a.
SPOUSES EXEQUIEL LOPEZ and
EUSEBIA LOPEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES EDUARDO LOPEZ and
MARCELINA R. LOPEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 161925               November 25, 2009
Respondents, spouses Eduardo and Marcelina
Lopez, are the owners and occupants of an 80-
square-meter residential lot situated in
Bulacan.
They acquired the property by donation inter
vivos from Maria Alvarado and Agatona
Caparas, in whose names the lot was
previously declared for taxation purposes.
Respondents have occupied the lot since
1977.2
In November 1992, respondents discovered
that Victor Villadares was granted a free patent
over an 885-sq-m land, which included
respondents’ lot, and was subsequently issued
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RP-253
(P-8511) on March 8, 1978.
Thereafter, Villadares subdivided the entire
parcel of land into 3 lots, namely: Lot 9954-A,
Lot 9954-B and Lot 9954-C.
As shown in the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Portions of a Parcel of Land, Villadares sold
Lot 9954-B with an area of 273 sq m to
petitioners, spouses Eusebia and Exequiel
Lopez, and Lot 9954-C with an area of 337
square meters to Filomena Caparas.
Consequently, OCT No. RP-253 (P-8511) was
cancelled and TCT Nos. T-5065, T-5066 and
T-5067 were issued to Villadares, to
petitioners, and to Caparas, respectively.
Respondents filed an action for reconveyance,
declaration of nullity of a deed of absolute sale,
cancellation of titles, and damages against
Villadares and petitioners. The action was filed
only against the two parties because
respondents’ property is situated between their
properties, Lots 9954-A and 9954-B.
During trial, Pedro Manansala, a witness for
respondents, testified that petitioners’ lot
consisted of 168 sq m only, which they bought
from him for ₱20,000.00 sometime after Martial
Law.4
Petitioner Eusebia Lopez refuted this by stating
that she bought a 273-sq-m lot from Pedro
Manansala.5 She admitted that she filed a
protest against Villadares’ application for
registration but claimed that Villadares later
agreed to sell the property to her for
₱30,000.00.6 Villadares corroborated her
testimony, saying that when petitioners showed
him proof that they owned a portion of the lot
registered in his name, he agreed to transfer
the title of the said portion to their names. 7
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE ACTUAL
POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS AND THEIR
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST ON (sic)
THE PROPERTY NOW COVERED BY TCT
NO. T-5066 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS
FOR THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN FOR
MORE THAN FIFTY (50) YEARS.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE DEED
OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF PORTION OF
PARCEL OF LAND EXECUTED BY
DEFENDANT VICTOR VILLADARES IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONERS, EXEQUIEL
LOPEZ AND EUSEBIA LOPEZ, WAS
MERELY TO SETTLE THEIR CONFLICT OF
OWNERSHIP ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
AND TO EXPEDITE THE TRANSFER
THEREOF TO THE PETITIONERS.
V.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE
LOWER COURT FOR THE CANCELLATION
OF TCT NO. T-5065 WITH AN AREA OF 275
SQUARE METERS IN THE NAME OF
DEFENDANT VICTOR VILLADARES AND
THE CANCELLATION OF TCT NO. T-5066
WITH AN AREA OF 273 SQUARE METERS
IN THE NAME OF PETITIONERS EXEQUIEL
LOPE[Z] AND EUSEBIA LOPEZ, WHEN THE
CLAIM OF RESPONDENTS IS ONLY EIGHTY
(80) SQUARE METERS.11
The petition is partly meritorious.
An action for reconveyance is a legal and
equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner
of a land which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in the name of another
for the purpose of compelling the latter to
transfer or reconvey the land to him.12
The action does not seek to reopen the
registration proceedings and to set aside the
decree of registration but only purports to show
that the person who secured the registration of
the property in controversy is not the real
owner thereof.13
Initially, we affirm the CA’s findings of fact that
respondents are the rightful owners of the
subject property, an 80-sq-m portion of land,
wrongfully included in either or in both of the
certificates of title of petitioners or Villadares,
and that petitioners were not innocent
purchasers for value. As neighbors of
respondents, petitioners certainly would have
known that respondents actually occupied the
subject property. Thus, Villadares, not being
the owner of the subject property, could not
have transferred ownership of the subject 80-
sq-m portion of land to petitioners.
As a logical consequence, petitioners did not
become the owners of the subject property
even after a TCT had been issued in their
names. After all, registration does not vest title.
Certificates of title merely confirm or record title
already existing and vested. They cannot be
used to protect a usurper from the true owner,
nor can they be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud, or to permit one to enrich
oneself at the expense of others. 14 Hence,
reconveyance of the subject property is
warranted.
It is well to remember that in an action for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is
highly regarded as incontrovertible. What is
sought is the transfer of the property or its title,
which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another person’s name, to its
rightful owner or to one who has a better
right.15
The present action for reconveyance only
entails the segregation of the portion wrongfully
included in the certificate of title. The decree of
registration is to be respected, but the
certificate of title will be cancelled for the
purpose of amending it in order to exclude the
portion wrongfully included therein. A new
certificate covering the portion reconveyed
shall then be subsequently issued in the name
of the real owner.
However, the CA went beyond this and
declared the entire deed of sale, covering 273
sq m, void for being simulated. As such, the CA
decision would result not only in the
amendment of petitioners’ certificate of title, but
in the absolute revocation of petitioners’ title
itself. The property would then revert to its
previous owner, subject to the right of
respondents over the portion of the lot which
they claim as their own.
Understandably, petitioners anxiously insist
that their TCT should not be cancelled even if
the deed of sale is declared void. They
maintain that they own the entire Lot 9954-B,
not because they purchased the same from
Villadares, but because they previously
acquired the same from Pedro Manansala, in
whose name the lot was previously declared
for taxation purposes. Petitioners allegedly
acquired the property from Pedro Manansala
long before they bought the property from
Villadares, and they claim that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession thereof for more than 50 years.
Hence, even if the deed of sale executed by
Villadares in their favor is nullified, they would
remain owners of the land and their title thereto
should not be cancelled.16
However, petitioners are barred from raising
this issue as it constitutes a collateral attack on
the decree of registration. The record shows
that petitioners had participated in the land
registration proceeding by filing their opposition
to Villadares’ application for registration.
Petitioners’ alleged possession of the property
prior to Villadares’ filing of the application for
registration was, in fact, the meat of their
opposition in the land registration proceeding.
And in a proceeding for land registration,
whether with or without opposition, the final
judgment of the court confirming the title of the
applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and
ordering its registration in his name constitutes
res judicata against the whole world.17
Thus, the Court is compelled to exercise its
authority to review the validity of the Deed of
Absolute Sale of Portions of a Parcel of Land,
though not specifically assigned as error in this
petition, because its resolution is necessary to
arrive at a just decision and complete
disposition of the case.18
In finding that the contract of sale was
simulated, the CA held that petitioner’s
opposition to Villadares’ application for
registration, together with Pedro Manansala’s
testimony that petitioners actually bought the
property from him, evinces the falsity of the
claim that petitioners purchased the property
from Villadares.
We are not convinced. The primary
consideration in determining the true nature of
a contract is the intention of the parties. Such
intention is determined not only from the
express terms of their agreement, but also from
the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of
the parties.191avvphi1
Simulation takes place when the parties do not
really want the contract they have executed to
produce the legal effects expressed by its
wordings.20 This Court’s pronouncement in
Valerio v. Refresca21 is instructive —
Article 1345 of the Civil Code provides that the
simulation of a contract may either be absolute
or relative. In absolute simulation, there is a
colorable contract but it has no substance as
the parties have no intention to be bound by it.
The main characteristic of an absolute
simulation is that the apparent contract is not
really desired or intended to produce legal
effect or in any way alter the juridical situation
of the parties. As a result, an absolutely
simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the
parties may recover from each other what they
may have given under the contract. However, if
the parties state a false cause in the contract to
conceal their real agreement, the contract is
relatively simulated and the parties are still
bound by their real agreement. Hence, where
the essential requisites of a contract are
present and the simulation refers only to the
content or terms of the contract, the agreement
is absolutely binding and enforceable between
the parties and their successors in interest. 22l a
wphil
Based on the foregoing, the subject deed of
sale can hardly be considered simulated. There
is no showing that the parties did not intend to
be bound by the contract and to comply with its
terms. In fact, Villadares surrendered to
petitioners any right he had over the property.
He caused the titling of the property and the
transfer of the tax declaration in petitioners’
names, and thereafter, delivered the certificate
of title and the tax declaration to petitioners and
accepted the purchase price from them. To
recall, Villadares admitted that he was swayed
by petitioners’ claim that they had a right over
the property and thus, he agreed to sell it to
them. Such motivation for entering into the
contract would not negate the efficacy of the
contract. In the same way, petitioners’
opposition in the land registration case does
not necessarily mean that petitioners did not
really intend to purchase the property.
Petitioners could have accepted or acquiesced
to Villadares’ title and entered into the
agreement to finally settle their claim over the
property. The following testimony of petitioner
Eusebia Lopez is telling:
Q Then after filing the protest, what did
you do?
A I talked with Victor Villadares and we
agreed that he will sell the land in a
much lower price, sir.
Q Did he comply with his promise?
A Yes, sir.
 Q So how much was it sold [to] you[;] as
you said it will be sold to you at a lower
price. How much was the selling price?

A ₱30,000.00, sir.

Q Did you pay the ₱30,000.00 to him?

A Yes, sir.

Q When did you pay it to defendant

Victor Villadares?

A When the title was given to me by him

as well as the tax declaration and the
Bilihang Patuluyan, sir.23

We, therefore, uphold the validity of the deed of

sale subject to the reconveyance of
respondents’ 80-sq-m portion of the land.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court
of Appeals Decision dated January 26, 2004 is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The
Deed of Absolute Sale of Portions of a Parcel
of Land dated May 8, 1990 is declared VALID
but subject to our disposition hereunder.
Petitioners and Victor Villadares are directed to
cause a SURVEY of Lots 9954-A and 9954-B
in order to determine the exact location of the
80-sq m portion pertaining to respondents.
Thereafter, the Register of Deeds of Tabang,
Guiguinto, Bulacan is ordered to ISSUE the
corresponding transfer certificates of title in the
names of petitioners, respondents and Victor
Villadares, in accordance with said survey.

SO ORDERED.

b. DINAH C. CASTILLO v. ANTONIO M.
ESCUTIN, GR No. 171056, 2009-03-13
Facts:
Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel
K. Moratilla (Raquel), married to Roel
Buenaventura. In the course of her search for
properties to satisfy the judgment in her favor,
petitioner discovered that Raquel, her mother
Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and sister Perla Kalaw.
Moratilla (Perla), co-owned Lot 13713, a parcel of
land consisting of 15,000 square meters, situated at
Brgy. Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas, and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449.
Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot
13713. She was able to secure an Order dated 4
March 1999 issued by Secretary Horacio R.
Morales, Jr. of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) approving the application of Summit Point
Golf & Country Club, Inc. for conversion of several
agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713
owned by "Perla K. Mortilla, et al." and covered by
Tax Declaration No. 00449, to residential,
commercial, and recreational uses.
Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on
execution Lot 13713, and the public auction sale of
the same was scheduled on 14 May 2002.
Sometime in May 2002, before the scheduled
public auction sale, petitioner learned that Lot
13713 was inside the Summit Point Golf and
Country Club Subdivision owned by Summit Point
Realty and Development Corporation (Summit
Realty). She immediately went to the Makati City
office of Summit Realty to meet with its Vice
President, Orense. However, she claimed that
Orense did not show her any document to prove...
ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit Realty, and
even threatened her that the owners of Summit
Realty, the Leviste family, was too powerful and
influential for petitioner to tangle with.
The records of the Registry reveals that the source
of the rights or interest of the adverse claimant is by
virtue of a Levy on Execution by the Regional Trial
Court Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 30, San
Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP-4489 (1996),
[Dinah] C. Castillo vs.
Raquel Buenaventura. The registered owner,
Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation
nor its predecessor-in-interest are not the judgment
debtor or a party in the said case. Simply stated,
there is no privity of contract between them
(Consulta No. 1044 and 1119). If ever, her adverse
claim is against Raquel Buenaventura, the
judgment debtor who holds no title over the
property.
The LRA distinguished between two systems of
land... registration: one is the Torrens system for
registered lands under the Property Registration
Decree, and the other is the system of registration
for unregistered land under Act No. 3344 (now
Section 113 of the Property Registration Decree).
These systems are separate and... distinct from
each other. For documents involving registered
lands, the same should be recorded under the
Property Registration Decree. The registration,
therefore, of an instrument under the wrong system
produces no legal effect.
Issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
PATENTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
CANCELLATION OF THE TAX DECLARATION
00942 OF PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF
SECTION 109 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PROPERTY
REGISTRATION ACT
Ruling:
Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or
ground of possessing that which is ours. It is that
which is the foundation of ownership of property,
real or... personal. Title, therefore, may be defined
briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of
exclusive possession, or which is the foundation of
ownership of property.[41] Certificate of title, on the
other hand, is a mere... evidence of ownership; it is
not the title to the land itself. Under the Torrens
system, a certificate of title may be an Original
Certificate of Title, which constitutes a true copy of
the decree of registration; or a Transfer Certificate
of Title,... issued subsequent to the original
registration.
Petitioner's reliance on Section 109 of the Property
Registration Decree is totally misplaced. It provides
for the requirements for the issuance of a lost
duplicate certificate of title. It cannot, in any way, be
related to the cancellation of petitioner's tax
declaration.
As between Catigbac's title, covered by a certificate
of title, and petitioner's title, evidenced only by a tax
declaration, the former is evidently far superior and
is, in the absence of any other certificate of title to
the same property, conclusive and indefeasible as
to
Catigbac's ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbac's
certificate of title is binding upon the whole world,
including respondent public officers and even
petitioner herself.
"[c]uriously, as to how and when petitioner's alleged
predecessor-in-interest, Raquel K. Moratilla and her
supposed co-owners acquired portions of Lot 1
described as Lot 13713 stated in TD
No. 00449, petitioner had so far remained utterly
silent."... t must be remembered that Summit Realty
had already... acquired a certificate of title, TCT No.
T-134609, in its name over Lot 1-B, which
constitutes conclusive and indefeasible evidence of
its ownership of the said property
Respondents were able to clearly describe their
official functions and to convincingly explain that
they had only acted in accordance therewith in their
dealings with petitioner and/or her documents.
Respondents' actions were only consistent with the
recognition... of the title of Catigbac over Lot 1-B,
transferred by sale to Summit Realty, registered
under the Torrens system, and accordingly
evidenced by certificates of title.

c. Intestate of San Pedro v CA (265 SCRA 733)
FACTS:
1. GR 103727
Engracio San Pedro, as heir-judicial administrator
of Plaintiff Intestate, filed a complaint for recovery
of real property/reconveyance with damages and
prayer for preliminary injunction against private
defendants Ocampo, Buhain and dela Cruz.
San Pedro alleged that defendants acquired portion
of the subject estate by employing fraud, bad faith
and misrepresentation.
2. GR 106496
Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito filed a
petition for letter of administration over the intestate
to be appointed as administrator and co-
administrator. Judge Echeverri appointed San
Pedro as administrator and the court issued letter
of administration in his favor upon posting a bond of
10,000.
Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for
intervention and opposition to the petition, claiming
that the Titulo de Propriedad is inadmissible and
ineffective proof of ownership in court and it is
invalid.
Republic filed a motion to suspend the proceedings
but the Republic‘s opposition to the petition for
letter of administration was dismissed. Republic
filed Motion for Recon.
2.NO. The lower court did not commit any error
when it declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as
null and void, consequently excluding all lands
covered by the said title from the inventory of the
estate.
Under PD 892, the system of registration under
Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all
holders of Spanish Titles should cause their lands
to be registered under Land Registration Act within
6 months from date of effectivity or until August 16,
1976.
In both cases, petitioner-heirs did not adduce
evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 was brought under the operation of PD 892.
There was no certificate of title shown.
Also, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under PD 892,
is inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of
private ownership in special proceedings case.
Since the Titulo was not registered under Land
Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the
registered title of defendants Ocampo, Buhain and
dela Cruz. Torrens title of the latter enjoys the
conclusive presumption of validity.
RULING:
The Titulo de Propriedad is null and void and no
rights can be derived therefrom. All lands covered
by said Titulo are excluded from inventory of the
estate. The petition for letter of administration
closed and terminated. The heirs are disallowed to
exercise any act of possession or ownership and
ordered to vacate.

ISSUES:
2. Whether or not the lower court committed error in
excluding from the inventory of the estate all lands
covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 on the
ground that it is null and void?
RATIO:

d.FIDELA R. ANGELES v. SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, GR No. 142549, 2010-03-09
Facts:
The property involved in this case is covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994, which
encompasses One Thousand Three Hundred Forty-
Two (1,342) hectares of the Maysilo Estate...
petitioner, together with other individuals, all of
them claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de
la Concepcion Vidal, and alleging that they are
entitled to inherit her proportional share in the
parcels of land located in Quezon City and in the...
municipalities of Caloocan and Malabon, Province
of Rizal, commenced a special civil action for
partition and accounting of the property otherwise
known as Maysilo Estate covered by OCT No. 994,
allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 with the
Registry ofDeeds of Caloocan City.
Some of said alleged heirs were able to procure
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) over portions
of the Maysilo Estate.
They also had led this Court to believe that OCT
No. 994 was registered twice
In the RTC Order sought to be implemented, Judge
Jaime D. Discaya granted the partition and
accounting prayed for by plaintiffs in that case;
directed the respective Registers of Deeds of
Caloocan City and Quezon City to issue transfer
certificates of title... in the names of all the co-
owners, including petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels
of land... and ordered that said parcels of land be
sold, subject to the... confirmation of the Court, and
the proceeds be divided among the plaintiffs in
proportion to their respective interests in the
property.
Petitioner alleges that the respective Registers of
Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City refused to
comply with the RTC Order because they were still
awaiting word from the LRA Administrator before
proceeding. Counsel for petitioner then requested
the LRA Administrator to... direct said Registers of
Deeds to comply with the Order.
The LRA Administrator,... sent counsel for
petitioner a letter-reply
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be
granted in view of the directive of the Department
of Justice... as a result of the inquiry conducted by
the Composite Fact-Finding
Committee (created under DOJ Department Order
No. 137) finding that there is only one OCT No.
994 which was issued by the Rizal Register of
Deeds on 3 May 1917 (and not on 19 April 1919)
The LRA Administrator likewise wrote that in
Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated May 25,
1998, the Senate Committees on Justice and Human
Rights and Urban Planning came up with the
following findings:... i. There is only one Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 and this was
issued or registered on May 3, 1917... ii. The [OCT]
No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent. It was
a fabrication perpetrated by Mr. Norberto Vasquez,
Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan
City.
iii. The alleged surviving heirs could not have been
the true and legal heirs of the late Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal as government findings showed
the physical and genetic impossibility of such
relationship... iv. Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former
Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, acted
maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, by
issuing "certifications" and/or written statements to
the effect that OCT No. 994 was issued or
registered on April 19, 1917 when in... truth and in
fact it was issued or registered on May 3, 1917.
v. Atty. Yolanda O. Alfonso, Registrar of Deeds of
Caloocan City, likewise acted maliciously,
fraudulently and in bad faith, when she signed the
TCTs issued in the name of Eleuteria Rivera which
bear a wrong date of the registration of OCT No.
994.
Petitioner avers that respondent Guingona, in
issuing the 1st Indorsement,[13] made a substantive
modification of the ruling made by this Court in
MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Luis
Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals.
She further avers that "[n]ot even the Secretary of
Justice has the power or authority to set aside or
alter an established ruling made by the highest
Court of the land."
Petitioner contends that "[t]he rule is well settled
that once a decision... becomes final[,] the Court
can no longer amend, modify, much less set aside
the same" and that respondent Guingona usurped
judicial functions and did a prohibited act which
rendered the Order of no effect.
Petitioner claims that respondent Guingona was the
one who caused the issuance by the LRA
Administrator of Circular No. 97-11... which had
the same legal effect on other cases similarly
situated without hearing or notice to the parties-in-
interest, and that... this was contemptuous and
contumacious and calls for "condemnation and
reproof of the highest degree."
Respondent Guingona contends that he was no
longer the Secretary of Justice, therefore, he did not
anymore possess the mandatory duties being
compelled to be performed in this case by way of a
writ of mandamus; he had no more duty resulting
from the said position and... could not perform an
act that pertained to said duty, even if he wanted to;
and since he did not have the powers and duties of
the Secretary of Justice, he was therefore not a real
party-in-interest in this case.
Petitioner argues that contrary to private
respondent's claim, she is entitled to file a petition
for mandamus as she and her co-plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. C-424 has been suffering from damages
and losses incapable of quantification, because of
the wrongful act of the... respondents.
Issues:
whether public respondents unlawfully neglected to
perform their duties by their refusal to issue the
questioned transfer certificates of title to petitioner
and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) or
have... unlawfully excluded petitioner from the use
and enjoyment of whatever claimed right
Ruling:
we find that it was not unlawful for public
respondents to refuse compliance with the RTC
Order, and the act being requested of them is not
their ministerial duty;... hence, mandamus does not
lie and the petition must be dismissed.
It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel
the performance, when refused, of a ministerial
duty, but not to compel the performance of a
discretionary duty.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is
in substantial dispute or to which a substantial...
doubt exists.
Therefore, we must look into the alleged right of
petitioner and see if compliance with the RTC
Order is compellable by mandamus; or, in the
alternative, find out if substantial doubt exists to
justify public respondents' refusal to comply with
said Order.
Considering the probable duplication of titles over
the... same parcel of land, such issuance may
contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby
destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of
registration.
Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded
only when the petitioners' legal right to the
performance of the particular act which is sought to
be compelled is clear and complete.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal
right is a right... which is indubitably granted by law
or is inferable as a matter of law.
As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the
issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of
registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases
where they find that such would result to the double
titling of the same parcel of land.
In the same vein, we find that in this... case, which
involves the issuance of transfer certificates of title,
the Register of Deeds cannot be compelled by
mandamus to comply with the RTC Order since
there were existing transfer certificates of title
covering the subject parcels of land and there was
reason to... question the rights of those requesting
for the issuance of the TCTs. Neither could
respondent LRA Administrator be mandated by the
Court to require the Register of Deeds to comply
with said Order, for we find merit in the
explanations of respondent LRA Administrator in
his... letter-reply
There was, therefore, sufficient... basis for public
respondents to refuse to comply with the RTC
Order, given the finding, contained in the cited
documents, that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917,
on which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the civil
case clearly anchored their rights, did not exist.
As we held in the 2007 Manotok case:
The determinative test to resolve whether the prior
decision of this Court should be affirmed or set
aside is whether or not the titles invoked by the
respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced
from the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17 April
1917, then such... titles are void or otherwise should
not be recognized by this Court. Since the true basic
factual predicate concerning OCT No. 994 which is
that there is only one such OCT differs from that
expressed in the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions,
said rulings have become... virtually functus officio
except on the basis of the "law of the case" doctrine,
and can no longer be relied upon as precedents.
the factual setting the same as or similar to that at
bar.
in the 2009 Manotok case... affirmed the earlier
finding that "there is only... one OCT No. 994, the
registration date of which had already been
decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April
1917" and categorically concluded that "OCT No.
994 which reflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its
registration date is null and void."
It appears... that the partition and accounting of a
portion of the Maysilo Estate that she and her co-
plaintiffs prayed for can no longer prosper because
of the conclusive findings quoted... above that the
very basis of their claim, a second, albeit earlier
registered, OCT No. 994, does not exist
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED.

Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that

OCT No. 994 allegedly issued on April 19, 1917
validly and actually exists, given the following
conclusions made by this Court in the 2007
Manotok case:

First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears

on the record, that mother title was received for
transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May
1917, and that should be the date which should be
reckoned as the date of registration of the title.

Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No.

994 dated [19] April 1917 is void, for such mother
title is inexistent.

Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v.

Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals
cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard
to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19
April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as...
inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS
or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated
19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under

e. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
v. RICO C. MANALASTAS +
[ GR No. 208264, Jul 27, 2016 ]
The Facts
This case originated from a complaint for Grave
Misconduct filed by Miriam Jane M. Jacinto
(Jacinto), Assistant Vice President of BPI Family
Savings Bank, Inc. (BPI Family), against Atty.
Lorna S. Dee (Dee), Manalastas, and Gilberto M.
Paras (Paras), in their capacities as Register of
Deeds, Examiner, and Acting Deputy Register of
Deeds, respectively, of the Office of the Register of
Deeds of San Juan City, Metro Manila.
In the Complaint, Jacinto alleged that sometime in
September 2000, Dy Chiu Ha Tiu or Marian Dy Tiu
(Marian) applied for a loan in the amount of
P20,000,000 with BPI Family. Marian requested
that her husband's property located at 19 Lincoln
St., West Greenhills, San Juan City be appraised for
collateral purposes. The property was registered in
the name of Paquito Tiu (Paquito), Marian's
husband, and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 1035. BPI Family assessed the
property at P36,072,900. Thereafter, BPI Family
approved the loan application of Marian secured by
the residential property.
On 25 January 2001, Marian and a certain person
whom she introduced as her husband Paquito,
signed, executed, and delivered to BPI Family
several documents required for the loan. These
documents were the Real Estate Mortgage, Loan
Agreement, Promissory Note, and Disclosure
Statement, as well as the Owner's Duplicate Copy
of TCT No. 1035 in the name of Paquito.
On the same day, Reynold Cuasay, BPI Family's
bank personnel, brought the Real Estate Mortgage
and the other documents to the Office of the
Register of Deeds of San Juan City for annotation
and registration of the mortgage.
Manalastas, as Examiner of said office, examined
the documents and assessed the corresponding fees.
After Cuasay paid for the fees, Manalastas entered
the mortgage in the Registration Book under Entry
No. 4435/T-1035 and affixed his initials on the Real
Estate Mortgage. Thereafter, Manalastas endorsed
the same document to Paras, as Acting Deputy
Register of Deeds. After examination, Paras affixed
his initials on the Real Estate Mortgage then
endorsed it further to Dee, the Register of Deeds.
Finding the documents to have passed through the
natural course of registration, Dee also affixed her
signature on the Real Estate Mortgage, the Owner's
Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 1035, and the Registry
Copy of TCT No. 1035, which served as collateral
for the loan.
Thereafter, BPI Family released the net proceeds of
the loan in the amount of P19,765,093.27 by
crediting the Spouses Tiu's Joint Current
Account/Savings Account No. 6835-0036-96 which
was opened at BPI Family's Commonwealth branch.
On 1 February 2001, the real Paquito Tiu,
accompanied by his lawyer, Atty. Deogracias C.
Eufemio, went to BPI Family's main office located
in Makati City. Paquito informed BPI Family's
officers that the signatures of one Paquito Tiu
appearing on the loan documents were not his since
he was not the same Paquito Tiu who signed them.
Paquito presented his Owner's Duplicate Copy of
TCT No. 1035 and submitted a Sworn Statement
stating that he never signed the loan documents
applied for by Marian and that his signatures therein
were forged.
BPI Family immediately made a verification with
the Office of the Register of Deeds of San Juan
City. Upon thorough examination, the Owner's
Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 1035 submitted by
Marian, although on its face appeared to be real and
authentic since the title was in a Land Registration
Authority form, turned out to be fake and spurious.
After such discovery, Dee, as Register of Deeds,
filed with the Office of the Prosecutor (Pasig City) a
case against Marian for falsification of public
documents.
Subsequently, BPI Family filed an administrative
complaint[4] for Grave Misconduct with the Office
of the Ombudsman against Dee, Manalastas, and
Paras. BPI Family asserted that due to their
negligence and dereliction of duties in failing to
examine the genuineness and authenticity of TCT
No. 1035, the bank was allegedly defrauded in the
amount of P16,460,671.63, exclusive of interest and
other charges.
In a Decision dated 12 September 2006, the Office
of the Ombudsman found Dee, Manalastas, and
Paras guilty of gross negligence and imposed on
them the penalty of one year suspension without
pay.
Since Paras retired from government service in
October 2003, his penalty of suspension was
rendered moot and academic. Dee and Manalastas
filed their separate motions for reconsideration
which were denied by the Office of the Ombudsman
in an undated Order.[7]
Manalastas then filed an appeal[8] with the CA. In a
Decision[9] dated 25 September 2012, the CA
reversed the ruling of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Issue
The issue for our resolution is whether the CA erred
in exonerating Manalastas for negligence in failing
to determine the genuineness of the owner's
duplicate copy of the title attached to the real estate
mortgage sought to be annotated with the Office of
the Register of Deeds of San Juan City.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner contends that Manalastas fell short of his
duties and responsibilities as Examiner of the Office
of the Register of Deeds for failing to determine the
genuineness of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT
No. 1035 when referred to him for examination in
the annotation and registration of the real estate
mortgage.
In the present case, Manalastas was found guilty of
gross negligence for failing to discover the falsity of
the owner's duplicate copy of title attached to the
real estate mortgage submitted by BPI Family to the
Office of the Register of Deeds. The Office of the
Ombudsman ruled that BPI Family had adequately
established Manalastas's negligence by substantial
evidence. The relevant portions of the
Ombudsman's Decision dated 12 September 2006
state:
Considering that the Owner's Duplicate Copy of
Title No. 1035 attached to the Real Estate Mortgage
being sought to be annotated, is in an authenticated
form only, that fact should have put the respondents
on guard and therefore, each respondent should
have been more vigilant by exerting effort in
comparing and verifying its authenticity by looking
into its minute details vis-a-vis the original copy on
file with them.
xxx [I]t is noted that, the BANK has no means of
knowing whether or not a title is genuine except
upon verification from the Office of the Registry of
Deeds as custodian of the original copies of the
transfer certificates of title. Lamentably, it is in this
wise that respondents were grossly negligent in the
performance of their official functions when they
failed to distinguish the discrepancies between the
owner's duplicate copy of title being presented for
registration and the original copy of the title on file
with their office.[12]
However, the CA, in reversing the decision of the
Ombudsman, held that the primary reason why BPI
Family went to the Office of the Register of Deeds
was to have the real estate mortgage registered and
annotated and not to verify the authenticity of the
owner's duplicate copy of title. Prior to such
registration, BPI Family already approved the loan.
The relevant portions of the Decision dated 25
September 2012 state:
It must be noted that the main purpose of BPI when
it brought the Real Estate Mortgage together with
the purported owner's duplicate copy of title to the
Office of the Register of Deeds was to have the said
mortgage inscribed in the records of said office and
annotated at the back of the certificate of title
covering the land subject of the instrument and not
to verify the authenticity of the owner's duplicate
copy of title. In fact, BPI verified the authenticity of
the forged title only after the real Paquito Tiu
showed up and informed its head office about the
forgery.[13]
We agree with the CA.
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 [14] lays
down the general functions of the Register of
Deeds:
Section 10. General functions of Registers of
Deeds. - The office of the Register of Deeds
constitutes a public repository of records of
instruments affecting registered or unregistered
lands and chattel mortgages in the province or city
wherein such office is situated.
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to
immediately register an Instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property
which complies with all the requisites for
registration. He shall see to it that said instrument
bears the proper documentary and science stamps
and that the same are properly canceled. If the
instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny
registration thereof and inform the presentor of such
denial in writing, stating the ground or reason
therefor, and advising him of his right to appeal by
consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this
Decree.
Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a
deed, contract, or instrument is sought to be
inscribed in the records of the Office of the Register
of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate
of title covering the land subject of the deed,
contract, or instrument. Being a ministerial act, it
must be performed in any case. The public officer
having this ministerial duty has no choice but to
perform the specific action which is the particular
duty imposed by law. The purpose of registration is
to give notice to all persons. It operates as a notice
of the deed, contract, or instrument to others, but
neither adds to its validity nor converts an invalid
instrument into a valid one between the parties. [15]
Since registration of documents is a ministerial act
and merely creates a constructive notice of its
contents against all third persons,[16] the Register of
Deeds is not authorized to determine whether or not
fraud was committed in the document sought to be
registered.[17]
Here, the falsification of the owner's duplicate copy
of title was professionally done, that even someone
exercising reasonable prudence and care would not
instantly detect. On its face, the title was not
apparently discernible as fake or spurious and could
pass as a genuine and bona fide document. The title
was in authentic form issued by the Land
Registration Authority and an exact reproduction of
the original copy with the same serial numbers,
impressions, texts, and signatures. When a
document is in "authentic form," this means that at
the time the document was inspected and verified,
there was nothing extraordinary that would have
placed even a reasonable person to suspect of any
wrongdoing.
As a public officer, Manalastas enjoys the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his
official duties and functions.[18] Manalastas accepted
the requirements presented by BPI Family for
annotation and registration of the real estate
mortgage in the ordinary course of transaction. His
examination of the owner's duplicate copy of title
and his recommendation to his superiors for the
approval of the annotation and registration of the
real estate mortgage were made in good faith and
not tainted with gross negligence.
Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or
failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the
entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless
disregard of consequences without exerting any
effort to avoid them.[19] It is characterized by want
of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as
other persons may be affected.[20]
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof
needed to adjudge a respondent guilty is substantial
evidence. In Miro v. Mendoza,[21] we held that
substantial evidence is defined as such amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
It is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. The
standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when
there is reasonable ground to believe, based on the
evidence submitted, that the respondent is
responsible for the misconduct complained of. It
need not be overwhelming or preponderant, as is
required in an ordinary civil case, or evidence
beyond reasonable doubt, as is required in a
criminal case, but the evidence must be enough for
a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.
In this case, the owner's duplicate copy of title
attached to the real estate mortgage was written in
an official paper of the Land Registration Authority
and contained all the markings of a genuine title.
The Office of the Register of Deeds is not mandated
to investigate further than necessary when
documents presented before it appear authentic. We
agree with the CA when it declared:
x x x [T]here is no basis to hold petitioner liable for
gross negligence simply because he failed to
discover the forgery in the owner's duplicate copy
of title. It would be a grave injustice to punish him,
when, in reality, he himself was a victim of the
defraudation.
x x x x
xxx [N]o liability could attach to petitioner in all
registration procured through fraud, as in this case,
unless he is a party to such fraud. Indeed, were it
not for the appearance of the real Paquito Tiu, the
forgery would not have been discovered. This
bolsters petitioner's claim that he had acted in good
faith in his dealings with the documents presented
before him for registration.[22]
Also, BPI Family has the burden of proof to
overcome the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty. BPI Family would
want to pass the blame to Manalastas by imputing
gross negligence on his part when it is BPI Family
which is the proximate cause of the loss.
As mentioned by the Office of the Ombudsman in
its Decision dated 12 September 2006, BPI Family
had been remiss in approving the loan without first
making a thorough investigation of the true identity
of its clients and the genuineness of the documents
submitted to it. The relevant portions of the
Decision state:
x x x [T]he BANK may have been negligent to
protect its interests when it approved the loan
without first making the necessary investigation
normally conducted by banking and/or
financial/lending institutions, that is, i) by
ascertaining that all the documents presented are
authentic and that the persons who introduce
themselves as owners are indeed the owner[s] of the
property, and borrowers, if not the registered owner,
are equipped with the legal document to transact
business and ii) by conducting actual character and
background investigation on Marian Dy Tiu as
applicant and of Paquito Tiu being the registered
owner of the property.[23]
Thus, as aptly held by the CA:
It cannot be said that by reason of the failure of
petitioner to discover the forgery, BPI was
defrauded in the amount of P4,850,000.00
considering that prior to registration of the
mortgage, BPI already approved the loan applied
for by Marian upon the latter's submission of the
requisite documents with the presence of an
impostor husband. In other words, as between the
failure of BPI to discover the forgeries in the
documents as well as the real identity of the
impostor husband on one hand, and the failure of
petitioner to discover the forged owner's duplicate
[copy] of title on the other, the former should be
considered as the proximate cause of BPI's loss. [24]
As Justice Tuason opined, in his concurring and
dissenting opinions in the case of him v. Register of
Deeds of Rizal,[25] Registers of Deeds are not
guardians entrusted with watching over the private
interests of contracting parties who are fully capable
of looking after their own affairs. Thus, BPI Family
has to bear the burden of loss.
In sum, in the absence of any substantial evidence
that Manalastas did not properly perform his duty as
Examiner or that he intentionally performed an
illegal act, then the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty should prevail. We do not find
Manalastas administratively liable for gross
negligence in carrying out his official functions
which he had executed within reasonable bounds of
diligence and care.

f. BALBIN V. REGISTER OF DEEDS
11 Feb
L – 20611 | May 8, 1969 | J. Makalintal
Where several co-owner’s duplicate of certificates
of titles are issued, a voluntary instrument cannot
be registered without surrendering all the copies to
the Register of Deeds so that every copy of thereof
would contain identical entries of the transactions
affecting the land covered.
ISSUE:
W/N the refusal of the Register of Deeds to make
the annotation is proper
HELD:
YES. There being several copies of the same title
in existence, their integrity may be affected if an
encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is
annotated on one copy and not on the others. If
different copies were permitted to carry different
annotations, the whole system of Torrens
registration would cease to be available.
Since the property subject of donation is also
presumed conjugal, that is, property of donor
Cornelio and his deceased wife Nemesia Mina,
“there should first be a liquidation of the partnership
before the surviving spouse may make such a
conveyance.” Assuming the conjugal nature of the
property, the donation bears on its face an
infirmity which justified the denial of registration,
namely, the fact that 2/3 portion of the property
which Cornelio donated was more than ½ his
share, not to say more than what remained of such
share after he had sold portions of the same land to
3 other parties.

FACTS:
Petitioners Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to
the Ilocos Sur register of deeds a duplicate copy of
the registered owner’s certificate of title and a deed
of donation inter-vivos, requesting that the latter be
annotated on the title. The registered owner
Cornelio Balbin appears to have donated inter-
vivos 2/3 portion of the land. The register of deeds
denied the requested annotation for being “legally
defective or otherwise not sufficient in law.” It
appears that previously annotated in the
memorandum of encumbrances on the OCT are
three separate sales earlier executed by Cornelio
Balbin in favor of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto
Bravo and Juana Gabayan, who each received
their co-owner’s duplicate CTs. Mainly because
these 3 co-owner’s copies of CTs had not been
presented by petitioners, the register of deeds
refused to make the requested annotation.
Petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner
of Land Registration, who upheld the action of the
Register of Deeds in a resolution.

g. ROSARIO BANGUIS-TAMBUYAT,
Petitioner, v. WENIFREDA BALCOM-
TAMBUYAT, Respondent. G.R. No.
202805, March 23, 2015
FACTS: Adriano M. Tambuyat and respondent
Wenifreda Balcom-Tambuyat were married on
September 16, 1965. During their marriage, Adriano
acquired several real properties, including a 700-square
meter parcel of land located at Barangay Muzon, San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan (the subject property),7 which
was bought on November 17, 1991. The deed of sale
over the said property was signed by Adriano alone as
vendee; one of the signing witnesses to the deed of sale
was petitioner Rosario Banguis-Tambuyat , who signed
therein as “Rosario Banguis.” 9 When (TCT T145321)
covering the subject property was issued, however, it
was made under the name of “ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT
married to ROSARIO E. BANGUIS.” On June 7, 1998,
Adriano died intestate.
Subsequently, Wenifreda filed a Petition for
Cancellation of TCT T-145321. She alleged therein that
she was the surviving spouse of Adriano; and that the
TCT was erroneously registered and made in the name
of “ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E.
BANGUIS;” that per annexed Marriage Contract,
Banguis was still married to Nolasco; that Banguis could
not have been married to Adriano; that the issuance of
the title in Banguis’s name as Adriano’s spouse was due
to “an insidious machination by her and the person who
brokered the sale of the subject property, allegedly a
cousin or relative of hers;” In her defense, Banguis
denied specifically that the subject property was
acquired by Adriano and Wenifreda during their
marriage. She claimed that on the other hand, she alone
bought the subject property using her personal funds;
that she and Adriano were married on September 2,
1988 and thereafter lived together as a married couple;
that their union produced a son, who was born on April
1, 1990; that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
petition for cancellation, which is merely a summary
proceeding – considering that a thorough determination
will have to be made as to whether the property is
conjugal or exclusive property, and since she and
Adriano have a child whose rights will be adversely
affected by any judgment in the case. The RTC decided
in favor of Wenifreda and directed the RD of
Meycauyan to cancel the TCT of Banguis, and in lieu
thereof to issue a new certificate of title in the name of
Adriano Tambuyat married to Winifreda Tambuyat.
RTC justified its decision by using Section 108 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) or the Property
Registration Decree – court authorization is required for
any alteration or amendment of a certificate of title
when any error, omission or mistake was made in
entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or
on any duplicate certificate, or when there is reasonable
ground for the amendment or alteration of the title. The
CA sustained the trial court’s decision noting that
Banguis name was included in the TCT be error or
mistake. It held that the evidence adduced that
Winifreda not Banguis is the lawful wife of Adriano; that
there was a valid and subsisting marriage of between
Nolasco and Banguis; and the latter admitted to such
fact during the course of the proceedings in the trial
court; and that Banguis’s opposition to Wenifreda’s
petition for cancellation of TCT T-145321 is not real and
genuine as to place the latter’s title to the subject
property in doubt.
ISSUE: Whether the cancellation of the TCT by
Winifreda be granted by the court.
HELD: Yes. Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the
proceeding for the erasure, alteration, or amendment
of a certificate of title may be resorted to in seven
instances: (1) when registered interests of any
description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or
inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (2) when new
interests have arisen or been created which do not
appear upon the certificate; (3) when any error,
omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate
or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate
certificate; (4) when the name of any person on the
certificate has been changed; (5) when the registered
owner has been married, or, registered as married, the
marriage has been terminated and no right or interest
of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (6) when a
corporation, which owned registered land and has been
dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three
years after its dissolution; and (7) when there is
reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of
title.
respondents - instead of registering the supposed
sale in their favor - executed an Affidavit of Non-
Loss
Petitioner confronted respondents, who showed her
a notarized Agreement[9] with right of repurchase...
and an unnotarized and undated Deed of Absolute
Sale,[10] on which documents petitioner's purported
signatures... were affixed.
These documents indicate that petitioner sold the
property... to respondents for P250,000.00 with
right to repurchase the same within a period of 90
days.

The present case falls under (3) and (7), where the Petitioner told respondents that she did not execute
Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan committed an error in these documents, and that her purported...
issuing TCT T-145321 in the name of “Adriano M. signatures therein were in fact falsified and forged.
Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis” when, in truth
and in fact, respondent Wenifreda – and not Banguis – She demanded the return of TCT... but respondents
refused to surrender the title to her. They claimed
is Adriano’s lawful spouse.
that the property was sold to them by Perez and "a
companion."
h. RUBY RUTH S. SERRANO MAHILUM v.
SPS. EDILBERTO ILANO AND LOURDES
All this time, title to the property remained in
ILANO, GR No. 197923, 2015-06-22
petitioner's name, as respondents have not
registered the unnotarized and undated Deed of
Facts:
Absolute Sale.
Petitioner Ruby Ruth S. Serrano Mahilum is the
petitioner and her husband Richard instituted
registered owner of a parcel of land... she entrusted
against respondents and Perez... with the Regional
the original owner's duplicate copy of TCT... to
Trial Court... a
Teresa Perez (Perez) - a purported real estate broker
- who claimed that she can assist petitioner in
Complaint[11] for "annulment of agreement and
obtaining a loan, with TCT... serving as collateral.
deed of absolute sale, specific... performance, with
damages,"

Respondents' Amended Answer with Compulsory

After several months, petitioner... demanded the
Counterclaim[13] alleged and admitted, among
return of the title, but Perez failed to produce the
others, that petitioner was the owner of the lot
same; after much prodding, Perez admitted that the
title was lost.
Perez - accompanied by one Corazon Tingson
(Tingson) "and a female person who introduced
petitioner executed an Affidavit of Loss and caused
herself as Ruby Ruth Serrano" - offered to sell to
the same to be annotated upon the original registry
them the property... that "in support of the identity
copy of TCT... petitioner received a letter from the
of the said Ruby
Registry of Deeds of Las Pinas City informing her
that the owner's duplicate copy of TCT... was not
Ruth Serrano, the original owner's copies of the title
lost, but that it was presented to the registry by
respondents, spouses Edilberto and Lourdes Ilano,
, Declaration of Real Property, Tax Clearance,
who claimed that the... property covered by the title
Barangay Clearance, Community Tax Certificate
was sold to them.
with picture of Ruby Ruth Serrano attached therein"
were presented to respondent
"the person who introduced herself as Ruby Ruth
Serrano" obtained a cash advance of P50,000.00;
that after verification confirmed that the property is
indeed owned by and registered in the name of
Ruby Ruth Serrano, Edilberto - "believing in good
faith that the person [with]... whom he is dealing x x
x is indeed the real Ruby Ruth Serrano" - entered
into the sale transaction... on the same day,...
petitioner received the full consideration of
P250,000.00 and signed the Agreement and Deed of
Absolute Sale... that... the complaint failed to allege
that respondents were purchasers in bad faith or at
least with notice of the defect in the title, which
leads to the conclusion that the complaint states no
cause of action
Respondents thus prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint, and by way of counterclaim, sought
indemnity for... damages
Pre-trial and presentation of petitioner's evidence
ensued. Thereafter, petitioner rested her case.
Respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence,[14]
arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action in that petitioner failed to allege that
respondents were purchasers in bad faith or with
notice of a defect in the title
Petitioner filed a Comment/ Opposition,[15]
contending essentially that her complaint contained
an allegation that respondents were purchasers in
bad faith
RTC... the trial court denied respondents' demurrer.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
[18] but the trial court denied the same
Respondents went up to the Court of Appeals (CA)
via an original Petition for Certiorari.
CA
The CA held that -
A careful reading of private respondents'[23]
complaint before public respondent would show
that private respondents indeed failed to allege that
petitioners[24] were in bad faith or at least aware of
the misrepresentation... of the vendor of the subject
property at the time they purchased the same
Petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration,[30]
which the CA denied
Issues:
NO... the CA was correct in declaring that
petitioner's complaint... failed to state a cause of
action owing to her failure to allege that the
property in question was... purchased in bad faith.
Ruling:
NO NEW TITLE
In granting demurrer, the CA failed to consider that
title to the property remained in petitioner's name...
no new title was issued in respondents' name. As a
matter of fact, what they did when petitioner
annotated her affidavit of loss... was to cause the
annotation of an "affidavit of non-loss" afterward.
Since a new title was never issued in respondents'
favor and, instead, title remained in petitioner's
name, the former never came within the coverage
and protection of the Torrens system, where the
issue of good or bad faith becomes relevant.
The jurisprudential bases for the CA's
pronouncement that there is a failure to state a cause
of action if there is no allegation in the complaint
that respondents were purchasers in bad faith...
involved complaints for annulment of new titles
issued to the buyers; they cannot apply to
petitioner's case where title remains in her... name.
Petitioner's case is to annul the agreement and deed
of sale based on the allegation that they are
forgeries, and that respondents were parties to the
fraud; since no new title was issued in respondents'
favor, there is no new title to annul. Indeed, if the
agreement and deed of... sale are forgeries, then
they are a nullity and convey no title.
FAILURE TO REG SALE
A cursory examination of the record will show that
petitioner's action does not appear to be groundless.
Their failure to register the unnotarized and undated
deed of... absolute sale is at the very least unusual; it
is contrary to experience. It is uncharacteristic of a
conscientious buyer of real estate not to cause the
immediate registration of his deed of sale as well as
the issuance of a new certificate of title in his name.

We cannot ascribe good faith to those who have not

shown any diligence in protecting their rights.

NEG PREGNANT

Even at the level of the CA, respondents admitted,

in their petition for certiorari, that they bought the
property not from petitioner, but from their "co-
defendants who had a defective title" - presumably
Perez and the impostor.

The above allegations in respondents' pleadings are

certainly revealing. They already knew petitioner's
identity and how she looked, having met her even
before the filing of the complaint - when petitioner
confronted them and they showed her the agreement
and deed of sale. Thus,... they should not have
referred to the supposed seller as "another person
herein named as 'Jane Doe' whose identity is yet to
be established who introduced herself as Ruby Ruth
Serrano" or "the person who introduced herself as
Ruby Ruth Serrano" if indeed it was... petitioner
herself who appeared and signed the agreement and
deed of sale in question. They should have
categorically alleged that they bought the property
from petitioner herself if indeed this was so. Their
ambiguous allegations constitute a negative
pregnant, which is in... effect an admission.

negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the

admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied.

It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the...

substantial facts alleged in the pleading.

Finally, petitioner's complaint... clearly states that in

the execution of the agreement and deed of absolute
sale, respondents and Perez acted in bad faith and
connived in the forgery.

i. SPOUSES YU HWA PING AND MARY
GAW, Petitioners vs. AYALA LAND, INC.,
Respondent
G.R. No. 173120
The titles of ALI are void due
to the erroneous technical
descriptions sourced from
void ab initio surveys
ALI essentially argues that the transfer certificate of
titles (TCTs) registered under its name cannot be
declared void simply because the survey conducted
on the subject land was not valid. It emphasizes that
the survey of the subject land is not part and parcel
of the TCTs, thus, it is immaterial whether the
survey suffered from any defect.
The argument fails.
Although a certificate of title serves as evidence of
an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein,10 it is not a conclusive proof of ownership.
It is a well-settled rule that ownership is different
from a certificate of title. The fact that a person was
able to secure a title in his name does not operate to
vest ownership upon him of the subject land.
Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens
System does not create or vest title, because it is not
a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title
is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the
particular property described therein. It cannot
bused to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor
can it be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at
the expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a
particular person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real property may be co-owned with
persons not named in the certificate, or that it may
be held in trust for another person by the registered
owner.11
One of the distinguishing marks of the Torrens
system is the absolute certainty of the identity of a
registered land. Consequently, the primary purpose
of the requirement that the land must first be
surveyed is to fix the exact or definite identity of the
land as shown in the plan and technical
description.12 It is imperative in an application for
original registration that the applicant submit to the
court, aside from the original or duplicate copies of
the muniments of title, a copy of a duly approved
survey plan of the land sought to be registered. The
survey plan is indispensable as it provides a
reference on the exact identity of the property.13
A survey plan precisely serves to establish the true
identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap
a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered
by a previous land registration, and to forestall the
possibility that it will be overlapped by a
subsequent registration of any adjoining land.14
Thus, if the survey plan is evidently erroneous, then
the exact and finite identity of the land cannot be
reflected in the technical description of the
certificate of title.
In Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals,15 the Court ruled that "it is well-
established that errors in the certificate of title that
relate to the technical description and location
cannot just be disregarded as mere clerical
aberrations that are harmless in character, but must
be treated seriously so as not to jeopardize the
integrity and efficacy of the Torrens system of
registration of real rights to property. Thus, when
the technical description appearing in the title is
clearly erroneous, the courts have no other
recourse but to order its cancellation and cause
the issuance of a new one that would conform to the
mutual agreement of the buyer and seller as laid
down in the deed of sale."
It was further discussed therein that the simple
possession of a certificate of title is not necessarily
conclusive of the holder's true ownership of all the
property described therein for said holder does not
by virtue of said certificate of title alone become
the owner of what has been either illegally or
erroneously included. It has been held by this
Court that "if a person or entity obtains a title which
includes by mistake or oversight land which cannot
be registered under the Torrens system or over
which the buyer has no legal right, said buyer does
not, by virtue of said certificate alone, become the
owner of the land illegally or erroneously included.
In fact, when an area is erroneously included in a
relocation survey and in the title subsequently
issued, the said erroneous inclusion is null and void
and of no effect. And on the rare occasion where
there is such an error, the courts may decree that the
certificate of title be cancelled and a correct one
issued to the buyer."16
Consequently, the invalidity of the survey affects
the technical description of the land, which is found
on the title. Glaring and substantial errors in the
technical description should not be simply
disregarded as trivial or formal errors because these
precisely affect the identity of the land. Regrettably,
never addressed are the numerous and manifest
mistakes in the identity of the purported lands
covered by the titles of ALI that will be discussed
below.
In Dizon v. Rodriguez17 and Republic v. Ayala y
Cia,18 the Court confronted the validity of the
surveys conducted on the lands to determine
whether the title was properly subdivided. It was
ruled therein that "subdivision plan Psd-27941 was
erroneous because it was "prepared not in
accordance with the technical descriptions in TCT
No. T-722 but in disregard of it, supports the
conclusion reached by both the lower court and the
Court of Appeals that Lots 49 and 1 are actually
part of the territorial waters and belong to the
State."19 Accordingly, the sole method for the
Court to determine the validity of the title was to
dissect the survey upon which it was sourced. As a
result, it was discovered that the registered titles
therein contained areas which belong to the sea and
foreshore lands.
In this case, the TCTs of petitioners originated from
Original Transfer Certificate (OCT) No. 8510,
which was based on survey plan Psu-25909 dated
March 17, 1921. On the other hand, the TCTs of
ALI originated from OCT No. 242, 244 and 1609,
which were based on survey plans Psu-47035 dated
October 21, 1925, Psu-80886 dated July 28, 1930,
and Psu-80886/SWO-20609 dated March 6, 1931.
As will be thoroughly discussed later, survey plans
Psu-47035, Psu-80886, Psu-80886/SWO-20609
contain numerous and glaring irregularities.
Consequently, as the surveys were marred with
blatant anomalies, the technical descriptions
contained in OCT No. 242, 244 and 1609 are also
void and erroneous. Verily, these technical
descriptions in the said certificate of titles do not
refer to a valid and exact portion of the lands. In
fact, as noted by the trial court, the lands therein
were described to be located in different places.
Further, the land surveyed in Psu-47035, Psu-
80886, Psu-80886/SWO-20609 patently overlaps
with the land surveyed in Psu-25909, even though
the latter was issued in an earlier date. Once a land
has been surveyed, it is highly irregular to conduct a
second survey to overlap with the same parcel of
land. Indeed, when the survey of the land is null and
void, the technical description of the land is also
null and void. As a result, the validity of OCT No.
242, 244 and 1609 cannot be upheld.
There were numerous
irregularities in the survey of
the land
 
As threshed out in the decision of the Court, the
surveys in OCT No. 242, 244 and 1609 contain
numerous irregularities that strikes out the validity
of these titles. The said irregularities are as follows:
First, Psu-25909 was conducted by a certain A.N.
Feliciano in favor of Andres Diaz and was approved
on May 26, 1921. Curiously, the subsequent surveys
of Psu-47035 for a certain Dominador Mayuga,
Psu-80886 for a certain Guico and
Psu-80886/SWO-20609 for a certain Yaptinchay,
were also conducted by A.N. Feliciano. It is dubious
how the same surveyor or agrimensor conducted
Psu-47035, Psu-80886 and Psu-80886/SWO-20609
even though an earlier survey on Psu-25909, which
the surveyor should obviously be aware, was
already conducted on the same parcel of land. Engr.
Pada, witness of the Spouses Yu, also observed this
irregularity and stated that this practice is not the
standard norm in conducting surveys.
Second, even though a single entity conducted the
surveys, the lands therein were described to be
located in different places. Psu-25909, the earliest
dated survey, indicated its location at Sitio Kay
Monica, Barrio Pugad Lawin, Las Piñas, Rizal,
while Psu-47035 and Psu-80886 stated their
locations at Sitio May Kokek, Barrio Almanza, Las
Piñas, Rizal, and Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las
Piñas, Rizal, respectively. Again, Engr. Pada
observed this peculiarity and pointed out that the
subject properties should have had the same
address. ALI did not provide an explanation to the
discrepancies in the stated addresses. Thus, it led
the CA to believe that the same surveyor indicated
different locations to prevent the discovery of the
questionable surveys over the same parcel of land.
Third, there is a discrepancy as to who requested
the survey of Psu-47035. The photocopy of Psu-
47035, as submitted by ALI, shows that it was done
for a certain Estanislao Mayuga. On the other hand,
the certified true copy of Psu-47035 depicts that it
was made for Dominador Mayuga. Once more,
Engr. Pada noticed this discrepancy on the said
survey. ALI, however, did not give any justification
on the diverging detail, which raises question as to
the authenticity and genuineness of Psu-47035.
Fourth, Psu-80886 does not contain the signature
of then Director of Lands, Serafin P. Hidalgo;
rather, the prefix "Sgd." was simply indicated
therein. As properly observed by the CA in its
February 8, 2005 decision, any person can place the
said prefix and it does not show that the Director of
Lands actually signed and gave his imprimatur to
Psu-80886. The absence of the approval of the
Director of Lands on Psu-80886 added doubt to its
legitimacy. The excuse proffered by ALI - that Psu-
80886 is regular and valid simply because land
registration proceedings were undertaken - is
insufficient to cure the crucial defect in the survey.
In University of the Philippines v. Rosario,20 it was
held that "[n]o plan or survey may be admitted in
land registration proceedings until approved by the
Director of Lands. The submission of the plan is a
statutory requirement of mandatory character.
Unless a plan and its technical description are duly
approved by the Director of Lands, the same are of
no value." Hence, the lack of approval by the
Director of Lands of Psu-80886 casts doubt on its
legality. It also affects the jurisdictional facts before
the land registration courts which relied on Psu-
80886 for registration.
In Del Rosario v. Republic,21 the Court emphasized
that the submission in evidence of the original
tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau
of Lands, in cases for application of original
registration of land is a mandatory requirement. The
reason for this rule is to establish the true identity of
the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of
land or a portion thereof already covered by a
previous land registration, and to forestall the
possibility that it will be overlapped by a
subsequent registration of any adjoining land.
Fifth, Psu-80886 was issued on July 28, 1930 but it
referred to a specific monument described as
B.L.L.M No. 4. According to the LMB-DENR, the
said monument was only established on November
27, 1937, more than seven years after Psu-80886
was issued.22 This discrepancy was duly noted in
the findings of the verification report and it was
affirmed by the testimony of Engr. Pada. Thus, both
the RTC of Las Piñas and the CA in its February 8,
2005 decision properly observed that it was highly
irregular for Psu-80886 to refer to B.L.L.M No. 4
because the said monument existed seven years
later.
The metes and bounds in the technical description
of the title are of utmost importance. It is well
settled that what defines a piece of titled property is
not the numerical data indicated as the area of the
land, but the boundaries or "metes and bounds" of
the property specified in its technical description as
enclosing it and showing its limits.23 Thus, if there
is an erroneous designation of the metes and bounds
as indicated in the survey due to a non-existent
monument, then such inaccurate data shall also be
reflected in the technical description of the
certificate of title.
Sixth, ALI attempted to explain this anomaly by
stating that Psu-80886 was amended by Psu-
80886/SWO-20609, a Special Work Order, in view
of the discrepancies of the former. While Psu-
80886/SWO-20609 is dated March 6, 1931, ALI
insists that it was actually conducted in 1937 and
approved in 1940. However, in its February 8, 2005
decision, the CA noted that said testimony crumbled
under cross-examination as ALI's witness, Engr.
Felino Cortez (Cortez), could not reaffirm the said
justification for Psu-80886's manifest error of
including a latter dated monument. Also, the Court
observed that ALI's other witness, Engr. Percival
Bacani, testified that he does not know why
B.L.L.M No. 4 was used in preparing Psu-80886
even though the said monument appears on all the
titles.24 Moreover, the alleged explanation provided
by ALI to justify the existence of B.L.L.M No. 4 in
Psu-80886 was not indicated at all in the
verification report and survey plan they submitted
before the RTC of Las Piñas. Accordingly, ALI did
not resolve the uncertainty surrounding the
reference to B.L.L.M No. 4 by Psu-80886 and it
seriously damages the validity of the said survey.
Seventh, ALI explained that Psu-80886/SWO-
20609 was undertaken to correct a discrepancy in
Psu-80886. Its witness, Engr. Cortez, confirmed that
Psu-80886/SWO-20609 was commenced to resolve
the mistake in the timeline. He added that the
timeline published in the notice of initial hearing in
the Official Gazette for Psu-80886 was different
from the approved plan in Psu-80886/SWO-20609.
He also noted some differences in the area of Psu-
80886 compared to Psu-80886/SWO-20609.25
These admissions show that Psu-80886 was flawed
from the very beginning. Yaptinchay merely
requested the conduct of Psu-80886/SWO-20609 in
order to resurrect or salvage the erroneous Psu-
80886 and to wrongfully acquire OCT No. 242. It
does not, however, erase the fact that Psu-80886,
from which ALI's titles originated, is marred with
irregularities. This is a badge of fraud that further
runs counter to the legitimacy of the surveys that
ALI relied upon.
Eight, the RTC of Las Piñas continuously observed
the irregularities in Psu-80886. It stated that "the
total area of the property covered by the document
bear many erasures, particularly two erasures as to
the total area in terms of number and one erasure
as to that total area in terms of unit of
measurement."26 Manifestly, no explanation was
provided why it was necessary to make erasures of
the crucial data in the survey regarding the total
area.
Ninth, the RTC of Las Piñas continued its
observations regarding Psu-80886's anomalies. It
added that "[a]n examination of the same reveals
that the lower right hand corner of the plan, which
bears the serial number Psu-80886, is manifestly
different from the main document in terms of the
intensity of its contrast, and that the change in the
intensity of the shading is abrupt as one examines
the document starting from the lower right-hand
corner to anywhere else in the same document.
Also, it is worth observing that the main document,
minus the lower right hand corner mentioned, does
not indicate anything to even suggest that it pertains
to plan Psu-80886. For these reasons, the contention
of the plaintiffs that this lower right-hand corner of
the plan appears to be a spurious attachment to the
main document, to make the main document look
like it is actually plan Psu-80886, has merit."27
These observations were based on the first-hand
examination of the surveys, verification reports, and
witnesses by the RTC of Las Piñas.
Tenth, as correctly emphasized by the CA in its
February 8, 2005 decision, the Supreme Court had
previously noted the defects surrounding Psu-80886
in the case of Guico v. San Pedro.28 The said case
involved the application of registration of Guico of
a tract of land covered by Psu-80886, subdivided
into eleven (11) lots, filed on November 4, 1930
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (CFI).
The said land originated from Pedro Lopez de Leon,
covered by Psu-16400. It was transferred to his son,
Mariano Lopez de Leon, and then one-third portion
thereof was conveyed to Guico. Several oppositors
appeared therein to assail Guico's application. On
August 19, 1935, the CFI ruled that only Lot Nos. 1,
2, 3, 6, 7 and 10 may be registered in the name of
Guico.
On appeal, the CA disposed the case in this wise:
Adjudicamos a Eduardo C. Guico los lotes 2 y 3 de
su plano y las porciones que quedan de las
adjudicadas a él por el Juzgado inferior y que no
están comprendidos en los terrenos reclamados por
Valeriano Miranda, Nicasio San Pedro, José
Dollenton, Gregorio Arciaga, Donato Navarro,
León Navarro, Dionisio Dollenton, Basilio
Navarro, Bernardo Mellama y Lorenzo Dollenton,
debiendo al efecto presentar un plano enmendado
debidamente aprobado por el Director de Terrenos,
confirmado así la decisión apelada en lo que
estuviera conforme, y revocandola en lo que no
estuviera.29
When translated, the text reads:
We adjudicate to Eduardo C. Guico Lots 2 and 3 of
his plan and the portions that remain adjudicated to
him by the lower court and that are not included in
the lands claimed by Valeriano Miranda, Nicasio
San Pedro, Jose Dollenton, Gregorio Arciaga,
Donato Navarro, Leon Navarro, Dionisio Dollenton,
Basilio Navarro, Bernardo Mellama, and Lorenzo
Dollenton, under the obligation to present an
amended properly approved plan to the Director
of Lands, confirming therefore the appealed
decision in what is consistent with this and
revoking it on what is not.30
Undeterred, Guico filed an appeal before the
Supreme Court alleging that the CA erred in
declaring that there was no imperfect title in favor
of Pedro Lopez de Leon, his predecessor-in-interest.
In its Decision dated June 20, 1941, the Court
dismissed the appeal of Guico and affirmed the CA
ruling. It was held that "la solicitud de Pedro Lopez
de Leon composicion con el Estado no fue
aprobada porque no pudo hacerse la medicion
correspondiente. " Its translation stated that the
application of Pedro Lopez de Leon regarding the
composition of the estate was not approved because
he was not able to submit the corresponding
measurements, referring to Psu-16400, from which
Psu-80886 was derived.
In addition, the Supreme Court noted that "while
abundant proof is offered concerning the filing of
the application for composition title by the original
possessor, the record nowhere exhibits compliance
with the operative requirement of said Section 45(a)
of Act. No. 2874, that 'such applicants or grantees
and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said
lands continuously since the filing of their
applications."'31
Consequently, the Court observed two major
irregularities in the application of Guico under Psu-
80886: (1) his predecessor-in-interest did not
submit any valid measurement of the estate from
which Psu-80886 was derived; and (2) that the
applicant or his grantees failed to occupy or
cultivate the subject land continuously. These
findings are substantial and significant as these
affect the validity of Psu-80886.
ALI insisted that Guico v. San Pedro should
actually be construed in their favor, because the
Court affirmed the ruling of the CA which awarded
Lot Nos. 2 and 3 to Guico, hence, Psu-80886 was
valid.
The Court is not persuaded.
A reading of the dispositive portion of the CA
decision in Guico v. San Pedro does not
categorically state that Lot Nos. 2 and 3 were
absolutely and completely awarded to Guico. The
award of the said lots was subject to the vital and
primordial condition or obligation to present to the
court an amended, properly approved, plan to the
Director of Lands. Evidently, the Court was not
satisfied with Psu-80886 because it lacked the
requisites for a valid survey. Thus, it required Guico
to secure an amended and correctly approved plan,
signed by the Director of Lands. The purpose of this
new plan was to confirm that the appealed decision
was consistent with the facts established therein.
The records, however, did not show that Guico
indeed secured an amended and properly approved
plan. Psu-80886/SWO-20609 obviously was not the
required amended order because a special work
order is different from an amended survey.32
Moreover, the said special work order was initiated
by Yaptinchay, and not Guico. The insufficiency of
Psu-80886 is evident in this decision.
Thus, as Guico did not subject Psu-80886 to a valid
amended approved plan, he was not awarded Lot
Nos. 2 and 3 for registration. It can be seen from
OCT Nos. 242, 244, and 1609 that Guico never
secured their registration because the Court
discovered the anomalous Psu-80886. The Court's
pronouncement in Guico v. San Pedro, although
promulgated more than half a century ago, must be
respected in accordance with the rule on judicial
adherence.
Lastly, the Court also agrees with the finding of the
CA in its February 8, 2005 decision that Psu-25909,
from which the titles of petitioners were sourced,
bears all the hallmarks of verity. It was established
that Andres Diaz was the very first claimant of the
subject property and was the proponent of Psu-
25909. The said survey clearly contained the
signatures of the surveyor and the Director of
Lands, as can be seen on its face. In stark contrast
with Psu-80886, which contained alterations and
erasures, Psu-25909 has none. The original ofPsu-
25909 was, likewise, on file with the Bureau of
Lands and a microfilm reproduction was readily
obtained from the file of the said office, unlike in
Psu-80886 and Psu-47909.
The RTC of Las Piñas shared this examination. It
ruled that Psu-25909 was a true copy of an official
document on file with the Bureau of Lands. It also
gave great weight and appreciation to the said
survey because no irregularity was demonstrated in
the preparation thereof. The trial court added that
Engr. Remolar, as the appropriate government
custodian and court appointed commissioner,
certified the authenticity of Psu-25909.
Psu-25909 bore all the hallmarks of verity
because it contains the signatures of the surveyor
and the Director of Lands, and it did not contain
any erasure or alterations thereon. Likewise, a
duly authenticated copy of Psu-25909 is readily
available in the Bureau of Lands.
In contrast, the Court cannot subscribe to the
finding of the CA in its June 19, 2006 decision that
the numerous defects in Psu-47909, Psu-80886 and
Psu-80886/SWO-20609 are "not enough to deprive
the assailed decree of registration of its conclusive
effect, neither are they sufficient to arrive at the
conclusion that the survey was definitely, certainly,
[and] conclusively spurious."33 The Court cannot
close its eyes to the blatant defects on the surveys
upon which the original titles of ALI were derived,
as reflected in their technical descriptions, simply
because its titles were registered. To allow these
certificates of title in the registration books, even
though these were sourced from invalid surveys and
contain erroneous technical descriptions, would
tarnish and damage the Torrens system of
registration, rather than uphold its integrity.
It is an enshrined principle in this jurisdiction that
registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A
certificate of title merely confirms or records title
already existing and vested. The indefeasibility of a
Torrens title should not be used as a means to
perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real
property. Good faith must concur with registration
because, otherwise, registration would be an
exercise in futility. A Torrens title does not furnish
a shield for fraud, notwithstanding the long-standing
rule that registration is a constructive notice of title
binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is
that if the registration of the land is fraudulent, the
person in whose name the land is registered holds it
as a mere trustee.34
When a land registration decree is marred by severe
irregularity that discredits the integrity of the
Torrens system, the Court will not think twice in
striking down such illegal title in order to protect
the public against scrupulous and illicit land
ownership. Thus, due to the numerous, blatant and
unjustifiable errors in Psu-47909, Psu-80886, and
Psu-80886/SWO-20609, these must be declared
void. Likewise, OCT Nos. 242, 244, and 1609, their
transfer certificates, and instruments of conveyances
that relied on the anomalous surveys, must be
absolutely declared void ab initio.
When there is an overlapping
boundary in the titles, a
verification survey must be
conducted
Another argument of ALI is that the Court should
have applied the rule that, in case of two certificates
of title purporting to include the same land, the
earlier date prevails.
The argument also fails.
As discussed in the Decision of the Court, the rule
that "in case of two certificates of title purporting to
include the same land, the earlier date prevails" is
not an absolute and conclusive rule; rather, it is
merely a general rule. This was first discussed in
Legarda v. Saleeby,35 as follows:
The question, who is the owner of land registered in
the name of two different persons, has been
presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In
some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has
been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by
express statutory provision. In others it has been
settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent
discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at
page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case
of two certificates of title, purporting to include the
same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the
land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or
only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. xxx
In successive registrations, where more than one
certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate
or interest in land, the person claiming under the
prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest;
and that person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is
derived directly or indirectly from the person who
was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in
respect thereof x x x.36
Justice Leonen asserts that the Decision of the Court
went against the doctrine of "Primus Tempora,
Portior Jure," or "First in Time, Stronger in Right."
This is because the mother title of the Spouses Yu's
predecessor-in-interest was issued more than two
(2) decades after those issued to ALI's predecessors-
in-interest, yet this did not prevent the Court from
upholding the later issued title over the earlier
issued one.
The rule on superiority, however, is not absolute.
The same case of Legarda v. Saleeby explains the
exception to the rule, viz.:
Hogg adds however that, "if it can be clearly
ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction
relating to written documents, that the inclusion of
the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a
mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding
the latter of the two certificates of title to be
conclusive."[37]
Accordingly, if the inclusion of the land in the
earlier registered title was a result of a mistake, then
the latter registered title will prevail. The ratio
decidendi of this exception is to prevent a title that
was earlier registered, which erroneously contained
a parcel of land that should not have been included,
from defeating a title that was later registered but is
legitimately entitled to the said land. It reinforced
the doctrine that "[r]egistering a piece of land under
the Torrens System does not create or vest title
because registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. A certificate of title is merely an
evidence of ownership or title over the particular
property described therein."38
Several jurists or authors on land registration affirm
that the general and the exceptional rule in Legarda
v. Saleeby. In his book, Land Registration and
Related Proceedings,39 Atty. Amado D. Aquino
explained that the principle of according superiority
to a certificate of title earlier in date cannot,
however, apply if it was procured through fraud or
was otherwise jurisdictionally flawed. Thus, if there
is a compelling and genuine reason to set aside the
rule on the superiority of earlier registered title, the
Court may look into the validity of the title bearing
the latter date of registration, taking into
consideration the evidence presented by the parties.
Similarly, in his book Property Registration Decree
and Related Laws,40 retired Court of Appeals
Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili affirmed that the
general rule – where two certificates purport to
include the same land, the earlier in date prevails –
is valid only absent any anomaly or irregularity
tainting the process of registration.41 He further
cites the exception in Legarda v. Saleeby that where
the inclusion of land in the certificate of prior date
is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by
holding the latter of the two certificates to be
conclusive. Indeed, a certificate of title is not
conclusive where it is the product of a faulty or
fraudulent registration.42
In Golloy v. Court of Appeals,43 there were two
conflicting titles with overlapping boundaries. The
first title was registered on March 1, 1918, while the
second title was registered on August 15, 1919.
Despite having been registered at a prior date, the
Court did not allow the earlier registered title of the
respondents to prevail because of the continuing
possession of the petitioners therein and the laches
committed by the respondents. Hence, the holder of
an earlier registered title does not, in all instances,
absolutely triumph over a holder of a latter
registered title.
To reiterate, the general rule is that in case of two
certificates of title purporting to include the same
land, the earlier date prevails. The exception to the
rule is that if the inclusion of the land in the earlier
registered title was a result of a mistake, then the
latter registered title will prevail.
When there are two registered
titles with overlapping or
conflicting boundaries, the
court must conduct a Indeed, in case there are two registered titles with
verification survey
Likewise, to subscribe to the argument of ALI – that
the rule on the earlier dated title is absolute – would
be absurd. It will limit the court to a mere
mechanical arbiter that will simply view the dates of
the two registered titles with overlapping
boundaries to determine the prevailing title.
The better approach would be for the court to order
the conduct of a verification survey on the titles
which have overlapping boundaries. In Cambridge
Realty and Resources Corp. v. Eridanus
Development, Inc.,44 it was ruled that a case of
overlapping of boundaries or encroachment depends
on a reliable, if not accurate, verification survey;
barring one, no overlapping or encroachment may
be proved successfully, for obvious reasons. The
first step in the resolution of such cases is for the
court to direct the proper government agency
concerned to conduct a verification or relocation
survey and submit a report to the court, or constitute
a panel of commissioners for the purpose. In that
case, the Court lamented that the trial court therein
did not order the conduct of a verification survey
and the appointment of geodetic engineers as
commissioners, to wit:
This is precisely the reason why the trial court
should have officially appointed a commissioner or
panel of commissioners and not leave the initiative
to secure one to the parties: so that a thorough
investigation, study and analysis of the parties' titles
could be made in order to provide, in a
comprehensive report, the necessary infom1ation
that will guide it in resolving the case completely,
and not merely leave the determination of the case
to a consideration of the parties' more often than not
self-serving evidence.45
Similarly, in Chua, et al. v. B.E. San Diego, Inc.,46
the Court ruled that in overlapping boundary
disputes, the verification survey must be actually
conducted on the very land itself. In that case, the
verification survey conducted was merely based on
the technical description of the defective titles. The
opinion of the surveyor lacked authoritativeness
because his verification survey was not made on the
land itself.
overlapping boundaries, the more prudent and
technical approach would be to conduct a
verification survey over the titles. After the
verification survey, the court would be given all the
necessary and technical analysis and data over the
two titles. At that point, the court can judiciously
and properly determine whether to apply (1) the
general rule that in case of two certificates of title
purporting to include the same land, the earlier date
prevails; (2) the exception that if the inclusion of
the land in the earlier registered title was a result of
a mistake, then the latter registered title will prevail.
In this case, the Court must commend the RTC of
Las Piñas for taking the correct procedure in
resolving such issue. When faced with the issue of
two registered titles with overlapping boundaries
based on their surveys and technical descriptions, it
issued an Order47 dated December 5, 1997, which
directed the parties to conduct a verification survey
pursuant to the prescribed rules. Engr. Veronica
Ardina-Remolar (Remolar), from the Bureau of
Lands of the DENR, was the court-appointed
commissioner who supervised and coordinated the
verification survey. Engrs. Rolando Nathaniel Pada
(Pada) and Alexander Ocampo (Ocampo) were the
geodetic engineers for the Spouses Yu; while Engr.
Lucal Francisco (Francisco) was the geodetic
engineer for ALI. They conducted actual
verification survey on April 5, 6, 7 and 16, 1998 and
June 8, 1998. Afterwards, Engr. Remolar submitted
her Report48 dated November 4, 1998, to the trial
court, which stated that there were overlapping
areas in the contested surveys. Likewise, Engrs.
Pada and Francisco submitted their Verification
Reports and Survey Plans,49 which were approved
by the DENR. Then, the parties presented their
respective witnesses.
The RTC of Las Piñas had a technical and accurate
understanding and appreciation of the overlapping
surveys of Psu-25909, Psu-47035, Psu-80886, and
Psu-80886/SWO-20609. In its Decision dated May
7, 2001, it ruled in favor of the petitioner Spouses
Yu and it discussed extensively its observations and
findings regarding the overlapping areas, to wit:
From the evidence on record, it appears that the
following plans were made on the dates and by the
surveyor specified herein:
Survey No. PSU-25909 March 17, 1921 A.N.
Feliciano
Survey No. PSU-47035 October 21, 1925 A.N.
Feliciano
Survey No. PSU-80886 July 28, 1930 A.N.
Feliciano
Survey No. SWO-20609 March 6, 1931 A.N.
Feliciano
Plan PSU-25909 (Exhibit "F") invoked by the
plaintiffs and the authenticity of which is certified
by appropriate government custodians including
Engineer Remolar, the court-designated
commissioner, appears to have been prepared on
March 17, 1921 for one Andres Diaz and recites the
following entries:
"THE ORIGINAL FIELD NOTES,
COMPUTATIONS AND PLAN OF THIS
SURVEY EXECUTED BY [A.N.] FELICIANO
HAVE BEEN CHECKED AND VERIFIED IN
THIS OFFICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
SECTIONS 1858 TO 1865, ACT 2711 AND ARE
HEREBY APPROVED MAY 26, 1921."
-and-
"This is to certify that this is a true and correct plan
of Psu-25909 as traced from the mounted paper of
plan Psu-25909 which is on file at T.R.S. Lands
Management Sector, N.C.R.
"This a true copy of the plan [as] requested by the
Chief Technical Records Section, as contained in a
letter dated February 15, 1989.
TEODORICO C. CALISTERIO
Chief, Topographic 7 Special Maps Section
Traced by: F. SUMAGUE
Checked by: A.O. VENZON (Sgd.) 4/28/89
Thus, the Court holds that plan PSU-25909
(Exhibit "F") is a true copy of an official
document on file with the Bureau of Lands and
is, therefore, entitled to great weight and
appreciation, there being no irregularity
demonstrated in the preparation thereof.
On the other hand, an examination of Plan PSU-
47035 (Exhibit "G") invites suspicion thereto. As
observed by Engineer Pada in his verification
survey report, the photocopy of plan PSU-47035
submitted by the defendant shows that the plan
appears to have been done for one Estanislao
Mayuga, while in the certified true copy of the
pertinent decree (Exhibit "HH"/Exhibit 20), it
appears that the same was done for a certain
Dominador Mayuga. Viewing this discrepancy in
the light of the fact that the plan for PSU-47035 was
undertaken on October 21, 1925, or more than four
years after the survey for plan PSU-25909 was
done, the same discrepancy leads the Court to
conclude that PSU-47035 is spurious and void.
The third plan enumerated above, plan PSU-80886
(Exhibit "II/Exhibit 29), prepared on July 28, 1930,
or more than five years since plan PSU-25909 was
done for Andres Diaz, also invites suspicion. An
examination of the same reveals that the lower
right-hand corner of the plan, which bears the serial
number PSU-80886, is manifestly different from the
main document in terms of the intensity of its
contrast, and that the change in the intensity of the
shading is abrupt as one examines the document
starting from the lower right-hand corner to
anywhere else in the same document. Also, it is
worth observing that the main document, minus the
lower right-hand corner mentioned, does not
indicate anything to even suggest that it pertains to
plan PSU-80886. For these reasons, the contention
of the plaintiffs that this lower right hand corner of
the plan appears to be a spurious attachment to the
main document to make the main document look
like it is actually plan PSU-80886, has merit.
Another discrepancy invites further suspicion
under the circumstances. The main document bears
what appears to be the actual signature of the
surveyor, Mr. A.N. Feliciano, while the lower right-
hand corner of the plan mentions only the name
"Serafin P. Hidalgo – Director of Lands" with the
prefix "Sgd." But without any actual signature. An
interesting query arises: Why would the document
bear an actual signature of the surveyor without
bearing the signature of the Director of Lands which
in essence is the more important signature for
authentication purposes?
Still another discrepancy is with respect to a
monument appearing in PSU-80886 (Exhibit "II").
At the upper off-right portion thereof are entries
referring to a monument more specifically described
as B.L.L.M. No. 4. According to Engineer Pada,
citing a certified document taken from the Land
Management Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, this monument
was established only on November 27, 1937 (TSN,
March 24, 2000, pp. 18-20) which is more than
seven years after PSU-80886 was undertaken. How
a monument which was established only in
November 1937 can actually exist in a plan made
on July 28, 1930 is absolutely incredible.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds good
reason to consider PSU-80886 (Exhibit "II" and 29),
relied upon by the defendant, spurious and void as
well:
The fourth and last plan mentioned is SWO-20609,
done on March 6, 1931.
It is admitted by the geodetic engineer of the
defendant that a specific work order (SWO) co-
exists with a survey plan, and that in particular,
SWO-20609 was undertaken in view of alleged
errors in plan PSU-80886 (TSN, February 16, 2001,
pp. 31-32). Therefore, SWO-20609 must be
evaluated in relation to plan PSU-80886. From this
perspective, the Court also notes that SWO-20609 is
attended with discrepancies thus rendering it devoid
of any credence.
For the record, in PSU-80886 (Exhibit "II"/Exhibits
29 and 30), the land concerned appears to have been
surveyed for one Eduardo C. Guico, while in PSU-
80886/SWO-20609 (Exhibit "H"/Exhibit 35), the
same land appears to have been surveyed for one
Alberto Yaptinchay. In addition, it is evident in
PSU-80886 (Exhibits 29 and 30) that vital entries
regarding the total area of the property covered by
the document bear many erasures, particularly two
erasures as to the total area in terms of number and
one erasure as to that total area in terms of unit of
measurement.
The Court likewise notes with suspicion the fact
that all four survey plans were purportedly
undertaken by one and the same surveyor, a Mr.
A.N. Feliciano. It seems extremely unusual why the
same A.N. Feliciano, who surveyed the same
property for Andres Diaz in 1921, would do so
again in 1925 with different results, and again in
1930 once more with different results, and still one
more time in 1931 with still different results. The
only reasonable and logical conclusion under these
telling circumstances is that the second, third and
last surveys corresponding to PSU-47035, PSU-
80886 and PSU-80886/SWO-20609 are all spurious
and void, too.
The Court went through the record of the case and
no satisfactory explanation has been offered by the
defendant regarding these discrepancies. Even the
documentary evidence presented by the defendant
offers no plausible reason for the Court to reject the
contentions of the plaintiffs. This all the more
strengthens the view of the Court to effect that PSU-
47035, PSU-80886 and PSU-80886/SWO-20609
are spurious and void ab initio. This view is also
strengthened by the credentials of Engineer Pada
whom the Court considers as a very credible
witness.
All in all, the Court is convinced that the title of
the plaintiffs to the properties in dispute is
superior over those invoked by the defendant.50
As discussed in the Decision of the Court, the trial
court was able to determine that the exception to
the rule is applicable – if the inclusion of the land
in the earlier registered title was a result of a
mistake, then the latter registered title will prevail –
because the verification survey showed that the
survey on the titles of ALI contained numerous
anomalies.
The case of Spouses Carpo v.
Ayala Land, Inc. does bar the
adjudication of this present
case
One argument raised for ALI is that the Court could
not anymore examine the validity of OCT No. 242
because it was already declared valid in Spouses
Carpo v. Ayala Land, Inc.51 (Spouses Carpo v.
ALI). Justice Leonen agrees that since the Court
already resolved the validity o£ OCT No. 242 and
1609 in the said case and Realty Sales v. IAC, then it
cannot be questioned.
The argument is unmeritorious.
In Spouses Carpo v. ALI, the contested titles were
TCT No. 296463, registered under the Spouses
Carpo, which was sourced from OCT No. 8575;
and TCT No. T-5333, registered under ALI, which
was sourced from OCT No. 242. Evidently, OCT
No. 242 is a vast tract of land and it borders several
other registered parcels of land. The Court ruled
therein that insofar as the contested lands are
concerned, TCT No. T-5333, which was sourced
from OCT No. 242, prevails over TCT No. 296463,
which was sourced from OCT No. 8575 because the
Spouses Carpo utterly failed to present evidence
regarding the irregularity of the issuance and survey
of OCT No. 242. Manifestly, the case therein was
only decided by the trial court on the basis of a
summary judgment. No verification survey was
conducted. Thus, insofar as TCT No. 296463 and
TCT No: T-5333 are concerned, the latter triumphs.
There is nothing therein which prevented any
adjudication on the validity of OCT No. 242 with
respect to other bordering titles aside from that of
OCT No. 8575.
In Realty Sales v. IAC, one of the contested titles
was TCT No. 2048, which was sourced from OCT
No. 1609. Again, these OCT Nos. 1609 and 242
cover a vast tract of land and it borders several other
registered parcels of land, thus, it was later on
divided into several parcels of land.
On the contrary, in this case, the contested titles are
TCT Nos. 287416, 287411, 287412, 39408 and
64549, registered under petitioners, which was
sourced from OCT No. 8510; and TCT Nos.
41325, 41263, 41262 and 41261, registered under
ALI, which was sourced from OCT No. 1609, 242
and 244. Accordingly, the contesting titles are
different from that of Spouses Carpo v. ALI and
Realty Sales v. IAC. Moreover, the present case only
adjudicates the title in favor of petitioners insofar
as they overlap with the erroneous titles of ALI
because the issue involves overlapping boundaries
in different registered titles. Thus, the present case
does not in any way affect the controversy between
TCT No. 296463 and TCT No. T-5333 in Spouses
Carpo v. ALI.
More importantly, in this case, there was a
presentation of evidence and a verification survey
was conducted between OCT No. 8510 and OCT
Nos. 1609, 242 and 244. After a rigorous study by
technical experts, it was determined that OCT Nos.
1609, 242 and 244 suffered from numerous
infirmities; while OCT No. 8510 bore the hallmarks
of validity.
In fine, there is nothing in Spouses Carpo v. ALI
and Realty Sales v. IAC that would prevent the
judgment of the Court in this present case as they
pertain to completely different subject matters.
A void title can always be attacked
In its last ditch attempt to overturn the Decision of
the Court, ALI reiterates that the Court cannot
anymore assail the validity of its titles because the
cause of action of petitioners has prescribed.
The argument likewise fails.
As discussed in the Decision, between OCT No.
8510 and OCT Nos. 1609, 242 and 244, latter titles
are null and void due to the invalid surveys and
technical descriptions. It is a well-settled rule that a
void title cannot give rise to a valid title.52 Further,
an action to declare the nullity of a void title does
not prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well as
to collateral attack.53
In certain instances, even an action for
reconveyance involving a void title does not
prescribe. Uy v. Court of Appeals54 remarkably
explained the prescriptive periods of an action for
reconveyance depending on the ground relied upon,
to wit:
The law creates the obligation of the trustee to
reconvey the property and its title in favor of the
true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of
PD No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil Code
with Article 1144 (2) of the Civil Code, the
prescriptive period for the reconveyance of
fraudulently registered real property is ten (10)
years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title. This ten-year prescriptive period
begins to run from the date the adverse party
repudiates the implied trust, which repudiation takes
place when the adverse party registers the land. An
exception to this rule is when the party seeking
reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust
is in actual, continuous and peaceful possession of
the property involved. Prescription does not
commence to run against him because the action
would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title,
an action that is imprescriptible.
The foregoing cases on the prescriptibility of
actions for reconveyance apply when the action is
based on fraud, or when the contract used as basis
for the action is voidable. Under Article 1390 of the
Civil Code, a contract is voidable when the consent
of one of the contracting parties is vitiated by
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or
fraud. When the consent is totally absent and not
merely vitiated, the contract is void. An action for
reconveyance may also be based on a void
contract. When the action for reconveyance is
based on a void contract, as when there was no
consent on the part of the alleged vendor, the
action is imprescriptible. The property may be
reconveyed to the true owner, notwithstanding the
TCTs already issued in another's name. The
issuance of a certificate of title in the latter's favor
could not vest upon him or her ownership of the
property; neither could it validate the purchase
thereof which is null and void. Registration does not
vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our
land registration laws do not give the holder any
better title than what he actually has. Being null and
void, the sale produces no legal effects whatsoever.
Whether an action for reconveyance prescribes or
not is therefore determined by the nature of the
action, that is, whether it is founded on a claim of
the existence of an implied or constructive trust, or
one based on the existence of a void or inexistent
contract. x x x.55
Thus, petitioners may always attack the validity of
ALI's void title. Accordingly, in this case, the
Spouses Yu sought to reconvey to them once and
for all the titles over the subject properties. To
prove that they had a superior right, they questioned
the validity of the surveys which were the bases of
OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609, the origin of ALI's
TCTs. Moreover, they also sought to recover the
possession that was clandestinely taken away from
them. Thus, as the subject matter of this case is the
ownership and possession of the subject properties,
the Spouses Yu's complaint is an action for
reconveyance, which is not prohibited by Section 38
of Act No. 496. The title under OCT Nos. 242, 244
and 1609, cannot be transferred or conveyed to any
person because it is a void title. Hence, ALI cannot
acquire a lawful title because these were sourced
from OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609, and the said
void title can always be attacked, whether directly
or collaterally.
Likewise, it must be noted that the present action
involves two consolidated petitions: the petition of
the Spouses Yu and the petition of the heirs of the
Spouses Diaz. Glaringly, ALI never questioned the
timeliness of the petition of the heirs of the Spouses
Diaz because the action was filed within the
prescriptive period under Section 38 of Act No.
496, as amended.56 The action of the heirs of the
Spouses Diaz originated when the OCT No. 8510
was issued on May 19, 1970. Then, within the one-
year period, on May 17, 1971, CPJ Corporation,
then owner of the land covered by TCT No. 190713,
which originated from OCT No. 242, filed an action
for review of the decree of registration against the
Spouses Diaz. Accordingly, the RTC and the CA
considered the case because it was timely filed.
Necessarily, the Court can also adjudicate the merits
of the case with respect to OCT No. 8510, issued in
the name of the Spouses Diaz.
Unfortunately, ALI cannot be considered an
innocent purchaser for value of the subject
properties under OCT Nos. 1609, 242 and
244.1âшphi1 As discussed by the RTC of Las
Piñas, when ALI purchased the subject lots from
their predecessors-in-interest in 1988, the titles bore
notices of the pending cases and adverse claims
sufficient to place it on guard. In the TCTs of ALI,
the notices of lis pendens indicated therein were
sufficient notice that the ownership of the properties
were being disputed.
Evidently, ALI cannot invoke. mere rules of
technicality to hide the inescapable invalidity of
their titles, which were sourced from OCT Nos.
1609, 242 and 244 vis-à-vis the titles of petitioners,
which were sourced from OCT No. 1609.
To recall, ownership is different from a certificate
of title. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of
ownership or title over the particular property
described therein, and it cannot be used to protect a
usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a
shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it
permit one to enrich himself at the expense of
others.58 Thus, the Court, in its July 26, 2017
Decision, allowed the action of the Spouses Yu
because it is an action for reconveyance that attacks
the right of ownership of ALI over the land,
resulting into void contracts of conveyances. As
discussed in the said Decision, between OCT No.
8510 and OCT Nos. 1609, 242 and 244, the latter
titles are null and void due to the invalid surveys
and technical descriptions. It is settled that a void
title cannot give rise to a valid title,59 and that an
action to declare the nullity of a void title does not
prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well as to
collateral attack.60