide
petitions for disqualification even after elections. I submit that Section 6 refers to
disqualifications under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and
consequently modifies Section 72 thereof. As such, the proper court or the COMELEC
are granted the authority to continue hearing the case after the election, and during the
pendency of the case, suspend the proclamation of the victorious candidate, if the
evidence against him is strong. Sections 12, 68, and 72 of the Code provide:
48 | P a g e

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by

competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for
which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months
or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon
or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed

removed upon declaration by competent authority that said insanity or
incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five
years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he
again becomes disqualified.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in

which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty
of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and
cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate,
or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)

Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission

and the courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of
violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not
later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is
sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified

shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.
Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the
provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation
and assumption to office.

III

Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not persuaded by the arguments in
support of the thesis that Frivaldo's repatriation may be given retroactive effect, as such
goes against the spirit and letter of P.D. No. 725. The spirit adheres to the principle that
acquisition or re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship is not a right, but a mere privilege.
Before the advent of P.D. No. 725, only the following could apply for repatriation: (a)
Army, Navy, or Air Corps deserters; and (b) a woman who lost her citizenship by reason
of her marriage to an alien after the death of her spouse (Section 2[2], C.A. No. 63).
P.D. NO. 725 expanded this to include Filipino women who lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens even before the death of their alien husbands, or the
termination of their marital status and to natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their
Philippine citizenship but subsequently desired to reacquire the latter.
49 | P a g e

Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 expressly provides that repatriation
takes effect only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
thus:

. . . may reacquire Philippine citizenship . . . by applying with the Special

Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and,
if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, AFTER WHICH THEY SHALL BE
DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.
(emphasis and capitalization supplied)

Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation under

the decree are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3)
taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only UPON
TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to
have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking
to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not have
explicitly provided otherwise.

This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this Court's pronouncement in the

first Frivaldo case that what reacquisition of Filipino citizenship requires is an act
"formally rejecting [the] adopted state and reaffirming . . . allegiance to the Philippines."
That act meant nothing less than taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. If we now take this revision of doctrine to its logical end, then it would also
mean that if Frivaldo had chosen and reacquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization
or through Congressional action, such would retroact to the filing of the petition for
naturalization or the bill granting him Philippine citizenship. This is a proposition which
both the first and second Frivaldo cases soundly rejected.

The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support of the proposition that P.D. No.
725 can be given retroactive effect is its alleged curative or remedial nature.

Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of legal hermeneutics may P.D. No.
725 be characterized as a curative or remedial statute:

Curative or remedial statutes are healing acts. They are remedial by

curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations.
The rule in regard to curative statutes is that if the thing omitted or failed to
be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to be removed or made
harmless, is something the legislature might have dispensed with by a
previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one.

Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in

existing laws, and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable a person
to carry into effect that which they have designed and intended, but has
failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory
disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which,
before the enactment of the statute, was invalid. (RUBEN E. AGPALO,
Statutory Construction, Second ed. [1990], 270-271, citations omitted).

P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship lost through the
marriage of a Filipina to an alien and through naturalization in a foreign country of
natural-born Filipino citizens. It involves then the substantive, nay primordial, right of
citizenship. To those for whom it is intended, it means, in reality, the acquisition of "a
new right," as the ponencia cannot but concede. Therefore, it may not be said to merely
remedy or cure a defect considering that one who has lost Philippine citizenship does
not have the right to reacquire it. As earlier stated, the Constitution provides that
citizenship, once lost, may only be reacquired in the manner provided by law. Moreover,
it has also been observed that:

The idea is implicit from many of the cases that remedial statutes are
statutes relating to procedure and not substantive rights. (Sutherland,
50 | P a g e

Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, Third ed. [1943], §5704 at 74, citations

omitted).

If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that P.D. No. 725 is curative or remedial
statute, it would be an inexcusable error to give it a retroactive effect since it explicitly
provides the date of its effectivity. Thus:

This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy five.

Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the reacquisition of Philippine

citizenship, then nothing therein supports such theory, for as the decree itself
unequivocally provides, it is only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines that the applicant is DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP.

IV

Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that taking the oath of allegiance
retroacted to the date of Frivaldo's application for repatriation, the same could not be
said insofar as it concerned the United States of America, of which he was a citizen. For
under the laws of the United States of America, Frivaldo remained an American national
until he renounced his citizenship and allegiance thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995,
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Section 401 of
the Nationality Act of 1940 of the United States of America provides that a person who
is a national of the United States of America, whether by birth or naturalization, loses his
nationality by, inter alia, "(b) Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal
declaration of allegiance to a foreign state" (SIDNEY KANSAS, U.S. Immigration
Exclusion and Deportation and Citizenship of the United States of America, Third ed.,
[1948] 341-342). It follows then that on election day and until the hour of the
commencement of the term for which he was elected - noon of 30 June 1995 as per
Section 43 of the Local Government Code - Frivaldo possessed dual citizenship, viz.,
(a) as an American citizen; and (b) as a Filipino citizen through the adoption of the
theory that the effects of his taking the oath of allegiance were retrospective. Hence, he
was disqualified to run for Governor for yet another reason: possession of dual
citizenship, in accordance with Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code.

The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be considered STATELESS on the

basis of his claim that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenship - long before May 8, 1985" - is untenable, for the following reasons: first, it is
based on Frivaldo's unproven, self-serving allegation; second, informal renunciation or
abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship; and third, simply put, never
did the status of a STATELESS person attach to Frivaldo.

Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the status of individuals stripped of their
nationality by their former government without having an opportunity to acquire another;
or de facto, which is the status of individuals possessed of a nationality whose country
does not give them protection outside their own country, and who are commonly, albeit
imprecisely, referred to as refugees (JORGE R. COQUIA, et al., Conflict of Laws Cases,
Materials and Comments, 1995 ed., 290).

Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Regarding the
Status of Stateless Persons (Philippine Treaty Series, Compiled and Annotated by
Haydee B. Yorac, vol. III, 363), a stateless person is defined as "a person who is not
considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law." However, it has
not been shown that the United States of America ever ceased to consider Frivaldo its
national at any time before he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 30 June 1995.
51 | P a g e

VI

Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno. I am absolutely happy to join him in his statement that "[t]he
sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution" and that the
said Constitution is "more people-oriented," "borne [as it is] out of the 1986 people
power EDSA revolution." I would even go further by saying that this Constitution is pro-
God (Preamble), pro-people (Article II, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16; Article XI, Section
1, Article XII, Sections 1, 6; Article XIII, Sections 1, 11, 15, 16, 18; Article XVI, Sections
5(2), 6), pro-Filipino (Article XII, Sections 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14; Article XIV, Sections 1,
4(2), 13; Article XVI, Section 11), pro-poor (Article II, Sections 9, 10, 18, 21; Article XII,
Sections 1, 2(3); Article XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), pro-life (Article II,
Section 12), and pro-family (Article II, Section 12; Article XV).

Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the principle of sovereignty beyond
what I perceive to be the reasonable constitutional parameters. The doctrine of people's
sovereignty is founded on the principles of democracy and republicanism and refers
exclusively to the sovereignty of the people of the Philippines. Section 1 of Article II is
quite clear on this, thus:

Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty

resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

And the Preamble makes it clear when it solemnly opens it with a clause
"We, the sovereign Filipino people . . ." Thus, this sovereignty is an attribute of
the Filipino people as one people, one body.

That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be fragmentized by looking at it as

the supreme authority of the people of any of the political subdivisions to determine their
own destiny; neither can we convert and treat every fragment as the whole. In such a
case, this Court would provide the formula for the division and destruction of the State
and render the Government ineffective and inutile. To illustrate the evil, we may
consider the enforcement of laws or the pursuit of a national policy by the executive
branch of the government, or the execution of a judgment by the courts. If these are
opposed by the overwhelming majority of the people of a certain province, or even a
municipality, it would necessarily follow that the law, national policy, or judgment must
not be enforced, implemented, or executed in the said province or municipality. More
concretely, if, for instance, the vast majority of the people of Batanes rise publicly and
take up arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance
to the said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any
part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives,
then those who did so -- and which are composed of the vast majority of the people of
Batanes -- a political subdivision -- cannot be prosecuted for or be held guilty of
rebellion in violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code because of the doctrine of
peoples' sovereignty. Indeed, the expansion of the doctrine of sovereignty by investing
upon the people of a mere political subdivision that which the Constitution places in the
entire Filipino people, may be disastrous to the Nation.

So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the concurring opinion. Thus, simply
because Frivaldo had obtained a margin of 20,000 votes over his closest rival, Lee, i.e.,
a vast majority of the voters of Sorsogon had expressed their sovereign will for the
former, then this Court must yield to that will and must, therefore, allow to be set aside,
for Frivaldo, not just the laws on qualifications of candidates and elective officials and
naturalization and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, but even the final and binding
decisions of this Court affecting him.

This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. I vote then to DISMISS G.R. No.
120295 and GRANT G.R. No. 123755.

 
52 | P a g e

Separate Opinions

PUNO, J., concurring:

I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban which is pro-people

and pierces the myopia of legalism. Upholding the sovereign will of the people which is
the be-all and the end-all of republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure time
and its tempest.

The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this
reason, it appears as the first in our declaration of principles and state policies. Thus,
section 1 of Article II of our fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a
democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them." The same principle served as the bedrock of our 1973
and 1935 Constitutions.1 It is one of the few principles whose truth has been cherished
by the Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV of the U.S. Constitution makes it
a duty of the Federal government to guarantee to every state a "republican form of
government." With understandable fervor, the American authorities imposed
republicanism as the cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being crafted by its
Filipino framers.2

Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987 Constitution is more
people-oriented. Thus, section 4 of Article II provides as a state policy that the prime
duty of the Government is "to serve and protect the people." Section 1, Article XI also
provides that ". . . public officers . . . must at all times be accountable to the people . . ."
Sections 15 and 1 of Article XIII define the role and rights of people's organizations.
Section 5(2) of Article XVI mandates that "[t]he state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit
and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the
performance of their duty." And section 2 of Article XVII provides that "amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative . . ."
All these provisions and more are intended to breathe more life to the sovereignty of our
people.

To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions
are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our
Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be
supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to govern.3 Former Dean Vicente
Sinco4 states that an essential quality of sovereignty is legal omnipotence, viz.: "Legal
theory establishes certain essential qualities inherent in the nature of sovereignty. The
first is legal omnipotence. This means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and
absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has the power to determine exclusively
its legal competence. Its powers are original, not derivative. It is the sole judge of what it
should do at any given time."5 Citing Barker,6 he adds that a more amplified definition of
sovereignty is that of "a final power of final legal adjustment of all legal issues." The
U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same thought in the landmark case of Yick Wo
v. Hopkins,7 where it held that ". . . sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for
it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers
are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the
people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts."

In our Constitution, the people established a representative democracy as distinguished

from a pure democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz explains:8

xxx xxx xxx

A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for

the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern
themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and
renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries
who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving
for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the
option of their principal. Obviously, a republican government is a
53 | P a g e

responsible government whose officials hold and discharge their position

as a public trust and shall, according to the Constitution, "at all times be
accountable to the people" they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a
republican government it is almost needless to state, is the promotion of
the common welfare according to the will of the people themselves.

I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Davide. I agree that sovereignty
is indivisible but it need not always be exercised by the people together, all the
time.9 For this reason, the Constitution and our laws provide when the entire electorate
or only some of them can elect those who make our laws and those who execute our
laws. Thus, the entire electorate votes for our senators but only our district electorates
vote for our congressmen, only our provincial electorates vote for the members of our
provincial boards, only our city electorates vote for our city councilors, and only our
municipal electorates vote for our councilors. Also, the entire electorate votes for our
President and Vice-President but only our provincial electorates vote for our governors,
only our city electorates vote for our mayors, and only our municipal electorates vote for
our mayors. By defining and delimiting the classes of voters who can exercise the
sovereignty of the people in a given election, it cannot be claimed that said sovereignty
has been fragmented.

It is my respectful submission that the issue in the case at bar is not whether the people
of Sorsogon should be given the right to defy the law by allowing Frivaldo to sit as their
governor. Rather, the issue is: whether the will of the voters of Sorsogon clearly
choosing Frivaldo as governor ought to be given a decisive value considering
the uncertainty of the law on when a candidate ought to satisfy the qualification of
citizenship. The uncertainty of law and jurisprudence, both here and abroad, on this
legal issue cannot be denied. In the United States, 10 there are two (2) principal schools
of thought on the matter. One espouses the view that a candidate must possess the
qualifications for office at the time of his election. The other ventures the view that the
candidate should satisfy the qualifications at the time he assumes the powers of the
office. I am unaware of any Philippine decision that has squarely resolved this difficult
question of law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban adhered to the second school
of thought while Mr. Justice Davide dissents.

I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in interpreting our law on the matter for
this is vital to dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my opinion can bring about ill
effects to the State. Mr. Justice Davide's fear is based on the assumption that Frivaldo
continues to be disqualified and we cannot allow him to sit as governor without
transgressing the law. I do not concede this assumption for as stressed above, courts
have been sharply divided by this mind boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not see
how we can derogate on the sovereignty of the people by according more weight to the
votes of the people of Sorsogon.

Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of Batanes stage a rebellion, we
cannot prosecute them "because of the doctrine of people's sovereignty." With due
respect, the analogy is not appropriate. In his hypothetical case, rebellion
is concededly a crime, a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, an offense
against the sovereignty of our people. In the case at bar, it cannot be held with certitude
that the people of Sorsogon violated the law by voting for Frivaldo as governor.
Frivaldo's name was in the list of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for governor.
At that time too, Frivaldo was taking all steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. And
even our jurisprudence has not settled the issue when a candidate should possess the
qualification of citizenship. Since the meaning of the law is arguable then and now, I
cannot imagine how it will be disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance in the case at
bar in favor of the people of Sorsogon.

In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of our people should be resolutory of
the case at bar which is one of its kind, unprecedented in our political history. For three
(3) times, Frivaldo ran as governor of the province of Sorsogon. For two (2) times, he
was disqualified on the ground of citizenship. The people of Sorsogon voted for him as
their governor despite his disqualification. The people never waffled in their support for
Frivaldo. In 1988, they gave him a winning margin of 27,000; in 1992, they gave him a
54 | P a g e

winning spread of 57,000; in 1995, he posted a margin of 20,000. Clearly then, Frivaldo
is the overwhelming choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election cases, we should
strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its law with the will of the
sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must respect the will
of the people. For in the eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an enfranchised
citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate source of established
authority."11 The choice of the governed on who shall be their governor merits the
highest consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the sovereignty of
the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We
cannot fail by making the people succeed.

DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the conclusions reached by my

distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, I find myself unable to join
him.

I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldo's repatriation was void, but not on the ground
that President Corazon C. Aquino's 27 March 1987 memorandum "effectively repealed"
P.D. No. 725. In my view, the said memorandum only suspended the implementation of
the latter decree by divesting the Special Committee on Naturalization of its authority to
further act on grants of citizenship under LOI No. 270, as amended, P.D. No. 836, as
amended; P.D. No. 1379; and "any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and
regulations." A reading of the last paragraph of the memorandum can lead to no other
conclusion, thus:

In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special

Committee on Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist from
undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of
responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instruction No. 270 dated April 11,
1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated December 3, 1975,
as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978,
relative to the grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other
related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations. (emphasis
supplied)

It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only refer to those related to LOI No.
270, P.D. No. 836, and P.D. No. 1379. There is no doubt in my mind that P.D. No. 725
is one such "related law" as it involves the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by
repatriation and designates the Special Committee on Naturalization created under LOI
No. 270 to receive and act on (i.e., approve or disapprove) applications under the said
decree. The power of President Aquino to suspend these issuances by virtue of the 27
March 1987 memorandum is beyond question considering that under Section 6, Article
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, she exercised legislative power until the Congress
established therein convened on the fourth Monday of July 1987.

I disagree with the view expressed in the ponencia that the memorandum of 27 March

1987 was merely a declaration of "executive policy," and not an exercise of legislative
power. LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, P.D. No. 1379 and "any other related laws," such as
P.D. No. 725, were issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his
legislative powers -- not executive power. These laws relate to the acquisition (by
naturalization) and reacquisition (by repatriation) of Philippine citizenship, and in light of
Sections 1(4) and 3, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution (naturalization and reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship shall be in accordance with law), it is indubitable that these
subjects are a matter of legislative prerogative. In the same vein, the creation of the
Special Committee on Naturalization by LOI No. 270 and the conferment of the power to
accept and act on applications under P.D. No. 725 are clearly legislative acts.

Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist order and

the reactivation or revival of the Committee can be done only by legislative fiat, i.e., by
55 | P a g e

Congress, since the President had long lost his authority to exercise "legislative power."
Considering that Congress has not seen it fit to do so, the President cannot, in the
exercise of executive power, lift the cease and desist order nor
reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee. A multo fortiori, the Committee cannot
validly accept Frivaldo's application for repatriation and approve it.

II

Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldo's repatriation is valid, it did not "cure his lack of
citizenship." I depart from the view in the ponencia that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement
must be met, and that being the case, then it suffices that citizenship be possessed
upon commencement of the term of the office involved; therefore, since Frivaldo "re-
assumed" his Philippine citizenship at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995 and the term of office
of Governor commenced at 12:00 noon of that day, he had, therefore, complied with the
citizenship requirement.

In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of elective local

officials and not those of an elected local official. These adjectives are not synonymous,
as the ponencia seems to suggest. The first refers to the nature of the office, which
requires the process of voting by the electorate involved; while the second refers to a
victorious candidate for an elective office. The section unquestionably refers
to elective -- not elected -- local officials. It falls under Title Two entitled ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph (a)
thereof begins with the phrase "An elective local official," while paragraphs (b) to (f)
thereof speak of candidates. It reads as follows:

Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of

the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of

the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent

component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least
twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod

or sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on
election day.

(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the

sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on
election day.

(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15)

years of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election
day (emphasis supplied)

It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of

candidates for elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may the
section be construed to mean that possession of qualifications should be
reckoned from the commencement of the term of office of the elected candidate.
56 | P a g e

For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the time when the
citizenship requirement must be possessed. I submit that the requirement must be
satisfied, or that Philippine citizenship must be possessed, not merely at the
commencement of the term, but at an earlier time, the latest being election day itself.
Section 39 is not at all ambiguous nor uncertain that it meant this to be, as one basic
qualification of an elective local official is that he be "A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE
BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . . WHERE HE INTENDS TO
VOTE." This simply means that he possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right
of suffrage. The fundamental qualification for the exercise of this sovereign right is the
possession of Philippine citizenship. No less than the Constitution makes it the first
qualification, as Section 1, Article V thereof provides:

Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not

otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and
who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election. . . . (emphasis supplied)

And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881)
expressly provides for the qualifications of a voter. Thus:

Sec. 117 Qualifications of a voter. -- Every citizen of the Philippines, not

otherwise disqualified by law, eighteen years of age or over, who shall
have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the city or municipality
wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
the election, may be a registered voter. (emphasis supplied)

It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldo's election as Governor in the 1988
and 1992 elections on the ground that for lack of Philippine citizenship -- he being a
naturalized citizen of the United States of America -- he was DISQUALIFIED to be
elected as such and to serve the position (Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174
SCRA 245 [1989]; Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994]).
This disqualification inexorably nullified Frivaldo's registration as a voter and declared it
void ab initio. Our judgments therein were self-executory and no further act, e.g., a
COMELEC order to cancel his registration as a voter or the physical destruction of his
voter's certificate, was necessary for the ineffectivity. Thus, he was never considered a
registered voter for the elections of May 1992, and May 1995, as there is no showing
that Frivaldo registered anew as a voter for the latter elections. Even if he did -- in
obvious defiance of his decreed disqualification -- this did not make him a Filipino
citizen, hence it was equally void ab initio. That he filed his certificate of candidacy for
the 1995 elections and was even allowed to vote therein were of no moment. Neither
act made him a Filipino citizen nor nullified the judgments of this Court. On the contrary,
said acts made a mockery of our judgments. For the Court now to validate Frivaldo's
registration as a voter despite the judgments of disqualification is to modify the said
judgments by making their effectivity and enforceability dependent on a COMELEC
order cancelling his registration as a voter, or on the physical destruction of his
certificate of registration as a voter which, of course, was never our intention. Moreover,
to sanction Frivaldo's registration as a voter would be to sacrifice substance in favor of
form (the piece of paper that is the book of voters or list of voters or voter's ID), and abet
the COMELEC's incompetence in failing to cancel Frivaldo's registration and allowing
him to vote.

The second reason in the ponencia as to why the citizenship disqualification should be

reckoned not from the date of the election nor the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
but from the date of proclamation, is that the only available remedy to question the
ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a candidate is a petition for quo warranto which, under
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, may be filed only within ten days from
proclamation and not earlier.

I beg to differ.
57 | P a g e

Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a candidate's

ineligibility for public office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows the filing of
a petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy on the ground that
any material representation contained therein, as required by Section 74, is false.
Section 74, in turn, requires that the person filing the certificate of candidacy must
state, inter alia, that he is eligible for the office, which means that he has all the
qualifications (including, of course, fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none of the
disqualifications as provided by law. The petition under Section 78 may be filed at any
time not later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The section
reads in full as follows:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.

This remedy was recognized in Loong vs. Commission on Elections (216 SCRA

760, 768 [1992]), where this Court held:

Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate

fails to file the petition within the 25-day period Section 78 of the Code for
whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave him completely helpless
as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by
filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation
of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code.
Section 1, Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure similarly provides
that any voter contesting the election of any regional, provincial or city
official on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the Electoral Contest
Adjudication Department. The petition may be filed within ten (10) days
from the date the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).

Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the filing of a
petition for disqualification on the ground of failure to possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided by the Constitution or by existing laws, "any day after the last day
for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation."
Sections 1 and 3 thereof provide:

Rule 25 -- Disqualification of Candidates

Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess
all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or
by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day after the
last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation.

While the validity of this rule insofar as it concerns petitions for disqualification on
the ground of lack of all qualifications may be doubtful, its invalidity is not in issue
here.

In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take up the last issue grappled within
the ponencia, viz., is Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code mandatory? The answer
is provided in Loong.
58 | P a g e

We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent Commission that

in the light of the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646, a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
filed even beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code,
as long as it is filed within a reasonable time from the discovery of the
ineligibility.

Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification case. Any candidate who

has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.

Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a

Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove
provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25-

day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for filing the appropriate
action to cancel a certificate of candidacy on account of any false
representation made therein. On the contrary, said Section 7 affirms and
reiterates Section 78 of the Code.

We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case

which may be based on grounds other than that provided under Section
78 of the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 also makes the effects
referred to in Section 6 applicable to disqualification cases filed under
Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No.
6646 is mention made of the period within which these disqualification
cases may be filed. This is because there are provisions in the Code
which supply the periods within which a petition relating to disqualification
of candidates must be filed, such as Section 78, already discussed, and
Section 253 on petitions for quo warranto.

I then disagree with the asseveration in the ponencia that Section 78 is merely directory

because Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the COMELEC to try and decide
petitions for disqualification even after elections. I submit that Section 6 refers to
disqualifications under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and
consequently modifies Section 72 thereof. As such, the proper court or the COMELEC
are granted the authority to continue hearing the case after the election, and during the
pendency of the case, suspend the proclamation of the victorious candidate, if the
evidence against him is strong. Sections 12, 68, and 72 of the Code provide:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by

competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for
which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months
or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon
or granted amnesty.
59 | P a g e

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed

removed upon declaration by competent authority that said insanity or
incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five
years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he
again becomes disqualified.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in

which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty
of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and
cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate,
or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)

Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission

and the courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of
violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not
later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is
sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified

shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.
Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the
provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation
and assumption to office.

III

Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not persuaded by the arguments in
support of the thesis that Frivaldo's repatriation may be given retroactive effect, as such
goes against the spirit and letter of P.D. No. 725. The spirit adheres to the principle that
acquisition or re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship is not a right, but a mere privilege.
Before the advent of P.D. No. 725, only the following could apply for repatriation: (a)
Army, Navy, or Air Corps deserters; and (b) a woman who lost her citizenship by reason
of her marriage to an alien after the death of her spouse (Section 2[2], C.A. No. 63).
P.D. NO. 725 expanded this to include Filipino women who lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens even before the death of their alien husbands, or the
termination of their marital status and to natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their
Philippine citizenship but subsequently desired to reacquire the latter.

Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 expressly provides that repatriation
takes effect only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
thus:

. . . may reacquire Philippine citizenship . . . by applying with the Special

Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and,
if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, AFTER WHICH THEY SHALL BE
60 | P a g e

DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.

(emphasis and capitalization supplied)

Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation under

the decree are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3)
taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only UPON
TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to
have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking
to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not have
explicitly provided otherwise.

This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this Court's pronouncement in the

first Frivaldo case that what reacquisition of Filipino citizenship requires is an act
"formally rejecting [the] adopted state and reaffirming . . . allegiance to the Philippines."
That act meant nothing less than taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. If we now take this revision of doctrine to its logical end, then it would also
mean that if Frivaldo had chosen and reacquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization
or through Congressional action, such would retroact to the filing of the petition for
naturalization or the bill granting him Philippine citizenship. This is a proposition which
both the first and second Frivaldo cases soundly rejected.

The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support of the proposition that P.D. No.
725 can be given retroactive effect is its alleged curative or remedial nature.

Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of legal hermeneutics may P.D. No.
725 be characterized as a curative or remedial statute:

Curative or remedial statutes are healing acts. They are remedial by

curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations.
The rule in regard to curative statutes is that if the thing omitted or failed to
be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to be removed or made
harmless, is something the legislature might have dispensed with by a
previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one.

Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in

existing laws, and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable a person
to carry into effect that which they have designed and intended, but has
failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory
disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which,
before the enactment of the statute, was invalid. (RUBEN E. AGPALO,
Statutory Construction, Second ed. [1990], 270-271, citations omitted).

P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship lost through the
marriage of a Filipina to an alien and through naturalization in a foreign country of
natural-born Filipino citizens. It involves then the substantive, nay primordial, right of
citizenship. To those for whom it is intended, it means, in reality, the acquisition of "a
new right," as the ponencia cannot but concede. Therefore, it may not be said to merely
remedy or cure a defect considering that one who has lost Philippine citizenship does
not have the right to reacquire it. As earlier stated, the Constitution provides that
citizenship, once lost, may only be reacquired in the manner provided by law. Moreover,
it has also been observed that:

The idea is implicit from many of the cases that remedial statutes are
statutes relating to procedure and not substantive rights. (Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, Third ed. [1943], §5704 at 74, citations
omitted).

If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that P.D. No. 725 is curative or remedial
statute, it would be an inexcusable error to give it a retroactive effect since it explicitly
provides the date of its effectivity. Thus:

This Decree shall take effect immediately.

61 | P a g e

Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy five.

Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the reacquisition of Philippine

citizenship, then nothing therein supports such theory, for as the decree itself
unequivocally provides, it is only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines that the applicant is DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP.

IV

Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that taking the oath of allegiance
retroacted to the date of Frivaldo's application for repatriation, the same could not be
said insofar as it concerned the United States of America, of which he was a citizen. For
under the laws of the United States of America, Frivaldo remained an American national
until he renounced his citizenship and allegiance thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995,
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Section 401 of
the Nationality Act of 1940 of the United States of America provides that a person who
is a national of the United States of America, whether by birth or naturalization, loses his
nationality by, inter alia, "(b) Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal
declaration of allegiance to a foreign state" (SIDNEY KANSAS, U.S. Immigration
Exclusion and Deportation and Citizenship of the United States of America, Third ed.,
[1948] 341-342). It follows then that on election day and until the hour of the
commencement of the term for which he was elected - noon of 30 June 1995 as per
Section 43 of the Local Government Code - Frivaldo possessed dual citizenship, viz.,
(a) as an American citizen; and (b) as a Filipino citizen through the adoption of the
theory that the effects of his taking the oath of allegiance were retrospective. Hence, he
was disqualified to run for Governor for yet another reason: possession of dual
citizenship, in accordance with Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code.

The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be considered STATELESS on the

basis of his claim that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenship - long before May 8, 1985" - is untenable, for the following reasons: first, it is
based on Frivaldo's unproven, self-serving allegation; second, informal renunciation or
abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship; and third, simply put, never
did the status of a STATELESS person attach to Frivaldo.

Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the status of individuals stripped of their
nationality by their former government without having an opportunity to acquire another;
or de facto, which is the status of individuals possessed of a nationality whose country
does not give them protection outside their own country, and who are commonly, albeit
imprecisely, referred to as refugees (JORGE R. COQUIA, et al., Conflict of Laws Cases,
Materials and Comments, 1995 ed., 290).

Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Regarding the
Status of Stateless Persons (Philippine Treaty Series, Compiled and Annotated by
Haydee B. Yorac, vol. III, 363), a stateless person is defined as "a person who is not
considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law." However, it has
not been shown that the United States of America ever ceased to consider Frivaldo its
national at any time before he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 30 June 1995.

VI

Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno. I am absolutely happy to join him in his statement that "[t]he
sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution" and that the
said Constitution is "more people-oriented," "borne [as it is] out of the 1986 people
power EDSA revolution." I would even go further by saying that this Constitution is pro-
God (Preamble), pro-people (Article II, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16; Article XI, Section
62 | P a g e

1, Article XII, Sections 1, 6; Article XIII, Sections 1, 11, 15, 16, 18; Article XVI, Sections
5(2), 6), pro-Filipino (Article XII, Sections 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14; Article XIV, Sections 1,
4(2), 13; Article XVI, Section 11), pro-poor (Article II, Sections 9, 10, 18, 21; Article XII,
Sections 1, 2(3); Article XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), pro-life (Article II,
Section 12), and pro-family (Article II, Section 12; Article XV).

Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the principle of sovereignty beyond
what I perceive to be the reasonable constitutional parameters. The doctrine of people's
sovereignty is founded on the principles of democracy and republicanism and refers
exclusively to the sovereignty of the people of the Philippines. Section 1 of Article II is
quite clear on this, thus:

Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty

resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

And the Preamble makes it clear when it solemnly opens it with a clause
"We, the sovereign Filipino people . . ." Thus, this sovereignty is an attribute of
the Filipino people as one people, one body.

That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be fragmentized by looking at it as

the supreme authority of the people of any of the political subdivisions to determine their
own destiny; neither can we convert and treat every fragment as the whole. In such a
case, this Court would provide the formula for the division and destruction of the State
and render the Government ineffective and inutile. To illustrate the evil, we may
consider the enforcement of laws or the pursuit of a national policy by the executive
branch of the government, or the execution of a judgment by the courts. If these are
opposed by the overwhelming majority of the people of a certain province, or even a
municipality, it would necessarily follow that the law, national policy, or judgment must
not be enforced, implemented, or executed in the said province or municipality. More
concretely, if, for instance, the vast majority of the people of Batanes rise publicly and
take up arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance
to the said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any
part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives,
then those who did so -- and which are composed of the vast majority of the people of
Batanes -- a political subdivision -- cannot be prosecuted for or be held guilty of
rebellion in violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code because of the doctrine of
peoples' sovereignty. Indeed, the expansion of the doctrine of sovereignty by investing
upon the people of a mere political subdivision that which the Constitution places in the
entire Filipino people, may be disastrous to the Nation.

So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the concurring opinion. Thus, simply
because Frivaldo had obtained a margin of 20,000 votes over his closest rival, Lee, i.e.,
a vast majority of the voters of Sorsogon had expressed their sovereign will for the
former, then this Court must yield to that will and must, therefore, allow to be set aside,
for Frivaldo, not just the laws on qualifications of candidates and elective officials and
naturalization and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, but even the final and binding
decisions of this Court affecting him.

This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. I vote then to DISMISS G.R. No.
120295 and GRANT G.R. No. 123755.

1 Composed of Pres. CoFootnotesmm. Regalado E. Maambong, ponente; Comm.

Graduacion A.R. Claravall, concurring, and Comm. Julio F. Desamito, dissenting.

2 In SPC No. 95-317, entitled Juan G. Frivaldo, petitioner, vs. Raul R. Lee,
respondent; rollo, pp. 110-129.

3 Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo, Comms. Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios

A. Salazar-Fernando, Manolo B. Gorospe and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores. Chairman
Pardo certified that "Commissioner Julio F. Desamito was on official travel at the time of
63 | P a g e

the deliberation and resolution of this case. However, the Commission has reserved to
Comm. Desamito the right to submit a dissenting opinion." Rollo, pp. 159-171.

4 Rollo, pp. 46-49.

5 Rollo, pp. 50-55. The Second Division was composed of Pres. Comm. Remedios A.
Salazar-Fernando, ponente; Comm. Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, concurring, and Comm.
Manolo B. Gorospe ("on official business").

6 Frivaldo was naturalized as an American citizen on January 20, 1983. In G.R. No.
87193, Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (June 23, 1989), the
Supreme Court, by reason of such naturalization, declared Frivaldo "not a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon." On February 28, 1992, the Regional Trial Court of Manila granted the
petition for naturalization of Frivaldo. However, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 104654,
Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, et al., 232 SCRA 785 (June 6, 1994),
overturned this grant, and Frivaldo was "declared not a citizen of the Philippines" and
ordered to vacate his office. On the basis of this latter Supreme Court ruling, the
Comelec disqualified Frivaldo in SPA No. 95-028.

7 Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo and the six incumbent commissioners,

namely, Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, Manolo B. Gorospe,
Graduacion A. Reyes-Claravall, Julio F. Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores; rollo,
pp. 56-57.

8 Rollo, p. 60.

9 Rollo, pp. 61-67.

10 Rollo, pp. 86-87. The Comelec considered the votes cast for Frivaldo as "stray
votes", and thus Lee was held as having garnered the "highest number of votes."

11 Rollo, pp. 88-97. This is the forerunner of the present case.

12 211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992) and 176 SCRA 1 (August 1, 1989).

13 Rollo, pp. 110-128.

14 Rollo, pp. 159-170.

15 Rollo, pp. 16-17; petition, pp. 14-15.

16 Rollo, pp. 10-15. This is the same resolution referred to in footnote no. 5.

17 Rollo, pp. 16-17. This is the same resolution referred to in footnote no. 7.

18 Rollo, pp. 18-21. This is signed also by the Chairman and the six other Comelec
Commissioners.

19 Republic Act No. 7160.

20 See footnote no. 6, supra.

21 In debunking Frivaldo's claim of citizenship, this Court in G.R. No. 87193, supra, p.

254, observed that "(i)f he (Frivaldo) really wanted to disavow his American citizenship
and reacquire Philippine citizenship, petitioner should have done so in accordance with
the laws of our country. Under C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473 and P.D. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or
by repatriation."

22 Supra, p. 794.
64 | P a g e

23 Petition, p. 27; rollo, p. 29.

24 The full text of said memorandum reads as follows:

MEMORANDUM

TO : The Solicitor General

The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs

The Director-General

National Intelligence Coordinating Agency

The previous administration's practice of granting citizenship by Presidential Decree or

any other executive issuance, and the derivative administrative authority thereof, poses
a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise
of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first
Congress under the 1987 Constitution.

In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special Committee on
Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist from undertaking any and all
proceedings within your functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of
Instructions No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836
dated December 3, 1975, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May
17, 1978, relative to the grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other related
laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations.

(Sgd.) Corazon C. Aquino

Manila, March 27, 1987.

25 Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines.

26 Cf. Ty, et al. vs. Trampe, et al., G.R. No. 117577 (December 1, 1995).

27 Petition, p. 28; rollo, p. 30.

28 The aforesaid Manifestation reads as follows:

MANIFESTATION

The Solicitor General, as Chairman of the Special Committee on Naturalization, hereby

manifests that the following persons have been repatriated by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 725, since June 8, 1995:

1. Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo R-000900

2. Manuel Reyes Sanchez 901

3. Ma. Nelly Dessalla Ty 902

4. Terry Herrera and

Antonio Ching 903

5. Roberto Salas Benedicto 904

6. Winthrop Santos Liwag 905

7. Samuel M. Buyco 906

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8. Joselito Holganza Ruiz 907

9. Samuel Villanueva 908

10. Juan Leonardo Collas, Jr. 909

11. Felicilda Otilla Sacnanas-Chua 910

29 The text of P.D. 725 is reproduced below:

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 725

PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAD LOST THEIR

PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL BORN
FILIPINOS.

WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who had lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens;

WHEREAS, while the new Constitution allows a Filipino woman who marries an alien to
retain her Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission, she is deemed under the
law to have renounced her Philippine citizenship, such provision of the new Constitution
does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took
effect;

WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) allows the repatriation of
Filipino women who lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to aliens only after
the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status; and

WHEREAS, there are natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship
but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship;

Now, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue

of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order that: (1)
Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (3)
natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine
citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on
Naturalization created by Letter of Instructions No. 270, and, if their applications are
approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The
Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of
registration.

The aforesaid Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and

regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for the effective
implementation of this Decree.

This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-five.

30 See footnote no. 6, supra.

31 Cf. Labo, Jr. vs. Comelec, 211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992).

32 The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code
shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be
provided for by law, . . ." Sec. 43, Local Government Code.

33 96 Phil. 447, 453 (1955).

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34 The following are excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the oral
argument held on March 19, 1996:

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Mr. Counsel, it is your position then that the

candidate should be a citizen at the time of proclamation?

ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, it is required that he must be a

citizen at the time of proclamation and not only that, at the time that he
assumes the office he must have the continuing qualification as a citizen.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Should that not be reckoned from the time of

filing of certificate of candidacy or at least the day of the election?

ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, there are positions taken that it
should be reckoned from the date of certificate of candidacy as in the case
of qualification for Batasang Pambansa before under B.P. 53 - it says that
for purposes of residence it must be reckoned . . . from the time of the
filing of the certificate, for purposes of age, from the time of the date of the
election. But when we go over all the provisions of law under current laws,
Your Honor, there is no qualification requirement insofar as citizenship is
concern(ed) as to when, as to when you should be a citizen of the
Philippines and we say that if there is no provision under any existing law
which requires that you have to be a citizen of the Philippines on the date
of the filing or on the date of election then it has to be equitably interpreted
to mean that if you are already qualified at the time that the office is
supposed to be assumed then you should be allowed to assume the
office.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Is it not also true that under the Local Autonomy
Code the candidate should also be a registered voter and to be a
registered voter one must be a citizen?

ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, in fact, Mr. Frivaldo has always
been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992,
then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was
questioned but the Court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he
was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections
including on May 8, 1995.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: But the fact that he voted does not make him a
citizen. The fact is, he was declared not a citizen by this Court twice.

ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true, Your Honor, we admit that he has been
twice declared not citizen and we admit the ruling of the Supreme Court is
correct but the fact is, Your Honor, the matter of his eligibility to vote as
being a registered voter was likewise questioned before the judiciary.
There was a ruling by the Municipal Court, there was a ruling by the
Regional Trial Court and he was sustained as a valid voter, so he voted.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I raised this question in connection with your

contention that citizenship should be determined as of the time of
proclamation and not as of the time of the election or at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy.

ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: And is it your contention that under the law,

particularly the Local Autonomy Code, the law does not specify when
citizenship should be possessed by the candidate, is that not correct?

ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, there is no express

provision.
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JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am also asking you that under the Local

Autonomy Code the candidate for governor or for other local positions
should be a voter and to be a voter one must be a citizen?

ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, but the fact of voting is not
an issue here because he was allowed to vote and he did in fact vote and
in fact, he was a registered voter. (TSN, March 19, 1996.)

35 Section 117, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as "The Omnibus Election
Code of the Philippines", as amended, provides for the various qualifications of voters,
one of which is Filipino citizenship.

36 Comment, p. 11; rollo, p. 259.

37 See footnote no. 33.

38 Section 253 reads as follows:

Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. -- Any voter contesting the election of any member
of the Congress, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo
warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of
the election. (Art. XIV, Sec. 60, BP 697; Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978 EC).

Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the ground of
ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition
for quo warranto with the regional trial court or metropolitan or municipal trial court,
respectively, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. (Art.
XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978 EC).

39 Art. 4, New Civil Code. See also Gallardo vs. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500 (May 25,
1988), and Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519 (April 2, 1984).

40 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,

Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 23 states:

Exceptions to Rule. -- Statutes can be given retroactive effect in the following cases: (1)
when the law itself so expressly provides, (2) in case of remedial statutes, (3) in case of
curative statutes, (4) in case of laws interpreting others, and (5) in case of laws creating
new rights.

41 Id., p. 25.

42 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., pp. 270-271.

43 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 354, p. 489, cited in Castro vs. Sagales, 94 Phil. 208, 210
(1953).

44 Memorandum, p. 9.

45 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 351, p. 488.

46 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 354, p. 490; emphasis supplied.

47 Art. 10, Civil Code of the Philippines.

48 Based on the "Corrected Compliance" dated May 16, 1996 filed by the Solicitor
General, it appears that, excluding the case of Frivaldo, the longest interval between
date of filing of an application for repatriation and its approval was three months and ten
days; the swiftest action was a same-day approval.
68 | P a g e

49 Sec. 40. Disqualifications. -- The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Those with dual citizenship;"

50 p. 11; rollo, p. 259.

51 Resolution, p. 12; rollo, p. 121.

52 Cf. Navarro vs. Commission on Elections, 228 SCRA 596 (December 17, 1993);
Arao vs. Commission on Elections, 210 SCRA 290 (June 23, 1992).

53 The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that
respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the office of Provincial Governor of Sorsogon
on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly respondent's
certificate of candidacy is cancelled.

54 Petition, p. 19; rollo, p. 21.

55 Resolution promulgated on December 19, 1995, p. 7; rollo, p. 116.

56 42 SCRA 561, 565 (December 20, 1971), citing Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner
of Immigration, L-21289, October 4, 1971.

57 Art. IX, Sec. 2.

58 SPC No. 95-317 is entitled "Annulment of Proclamation" and contains the following
prayer:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Commission that after

due notice and hearing an Oder (sic) /Resolution/Decision be issued as follows:

a) Annulling/setting aside the 30 June 1995 proclamation of respondent as the duly

election (sic), Governor of Sorsogon for being contrary to law;

b) Ordering the proclamation of the petitioner as duly elected governor of Sorsogon;

69 | P a g e

3.6 Constitutional supremacy

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights,

privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,1 is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic
Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing
but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask
whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by
the protective mantle of the Constitution.

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System

(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning
bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or
an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.2 In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton
as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state —

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH

GSIS/MHC —

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by
October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will
lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer
the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the

GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of
contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan
for the Manila Hotel. . . .
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b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and

Sale Agreement with GSIS . . . .

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING

BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER —

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner

after the following conditions are met:

a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not

later than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995);
and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP

(Committee on Privatization)/OGCC (Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained.3

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and
the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated
28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad.4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's
check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid
Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . . .5 which
respondent GSIS refused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the
tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by
respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court
on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to
the Malaysian firm.

On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was
referred to it by the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has
practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who
believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to
release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has
become a part of the national patrimony.6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the
shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is
owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel
business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a
part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock
of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second
par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.7

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony
and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be
preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules
mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms
of price per share.8

Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-
executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said
71 | P a g e

provision to Operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which
business may be done."9

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under
the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and
exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII,
1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who
have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel
historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What
is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent
GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the
Philippines as a State.

Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the
constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51%
of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon
which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be
considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of
the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right
from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.

Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which
provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms
of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting
a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a
matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the
block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a
matching bid had not yet taken place.

Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail
since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner,
and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to
what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act
required of them by petitioner.

We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by
the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of
government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties,
and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws
must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and
all public authority administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a
law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their
provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the
framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different
departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and
inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which lays down a general principle, such as
72 | P a g e

those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred
and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted
upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws
intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more
like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act
is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.14 This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing

rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended,
the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as
a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated
to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute. 15

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
clearly not self-executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986
Constitutional Commission —

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question

as the Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of
"PREFERENCE" is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it
be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-
vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make
it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?

THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner

Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word "QUALIFIED?".

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED

FILIPINOS" as against whom? As against aliens or over
aliens?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is

understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED" because
the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down
conditions under which business may be done. For
example, qualifications on the setting up of other financial
structures, et cetera (emphasis supplied by respondents)

MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to
make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
73 | P a g e

Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-
executing nature of constitutional provisions.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to

facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation
of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof,
or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-
executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the
absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision
for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was
not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional
right and make it more available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully
enforceable.

Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of
Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section
which undoubtedly are not self-executing. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first and third
paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the
first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority
over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then
a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does
not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified
Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part
and non-self-executing in another. 19

Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are
merely statements of principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and
only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights — are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and
Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional provisions on personal dignity, 21 the
sanctity of family life, 22 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 23 the promotion of
social justice, 24 and the values of education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance  26 refers to the constitutional provisions on social justice and human
rights 27 and on education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato  29 cites provisions on the
promotion of general welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the vital role of the youth in
nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human liberation and development. 33 A
reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the
provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which the legislations must be
based. Res ipsa loquitur.

On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And
when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an
action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to
enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency
and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is
a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
74 | P a g e

As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission 34 explains —

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed

refers not only to out rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage
of out race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters.
Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other
natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.

We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While
it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately
evolved to be truly Filipino, Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become
the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was
called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site of the festivities during the
inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of
the Philippine Government. it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are
accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality. 36

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart
and Memory of a City. 37 During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese
Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the American forces returned
to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as
the two (2) places fro their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950's and 1960's, the hotel
became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every political
convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous
international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In
1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d' etat where an aspirant for vice-president
was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine Republic.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs
and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public
interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence
and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone
who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In
this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on
which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that
the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only
51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land
upon which the building stands. 38

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in Our Constitution
also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear
from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the

Nolledo amendment. And the amendment would consist in
substituting the words "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the
following: "CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR
CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL
OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY
SUCH CITIZENS.

x x x           x x x          x x x
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MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent

is agreeable, but we have to raise a question. Suppose it is a
corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it
preference?

MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an

individual Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned
by Filipino citizens?

MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it

if we say that the preference should only be 100-percent
Filipino.

MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because

"QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" may refer only to individuals and
not to juridical personalities or entities.

MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President. 39

x x x           x x x          x x x

MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the

amendment be read again.

MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT

OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here, as
intended by the proponents, will include not only individual
Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-
controlled by Filipinos. 40

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus —

MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request

Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his amendment so
that I can ask a question.

MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS,

PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE
SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."

MR FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign

enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also
qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference?

MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects

than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?

MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes."

MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41

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Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo

continues —

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be

"SHALL — THE STATE SHALL GlVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy. That means
that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concessions,
privileges and rights covering the national patrimony. 42

The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the
subject provision was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43 —

Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all

economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . .
This provision was never found in previous Constitutions . . . .

The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given
to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good,
because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT
mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or
organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an
indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and inimical to the
common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a

choice has to be made between a "qualified foreigner" end a "qualified
Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over the former."

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by

respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by
respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here
is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in
the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it
has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the
Manila Hotel. 44

The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the
subject provision is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite
disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision — by the government
itself — is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty
to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the
Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own
and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a
defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding
legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional
government is apt —

The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws,

including the Constitution, even before Congress acts — provided that
there are discoverable legal standards for executive action. When the
executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the
constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for
reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole
prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask
Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the
executive is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how
constitutional government operates. 45

Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State,
not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality.
This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the
MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through
77 | P a g e

respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G.

Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and
MHC a "state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from
the government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the
activity it engages in is a "public function;" (2) when the government is so significantly
involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action;
and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that
the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under
the second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the
transaction. although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the
State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. 46

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to
the government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3)
divisions of power — legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional
mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three(3) branches of
government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is
addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a
government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the
winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be
declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary
contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the "Filipino First Policy provision
of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the
highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning
bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they
under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the
provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested
parties.

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision

is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest
the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle
in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law
of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any reason the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are
willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the
block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a
higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than
the constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question
that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be
so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the
bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore
it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign
investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always
open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when
venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do
78 | P a g e

business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed

to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.

The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale
to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner
could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike
were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino
qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign
entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of
the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the
bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to
compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the
bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's
matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.

Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps
the award has been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners
when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist
that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its
mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino
people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather
remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the
government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic
conditions and parameters for its actions.

Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad
pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to
petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute
the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the
latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.

The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987

Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be
enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution
will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty
of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the
intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of
foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business
opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such
preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter
could have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to

substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about the
wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme
Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles
to economic progress and development . . . in connection with a
temporary injunction issued by the Court's First Division against the sale of
the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements
were published in a major daily to the effect that injunction "again
demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to
doing business here.

Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the
Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the
judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to
make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not
adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
79 | P a g e

or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how

buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. 48

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and
preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take
precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective
should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution
enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to
the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so
sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the
Constitution is involved. 49

Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and
republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all
government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the
people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any
interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept.
Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override
the demands of nationalism. 50

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be
sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about
an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic
relic that has hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the
Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would prefer
to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest
state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played
and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century
Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the
Filipino soul — a place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has
played a part in the shaping of a country. 51

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents
to sell the historical landmark — this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total
stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to
alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a
veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask:
What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained
by the Filipinos Manila Hotel — and all that it stands for — is sold to a non-Filipino?
How much of national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a
foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the
national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning
Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and
accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect
and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,

MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF
THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST
from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD,
and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances
and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
80 | P a g e

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. At the same time, I would like to
expound a bit more on the concept of national patrimony as including within its scope
and meaning institutions such as the Manila Hotel.

It is argued by petitioner that the Manila Hotel comes under "national patrimony" over
which qualified Filipinos have the preference, in ownership and operation. The
Constitutional provision on point states:

xxx xxx xxx

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national

economy and patrimony, the State shall Give preference to qualified
Filipinos.1

Petitioner's argument, I believe, is well taken. Under the 1987 Constitution, "national
patrimony" consists of the natural resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in
our territory (Article I) consisting of land, sea, and air.2 study of the 1935 Constitution,
where the concept of "national patrimony" originated, would show that its framers
decided to adopt the even more comprehensive expression "Patrimony of the Nation" in
the belief that the phrase encircles a concept embracing not only their natural resources
of the country but practically everything that belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible
and the material as well as the intangible and the spiritual assets and possessions of
the people. It is to be noted that the framers did not stop with conservation. They knew
that conservation alone does not spell progress; and that this may be achieved only
through development as a correlative factor to assure to the people not only the
exclusive ownership, but also the exclusive benefits of their national patrimony).3

Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to
our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our
race.4

There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national
patrimony and, as such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and
benefit from its operation. This institution has played an important role in our nation's
history, having been the venue of many a historical event, and serving as it did, and as
it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of state, dignitaries,
celebrities, and others.5

It is therefore our duty to protect and preserve it for future generations of Filipinos. As
President Manuel L. Quezon once said, we must exploit the natural resources of our
country, but we should do so with. an eye to the welfare of the future generations. In
other words, the leaders of today are the trustees of the patrimony of our race. To
preserve our national patrimony and reserve it for Filipinos was the intent of the
distinguished gentlemen who first framed our Constitution. Thus, in debating the need
for nationalization of our lands and natural resources, one expounded that we should
"put more teeth into our laws, and; not make the nationalization of our lands and natural
resources a subject of ordinary legislation but of constitutional enactment"6 To quote
further: "Let not our children be mere tenants and trespassers in their own country. Let
us preserve and bequeath to them what is rightfully theirs, free from all foreign liens and
encumbrances".7

Now, a word on preference. In my view "preference to qualified Filipinos", to be

meaningful, must refer not only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It
must touch and affect the very "heart of the existing order." In the field of public bidding
81 | P a g e

in the acquisition of things that pertain to the national patrimony, preference to qualified
Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or equal the higher bid of a non-Filipino;
the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the qualified Filipino and the non-
Filipino are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly be made to the qualified
Filipino. The Constitutional preference should give the qualified Filipino an opportunity
to match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference of the
qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.

It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude towards foreign investments
in our country, stress is on the elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment in
the country. While government agencies, including the courts should re-condition their
thinking to such a trend, and make it easy and even attractive for foreign investors to
come to our shores, yet we should not preclude ourselves from reserving to us Filipinos
certain areas where our national identity, culture and heritage are involved. In the hotel
industry, for instance, foreign investors have established themselves creditably, such as
in the Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels. This should not stop
us from retaining 51% of the capital stock of the Manila Hotel Corporation in the hands
of Filipinos. This would be in keeping with the intent of the Filipino people to preserve
our national patrimony, including our historical and cultural heritage in the hands of
Filipinos.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I agree with Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo on his clear-cut statements, shared by Mr.
Justice Reynato S. Puno in a well written separate (dissenting) opinion, that:

First, the provision in our fundamental law which provides that "(I)n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos"1 is self-executory. The provision verily does
not need, although it can obviously be amplified or regulated by, an enabling law or a
set of rules.

Second, the term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country's natural resources
but also to its cultural heritage. A "historical landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice
Justo P. Torres, Jr., Manila Hotel has now indeed become part of Philippine heritage.

Third, the act of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a government
entity which derives its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC
should be considered an act of the State subject to the Constitutional mandate.

On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos," I find it

somewhat difficult to take the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice
Puno. In the particular case before us, the only meaningful preference, it seems, would
really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match the foreign bid for, as a particular matter,
I cannot see any bid that literally calls for millions of dollars to be at par (to the last cent)
with another. The magnitude of the magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly
possible for the competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the
dissenting view, could trigger the right of preference.

It is most unfortunate that Renong Berhad has not been spared this great
disappointment, a letdown that it did not deserve, by a simple and timely advise of the
proper rules of bidding along with the peculiar constitutional implications of the
proposed transaction. It is also regrettable that the Court at time is seen, to instead, be
the refuge for bureaucratic inadequate which create the perception that it even takes on
non-justiciable controversies.

All told, I am constrained to vote for granting the petition.

MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:

I take the view that in the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the
constitutional mandate that "[i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
82 | P a g e

the national patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos"1 is to allow
petitioner Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad
for the purchase of the controlling shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation.
Indeed, it is the only way a qualified Filipino of Philippine corporation can be
given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or concession given by the State,
by favoring it over a foreign national corporation.

Under the rules on public bidding of the Government Service and Insurance System, if
petitioner and the Malaysian firm had offered the same price per share, "priority [would
be given] to the bidder seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC,"2 so that petitioner
bid for more shares, it would be preferred to the Malaysian corporation for that reason
and not because it is a Philippine corporation. Consequently, it is only in cases like the
present one, where an alien corporation is the highest bidder, that preferential treatment
of the Philippine corporation is mandated not by declaring it winner but by allowing it "to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share" before it is awarded the shares of
stocks.3 That, to me, is what "preference to qualified Filipinos" means in the context of
this case — by favoring Filipinos whenever they are at a disadvantage vis-a-
vis foreigners.

This was the meaning given in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno4 to a 1947 statute giving
"preference to Filipino citizens in the lease of public market stalls."5 This Court upheld
the cancellation of existing leases covering market stalls occupied by persons who were
not Filipinos and the award thereafter of the stalls to qualified Filipino vendors as
ordered by the Department of Finance. Similarly, in Vda. de Salgado v. De la
Fuente,6 this Court sustained the validity of a municipal ordinance passed pursuant to
the statute (R.A. No. 37), terminating existing leases of public market stalls and granting
preference to Filipino citizens in the issuance of new licenses for the occupancy of the
stalls. In Chua Lao v. Raymundo,7 the preference granted under the statute was held to
apply to cases in which Filipino vendors sought the same stalls occupied by alien
vendors in the public markets even if there were available other stalls as good as those
occupied by aliens. "The law, apparently, is applicable whenever there is a conflict of
interest between Filipino applicants and aliens for lease of stalls in public markets, in
which situation the right to preference immediately arises."8

Our legislation on the matter thus antedated by a quarter of a century efforts began only
in the 1970s in America to realize the promise of equality, through affirmative action and
reverse discrimination programs designed to remedy past discrimination against colored
people in such areas as employment, contracting and licensing.9 Indeed, in vital areas
of our national economy, there are situations in which the only way to place Filipinos in
control of the national economy as contemplated in the Constitution 10 is to give them
preferential treatment where they can at least stand on equal footing with aliens.

There need be no fear that thus preferring Filipinos would either invite foreign retaliation
or deprive the country of the benefit of foreign capital or know-how. We are dealing here
not with common trades of common means of livelihood which are open to aliens in our
midst, 11 but with the sale of government property, which is like the grant of government
largess of benefits and concessions covering the national economy" and therefore no
one should begrudge us if we give preferential treatment to our citizens. That at any rate
is the command of the Constitution. For the Manila Hotel is a business owned by the
Government. It is being privatized. Privatization should result in the relinquishment of
the business in favor of private individuals and groups who are Filipino citizens, not in
favor of aliens.

Nor should there be any doubt that by awarding the shares of stocks to petitioner we
would be trading competence and capability for nationalism. Both petitioner and the
Malaysian firm are qualified, having hurdled the prequalification process. 12 It is only the
result of the public bidding that is sought to be modified by enabling petitioner to up its
bid to equal the highest bid.

Nor, finally, is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a Filipino bidder to match
the highest bid of an alien could encourage speculation, since all that a Filipino entity
would then do would be not to make a bid or make only a token one and, after it is
83 | P a g e

known that a foreign bidder has submitted the highest bid, make an offer matching that
of the foreign firm. This is not possible under the rules on public bidding of the GSIS.
Under these rules there is a minimum bid required (P36.87 per share for a range of 9 to
15 million shares). 13 Bids below the minimum will not be considered. On the other hand,
if the Filipino entity, after passing the prequalification process, does not submit a bid, he
will not be allowed to match the highest bid of the foreign firm because this is a privilege
allowed only to those who have "validly submitted bids." 14 The suggestion is, to say the
least, fanciful and has no basis in fact.

For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition.

TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion:

Constancy in law is not an attribute of a judicious mind. I say this as we are not
confronted in the case at bar with legal and constitutional issues — and yet I am driven
so to speak on the side of history. The reason perhaps is due to the belief that in the
words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a "page of history is worth a volume of
logic."

I will, however, attempt to share my thoughts on whether the Manila Hotel has a
historical and cultural aspect within the meaning of the constitution and thus, forming
part of the "patrimony of the nation".

Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

xxx xxx xxx

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national

economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments
within its national goals and priorities.

The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Article II of the same
Constitution pertaining to "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" which ordain —

The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy

effectively by Filipinos. (Sec. 19).

Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of the
highlights in the 1987 Constitution Commission proceedings thus:

x x x           x x x          x x x

MR. NOLLEDO. The Amendment will read: "IN

THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE
SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS". And the word "Filipinos" here, as
intended by the proponents, will include not
only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-
Controlled entities fully controlled by Filipinos
(Vol. III, Records of the Constitutional
Commission, p. 608).

MR. MONSOD. We also wanted to add, as

Commissioner Villegas said, this committee
and this body already approved what is known
as the Filipino First policy which was
suggested by Commissioner de Castro. So that
84 | P a g e

it is now in our Constitution (Vol. IV, Records of

the Constitutional Commission, p. 225).

Commissioner Jose Nolledo explaining the provision adverted to above,

said:

MR. NOLLEDO. In the grant of rights,

privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment,

if a foreign enterprise is qualified and the
Filipinos enterprise is also qualified, will the
Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in

some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will
the Filipino still be preferred:?

MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes". (Vol. III,

p. 616, Records of the Constitutional
Commission).

The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the history and spirit of the
Malolos Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitutions. That we
have no reneged on this nationalist policy is articulated in one of the earliest case, this
Court said —

The nationalistic tendency is manifested in various provisions of the

Constitution. . . . It cannot therefore be said that a law imbued with the
same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the
Constitution is unreasonable, invalid or unconstitutional (Ichong, et al. vs.
Hernandez, et al., 101 Phil. 1155).

I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and traditions are not legislated
and is the product of events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of
growth and acceptance by the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a
people.

The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila
Hotel is witness to historic events (too numerous to mention) which shaped our history
for almost 84 years.

As I intimated earlier, it is not my position in this opinion, to examine the single

instances of the legal largese which have given rise to this controversy. As I believe that
has been exhaustively discussed in the ponencia. Suffice it to say at this point that the
history of the Manila Hotel should not be placed in the auction block of a purely
business transaction, where profits subverts the cherished historical values of our
people.

As a historical landmark in this "Pearl of the Orient Seas", it has its enviable tradition
which, in the words of the philosopher Salvador de Madarriaga tradition is "more of a
river than a stone, it keeps flowing, and one must view the flowing , and one must view
the flow of both directions. If you look towards the hill from which the river flows, you
see tradition in the form of forceful currents that push the river or people towards the
future, and if you look the other way, you progress."
85 | P a g e

Indeed, tradition and progress are the same, for progress depends on the kind of
tradition. Let us not jettison the tradition of the Manila Hotel and thereby repeat our
colonial history.

I grant, of course the men of the law can see the same subject in different lights.

I remember, however, a Spanish proverb which says — "He is always right who
suspects that he makes mistakes". On this note, I say that if I have to make a mistake, I
would rather err upholding the belief that the Filipino be first under his Constitution and
in his own land.

I vote GRANT the petition.

PUNO, J., dissenting:

This is a. petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by the Manila Prince Hotel

Corporation, a domestic corporation, to stop the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) from selling the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign
corporation. Allegedly, the sale violates the second paragraph of section 10, Article XII
of the Constitution.

Respondent GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation. It is the sole

owner of the Manila Hotel which it operates through its subsidiary, the Manila Hotel
Corporation. Manila Hotel was included in the privatization program of the government.
In 1995, GSIS proposed to sell to interested buyers 30% to 51% of its shares, ranging
from 9,000,000 to 15,300,000 shares, in the Manila Hotel Corporation. After the
absence of bids at the first public bidding, the block of shares offered for sale was
increased from a maximum of 30% to 51%. Also, the winning bidder, or the eventual
"strategic partner" of the GSIS was required to "provide management expertise and/or
an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel"1 The proposal was approved by
respondent Committee on Privatization.

In July 1995, a conference was held where prequalification documents and the bidding
rules were furnished interested parties. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic
corporation, and Renong Berhad, Malaysian firm with ITT Sheraton as operator,
prequalified.2

The bidding rules and procedures entitled "Guidelines and Procedures: Second
Prequalification and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization" provide:

I INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS

DETERMINING THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER

The party that accomplishes the steps set forth below will be declared the
Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner and will be awarded the Block of Shares:

First — Pass the prequalification process;

Second — Submit the highest bid on a price per share basis for the Block
of Shares;

Third — Negotiate and execute the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC

not later than October 23, 1995;

xxx xxx xxx

IV GUIDELINES FOR PREQUALIFICATION

86 | P a g e

A. PARTIES WHO MAP APPLY FOR PREQUALIFICATION

The Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner will be expected to

provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of The Manila
Hotel. In this context, the GSIS is inviting to the
prequalification process any local and/or foreign corporation,
consortium/joint venture or juridical entity with at least one of
the following qualifications:

a. Proven management .expertise in the hotel

industry; or

b. Significant equity ownership (i.e. board

representation) in another hotel company; or

c. Overall management and marketing

expertise to successfully operate the Manila
Hotel.

Parties interested in bidding for MHC should be able to

provide access to the requisite management expertise
and/or international marketing/reservation system for The
Manila Hotel.

xxx xxx xxx

D. PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS

xxx xxx xxx

E. APPLICATION PROCEDURE

1. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE REGISTRATION

OFFICE

The prequalification documents can be secured at the

Registration Office between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during
working days within the period specified in Section III. Each
set of documents consists of the following:

a. Guidelines and Procedures: Second

Prequalification and Public Bidding of the MHC
Privatization

b. Confidential Information Memorandum: The

Manila Hotel Corporation

c. Letter of Invitation. to the Prequalification

and Bidding Conference

xxx xxx xxx

4. PREQUALIFICATION AND BIDDING CONFERENCE

A prequalification and bidding conference will be held at The

Manila Hotel on the date specified in Section III to allow the
Applicant to seek clarifications and further information
regarding the guidelines and procedures. Only those who
purchased the prequalification documents will be allowed in
this conference. Attendance to this conference is strongly
87 | P a g e

advised, although the Applicant will not be penalized if it

does not attend.

5. SUBMISSION OF PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS

The applicant should submit 5 sets of the prequalification

documents (1 original set plus 4 copies) at the Registration
Office between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days
within the period specified in Section III.

F. PREQUALIFICATION PROCESS

1. The Applicant will be evaluated by the PBAC

with the assistance of the TEC based on the
Information Package and other information
available to the PBAC.

2. If the Applicant is a Consortium/Joint

Venture, the evaluation will consider the overall
qualifications of the group, taking into account
the contribution of each member to the
venture.

3. The decision of the PBAC with respect to the

results of the PBAC evaluation will be final.

4. The Applicant shall be evaluated according

to the criteria set forth below:

a. Business management
expertise, track record, and
experience

b. Financial capability.

c. Feasibility and acceptability of

the proposed strategic plan for
the Manila Hotel

5. The PBAC will shortlist such number of Applicants as it

may deem appropriate.

6. The parties that prequalified in the first MHC public

bidding — ITT Sheraton, Marriot International Inc.,
Renaissance Hotels International Inc., consortium of RCBC
Capital/Ritz Carlton — may participate in the Public Bidding
without having to undergo the prequalification process again.

G. SHORTLIST OF QUALIFIED BIDDERS

1. A notice of prequalification results containing the shortlist

of Qualified Bidders will be posted at the Registration Office
at the date specified in Section III.

2. In the case of a Consortium/Joint Venture, the withdrawal

by member whose qualification was a material consideration
for being included in the shortlist is ground for
disqualification of the Applicant.

V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PUBLIC BIDDING

88 | P a g e

A. PARTIES WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PUBLIC

BIDDING

All parties in the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be eligible

to participate in the Public Bidding.

B. BLOCK OF SHARES

A range of Nine Million (9,000,000) to Fifteen Million Three

Hundred Thousand (15,300,000) shares of stock
representing Thirty Percent to Fifty-One Percent (30%-51%)
of the issued and outstanding shares of MHC, will be offered
in the Public Bidding by the GSIS. The Qualified Bidders will
have the Option of determining the number of shares within
the range to bid for. The range is intended to attract bidders
with different preferences and objectives for the operation
and management of The Manila Hotel.

C. MINIMUM BID REQUIRED ON A PRICE PER SHARE

BASIS

1. Bids will be evaluated on a price per share basis. The

minimum bid required on a price per share basis for the
Block of Shares is Thirty-Six Pesos and Sixty-Seven
Centavos (P36.67).

2. Bids should be in the Philippine currency payable to the

GSIS.

3. Bids submitted with an equivalent price per share below

the minimum required will not considered.

D. TRANSFER COSTS

x x x           x x x          x x x

E. OFFICIAL BID FORM

1. Bids must be contained in the prescribed Official Bid

Form, a copy of which is attached as Annex IV. The Official
Bid Form must be properly accomplished in all details;
improper accomplishment may be a sufficient basis for
disqualification.

2. During the Public Bidding, the Qualified Bidder will submit

the Official Bid Form, which will indicate the offered
purchase price, in a sealed envelope marked "OFFICIAL
BID."

F. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

During the Public Bidding, the following documents should

be submitted along with the bid in a separate envelop
marked "SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS":

1. WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO BID (UNDER OATH).

If the Qualified Bidder is a corporation, the representative of

the Qualified Bidder should submit a Board resolution which
adequately authorizes such representative to bid for and in
behalf of the corporation with full authority to perform such
acts necessary or requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.
89 | P a g e

If the Qualified Bidder is a Consortium/Joint Venture, each

member of the Consortium/Joint venture should submit a
Board resolution authorizing one of its members and such
member's representative to make the bid on behalf of the
group with full authority to perform such acts necessary or
requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.

2. BID SECURITY

a. The Qualified Bidder should deposit Thirty-Three Million

Pesos (P33,000,00), in Philippine currency as Bid Security in
the form of:

i. Manager's check or unconditional demand

draft payable to the "Government Service
Insurance System" and issued by a reputable
banking institution duly licensed to do business
in the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS; or

ii. Standby-by letter of credit issued by a

reputable banking institution acceptable to the
GSIS.

b. The GSIS will reject a bid if:

i. The bid does not have Bid Security; or

ii. The Bid Security accompanying the bid is for

less than the required amount.

c. If the Bid Security is in the form of a manager's check or

unconditional demand draft, the interest earned on the Bid
Security will be for the account of GSIS.

d. If the Qualified Bidder becomes the winning

Bidder/Strategic Partner, the Bid Security will be applied as
the downpayment on the Qualified Bidder's offered purchase
price.

e. The Bid Security of the Qualified Bidder will be returned

immediately after the Public Bidding if the Qualified Bidder is
not declared the Highest Bidder.

f. The Bid Security will be returned by October 23, 1995 if

the Highest Bidder is unable to negotiate and execute with
GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other types of
contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan
for The Manila Hotel.

g. The Bid Security of the Highest Bidder will be forfeited in

favor of GSIS if the Highest Bidder, after negotiating and
executing the Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract specified by the
Highest Bidder or other types of contract in its strategic plan
for The Manila Hotel, fails or refuses to:

i. Execute the Stock Purchase and Sale

Agreement with GSIS not later than October
23, 1995; or
90 | P a g e

ii. Pay the full amount of the offered purchase

price not later than October 23, 1995; or

iii. Consummate the sale of the Block of

Shares for any other reason.

G. SUBMISSION OF BIDS

1. The Public Bidding will be held on September 7, 1995 at

the following location:

New GSIS Headquarters Building

Financial Center, Reclamation Area
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, Metro Manila.

2. The Secretariat of the PBAC will be stationed at the Public

Bidding to accept any and all bids and supporting
requirements. Representatives from the Commission on
Audit and COP will be invited to witness the proceedings.

3. The Qualified Bidder should submit its bid using the

Official Bid Form. The accomplished Official Bid Form should
be submitted in a sealed envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."

4. The Qualified Bidder should submit the following

documents in another sealed envelope marked
"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS"

a. Written Authority Bid

b. Bid Security

5. The two sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" and

"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" must be submitted
simultaneously to the Secretariat between 9:00 AM and 2:00
PM, Philippine Standard Time, on the date of the Public
Bidding. No bid shall be accepted after the closing time.
Opened or tampered bids shall not be accepted.

6. The Secretariat will log and record the actual time of

submission of the two sealed envelopes. The actual time of
submission will also be indicated by the Secretariat on the
face of the two envelopes.

7. After Step No. 6, the two sealed envelopes will be

dropped in the corresponding bid boxes provided for the
purpose. These boxes will be in full view of the invited public.

H. OPENING AND READING OF BIDS

1. After the closing time of 2:00 PM on the date of the Public

Bidding, the PBAC will open all sealed envelopes marked
"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" for screening,
evaluation and acceptance. Those who submitted
incomplete/insufficient documents or document/s which
is/are not substantially in the form required by PBAC will be
disqualified. The envelope containing their Official Bid Form
will be immediately returned to the disqualified bidders.

2. The sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" will be

opened at 3:00 PM. The name of the bidder and the amount
91 | P a g e

of its bid price will be read publicly as the envelopes are

opened.

3. Immediately following the reading of the bids, the PBAC

will formally announce the highest bid and the Highest
Bidder.

4. The highest bid will be, determined on a price per share

basis. In the event of a tie wherein two or more bids have the
same equivalent price per share, priority will be given to the
bidder seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC.

5. The Public Bidding will be declared a failed bidding in

case:

a. No single bid is submitted within the

prescribed period; or

b. There is only one (1) bid that is submitted

and acceptable to the PBAC.

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH

GSIS/MHC

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set

forth below by October 23, 1995 or the Highest Bidder will
lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will
instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified
Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and

execute with GSIS/MHC the Management
Contract, International Marketing Reservation
System Contract or other type of contract
specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic
plan for The Manila Hotel. If the Highest Bidder
is intending to provide only financial support to
The Manila Hotel, a separate institution may
enter into the aforementioned contract/s with
GSIS/MHC.

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock

Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS, a
copy of which will be distributed to each of the
Qualified Bidder after the prequalification
process is completed.

2. In the event that the Highest Bidder chooses a

Management Contract for The Manila Hotel, the maximum
levels for the management fee structure that GSIS/MHC are
prepared to accept in the Management Contract are as
follows:

a. Basic management fee: Maximum of 2.5%

of gross revenues.(1)

b. Incentive fee: Maximum of 8.0% of gross

operating profit(1) after deducting undistributed
overhead expenses and the basic
management fee.
92 | P a g e

c. Fixed component of the international

marketing/reservation system fee: Maximum of
2.0% of gross room revenues.(1) The Applicant
should indicate in its Information Package if it
is wishes to charge this fee.

Note (1): As defined in the uniform system of account for

hotels.

The GSIS/MHC have indicated above the acceptable

parameters for the hotel management fees to facilitate the
negotiations with the Highest Bidder for the Management
Contract after the Public Bidding.

A Qualified Bidder envisioning a Management Contract for

The Manila Hotel should determine whether or not the
management fee structure above is acceptable before
submitting their prequalification documents to GSIS.

J. BLOCK SALE TO THE OTHER QUALIFIED BIDDERS

1. If for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded

the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided
that these Qualified are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share.

2. The order of priority among the interested Qualified

Bidders will be in accordance wit the equivalent price per
share of their respective bids in their public Bidding, i.e., first
and second priority will be given to the Qualified Bidders that
submitted the second and third highest bids on the price per
share basis, respectively, and so on.

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING

BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning

Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are
met:

a. Execution of the necessary contract with

GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995;
and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC

and COP/OGCC are obtained.

I. FULL PAYMENT FOR THE BLOCK OF SHARES

1. Upon execution of the necessary contracts with

GSIS/MHC, the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner must fully
pay, not later than October 23, 1995, the offered purchase
price for the Block of Shares after deducting the Bid Security
applied as downpayment.

2. All payments should be made in the form of a Manager's

Check or unconditional Demand Draft, payable to the
"Government Service Insurance System," issued by a
reputable banking institution licensed to do business in the
Philippines and acceptable to GSIS.
93 | P a g e

M. GENERAL CONDITIONS

1. The GSIS unconditionally reserves the right to reject any

or all applications, waive any formality therein, or accept
such application as maybe considered most advantageous
to the GSIS. The GSIS similarly reserves the right to require
the submission of any additional information from the
Applicant as the PBAC may deem necessary.

2. The GSIS further reserves the right to call off the Public
Bidding prior to acceptance of the bids and call for a new
public bidding under amended rules, and without any liability
whatsoever to any or all the Qualified Bidders, except the
obligation to return the Bid Security.

3. The GSIS reserves the right to reset the date of the

prequalification/bidding conference, the deadline for the
submission of the prequalification documents, the date of the
Public Bidding or other pertinent activities at least three (3)
calendar days prior to the respective deadlines/target dates.

4. The GSIS sells only whatever rights, interest and

participation it has on the Block of Shares.

5. All documents and materials submitted by the Qualified

Bidders, except the Bid Security, may be returned upon
request.

6. The decision of the PBAC/GSIS on the results of the

Public Bidding is final. The Qualified Bidders, by participating
in the Public Bidding, are deemed to have agreed to accept
and abide by these results.

7. The GSIS will be held free and harmless form any liability,
suit or allegation arising out of the Public Bidding by the
Qualified Bidders who have participated in the Public
Bidding.3

The second public bidding was held on September 18, 1995. Petitioner bidded P41.00
per share for 15,300,000 shares and Renong Berhad bidded P44.00 per share also for
15,300,000 shares. The GSIS declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder and
immediately returned petitioner's bid security.

On September 28, 1995, ten days after the bidding, petitioner wrote to GSIS offering to
match the bid price of Renong Berhad. It requested that the award be made to itself
citing the second paragraph of Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution. It sent a
manager's check for thirty-three million pesos (P33,000,000.00) as bid security.

Respondent GSIS, then in the process of negotiating with Renong Berhad the terms
and conditions of the contract and technical agreements in the operation of the hotel,
refused to entertain petitioner's request.

Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. We issued a temporary restraining order on
October 18, 1995.

Petitioner anchors its plea on the second paragraph of Article XII, Section 10 of the
Constitution4 on the "National Economy and Patrimony" which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

94 | P a g e

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national

economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.

xxx xxx xxx

The vital issues can be summed up as follows:

(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a

self-executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to
carry it into effect;

(2) Assuming section 10 paragraph 2 of Article XII is self-executing

whether the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of
our patrimony as a nation;

(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to

implement section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;

(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference
to petitioner, a qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong
Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation;

(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares
to Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation.

Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the guiding
policies and principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and general
framework of the law and government.5 As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-
executing and can be enforced without further legislative action.6 Some of its provisions,
however, can be implemented only through appropriate laws enacted by the
Legislature, hence not self-executing.

To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is self-executing is a hard

row to hoe. The key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamental law oftentimes
submerged in its language. A searching inquiry should be made to find out if the
provision is intended as a present enactment, complete in itself as a definitive law, or if
it needs future legislation for completion and enforcement.7 The inquiry demands a
micro-analysis of the text and the context of the provision in question.8

Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing,9 rather

than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement. 10 The reason is not difficult to
discern. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental
law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by
Congress. 11 Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative
actions may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional in action should not
suffocate them. 12

Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests,
searches and seizures, 13 the rights of a person under custodial investigation, 14 the
rights of an accused, 15 and the privilege against self-incrimination, 16 It is recognize a
that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to effectuate constitutional provisions
guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and the protection of property. 17 The
same treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the taking or
damaging of property for public use without just compensation.18

Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-
executing where it merely announces a policy and its language empowers the
Legislature to prescribe the means by which the policy shall be carried into
effect. 19 Accordingly, we have held that the provisions in Article II of our Constitution
entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" should generally be construed as
95 | P a g e

mere statements of principles of the State. 20 We have also ruled that some provisions
of Article XIII on "Social Justice and Human Rights," 21 and Article XIV on "Education
Science and Technology, Arts, Culture end Sports" 22 cannot be the basis of judicially
enforceable rights. Their enforcement is addressed to the discretion of Congress though
they provide the framework for legislation 23 to effectuate their policy content. 24

Guided by this map of settled jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section 10,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing or not. It reads:

Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and
planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher
percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The
Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national

economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments
within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and
priorities.

The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in

the country 25 to Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per
cent 26 of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands
Congress to enact laws that will encourage the formation and operation of one
hundred percent Filipino-owned enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second
paragraph orders the entire State to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the
grant of rights and privileges covering the national economy and patrimony. The
third paragraph also directs the State to regulate foreign investments in line with
our national goals and well-set priorities.

The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there
is a categorical command for Congress to enact laws restricting foreign
ownership in certain areas of investments in the country and to encourage the
formation and operation of wholly-owned Filipino enterprises. The right granted
by the provision is clearly still in esse. Congress has to breathe life to the right by
means of legislation. Parenthetically, this paragraph was plucked from section 3,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. 27 The provision in the 1973 Constitution
affirmed our ruling in the landmark case of Lao Ichong v. Hernandez, 28 where we
upheld the discretionary authority of Congress to Filipinize certain areas of
investments. 29 By reenacting the 1973 provision, the first paragraph of section
10 affirmed the power of Congress to nationalize certain areas of investments in
favor of Filipinos.

The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the
State and not to Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our
government. Their coverage is also broader for they cover "the national economy and
patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national jurisdiction" and not merely
"certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot be read as granting
Congress the exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving preference to
qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges covering our national economy
and patrimony. Their language does not suggest that any of the State agency or
instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its implementation for any reason
whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional and it is now. The second and the
third paragraphs of Section 10, Article XII are thus self-executing.

This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled "Declaration of

Principles and State Policies." Its Section 19 provides that "[T]he State shall develop a
96 | P a g e

self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." It

engrafts the all-important Filipino First policy in our fundamental law and by the use of
the mandatory word "shall," directs its enforcement by the whole State without any
pause or a half- pause in time.

The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel
Corporation involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of the
Constitutional Commission show that the Commissioners entertained the same view as
to its meaning. According to Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our
rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. 30 By this yardstick,
the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the coverage of the constitutional provision giving
preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights involving our national
patrimony. The unique value of the Manila Hotel to our history and culture cannot be
viewed with a myopic eye. The value of the hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. As
chronicled by Beth Day Romulo, 31 the hotel first opened on July 4, 1912 as a first-class
hotel built by the American Insular Government for Americans living in, or passing
through, Manila while traveling to the Orient. Indigenous materials and Filipino
craftsmanship were utilized in its construction, For sometime, it was exclusively used by
American and Caucasian travelers and served as the "official guesthouse" of the
American Insular Government for visiting foreign dignitaries. Filipinos began coming to
the Hotel as guests during the Commonwealth period. When the Japanese occupied
Manila, it served as military headquarters and lodging for the highest-ranking officers
from Tokyo. It was at the Hotel and the Intramuros that the Japanese made their last
stand during the Liberation of Manila. After the war, the Hotel again served foreign
guests and Filipinos alike. Presidents and kings, premiers and potentates, as well as
glamorous international film and sports celebrities were housed in the Hotel. It was also
the situs of international conventions and conferences. In the local scene, it was the
venue of historic meetings, parties and conventions of political parties. The Hotel has
reaped and continues reaping numerous recognitions and awards from international
hotel and travel award-giving bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of Filipino talent and
ingenuity. These are judicially cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased mind.

The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursuant to
Republic Act No. 4846 but that does not exclude it from our national patrimony.
Republic Act No. 4846, "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act,"
merely provides a procedure whereby a particular cultural property may be classified a
"national cultural treasure" or an "important cultural property. 32 Approved on June 18,
1966 and amended by P.D. 374 in 1974, the law is limited in its reach and cannot be
read as the exclusive law implementing section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
To be sure, the law does not equate cultural treasure and cultural property as
synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of the nation."

The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the
respondent GSIS. A look at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned and
controlled corporation that administers funds that come from the monthly contributions
of government employees and the government. 33 The funds are held in trust for a
distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of indifferently. 34 They are to be used to
finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of the employees and the
administrative and operational expenses of the GSIS, 35 Excess funds, however, are
allowed to be invested in business and other ventures for the benefit of the
employees.36 It is thus contended that the GSIS investment in the Manila Hotel
Corporation is a simple business venture, hence, an act beyond the contemplation of
section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.

The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is

essentially a public corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to
serve a public purpose. It is subject to the jurisdictions of the Civil Service
Commission 37 and the Commission on Audit. 38 As state-owned and controlled
corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the general welfare
of the people. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevated
as a constitutional command.
97 | P a g e

The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of phrase "qualified Filipinos" and
their "preferential right." The Constitution desisted from defining their contents. This is
as it ought to be for a Constitution only lays down flexible policies and principles which
can bent to meet today's manifest needs and tomorrow's unmanifested demands. Only
a constitution strung with elasticity can grow as a living constitution.

Thus, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Nolledo

to define the phrase brushed aside a suggestion to define the phrase "qualified
Filipinos." He explained that present and prospective "laws" will take care of the
problem of its interpretation, viz:

x x x           x x x          x x x

THE PRESIDENT. What is the suggestion of

Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the
word "QUALIFIED?"

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO

QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As
against aliens over aliens?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that

is understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED"
because the existing laws or the prospective
laws will always lay down conditions under
which business map be done, for example,
qualifications on capital, qualifications on the
setting up of other financial structures, et
cetera.

MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO Yes.

MR. RODRIGO. If we say, "PREFERENCE TO

QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," it can be understood
as giving preference to qualified Filipinos as
against Filipinos who are not qualified.

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, that was

the intention of the proponents. The committee
has accepted the amendment.

x x x           x x x          x x x

As previously discussed, the constitutional command to enforce the Filipino First

policy is addressed to the State and not to Congress alone. Hence, the word
"laws" should not be understood as limited to legislations but all state actions
which include applicable rules and regulations adopted by agencies and
instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of their rule-making power. In the
case at bar, the bidding rules and regulations set forth the standards to measure
the qualifications of bidders Filipinos and foreigners alike. It is not seriously
disputed that petitioner qualified to bid as did Renong Berhad. 39

Thus, we come to the critical issue of the degree of preference which GSIS should have
accorded petitioner, a qualified Filipino, over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the
purchase of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel. Petitioner claims that after losing
the bid, this right of preference gives it a second chance to match the highest bid of
Renong Berhad.

With due respect, I cannot sustain petitioner's submission. I prescind from the premise
that the second paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Pilipino but
98 | P a g e

not anti-alien. It is pro-Filipino for it gives preference to Filipinos. It is not, however, anti-
alien per se for it does not absolutely bar aliens in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. Indeed, in the absence of
qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited from granting these rights, privileges and
concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the weal of the nation.

In implementing the policy articulated in section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, the
stellar task of our State policy-makers is to maintain a creative tension between two
desiderata — first, the need to develop our economy and patrimony with the help of
foreigners if necessary, and, second, the need to keep our economy controlled by
Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the Constitution did not define the degree of the right
of preference to be given to qualified Filipinos. They knew that for the right to serve the
general welfare, it must have a malleable content that can be adjusted by our policy-
makers to meet the changing needs of our people. In fine, the right of preference of
qualified Filipinos is to be determined by degree as time dictates and circumstances
warrant. The lesser the need for alien assistance, the greater the degree of the right of
preference can be given to Filipinos and vice verse.

Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to determine the degree of this
privilege at any given time is addressed to the entire State. While under our
constitutional scheme, the right primarily belongs to Congress as the lawmaking
department of our government, other branches of government, and all their agencies
and instrumentalities, share the power to enforce this state policy. Within the limits of
their authority, they can act or promulgate rules and regulations defining the degree of
this right of preference in cases where they have to make grants involving the national
economy and judicial duty. On the other hand, our duty is to strike down acts of the
state that violate the policy.

To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the preferential right.
Consequently, we must turn to the rules and regulations of on respondents Committee
Privatization and GSIS to determine the degree of preference that petitioner is entitled
to as a qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A tearless look at the rules and regulations
will show that they are silent on the degree of preferential right to be accorded qualified
Filipino bidder. Despite their silence, however, they cannot be read to mean that they do
not grant any degree of preference to petitioner for paragraph 2, section 10, Article XII
of the Constitution is deemed part of said rules and regulations. Pursuant to legal
hermeneutics which demand that we interpret rules to save them from
unconstitutionality, I submit that the right of preference of petitioner arises only if it tied
the bid of Benong Berhad. In that instance, all things stand equal, and bidder, as a
qualified Pilipino bidder, should be preferred.

It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to
match the bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner's submission must be supported by the
rules but even if we examine the rules inside-out .thousand times, they can not justify
the claimed right. Under the rules, the right to match the highest bid arises only "if for
any reason, the highest bidder cannot be awarded block of shares . . ." No reason has
arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as bidder. It complied
with the procedure of bidding. It tendered the highest bid. It was declared as the highest
bidder by the GSIS and the rules say this decision is final. It deserves the award as a
matter of right for the rules clearly did not give to the petitioner as a qualified Filipino
privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the rules did not grant, petitioner
cannot demand. Our symphaties may be with petitioner but the court has no power to
extend the latitude and longtitude of the right of preference as defined by the rules. The
parameters of the right of preference depend on galaxy of facts and factors whose
determination belongs to the province of the policy-making branches and agencies of
the State. We are duty-bound to respect that determination even if we differ with the
wisdom of their judgment. The right they grant may be little but we must uphold the
grant for as long as the right of preference is not denied. It is only when a State action
amounts to a denial of the right that the Court can come in and strike down the denial as
unconstitutional.
99 | P a g e

Finally, I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong
Berhad. Petitioner was aware of the rules and regulations of the bidding. It knew that
the rules and regulations do not provide that a qualified Filipino bidder can match the
winning bid submitting an inferior bid. It knew that the bid was open to foreigners and
that foreigners qualified even during the first bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to
repudiate the rules which it agreed to respect. It cannot be allowed to obey the rules
when it wins and disregard them when it loses. If sustained, petitioners' stance will
wreak havoc on he essence of bidding. Our laws, rules and regulations require highest
bidding to raise as much funds as possible for the government to maximize its capacity
to deliver essential services to our people. This is a duty that must be discharged by
Filipinos and foreigners participating in a bidding contest and the rules are carefully
written to attain this objective. Among others, bidders are prequalified to insure their
financial capability. The bidding is secret and the bids are sealed to prevent collusion
among the parties. This objective will be undermined if we grant petitioner that privilege
to know the winning bid and a chance to match it. For plainly, a second chance to bid
will encourage a bidder not to strive to give the highest bid in the first bidding.

We support the Filipino First policy without any reservation. The visionary nationalist
Don Claro M. Recto has warned us that the greatest tragedy that can befall a Filipino is
to be an alien in his own land. The Constitution has embodied Recto's counsel as a
state policy. But while the Filipino First policy requires that we incline to a Filipino, it
does not demand that we wrong an alien. Our policy makers can write laws and rules
giving favored treatment to the Filipino but we are not free to be unfair to a foreigner
after writing the laws and the rules. After the laws are written, they must be obeyed as
written, by Filipinos and foreigners alike. The equal protection clause of the Constitution
protects all against unfairness. We can be pro-Filipino without unfairness to foreigner.

I vote to dismiss the petition.

Narvasa, C.J., and Melo, J., concur.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:

I regret I cannot join the majority. To the incisive Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno, may I just add

1. The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a
bidding process is concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to
equal the highest foreign bid, and thus to win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2),
Art. XII] simply states that "in the grant of rights . . . covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos." The majority concedes
that there is no law defining the extent or degree of such preference. Specifically, no
statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal that of the
winning foreigner. In the absence of such empowering law, the majority's strained
interpretation, I respectfully submit constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation, which
makes bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no foreigner can
win. Only in the Philippines!.

2. Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial is short-sighted and,
viewed properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interest. It encourages other
countries — in the guise of reverse comity or worse, unabashed retaliation — to
discriminate against us in their own jurisdictions by authorizing their own nationals to
similarly equal and defeat the higher bids of Filipino enterprises solely, while on the
other hand, allowing similar bids of other foreigners to remain unchallenged by their
nationals. The majority's thesis will thus marginalize Filipinos as pariahs in the global
marketplace with absolute no chance of winning any bidding outside our country. Even
authoritarian regimes and hermit kingdoms have long ago found out unfairness, greed
and isolation are self-defeating and in the long-term, self-destructing.
100 | P a g e

The moral lesson here is simple: Do not do unto other what you dont want other to do
unto you.

3. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of
the Constitution, the constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be
allowed only where all the bids are equal. In this manner, we put the Filipino ahead
without self-destructing him and without being unfair to the foreigner.

In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when the
scores are tied. But not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the
highest score.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. At the same time, I would like to
expound a bit more on the concept of national patrimony as including within its scope
and meaning institutions such as the Manila Hotel.

It is argued by petitioner that the Manila Hotel comes under "national patrimony" over
which qualified Filipinos have the preference, in ownership and operation. The
Constitutional provision on point states:

xxx xxx xxx

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national

economy and patrimony, the State shall Give preference to qualified
Filipinos.1

Petitioner's argument, I believe, is well taken. Under the 1987 Constitution, "national
patrimony" consists of the natural resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in
our territory (Article I) consisting of land, sea, and air.2 study of the 1935 Constitution,
where the concept of "national patrimony" originated, would show that its framers
decided to adopt the even more comprehensive expression "Patrimony of the Nation" in
the belief that the phrase encircles a concept embracing not only their natural resources
of the country but practically everything that belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible
and the material as well as the intangible and the spiritual assets and possessions of
the people. It is to be noted that the framers did not stop with conservation. They knew
that conservation alone does not spell progress; and that this may be achieved only
through development as a correlative factor to assure to the people not only the
exclusive ownership, but also the exclusive benefits of their national patrimony).3

Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to
our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our
race.4

There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national
patrimony and, as such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and
benefit from its operation. This institution has played an important role in our nation's
history, having been the venue of many a historical event, and serving as it did, and as
it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of state, dignitaries,
celebrities, and others.5

It is therefore our duty to protect and preserve it for future generations of Filipinos. As
President Manuel L. Quezon once said, we must exploit the natural resources of our
country, but we should do so with. an eye to the welfare of the future generations. In
other words, the leaders of today are the trustees of the patrimony of our race. To
preserve our national patrimony and reserve it for Filipinos was the intent of the
distinguished gentlemen who first framed our Constitution. Thus, in debating the need
101 | P a g e

for nationalization of our lands and natural resources, one expounded that we should
"put more teeth into our laws, and; not make the nationalization of our lands and natural
resources a subject of ordinary legislation but of constitutional enactment"6 To quote
further: "Let not our children be mere tenants and trespassers in their own country. Let
us preserve and bequeath to them what is rightfully theirs, free from all foreign liens and
encumbrances".7

Now, a word on preference. In my view "preference to qualified Filipinos", to be

meaningful, must refer not only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It
must touch and affect the very "heart of the existing order." In the field of public bidding
in the acquisition of things that pertain to the national patrimony, preference to qualified
Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or equal the higher bid of a non-Filipino;
the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the qualified Filipino and the non-
Filipino are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly be made to the qualified
Filipino. The Constitutional preference should give the qualified Filipino an opportunity
to match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference of the
qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.

It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude towards foreign investments
in our country, stress is on the elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment in
the country. While government agencies, including the courts should re-condition their
thinking to such a trend, and make it easy and even attractive for foreign investors to
come to our shores, yet we should not preclude ourselves from reserving to us Filipinos
certain areas where our national identity, culture and heritage are involved. In the hotel
industry, for instance, foreign investors have established themselves creditably, such as
in the Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels. This should not stop
us from retaining 51% of the capital stock of the Manila Hotel Corporation in the hands
of Filipinos. This would be in keeping with the intent of the Filipino people to preserve
our national patrimony, including our historical and cultural heritage in the hands of
Filipinos.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I agree with Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo on his clear-cut statements, shared by Mr.
Justice Reynato S. Puno in a well written separate (dissenting) opinion, that:

First, the provision in our fundamental law which provides that "(I)n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos"1 is self-executory. The provision verily does
not need, although it can obviously be amplified or regulated by, an enabling law or a
set of rules.

Second, the term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country's natural resources
but also to its cultural heritage. A "historical landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice
Justo P. Torres, Jr., Manila Hotel has now indeed become part of Philippine heritage.

Third, the act of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a government
entity which derives its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC
should be considered an act of the State subject to the Constitutional mandate.

On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos," I find it

somewhat difficult to take the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice
Puno. In the particular case before us, the only meaningful preference, it seems, would
really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match the foreign bid for, as a particular matter,
I cannot see any bid that literally calls for millions of dollars to be at par (to the last cent)
with another. The magnitude of the magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly
possible for the competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the
dissenting view, could trigger the right of preference.

It is most unfortunate that Renong Berhad has not been spared this great
disappointment, a letdown that it did not deserve, by a simple and timely advise of the
proper rules of bidding along with the peculiar constitutional implications of the
102 | P a g e

proposed transaction. It is also regrettable that the Court at time is seen, to instead, be
the refuge for bureaucratic inadequate which create the perception that it even takes on
non-justiciable controversies.

All told, I am constrained to vote for granting the petition.

MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:

I take the view that in the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the
constitutional mandate that "[i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
the national patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos"1 is to allow
petitioner Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad
for the purchase of the controlling shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation.
Indeed, it is the only way a qualified Filipino of Philippine corporation can be
given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or concession given by the State,
by favoring it over a foreign national corporation.

Under the rules on public bidding of the Government Service and Insurance System, if
petitioner and the Malaysian firm had offered the same price per share, "priority [would
be given] to the bidder seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC,"2 so that petitioner
bid for more shares, it would be preferred to the Malaysian corporation for that reason
and not because it is a Philippine corporation. Consequently, it is only in cases like the
present one, where an alien corporation is the highest bidder, that preferential treatment
of the Philippine corporation is mandated not by declaring it winner but by allowing it "to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share" before it is awarded the shares of
stocks.3 That, to me, is what "preference to qualified Filipinos" means in the context of
this case — by favoring Filipinos whenever they are at a disadvantage vis-a-
vis foreigners.

This was the meaning given in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno4 to a 1947 statute giving
"preference to Filipino citizens in the lease of public market stalls."5 This Court upheld
the cancellation of existing leases covering market stalls occupied by persons who were
not Filipinos and the award thereafter of the stalls to qualified Filipino vendors as
ordered by the Department of Finance. Similarly, in Vda. de Salgado v. De la
Fuente,6 this Court sustained the validity of a municipal ordinance passed pursuant to
the statute (R.A. No. 37), terminating existing leases of public market stalls and granting
preference to Filipino citizens in the issuance of new licenses for the occupancy of the
stalls. In Chua Lao v. Raymundo,7 the preference granted under the statute was held to
apply to cases in which Filipino vendors sought the same stalls occupied by alien
vendors in the public markets even if there were available other stalls as good as those
occupied by aliens. "The law, apparently, is applicable whenever there is a conflict of
interest between Filipino applicants and aliens for lease of stalls in public markets, in
which situation the right to preference immediately arises."8

Our legislation on the matter thus antedated by a quarter of a century efforts began only
in the 1970s in America to realize the promise of equality, through affirmative action and
reverse discrimination programs designed to remedy past discrimination against colored
people in such areas as employment, contracting and licensing.9 Indeed, in vital areas
of our national economy, there are situations in which the only way to place Filipinos in
control of the national economy as contemplated in the Constitution 10 is to give them
preferential treatment where they can at least stand on equal footing with aliens.

There need be no fear that thus preferring Filipinos would either invite foreign retaliation
or deprive the country of the benefit of foreign capital or know-how. We are dealing here
not with common trades of common means of livelihood which are open to aliens in our
midst, 11 but with the sale of government property, which is like the grant of government
largess of benefits and concessions covering the national economy" and therefore no
one should begrudge us if we give preferential treatment to our citizens. That at any rate
is the command of the Constitution. For the Manila Hotel is a business owned by the
Government. It is being privatized. Privatization should result in the relinquishment of
the business in favor of private individuals and groups who are Filipino citizens, not in
favor of aliens.
103 | P a g e

Nor should there be any doubt that by awarding the shares of stocks to petitioner we
would be trading competence and capability for nationalism. Both petitioner and the
Malaysian firm are qualified, having hurdled the prequalification process. 12 It is only the
result of the public bidding that is sought to be modified by enabling petitioner to up its
bid to equal the highest bid.

Nor, finally, is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a Filipino bidder to match
the highest bid of an alien could encourage speculation, since all that a Filipino entity
would then do would be not to make a bid or make only a token one and, after it is
known that a foreign bidder has submitted the highest bid, make an offer matching that
of the foreign firm. This is not possible under the rules on public bidding of the GSIS.
Under these rules there is a minimum bid required (P36.87 per share for a range of 9 to
15 million shares). 13 Bids below the minimum will not be considered. On the other hand,
if the Filipino entity, after passing the prequalification process, does not submit a bid, he
will not be allowed to match the highest bid of the foreign firm because this is a privilege
allowed only to those who have "validly submitted bids." 14 The suggestion is, to say the
least, fanciful and has no basis in fact.

For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition.

TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion:

Constancy in law is not an attribute of a judicious mind. I say this as we are not
confronted in the case at bar with legal and constitutional issues — and yet I am driven
so to speak on the side of history. The reason perhaps is due to the belief that in the
words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a "page of history is worth a volume of
logic."

I will, however, attempt to share my thoughts on whether the Manila Hotel has a
historical and cultural aspect within the meaning of the constitution and thus, forming
part of the "patrimony of the nation".

Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

xxx xxx xxx

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national

economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments
within its national goals and priorities.

The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Article II of the same
Constitution pertaining to "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" which ordain —

The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy

effectively by Filipinos. (Sec. 19).

Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of the
highlights in the 1987 Constitution Commission proceedings thus:

x x x           x x x          x x x

MR. NOLLEDO. The Amendment will read: "IN

THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE
SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS". And the word "Filipinos" here, as
intended by the proponents, will include not
only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-
104 | P a g e

Controlled entities fully controlled by Filipinos

(Vol. III, Records of the Constitutional
Commission, p. 608).

MR. MONSOD. We also wanted to add, as

Commissioner Villegas said, this committee
and this body already approved what is known
as the Filipino First policy which was
suggested by Commissioner de Castro. So that
it is now in our Constitution (Vol. IV, Records of
the Constitutional Commission, p. 225).

Commissioner Jose Nolledo explaining the provision adverted to above,

said:

MR. NOLLEDO. In the grant of rights,

privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment,

if a foreign enterprise is qualified and the
Filipinos enterprise is also qualified, will the
Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in

some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will
the Filipino still be preferred:?

MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes". (Vol. III,

p. 616, Records of the Constitutional
Commission).

The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the history and spirit of the
Malolos Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitutions. That we
have no reneged on this nationalist policy is articulated in one of the earliest case, this
Court said —

The nationalistic tendency is manifested in various provisions of the

Constitution. . . . It cannot therefore be said that a law imbued with the
same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the
Constitution is unreasonable, invalid or unconstitutional (Ichong, et al. vs.
Hernandez, et al., 101 Phil. 1155).

I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and traditions are not legislated
and is the product of events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of
growth and acceptance by the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a
people.

The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila
Hotel is witness to historic events (too numerous to mention) which shaped our history
for almost 84 years.

As I intimated earlier, it is not my position in this opinion, to examine the single

instances of the legal largese which have given rise to this controversy. As I believe that
has been exhaustively discussed in the ponencia. Suffice it to say at this point that the
history of the Manila Hotel should not be placed in the auction block of a purely
business transaction, where profits subverts the cherished historical values of our
people.
105 | P a g e

As a historical landmark in this "Pearl of the Orient Seas", it has its enviable tradition
which, in the words of the philosopher Salvador de Madarriaga tradition is "more of a
river than a stone, it keeps flowing, and one must view the flowing , and one must view
the flow of both directions. If you look towards the hill from which the river flows, you
see tradition in the form of forceful currents that push the river or people towards the
future, and if you look the other way, you progress."

Indeed, tradition and progress are the same, for progress depends on the kind of
tradition. Let us not jettison the tradition of the Manila Hotel and thereby repeat our
colonial history.

I grant, of course the men of the law can see the same subject in different lights.

I remember, however, a Spanish proverb which says — "He is always right who
suspects that he makes mistakes". On this note, I say that if I have to make a mistake, I
would rather err upholding the belief that the Filipino be first under his Constitution and
in his own land.

I vote GRANT the petition.

PUNO, J., dissenting:

This is a. petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by the Manila Prince Hotel

Corporation, a domestic corporation, to stop the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) from selling the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign
corporation. Allegedly, the sale violates the second paragraph of section 10, Article XII
of the Constitution.

Respondent GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation. It is the sole

owner of the Manila Hotel which it operates through its subsidiary, the Manila Hotel
Corporation. Manila Hotel was included in the privatization program of the government.
In 1995, GSIS proposed to sell to interested buyers 30% to 51% of its shares, ranging
from 9,000,000 to 15,300,000 shares, in the Manila Hotel Corporation. After the
absence of bids at the first public bidding, the block of shares offered for sale was
increased from a maximum of 30% to 51%. Also, the winning bidder, or the eventual
"strategic partner" of the GSIS was required to "provide management expertise and/or
an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel"1 The proposal was approved by
respondent Committee on Privatization.

In July 1995, a conference was held where prequalification documents and the bidding
rules were furnished interested parties. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic
corporation, and Renong Berhad, Malaysian firm with ITT Sheraton as operator,
prequalified.2

The bidding rules and procedures entitled "Guidelines and Procedures: Second
Prequalification and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization" provide:

I INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS

DETERMINING THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER

The party that accomplishes the steps set forth below will be declared the
Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner and will be awarded the Block of Shares:

First — Pass the prequalification process;

Second — Submit the highest bid on a price per share basis for the Block
of Shares;
106 | P a g e

Third — Negotiate and execute the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC

not later than October 23, 1995;

xxx xxx xxx

IV GUIDELINES FOR PREQUALIFICATION

A. PARTIES WHO MAP APPLY FOR PREQUALIFICATION

The Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner will be expected to

provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of The Manila
Hotel. In this context, the GSIS is inviting to the
prequalification process any local and/or foreign corporation,
consortium/joint venture or juridical entity with at least one of
the following qualifications:

a. Proven management .expertise in the hotel

industry; or

b. Significant equity ownership (i.e. board

representation) in another hotel company; or

c. Overall management and marketing

expertise to successfully operate the Manila
Hotel.

Parties interested in bidding for MHC should be able to

provide access to the requisite management expertise
and/or international marketing/reservation system for The
Manila Hotel.

xxx xxx xxx

D. PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS

xxx xxx xxx

E. APPLICATION PROCEDURE

1. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE REGISTRATION

OFFICE

The prequalification documents can be secured at the

Registration Office between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during
working days within the period specified in Section III. Each
set of documents consists of the following:

a. Guidelines and Procedures: Second

Prequalification and Public Bidding of the MHC
Privatization

b. Confidential Information Memorandum: The

Manila Hotel Corporation

c. Letter of Invitation. to the Prequalification

and Bidding Conference

xxx xxx xxx

4. PREQUALIFICATION AND BIDDING CONFERENCE

107 | P a g e

A prequalification and bidding conference will be held at The

Manila Hotel on the date specified in Section III to allow the
Applicant to seek clarifications and further information
regarding the guidelines and procedures. Only those who
purchased the prequalification documents will be allowed in
this conference. Attendance to this conference is strongly
advised, although the Applicant will not be penalized if it
does not attend.

5. SUBMISSION OF PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS

The applicant should submit 5 sets of the prequalification

documents (1 original set plus 4 copies) at the Registration
Office between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days
within the period specified in Section III.

F. PREQUALIFICATION PROCESS

1. The Applicant will be evaluated by the PBAC

with the assistance of the TEC based on the
Information Package and other information
available to the PBAC.

2. If the Applicant is a Consortium/Joint

Venture, the evaluation will consider the overall
qualifications of the group, taking into account
the contribution of each member to the
venture.

3. The decision of the PBAC with respect to the

results of the PBAC evaluation will be final.

4. The Applicant shall be evaluated according

to the criteria set forth below:

a. Business management
expertise, track record, and
experience

b. Financial capability.

c. Feasibility and acceptability of

the proposed strategic plan for
the Manila Hotel

5. The PBAC will shortlist such number of Applicants as it

may deem appropriate.

6. The parties that prequalified in the first MHC public

bidding — ITT Sheraton, Marriot International Inc.,
Renaissance Hotels International Inc., consortium of RCBC
Capital/Ritz Carlton — may participate in the Public Bidding
without having to undergo the prequalification process again.

G. SHORTLIST OF QUALIFIED BIDDERS

1. A notice of prequalification results containing the shortlist

of Qualified Bidders will be posted at the Registration Office
at the date specified in Section III.

2. In the case of a Consortium/Joint Venture, the withdrawal

by member whose qualification was a material consideration
108 | P a g e

for being included in the shortlist is ground for

disqualification of the Applicant.

V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PUBLIC BIDDING

A. PARTIES WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PUBLIC

BIDDING

All parties in the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be eligible

to participate in the Public Bidding.

B. BLOCK OF SHARES

A range of Nine Million (9,000,000) to Fifteen Million Three

Hundred Thousand (15,300,000) shares of stock
representing Thirty Percent to Fifty-One Percent (30%-51%)
of the issued and outstanding shares of MHC, will be offered
in the Public Bidding by the GSIS. The Qualified Bidders will
have the Option of determining the number of shares within
the range to bid for. The range is intended to attract bidders
with different preferences and objectives for the operation
and management of The Manila Hotel.

C. MINIMUM BID REQUIRED ON A PRICE PER SHARE

BASIS

1. Bids will be evaluated on a price per share basis. The

minimum bid required on a price per share basis for the
Block of Shares is Thirty-Six Pesos and Sixty-Seven
Centavos (P36.67).

2. Bids should be in the Philippine currency payable to the

GSIS.

3. Bids submitted with an equivalent price per share below

the minimum required will not considered.

D. TRANSFER COSTS

x x x           x x x          x x x

E. OFFICIAL BID FORM

1. Bids must be contained in the prescribed Official Bid

Form, a copy of which is attached as Annex IV. The Official
Bid Form must be properly accomplished in all details;
improper accomplishment may be a sufficient basis for
disqualification.

2. During the Public Bidding, the Qualified Bidder will submit

the Official Bid Form, which will indicate the offered
purchase price, in a sealed envelope marked "OFFICIAL
BID."

F. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

During the Public Bidding, the following documents should

be submitted along with the bid in a separate envelop
marked "SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS":

1. WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO BID (UNDER OATH).

109 | P a g e

If the Qualified Bidder is a corporation, the representative of

the Qualified Bidder should submit a Board resolution which
adequately authorizes such representative to bid for and in
behalf of the corporation with full authority to perform such
acts necessary or requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.

If the Qualified Bidder is a Consortium/Joint Venture, each

member of the Consortium/Joint venture should submit a
Board resolution authorizing one of its members and such
member's representative to make the bid on behalf of the
group with full authority to perform such acts necessary or
requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.

2. BID SECURITY

a. The Qualified Bidder should deposit Thirty-Three Million

Pesos (P33,000,00), in Philippine currency as Bid Security in
the form of:

i. Manager's check or unconditional demand

draft payable to the "Government Service
Insurance System" and issued by a reputable
banking institution duly licensed to do business
in the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS; or

ii. Standby-by letter of credit issued by a

reputable banking institution acceptable to the
GSIS.

b. The GSIS will reject a bid if:

i. The bid does not have Bid Security; or

ii. The Bid Security accompanying the bid is for

less than the required amount.

c. If the Bid Security is in the form of a manager's check or

unconditional demand draft, the interest earned on the Bid
Security will be for the account of GSIS.

d. If the Qualified Bidder becomes the winning

Bidder/Strategic Partner, the Bid Security will be applied as
the downpayment on the Qualified Bidder's offered purchase
price.

e. The Bid Security of the Qualified Bidder will be returned

immediately after the Public Bidding if the Qualified Bidder is
not declared the Highest Bidder.

f. The Bid Security will be returned by October 23, 1995 if

the Highest Bidder is unable to negotiate and execute with
GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other types of
contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan
for The Manila Hotel.

g. The Bid Security of the Highest Bidder will be forfeited in

favor of GSIS if the Highest Bidder, after negotiating and
executing the Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract specified by the
Highest Bidder or other types of contract in its strategic plan
for The Manila Hotel, fails or refuses to:
110 | P a g e

i. Execute the Stock Purchase and Sale

Agreement with GSIS not later than October
23, 1995; or

ii. Pay the full amount of the offered purchase

price not later than October 23, 1995; or

iii. Consummate the sale of the Block of

Shares for any other reason.

G. SUBMISSION OF BIDS

1. The Public Bidding will be held on September 7, 1995 at

the following location:

New GSIS Headquarters Building

Financial Center, Reclamation Area
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, Metro Manila.

2. The Secretariat of the PBAC will be stationed at the Public

Bidding to accept any and all bids and supporting
requirements. Representatives from the Commission on
Audit and COP will be invited to witness the proceedings.

3. The Qualified Bidder should submit its bid using the

Official Bid Form. The accomplished Official Bid Form should
be submitted in a sealed envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."

4. The Qualified Bidder should submit the following

documents in another sealed envelope marked
"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS"

a. Written Authority Bid

b. Bid Security

5. The two sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" and

"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" must be submitted
simultaneously to the Secretariat between 9:00 AM and 2:00
PM, Philippine Standard Time, on the date of the Public
Bidding. No bid shall be accepted after the closing time.
Opened or tampered bids shall not be accepted.

6. The Secretariat will log and record the actual time of

submission of the two sealed envelopes. The actual time of
submission will also be indicated by the Secretariat on the
face of the two envelopes.

7. After Step No. 6, the two sealed envelopes will be

dropped in the corresponding bid boxes provided for the
purpose. These boxes will be in full view of the invited public.

H. OPENING AND READING OF BIDS

1. After the closing time of 2:00 PM on the date of the Public

Bidding, the PBAC will open all sealed envelopes marked
"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" for screening,
evaluation and acceptance. Those who submitted
incomplete/insufficient documents or document/s which
is/are not substantially in the form required by PBAC will be
disqualified. The envelope containing their Official Bid Form
will be immediately returned to the disqualified bidders.
111 | P a g e

2. The sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" will be

opened at 3:00 PM. The name of the bidder and the amount
of its bid price will be read publicly as the envelopes are
opened.

3. Immediately following the reading of the bids, the PBAC

will formally announce the highest bid and the Highest
Bidder.

4. The highest bid will be, determined on a price per share

basis. In the event of a tie wherein two or more bids have the
same equivalent price per share, priority will be given to the
bidder seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC.

5. The Public Bidding will be declared a failed bidding in

case:

a. No single bid is submitted within the

prescribed period; or

b. There is only one (1) bid that is submitted

and acceptable to the PBAC.

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH

GSIS/MHC

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set

forth below by October 23, 1995 or the Highest Bidder will
lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will
instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified
Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and

execute with GSIS/MHC the Management
Contract, International Marketing Reservation
System Contract or other type of contract
specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic
plan for The Manila Hotel. If the Highest Bidder
is intending to provide only financial support to
The Manila Hotel, a separate institution may
enter into the aforementioned contract/s with
GSIS/MHC.

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock

Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS, a
copy of which will be distributed to each of the
Qualified Bidder after the prequalification
process is completed.

2. In the event that the Highest Bidder chooses a

Management Contract for The Manila Hotel, the maximum
levels for the management fee structure that GSIS/MHC are
prepared to accept in the Management Contract are as
follows:

a. Basic management fee: Maximum of 2.5%

of gross revenues.(1)

b. Incentive fee: Maximum of 8.0% of gross

operating profit(1) after deducting undistributed
overhead expenses and the basic
management fee.
112 | P a g e

c. Fixed component of the international

marketing/reservation system fee: Maximum of
2.0% of gross room revenues.(1) The Applicant
should indicate in its Information Package if it
is wishes to charge this fee.

Note (1): As defined in the uniform system of account for

hotels.

The GSIS/MHC have indicated above the acceptable

parameters for the hotel management fees to facilitate the
negotiations with the Highest Bidder for the Management
Contract after the Public Bidding.

A Qualified Bidder envisioning a Management Contract for

The Manila Hotel should determine whether or not the
management fee structure above is acceptable before
submitting their prequalification documents to GSIS.

J. BLOCK SALE TO THE OTHER QUALIFIED BIDDERS

1. If for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded

the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided
that these Qualified are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share.

2. The order of priority among the interested Qualified

Bidders will be in accordance wit the equivalent price per
share of their respective bids in their public Bidding, i.e., first
and second priority will be given to the Qualified Bidders that
submitted the second and third highest bids on the price per
share basis, respectively, and so on.

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING

BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning

Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are
met:

a. Execution of the necessary contract with

GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995;
and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC

and COP/OGCC are obtained.

I. FULL PAYMENT FOR THE BLOCK OF SHARES

1. Upon execution of the necessary contracts with

GSIS/MHC, the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner must fully
pay, not later than October 23, 1995, the offered purchase
price for the Block of Shares after deducting the Bid Security
applied as downpayment.

2. All payments should be made in the form of a Manager's

Check or unconditional Demand Draft, payable to the
"Government Service Insurance System," issued by a
reputable banking institution licensed to do business in the
Philippines and acceptable to GSIS.
113 | P a g e

M. GENERAL CONDITIONS

1. The GSIS unconditionally reserves the right to reject any

or all applications, waive any formality therein, or accept
such application as maybe considered most advantageous
to the GSIS. The GSIS similarly reserves the right to require
the submission of any additional information from the
Applicant as the PBAC may deem necessary.

2. The GSIS further reserves the right to call off the Public
Bidding prior to acceptance of the bids and call for a new
public bidding under amended rules, and without any liability
whatsoever to any or all the Qualified Bidders, except the
obligation to return the Bid Security.

3. The GSIS reserves the right to reset the date of the

prequalification/bidding conference, the deadline for the
submission of the prequalification documents, the date of the
Public Bidding or other pertinent activities at least three (3)
calendar days prior to the respective deadlines/target dates.

4. The GSIS sells only whatever rights, interest and

participation it has on the Block of Shares.

5. All documents and materials submitted by the Qualified

Bidders, except the Bid Security, may be returned upon
request.

6. The decision of the PBAC/GSIS on the results of the

Public Bidding is final. The Qualified Bidders, by participating
in the Public Bidding, are deemed to have agreed to accept
and abide by these results.

7. The GSIS will be held free and harmless form any liability,
suit or allegation arising out of the Public Bidding by the
Qualified Bidders who have participated in the Public
Bidding.3

The second public bidding was held on September 18, 1995. Petitioner bidded P41.00
per share for 15,300,000 shares and Renong Berhad bidded P44.00 per share also for
15,300,000 shares. The GSIS declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder and
immediately returned petitioner's bid security.

On September 28, 1995, ten days after the bidding, petitioner wrote to GSIS offering to
match the bid price of Renong Berhad. It requested that the award be made to itself
citing the second paragraph of Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution. It sent a
manager's check for thirty-three million pesos (P33,000,000.00) as bid security.

Respondent GSIS, then in the process of negotiating with Renong Berhad the terms
and conditions of the contract and technical agreements in the operation of the hotel,
refused to entertain petitioner's request.

Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. We issued a temporary restraining order on
October 18, 1995.

Petitioner anchors its plea on the second paragraph of Article XII, Section 10 of the
Constitution4 on the "National Economy and Patrimony" which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

114 | P a g e

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national

economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.

xxx xxx xxx

The vital issues can be summed up as follows:

(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a

self-executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to
carry it into effect;

(2) Assuming section 10 paragraph 2 of Article XII is self-executing

whether the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of
our patrimony as a nation;

(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to

implement section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;

(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference
to petitioner, a qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong
Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation;

(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares
to Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation.

Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the guiding
policies and principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and general
framework of the law and government.5 As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-
executing and can be enforced without further legislative action.6 Some of its provisions,
however, can be implemented only through appropriate laws enacted by the
Legislature, hence not self-executing.

To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is self-executing is a hard

row to hoe. The key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamental law oftentimes
submerged in its language. A searching inquiry should be made to find out if the
provision is intended as a present enactment, complete in itself as a definitive law, or if
it needs future legislation for completion and enforcement.7 The inquiry demands a
micro-analysis of the text and the context of the provision in question.8

Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing,9 rather

than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement. 10 The reason is not difficult to
discern. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental
law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by
Congress. 11 Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative
actions may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional in action should not
suffocate them. 12

Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests,
searches and seizures, 13 the rights of a person under custodial investigation, 14 the
rights of an accused, 15 and the privilege against self-incrimination, 16 It is recognize a
that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to effectuate constitutional provisions
guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and the protection of property. 17 The
same treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the taking or
damaging of property for public use without just compensation.18

Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-
executing where it merely announces a policy and its language empowers the
Legislature to prescribe the means by which the policy shall be carried into
effect. 19 Accordingly, we have held that the provisions in Article II of our Constitution
entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" should generally be construed as
115 | P a g e

mere statements of principles of the State. 20 We have also ruled that some provisions
of Article XIII on "Social Justice and Human Rights," 21 and Article XIV on "Education
Science and Technology, Arts, Culture end Sports" 22 cannot be the basis of judicially
enforceable rights. Their enforcement is addressed to the discretion of Congress though
they provide the framework for legislation 23 to effectuate their policy content. 24

Guided by this map of settled jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section 10,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing or not. It reads:

Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and
planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher
percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The
Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national

economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments
within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and
priorities.

The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in

the country 25 to Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per
cent 26 of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands
Congress to enact laws that will encourage the formation and operation of one
hundred percent Filipino-owned enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second
paragraph orders the entire State to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the
grant of rights and privileges covering the national economy and patrimony. The
third paragraph also directs the State to regulate foreign investments in line with
our national goals and well-set priorities.

The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there
is a categorical command for Congress to enact laws restricting foreign
ownership in certain areas of investments in the country and to encourage the
formation and operation of wholly-owned Filipino enterprises. The right granted
by the provision is clearly still in esse. Congress has to breathe life to the right by
means of legislation. Parenthetically, this paragraph was plucked from section 3,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. 27 The provision in the 1973 Constitution
affirmed our ruling in the landmark case of Lao Ichong v. Hernandez, 28 where we
upheld the discretionary authority of Congress to Filipinize certain areas of
investments. 29 By reenacting the 1973 provision, the first paragraph of section
10 affirmed the power of Congress to nationalize certain areas of investments in
favor of Filipinos.

The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the
State and not to Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our
government. Their coverage is also broader for they cover "the national economy and
patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national jurisdiction" and not merely
"certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot be read as granting
Congress the exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving preference to
qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges covering our national economy
and patrimony. Their language does not suggest that any of the State agency or
instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its implementation for any reason
whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional and it is now. The second and the
third paragraphs of Section 10, Article XII are thus self-executing.

This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled "Declaration of

Principles and State Policies." Its Section 19 provides that "[T]he State shall develop a
116 | P a g e

self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." It

engrafts the all-important Filipino First policy in our fundamental law and by the use of
the mandatory word "shall," directs its enforcement by the whole State without any
pause or a half- pause in time.

The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel
Corporation involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of the
Constitutional Commission show that the Commissioners entertained the same view as
to its meaning. According to Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our
rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. 30 By this yardstick,
the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the coverage of the constitutional provision giving
preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights involving our national
patrimony. The unique value of the Manila Hotel to our history and culture cannot be
viewed with a myopic eye. The value of the hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. As
chronicled by Beth Day Romulo, 31 the hotel first opened on July 4, 1912 as a first-class
hotel built by the American Insular Government for Americans living in, or passing
through, Manila while traveling to the Orient. Indigenous materials and Filipino
craftsmanship were utilized in its construction, For sometime, it was exclusively used by
American and Caucasian travelers and served as the "official guesthouse" of the
American Insular Government for visiting foreign dignitaries. Filipinos began coming to
the Hotel as guests during the Commonwealth period. When the Japanese occupied
Manila, it served as military headquarters and lodging for the highest-ranking officers
from Tokyo. It was at the Hotel and the Intramuros that the Japanese made their last
stand during the Liberation of Manila. After the war, the Hotel again served foreign
guests and Filipinos alike. Presidents and kings, premiers and potentates, as well as
glamorous international film and sports celebrities were housed in the Hotel. It was also
the situs of international conventions and conferences. In the local scene, it was the
venue of historic meetings, parties and conventions of political parties. The Hotel has
reaped and continues reaping numerous recognitions and awards from international
hotel and travel award-giving bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of Filipino talent and
ingenuity. These are judicially cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased mind.

The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursuant to
Republic Act No. 4846 but that does not exclude it from our national patrimony.
Republic Act No. 4846, "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act,"
merely provides a procedure whereby a particular cultural property may be classified a
"national cultural treasure" or an "important cultural property. 32 Approved on June 18,
1966 and amended by P.D. 374 in 1974, the law is limited in its reach and cannot be
read as the exclusive law implementing section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
To be sure, the law does not equate cultural treasure and cultural property as
synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of the nation."

The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the
respondent GSIS. A look at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned and
controlled corporation that administers funds that come from the monthly contributions
of government employees and the government. 33 The funds are held in trust for a
distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of indifferently. 34 They are to be used to
finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of the employees and the
administrative and operational expenses of the GSIS, 35 Excess funds, however, are
allowed to be invested in business and other ventures for the benefit of the
employees.36 It is thus contended that the GSIS investment in the Manila Hotel
Corporation is a simple business venture, hence, an act beyond the contemplation of
section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.

The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is

essentially a public corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to
serve a public purpose. It is subject to the jurisdictions of the Civil Service
Commission 37 and the Commission on Audit. 38 As state-owned and controlled
corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the general welfare
of the people. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevated
as a constitutional command.
117 | P a g e

The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of phrase "qualified Filipinos" and
their "preferential right." The Constitution desisted from defining their contents. This is
as it ought to be for a Constitution only lays down flexible policies and principles which
can bent to meet today's manifest needs and tomorrow's unmanifested demands. Only
a constitution strung with elasticity can grow as a living constitution.

Thus, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Nolledo

to define the phrase brushed aside a suggestion to define the phrase "qualified
Filipinos." He explained that present and prospective "laws" will take care of the
problem of its interpretation, viz:

x x x           x x x          x x x

THE PRESIDENT. What is the suggestion of

Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the
word "QUALIFIED?"

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO

QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As
against aliens over aliens?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that

is understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED"
because the existing laws or the prospective
laws will always lay down conditions under
which business map be done, for example,
qualifications on capital, qualifications on the
setting up of other financial structures, et
cetera.

MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO Yes.

MR. RODRIGO. If we say, "PREFERENCE TO

QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," it can be understood
as giving preference to qualified Filipinos as
against Filipinos who are not qualified.

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, that was

the intention of the proponents. The committee
has accepted the amendment.

x x x           x x x          x x x

As previously discussed, the constitutional command to enforce the Filipino First

policy is addressed to the State and not to Congress alone. Hence, the word
"laws" should not be understood as limited to legislations but all state actions
which include applicable rules and regulations adopted by agencies and
instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of their rule-making power. In the
case at bar, the bidding rules and regulations set forth the standards to measure
the qualifications of bidders Filipinos and foreigners alike. It is not seriously
disputed that petitioner qualified to bid as did Renong Berhad. 39

Thus, we come to the critical issue of the degree of preference which GSIS should have
accorded petitioner, a qualified Filipino, over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the
purchase of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel. Petitioner claims that after losing
the bid, this right of preference gives it a second chance to match the highest bid of
Renong Berhad.

With due respect, I cannot sustain petitioner's submission. I prescind from the premise
that the second paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Pilipino but
118 | P a g e

not anti-alien. It is pro-Filipino for it gives preference to Filipinos. It is not, however, anti-
alien per se for it does not absolutely bar aliens in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. Indeed, in the absence of
qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited from granting these rights, privileges and
concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the weal of the nation.

In implementing the policy articulated in section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, the
stellar task of our State policy-makers is to maintain a creative tension between two
desiderata — first, the need to develop our economy and patrimony with the help of
foreigners if necessary, and, second, the need to keep our economy controlled by
Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the Constitution did not define the degree of the right
of preference to be given to qualified Filipinos. They knew that for the right to serve the
general welfare, it must have a malleable content that can be adjusted by our policy-
makers to meet the changing needs of our people. In fine, the right of preference of
qualified Filipinos is to be determined by degree as time dictates and circumstances
warrant. The lesser the need for alien assistance, the greater the degree of the right of
preference can be given to Filipinos and vice verse.

Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to determine the degree of this
privilege at any given time is addressed to the entire State. While under our
constitutional scheme, the right primarily belongs to Congress as the lawmaking
department of our government, other branches of government, and all their agencies
and instrumentalities, share the power to enforce this state policy. Within the limits of
their authority, they can act or promulgate rules and regulations defining the degree of
this right of preference in cases where they have to make grants involving the national
economy and judicial duty. On the other hand, our duty is to strike down acts of the
state that violate the policy.

To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the preferential right.
Consequently, we must turn to the rules and regulations of on respondents Committee
Privatization and GSIS to determine the degree of preference that petitioner is entitled
to as a qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A tearless look at the rules and regulations
will show that they are silent on the degree of preferential right to be accorded qualified
Filipino bidder. Despite their silence, however, they cannot be read to mean that they do
not grant any degree of preference to petitioner for paragraph 2, section 10, Article XII
of the Constitution is deemed part of said rules and regulations. Pursuant to legal
hermeneutics which demand that we interpret rules to save them from
unconstitutionality, I submit that the right of preference of petitioner arises only if it tied
the bid of Benong Berhad. In that instance, all things stand equal, and bidder, as a
qualified Pilipino bidder, should be preferred.

It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to
match the bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner's submission must be supported by the
rules but even if we examine the rules inside-out .thousand times, they can not justify
the claimed right. Under the rules, the right to match the highest bid arises only "if for
any reason, the highest bidder cannot be awarded block of shares . . ." No reason has
arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as bidder. It complied
with the procedure of bidding. It tendered the highest bid. It was declared as the highest
bidder by the GSIS and the rules say this decision is final. It deserves the award as a
matter of right for the rules clearly did not give to the petitioner as a qualified Filipino
privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the rules did not grant, petitioner
cannot demand. Our symphaties may be with petitioner but the court has no power to
extend the latitude and longtitude of the right of preference as defined by the rules. The
parameters of the right of preference depend on galaxy of facts and factors whose
determination belongs to the province of the policy-making branches and agencies of
the State. We are duty-bound to respect that determination even if we differ with the
wisdom of their judgment. The right they grant may be little but we must uphold the
grant for as long as the right of preference is not denied. It is only when a State action
amounts to a denial of the right that the Court can come in and strike down the denial as
unconstitutional.
119 | P a g e

Finally, I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong
Berhad. Petitioner was aware of the rules and regulations of the bidding. It knew that
the rules and regulations do not provide that a qualified Filipino bidder can match the
winning bid submitting an inferior bid. It knew that the bid was open to foreigners and
that foreigners qualified even during the first bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to
repudiate the rules which it agreed to respect. It cannot be allowed to obey the rules
when it wins and disregard them when it loses. If sustained, petitioners' stance will
wreak havoc on he essence of bidding. Our laws, rules and regulations require highest
bidding to raise as much funds as possible for the government to maximize its capacity
to deliver essential services to our people. This is a duty that must be discharged by
Filipinos and foreigners participating in a bidding contest and the rules are carefully
written to attain this objective. Among others, bidders are prequalified to insure their
financial capability. The bidding is secret and the bids are sealed to prevent collusion
among the parties. This objective will be undermined if we grant petitioner that privilege
to know the winning bid and a chance to match it. For plainly, a second chance to bid
will encourage a bidder not to strive to give the highest bid in the first bidding.

We support the Filipino First policy without any reservation. The visionary nationalist
Don Claro M. Recto has warned us that the greatest tragedy that can befall a Filipino is
to be an alien in his own land. The Constitution has embodied Recto's counsel as a
state policy. But while the Filipino First policy requires that we incline to a Filipino, it
does not demand that we wrong an alien. Our policy makers can write laws and rules
giving favored treatment to the Filipino but we are not free to be unfair to a foreigner
after writing the laws and the rules. After the laws are written, they must be obeyed as
written, by Filipinos and foreigners alike. The equal protection clause of the Constitution
protects all against unfairness. We can be pro-Filipino without unfairness to foreigner.

I vote to dismiss the petition.

Narvasa, C.J., and Melo, J., concur.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:

I regret I cannot join the majority. To the incisive Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno, may I just add

1. The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a
bidding process is concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to
equal the highest foreign bid, and thus to win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2),
Art. XII] simply states that "in the grant of rights . . . covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos." The majority concedes
that there is no law defining the extent or degree of such preference. Specifically, no
statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal that of the
winning foreigner. In the absence of such empowering law, the majority's strained
interpretation, I respectfully submit constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation, which
makes bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no foreigner can
win. Only in the Philippines!.

2. Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial is short-sighted and,
viewed properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interest. It encourages other
countries — in the guise of reverse comity or worse, unabashed retaliation — to
discriminate against us in their own jurisdictions by authorizing their own nationals to
similarly equal and defeat the higher bids of Filipino enterprises solely, while on the
other hand, allowing similar bids of other foreigners to remain unchallenged by their
nationals. The majority's thesis will thus marginalize Filipinos as pariahs in the global
marketplace with absolute no chance of winning any bidding outside our country. Even
authoritarian regimes and hermit kingdoms have long ago found out unfairness, greed
and isolation are self-defeating and in the long-term, self-destructing.
120 | P a g e

The moral lesson here is simple: Do not do unto other what you dont want other to do
unto you.

3. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of
the Constitution, the constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be
allowed only where all the bids are equal. In this manner, we put the Filipino ahead
without self-destructing him and without being unfair to the foreigner.

In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when the
scores are tied. But not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the
highest score.

Footnotes

1 See Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution

2 Par I. Introduction and Highlights; Guidelines and Procedures: Second

Prequailifications and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization; Annex "A,"
Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents; Rollo, p. 142.

3 Par. V. Guidelines for the Public Bidding, id., pp. 153-154.

4 Annex "A," Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary

Restraining Order; Rollo, pp. 13-14.

5 Annex "B," Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary

Restraining Order; id., p. 15.

6 Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary Restraining

Order, pp. 5-6; id., pp. 6-7.

7 Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents, p. 17; id., p. 133.

8 Par. V.J. 1, Guidelines for Public Bidding, Guidelines and Procedures:

second Prequalifications and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization,
Annex "A," Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents; id., p. 154.

9 Respondents' Joint Comment with Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary

Restraining Order, p. 9; Rollo, p. 44.

10 Marbury v. Madison, 5, U.S. 138 (1803).

11 Am Jur. 606.

12 16 Am Jur. 2d 281.

13 Id., p. 282.

14 See Note 12.

15 Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., pp. 8-10.

16 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, 22 August 1986, p.

608.

17 16 Am Jur 2d 283-284.

18 Sec. 10, first par., reads: The Congress shall, upon recommendation of
the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates,
reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such
higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
121 | P a g e

investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by
Filipinos.

Sec. 10, third par., reads: The State shall regulate and exercise authority
over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance
with its national goals and priorities.

19 State ex rel. Miller v. O'Malley, 342 Mo. 641, 117 SW2d 319.

20 G.R. No. 91649, 14 May 1991, 197 SCRA 52.

21 Sec. 11, Art. II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), provides

that [t]he State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights.

22 Sec. 12, Art. II, provides that [t]he State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
government.

23 Sec. 13, Art. II, provides that [t]he State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical,
moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the
youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in
public and civic affairs.

24 Sec. 1, Art. XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), provides that [t]he
Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities
by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition of property and its increments.

Sec. 2, Art. XIII, provides that [t]he promotion of social justice shall include
the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of
initiative and self-reliance.

25 Sec. 2, Art. XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture,

and Sports), provides that [t]he State shall:

(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated

system of education relevant to the needs of the people and society;

(2) Establish and maintain a system of free public education in the

elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the natural right of
parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all
children of school age;

(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan

programs, subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to
deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to the
underprivileged.

(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indegenous learning,

independent, and out-of-school study programs particularly those that
respond to community needs; and
122 | P a g e

(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with
training in civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills.

26 G.R. 115455, 25 August 1994, 235 SCRA 630.

27 See Note 25.

28 Sec. 1 Art. XIV, provides that [t]he State shall protect and promote the
right of all citizens to quality education at all levels of education and shall
take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.

29 G.R. No. 118910, 17 July 1995.

30 Sec. 5 Art. II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), provides

that [t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty,
and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for
the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

31 See Note 23.

32 See Note 24.

33 Sec. 17, Art II, provides that [t]he State shall give priority to education,
science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and
nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human
liberation and development.

34 Nolledo, Jose N., The New Constitution of the Philippines Annotated,

1990 ed., p. 72.

35 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1986 ed., p. 1656.

36 The guest list of the Manila Hotel includes Gen. Douglas MacArthur,
the Duke of Windsor, President Richard Nixon of U.S.A., Emperor Akihito
of Japan, President Dwight Eisenhower of U.S.A, President Nguyen Van
Thieu of Vietnam, President Park Chung Hee of Korea, Prime Minister
Richard Holt of Australia, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake of New Zealand,
President Lyndon Johnson of U.S.A., President Jose Lopez Portillo of
Mexico, Princess Margaret of England, Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser of
Australia, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of Japan, Prime Minister
Pierre Elliot Trudeau of Canada, President Raul Alfonsin of Argentina,
President Felipe Gonzalez of Spain, Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita of
Japan, Prime Minister Hussain Muhammad Ershad of Bangladesh, Prime
Minister Bob Hawke of Australia, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of
Japan, Premier Li Peng of China, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei,
President Ramaswani Venkataraman of India, Prime Minister Go Chok
Tong of Singapore, Prime Minister Enrique Silva Cimma of Chile, Princess
Chulaborn and Mahacharri Sirindhorn of Thailand, Prime Minister Tomiichi
Murayama of Japan, Sultan Azlan Shah and Raja Permaisuri Agong of
Malaysia, President Kim President Young Sam of Korea, Princess Infanta
Elena of Spain, President William Clinton of U.S.A., Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia, King Juan Carlos I and Queen Sofia of
Spain, President Carlos Saul Menem of Argentina, Prime Ministers
Chatichai Choonvan and Prem Tinsulanonda of Thailand, Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, President Vaclav Havel of Czech Republic,
Gen. Norman Schwarzcopf of U.S.A, President Ernesto Perez Balladares
of Panama, Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius of Lithuania, President
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani of Iran, President Frei Ruiz Tagle of Chile,
President Le Duc Anh of Vietnam, and Prime Minister Julius Chan of
Papua New Guinea, see Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 16-19.

37 Authored by Beth Day Romulo.

123 | P a g e

38 See Note 9, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp. 50-51.

39 Record of the Constitutional Commission. Vol. 3, 22 August 1986. p.

607.

40 Id., p. 612.

41 Id., p. 616.

42 Id., p. 606.

43 Nolledo, J.N., The New Constitution of the Philippines Annotated, 1990

ed., pp. 930-931.

44 Bidders were required to have at least one of the these qualifications to

be able to participate in the bidding process; see Note 2.

45 Memorandum of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., p. 6.

46 Id., pp. 3-4.

47 See Note 8.

48 Keynote Address at the ASEAN Regional Symposium of Enforcement

of Industrial Property Rights held 23 October 1995 at New World Hotel,
Makati City.

49 Speech of Senior Associate Justice Teodoro R. Padilla at the Induction

of Officers and Directors of the PHILCONSA for 1996 held 16 January
1996 at the Sky-Top, Hotel Intercontinental, Makati City.

50 Memorandum of Authorities submitted by former Chief Justice Enrique

M. Fernando, p. 5.

51 8 March 1996 issue of Philippine Daily Inquirer, p. B13.

PADILLA, J., concurring:

1 Article XII, Section 10, par. 2, 1987 Constitution.

2 Padilla, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Volume

III, p. 89.

3 Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 11th ed, p. 112.

4 Nolledo, The New Constitution of the Philippines, Announced, 1990 ed.,

p. 72.

5 Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 1.

6 Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention (1934-

1935), p. 507.

7 Id., p. 562.

VITUG, J., concurring:

1 Second par. Section 10, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.

MENDOZA, J., concurring:

1 Art. XII, §10, second paragraph.

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2 GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES: SECOND PREQUALIFICATION

AND PUBLIC BIDDING OF THE MHC PRIVATIZATION (hereafter
referred to as GUIDELINES), Part. V, par. H(4)..

3 Id.

4 83 Phil. 242 (1949).

5 R.A. No. 37, §1.

6 87 Phil. 343 (1950).

7 104 Phil. 302 (1958).

8 Id, at 309.

9 For an excellent analysis of American cases on reverse discrimination in

these areas, see GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 780-819
(1991).

10 Art. II, §19: "The State shall develop a self-reliant and

independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."
(Emphasis added)

11 See Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270 (1978)

(invalidating an ordinance imposing a flat fee of P500 on aliens for the
privilege of earning a livelihood).

12 Petitioner passed the criteria set forth in the GUIDELINES, Part IV, par.
F(4), of the GSIS, relating to the following:

a. Business management expertise, tract record, and

experience

b. Financial capability

c. Feasibility and acceptability of the proposed strategic plan

for the Manila Hotel.

13 GUIDELINES, Part V, par. (1)(3), in relation to Part. I.

14 Id., Part V, par. V (1).

PUNO, J., dissenting:

1 Introduction and Highlights, Guidelines and Procedures: Second

Prequalification and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization, Annex "A" to
Petitioner's Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents, Rollo, p.
142.

2 The four bidders who previously prequalified for the first bidding,
namely, ITT Sheraton, Marriot International, Inc., Renaissance Hotel
International, Inc., and the consortium of RCBC and the Ritz Carlton, were
deemed prequalified for the second bidding.

3 Annex "A" to the Consolidated Reply to Comments of

Respondents, Rollo, pp. 140-155.

4 Former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando and Commissioner Joaquin

Bernas were invited by the Court as amicus curiae to shed light on its
meaning.
125 | P a g e

5 Lopez v. de los Reyes, 55 Phil. 170, 190 [1930].

6 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, Sec. 139 p. 510 [1979 ed. ]; 6 R.C.L.
Sec. 52 p. 57 [1915]; see also Willis v. St. Paul Sanitation Co. 48 Minn.
140, 50 N.W. 1110, 31 A.J.R. 626, 16 L.R.A. 281 [1892]; State ex rel.
Schneider v. Kennedy, 587 P. 2d 844, 225 Kan [1978].

7 Willis v. St. Paul Sanitation, supra, at 1110-1111; see also Cooley, A

Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 167, vol. 1 [1927].

8 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 48, p. 100.

9 Cooley, supra, at 171; 6 R.C.L. Sec. 53, pp. 57-58; Brice v. McDow, 116
S.C. 324, 108 S.E. 84, 87 [1921]; see also Gonzales, Philippine
Constitutional Law p. 26 [1969].

10 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 48, p. 101.

11 Way v. Barney, 116 Minn. 285, 133 N.W. 801, 804 38 L.R.A. (N.S.)
648, Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 719 [1911]; Brice v. McDow, supra, at 87; Morgan
v. Board of Supervisors, 67 Ariz. 133, 192 P. 2d 236, 241 [1948];
Gonzales, supra..

12 Ninth Decennial Digest Part I, Constitutional Law, (Key No. 28), p.

1638.

13 Article III, Section 2; see Webb v. de Leon, 247 SCRA 652 [1995];

People v. Saycon, 236 SCRA 325 (1994]; Allado v. Diokno, 232 SCRA
192 (1994]; Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 [1984]; Yee Sue Kuy
v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141 [1940]; Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil.
689 [1938]; and a host of other cases.

14 Article III, Section 12, pars. 1 to 3; People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293
[1995]; People v. Bandula 232 SCRA 566 [1994]; People v. Nito 228
SCRA 442 [1993]; People v. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 [1981]; People v.
Galit, 135 SCRA 465 [1985]; and a host of other cases.

15 Article III, Section 14; People v. Digno, 250 SCRA 237 [1995]; People
v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 [1995]; People v. Colcol 219 SCRA [1993];
Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 [1977]; People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59
[1971]; and a host of other cases.

16 Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 [1985]; Chavez v. Court of

Appeals 24 SCRA 663 [1968]; People v. Otadura, 86 Phil. 244 [1950];
Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil, 485 [1937]; and a host of other cases.

17 Harley v. Schuylkill County, 476 F. Supp, 191, 195-196 [1979]; Erdman

v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. St. 79, 56 Atl. 327, 99 A.S.R. 783 63 L.R.A. 534
[1903]; see Ninth Decennial Digest Part I, Constitutional Law, (Key No.
28), pp. 1638-1639.

18 City of Chicago v. George F. Harding Collection, 217 N.E. 2d 381, 383,

70 Ill. App. 2d 254 [1966]; People v. Buellton Dev. Co., 136 P. 2d 793,
796, 58 Cal. App. 2d 178 [1943]; Bordy v. State, 7 N.W. 2d 632, 635, 142
Neb. 714 [1943]; Cohen v. City of Chicago, 36 N.E. 2d 220, 224, 377 Ill
221 [1941].

19 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, Sec. 143, p. 514; 16 C.J.S.

Constitutional Law, Sec. 48, p. 100; 6 R.C.L. Sec. 54, p. 59; see
also State ex rel. Noe v. Knop La. App. 190 So. 135, 142 [1939]; State ex
rel. Walker v. Board of Comm'rs. for Educational Lands and Funds, 3 N.W.
126 | P a g e

2d 196, 200, 141 Neb. 172 [1942]; Maddox v. Hunt, 83 P. 2d 553, 556, 83
Okl. 465 [1938].

20 Article II, Sections 11, 12 and 13 (Basco v. Phil. Amusements and

Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA 52, 68 [1991]); Sections 5, 12, 13 and 17
(Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 246 SCRA 540, 564 [1995]).

21 Article XIII, Section 13 (Basco, supra).

22 Article XIV, Section 2 (Basco, supra).

23 Kilosbayan v. Morato, supra, at 564.

24 Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corporation, supra, at 68.

25 Congress had previously passed the Retail Trade Act (R.A. 1180); the
Private Security Agency Act (R.A. 5487; the law on engaging in the rice
and corn industry (R.A. 3018, P.D. 194), etc.

26 Or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe.

27 Article XIV, section 3 of the 1973 Constitution reads:

"Sec. 3. The Batasang Pambansa shall, upon recommendation of the

National Economic and Development Authority, reserve to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations wholly owned by such
citizens, certain traditional areas of investments when the national interest
so dictates,"

28 101 Phil. 1155 [1957].

29 See Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 450,

vol. II [1988]. The Lao Ichong case upheld the Filipinization of the retail
trade and implied that particular areas of business may be Filipinized
without doing violence to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

30 Nolledo The New Constitution of the Philippines, Annotated, 1990 ed.,

p. 72. The word "patrimony" first appeared in the preamble of the 1935
Constitution and was understood to cover everything that belongs to the
Filipino people, the tangible and the material as well as the intangible and
the spiritual assets and possessions of the nation (Sinco, Philippine
Political Law, Principles and Concepts [1962 ed.], p. 112; Speech of
Delegate of Conrado Benitez defending the draft preamble of the 1935
Constitution in Laurel, Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, vol.
III, p. 325 [1966]).

31 Commissioned by the Manila Hotel Corporation for the Diamond

Jubilee celebration of the Hotel in 1987; see The Manila Hotel: The Heart
and Memory of a City.any

32 Section 7 of R.A. 4846 provides:

Sec. 7. In the designation of a particular cultural property as a .national

cultural treasure," the following procedure shall be observed:

(a) Before the actual designation, the owner, if the property is privately
owned, shall be notified at least fifteen days prior to the intended
designation, and he shall be invited to attend the deliberation and given a
chance to be heard. Failure on the part of the owner to attend the
deliberation shall not bar the panel to render its decision. Decision shall be
given by the panel within a week after its deliberation. In the event that the
owner desires to seek reconsideration of the designation made by the
127 | P a g e

panel, he may do so within thirty days from the date that the decision has
been rendered. If no request for reconsideration is filed after this period,
the designation is then considered final and executory. Any request for
reconsideration filed within thirty days and subsequently again denied by
the panel, may be further appealed to another panel chairmanned by the
Secretary of Education with two experts as members appointed by the
Secretary of Education. Their decision shall final and binding.

(b) Within each kind or class of objects, only the rare and unique objects
may be designated as "National Cultural Treasures." The remainder, if any
shall be treated as cultural property.

xxx xxx xxx

33 P.D. 1146, Sec, 5; P.D, 1146, known as "The Revised Government

Service Insurance Act of 1977" amended Commonwealth Act No. 186, the
"Government Service Insurance Act" of 1936.

34 Beronilla v. Government Service Insurance System, 36 SCRA 44, 53

[1970]; Social Security System Employees Association v. Soriano, 7
SCRA 1016, 1023 [1963].

35 Id., secs. 28 and 29.

36 Id., Sec. 30.

37 Constitution, Article IX (B), section 2 (1).

38 Constitution, Article IX (D), section 2 (1).

39 It is meet to note that our laws do not debar foreigners from engaging
in the hotel business. Republic Act No. 7042, entitled the "Foreign
Investments Act of 1991" was enacted by Congress to "attract, promote
and welcome . . . foreign investments . . . in activities which significantly
contribute to national industrialization and socio-economic development to
the extent that foreign investment is allowed by the Constitution and
relevant laws." The law contains a list, called the Negative List specifying
areas of economic activity where foreign participation is limited or
prohibited. Areas of economic activity not included in the Negative List are
open to foreign participation up to one hundred per cent (Sees. 6 and 7).
Foreigners now own and run a great number of our five-star hotels.
128 | P a g e

Manila Prince Hotel

vs.

Government Service Insurance System (267 SCRA 408),

G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

NOTE: Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and
planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital
is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe,
certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage
the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
 
Facts:
Respondent (GSIS) decided to sell 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent Manila Hotel Corporation through public bidding as part of the Philippine
government's privatization initiative under Proclamation No. 50.

According to its terms, the winning bidder is to provide management expertise and/or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.

Only two (2) bidders participated:

a.   petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the corporation or
15.3M shares at P41.58 per share, and
b.   Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the
bid of petitioner.

In a letter to respondent, petitioner matched Renong Berhad's bid price of P44.00 per
share, pending the designation of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder partner and the
execution of the relevant contracts.

In a subsequent letter petitioner sent a manager's check for P33.000.000.00 as Bid

Security to match the bid of Renong Berhad which respondent refused to accept.

Because of this refusal by the respondent, petitioner came to the Supreme Court on
prohibition and mandamus. The SC issued a TRO enjoining respondents from
consummating and perfecting the said sale.
129 | P a g e

The petitioner hinged his arguments on Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution. It argued that :
a.   Manila Hotel had become part of the national patrimony, having
become a historical monument for the Filipino nation; and
b.   Because respondent GSIS, a GOCC, owns 51 percent of the
corporation’s shares, the hotel business of GSIS, which is part
of the tourism industry, is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Hence, the petitioner claimed that the corporation is
clearly covered by the term national economy under the
contemplation of Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution.

The respondent, on the other hand, raised the following arguments:

a.   Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely
a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing
provision and requires implementing legislation
b.   While the hotel is indeed historic, Manila Hotel does not fall
under the term national patrimony
c.   But even if it is, the constitutional provision invoked is still
inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor
the land upon which the building stands
d.   the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen
since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares.
 
Issue: Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are
self-executing.
 
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of
the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered by private persons for private purposes is null and void and
without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. 

While the Article 12, Sec. 10 (2) may be couched in such a way as not to make it
appear that it is non-self-executing, the legislature is not precluded from enacting other
further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as it is consistent with the
Constitution. The SC remarked that Article 12, Sec. 10 (2) is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.

The SC added further that there is a presumption that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing and minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the
self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. However, a provision which is complete
and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing.
 130 | P a g e

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead
of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify
the mandate of the fundamental law.

 
Summary of Principles:
1.           1. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation— it is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable
except by the authority from which it emanates. Since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme Iaw of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract.
 
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of
a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation. lt prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to
the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain
fixed principles on which government is founded.
 
The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined
and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if
a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus,
since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it
is deemed written in every statute and contract.
 
2.           2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so
that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action.
 
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their
provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the
framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different
departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and
inalienable rights of citizens.
 
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed
or protected, is self-executing.
 
Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.
 
3.          3. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self- executing.
 
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted
upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws
 131 | P a g e

intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more
like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act
is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic.
 
4.           4. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-
executing nature of constitutional provisions.
 
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not to
make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-
executing nature of constitutional provisions.
 
5.           5. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing—the rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but
any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available.
 
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to
facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation
of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof,
or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.
 
The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an
indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing
provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise
of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does
not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully
enforceable.
 
6.           6. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-
executing in another.
 
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of
Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section
which undoubtedly are not selfexecuting. The argument is flawed.
 
If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact
measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by
Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and
exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third
paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-
executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-
executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.
 
7.          7.  When the Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
 132 | P a g e

preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that—qualified Filipinos shall be

preferred.
 
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos, it means just that—qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
 
8.           8. When the Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances, an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject—such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance.
 
9.           9. When the Constitution speaks of “national patrimony,” it refers not only to
the natural resources of the Philippines but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark—a living testimonial of Philippine
heritage. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony.
 
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs
and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public
interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence
and nationhood.
 
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure,
51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the
51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the
MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands.
 
10.       10. Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject
constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules
issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative
of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and
contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which
violate the Constitution lose their reason for being. 
133 | P a g e

EN BANC

G.R. No. 160261             November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-

ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-
intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-
in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003

134 | P a g e

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT
OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO,
JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM
BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS,
DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA
SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL
DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO
AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS
LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO
SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT,
AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO
BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS,
RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS,
ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS
BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO
TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI
LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO,
RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN
DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-
CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG,
GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI,
BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO,
MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER
BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO,
JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA,
NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P.
SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M.

GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
135 | P a g e

WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS

PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG,

RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO
SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH,
EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A.
LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL,
ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A.
AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ,
HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE
RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY
SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER
QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON
SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL
ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO
GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE
C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET
AL., respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,

vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL
MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N.
MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE
ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
136 | P a g e

REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX

WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA,

DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V.
DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS,
ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G.
AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER
CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY
THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT
COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE,
JR. respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN
REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
137 | P a g e

VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE

PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER,

MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A.
MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE
COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF
CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI,
CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
[CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ,
FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY
THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
[CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST
PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY
SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate
and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the
independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective
constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for
its resolution.

Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times
turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is
confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has
drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to
vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present
controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
138 | P a g e

Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether
the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps
even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address
all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces,
at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it
is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the
public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever
mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among
the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power
assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been
carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three
branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as

they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people,
mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination among these branches
where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized
to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-
being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XI

Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme

Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power

to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment
of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded.
139 | P a g e

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least

one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles
of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official

more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry

out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th

Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28,
2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th
Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House
Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW

RULES

RULE II RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION

Section 2. Mode of Initiating
Impeachment. – Impeachment
shall be initiated only by a
verified complaint for
impeachment filed by any
Member of the House of
Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member
thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment filed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House.
OF IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
THE SAME OFFICIAL
Section 16. – Impeachment
Proceedings Deemed
Initiated. – In cases where a
Member of the House files a
verified complaint of
impeachment or a citizen files
a verified complaint that is
endorsed by a Member of the
House through a resolution of
endorsement against an
impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings
against such official are
deemed initiated on the day
the Committee on Justice
finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution
against such official, as the
case may be, is sufficient in
substance, or on the date the
House votes to overturn or
affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified
140 | P a g e

complaint and/or resolution, as

the case may be, is not
sufficient in substance.

In cases where a verified

complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may
be, by at least one-third (1/3)
of the Members of the
House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the
filing of such verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment with the
Secretary General.

RULE V Section 17. Bar Against

BAR AGAINST
IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. –
No impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the
same official more than once
within the period of one (1)
year.
Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. – Within a
period of one (1) year from the
date impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated as provided in Section
16 hereof, no impeachment
proceedings, as such, can be
initiated against the same
official. (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by

Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice
"to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF)."3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment

complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member
of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority
vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session
days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session
days from receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003
141 | P a g e

for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not
yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article
XI of the Constitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or
on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it,
the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the
House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix
William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied
by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all
the Members of the House of Representatives.13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of
which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution
that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year."

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a
duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal
remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he
"himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure
in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to
bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been
violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules
adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and
prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof
be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing
respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3)
and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it
off the records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are
consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent
House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and

taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in
their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting
respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against
the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting
respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted
the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as

citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of
public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment
complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from
conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has
recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases
of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint
be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members
of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting
respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and
142 | P a g e

transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De

Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.

In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy

Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives,
they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings
are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment
complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right
to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that
they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the
integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is
instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second
impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null
and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking
cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and
issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist
from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens
and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member
of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is,
that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest
and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second
impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of

the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the
House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is

mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays
in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and
Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their
petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all
citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations
of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of
Representatives and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second
impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second
impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in
interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.

In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that

the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance
and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and
substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials
in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of
a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the
impeachment complaint due course.
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In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition

for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the
second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as
they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged
abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."

In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofileña,

alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of
their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which
they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of
Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of
Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus
standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of
whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law
and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the
examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void
for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be
declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised
in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental
importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second
impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void;
(2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting
the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.

In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers,

pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment
complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent
House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and
Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the
same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three
of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second
impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261
likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment
Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were
filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket
number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative
inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the
constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a
motion was put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to
the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for
lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet
to be forwarded to the Senate.

Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno
and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice
Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
144 | P a g e

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of
October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent
House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment
on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for
oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished
legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and
respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for
and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through

Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special
appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to
hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an
independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the
performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On
even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to
Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated
petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the
impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the
Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the
one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to
the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a)
consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file
their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for
oral arguments on November 5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin
M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are
plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the
filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its
constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon
its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues
raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of
Representatives.

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in
G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning
the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it
would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and
praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for
judicial determination.

On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in
G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein
Incorporated Petition in Intervention."

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang

Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003,
World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-
Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277,
160292, 160295, and 160310.

The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and
Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the
arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and
Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued
by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
145 | P a g e

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who
can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be
exercised by this Court at this time.

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

a) locus standi of petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability;

d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;

f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section

3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the
instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and
against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to
be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial
review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the
essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been
fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be
discussed in seriatim.

Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial
review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.

This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice
Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did
not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power
includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of

the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In
cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ
which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent
units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and

perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through
146 | P a g e

their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their

sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended
to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and
balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If
these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by
which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for
then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United
States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its
historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from
section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to

determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution
itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational
way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of
judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review
is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity
of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not
only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper
allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course
of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary
consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."26

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly
conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it
was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review
was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the
supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws
of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance
of the constitution, have that rank.
147 | P a g e

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States

confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all
written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and
that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935
Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate
constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and
former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative
branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial
review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only

when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis
supplied)

As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral

component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the
corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of
government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the
people for which it serves.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of

government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in
our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance
of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of
the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn,
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x
judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of
powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government
through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing
operation."34

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion
by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter
law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and
rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of
its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:

xxx

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
148 | P a g e

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our

experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in
the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general
set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas
corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees,
and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because
the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court
said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The
Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the
questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the
rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof
during the martial law regime. x x x

xxx

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the

agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In
other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not
a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This
is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts

cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming
that such matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must
necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of
constitutional construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its
meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to
be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in
which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of
law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its
language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in
149 | P a g e

common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be

construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.
Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court
apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 38 in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the

provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing
a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The
object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. 39 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue 40 where, speaking through

Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental

principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The
primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure
the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of
the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying
the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran
declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have

dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one
person without considering that it could also affect others. When they
adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision
should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by
itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one

provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be
considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate
the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular
subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the
whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to
stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in
favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one
which may make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
150 | P a g e

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is
available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this
Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and

proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and
purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when
other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of
the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We
think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its
face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and

jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De
Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the
Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial
review.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that

impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any
question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is
beyond the reach of judicial review.47

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to
try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it;
and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions
relative to impeachment proceedings.49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are

outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority
opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to
the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to
try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is
the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and
difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US
Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of
impeachment.

Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American

Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that
the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under
Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total
exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the
impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it
necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine
constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are
of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have
only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As
held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this
Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly
applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and
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needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the
United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful
words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and
that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is
only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in
the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded
definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
any government branch or instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine
Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over
impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include
the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their
finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they
call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever
possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively,
recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."56

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned
safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave
the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for
certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57 "judicially discoverable
standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the
power of judicial review.

The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in

support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial
review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of
mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern
the exercise of the power of judicial review.

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial
review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled
that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate
or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in
the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to
nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution,
it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v.
Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a
member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the
House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although
under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does
not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the
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National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is
contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and
enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial
review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances.
Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act
beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review,
like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations,
namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2)
the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.

x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties,
and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.68 (Italics in the original)

Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.69

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners
do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct
personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito
Mendoza similarly contends.

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since
this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens,
legislators in cases involving paramount public interest70 and transcendental
importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine
whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the
limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion
given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of
the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule
exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking
the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot
himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
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There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on
standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has
constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it
behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what
is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.

The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been
noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its
constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions
relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity
to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only
certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial
consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the
proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits

are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a
law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who
actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such
parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."

xxx

On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the
party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to
the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us
asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they
invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers; members of
Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the
legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts
of the House of Representatives.

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when
specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a
statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or
any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or
act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds
are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose,
or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he
must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he
has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.80

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit
should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners,
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given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of
Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the
House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers
and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83

While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when it

is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital
interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member
of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too
general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the
petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.86 It, therefore,
behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented
by it.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons
intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all
concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the
suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is,
under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they
were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently
represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before
this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition
will stand.

The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of
transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is
mum on his standing.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following

instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the
case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and
(3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the
issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.

In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of
a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance
to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the
public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party
should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least,
still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take
judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He
does not thus have standing.

With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be
permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements
of the law authorizing intervention.92
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In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek
to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional
issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part
of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated,
granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et.

al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens
to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority
members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites
for intervention had been complied with.

Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263,
160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II
Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave
to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment
complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed
by the Constitution.

Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,

Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a
legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby
granted.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited
purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate
President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate
President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an
impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the
House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions
are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the
matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated,
allowed to argue.

Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while
he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for
bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public

moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money
is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection
against abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such
funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law.94 (Citations omitted)

In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of
petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being
deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the
Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.

Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case
to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when
the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
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The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is
questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment
complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have
already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v.
Macapagal holds, has been complied with.

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are
premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there
may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final
arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies
in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who
suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage
signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and
opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to
raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are
presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that
even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can
raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.

The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of
their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their
constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the
questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit
of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners
would continue to suffer their injuries.

Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both
Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously
discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the
power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning
impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the
judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot
be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.

Justiciability

In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined

the term "political question," viz:

[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in

ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language
of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature
or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.99 (Italics in the original)

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or
reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved
political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political
question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other cases,
however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court
assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case
of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973
Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question
157 | P a g e

doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a

political question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.

The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to
take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice
Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's
power of judicial review and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual
comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the
service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary
has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of
reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the
most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's
indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the
Judiciary.

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience

during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but
the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general
set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas
corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political
detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial
law failed because the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no
authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was
not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an
encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged
further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the
members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the
Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start
with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the
Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on
September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious
reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had
apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when
martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published
anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because
our main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who
succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of
wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June
1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had
barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon
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the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional

Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own
colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution
was taken over by representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what
the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to
accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was
presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President
issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some
provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less
public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was
presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a
plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous
by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft
of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that
Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended
indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the
people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the
questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of
its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the Commission
on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or
barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be
propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was
unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum
should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was
filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be
suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the
Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President
declaring that the new Constitution was already in force because the
overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the
Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I
proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed
the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973
Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.

A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null
and void. The main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a
political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.

xxx

The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15,
the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the
Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of
any referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they
participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum
proceeding.

In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the
members of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.

Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big

difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of
justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question.
Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in
which the plea of "political question" was set up. There have been a
number of other cases in the past.

x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue
was clearly justiciable.

xxx
159 | P a g e

x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it

faced the following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political
question?

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual
controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable.
There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a
judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was
unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife
what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we
cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband.
There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to
enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical

questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has,
also another important function. The powers of government are generally
considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and
the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent
of the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a
given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the

agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In
other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not
a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This
is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the

courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by
claiming that such matters constitute a political question.

I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may
have an initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the
original; emphasis supplied)

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion

further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial
power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower
courts as may be created by law.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify
political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?

MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases

but where there is a question as to whether the government had authority
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or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of

jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the
duty to decide.

xxx

FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the

Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes.

On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political

question doctrine?

MR. CONCEPCION. No.

FR. BERNAS. It is not.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion,

amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .

FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do
away with the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is

judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power
includes" and the reason being that the definition that we might make may
not cover all possible areas.

FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from
the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly
political questions are beyond the pale of judicial power. 104 (Emphasis
supplied)

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it
is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine.
Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was
not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is
gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions"
and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."

Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the
doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly
political in nature.

As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law,
this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are
not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.

In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes,

held:

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and
broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous
constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x
xx
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In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this
Court declared:

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must

perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he
political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial
determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional
boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that
obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by
no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable
and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue
presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers,
in proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)

Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political
questions and non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these two
species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard.
The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is

found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)

Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct
concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the
conclusion that the others are also present.

The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial
review is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they
should pass upon a constitutional issue.

In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable

political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then
our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this
standard to the present controversy.

These petitions raise five substantial issues:

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute

valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
162 | P a g e

II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with
Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.

III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the
Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted

by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section
3, Article XI of the Constitution.

V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of

Article XI of the Constitution.

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over
which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this
issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which
the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent
is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for

impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude
a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the
boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both
positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or
even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-
justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under
Section 1, Article VIII.

Lis Mota

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a

governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v.
Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:

x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a

constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless
such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record
also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its
judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will
be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such
question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where
this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being
confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a

constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a
judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be
an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of
judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely
raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]

Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly
unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.

As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the
second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon
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which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining
whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon,
this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form
a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
applied."119

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other
reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a
Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and
legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a
violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an
open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally
mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of
the judiciary.121

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied
opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and
resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second
impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's
opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and
distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is
required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened
by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition
which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.

En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has
already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Commttee,122 viz:

The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of

Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI
thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees

may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is

not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-
quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation
must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under
the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the
right not be compelled to testify against one's self.123

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while
joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument
that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not
fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed

by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute
the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the
application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With
the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said
164 | P a g e

Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of

Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement
which states that:

"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the

abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix
William B. Fuentebella x x x"124

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in
order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of
Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that
the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the
Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement,
they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been calendared
and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the
Constitution, viz:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member
of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority
vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session
days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session
days from receipt thereof.

Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for
Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more
representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint
as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment.
Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment
signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives
as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution,
such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member
whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.

While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does
indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment,
more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of
the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and
Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for
invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground
as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for
naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts
presented by the other petitioners as well.

Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the
determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors
Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the
latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly
prejudiced by this Court's decision.

In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are,
constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of
Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution;
and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Judicial Restraint
165 | P a g e

Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the
Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases
of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes
the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.

On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a
moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment
because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125 But this argument is
very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with
penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to
them.

The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this
Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified.
Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy
may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under
Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this
Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words
of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty
which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a
dereliction of duty."

Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government
cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the
authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the
controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the
discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and
fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a
member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass
upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be
fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest
or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations
lurking in [his] office."130

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been
settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners
filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or
Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET
Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as
respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its
three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide
the matter. This Court held:

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any

Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate
without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed
mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no
alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but
which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not
prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the
performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being
expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the
Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest
that would involve all Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in
judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the
1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate
will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling
166 | P a g e

such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the

Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must
simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of
justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and
collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate

Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any
case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective
and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the
Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such,
absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules
can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication
of a senatorial election contest.

More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:

Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of

them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as
established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of
his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to
exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court,
the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the
judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence.
The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if
shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the
original)

Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises
its power of judicial review.

In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven
pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court
Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly,
non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions 'is
legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real,
earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that,
by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the
courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'

2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of
a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'

3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'

4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which
the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus,
if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional
question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging
its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed
because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.
167 | P a g e

5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one
who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications
of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one
who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official
interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . .
In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a
citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional.
In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not
entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of
one who has availed himself of its benefits.

7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court
will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which
the question may be avoided (citations omitted).

The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v.

TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated
into the following categories:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts
of the case

3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground

4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of
the statute

5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise
of judicial review:

1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power

2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement

3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible

opportunity

4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint

the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing
conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the
appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario
that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home
and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an
impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure
of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of
its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.

Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the
Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a
168 | P a g e

reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment
cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may
start, if not precipitate, a crisis.

Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.

x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not

regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the
constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but
also political consequences. Those political consequences may follow even
where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the
necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the
other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least
quasi-validation, follows." 138

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end
there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's
claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for
the establishment of the martial law regime.

Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate
branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty
under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no
reason to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate
manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging
disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.

Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine
in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public
officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise
the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws,
not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting
under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of
Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist
encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their
own personal beliefs.142

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure

for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress

Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that

Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3
(5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not
mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a
collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that
initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of
the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified
complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all
the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the
one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.

The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort
to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
169 | P a g e

That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner
Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed
on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he
(Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the
instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating"
included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that
indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution
means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.

"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin,

to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the
English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action,"
which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated
during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of

acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of
the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those
deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment.
The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the
Committee on Justice.

Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives
Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when
the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House
reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say
"impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The
language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there
is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the
intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be
pried from its records:

MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the
substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many
proposals and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.

However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a

resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished
the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took charge
of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang
Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers
several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation,
action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on
the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the
Senate.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of

the approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will
just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the
Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out
earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint.  And
what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution
containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
170 | P a g e

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on

Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could
cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard
Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation,
the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body
who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only
approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the
Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words because we have to
be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the
House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me.
The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my
proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to
indicate this on record.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval
of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is
only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of
Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision,

that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which
read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on
line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then
capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so
that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE
ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House
of Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the
filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries
with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of
Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a
verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention
again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any
way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of
Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam
President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)

This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by

the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the
complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the
obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as
contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it
understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts
with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution
of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already
initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2),
Article XI of the Constitution."145

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father

Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word
"initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the
filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.

During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word
"initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
171 | P a g e

Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment.

xxx

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)

refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."

Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate."
The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second
sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala
sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An
impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-
quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members,
can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power"
to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a
decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to
arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from
the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive
noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in
the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint
either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by
a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this
complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it;
(3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the
resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the
processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms
a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of
one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the
complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at
this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an
impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully
charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the
complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House
proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the
"impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution
passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been
done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its
initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified
complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the
initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus
when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this
was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does
not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the
line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.

Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it
means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the
common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He
reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated,
as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary
words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as
sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
172 | P a g e

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate
impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives
shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a
misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula
singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two

former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate"
refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial
action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by
the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment

proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2)
once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing
or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a
verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the
House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the
term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.

In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use
contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI,
citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring
to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue
expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the
properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he
states that this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to
actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know
more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and
disinterestedness.148

Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at
present only two members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has
not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not
simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the Constitutional
Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings
thereof.

Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it
is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules
governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress
has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.

Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3
of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:

Section 3. (1) x x x
173 | P a g e

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment
of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least

one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles
of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental
law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary
implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without
need of referendum.

In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of
Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted
"disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando,
speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v.
Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other
than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v.
De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 153 Justice Vicente
Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each
house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the
result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of
method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v.
De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was
even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more
reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are
non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of
separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in
the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an
impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases
involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window
to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court
first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional
rules. It held:

"x x x

"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine
the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the
House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
174 | P a g e

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the

names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do
not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to
the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be counted and
announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House
Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question,
therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker
may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor
what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the
journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such
a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question
is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine
its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and
it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better,
more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a
different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to
make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations
suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity

of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was
examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not
ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and
(3) its method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained.
By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by
the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers.154

xxx

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to

categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will
cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution
was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935
and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or
any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power
to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive
exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse
of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking
powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of
government.155

xxx

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a

mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this
disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike
down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its
officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking
175 | P a g e

powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite their
more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected by
the people.156

xxx

The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice.
. . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the
Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other
branches of government. This provision was dictated by our experience under
martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is
needed to abort abuses in government. x x x

xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of
government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution
transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by
our distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached
constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the
1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court is mandated to
approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do
but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not
resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new
constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the
parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will
not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if
we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be
sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has
increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not
defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator
Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is
distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue
reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the
lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here,
the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.

Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for
arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of
the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution
simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of
impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole
power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme
Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a
constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with
regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our
Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that
"exclusive power" is to be exercised.

The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which
state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the
House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in
substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee
on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or
176 | P a g e

(3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of

Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of
the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they
give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."

Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken
thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5)
of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices
of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23,
2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Conclusion

If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon
that takes the center stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people
with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to
demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of
us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally
exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate
what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved.
Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the
Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their
voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to
the academe and denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a return to a state of
normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any
perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.

Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been
constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action
of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of
the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the
present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same
clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of
jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court
from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.

This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the
constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is
concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence
in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power
and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the
construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies
in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can
properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut
allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter
or problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action
can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.

The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of
impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without
basis in fact and in law.
177 | P a g e

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the
merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against
the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor
indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is
not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great
branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement
the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about
ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the
rule of law.

It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the

impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have
actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said
issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from
the truth.

The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and
been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the
personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the
course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid
by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered
judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield
judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is
involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the
validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the
Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary
from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution
now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of
impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non
sequitur.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system
which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral
authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands.
Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in
protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has
discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases
especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not
above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the
Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law
is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once
again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this
Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what
many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a
blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is
equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to
discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon
each other.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in

Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on
November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the
Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is
barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.
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Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion.

Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see separate concurring
opinion.
Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received.
Carpio, J., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in the separate opinion of J.
Vitug.
Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.
179 | P a g e

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
GR NO. 160261
Nov. 10, 2003

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF). On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal
of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by Representatives
Suplico, Zamora and Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in
form,” but voted to dismiss the same for being insufficient in substance.

On October 23, 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
the House against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.”

ISSUE:
WON Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.

HELD:
No. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ, which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of
the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
“judicial supremacy” which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not
only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and
180 | P a g e

justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this “moderating power” to “determine the proper allocation of
powers” of the different branches of government and “to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels” is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power
itself, which is “the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.”

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily
turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional
construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of
course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the
people’s consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they
have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers
and the people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for construction is
reduced to a minimum.

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision
under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should
bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to
be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object
is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular
provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as
to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted
as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject
should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words
idle and nugatory.

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is
available. While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.

Debates in the constitutional convention “are of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of
the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at
the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face.” The proper interpretation therefore depends more
on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers’ understanding thereof.