Case Digest Compilation Succession 2021 2022 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CASE TITLE PAGE

NO.
GENERAL PROVISIONS
INOCENCIO V HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE
G.R. NO. 201787, SEPTEMBER 25, 2013……………………......... 1
DKC HOLDINGS V CA
G.R. NO. 118248, APRIL 05, 2000………………………………......... 2
WILLS IN GENERAL
DY YIENG SEANGIO ET AL V HON. AMOR A. REYES
G.R. NO. 140371-72, NOVEMBER 27, 2006 ……………………….. 3
FORMS OF WILLS
PAYAD V TOLENTINO
G.R. NO. 42258, MAY 09, 1936 ……………………………………...... 4
GARCIA V LACUESTA
G.R. NO. 4067, NOVEMBER 29, 1951……………………………....... 5
BARUT V CABACUNGAN
G.R. NO. 6285, FEBRUARY 15, 1912………………...……………..... 6
ICASIANO V ICASIANO
G.R. NO. 18979, JUNE 30, 1964………………………....…………...... 7
IN RE: WILL OF ANDRADA

42 PHIL. 180............................................................................... 9
CARGO V CARGO
G.R. NO. 5826, APRIL 29, 1953.................................................. 10
JAVELLANA V LEDESMA
G.R NO. 7179, JUNE 30, 1955......................................................... 11
CRUZ V VILLASOR
54 SCRA 31....................................................................................... 12
YAP TUA V YAP KA KUAN

27 PHIL. 579 (1914)......................................................................... 14
ABANGAN V ABANGAN
40 PHIL. 476 (1919)........................................................................ 16
LOPEZ V LIBORO
81 PHIL. 429 (1948)........................................................................ 17
GARCIA V LACUESTA
90 PHIL. 489 (1951)........................................................................ 18
TABOADA V ROSAL
G.R. NO. 36033, NOVEMBER 05, 1982......................................... 19
NERA V RIMANDO
18 PHIL. 450 (1911)......................................................................... 20
DE GALA V GONZALES AND ONA

G.R. NO. 30289, MARCH 26, 1929................................................. 21
JABONETA V GUSTILLO
G.R. NO. 1641, JANUARY 19, 1906................................................. 22
VALMONTE V ORTEGA
G.R. NO. 157451, DECEMBER 16, 2005......................................... 23
AZUELA V CASTILLO
G.R. NO. 122880, APRIL 12, 2006.................................................. 25
IN RE: WILL OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ ET AL.,

G.R NO. 189982, NOVEMBER 12, 2012......................................... 27
LABRADOR V CA
184 SCRA 170................................................................................... 29
AJERO V CA
236 SCRA 488.................................................................................. 30
KALAW V RELOVA
132 SCRA 237................................................................................... 32
PROBATE OF WILLS
NUGUID V NUGUID
G.R. NO. L-23445, JUNE 23, 1996.................................................. 34
INSTITUTION OF HEIRS
JLT AGRO, INC. V BALANSANG

G.R. NO. 141882, MARCH 11, 2005................................................ 36
MANINANG V CA
G.R. NO. 57848, JUNE 19, 1982..................................................... 38
NUGUID V NUGUID
G.R. NO. L-23445 JUNE 23, 1996................................................... 39
NERI V AKUTIN
G.R. NO. 47799, JUNE 13, 1941...................................................... 41
LEGITIME
EDROSO V SABLAN
25 PHIL. 296 (1913)......................................................................... 42
PADURA V BALDOVINO
104 PHIL. 1065................................................................................ 44
SIENES V ESPARCIA
1 SCRA 750 (1961)............................................................................ 46
FLORENTINO V FLORENTINO
40 PHIL. 460................................................................................... 48
DISINHERITANCE
RAMON S. CHING V HON. JANSEN RODRIGUEZ
G.R. NO. 192828, NOVEMBER 28, 2011....................................... 50
DY YIENG SEANGIO ET AL V HON. AMOR A. REYES

G.R. NO. 140371-72, NOVEMBER 27, 2006................................... 51
RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION
DIAZ V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. NO. 66574 FEBRUARY 21, 1990............................................. 52
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE

INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO SUNTAY
G.R. NO. 183053, JUNE 16, 2010.................................................. 54
DELA PUERTA V CA
G.R. NO. 77867 FEBRUARY 06, 1990............................................ 56
RESCISSION AND NULLITY OF PARTITION
ARELLANO V PASCUAL
G.R. NO. 189776 DECEMBER 15, 2010.......................................... 59
GENERAL PROVISIONS
INOCENCIO V. HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE

GR No. 201787, September 25, 2013
FACTS:
Hospicio de San Jose (HDSJ) leased a parcel of land to German Inocencio

(German). The lease contract was effective for a period of one year, and was
renewed for one-year periods several times. In the last written contract, Section 6
of the Lease contract provide that the contract is non-transferrable unless prior
consent of the lessor is obtained. Meanwhile, German constructed two buildings
on the parcel of land which he subleased. He also designated his son, Ramon
Inocencio (Ramon) to administer the said property. German passed away but
Ramon did not notify HDSJ of German’s death. Ramon collected the rentals from
the sublesses and paid rentals to HDSJ, and the taxes on the property. However,
HDSJ notified Ramon, through its representative, that HDSJ is terminating and
not renewing the lease contract.
HDSJ then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Ramon and his
sublesees, alleged that Ramon and his sublessees have been illegally occupying the
leased premises. The MeTC ruled in favor of HDSJ and held that the contract of
lease cannot be transmitted to Ramon as German’s heir because of the stipulation
in Section 6. On appeal, the RTC dismissed the appeal and affirmed in to the
decision of the MeTC. It ruled that even before the termination of the contract,
Ramon had no right to sublease the said property due to the intransferability clause
in the contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sublease contracts are transmissible upon the death of
German
HELD:
Yes. Lease contracts, by their nature, are not personal. The general rule is
lease contracts survive the death of the parties and continue to bind the heirs
except if the contract states otherwise. Section 6 of the Lease contract refers to
transfers inter vivos and not transmissions mortis causa. What Section 6 seeks to
avoid is for the lessee to substitute a third party in place of the lessee without the
lessor’s consent. The death of German did not terminate the lease contract with
HDSJ but instead continued with Ramon as the lessee. Thus, Ramon had a right
to sublease the premises since the lease contract did not contain any stipulation
forbidding subleasing. Hence, the sublease contracts executed by Ramon were
valid.
1
DKC HOLDINGS CORP V. CA
GR No. 118248, April 05, 2000
FACTS:
DKC entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy with Encarnacion
Bartolome, whereby DKC was given the option to lease or lease with purchase the
subject land, which option must be exercised within a period of two years counted
from the signing of the Contract. The contract also provided that in case DKC chose
to lease the property, it may take actual possession of the premises. In such an
event, the lease shall be for a period of six years, renewable. DKC regularly paid the
monthly rent provided for in the contract to Encarnacion until her death.
Thereafter, DKC coursed its payment to Victor Bartolome (Victor), being the sole
heir. However, Victor refused to accept these payments. Then, DKC served upon
Victor a notice that it was exercising its option to lease the property, tendering their
rent. Again, Victor refused to accept the tendered payment and to surrender
possession of the property to DKC.
DKC then filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against
Victor and the Register of Deeds to the RTC. The RTC dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, the decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether the Contract of Lease with option to buy is binding to Victor
HELD:
Yes.
Heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest

except when the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by (1) their nature; (2) stipulation; or (3) provision of law.
In the case at bar, there is neither contractual stipulation, nor legal

provision making the rights and obligations under the contract intransmissible.
More importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations are by their nature
transmissible.
2
WILLS IN GENERAL
SEANGIO V. REYES
GR No. 140371-72, November 27, 2006
FACTS:
A petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo
Seangio. However, in the will, it only contained an alleged act of disinheritance of
his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else. The RTC dismissed the petition for
probate.
ISSUE:
Whether the Kasulatan sa Pag-alis ng Mana is a valid will
HELD:
Yes. A holographic will must be entirely written, dated and signed by the
hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no form, and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Segundo’s document, although it may
initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the
formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed
by the hand of Segundo. An intent to dispose mortis cause can be clearly deduced
from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative
disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an
act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would
succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
It is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator,

expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized
as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to
ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the
testator is contrary to law, morals, public police that it cannot be given effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in
the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than
the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding
the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard,
the court is convinced that the document was intended by Segundo to be his last
testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a
holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given
effect. The Kasulatan unmistakable showed Segundo’s intention of excluding his
eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons he cited.
3
FORMS OF WILLS
PAYAD V. TOLENTINO
GR No. 42258, September 5, 1936
FACTS:
Leoncia Tolentino, assisted by Atty. Almario, placed her thumb mark on

each and every page of the questioned will and that said attorney merely wrote her
name to indicate the place where she placed her thumbmark. In other words, Atty.
Almario did not sign for the testatrix. She signed by placing her thumbmark on
each and every page.
A petition for probate was initiated but was denied on the ground that the
attestation clause was defective. The attestation clause did not conform with the
requirements of the law in not stating that Leoncia caused Atty. Almario to write
her name at her express direction.
ISSUE:
Whether the attestation clause was defective
HELD:
Yes.
It was not necessary that the attestation clause in question should state that
Leoncia requested Atty. Almario to sign her name inasmuch as Leoncia signed the
will in accordance with law. She signed by placing her thumb mark on each and
every page of the will. A statute requiring the will to be signed is satisfied if the
signature is made by the testator’s mark. (De Gala v. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil
104,108)
4
GARCIA V. LACUESTA
GR. No. L-4067, November 29, 1951
FACTS:
Antonio Mercado made a will dated January 3, 1943. The will was written
in the Ilocano dialect. It appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier
who wrote the name of Antero, followed by “a ruego del testator” (express direction
of the testator) and the name of Florentino Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged to
have written a cross immediately after his name. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the Court of First Instance and ruled that the attestation clause is fatally
defective.
ISSUE:
Whether the attestation clause is fatally defective
HELD:
Yes.
A mere sign of the cross cannot be likened to a thumb mark. The cross does
not have the trustworthiness of a thumb mark. Hence, not valid.
Where the cross appearing on the will is not the usual signature of the
testator or even one of the ways by which he signed his name, that cross cannot be
considered a valid signature.
When the testator expressly caused another to sign the former’s name, this
fact must be recited in the attestation clause Otherwise, the will is fatally defective.
5
BARUT v CABACUNGAN
G.R. No. L-6285 February 15, 1912
FACTS:
The will of Maria Solomon was applied for probate by Pedro Barut. It was
stated in the will that the testatrix is unable to read or write. Thus, it has been read
to her by Ciriaco Concepcion and Timotea Inoselda. It was also stated that testatrix
had instructed Severo Agayan, one of the instrumental witnesses, to sign her name
to it as testatrix.
The lower court denied the probate because the supposed handwriting of Severo
Agayan who signed the name of the testatrix look more like the handwriting of one
of the other instrumental witnesses.
ISSUE:
Was the dissimilarity in handwriting sufficient to deny probate of the will?
HELD:
NO. The mere dissimilarity in writing is not sufficient to overcome the

uncontradicted testimony of all the witnesses to the will that the signature of the
testatrix was written by Severo Agayan at her request and in her presence and in
the presence of all the witnesses to the will. It is immaterial who writes the name
of the testatrix provided it is written at her request and in her presence and in the
presence of all the witnesses to the execution of the will.
Also, with respect to the validity of the will, it is unimportant whether the person
who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or not. It may be wise as a
practical matter that the one who signs the testator's name signs also his own; but
that it is not essential to the validity of the will. The main thing to be established in
the execution of the will is the signature of the testator. If that signature is proved,
whether it be written by himself or by another at his request, it is nonetheless valid.
6
INCASIANO v. INCASIANO
Gr no. 18979, June 30, 1964
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that the late Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and
testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa Icasiano attested
by three instrumental witnesses and acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said
three instrumental witnesses on the same date before a Notary Public.
The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered
simultaneously with the filing of the petition and marked as Exhibit "A" consists of
five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain the
signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page 3
thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition
and marked as Exhibit "A-1" is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting
witnesses in each and every page.
The testimony presented by the proponents of the will tends to show that
the original of the will and its duplicate were subscribed at the end and on the left
margin of each and every page thereof by the testatrix herself and attested and
subscribed by the three mentioned witnesses in the testatrix's presence and in that
of one another as witnesses (except for the missing signature of attorney Natividad
on page 3 of the original); that pages of the original and duplicate of said will were
duly numbered; that the attestation clause thereof contains all the facts required
by law to be recited therein and is signed by the aforesaid attesting witnesses; that
the will is written in the language known to and spoken by the testatrix that the
attestation clause is in a language also known to and spoken by the witnesses.
Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page 3 of the original,
admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same,
but affirmed that page 3 was signed in his presence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of one of the witnesses to sign a page of the will
fatal to its validity
HELD:
No. The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page
of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing,
is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of
this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did
7
sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of
the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three
witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize
the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct
she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the
testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or
deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full
observance of the statutory requisites. The failure of witness Natividad to sign page
3 was entirely through pure oversight as shown by his own testimony as well as by
the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every
page.
8
In Re Will of the Deceased Lucina Andrada
G.R. No. 16008, September 29, 1921
FACTS:
Lucila Andrada died on June 5, 1919 and thereafter a petition was filed by
Lucila Arce for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the deceased. In the
document presented before the court, the attestation clause is incorporated in the
will itself as its last paragraph and does not state the number of sheets or pages
upon which the will is written, though it does state that the testator and the
instrumental witnesses signed on every page.
The judge denied probate on the ground that the purported will does not
conform to Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Last Will and Testament is valid.
HELD:
No.
The defect in the attestation clause is fatal.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly states that the attestation
clause shall state the number of sheets or pages used, the evident purpose being to
safeguard the document from the possibility of the interpolation of additional
pages or omission of some of the pages actually used.
Hence, the will is invalid.
9
CAGRO V. CAGRO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-5826, April 29, 1953
FACTS:
Vicente Cagro died on February 14, 1949 and thereafter a petition was filed
by Jesusa Cagro for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the deceased. In
the document presented before the court, the signatures of the instrumental
witnesses do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page
containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left margin.
The judge admitted the will to probate, but the oppositors alleged the will
to be fatally defective because its attestation clause is not signed by the
instrumental witnesses.
Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
HELD:
No.
The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution

of the will required by law to be made by the instrumental witnesses, and it must
necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be
considered an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the
bottom thereof negates their participation.
The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin do not

constitute compliance with the law. If an attestation clause not signed by the three
witnesses at the bottom thereof be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add
such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator
and any or all of the witnesses.
Hence, the will is invalid.
10
JAVELLANA V. LEDESMA
GR no. 7179, June 30, 1955
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance of Iloilo admitted to probate the documents as

the testament and codicil duly executed by the deceased Da. Apolinaria Ledesma
Vda. de Javellana, on 1950 and 1952 respectively. The contestant is the sister and
nearest surviving relative of said deceased. She appealed from the decision,
insisting that the said exhibits were not executed in conformity with law.
The codicil was executed after the enactment of the new Civil Code, and,
therefore, had to be acknowledged before a notary public (Art. 806). The
instrumental witnesses (who happen to be the same ones who attested the will of
1950) asserted that after the codicil had been signed by the testatrix and the
witnesses at the San Pablo Hospital, the same was signed and sealed by notary
public Gimotea on the same occasion. On the other hand, Gimotea affirmed that
he did not do so, but brought the codicil to his office, and signed and sealed it there.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the notary signed the certification of acknowledgment in the

presence of the testatrix and the witnesses affect the validity of the codicil
HELD:
No. The new Civil Code does not require that the signing of the testator,
witnesses and notary should be accomplished in one single act. A comparison of
Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code reveals that while testator and witnesses
sign in the presence of each other, all that is thereafter required is that "every will
must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses"
(Art. 806); i.e., that the latter should avow to the certifying officer the authenticity
of their signatures and the voluntariness of their actions in executing the
testamentary disposition. Article 806 of the new Civil Code does not contain words
requiring that the testator and the witnesses should acknowledge the testament on
the same day or occasion that it was executed.
11
CRUZ vs VILLASOR
54 SCRA 31
FACTS:
Petitioner Agapita N. Cruz, the surviving spouse of the late Valente Z. Cruz
opposed the allowance of the will, alleging the will was executed through fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was
execute without the testator having been fully informed of the content thereof,
particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the supposed last will
and testament was not executed in accordance with law.
Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, one of them, Atty. Angel H.

Teves, Jr. is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed
to have been acknowledged. As the third witness is the notary public himself,
petitioner argues that the result is that only two witnesses appeared before the
notary public to acknowledge the will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the supposed last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz was
executed in accordance with law, particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil
Code, the first requiring at least 3 credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the
will, and the second requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the
will before a notary public
HELD:
NO.
The Court held that the last will and testament in question was not executed
in accordance with law. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged
cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot
acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before
means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and ‘before’ means in front
of or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness were the
notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed
the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his
personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his
participation in the making of the will.
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one the attesting and
acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting
12
witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of Article
805 be requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806
which requires that the testator and the required number of witnesses must appear
before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The result would be, as has been
said, that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public for or that purpose.
13
YAP TUA v. YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA KUAN
G.R. No. 6845 September 1, 1914
FACTS:
Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua, presented a petition
in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, asking that the will of Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong be admitted to probate. Accompanying said petition and
attached thereto was the alleged will of the deceased. The will was signed by the
deceased, as well as Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo Paez.
Gabriel La O, as guardian ad litem of Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, appeared

in court and presented a motion in which he alleged that the will which was
admitted to probate by order of the court was null, for the following reasons:
(a) Because the same had not been authorized nor signed by the witnesses
as the law prescribes.
(b) Because at the time of the execution of the will, the said Tomasa Elizaga
Yap Caong was not then mentally capacitated to execute the same, due
to her sickness.
(c) Because her signature to the will had been obtained through fraud and
illegal influence upon the part of persons who were to receive a benefit
from the same, and because the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had no
intention of executing the same.
Allegedly, Tomasa was in another room different from that in which the will
was written and the will was not written in the presence of Tomasa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requirement of having the will signed by the testator in
the presence of the witnesses was met.
HELD:
Yes. A plan of the room or rooms in which the will was signed was presented
as proof and it was shown that there was but one room; that one part of the room
was one or two steps below the floor of the other; that the table on which the
witnesses signed the will was located upon the lower floor of the room. It was also
shown that from the bed in which Tomasa was lying, it was possible for her to see
the table on which the witnesses signed the will.
While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the same in
the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of
14
each other, as well as in the presence of the one making the will, yet, nevertheless,
the actual seeing of the signatures made is not necessary. It is sufficient if the
signatures are made where it is possible for each of the necessary parties if they
desire to see, may see the signatures placed upon the will.
15
ABANGAN V. ABANGAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-13431, November 12, 1919
FACTS:
Ana Abangan died on July 1916 and thereafter a petition was filed by
Gertrudis Abangan for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the deceased.
The document presented before the court consists of only two sheets. The first
contains all the dispositions of the testator duly signed at the bottom by Martin
Montalban, in the name and under the instruction of the testator, and by three
witnesses. The second contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the
bottom by the said witnesses. Neither of the sheets is signed on the left margin by
the testator or the instrumental witnesses, nor numbered by letters.
The judge admitted the will to probate, but the oppositors alleged the will
to be fatally defective because it does not conform to Act No. 2645.
Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes.
Act No. 2645 requires that each and every sheet of the will should be signed
on the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other
to avoid the substitution or removal of any of the sheets, thereby changing the
testator’s dispositions.
However, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet
only and signed at the bottom thereof by the testator and the instrumental
witnesses, and the attestation clause is contained in another sheet signed also at
the bottom by the instrumental witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be
further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged. The
object of the statute is already satisfied because the substitution or removal of any
sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.
Hence, the will is valid.
16
LOPEZ V. LIBORO
G.R. No. L-1787, August 27, 1948
FACTS:
Don Sixto Lopez died on March 3, 1947 and thereafter a petition was filed
by Jose Lopez for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the deceased. The
document presented before the court consists of two pages, each of which is written
on one side of a separate sheet. The first sheet is not paged either in letters or in
Arabic numerals.
The judge admitted the will to probate, but the oppositor alleged the will to
be fatally defective because it does not conform to the formalities prescribed by
law.
Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes.
The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is to guard against
fraud and to afford means of preventing the substitution or removal of any of its
pages.
In this case, the unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by
the internal sense of its contents in relation to the contents of the second page.
Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption “TESTAMENTO”, the
invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full use of his
testamentary faculty, all of which logically precede the direction of the testator’s
property. The object of the statute is already satisfied because the omission to put
a page number on the first sheet is supplied by other forms of identification more
trustworthy than the convenient numerical words or characters.
Hence, the will is valid.
17
GARCIA V. LACUESTA
GR. No. L-4067, November 29, 1951
FACTS:
Antonio Mercado made a will dated January 3, 1943. The will was written
in the Ilocano dialect. It appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier
who wrote the name of Antero, followed by “a ruego del testator” (express direction
of the testator) and the name of Florentino Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged to
have written a cross immediately after his name. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the Court of First Instance and ruled that the attestation clause is fatally
defective.
ISSUE:
Whether the attestation clause is fatally defective
HELD:
Yes.
A mere sign of the cross cannot be likened to a thumb mark. The cross does
not have the trustworthiness of a thumb mark. Hence, not valid.
Where the cross appearing on the will is not the usual signature of the
testator or even one of the ways by which he signed his name, that cross cannot be
considered a valid signature.
When the testator expressly caused another to sign the former’s name, this
fact must be recited in the attestation clause Otherwise, the will is fatally defective.
18
TABOADA V. ROSAL
G.R. No. L-36033, November 5, 1982
FACTS:
Petitioner Apolonio Taboada filed a petition for probate of the will of the
late Dorotea perez. The will was written in Cebuano-Visayan dialect. The will
consisted of two pages. The first page contains all the testamentary dispositions of
the testator and was signed at the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix alone
and at the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page
consisted of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment was signed at the end
of the attestation clause by the three witnesses and at the left hand margin by the
testatrix.
The trial court disallowed the will for want of formality in its execution
because the will was signed at the bottom of the page solely by the testatrix, while
the three witnesses only signed at the left hand margin of the page. The judge
opined that compliance with the formalities of the law required that the witnesses
also sign at the end of the will because the witnesses attest not only the will itself
but the signature of the testatrix.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is void for failure to state the number of pages used
in the will.
RULING:
NO. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this
case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed of
only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. [T]he
first page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by
the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at
the left margin. The other page which is marked as “Pagina dos” comprises the
attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that
“This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this page”.
19
NERA VS. RIMANDO
G.R. No. L-5971, February 27, 1911
FACTS:
The subject will was executed in a small room wherein witness Javellana
signed the document, Jaboneta was outside, eight or ten feet away but was actually
and physically present that the latter could see everything that took place by merely
casting his eyes in the proper direction and without any physical obstruction to
prevent his doing so.
The trial court did not consider the determination of the issue as to the
position of the witness as of vital importance in determining the case. It agreed
with the ruling in the case of Jaboneta v. Gustillo that the alleged fact being that
one of the subscribing witnesses was in the outer room while the signing occurred
in the inner room, would not be sufficient to invalidate the execution of the will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the notarial will is void for failure of the instrumental
witnesses to see each other sign the will.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that the phrase “in the presence” required by
law simply means that position of the parties with relation to each other at the
moment of the subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each
other sign if they choose to do so. The question whether the testator and the
subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument “in the presence” of
each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast
upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that
moment existing conditions and their position with relation to each other were
such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen
each other sign.
20
SERAPIO DE GALA VS. GONZALES, ET AL
GR No. 30289 dated March 26, 1929
FACTS:
Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, a niece of

Severina, designated as executrix. The husband of the deceased( Severina) and her
nephew contended that the will is invalid because it does not appeared in the
attestation clause that the testatrix signed by thumbmark.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid.
HELD:
The will is valid. As will be seen, it is not mentioned in the attestation clause
that the testatrix signed by thumb-mark, but it does there appear that the signature
was affixed in the presence of the witnesses, and the form of the signature is
sufficiently described and explained in the last clause of the body of the will. It
maybe conceded that the attestation clause is not artistically drawn and that,
standing alone, it does not quite meet the requirements of the statute, but taken in
connection with the last clause of the body of the will, it is fairly clear and
sufficiently carries out the legislative intent; it leaves no possible doubt as to the
authenticity of the document.
21
GERMAN JABONETA vs. RICARDO GUSTILO, ET AL.,
No. 19 G.R. No. 1641 January 19, 1906
FACTS:
The probate proceedings of the last will and testament of Macano Jaboneta
was denied by the trial court, because one of the instrumental witnesses, Julio
Javellana, did not attached his signature thereto in the presence of Isabelo Jena.
According to the witnesses, when Julio Javellana is about to sign and holding a
pen, Isabelo Jena hurry up to leave the room, leaving therein the testator and the
two other instrumental witnesses. The appellant assailed that the signature of Julio
Javellana was not affixed in the presence of Isabelo, thus it affect the validity of the
will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid.
HELD:
Based on the established facts and circumstances it clearly manifests that

Isabelo Jena, with the other witnesses and the testator, had assembled for the
purpose of executing the testament, and were together in the same room for that
purpose, and at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he
was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to Javellana
that he could see everything which took place by merely casting his eyes in the
proper direction, and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so,
therefore we are of opinion that the document was in fact signed before he finally
left the room.
In the matter of Bedell(2 Connoly(NY.) 38) it was held that it is sufficient if

the witnesses are together for the purpose of witnessing the execution of the will.
The Court reversed the decision of the trial court and the will admitted to
probate.
22
LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA vs. JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE
G.R. No. 157451 dated December 16, 2005
FACTS:
Placido went back to the Philippines in 1980 and lived in the house and lot
at Makati which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte. Two years
after, at the age of 80, he wed Josefina. But in a little more than two years of
wedded bliss, Placido died.
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and
consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on
August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a
part of the attestation clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by
the testator and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The
second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation
clause and again on the left hand margin.
The probate of his will was opposed by Leticia on several grounds one of
which is that the will was not executed and attested as required by law and legal
solemnities and formalities were not complied with;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was
procured by fraud or trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never intended that the
instrument should be his last will and testament.
HELD:
No. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement or pretense, by which the
subject is cheated. The court stress that the party challenging the will bears the
burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. Unfortunately
in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of the petitioner, no evidence of
fraud was ever presented.
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the
dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, 'because the law does
not even require that a will be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion.
More important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or
23
more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator
and of one another. Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge
the will before a notary public. In any event, we agree with the CA that 'the variance
in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was
satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental
witnesses.
24
FELIX AZUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS and GERALDA AIDA
CASTILLO, substituted by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO
G.R. 122880, 12 April 2006, Tinga, J. (Third Division)
FACTS :
Felix Azuela filed a petition with the trial court for the probate of a notarial
will purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo on June 10, 1981 and notarized on
the same day. The will consisted of two (2) pages and was written in Filipino. The
attestation clause did not state the number of pages and it was not signed by the
attesting witnesses at the bottom thereof. The said witnesses affixed their
signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will though. Geralda
Castillo opposed the petition, claiming that the will was a forgery. She also argued
that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed
out that the decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and
the will was not properly acknowledged.
The trial court held the will to be authentic and to have been executed in
accordance with law and, thus, admitted it to probate.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court’s decision and
ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. It noted that the attestation clause
failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void
and undeserving of probate.
Azuela argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that
“the number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause” is
merely directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed
as “the substantial compliance rule.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject will complied with the requirements of the law
and, hence, should be admitted to probate.
HELD:
NO.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on
which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not
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College of Law
Succession Case Digests
signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most

importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat,
is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial
will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.
The Court suggested in Caneda v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 103554, May
28, 1993, 222 SCRA 781): “the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which can be
supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to
extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the
allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which
cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of
the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.”
In this case, however, there could have been no substantial compliance with
the requirements under Art. 805 of the Civil Code since there is no statement in
the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which
comprise the will. There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite,
a space having been allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the
attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in.
The subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the
instrumental witnesses. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested
will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page
containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate
these witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on
the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.
The notary public who notarized the subject will wrote, “Nilagdaan ko at
ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.” By
no manner of contemplation can these words be construed as an acknowledgment.
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some
competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It might be possible
to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not follow to the usual
language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that
before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the
will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806
is that the will be “acknowledged,” and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The
will does not present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the
decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own
free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-
important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free
consent of the testator.
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IN RE: WILL OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ, ET Al.,

GR No. 189982, November 12, 2012
FACTS:
Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez (Lopez),
and their four legitimate children, namely, petitioner Richard, Diana, Marybeth
and Victoria as compulsory heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he executed a Last Will
and Testament and constituted Richard as his executor and administrator.
Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and
Testament before the RTC with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary in
his favor. Marybeth opposed the petition contending that the purported last will
and testament was not executed and attested as required by law, and that it was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of Richard.
Victoria also adopted the said opposition.
The instrumental witnesses testified that after the late Enrique read and
signed the will on each and every page, they also read and signed the same in the
latter's presence and of one another. Photographs of the incident were taken and
presented during trial. Manalo further testified that she was the one who prepared
the drafts and revisions from Enrique before the final copy of the will was made.
Likewise, Atty. Nolasco claimed that Enrique consulted him in the preparation of
the subject will and furnished him the list of his properties for distribution among
his children. He prepared the will in accordance with Enrique's instruction and
that before the latter and the attesting witnesses signed it in the presence of one
another, he translated the will, which was written in English to Filipino and added
that Enrique was in good health and of sound mind at that time.
The RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article
805 of the Civil Code which requires a statement in the attestation clause of the
number of pages used upon which the will is written. It held that while Article 809
of the same Code requires mere substantial compliance of the form laid down in
Article 805 thereof, the rule only applies if the number of pages is reflected
somewhere else in the will with no evidence aliunde or extrinsic evidence required.
While the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages
including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the
RTC observed that it has 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion. As such,
it disallowed the will for not having been executed and attested in accordance with
law.
The CA found no valid reason to deviate from the findings of the RTC that
the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause was
fatal.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate of the will should be disallowed.
HELD:
YES. While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form
of the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in
the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that it "consists
of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are
written" cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8
pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by
mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence
aliunde.
The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied
by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively
numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the
subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that
the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the
attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and
whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must
substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury
in the probate proceedings.
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LABRADOR VS CA
184 SCRA 170
FACTS:
On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died leaving behind a parcel of land to
his heirs through a holographic way.
Sagrado, therefore, one of his heirs, filed a petition for the probate of the
alleged holographic way of the late Melecio Labrador. However, during probate
proceedings, Jesus and Gaudencio, also heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition
to the petition on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by
implications of law, alleging therein that before Melecio’s death, the land was sold
to them evidenced by TCT No. 21178. Earlier, however, in 1973, Jesus sold it to
Navat.
Sagrado, thereupon filed against his brothers, for the annulment of the
Deed of Absolute Sale over that parcel of land. After both parties had rested and
submitted their respective evidence, the trial court allowed the probate of the
holographic will and declared null and void. However, the CA on appeal denied
the probate on the ground that it was undated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged holographic will is dated, as provided for in

Article 810 of the New Civil Code.
HELD:
Yes. The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect
compliance with Article 810. It is worthy to quote the first paragraph of the second
page of the holographic will, viz:
"And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the
partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said fishpond,
and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this
decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the
one who made this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their
father."
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be
placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and
executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the subject
will.
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AJERO VS CA
236 SCRA 237
FACTS:
In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto

and Thelma Ajero, private respondents Clemente Sand, Mariam S. Arong, Leah
Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and
their children.
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted special proceedings for

allowance of decedent’s holographic will. They alleged that at the time of execution,
she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue
influence and was in every respect capacitated to every respect capacitated to
dispose of her estate by will.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the
testament’s body nor the signature therein was in the decedent handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by the decedent;
and that the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and
undue influence. Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the
decedents holographic will to probate.
On appeal, said decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of the
decedent’s will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, “the holographic
will fails to meet the requirements for its validity.” It held that the decedent did not
comply with Art. 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code. It alluded to certain
dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not
dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon
had not been authenticated by the decedent.
ISSUE:
WON the non-compliance of Art 813 and 814 will result in the disallowance
of the probate proceedings.
HELD:
No. A Holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding

non-compliance with the provisions of Art. 814.
In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the

requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator
himself, as provided under Art 810. Of the NCC. Failure to strictly observe other
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formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that in

unquestionably handwritten by the testator. A reading of Art. 813 of the NCC shows
that its requirement affects the validity of dispositions contained in the
holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of
the dispositions, the results is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such
failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
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KALAW V RELOVA
132 SCRA 237
FACTS:
Private respondent Gregorio Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir of his

deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the Court of First
Instance for the probate of her holographic Will.
The holographic Will, as first written, named Rosa K. Kalaw, a sister of the
testatrix as her sole heir. Hence, petitioner Rosa K. Kalaw opposed probate
alleging, that the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and
insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix
as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code reading:
Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration

in a holographic will the testator must authenticate the same by his
full signature.
Rosa’s position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be
given effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.
After trial, respondent Judge denied probate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and
insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full
signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with her as sole heir
HELD:
No. In this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial
provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but
which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full
signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked
for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could
remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to
disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can
neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required
by law by affixing her full signature.
As a general rule, when a number of erasures, corrections, and

interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will has not been noted under
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his signature, the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as
respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.
The exception is where the change affects the essence of the will of the
testator; Note: When the holographic will had only one substantial provision,
which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, and the same did
not carry the requisite full signature of the testator, the entirety of the will is voided
or revoked.
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College of Law
PROBATE OF WILLS
NUGUID V NUGUID
GR No. L-23445 dated June 23, 1996
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid, died single, without descendants, legitimate or

illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz
Salonga Nuguid, and 6 brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios,
Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
“I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and

memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give,
devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to
my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B
Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day
of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.”
Petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance a

holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid 11 years before her demise.
Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate.
Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, the legitimate parents of the
deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. They
contend that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of
the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct
ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution
is void.
The lower court held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will
perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deceased’s parents are preterited
HELD:
Yes. The will completely omits the parents of the deceased. They thus
received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime;
neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition.
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The will institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No
specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we
say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.
There is no other provision in the will except the institution of petitioner as

universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession
ensues.
The will does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced
heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled
ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from
preterition.
The Court held that the will in question is "a complete nullity". Article 854
merely nullifies "the institution of heir". However, the will solely provides for the
institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same.
The entire will is null.
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College of Law
INSTITUTION OF HEIRS
J.L.T. AGRO, INC. V. BALANSAG

G.R. No. 141882, March 11, 2005
FACTS :
Don Julian Teves contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena and
had two kids namely Josefa and Emilio. After her death, he married Milagros Teves
and they had four children namely: Maria Teves, Jose Teves, Milagros Teves and
Pedro Teves. Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into a Compromise
Agreement.
When Antonia died an action for partition was instituted where the parties
entered into a Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all the
properties of Don Julian. On the basis of the compromise agreement, the CFI
declared a tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned
in common by Don Julian and his two children of the first marriage. The property
was to remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. Josefa and Emilio
likewise were given other properties at Bais, including the electric plant, the “movie
property,” the commercial areas, and the house where Don Julian was living. The
remainder of the properties was retained by Don Julian.
On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of

Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc.
(petitioner). Later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an instrument
entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of
Liabilities (Supplemental Deed) dated 31 July 1973. This instrument transferred
ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of petitioner. The
appellate court ruled that the supplemental deed, conveying ownership to JLT agro
is not valid because the Compromise Agreement reserved the properties to Don
Julian’s two sets of heirs their future legitimes. The two sets of heirs acquired full
ownership and possession of the properties respectively adjudicated to them and
Don Julian himself could no longer dispose of the same. The appellate court in
holding that the Supplemental Deed is not valid, added that it contained a
prohibited preterition of Don Julian’s heirs from the second marriage.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not preterition exists.
2. Whether or not the future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and

reserved prior to the death of Don Julian.
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HELD:
1. No preterition.
Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or

all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as
they are not inofficious.
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he
resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the
court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not
irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the
absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are
other properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit
from Don Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions in the Compromise
Agreement are indicative of Don Julian's desire along this line. Hence, the
total omission from inheritance of Don Julian's heirs from the second
marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is
unfounded.
2. NO.
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which
are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The
exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to
future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is partition inter vivos
referred to in Article 1080.
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is

undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it
would become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right
of his heirs from the second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him
under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare
hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the prospect of a
future acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. Evidently, at the
time of the execution of the supplemental deed in favor of petitioner, Don
Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject
lot would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his
death.
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MANINANG V. CA
G.R. No. 57848, June 19, 1982
FACTS:
Clemencia, left a holographic will which provides that all her properties
shall be inherited by Dra. Maninang with whose family Clemencia has lived
continuously for the last 30 years. The will also provided that she does not consider
Bernardo as his adopted son. Bernardo, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole
heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bernardo was preterited
HELD:
In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under
the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or
disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and
disinheritance are two diverse concepts. Preterition consists in the omission in the
testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving
any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. By
virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the determination of that controversial
issue has not been thoroughly considered. The conclusion of the trial court was
that Bernardo has been preterited.
The SC is of opinion, however, that from the face of the will, that conclusion
is not indubitable. Such preterition is still questionable. The Special Proceeding is
REMANDED to the lower court.
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NUGUID V. NUGUID
GR No. L-23445, June 23, 1996
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid, died single, without descendants, legitimate or

illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz
Salonga Nuguid, and 6 brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios,
Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
“I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and

memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give,
devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to
my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B
Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day
of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.”
Petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance a

holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid 11 years before her demise.
Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate.
Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, the legitimate parents of the
deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. They
contend that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of
the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct
ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution
is void.
The lower court held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will
perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deceased’s parents are preterited
HELD:
Yes. The will completely omits the parents of the deceased. They thus
received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime;
neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition.
The will institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No
specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we
say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.
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There is no other provision in the will except the institution of petitioner as

universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession
ensues.
The will does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced
heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled
ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from
preterition.
The Court held that the will in question is "a complete nullity". Article 854
merely nullifies "the institution of heir". However, the will solely provides for the
institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same.
The entire will is null.
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College of Law
NERI V. AKUTIN
GR NO. L- 4799, MAY 21,1943
FACTS:
Agripino Neri left on his will all his property by universal title to his children
on his second marriage herein respondents, with omission of his children on his
first marriage, herein petitioners.
The omission of his heirs on his first marriage in the will was contemplated
by the testator with the belief that he had already given each of the children portion
of the inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned and was occupied by the
petitioners over which registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land,
and an aggregate amount of money which the petitioners were indebted to their
father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is preterition
HELD:
Yes. The court annulled of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the ground
that the testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second
marriage, none of the children on the first marriage received their respective
shares from the testator’s property, without expressly disinheriting the children by
his first marriage.
Even if clause 8 of the will is invoked (said clause states that the children
by his first marriage had already received their shares in hi property excluding
what he had given them as aid during their financial troubles and the money they
had borrowed from him) the court can rely only on the findings of the trial court
that the inventory indicates that the property of Neri has remained intact and that
no portion has been given to the children of the first marriage.
Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested shall

annul the institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person.
This is a case of preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.
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LEGITIME
EDROSO V. SABLAN
G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913
FACTS:
Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels
of land. She inherited these two parcels of land from her son, Pedro Sablan, who
died intestate, unmarried and without issue. Pedro had inherited them from
another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano
(uncles of Pedro) opposed the registration claiming that the registration be denied
or if registration is granted, the right reserved by law to the opponents be recorded
in the registration of each parcel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marcelina is entitled to register in her own name the two
parcels of land which are required by law to be reserved under Article 811 of the
Civil Code (Article 891 NCC)
HELD:
YES. Article 811 provides:
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the
latter acquired without a valuable consideration from another
ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve
what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are
within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property
proceeded.
The ascendant required by article 811 to reserve the right has all the rights
inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a condition. The
condition is whether or not there exists at the time of his death relatives within the
third degree of the descendants from whom they inherit in the line whence the
property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property
at the death of the ascendant. If they do not exist, the ascendant can freely dispose
thereof.
What is prohibited is an act mortis causa in favor of persons other than

relatives of the descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved. The
object of the law is: "To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some
special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein."
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Thus, the court declared that Marcelina is entitled to register in her own
name the two parcels of land. It also directed the recording in the registration the
right required by article 811 to be reserved to the two uncles of Pedro, should they
survive her.
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PADURA V. BALDOVINO
G.R. NO. 11960, 27 December 1958
FACTS:
Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during his lifetime. With his first
wife, Gervacia Landig, he had one child whom they named Manuel Padura, and
with his second, Benita Garing; he had two children named Fortunato Padura and
Candelaria Padura.
Agustin died testate bequeathing his properties among his children,

Manuel, Candelaria and Fortunato, and his surviving spouse, Benita Garing.
In 1908, Fortunato died intestate, unmarried and without issue. His parcels
of land were exclusively inherited by his mother, Benita. In 1934, Candelaria died
leaving as her only heirs, her four legitimate children, the appellants herein. Six
years later, Manuel died leaving seven legitimate children, the appellees herein.
Upon the death of Benita Garing (the reservista) in 1952, appellants and
appellees took possession of the reservable properties. The appellants sought to
have the properties partitioned, such that one half should be adjudicated to them,
and the other half to the appellees, allegedly on the basis that they inherit by right
of representation from their respective parents, the original reserves. The
appellees, on the other hand, maintained that they should all (the eleven reservees)
be deemed as inheriting in their own right, under which, they claim, each should
have an equal share.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reserved properties be divided equally among the eleven
reservees (without distinction).
HELD:
NO. There is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are

within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased
person from whom the reservable property came. Proximity of degree and right of
representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule
that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of
brothers and nephews of half-blood. If in determining the rights of the
reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of
nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of
the whole blood should be likewise operative.
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Reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to

whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right
to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate
succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. Upon the death of the
ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the
reservatorios as a class, but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant
(prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree.
Thus, reservatarios who are nephews of the whole blood are declared
entitled to a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half-blood.
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CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL. V. FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-12957 dated 24 March 1961
FACTS:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaseo. With his first wife, Teresa
Ruales, he had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana,
while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco.
Upon Yaseo’s death, said lot was given to Francisco and a title was issued in his
name. Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the
property for him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes.
When Francisco died, single and without a descendant, his mother executed
an Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale of the property in favor of Constancio Sienes
and Genoveva Silay. Said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband
Jose Esparcia, the surrender of original certificate of title, which was in their
possession, but the latter refused.
Cipriana and Paulina Yaseo, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, declared

the property in their name. They executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses
Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes who, in turn, declared it in their name for tax
purposes and thereafter secured the issuance in their name of transfer certificate
of title.
Constancia Sienes filed an action asking for the nullification of the sale
executed by Paulina and Cipriana, the reconveyance of the lot and damages and
cost of suit. Fidel Esparcia disclaimed that they did not know any information
regarding the sale by Andrea Gutang in favor of Constancio and Genoveva, and if
such sale was made, the same was voice since Andrea had no right to dispose of the
property.
The lower court declared that the sale of Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea
Gutang to the plaintiff spouses Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay was void,
and the sale made by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of defendants Fidel
Esparcia and Paulina Sienes involving the same lot was also void. The land in
question was reservable property and must be reverted to the estate of Cipriana
Yaseo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lot in question is reservable property and if so, whether
the reservista or the reservatorio can alienate the same
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HELD:
The land in question is reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by

operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried
and without descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang.
The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any
survived her.
Being a reservable property, the reserve creates two resolutory conditions,

namely: (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at
the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which the property came. The reservista has the legal title and dominion to the
reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition. He may alienate the same
but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being
revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the
reservista.
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore,

subject to the condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by
virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any
person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea
Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable
that the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal
effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive
ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana
Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a
similar resolutory condition. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the
reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died.
Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon
Andrea's death. While it may be true that the sale was made by Paulina and
Cipriana prior to the death of Andrea Gutang, it became effective only because of
the occurrence of the resolutory condition.
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College of Law
FLORENTINO, ET AL, V. FLORENTINO, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-14856 dated 15 November 1919
FACTS:
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia Faz de Leon;
that during the marriage he had nine children. When his wife died, he married the
second time Severina Faz de Leon with whom he had two children, Mercedes and
Apolonio III. Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died and he was survived by his
second wife Severina Faz de Leon and the ten children, Apolonio III, being born
after Apolonio II died.
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino executed a will instituting as his universal heirs

his ten children, the posthumos Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz de Leon
and declaring that all his property should be divided among all of his children of
both marriages. In the partition of the estate, Apolonio III was given six parcels of
land and some personal property of Apolonio II. Apolonio III later died and his
mother, Severina Faz de Leon, succeeded to all his properties. She subsequently
died, leaving a will instituting as her universal heiress her only living daughter,
Mercedes Florentino. As such heir, Mercedes took possession of all the property
left at the death of her mother, including the property inherited by Severina from
Apolonio III which is said to be reservable property. Accordingly, Mercedes had
been gathering the fruits of the parcels of land.
Hence, the children of Apolonio II with his first wife, as well as his
grandchildren by the first marriage, instituted an action for recovery of their share
of the reservable property. The defendants contend that no property can be
reserved for the plaintiffs inasmuch as there is a forced heiress and the obligation
to reserve is secondary to the duty to respect the legitime. Also, the danger that the
property coming from the same line might fall into the hands of the strangers has
been avoided.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property is subject to reserve troncal
HELD:
The property is subject to reserve troncal. Even if Severina left in her will
said property to her only daughter and forced heiress, Mercedes Florentino,
nevertheless this property had not lost its reservable nature inasmuch as it
originated from the common ancestor of the litigants, Apolonio Isabelo; was
inherited by his son Apolonio III; was transmitted by same (by operation of law)
to his legitimate mother and ascendant, Severina Faz de Leon.
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The posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, acquired the property, now
claimed by his brothers, by a lucrative title or by inheritance from his legitimate
father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. Although said property was inherited by his
mother, Severina Faz de Leon, nevertheless, she was in duty bound to reserve the
property thus acquired for the benefit of the relatives, within the third degree, of
the line from which such property came. Ascendants do not inherit the reservable
property, but its enjoyment, use or trust, merely for the reason that the law imposes
the obligation to reserve and preserve same for certain designated persons who, on
the death of the said ascendants reservists, acquire the ownership of said property
in the same manner as forced heirs.
There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the reservable
property left at the death of Apolonio III to wit, Apolonio II’s three children from
his first marriage; the children of Apolonio II’s deceased children, 12 in all; and
Mercedes Florentino, Apolonio III’s sister. All of the plaintiffs are the relatives of
the deceased posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, within the third degree (four
of whom being his half-brothers and the remaining twelve being his nephews as
they are the children of his three half-brothers). As the first four are his relatives
within the third degree in their own right and the other twelve are such by
representation, all of them are indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the
property.
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all
her own property in favor of her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino, as
forced heiress. But whatever provision there is in her will concerning the reservable
property received from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will
reduce the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews of her
daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as said property is not
her own and she has only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the obligation
to preserve and to deliver same to the reservatarios, one of whom is her own
daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion
of the ascendant who inherits and receives same from his descendant, therefore it
does not form part of his own property nor become the legitimate of his forced
heirs. It becomes his own property only in case that all the relatives of his
descendant shall have died (reservista) in which case said reservable property
losses such character.
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DISINHERITANCE
RAMON S. CHING V. HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ

G.R. No. 192828, November 28, 2011
FACTS:
Respondents Joseph Cheng, et. al. filed a Complaint against Petitioner

Ramon Ching, et. al. for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and
Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer
Certificates of Title with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction”.
Joseph, et. al. are the heirs of Antonio Ching/Cheng. They averred that
Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonio's and Lucina's son when in truth and
in fact, he was adopted and his birth certificate was merely simulated. Antonio died
of a stab wound. Police Investigators identified Ramon as the prime suspect and
he now stands as the lone accused in a criminal case for murder filed against him.
It was also averred that Ramon performed several illegal transfers of properties
left by Antonio, and further exerted fraud and undue influence to adjudicate solely
to himself the entire estate of said decedent. From the foregoing circumstances and
upon the authority of Article 919 the Civil Code, respondents concluded that
Ramon can be legally disinherited, hence, prohibited from receiving any share
from the estate of Antonio who died intestate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be valid disinheritance in intestate succession.
HELD:
NO. Under Article 916 of the New Civil Code, “Disinheritance can be
effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified.”
While the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought

the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the
disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for
Ramon's disinheritance, the case does not partake of the nature of a special
proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited
jurisdiction.
Moreover, the issue of disinheritance, which is one of the causes of action

in the Complaint, can be fully settled after a trial on the merits. And at this stage,
it has not been sufficiently established whether or not there is a will. Thus, there is
no valid disinheritance to contemplate of in the case.
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SEANGIO V. REYES
GR No. 140371-72, November 27, 2006
FACTS:
A petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo
Seangio. However, in the will, it only contained an alleged act of disinheritance of
his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else. The RTC dismissed the petition for
probate.
ISSUE:
Whether the Kasulatan sa Pag-alis ng Mana is a valid will
HELD:
Yes.
A holographic will must be entirely written, dated and signed by the hand
of the testator himself. It is subject to no form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Segundo’s document, although it may
initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the
formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed
by the hand of Segundo. An intent to dispose mortis cause can be clearly deduced
from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative
disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an
act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would
succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
It is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator,

expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized
as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to
ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the
testator is contrary to law, morals, public police that it cannot be given effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in
the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than
the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding
the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard,
the court is convinced that the document was intended by Segundo to be his last
testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a
holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given
effect. The Kasulatan unmistakable showed Segundo’s intention of excluding his
eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons he cited.
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RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION
DIAZ V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-66574. June 17, 1987
FACTS:
Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero who

together with Felisa’s mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of Spouses
Felipe and Petronilla. Juliana married Simon and out of their union were born
Felisa and another child who died during infancy. Simona is the widow of Pascual
and mother of Pablo who is the only legitimate son of his parents.
Pascual died in 1970. Pablo in 1973 and Simona in 1976. Pablo at the time
of his death was survived by his Mother Simona and six minor natural children,
four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta
Pascursa.
On December 1,1976, Judge Jose Raval declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the
sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero. Petitioners Anselma and
Felixberta then as guardians of their minor children file for opposition and motion
to exclude Felisa from further taking part intervening in the settlement of the
intestate of Simona.
On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso Bleza, issued an order excluding Felisa
from further taking part or intervening and declared her to be not an heir of
Simona. Felisa filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. She then filed
her appeal to the Intermediate Appelate Court declaring her as the sole heir of
Simona.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners herein as illegitimate children of Pablo

Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero, by right of
representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona
Vda. De Santero?
RULING:
No. Since the hereditary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero,
the applicable law is the provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code.
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Pablo Santero is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the petitioners
are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Thus, petitioners cannot represent
their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of
his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero because of the barrier
provided for under Article 992 of the Civil Code.
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IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTESTATE

ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY
III vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.
GR. NO. 183053, JUNE 16, 2010
FACTS:
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay and Dr. Federico Suntay borne a child named

Emilio Suntay. During the lifetime of Emilio, he married to Isabel Cojuangco, and
they had children named Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. The said marriage of
Emilio I to Isabel was annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had children named Emilio
III and Nenita Suntay Tañedo out of wedlock to Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel
Santos, respectively. Emilio I predeceased his parents. The spouses Cristina and
Emilio reared the two acknowledged natural children of Emilio I even with the
illegitimate status. The children of Emilio I in the first marriage lived with their
mother Isabel.
On June 4, 1990, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died intestate. After the death

of the female spouse, Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren Emilio III
and Nenita. On October 26, 1995, the respondent filed a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration in her favor primarily on the ground that she and her
siblings were of legitimate status. On the other hand, Federico opposed said
application alleging that being the surviving spouse, he is more capable in
administering the estate and considering also that he is a part owner of the mass
of the estate. Federico filed a manifestation nominating the adopted Emilio III to
be the administrator of the estate. Emilio III filed a motion to intervene and it was
granted by the court. He alleged that we is more capable in the administration of
the estate since he was trained by Federico and he was involved in some of the
activities of Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation. In 2000, Federico died.
Regarding the administration of the estate, the court decided in favor of

Emilio III to become the administrator of the estate. The respondent appealed to
CA and CA set aside the decision of RTC, revoked the Letter of Administration
issued in favor of Emilio III and appointed the respondent to become the
administratrix. Aggrieved, Emilio III appealed by Certiorari to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct when it excluded Emilio
III the right to become the administrator of the decedent’s estate.
RULING:
Yes. CA erred when it excluded Emilio III from the administration of the
decedent’s estate.
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In Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de

Damian, the court declared that in the appointment of an administrator, the
principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The
order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators,
especially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the estates. Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court provides the order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator of an estate. However, the order of preference is not absolute for it
would depend on the surrounding facts and circumstances.
In this case, the subject estate calls to the succession of other putative heirs,
both the legitimate and illegitimate children of Emilio I and the grandchildren of
Spouses Federico and Cristina. Also, the estate remained to be an unliquidated
conjugal partnership of deceased spouses Federico and Cristina, to Court was
impelled to have a joint administration of the subject estate, by Emilio III and the
respondent.
As to the right of representation, invoking Article 992 of the New Civil Code,
an illegitimate child cannot inherit ab intesto from a legitimate child or relatives of
the mother or father (also known as the iron curtain bar rule). However, this rule
is not applicable in this case because of the surrounding facts. Emilio III was reared
by the deceased Federico and Cristina even from infancy and their relationship was
likened to a natural relationship of legitimate relatives. Also, Emilio III was
adopted by Federico who has an interest to the unliquidated conjugal partnership
with his wife.
From the foregoing, Emilio III, as decided by the court, was considered to
be a co-administrator to the estate of the decedent.
55
College of Law
ISABEL DE LA PUERTA V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

and CARMELITA DE LA PUERTA
G.R. No. 77867 February 6, 1990
FACTS:
This case involves the filiation of Carmelita de la Puerta, who claims

successional rights to the estate of her alleged grandmother, Dominga Revuelta.
Dominga Revuelta died in 1966 with a will leaving her properties to her three
surviving children - Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel. Isabel was appointed executrix of
the will. When Isabel filed the petition for the probate of the will, it was opposed
by her brothers, who averred that their mother was already senile at the time of the
execution of the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning. Moreover, some of
the properties listed in the inventory of her estate belonged to them
exclusively. Isabel was appointed special administratrix by the probate
court. Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor.
In 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta.

After hearing, the petition was granted. However, the decision was appealed by
Isabel to the Court of Appeals. Vicente subsequently died. Carmelita, having been
allowed to intervene in the probate proceedings of Domingo Revuelta, filed a
motion for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural
child of Vicente de la Puerta. The probate court granted the motion. Isabel
appealed on the ground that Carmelita was not the natural child of Vicente de la
Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta and that Carmelita's real
parents are Juanita Austrial and Gloria Jordan.Vicente and Genoveva separated
and never reconciled. In 1962, Gloria Jordan started living with Vicente de la
Puerta in his house, which was only five or six houses away from where she herself
was staying. Genoveva said that the relationship between her husband and Gloria
was well known in the community. However, the lower court declared that
Carmelita’s father was Vicente de la Puerta and her mother is Gloria Jordan who
were living as common law husband and wife until his death. Also, during the
hearing of her adoption case, Vicente de la Puerta stated in court that Carmelita de
la Puerta is his daughter with Gloria Jordan.
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to

recognize the child as his natural child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the
offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of
the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother
cohabited with the supposed father;
56
College of Law
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father. (n)
Art. 284. The mother is obliged to recognize her natural child:
(1) In any of the cases referred to in the preceding article, as between
the child and the mother;
(2) When the birth and the identity of the child are clearly
proved. (136a)
ISSUE:
Whether or not Carmelita de la Puerta can claim support and successional

rights to the estate of Dominga Revuelta, the mother of Vicente?
RULING:
No. Carmelita cannot claim support and successional rights to the estate of
Domingo Revuelta. As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from
inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down
the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families. This article provides
quite clearly:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from

the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from inheriting
from Dominga Revuelta for there would be no natural kindred ties between them
and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either. As aptly pointed out by Dr.
Arturo M. Tolentino:
If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the latter
cannot represent the former in the inheritance from the parents or
ascendants of the adopter. The adopted child is not related to the
deceased in that case, because the filiation created by fiction of law is
exclusively between the adopter and the adopted. "By adoption, the
adopters can make for themselves an heir, but they cannot thus make
one for their kindred.
The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta, has
successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but not to the estate of
Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance should therefore be
57
College of Law
filed in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father's

estate and cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga Revuelta's Will.
The reason for this rule was explained in the recent case of Diaz v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, thus:
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain
in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural
tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of
Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down
upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child the latter considers the privileged condition of the
former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former
in turn sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of
resentment.
58
College of Law
RESCISSION AND NULLITY OF PARTITION
ARELLANO V. PASCUAL
G.R. NO. 189776; DECEMBER 15, 2010
FACTS:
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her
daughters Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents
Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.
In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of

Letters of Administration," filed by respondents before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated
property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation,
transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation
respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance legitime" of petitioner.
Respondents nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as

Administrator of the estate by Branch 135 of the Makati RTC.
Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated

property only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the
decedents estate, the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in light of the
presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on to hold that it is
subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received
from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate

estate.
ISSUE:
Is the property donated to petitioner subject to collation? Should the

property of the estate have been ordered equally distributed among the parties?
HELD:
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical
operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the
59
value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate
of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime.
The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs
in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime,
so that inofficious donations may be reduced.
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes
being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir,
there is no legitime to be safeguarded.
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his
collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of the
testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for
compulsory heirs.
The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and
(3) concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over
and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are
primary compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed
only in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and ascendants are
secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are those who
succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the
illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any
legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for
his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that
it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a "stranger," chargeable against the
free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated
property is not subject to collation.
The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among

his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant
to the provisions of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate

children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full
blood, they shall inherit in equal shares
60
61

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CASE TITLE PAGE

IN RE: WILL OF ANDRADA

YAP TUA V YAP KA KUAN

DE GALA V GONZALES AND ONA

IN RE: WILL OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ ET AL.,

JLT AGRO, INC. V BALANSANG

DY YIENG SEANGIO ET AL V HON. AMOR A. REYES

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE

RESCISSION AND NULLITY OF PARTITION

INOCENCIO V. HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE

Hospicio de San Jose (HDSJ) leased a parcel of land to German Inocencio

Whether the Contract of Lease with option to buy is binding to Victor

Heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest

In the case at bar, there is neither contractual stipulation, nor legal

Whether the Kasulatan sa Pag-alis ng Mana is a valid will

It is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator,

Leoncia Tolentino, assisted by Atty. Almario, placed her thumb mark on

Whether the attestation clause was defective

Whether the attestation clause is fatally defective

Was the dissimilarity in handwriting sufficient to deny probate of the will?

NO. The mere dissimilarity in writing is not sufficient to overcome the

Whether or not the Last Will and Testament is valid.

The defect in the attestation clause is fatal.

Hence, the will is invalid.

Hence, the appeal.

Whether or not the Last Will and Testament is valid.

The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution

The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin do not

Hence, the will is invalid.

The Court of First Instance of Iloilo admitted to probate the documents as

Whether or not the notary signed the certification of acknowledgment in the

Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, one of them, Atty. Angel H.

Gabriel La O, as guardian ad litem of Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, appeared

Hence, the appeal.

Whether or not the Last Will and Testament is valid.

Hence, the will is valid.

Hence, the appeal.

Whether or not the Last Will and Testament is valid.

Hence, the will is valid.

Whether the attestation clause is fatally defective

Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, a niece of

Whether or not the will is valid.

Whether or not the will is valid.

Based on the established facts and circumstances it clearly manifests that

In the matter of Bedell(2 Connoly(NY.) 38) it was held that it is sufficient if

signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most

IN RE: WILL OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ, ET Al.,

Whether or not the probate of the will should be disallowed.

Whether or not the alleged holographic will is dated, as provided for in

In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto

On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted special proceedings for

No. A Holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding

In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the

formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that in

Private respondent Gregorio Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir of his

Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration

After trial, respondent Judge denied probate.

As a general rule, when a number of erasures, corrections, and

Rosario Nuguid, died single, without descendants, legitimate or

“I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and

Petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance a

Whether or not the deceased’s parents are preterited