Aviation Security Manual

CHAPTER I
1.1 OVERVIEW
This revised edition of Aviation Security (AVSEC) Operations Manual is

prepared to implement the National Civil Aviation Security Program (NCASP). It sets
forth comprehensively the various aviation security concepts, doctrines and
measures as implemented by the Philippine National Police - Aviation Security
Group (PNP - ASG) and specifies the various security doctrines, concepts and
principles to be observed and enforced in our airports. This AVSEC Manual further
contains the specific responsibilities of each key PNP-ASG officers and the duties
and responsibilities of every security personnel from normal to extreme airport
security operational conditions.
This manual further provides a handy reference to all PNP ASG uniformed
and Civil Aviation Security Bureau, Office for Transportation Security (CASB,
OTS) personnel especially those stationed in outlaying airports and contains, as
well, definition of terms to ensure uniform understanding by all users.
The main purpose of this program is to enhance the security, reliability and
efficiency of civil aviation in the Philippines by developing, providing and
implementing regulations, standards and guidelines, the necessary safeguards
against acts of unlawful interference. It aims to uphold the security and safety of the
airport users, facilities and equipment within the airport complex.
The Airport Security System in the country consists of physical and electronics
measures, to prevent the entry of explosives, weapons and other dangerous
devices into the aircraft, passenger terminals and cargo warehouses. In order to
achieve this, the PNP-ASG is conducting mandatory inspection and screening of
passengers and their baggage and cargoes prior entry into the airport terminal
and aircraft.
1.2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY
The aircraft was originally conceived and developed by the Wright brothers
(Wilbur and Orville) on December 17, 1909 to harness the concept of time and space
in order to benefit humanity. Since then, the aircraft utility, capacity and configuration
evolved from its early limited operational capability and upgraded to its present non-
stop trans-oceanic operational capability and lift to move men, goods and services.
The first recorded aircraft hijacking transpired in Lima, Peru on February 21,
1931. It was not motivated by an ill intention because the hijacker was plainly a
disgruntled family man. To assure the healthy development of the then infant
international civil aviation industry, the UN created the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) to ensure its growth and the safety of every flight during its first
convention in Chicago, USA on December 7, 1944. The Chicago Convention
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established the ICAO and officially came into existence on April 04, 1947, thus
becoming the permanent body under the UN Charter. The convention
established 18 Annexes, wherein Annex 17 pertains to Standards and
Recommended Practices (SARPs) which contains an obligation for States to
comply and incorporate the SARPs set forth in the 18 Annexes in their National
Legislation. There are three (3) more Conventions and two (2) Protocols
relating to unlawful acts against civil aviation. The Tokyo Convention dubbed
as the Convention on Offenses and Certain Acts Committed on Board Aircraft
signed at Tokyo, Japan on September 14, 1963. Said convention gave birth to
organized aviation security in the Philippines on November 26, 1965 and came
into force on December 4, 1969. However, in the immediate past, misguided
individuals and groups saw in the aircraft an advantage they could utilize to extort
money, advance their political causes and force governments to perform acts against
its wills or negotiate over the bargaining table.
The next instrument is the Hague Convention known as the Convention

for the Suppression on Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed in Hague,
Netherlands on December 16, 1970 and was ratified by the Philippine
government on March 26, 1973. Its vital features are: the definition of unlawful
seizures as a separate offense and obligation of States to extradite or punish
offenders severely.
This was followed by the Montreal Convention of 1971, known as the

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation signed at Montreal, Canada on September 23, 1971 and was ratified by
the Philippine government on March 26, 1973 and came into force on April 25,
1973. Its key feature is the creation of the same obligations as under the Hague
Convention (extradition or severe punishment of offenders) for sabotage and armed
attacks against international civil aviation facilities.
Its vital convention features were further strengthened by the Montreal

Protocol known as The Protocol of Suppression for Unlawful Acts of Violence
at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, which is supplementary to
Montreal Convention of 1971 done at Montreal, Canada on February 24, 1988.
This was followed by the Convention on the Marking of Plastic

Explosives for the purpose of detection, done at Montreal, Canada on March
01, 1991. This was entered into force on June 21, 1998 by the Philippine
government, that called for the interpretation of both the Convention and Protocol as
a single instrument. Its key feature is the amendment in the definition of the offense
to include person who unlawfully and intentionally performs an act of violence at an
international airport which causes or may cause injury or death and an offense that
destroys or damages any facility of an international airport or an aircraft not in
service. All other general principles of international law pertaining to safety and
security of civil aviation and transportation laws are likewise deem
incorporated within this programme.
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The first recorded organized aircraft hijacking was committed against Israel’s
El Al Airliner in 1968 by the Palestinian Liberation Organization. It was followed by a
series of other successful hijackings that caused untold losses of properties and lives
that reached its peak in the 70s and tapered off somehow due to the effective early
aviation security counter measures developed then. Intermittent attempts on
hijackings were thwarted, but some well planned undertakings succeeded.
Specifically, the successive seizures of four (4) aircrafts of TWA, Swiss Air, BOAC
and Pan Am and their simultaneous wanton destruction before horrified television
audiences world-wide in September 1970 in Jordan and Egypt airports awakened
aviation security specialists on the vulnerabilities of the adopted security measures.
An unnamed American airline passenger on a domestic flight from Portland to

Seattle in November 1971 perpetrated a successful hijacking for $200,000 and
parachuted to safety by lowering the tailgate door of the aircraft. This was followed
by three (3) more equally successful undertakings, but was stopped when the
particular aircraft model was taken out of service of the American aviation industry.
The event that cause the control and minimized the unlawful interference in
international civil aviation transpired when the Bonn Declaration was signed on July
17, 1978 among the seven (7) developed countries, Canada, the Federal Republic
of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the United States of America obligating themselves to
immediately terminate their respective air services to and from any country that
refuses to comply with the Hague Convention.
Today, aviation security is an avowed national concern of democratic

government primarily because of international terrorist acts sponsored by
terrorist network organizations such as Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah and the
Abu Sayyaf Group.
1.3 EVOLUTION OF PNP-AVIATION SECURITY GROUP
In compliance with the Montreal Convention of 1971 and the Supplementary

Protocol to the said convention, the Philippine government issued Presidential Letter
of Instruction (LOI) Number 399 on April 28, 1976 creating the National Action
Committee on Anti Hijacking (NACAH) with the Secretary of National Defense as
Chairman and the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Public Works,
Transportation and Communications, Public Information, Administrator of Civil
Aviation Administration (now Air Transportation Office) and Director-General,
NISA as members. Its implementing arm, the Aviation Security Command
(AVSECOM) was organized on June 1, 1976 with the primary mission of
ensuring the continued and uninterrupted operations of civil aviation industry
in the country. AVSECOM was later renamed by virtue of GHQ AFP GO
Number 37 as Philippine Air Force Security Command (PAFSECOM) on March
I, 1986. With the enactment of Republic Act 6975, otherwise known as the Act
Establishing the PNP under a Reorganized DILG and for Other Purposes, the
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Chairmanship of NACAH was transferred to the DILG and the mission and functions
of the defunct PAFSECOM was transferred to the PNP. Executive Order (EO)
Number 452 issued on April 5, 1991 provides amendment to the composition of
NACAH with the DILG Secretary as Chairman and the DND Secretary as Vice-
Chairman. EO 246 reconstituted NACAH into National Action Committee on
Anti-Hijacking and Anti-Terrorism (NACAHT) which took effect in May 1995, is
geared towards implementing effective monitoring activities of suspected
terrorist and develop capabilities of Local Law Enforcement Agencies to
contain the threat of terrorism. However, on July 2, 1991, the PNP, through its
Police Aviation Security Command (PASCOM) which was later renamed as PNP-
Aviation Security Group (PNP-ASG) by virtue of Memo Circular Number 96-01
dated September 12, 1996 assumed the responsibility of ensuring the uninterrupted
security operations of the civil aviation in the country.
EO 336 was issued on January 5, 2000, reconstituted the NACAHT as the

National Council for Civil Aviation Security (NCCAS). EO 277 issued on
January 30, 2004 approving and reconstituting the National Civil Aviation
Security Program (NCASP) creating the Office for Transportation Security
(OTS) within the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC).
EO 311 issued on April 26, 2004 designated OTS as the single authority for all
modes of Transportation Security in the Philippines.
1.4 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY
In the country, the first hijacking was made by two (2) young Filipino-Chinese
students on December 30, 1952 while on board the PAL aircraft from Laoag en
route to Aparri. The hijackers demanded to be flown to mainland China,
however, it was intercepted by Taiwanese jets and was brought to Taipei.
Thinking that it was already mainland China, the hijackers surrendered
peacefully. As a result, the pilot and the flight steward were killed.
After which, eight (8) more hijacking incidents transpired that were
staged in the provinces to include one (1) incident at MIA (now NAIA) that
interfered with our civil aviation. Out of the nine (9) hijacking cases, five (5)
were terminated through skillful negotiations while four (4) incidents were
successful in attaining their demands despite dilatory tactics employed by the
authority.
The bloodiest hijacking occurred on May 26, 1976 on board a PAL BAC
1-11 on a scheduled flight from Davao City to Manila that was diverted to
Zamboanga City. Ten (10) civilian passengers and three (3) hijackers were
killed when the negotiation failed and the aircraft exploded during the assault.
A mid-air explosion happened on December 11, 1994 on PAL flight 434

when a 747 aircraft was on the last leg of its journey from Manila Domestic
Airport to Narita, Japan via Cebu City. Apparently, the first generation anti-
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hijacking equipment was functional at the airport initial and final security gates
at the time, but was not enough to detect the knocked-down parts of an
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) that was surreptitiously smuggled inside
the aircraft by a departing passenger.
Investigation revealed that the five (5) critical miniaturized parts of the
knocked-down IED were carried by a mid-eastern looking passenger through
the security checkpoints. Later on, the attending stewardess when shown the
terrorist’s latest photograph identified to be that of the infamous Mahmoud
Yousef, Pakistani chemical engineer, explosive genius and architect, who also
bombed the World Trade Center in New York, USA, in 1993. Said passenger
occupied seat 32-K and transferred to seat 22-K when the aircraft was airborne
and disembarked in Mactan-Cebu International Airport. An hour before
landing, the bomb claimed its lone passenger fatality a Japanese passenger
seating on 22-K, however, the pilot was able to land the aircraft safely in
Okinawa, Japan.
The latest incident happened on May 28, 2000 involving a PAL airbus
from Davao to Manila, Initial report state that Augusto Lakandula later on
identified as Trance Chua who managed to sneak in a home-made cal .22
magnum revolver at the Security Screening Checkpoint. After holding the crew
and passengers at bay and collecting their cash and valuables, Chua
parachuted using an improvised parachute that caused his death.
All of these cases transpired when the present state-of-the-art anti-

hijacking equipment was not yet in place and the competency of our security
personnel left so much to be professionalized. Airport complexes are vital
security installations crucial to our continued growth and development as a nation.
They play important roles in our national endeavor to enhance our quality of life
through the unhampered movement of men, goods and services within and beyond
the country.
CHAPTER II
2.1 TOTAL AVIATION SECURITY SYSTEM
Airport complexes are vital security installations crucial to our continued

growth and development as a nation. They play important roles in our national
endeavor to enhance our quality of life through the unhampered movements of
men good and services within and beyond the country. To ensure at all times the
adequate protection of our airports from any form of unlawful interference, the Total
Aviation Security System or simply TASS is adopted and enforced. The Police
Center for Aviation Security (PCAS), being the primary operating unit of PNP-ASG, is
responsible for its effective implementation in each airport complex by observing the
total team approach.
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Use of various security measures is a recognized concept in aviation security
to plug whatever vulnerable points that may be created due to the daily hustle and
bustle in the airport. Likewise, this is to attain the primary operational objective to
harden our airports with adequate interconnected aviation security measures. These
active security measures shall be undertaken by the dedicated PNP-ASG units
for maximum effectiveness. Each airport station/terminal shall have a
Station/Terminal Action Officer (SAO/TAO) who will be responsible for the
overall supervision of PNP personnel and other security personnel of the
airport. Aviation terrorism and acts of unlawful interference to civil aviation have its
rightful antecedents that brought about the development of aviation security in the
country.
The security system encompasses three (3) major sub-systems that are
interrelated and mutually reinforcing to blanket our airports with continuing shields of
concentric and tiered levels of protection.
2.2 PROACTIVE / DETERRENT SECURITY MEASURES
Complementation among the various security measures is a recognized

concept in aviation security to plug whatever vulnerable points / pores that
may be created due to the daily hustle and bustle in the airport. Likewise, this
is to attain the primary operational objective to envelop our airports with
adequate interconnected aviation security measures. The various passive
security measures discussed earlier will be supplemented by active security
measures to overlap and strengthen existing security net. These different
active security measures will independently be undertaken by separate and
dedicated ASG units for optimum effectiveness. This security component
represents the second layer of security systems to prevent any unauthorized
individuals from gaining access into the airside or preclude anyone from
breaching any established security sub-system.
The outer security layer represents the Proactive / Deterrent measures that
interlock and supplement each other such as Intelligence, Investigation,
Landside Patrol, Access Control, Vehicle Inspection, Security Survey, Audit &
Inspection, Guard and Guard System, Lighting System and Signage.
2.2.1 INTELLIGENCE
The ability to foretell the plans, actions and intentions of individuals and
groups inimical to aviation security and initiate criminal prosecution and
administrative proceeding.
The known nature of organized international aviation terrorism consisting of

support and hit groups behooves government to undertake preemptive steps. This
is in order to prevent attempts to case our airports for its undiscovered weak points
that can be exploited in tandem with local cohorts or independently by its own
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support group. To aggressively ferret out/discourage these probing efforts in order to
undermine security operations.
The following are the duties and responsibilities of an Intelligence Offices:
a. Coordinate and collaborate with other aviation security-related agencies for

information exchange;
b. Coordinate with PNP/AFP intelligence community;
c. Conduct counter intelligence operations to prevent unwitting and witting

activities of airport personnel prejudicial to airport security;
d. Launch case operations against identified airport security threat

groups/personalities and initiate criminal prosecution and
administrative proceeding as warranted;
e. Monitor through matrix system the interceptions of prohibited/ dangerous

objects/substances per airport and submits recommendations on patterns
observed;
f. Conduct Airport Security Inspection and Survey and submit report with
recommendations specially on international airports;
g. Prepare appropriate Aviation Security Advisory and Current Threat

Assessment in collaboration with the Assistant Director for Operations;
h. Comply with all information requirements from the Directorate for

Intelligence, NHQ PNP;
i. Conduct continuing Security Education and Awareness Program among

PNP-ASG personnel particularly on document, physical and
communications security;
j. Submit Daily/Weekly/Monthly Intelligence Briefs/Summaries to the Director,

PNP-ASG;
k. Maintain Rogue Gallery of identified local and international terrorist

personalities;
l. Develop Watch / Target List and conduct background investigation of

airport users/ personnel identified to be security risks; and
m. Perform such other duties and responsibilities as required.
2.2.2 INVESTIGATION
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Judicial action is an effective deterrence to any wrongdoing. Specifically, the
possibility of losing one’s liberty prevents any insidious idea/misguided individuals to
unlawfully interfere with the civil aviation or commit common crimes in the airport. All
interceptions in the airport premises falling under Revised Penal Code and special
laws will be investigated, followed up and followed through until appropriate cases
are filed with our judicial authorities and pursued to finality. Personnel for this
purpose are dedicated in each level of this Group.
The following are the duties and responsibilities of an Investigation Offices:
a. Investigate all reported violations of law and prepare all pertinent legal
documents necessary for the filing of appropriate case/s in court;
b. Inform immediately the Director, PNP-ASG (Attn: ADII) about each

interception/apprehension made in AOR together with its current
disposition;
c. Interview or interrogate separately and individually each witness and

suspect;
d. Conduct follow-up investigations against identified cohorts of arrested

individuals;
e. Establish the positive identifications of each suspect/arrested persons, take

their photographs, fingerprints and inventory of their
belongings/confiscated materials;
f. Ensure the integrity of all pertinent legal documents and gathered pieces of
evidences;
g. Attend all scheduled judicial hearings of each case filed in court; and
h. Perform such other duties and responsibilities as directed.
2.2.3 LANDSIDE PATROL
This is conducted regularly to preempt any activities prejudicial to

airport operations. Special emphasis will be given to the security gates, airline
offices and other vital installation within the airport complex damaged to which
hampers airport operations.
The following are the duties and responsibilities of a Landside patrol

personnel:
a. Conduct daily systematic visibility patrols within vital airport facilities;
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b. Be unobtrusive in conduct and project the impression of alertness, agility
and competence;
c. Challenge any airport-user and vehicle within any restricted area with or
without appropriate access authority and turn him over for investigation as
warranted;
d. Verify and act as first responder on unattended baggage;
e. Report and take remedial action of any security breach during his
tour of duty; and
f. Perform such other duties and responsibilities as directed.
2.2.4 ACCESS CONTROL
The airport authority/management, based on its Airport Security

Program (ASP), is responsible for the issuance of personnel access passes.
Authority for access into any restricted area of an airport complex is prescribed. The
prescribed access pass should be worn appropriately and conspicuously (above the
waistline) while its user is within the airport complex. However, this access pass
can never be used as basis for exemption from required security screening. All
security personnel are duty-bound to challenge and report anyone observed without
the appropriate access pass within a restricted area in accordance with the
established coded-access system of the airport. Prevention of passengers mix shall
always be observed.
2.2.5 VEHICLE INSPECTION
The Airport management shall be the authorized body for the issuance of
restricted area permits, which shall incorporate measures for the production,
administration and control of permits for the authorized access of vehicles to
restricted areas.
The number of vehicle permits, as far as is practicable, shall be kept to a

minimum so as to avoid proliferation of vehicles in Aircraft Movement Areas
(AMA):
a. Contained in each vehicle permit are the following;
 Registration number of the vehicle;

 Owner/operator logo of the vehicle;
 Validity period;
 Security restricted areas for which the permit is valid; and
 Access gates which the vehicle is allowed to use.
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b. Drivers of vehicles issued with restricted area vehicle permits should
be qualified to drive the appropriate class of vehicle and have been
given instruction in all safety requirements for the operation of a
vehicle in the airside.
c. The following guidelines should be observed in the movement of

authorized vehicles in the AMA:
 Drivers of authorized vehicles must have undergone

familiarization seminar on AMA layout and on rules and
regulations relating to the use thereof;
 During upgraded security conditions, the only vehicles

authorized to gain access to the AMA are vehicles used in
the airports ground operations, as all gates leading to the
AMA shall be closed. All others shall have to use the public
thoroughfares and park at designated parking area;
 Those vehicles allowed movement in the AMA shall obtain

clearance from the control tower or ramp control;
 Airline operators’ service vehicles/equipment intended to be

used on the appropriate route shall be properly marked with
the company stickers logo etc.;
 Service vehicles shall display a checkered black and yellow

flag measuring 10 inches by 12 inches;
 A rotating/alternating beacon light shall be placed on top of

the vehicle while operating on the aircraft movement areas;
 The aircraft always have the traffic priority. Likewise, during

emergencies, responding police/rescue vehicles shall have
priority over all vehicles in the area; and
 All entry and exit gates of the airport complex shall be

secured on a 24-hour basis.
2.2.6 SECURITY SURVEY, AUDIT and INSPECTION
To ensure the readiness and compliance to various security requirements in

each airport complex provided in the NCASP, personnel trained on civil aviation
security survey, audit and inspection should be designated. All PCAS are
required to conduct in-house regular security survey, audit and inspection,
Reports using the appropriate forms should be made to HQ ASG.
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Security survey is conducted to determine the adequacy,
appropriateness of the security measures implemented under the TASS
concept. Security audit is conducted to determine whether the security
measures are sufficient or needs for improvement. Security inspection should
be conducted daily. It is a daily routine activity to ensure the minimum security
requirement is met. Special attention should know the given on the serious
security violations and deficiencies noted after the conduct of security survey,
audit and inspection, The security personnel should know the results of the
security survey, audit and inspection to institute appropriate corrective
measures.
The Terminal Facility Security Inspection (TFSI) and the aerodrome

inspection shall be conducted twice daily; three (3) hours before and
immediately after airport operation to sanitize and clear the airport complex in
coordination with the airport management.
The following are the recommended Security Audit procedures:
a. Coordinate with airport management and other aviation

security stakeholders;
b. Brief the Audit Team on the emphases of the security audit;
c. Security Audit Proper; and
d. Exit briefing and preparation of report for submission to PNP-

ASG, Headquarters;
2.2.7 GUARD and GUARD SYSTEM
All facilities within the airport complex are deemed restricted areas.
Only authorized individuals, personnel and vehicle are allowed access. Guards
are posted at various perimeter posts and gates strategically established
within the complex and terminal buildings. At least one (1) security personnel
shall be posted to implement the access procedure.
The Guard System is composed of the following:
a. Perimeter Guards. Specific duties and responsibilities:
 To inspect all perimeter fence with physical security devices;
 Challenge all person/vehicle access that passes his area of

jurisdiction;
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 Always be alert and report all unauthorized and untoward
incident; and
 Perform other duties and responsibilities as directed.
b. Gate Guards. Specific duties and responsibilities:
 Check the access pass and enforce the Aircraft Movement Area
(AMA) requirements for vehicles such as; AMA DRIVER’S
PERMIT, AMA STICKER, BEACON LIGHT as provided for the
airport security program;
 In conducting vehicle search use extended mirror for under

chassis inspection and visual inspection of vehicle back seats,
gloves and trunk compartments for prohibited/unauthorized items
and verify their company tally in/out receipts/documents;
 Direct authorized airport-users on foot to use the pedestrian gate

provided for their access;
 Record the ENTRY and EXIT of all authorized person and

vehicles;
 Inform immediately the supervisor in case of any untoward incident

in his area of jurisdiction; and
 Perform other duties and responsibilities as directed.
2.2.8 LIGHTING SYSTEM
Time is essential for airport-related agencies especially to the airline with turn
around flights, aircraft to repair and on Rest Overnight (RON). All airport facilities
should be well illuminated during the day and night.
The terminal building should be properly lighted during the day to prevent
luggage mishandling, intrusions of unauthorized airport-users into restricted areas
and proper conduct of security screening in each station. Cones of appropriate light
intensity should illuminate the perimeter fence, gate and ramp areas.
Immediate replacements of busted bulbs should be immediately reported to

appropriate airport authority. Likewise, back-up lighting system should be
provided and protected from sabotage / theft. Ramp lightings should be
sufficiently high in order not to obstruct aircraft movement and prevent accident.
There are various Types of security lighting to meet particular
applications:
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a. Perimeter lighting - is designed to cast a strong light on the
perimeter. This may be provided by overhead lamps or by low
mounted lamps that will create effect to dazzle and alter intruders.
b. Area lighting - is intended to illuminate areas inside the perimeter

through which intruders must cross in order to reach their objectives.
c. Local lighting – should illuminate those areas inadequately covered

by area lighting and which may concealed intruders. All dark spots
like roof, fire escapes and emergency exits should be illuminated by
mechanical lighting.
Flood lighting – should be used to illuminate surface (ex. buildings and fences)
which intruders must pass in-front to reach their objectives.
2.2.9 SIGNAGE
To prevent any unauthorized access by anyone into a restricted area,

appropriate signage shall be installed strategically and conspicuously within
the airport complex, to guide the airport users on the right direction.
For uniformity all types of signages indoor and outdoor shall be in

accordance with the standard materials, letter size, color and background as
approved by the proper authority.
2.3 PROTECTIVE / DEFENSIVE SECURITY MEASURES
The aircraft is the safest and most efficient mode of moving men, goods and
services. It is also the most important single component in an airport. To assure its
unhampered operations in our airports, different passive measures that interlock with
each other are institutionalized to prevent intrusion and segregate authorized from
the unauthorized airport-users and identify prohibited/dangerous objects/substances.
The middle security layer consists of Protective / Defensive security

measures that are equally complementing each other like the Passenger and
Baggage Screening Operation, Cargo Screening Operation, Airside Patrol &
Surveillance, Ramp/Aircraft Guard, Profiling, Terminal Facility Security
Inspection and Paneling.
2.3.1 PASSENGER and BAGGAGE SCREENING OPERATION
The aircraft in our air transportation system cannot be over emphasized.

To ensure its protection, all persons and luggage to include airline crew and
departing passengers without exemption should be properly screened before
boarding. Total Team approach is the guiding principle in the security
operations.
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The concept for this security operation is primarily to ferret out
prohibited/dangerous items from the persons and belongings of airport-users
through electronic and physical means. The security screening operation
consist of two (2) stages:
a. Initial security screening of all baggage thru x-ray machines

and walk-thru metal detector for the passengers and airport users at
the terminal departure lobby.
b. Final security screening of all hand carried/cabin baggage thru

x-ray machine and walk-thru metal detector and the conduct of 100%
body frisk to all passengers and airport users, immediately after
immigration or terminal fee counter.
Conduct of manual search of all passengers and their baggage when

security screening equipment is not available, non-operational or when
security screening equipment alarms to identify the items. As necessary,
dedicated security screening checkpoint may be established in coordination
with the airport authority. In addition, EOD / K-9 elements should be randomly
deployed as part of the security screening procedure.
To meet the international standards the following security equipment

such as x-ray machines, walk-thru metal detectors (WTMD) and handheld metal
detectors (HHMD)/scanner are used in each security screening checkpoint.
Composition of the Security Screening Checkpoint:
a. Passenger Controller - must be stationed one (1) meter in front of the

screening checkpoint to regulate and control the orderly flow of the
airport-users one at a time prior to passengers/baggage screening.
Duties and responsibilities:
 Directs the passenger to place their baggage and hand carried

item large enough to conceal a weapon, explosive device or other
restricted article unto the x-ray conveyor belt for x-ray inspection
and/or submit the item for hand inspection.
 Directs passenger to divest any metal objects in pockets or that

can be removed from their person or clothing.
 Advises the concerned to pass through the WTMD in normal/regular

pace and gait; and
 Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.
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b. Baggage Feeder – is the front liner in a security screening checkpoint if
there is no passenger controller and positions himself/herself before
the x-ray machine metal rollers. Responsible for the orderly
processing, placement and distancing of each luggage and object to
enable the electronic sensor to scan their contents properly.
 Advises airport users to place each luggage flat on the metal roller and
direct them to divests metal object and other personal items in their
possession and place them in the divest container provided for the
purpose;
 Places the divest container in a location where the airport user can
see it while passing through the WTMD.
 Ensures that spaces of each luggage is at least one foot apart and
acceptable through the x-ray tunnel;
 Directs airport-user to pass thru the WTMD one at a time; and
c. X-ray Machine Operator - is the one who identifies, interprets images

and color codes as reflected in the x-ray monitor regarding security
prohibited items (SPI) like; drugs, weapons, explosives and its components
like 24-gauge wire, clock, fuse, detonator and batteries; bladed/pointed
objects and corrosive substances.
 Checks the operational status of the machine before assuming duty;
 Focuses on the job and be guided with the following three (3) threat
signs on the monitor screen: Obvious threats are clear images/color
codes of SPI like firearms, explosives and pointed/bladed weapons or
any of these components that calls for the assistance of the Armed
Supervisor. Possible threats are suspicious unidentifiable images/color
codes denoting SPI or parts thereof, that needs physical inspection of
the suspected baggage. No threat means the luggage is clear of any
SPI and therefore acceptable for loading into the aircraft;
 Stops the conveyor belt and inform immediately the Armed Supervisor
in case of any Obvious Threat and the Baggage Inspector in case of
Possible Threat in a particular luggage and its exact location;
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 Observes at least 20 minutes rotation and accomplish the X-ray
Operator Log Sheet;
d. Baggage Inspector - conducts the systematic physical inspection of

suspected luggage for SPI in the presence of the owner under the
supervision of the armed supervisor witnessed by an airline staff or
any airport authority until the suspected item is found, verified and
identified.
 Establishes the identity of the rightful owner of a suspected luggage

through his/her valid airline ticket and other documents prior to the
conduct of baggage inspection either random or Possible Threat;
 Coordinates with the X-ray Machine Operator the exact location of the
suspected item/s inside the luggage;
 Informs the Armed Supervisor about the need for physical inspection;
 Requests the rightful owner of the suspected luggage to open for

manual inspection in the presence of the Armed Supervisor
witnessed by the airline staff or any airport authority. In case of
electronic gadgets, requires the owner to personally operate the
same before removing all its batteries;
 Prevents the rightful owner to have physical contact with the

content of his luggage during the conduct of systematic physical
inspection;
 Turns over to the Armed Supervisor all SPI found during the
inspection for proper disposition; and
e. Body Frisker – conducts body frisking of all airport-users every time

the Walk-Thru Metal Detector (WTMD) alarms and resolve by the use
of Hand Held Metal Detector (HHMD) on both Initial and Final Security
Screening Checkpoint (SSCP). In addition, conduct 100% body pat-
down at the final SSCP.
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 At the Initial SSCP, when the airport user passed thru the WTMD
and there is no alarm, the body frisker will allow them to proceed
to the check-in counter, however, if the WTMD alarms the body
frisker shall use the HHMD to resolve the caused of alarm;
 At the Final SSCP, when the airport user passed thru the WTMD
and there is no alarm, the body frisker will allow them to proceed
at the 100% pat down area. If the WTMD alarms the body frisker
shall direct the airport user to remove the shoes and to divest all
metal objects and placed them on the divest container for x-ray
examination and require the airport user to pass thru the WTMD
and if it alarms for the 2nd time, HHMD shall be used to resolve the
caused of alarm and allow the airport user to proceed at the 100%
pat down area;
 Turn-over to the Armed Supervisor any SPI found from the airport
user during the search for proper disposition; and
f. SSCP Armed Supervisor - oversees the Uniformed and Non-uniformed

personnel for the consistent performance of their duties and
responsibilities at each SSCP.
 Ensures that all anti-hijacking equipments are operational and

passed the mandatory operational testing and properly recorded
in the equipment logbook;
 Inform the Terminal Action Officer (TAO) and coordinate for the
immediate repair/maintenance of defective anti-hijacking
equipment with the concerned authority;
 Supervises the performance of each member of the SSCP;
 Acts as witness and prevent the passenger to hold any item inside
his luggage during the conduct of manual inspection;
 Resolves any misunderstanding between any member of the SSCP

and/or airport-user;
 Assumes control over the confiscated/surrendered SPI and

deposits in a box provided for the purpose;
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 Coordinates with the appropriate airline and government agency
for the off-loading passenger and his luggage as warranted;
 Reports any breach of security to the Station Action Officer for

corrective measures and/or proper disposition; and
Other security personnel that support the security screening checkpoint;
a. Terminal Action Officer (TAO) - is primarily responsible for the

supervision and management of all security screening checkpoint teams
in the terminal/airport station.
 Conduct accounting and dissemination of security issuances and

directives from Hqs, PNP-ASG and Airport Authority to all
incoming duty security screening personnel prior to deployment
to their respective SSCP;
 Ensures the proper conduct, efficiency, adequate manning and the

presence of the Armed Supervisors in every SSCP in the
terminal/airport station at any time of each shift;
 Inform and submit report to the Chief, PCAS/station of any untoward

incident or significant development in his area of responsibility;
 Monitor and provide security assistance to any VIPs and members

of the diplomatic corps; and
 Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed;
b. Protocol Officer/Firearm Facilitator – assist the SSCP armed

supervisor in monitoring the individual performance of uniformed and
non-uniformed personnel at each SSCP and acts primarily as fire armed
facilitator and /or protocol officer who provides VIP facilitation.
 Supervises the safe unloading of the turned-in firearm using the

designated clearing box and ensures that policies and rules in
firearms handling are strictly observed;
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 Verifies the authenticity of each document presented by the
firearm holder like license, memorandum receipt, permit to carry
and/or authority to transport;
 Records all pertinent data in the log book provided for the
purpose;
 Properly transfers the turned-in firearms to be contained in a

sturdy bag to the concerned airlines and ensures proper receipt
thereof. No passenger should be allowed to turn over his/her
firearm directly to the airline; and
2.3.2 CARGO SCREENING OPERATION
The PNP-ASG shall ensure the proper implementation of security

measures relative to screening and administrative procedures to all outgoing
cargo. Coordination should be made to Airlines, freight forwarders, postal authorities
and courier companies to establish accountability for the security of all consigned
cargo.
Cargo Security procedures at the acceptance, storage/staging and

aircraft loading area should be developed and updated per Airport Security
Program (ASP) to ensure that no prohibited and dangerous items shall be
loaded on board the aircraft. EOD/K-9 teams should be randomly deployed as
part of the cargo screening operation.
Composition of Cargo Security Screening Operation:
a. PNP Cargo Screening In-Charge – responsible for the supervision of

the cargo security screening of all cargo before loading on board the
aircraft.
 Supervise the X-ray operator of the airline or cargo operator in the

performance of their duties and responsibilities;
 Monitor all activities within his areas of responsibilities;
 Coordinate with the airline/cargo security supervisor for the list of

authorized personnel involved in x-ray security screening
procedures;
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 Inform the cargo security team leader and/or PCAS/Station Hqs of
any prohibited/contraband items detected by the cargo x-ray
operator who will in turn dispatched investigator for proper
disposition ;
 Ensures that all cargo found with possible or obvious threat image are
properly inspected in the presence of a cargo representative and a
Bureau of Customs (BoC) Examiner
 Effect the arrest of any person for violations of the revised penal
code and other special laws and turn over to the investigation
section for filing of appropriate charges;
b. PNP Cargo Staging Area Security In-Charge – responsible for the cargo
security at the staging/storage area.
 To prevent pilferage/tampering or switching of screened cargo at

staging/storage areas of the airline/cargo operator prior to heir
transport to the aircraft;
 Counter check access pass and courteously challenge all persons

loitering within the cargo staging/storage area;
 Coordinate with the customs, airline and cargo security supervisor

for the list of authorized personnel involved in cargo handling
operations at the staging/storage areas;
 Inform the cargo security team leader of all incident and any
unusual observation in the area thru any means of fastest
communications;
c. PNP Cargo Security Escort – Screened Cargo from the

staging/storage areas to the aircraft.
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 Prevent pilferage and tampering of the screened cargo while on
transit from the airline/cargo staging/storage to the aircraft;
 Coordinate with the customs and airlines cargo security

supervisor for the list of authorized personnel involved in cargo
handling operations from the cargo warehouse to the aircraft;
 Inform the cargo security team leader of all incident and any
unusual observation in the area thru any means of fastest
communications;
2.3.3 AIRSIDE PATROL AND SURVEILLANCE
Aside from the checkpoint and visibility patrols conducted on the landside,
preventive foot and motorized patrol within the airside shall also be conducted
regularly to preempt any activity prejudicial to airport operations. Special emphasis
will be given to the AMA, ramp, cargo/baggage hold areas, power generators,
terminal, radar, control tower and other identified vulnerable facilities.
The airside of the airport should be kept under surveillance with the use of
CCTV if possible. This is to ensure that any untoward development can be easily
monitored and immediately attended to by the patrol teams.
a. Foot and Motorized Patrol Teams - are joint by law enforcement and
security teams led by PCAS/Station personnel organized to conduct
patrol at the airside of the airport.
 Conduct routine foot and motorized patrols within the airside of the
airport;
 Act as first responder on reported or discovered unattended baggage;
 Exercise operational supervision to all security complement detailed in

the airside of the airport;
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 Ensure that the runway and taxiway are swept for debris and
obstructions and looks out for any security breach in the perimeter
fence;
 Effect the arrest of any airport-user and vehicle operator within

any restricted area without appropriate access authority for
violations of the revised penal code and other special laws and
turn over to the investigation section for filing of appropriate
charges;
 Perform such other duties and responsibilities as directed.
2.3.4 RAMP/AIRCRAFT GUARD
The most important element of the middle security layer who controls the
authorized access of service, maintenance, catering and airline flight crews
around the aircraft.
 Ensures that he positions himself/herself near the aircraft parking bay

ten (10) minutes before arrival and departure of the aircraft;
 Supervise the airline security in the conduct of physical

inspections of the tool box/bags and cleaning equipment of airline
flight crew and maintenance personnel and check their access before
they will be allowed to enter the aircraft;
 Effect the arrest of any airport-user and vehicle operator within

any restricted area without appropriate access authority for
violations of the revised penal code and other special laws and
turn over to the investigation section for filing of appropriate
charges;
 Inhibits anybody from using the aircraft belly as standby point;
 Inform the Terminal Action Officer of all incident and any unusual
observation in the area thru any means of fastest
communications;
2.3.5 PROFILING
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This is another effective preemptive security measures that can ferret out or
deter would-be terrorists to attempt any form of unlawful interference to civil aviation.
It is primarily based on the careful evaluation of gathered intelligence and operational
information regarding impending threats of terrorism or peak hour airport operations
that may be taken advantage of by misguided individuals/groups.
Profiling, however, should be properly planned, organized and executed in a

judicious and courteous manner at the landside security checkpoint, curbside,
lobby prior to initial and final security checkpoints and other restricted areas to
prevent unfounded accusations of harassment from departing passengers.
Guidelines to be followed by the profiler
 Observe and record behavior of the selectee, nationality,

description, age and number of baggage.
 Record the number of companion/s, nationality, description and
age who accompanied the selectee.
 Record the type of vehicle, color, make, model, plate number and
other distinguishing markers/logos.
 Coordinate with the security personnel at the passenger entrance
gate to check and verify the ticket and travel documents of the
selectee.
 Coordinate with the SSCP armed supervisor for the conduct of
rigid security inspection on the selectee and his baggage.
 Selectee and his baggage shall be subjected to additional security
screening with the use of drugs and explosives trace device. (if
available)
a. The following are sample questions that might be asked during profiling:
 Who packed your luggage?

 Do you know the content of your luggage?
 Where was the luggage kept after it was packed?
 For how long and where did it transpire?
 Who has access to it?
 Does the luggage contain packages from friends?
 Do you know or personally seen the contents of the package?
 Who knows that you were scheduled to depart today?
b. The following are to be observed by the profiler but not limited to:
o Eye movement
o Eye contact
o Nervousness with no apparent
reasons
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o Inappropriate clothing/attire
o Sweating in the area with controlled
air environment
o Unnecessary movement
2.3.6 TERMINAL FACILITY SECURITY INSPECTION (TFSI)
TFSI is conducted three (3) hours before the start of terminal operation and
one (1) hour after to ensure that the airport is sterile and secured from sabotage,
infiltration and other acts of unlawful interference to civil aviation. The security
inspection is normally done by a composite team of PNP-ASG, airport authority and
airline security personnel, such as:
 briefing/debriefing of security personnel

 activation/deactivation of Anti Hijacking Equipment (AHE)
 paneling of the airport terminal/facilities
a. Team Composition of TFSI:
 PNP-ASG Terminal Action Officer – Team Leader

 PNP-ASG K-9 and EOD Teams
 Airport Duty Manager/Action Officer or representative from the airport
authority
 Airline Security Representative
Airport Police/Contracted Security Agencies/Airport Civil Security Force
b. Procedures to be followed in the conduct of TFSI;
 TFSI shall be conducted three (3) hours before and one (1) hour after the
flight operations.
 Terminal Action Officer to coordinate with Airport Authority with the
conduct of TFSI.
 The Airport Duty Manager or Representative from the Airport Authority
will notify representatives from the Airline, Airport Police/Airport Civil
Security Force/Contracted Security Agency for the conduct of TFSI.
 Operational testing of AHE simultaneously with the inspection by the
TFSI team.
 TFSI team will conduct paneling by levels to ensure full coverage of the
areas.
 Passenger terminal shall be closed and no movement of personnel or
passenger shall be allowed during the inspection. Announcement will
be made thru the Public Address System.
 After TFSI report shall be submitted by the TAO for the information of
GOC and the Director, ASG.
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2.3.7 PANELING
Paneling is being conducted by EOD and K-9 personnel to determine the

presence of any explosive substance, incendiary material or IED component in all
facilities, baggage, vehicles and aircraft.
 Conduct regular or routine paneling of vital airport facilities particularly

on the security screening gates, AMA, ramp, cargo/baggage hold
areas, power generators, fuel depot, lobby and airline offices;
 Conduct random K-9 searches on luggage of departing passengers;
 Inform the TAO of any untoward or significant incident as soon as it

arises;
 Respond to report on the presence of Unattended Baggage (UB); and
2.4 REACTIVE SECURITY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT MEASURES

The inner security layer depicts the Reactive / Crisis Management
measures that are mutually exclusive with each other developed to respond to
and to manage contingencies. It includes procedures on Incident Management,
Explosive Disposal and Clearing & Armed Intervention.
Murphy’s Law states that “If anything happens, it will, at the worst moment”
is a recognized phenomenon despite efforts to envelop our airport complexes with
adequate concentric layers of protective and preventive security operations. The
threat to civil aviation is like Sword of Damocles hanging overhead and should not be
treated lightly.
In the event of the occurrence of a crisis situation, the established security

operational plans intended specifically to respond, manage and mitigate
security/emergencies that may transpire in our airport complexes, e.g. bomb threat,
hijacking and airport emergencies. Each incident should preferably be nipped in the
bud during its incipient stage to ensure its early resolution and prevent protracted and
costly and embarrassing crisis incident situations.
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2.4.1 INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
In cases of acts of unlawful interference to Civil Aviation, appropriate pro

active security operations is undertaken by the PNP-ASG in coordination with the
airport authority/management through its Airport Crisis Management
Group/Committee based on the provisions of the NCASP/ASP to resolve the
situation and without unduly jeopardizing other on-going unaffected airport security
operations. This is because adequate protection of lives and properties in the airport
at any time is the avowed mission of the PNP-ASG.
A crisis has four (4 known stages that must be recognized and appropriately
handled in order to avoid escalation. Each stage has its characteristics and
defining traits. It is akin to a fluid, unstable and dynamic; its progress should be
controlled. Remember, a brewing crisis cannot be seen, touched, heard, tasted or
felt.
a) The First Phase is the Prodromal or the Warning Stage characterized by

existence of perceptible or imperceptible signs. An example is an accumulation
over time of ignored and neglected minor and seemingly harmless security violations
and deficiencies that may collectively trigger a proverbial spark as occurred in an
spontaneous explosion that would result in a conflagration; as exemplified by
mounting indifference and complacency to the required standard security
procedures or by a well-planned event of terrorist.
b) The Second Phase is the Acute Stage known as the turning point for the
worst. Ideally, a crisis should be resolved in its incipient stage. However, once an
incident is allowed to progress to this stage, only damage control techniques could
only be instituted to prevent or delay/control the turn of events for the worst. In the
aviation security front, this is likened to an access and control by the hijackers of an
aircraft.
c) The Third Phase is the Chronic Stage characterized by the aggravation of

the unfolding events marked as the point of no return. In such situation, the hijackers
begin to harm or kill their hostages and press hard for the immediate granting of
their demands.
d) The Final Phase is the Crisis Stage wherein the reaction unit is ordered
and dispatched to terminate the impasse and has initiated the launching of
surgical operations.
The overall command of an incident at the national level is exercised by the

Office of Transportation Security (OTS). However, the initial reaction to a crisis
situation outside Metro Manila is the responsibility of the PNP Regional Director
under whose area of jurisdiction the affected airport is located. When the Director,
PNP-ASG arrives at the area, he takes over the command and control of the
crisis resolution actions from the Regional Director.
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In the event of crisis, the C, PCAS with jurisdiction over the concerned airport
is the On-site Commander and will take order from the Director, PNP-ASG upon
the arrival of the latter.
a. On-Site Commander duties and functions:
 Inform the Director, PNP-ASG by fastest means of communication;
 Activates the On-site coordinating committee by coordinating with

the airport authority for the convening of the airport crisis committee;
 Coordinate with the airport authority and airline security for the
transfer of the aircraft to a designated Isolation Parking Area IPA;
 Establish tighter security at the IPA, outer and inner perimeter of the
airport complex;
 Gather initial information about hijackers, passengers and involved

aircraft and relay them to HQ ASG (Attn: GOC). Specifically, required
data is the number, organization/affiliation, armaments and demands of
the hijackers and their identities and nationality, the passengers, the
aircraft, its registry, model, and destination;
 Establish the Advance Command Post (ACP) and coordinate with the
airport authority for the staging area of the SOU or Police/ Military
Reaction Unit;
 Designate a media coordinator and press briefing area to control the

movement of members of the media; and
 Request for technical and medical support personnel from the nearest
PNP/AFP unit with jurisdiction over the area;
 Designate an official negotiator and assistant;
 Perform all other duties and responsibilities as directed;
b. Incident Management Staff
The HQ PNP-ASG Staffs shall automatically be converted into an

Incident Management Staff (IMS) to assist the Director, PNP-ASG in
effectively managing and resolving the instant Aviation Security Crisis
Situation.
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Responsibilities of the IMS:
 Establishment of the Command Post;
 Planning of negotiation tactics and strategies;
 Appointment of trained negotiation;
 Initiate coordination with airline airport authority, concern affair

for technical assistance;
 Deploy it of SOU personnel when necessary;
 Perform other tasked as directed.]
The following are tasking of each PNP-ASG Staff Officer
1. Director, ASG (DASG) Incident Commander
 Appoint member of the negotiating team and guide the conduct of

negotiator;
 Prepare timely report about the incident for the information of

CASS, OTS and C, PNP;
 Gave the order for the final option for armed intervention;
 Perform other tasked as directed by the CMC.
Deputy Director for Administration (DDA) will act as the alternate

IMS commander in case the Director, ASG is not available and perform
other tasked as maybe directed.
2. Deputy Director for Operations (DDO)
 Prepare the plan releases to be issued by ADPCR/PIO;
 Assist the incident commander in the negotiation process; and
 Perform other task as directed.
3. Assistant Director for Personnel and Records Management (ADPRM)
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 Coordinate with concerned PCAS Chief for the required personnel
support;
 Provide a comprehensive personnel disposition plan and estimate

of the of the situation to the incident commander;
 Initiate generation of additional personnel through General Service

Office;
 Provide administrative support to the IMS;
 Issue orders of personnel to be dispatched; and
 Perform other tasked as directed.
4. Assistant Director for Intelligence and Investigation (ADII)
 Gather information and updates about the hijackers, their identities,

organization, cohorts, weapons, the passengers and the affected
aircraft to support the negotiating and assault than intelligence
update;
 Dispatch intelligence operatives to the site with their monitoring

equipment;
 Prepare intelligence estimate of the situation for the incident

________ debriefs the released passengers;
 Organize a penetration decoys and follow-up team for dispatch;
 Secure the Passenger Number Manifest (PNM); General Declaration

and relevant flight documents;
 Update and validate watch list on major threat groups and finish
the tasked units;
 Conducts appropriate investigation of arrested hijackers and prepare

required legal documents for filing of appropriate charges in court; and
 Performs other tasked as directed.
5. Assistant Director for Operations (ADO)
 Overseas the implementation of appropriate operations plans and

progress of the operations of the tasked units;
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 Coordinates with affected airline and alerts ACTF for deployment;
Periodically briefs Director, PNP-ASG and submits reports to NHQ PNP
and OTS;
 Designates qualified negotiators to back up those already at the site

and arranges for their transport; and
6. Assistant Director for Logistics (ADL)
 Provides necessary supply support to meet operational

requirements to be dispatched to the site without delay;
 Arrange for transportation support to ferry required support

personnel to the holding area in coordination with the ADO;
 Arrange for the communication equipment needed at the IMS,

commo link with the hijacker and on site coordination committee
coordination with ADTS; and
7. Assistant Director for Technical Service (ADTS)
 Coordinate with concern agency for the installation of

communications link between the hijackers, On-Site Crisis Committee
and IMS; and
8. Assistant Director for Police Community Relations/Public Information

Officer (ADPCR/PIO)
 Coordinates with ADL for the release of required medical supplies

and the ADI for the names, addresses/telephone numbers and
nationalities of the passengers contained in the PNM;
 Insures the proper conduct of Passenger Assistance effort to inform

their nearest of kin and the extension of necessary medical services to
the injured or those in safe of shock; and
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9. Assistant Director for Human Resource and Doctrine Development
 Assists in the conceptualization of appropriate crisis management

strategy to be implemented;
 Culls operational data as basis for programming training courses

and for enhancing aviation security doctrines; and
10. Assistant Director for Comptrollership
 Coordinates with CASS, OTS for the required financial support; and
11. Group Legal Officer
 Renders necessary legal assistance required; and
12. Public Information Officer
 Establishes a Media Coordinating Center and the procedures to be

followed by members of the media;
 Conducts periodic press briefing as appropriate;
 Accredits members of the media and their equipment;
 Controls the movements of members of the media during the incident;

and
13. Non-Aviation Security Related Airport Emergencies
Airport emergencies such as aircraft crashes, terminal and other airport

emergencies like facility fire, earthquake, inundation, typhoons and power failure due
to sabotage of power generator and navigational aids will be dealt with appropriately
due to its threat to security. This is because the airside is the exclusive jurisdiction
of PNP-ASG and public safety is one of the major concerns of the PNP. These
unintended or intended incidents may have been deliberately initiated to divert our
attention in order to penetrate the airport premises via the backdoor.
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The following are the responsibilities of concerned PCAS Chief:
 Immediately determines the exact location and cause of the

emergency;
 Conducts quick inventory of available personnel and dispatches them

to the site in coordination with the airport authority;
 Establishes control over the site and protect its integrity;
 Coordinates for the required emergency assistance like firefighting,

medical, evacuation and recovery of equipment;
 Insures protection of lives and damage to properties;
 Submits report of action taken to Director, ASG (Attn: ADO); and
2.3.2 EXPLOSIVE DISPOSAL AND CLEARING
a. Bomb Threat Response
The mode of conveying the threat information specifically intended to disrupt

airline operations should dictate the appropriate actions to undertake which fall on
the following manner: by phone, written and personal delivery. Any threat
information should be treated seriously. Some individuals motivated by greed,
revenge and hatred or political agenda might attempt to delay, disrupt and jeopardize
airline/airport operations to the inconvenience of departing passengers and causing
unnecessary airline expenses.
The centrality of pinpointing the exact location and time of supposed explosion
of the alleged bomb can greatly assist in the initiation of appropriate remedial bomb
recovery procedures.
Positive Target Identification (PTI) System should be implemented if feasible

by the Chief PCAS/DSAO. In this case, certified bomb threat assessors are
designated by the airport authority/management to evaluate the threat whether it
lacks credibility and therefore does not justify extra precautions or is credible that
merits intermediate or complete countermeasures. Otherwise, the assessment
should be done in coordination with the airport authority/management; Chairman,
Airline Operators’ Council (if feasible); and airline concerned.
In all of the situations mentioned below, the DSAO; PCAS Chief; ASC;
Director, PNP-ASG; and the affected airline should immediately be informed as soon
as the threat arises. They should then be informed of the result of the paneling and
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render safe procedure as soon as it is completed as basis for clearing the aircraft.
Furthermore, necessary coordination should be made with medical, fire and airport
authority/management in all cases of bomb threat.
b. By telephone
Primarily, the telephone provides a cloak of anonymity and is a preferred

method to relay bomb threat. To thwart this malicious intention, the following action
should be observed by PCAS and other subordinate offices:
 Bomb Threat Checklist should be provided and made accessible and

conspicuous in each telephone set in the airport; (Appendix MM – Bomb
Threat Checklist)
 Words uttered by the caller over the telephone should be recorded and
analyzed while he is encouraged to divulge the exact location and specific
time of explosion of the alleged bomb;
 Dilatory tactics by referring him to a supervisor should likewise be

attempted to determine the aforementioned information;
 Regional accent and any background noise picked up by telephone

receiver should be monitored while accomplishing the checklist;
 HQ ASG (Attn: ADO) should be notified in case of a bomb threat without

delay;
 Monthly Bomb Threat Report together with the accomplished Checklist for
each incident should be submitted to HQ ASG
c. By Written Communication
The written communication bearing the threat information should

immediately be evaluated and handled properly before competent authorities
are able to examine it for tale-tell evidences in it like fingerprints, handwriting
styles and minute traces of sticky substances invisible to the naked eye. The
accompanying envelop particularly its postmarks can provide the location and
date it was sent.
d. Personal Delivery
When the threat information is conveyed through the use of a courier,

the person should be held to determine relevant information on his physical
attributes, occupations and motive, etc. When the courier leaves, efforts
should be exerted to identify the mode of transportation, direction he took and
his companions.
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e. Procedural Response on Bomb Threat
If per chance, the exact location of the bomb in the airport complex is
elicited and the bomb is within the airport building or facility, the orderly
evacuation of the affected building or facility, if necessary, should be ensured.
In other cases, the following actions depending on the specific situation should
be undertaken:
f. Baggage Already Loaded in Aircraft that is on the Ground Before

Boarding
 The aircraft should be boarded by a designated uniformed security

personnel, towed to the designated Isolation Parking Area (IPA) and
provided with adequate perimeter security thereat;
 Baggage should be unloaded from the aircraft and systematically

lined up at a safe distance away from the aircraft and other airport
facilities;
 Paneling shall be conducted by K-9/EOD personnel to isolate the

suspected baggage. It shall then be brought by the EOD personnel
to the designated isolation area and render safe procedure
undertaken;
 Paneling of other areas of the aircraft should be done by K-9/EOD

personnel; and
 Positive passenger-baggage match-up shall be undertaken prior to

reloading of baggage into the aircraft.
g. Baggage Not Yet Loaded in the Aircraft
 When the baggage is reported to be in the baggage build up area,

EOD/K-9 personnel should conduct paneling thereat to locate and
isolate the particular baggage. The suspected baggage should be
brought by the EOD personnel at a safe distance away from the
terminal or at the designated isolation area and render safe
procedure undertaken;
 When the baggage is already in the container van or in the baggage

cart, the van or the cart should be brought to the designated
isolation area and the baggage lined up. Paneling should be
conducted by K-9/EOD personnel to locate the suspected baggage
and render safe procedure undertaken.
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h. Baggage Loaded and Passengers aboard in the Aircraft
 If the aircraft is not yet ready for take-off, all passengers and crew
with their hand carried luggage should be required to disembark
immediately;
 If the aircraft is ready for take-off, it should be towed or directed to

proceed to the designated IPA. The crew and passengers should
then be directed to disembark from the aircraft with their hand-
carried luggage and brought back by shuttle bus (if available) to the
pre-departure area inside the terminal;
 Passengers and their luggage should be isolated while inside

terminal to prevent passenger/luggage mix. Movement of the
passengers while thereat should be closely monitored by security
personnel;
 Baggage should then be at the same time unloaded from the

baggage hold of the aircraft and systematically lined up for paneling
by K-9/EOD personnel. The suspected baggage should then be
isolated and brought by the EOD personnel at a safe distance away
from the aircraft or to the designated isolation area and render safe
procedure undertaken;
 Other areas of the aircraft should also be paneled by K-9/EOD

personnel;
 When the aircraft and baggage is cleared, security re-screening of

crew, passengers and their hand-carried luggage should be
undertaken at the terminal;
 Prior to boarding and loading of baggage, positive passenger–

baggage match-up shall be done; and
 Unclaimed and/or unidentified baggage should be isolated and

secured and turned over to affected airline for proper disposition.
i. Aircraft In-Flight
 The control tower should be informed about the threat and be

required to direct the Pilot-In-Command of the aircraft for the
immediate landing and parking of the aircraft in the designated IPA
to initiate the implementation of the airline emergency plan;
35
 When the aircraft is already in the IPA, procedures in para 4.3.2.3.
should be implemented.
2.3.3 ARMED INTERVENTION
The Aviation Counter Terrorism Force (ACTF) is the special unit of the Group
tasked to conduct counter-terrorism measures to prevent and resolved any
unlawful interference to civil aviation especially when there is a need for armed
intervention and bomb threat clearing operations. In case of hijacking incident,
ACTF will deploy SOU personnel to secure the affected area while the negotiation
is ongoing and to conduct aircraft assault in case the negotiation fails. The following
are the duties and responsibilities of concerned unit commanders:
a. Commander, ACTF
 Alerts and deploys SOU and K-9 personnel;
 Organizes reserved elements for further deployment;
 Monitors developing situation;
 Advises Director, PNP-ASG on courses of action that can be taken;

and
b. Chief, SOU
 Immediately places his personnel on standby alert status;
 Practices aircraft assault with the aircraft model similar with the
affected aircraft;
 Establishes staging areas for assault teams;
 Deploys snipers and spotters at the designated areas as

appropriate;
 Performs counter hijacking assault operations upon direction

of the Director, ASG?
 Ensures the proper identification/segregation of hijackers and

passengers after the incident; and
 Employs EOD personnel for a bomb clearing operation when

necessary.
36
Chief, K-9 Unit
a. Places his personnel on standby alert status;
b. Conducts paneling of affected areas as directed;
c. Coordinates with the SOU for deployment; and
d. Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.
CHAPTER III
EXCEPTIONAL SECURITY SCREENING
1. VIPs and Diplomats
a. The President, Vice President and visiting Heads of States are exempted
from security screening. However, their luggage may be screened
electronically, if requested.
b. Sealed diplomatic pouches in the courier’s possession are not subject to

manual search. However, personal luggage of the courier should be
processed in the normal manner.
c. Exemption from screening may be extended to Head of Diplomatic

Missions and their personal effects if advance coordination are made.
2. Passenger under Escort
a. Certain dignitaries, VIPs, witness under

protective custody or prisoners in-transit will be escorted by armed law
enforcement officers (LEO) from PNP-ASG upon request in coordination
with other airport authorities. Armed LEO escorts which are not organic at
the airport shall deposit their firearms at the initial screening checkpoint
consigned by proper receipt.
b. Dignitaries with appropriate/advance

coordination with the airport authorities will be notified into private or
special screening process.
c. Security personnel accompanying foreign

dignitaries must have advance coordination with the airport authorities.
37
Only designated Air Marshals on duty with MOU with the Philippine
Government will be allowed to board the aircraft with authorized firearms.
3. Law Enforcement Officer (LEO)
At the airport, on duty uniformed officers with proper credentials, serving as

law enforcement officers such as PNP-ASG in prescribed uniform, may pass
through the checkpoint without full screening.
4. Classified Materials and Diplomatic Pouches
a. Passengers with diplomatic pouches must

make prior arrangements with airport authorities and airline concerned for
these items to be exempted from screening.
b. Upon presentation of the appropriate

identification and documentation describing the materials to be exempted
form screening to the checkpoint Supervisor, the material designated in the
documentation may pass through the checkpoint without being x-ray or
searched.
c. The person carrying the materials must be

screened in the same manner as other passengers. It is the classified
materials or so called “diplomatic documents” placed in a sealed diplomatic
pouch that are exempted from normal screening but not the person or
other baggage.
5. Extra-ordinary Items
a. Some religious articles, medical lifesaving and scientific items, legal

evidences and crematory containers (burial urns) may be exempted from x-
ray inspection and/or manual inspection if they cannot be opened without
damaging it or its content. However, proper documentation and chain of
custody will be scrutinized. Prior arrangements must be made with airport
authorities and airline concerned where the passenger is traveling.
b. The passenger must have documentations to verify the contents of the item
to be exempted and personal identification. The passenger should undergo
the standard screening procedures.
6. Infants and Small Children
a. Passengers traveling with infants or children shall be asked to remove child

from child carrier device and should carry the child carrier device shall be
passed through the x-ray machine.
38
e. Be sure that the child carriers are not placed on the x-ray machine
conveyor belt until the child has been removed.
f. If the passenger does want to remove the infant from the carrier, the infant
in the carrier must pass through the walk-thru metal detector. When the
metal detector alarms, both must be cleared by the hand held metal
detector for alarm resolution.
g. Children in strollers should be removed from the stroller and be required to

pass through the metal detector. If the child cannot walk, the child should
be carried and passed through the walk-thru metal detector by the person
accompanying the child. When the metal detector alarms, both must be
cleared by the handheld metal detector. Enough alarm between the person
coming the baby and the baby for alarm resolution.
h. The stroller should be cleared through the x-ray. Nevertheless, special

scrutiny should be taken to ensure that pockets or container on the stroller
and the under side are all inspected.
7. Physically Impaired Persons
a. Physically impaired persons, e.g. incapacitated / stretcher-

borne passengers (or their escorts) should be interviewed for the cause of
the ailment and medical certificate or proof of their condition should be
inquired.
b. With the gathered information, security screeners shall

conduct the Pat Down Search using the handheld metal detector to subject
passenger and be sensitive to his condition. They shall pay particular
attention to the blanket, clothes/carriage pockets, linings and covers.
c. Wheel chairs and hand carried baggage to be brought into

the aircraft should be screened electronically.
d. Unauthorized access to airport of wheel chairs should be

prevented to prevent substitution and insertion of prohibited/dangerous
objects.
e. All crutches, walking aids and baby carriages should likewise

be screened electronically. Scratches and other recent disturbances in the
metal surfaces of screws and joints should be looked into since they are
indicative of effort to insert prohibitive substance in the frame/tubing and
canvas/leather double linings/ pockets of carriage, wheel chairs, and
crutches.
8. Intransient Passengers
39
a. In-transit and transfer passenger and their cabin baggage may be
subjected to security check before continuing the flight. However,
measures must be established to control these passengers and their cabin
baggage in order to prevent unauthorized articles form being taken aboard
the aircraft.
b. Special precautions taken to control transfer and transit passengers

and baggage should include surveillance of transit areas (arrival/departure
halls) and baggage storage and sorting areas. Where a transit or transfer
passenger has had access to checked baggage or baggage collection
areas, the passenger needs to be re-screened before re-boarding or
having any contact with other screened passengers.
c. In-transit passengers should be permitted to remain on board the

aircraft, if they so wish, unless required to disembark for a technical reason
or unless the aircraft needs to be searched for security reasons.
d. Flight under an increased threat situation, all passengers and their

cabin baggage must be offloaded during the transit stop and to conduct an
inspection of the interior of the aircraft where passengers have had access
during the flight to ensure that no items have been left aboard, should a
passenger attempt to disembark as mentioned in.
9. Person-In-Custody
The following guidelines and procedures shall be strictly followed:
a. The airport management/authority and the PNP-ASG

and the responsible representative of the operator must be properly
notified before the date s proposed to transport a prisoner, or soon as
practicable in an emergency, of the identity of the person being escorted,
the flight on which transportation has been arranged, and whether or not
the escorted person is considered dangerous.
b. An operator should not accept a prisoner and escort

(s) as passengers unless concurrence has been obtained in advance from
the States and other operators that may be involved en route and at the
intended final destination. In such cases sufficient advance notification
must be given the operator so that prior agreements can be obtained.
c. Escorting officers should ensure that a prisoner does

not carry contraband, weapons, matches or other potentially dangerous
items.
40
d. Escort should be equipped with adequate restraining
devices to be used in the event they determine that restraint is necessary.
Under normal circumstances a prisoner should not be shackled to any part
of the aircraft, including seats, tables, etc.
e. Escorts should not be carry mace, tear-gas or similar

incapacitating gas generating devices on board an aircraft.
f. Escort should adequately identify themselves to

security personnel, policing authority officers on duty and flight attendants,
requesting that their presence on board and seat assignment be
transmitted to the pilot-in-command, who should acknowledge receipt of
this information.
g. Escorted persons should be boarded before all other

passengers and disembarked after all other passengers have left the
aircraft.
h. They should be seated as far to the rear of the

passenger cabin as is possible but not in a lounge area or next to/directly
across from an exit.
i. They should only be seated in a roe of two or more

seats and at one escort should sit between the escorted person and any
aisle.
j. Not intoxicating beverage should be served escorts

or prisoners while on board the aircraft.
k. Prisoners may be served food at the discretion of

escorts but should not be provided with metal utensils or a knife.
10. Screening Procedure in Other Cases
a. Religious, medical, scientific and life-saving objects, legal pieces of

evidences and crematory containers which are difficult to manually inspect
may be exempted from screening if authentic documents are presented
attesting to their true nature/state.
b. The x-ray machines installed at the airports are film safe/friendly,

loaded still and video cameras should be screened electronically.
c. Infant on a carriage/stroller should be removed from it and carried

by an adult through the walk thru metal detector while the carriage/stroller
itself should be screened electronically. (Appendix X)
41
d. Cigarette packs, infant/liquid formulas, canned goods, writing
implements (ball/fountain pens), books, newspapers, magazines and
electronic devices carried by the airport-user should be screened
electronically and manually.
e. During x-ray machine downtime caused by brown out or mechanical

defects, all of these items and similar objects should be either visually
scrutinized, folded and inspected for carved-out portions that may carry
weapon that can be used to interfere with civil aviation.
42
11. Visually Impaired Passengers
If a visually impaired passenger is traveling without a companion,

he/she must be escorted by the airline staff and should be required to pass
through the normal screening procedures. They must divest themselves of
metal canes or other guide devices before walking (or being assisted) through
the walk thru metal detector.
12. Hearing Impaired Passengers and Passengers with Luggage Barriers
They should be processed using the standard screening procedures.

Face the passengers and speak clearly and slowly, pointing or pantomiming the
necessary actions and/or movements which maybe useful to help communicate
with the passenger.
13. Passengers with Pacemakers or Other Implantable Medical Devices
Passengers should be searched by hand winding the body areas away

from the device. A pat down search can clear the area where the device is
implanted. The passenger will be subjected to a whole body pat down search.
14. Wheel Chaired Passengers
a. They should be asked if it is possible for them to pass the

walk thru metal detector or stand far enough away from the metal
wheelchair to allow a handheld metal detector search. If this option is
impractical, the passenger should be processed using the appropriate
method.
b. If this is not possible, request the passenger for a whole

body pat down search. Always search the wheelchair to make sure that
there re no weapons or explosive devices concealed in any part of the
chair. Hand-carried items should pass through x-ray screening.
c. Wheelchairs should be searched systematically from the

backrest leather canvass, the external pockets, going to the arm rest, down
to the seat cover from front and back. Inspect properly the wheel of the
chair and the adjusting gear for any signs of tampering to ensure or parts
of an explosive are hidden thereat.
d. Direct the handler of the wheelchair to pass through the

walk thru metal detector for normal screening process and the hand carried
luggage to pass through the x-ray machine.
43
e. Advise the handler to standby and wait until the inspection
of the handicapped passenger and wheelchair are completed before
reconciliation.
f. Nitroglycerine in its original liquid form is a highly volatile

detonating explosive. It is highly unstable and toxic which render its
transport unsafe and very risky. To secure its safe transport, this explosive
must be stabilized with the use of absorbent materials like pulp woods.
macerated dried leaves, fowl’s feather, cloth, tissue, foam or cotton.
Nitroglycerine is any form has a PUNGENCY odor.
g. Require owners of bottled liquid to open the same and

sample a gulp in your presence.
h. Stuffed toys, pillows, blankets, hallowed-out transformer

toys, dolls, figurines and electronic devices loaded with PUNGENT
SMELLING pulp woods, macerated dried leaves, cloth, foam, feather,
tissue, cotton and other absorbent materials should be considered suspect
and its owner held for complete pat down and further investigation.
i. Traveling/ladies bags and luggage should be probed for

the presence of false bottom by comparing its actual physical depth with
that of its probable true depth. Presence of disturbances in the lining and
seams should arouse suspicions. The pockets, sidings and linings should
be checked for any bulge or wet, pungent portions
j. Contact lens container, ointments and balms should be

opened and smelled for PUNGENCY. Cotton/pulp stabilizers should be
inspected. The bottom of infant formulas should be probed for its true
content and sampled by its owner.
15. Shipment of Firearms and Ammunitions Aboard Aircraft
a. Pertinent papers, such as authority/license to carry,

memorandum receipt (MR) and Mission/Letter Orders (MO/LO) stating the
area covered and the duration of the mission of the passenger carrying his
personal or issued government firearms and ammunition shall be checked
by ASG duty personnel. The duty personnel shall then record such firearm
or ammunition check in a logbook provided for the purpose.
b. Passenger/s, whether members of the PNP/AFP or not, found

carrying firearms and/or ammunition without necessary supporting papers
shall be immediately apprehended for proper investigation/disposition in
violation of PD 1866 as amended by RA 8294.
44
c. Any passenger with valid firearm documents but refuses to
surrender his firearm/ammunition shall be denied boarding the aircraft.
d. Firearms/ammunition found in hand carried/checked-in baggage

with or without pertinent documents shall be likewise seized.
e. Passenger with firearms and ammunitions, covered with

pertinent papers, shall be required to unload his firearm/s of bullet/s and
clear same in the firearm clearing box provided before the initial security
screening checkpoint, duly supervised by the PNP-ASG Firearm Facilitator.
16. Safety Procedures in the Clearing of Firearms by the Owner
Unloading a Pistol
a. The owner shall be required to grasp the gun using his/her strong arm
with trigger finger out of the trigger guard while the gun muzzle is pointed
towards the Firearms Clearing Box. The weak arm of a right-handed
person is his/her left arm while his/her right arm is his/her strong arm and
vice versa;
b. He shall then press the magazine release latch to release the magazine
with ammo and give it to the Firearm Facilitator;
c. He shall disengage the safety lock and pull back the slide using the
weak arm;
d. If the chamber load does not eject, he shall repeat previous step, open
bolt and visually ensure that there is no live ammo inside the chamber;
e. He shall then turn-over the pistol to the Firearm Facilitator;
Unloading a Revolver
a. The owner shall likewise grasp the revolver using his strong arms
and point the muzzle towards the box. He shall then press the chamber
latch to swing out the chamber and press the chamber rod out downward
to eject the bullets;
b. The owner shall then turn-over the ejected bullets and revolver to
the Firearm Facilitator;
c. The Firearm Facilitator shall ensure that the chambers of the

revolver are cleared.
45
17. Handling and Shipment of Firearms Replica, Toy Firearms and Toy
Explosive:
a. Firearms and explosives replica are prohibited either as a

carry-on item or inside the checked-in baggage. During the screening and
the firearm or explosive replicas are found, the items shall be automatically
confiscated.
b. Toy firearms and toy explosives are not prohibited, however
they shall not be allowed as carry-on items. Toy firearms and toy
explosives shall be placed inside the checked-in baggage or shall be
endorsed to the airline for proper handling and safe keeping during the
flight.
c. Lighter gun is not considered a prohibited item, however,

when it resembles with the characteristics of the gun replica, the item must
be confiscated. If the lighter gun is dissimilar from that of a gun replica, it
shall be treated as an ordinary lighter.
18. Policies and Rules in Carrying of Firearms in airport restricted areas
a. Only uniformed security personnel in complete uniform of PNP-ASG and

Airport Police Department (APD) are allowed to bring their issued firearms
within the airport restricted areas. However, private security guards under
employ of the airport authority/management maybe allowed to do so under
certain circumstances based on their ASP. When in uniform, the gun
should be holstered and secured by a snap;
b. Other law enforcement personnel with official business to transact within

the airport premises shall be required to deposit their issued firearms at the
initial screening checkpoint with the Firearms Facilitator who shall issue a
corresponding receipt thereof;
c. Incoming firearms arranged by licensed firearms importers, shooting

sports enthusiasts and firearms collectors aficionados shall be deposited
with the BOC until claimed / released in the presence of Firearms and
Explosives Division (FED) representative;
d. Competition firearms of local shootfest participants shall be handled

accordingly.
19. Anti-Hijacking Equipment Preventive Maintenance
1. X-ray Machine
a. An efficient security machine that bombards the

passenger luggage and objects by gamma rays through a sensor and
46
projects the shades, shadows, shapes and colors of its metal, organic and
non-organic contents. The following must be observed in its maintenance
and operations:
b. Inspection of the inter-connections of all

switches and plugs per unit before operation/warm-up together with the
tunnel conveyor belt for any obstruction;
c. The conveyor belt must be moved according to

personal preference of operator without unduly causing unnecessary delay
in the screening of luggage;
d. Anybody should be inhibited to place bottled

liquid or cream that may be spilt in its inner parts and jeopardized its
operations;
e. The x-ray machine must be able to detect the

presence of 24 gauge wire, organic/non organic materials and the outline
of ferrous objects in each luggage;
f. The x-ray machine must be warmed-up until

“SIGNAL SYSTEM READY” appeared on the monitor and must be turned
off after each use;
g. It should be tested periodically as to its

capability with the findings recorded properly and HQS ASG informed
immediately;
h. It must be inspected annually by qualified

technicians who maintain individual repair history of each unit per airport;
i. Luggage size and weight should conform to the tunnel and weight
capability of the conveyor belt; and
j. The conveyor belt/tunnel should not be used as storage special for

liquid/bottled items.
2. Walk Thru Metal Detector (WTMD)
It is an efficient security machine used to detect the presence of ferrous

materials in the person of an airport-user as he walks through its sensor. The
following must be observed in its maintenance and operations:
a. Any airport-user must be inhibited from bumping the detector

wood/plastic frame during its operations that may damage its mechanism;
47
b. It must be inspected half-hour before and turned off after each
use;
c. It must be inspected annually by qualified technicians who

maintain individual repair history of each unit per airport;
d. It must be tested periodically as to is capability. Findings and

observations should be recorded in appropriate form and reported to HQS
ASG immediately.
3. Handheld Metal Detector (HHMD)
It is a handy security instrument that determines the exact location of

ferrous materials in the person of airport-users by sound. The following must
be observed during its use:
a. It must be turned off when not in use and handled properly. It

must be laid gingerly over hard surfaces when not in use;
b. It must be tested periodically and its batteries replaced when

weak;
c. Appropriate maintenance ledger should be maintained about its

operational condition;
4. Handheld Radio
a. A handy two-way communication device that enables a security

personnel to coordinate with their office while in the field. The following
must be observed in its use;
b. It must be protected from the elements when not in actual use;
c. Its battery must be recharged immediately after each tour of

duty.
5. Exceptional Security Articles/Items
Screeners must be aware that there are restrictions that apply to certain
“prohibited items” as well as articles or substances classified as “dangerous
goods” which passengers may attempt to carry in their baggage. Dangerous
goods are items that can pose a significant risk to health, safety or property
when transported by air.
Passengers must not be allowed to take the following types or articles

onto an aircraft:
48
a. those made or intended for offensive or defensive use such as
firearms and pointed, sharp-edged or blunt weapons such as
truncheons, axes and loaded or spiked sticks;
b. all ordinary articles capable of being used as offensive or defensive

weapons such as ice-axes, metal-tipped walking sticks, open razors,
long-pointed scissors, knives, professional tools, aerosol containers;
c. imitations of any of the articles described above; and
d. other articles which give rise to reasonable suspicion.
Examples of forbidden dangerous goods are as follows:
a. Explosives
b. Gases
c. Flammable liquids
d. Flammable solids and reactive substances
e. Oxidizers/organic peroxides
f. Toxic/infectious substances
g. Radioactive material
h. Corrosives
i. Miscellaneous
j. Grenades, fireworks, flares
k. Propane, butane
l. Gasoline, methanol
m. Magnesium, firelighters
n. Bleach, car body repair kits
o. Rat poison, infected blood
p. Medicinal or commercial isotopes
q. Mercury, vehicle batteries
r. Vehicle fuel system components which have contained fuel
49
7. Complete Pat Down Search
This is a mandatory search conducted by security personnel of the same

gender to ensure that no prohibited/ dangerous/ security risk items other than metal
objects will be carried by any person on board an aircraft. The security personnel
must concentrate on this job and should not be distracted by any noise meant to
divert his attention. He/she should not be deceived by the innocence of a child or be
cowed by the elegance of worn jewelry or his stern looks. In the conduct of this pat
down search, the security personnel shall do the following mandatory procedures:
a. Slips forefingers through the hair

at the nape area for any attached
hidden objects
b. Faces the passenger with both
hands raised parallel to the
ground; slips both right and left
forefingers to the back collar; and
clip it with both thumbs and index
fingers. Feels the entire collar by
sweepingly moving both thumb
and index fingers separately
toward the front in circular
motion.
c. Tap the right and left shoulder

blade with open left and right
palms and sweepingly spread
them out separately towards the
wrist/cuff. Bring both open palms
to the lower wrist and sweepingly
spread them inward separately
toward the armpit .
d. Slips both open palms to the

edge of the back shoulder and
sweepingly spreads them
separately downward to the
waistline following the body
contour.
50
e. Clips the back waistband with
both thumbs and index fingers and
sweepingly spreads them
separately to the front in circular
motion;
f. Passes through right and left

forefingers to the solar plexus
or bust cleavage for ladies and
runs left and right open palms
to the breast base for any
foreign objects.
g. With both open palms on each

side of the pelvic bone,
sweepingly slides them
separately towards the front;
h. With the right hand on the right

buttock and the left hand on the
thigh of the concerned,
sweepingly slides both hands
downward along the thigh
towards the ankle. Does the
same procedures on the other
leg. The crotch area should be
felt by the inner forearm in the
process for foreign objects;
51
i. Cuffs each ankle together with
the trouser/skirt seams by each
hand;
j. Requires the passenger to walk a five-meter line and watches for evidence
of any unusual gait;
k. Inspects manually the divested items and shoes by paying particular

attention to the shoes’ inner soles and heels; and
l. Requests for the assistance of a medical doctor before conducting rectal or

anal inspection with the use of a flashlight;
52
CHAPTER 4
GENERAL AVIATION
Pre-flight security inspections should be conducted on all aircrafts, whether

locally or foreign registered, using the general aviation facilities of airports. All
passengers, baggage and cargo should be subjected to electronic and/or manual
security screening for prohibited/dangerous/security risk items like drugs, weapons,
explosives and its components like 24-gauge wire, clock, fuse, detonator and
batteries; bladed/pointed objects and corrosive substances. K-9 teams, if available,
should be deployed for security screening of cargo. Profiling of aircraft crew and
passengers should be done.
Visual inspection inside the aircraft and counterchecking of documents for

positive ID of aircraft crew and passengers cited in the flight manifest should be
conducted prior to departure. This inspection should be made in coordination with
the customs, quarantine, immigration and airport authority/management personnel,
when necessary, particularly in flights destined for other countries.
Aircraft exit clearance for each flight should be issued by PCAS prior to
departure. An aircraft security inspection report should likewise be prepared by
PCAS and submitted to HQ ASG (Attn: ADO).
There should be duly designated uniformed personnel to conduct such

inspections and their duties and responsibilities are as follow:
General Aviation Officer-In-Charge
a. Primarily responsible on the conduct of all pre-flight inspections;
b. Assigns the right number of personnel to conduct the pre-flight inspection

by issuing the appropriate order;
c. Conducts specific seminar on the proper conduct of pre-flight inspection

among his personnel;
d. Coordinates the deployment of K-9 team as necessary; and
e. Performs such other duties and functions as directed.
General Aviation Supervisor
a. Acts as liaison between the assigned security inspectors and owners of the
aircraft;
53
b. Supervises the security inspectors in their conduct of the required pre-flight
inspections for each aircraft;
c. Conducts daily briefings of incoming security inspectors;
d. Apportions the workload among his/her personnel; and
e. Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.
General Aviation Security Inspector
a. Conducts pre-flight security inspection;
b. Conducts pat-down search or with the use of HHMD to screen passengers

and crew;
c. Conducts electronic or manual luggage, baggage and cargo inspection;
d. Confiscates prohibited/dangerous items found during the screening and

subsequently apprehends the concerned passenger or aircraft crew and
makes appropriate report to the GA Officer In-Charge; (Appendix T –
Affidavit of Arrest) and
e. Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.
54
CHAPTER 5
SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS
The successive hijacking of four (4) aircrafts in the US that ended in the
massive destruction of World Trade Center and Pentagon last 11 September 2001 by
utilizing the aircraft as weapons of mass destruction is unprecedented in the annals
of aviation history. It was a gloomy reminder of the ignominy of man that begs for
appropriate security counter measures.
To enhance basic aviation security measures, additional procedures are

issued from time to time based on the prevailing threat situation and on OTS policies,
airport authority/management directives and ICAO SARPs.
Contraption of Deadly Weapons Out of Soft Drinks Canisters
Discouragement of airlines from serving any beer, juices, soft drinks, or any
food item contained in aluminum tin foil/ canister can to all airport users during
original and turn-around flights from any airport (domestic and international) and by
airside terminal concessionaires.
Passenger Security Screening Operations
Confiscation at the Initial Security checkpoint of the terminal of any bladed,

cutting and edged instrument, disposable lighter, nail cutter, tweezers, safety razor
(including disposable), stick made of hardwood and plastic and syringe that is
considered as Security Removed Items (SRI);
The following are the pertinent procedures of the security advisory:
a. Confiscated items shall be turned-over to concerned airline representative

under receipt;
b. Passenger controllers shall require all passengers with jacket and

overcoats to place the same on the plastic container for x-ray examination;
c. All airport users who passes thru the WTMD must be frisked;
d. Manually inspect all luggage containing unidentifiable/ questionable item in

it as projected in the monitor.
e. Use of HHMD to any passenger who refuses to be manually frisked at the

screening checkpoint is allowed. This is allowed not as a general rule but
rather as an exception;
55
f. Personal accessories like belt buckles, clutch bags, umbrella and crutches
shall be x-rayed;
g. Coins in any denomination and type should be allowed to be carried on

board after inspection/examination. They should be placed in a tray also for x-
ray examination;
h. Confiscated prohibited/regulated objects relative to filed cases should be

turned over to the SAO;
i. Clogs/elevator shoes and the like must be inspected closely;
j. Airline crews, cockpit crews, attendants, ground mechanics and all

personnel entering the ramp area (airside), should pass thru all the screening
checkpoints. However, they should be given priority in queuing;
k. Disabled/elderly passenger must be given priority in queuing but must pass

thru the WTMD. Wheel chairs and other carriers and crutches used must be
thoroughly inspected both visually and electronically;
Guidelines re Shipment of Authorized Hazardous Materials
The following are the pertinent guidelines of this memo:
a. A thorough background investigation of contractors and other airport

personnel involved in the air shipment of authorized hazardous materials
should be conducted in coordination with the local law enforcement and
intelligence agencies to facilitate record check; and
b. This background investigation should commence when these contractors

and other airport personnel start doing business at the airport complex and
every six months thereafter.
Enhancement of Aircraft Security
The following are the pertinent provisions of this directive:
a. Any violation of ID access control should be duly acted upon and reported;
b. Remained-Over-Night (RON) aircraft should be closely monitored and

parking area should be properly illuminated.
c. Ground servicing personnel, such as aircraft cleaners, maintenance

personnel, catering personnel, ground staff and all other persons gaining
access to the aircraft should be subjected to a pat down search and their
carry-on items carried inside the aircraft should be manually inspected to deter
56
any introduction of items that may be used in the commission of unlawful
interference to civil aviation.
Security Bulletin (Memo to all RASOs dtd 17 September 2001)
a. Cigarette lighter with concealed knife: A commonly manufactured cigarette

lighter which contained a concealed knife blade was recovered by the FBI at
the United States Flight 93 crash scene (Stoney Creek Township, PA). The
recovered item was badly damaged. Preliminary FBI Laboratory forensic
examination of the item revealed the cigarette lighter was approximately 2¾ in
length with knife blade approximately 2 ½ in length. Due to the damaged
condition of the item, the actual original length, diameter, appearance and
shape of the lighter cannot be positively identified.
b. Concealed Knife/Cigarette Lighter: Similarly, commercially available

models have spring-loaded blades which extend directly out of the top of the
lighter. FBI Laboratory research indicates that a number of similar knives are
commercially available concealed in other common objects, such as pens,
keys, belt, belt buckles and lipstick containers.
Enhancement of Security Measures
The following are the pertinent provisions of this directive:
a. Exercise of closer operational control and supervision over the private

security guards employed by the air carriers particularly during flight
operations period pursuant to Section 35.b (7) of RA 6975;
b. Observance of positive identification of passengers and prevention of

passengers mix;
c. Conduct of regular police visibility patrols in vulnerable areas of the airport

i.e. unfenced terminal buildings and runways;
d. Intensification of access control measures for persons and vehicles

entering restricted areas;
e. Coordination with the air carrier for measures to ensure the security of the
aircraft to include personnel security investigation of personnel such as aircraft
cleaners, aircraft maintenance, catering service personnel and other
authorized persons;
f. Institutionalization of stricter security measures to sanitize, isolate and

protect cargo, parcels prior to loading and transport by air.
57
g. Coordination with the airport authorities in respective stations to inform the
Airport Security Committee on the intensified security measures and the
infrastructure weaknesses.
Screening of Crews, Airline Staffs, Passengers and Airport Employees
a. No person shall be exempted from the security checkpoint standard

operating procedures in both the initial and final security screening
checkpoints except as provided in existing laws, rules and regulations;
b. Airline crew/staff, VIPs, airport employees and authorized visitors shall be

provided a separate lane for security screening if circumstances so warrant;
c. All persons shall be made to place their baggage thru the x-ray machine
and to divest themselves of all metal objects from their persons or clothing to
be placed on the plastic trays provided for and to be passed through the x-ray
machine for screening;
d. All persons shall be made to pass thru the WTMD one at a time. If the
alarm is triggered, the concerned individual shall be asked to further divest
himself/herself of any possible metal objects and to remove his/her shoes for
x-ray inspection, and required to pass again thru the WTMD for the second
time.
e. If the WTMD still triggered another alarm, the screeners shall make use of
the HHMD (if available) to determine further the cause of the alarm or conduct
pat-down search until the issue is resolved. However, all persons are
subjected to mandatory pat-down search at final SSCP.
Testing and Calibration of Anti-Hijacking Equipment (HQ PNP-ASG SOP

Nr 2004-03 dated 19 March 2004)
Testing for x-ray machine shall be done as follows:
a. Once daily before the start of actual operations or once in every 24 hours
in case of continuous operations;
b. Every time the machine is turned-off and re-started for an actual

operations;
c. Testing should be conducted by using the standard operational test object

(STEP WEDGE)
d. Results of the test shall be recorded in the operational test log (logbook
ICAO standard form) and the screening check properly signed by duty area
supervisor.
58
e. Only authorized technician/shall conduct calibration and repair.
Testing for the WTMD shall be done as follows:
a. At least once before start of actual operation or once every 24 hours in

case of continuous operations.
b. Every time the WTMD is turned off and to be re-started for actual
operation.
c. Using an encapsulated weapon or operational test piece (OTP) which shall

be carried by a person in three different critical positions (head, waist, feet)
and the person to pass thru the WTMD in normal walking speed three times in
each position.
d. The person conducting the testing shall divest himself/herself of all

extraneous metals prior to commencing the test.
e. Result of the operational test shall be recorded in the ICAO standard form
(operational test log) to be signed by the area supervisor and shall be retained
at the screening checkpoint.
f. Authorized technicians shall conduct appropriate calibration/repair and

adjustment if necessary.
Establishment and Conduct of Controlled Landside Checkpoints (HQ

PNP-ASG SOP Nr 2005-01 dated 01 March 2006)
a. Checkpoints shall be established at least 50 meters away from the airport

terminal.
b. Checkpoints shall be under the responsibility of PNP-ASG uniformed

personnel. Elements from AFP, other PNP units, ATO and contracted airport
security guards detailed at the checkpoints shall be under the operational
control and supervision of PNP-ASG.
c. Personnel manning the checkpoint must observe buddy system at all

times. Additional personnel detailed to serve as back-up security must be
equipped with long firearms and shall be at a vantage position while other
members are conducting the inspection.
d. Plain-view doctrine shall be applied in the conduct of search/ inspection of

people and vehicles. An extensive search is allowed pursuant to NCASP
provisions, if the officers conducting the search have probable cause to
59
believe that they would find evidences pertaining to the commission of the
crime in the vehicle to be searched and there is no sufficient time to secure
valid warrant.
Carrying of Liquid or Gel into the Aircraft (HQ PNP-ASG Memo re Strict
Implementation of Enhanced Security Measures dated 11 August 2006)
a. All airline passengers are prohibited from carrying liquid or gel of any
quantity and size such as beverages, suntan lotion, perfumes, shampoo,
toothpaste and the like inside hand carried luggage at all airports. However,
baby formula, breast milk or juice shall be properly scrutinized and only be
permitted if a baby or small child is traveling. Likewise, prescription medicine
with name that matches the passenger’s ticket like insulin and other essential
non-prescription medicine should be allowed after consultation with the airport
physician.
b. Above mentioned prohibited items of same nature found at the final SSCP
shall be automatically confiscated.
c. Coordination with all the airlines shall be made to advise their respective
passengers that before checking-in, they have to place the above mentioned
items inside their checked-in baggage.
Mandatory Removal and X-ray Screening of Shoes and Other Items (HQ
PNP-ASG SOP # 2006-01 dated 05 September 2006)
a. Mandatory removal and x-ray screening of shoes, belts cigarette cases,

eyeglass cases and all items either metallic or non-metallic that are capable of
concealing prohibited articles or substances shall be done at the final SSCP.
b. In the absence of an x-ray machine, all electronic gadgets shall be

operationally tested and physically inspected thoroughly.
60
Glossary
The following terms and concepts used in this Manual are defined herein to
insure commonality of understanding and prevent confusions:
Acts of Unlawful Interference to Civil Aviation – An act of:
Violence or threat of violence against a person on board an aircraft while still

on the ground or on flight, if that act is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft;
Destroying an aircraft in service or causing damage to such an aircraft which

renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in flight;
Placing or causing to be placed an aircraft in service, by any means

whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or
causing damage to it which renders it incapable of flight or causing damage to it
which is likely to endanger its safety in flight;
Destroying or damaging air navigation facilities or interfering with their

operations, if any such act is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft;
Communicating information which is known to be false thereby endangering

the safety of the aircraft; or
Unlawfully and intentionally using any device, substance or weapon:
Performing an act of violence against a person at an airport which

cause or is likely to cause serious injury or death;
Destroying or seriously damaging the facilities of an airport or aircraft

not in service located thereon or disrupting the services of the airport, if any
such act endangers or is likely to endanger safety at that airport.
Access Authority – Identification card and other documentation issued to

authorized airport-users and to those individuals and vehicles with official business to
transact in order to facilitate passage into airport restricted areas. It is limited by the
use of color code on various restricted areas within an airport complex.
Aircraft – A heavier than air device / contraption designed to carry weights

while navigating in the atmosphere through the dynamic action of air against its
surface (aerodrome).
Aircraft Security Check –
Airport – A land’s physical facility wherein aircraft embarked and disembarked

passengers and cargoes, make repairs and replenish fuel.
61
Airport Authority – A Government Owned or Controlled Corporation (GOCC)
engaged in the efficient and orderly operations of an international airport like NAIA
and MCIA.
Aircraft Movement Area – The area dedicated exclusively for the purpose of
landing, takeoff, taxi, maneuver and parking of aircraft.
Airside – The movement area on an airport, adjacent terrain and buildings or

portion thereof, access to which is controlled.
Air Transportation – The mode of travel or conveyance of people and goods

through the medium of aircraft movement.
Anti-Hijacking Equipment – The pre-boarding security screening equipment

like x-ray, metal detector and scanners installed at the initial and final security
checkpoints of airport terminals to inspect the passengers, airline crew and their
luggage for dangerous / prohibited goods / items.
Airline – Business organization or company engaged in scheduled transport

and movement of passengers, goods and services by means of aircraft.
Airport Emergency – Any unscheduled incident / event that may transpire in

any airport facility that may disrupt / impede / hamper its smooth operations.
Airport-User – A generic term that includes authorized individuals like airline

crew, airport-related agency personnel, passengers and well-wishers to gain access
to the various airport facilities on a need basis during its operations.
Alternate International Airport – An airport rated for international air travel

but due to passenger volume deficiency, the same is not used for said purpose.
Airport Security Fee (ASF) – The amount collected from departing

international and domestic airline passengers other than those paid for ticket,
immigration and other requirements originally authorized by PLOI 141-A.
Apron – The designated area devoted for the maneuvering and parking of
aircraft in order to disembark and embark passengers and cargoes.
Background Check – A check of a person’s identity and previous experience,

including any criminal history, where appropriate, a part of the assessment of an
individual’s suitability for unescorted access to a security restricted area.
Baggage – Personal properties of passengers and crew carried into an

aircraft by agreement stipulated in the ticket with airline operator.
62
Baggage Container – A receptacle in which baggage is loaded for
conveyance in aircraft.
Baggage Sorting Area – Space in which departure baggage is sorted into

flight loads.
Baggage Storage Area – The designated space where checked-in / held /

mishandled bags are stored pending their transport into the aircraft forwarded to its
destination or claimed by its owner.
Bomb – An explosive devise that generates and releases its energy very
rapidly as an explosion and as a violent, destructive shockwave.
Bomb Alert – A status of alert, put in place by competent authorities to

activate an intervention plan intended to counter the possible consequences arising
from a communicated threat, anonymous or otherwise, or arising from the discovery
of a suspect device or other suspect item on an aircraft, at an airport or in any civil
aviation facilities.
Bomb Threat – A communicated threat, anonymous or otherwise, that

alludes, suggests or infers rightly or falsely that the safety of an aircraft in flight or on
the ground or an airport facility or an individual or object may be jeopardized.
Cabin Baggage – Space above the passenger’s seat where hand carried
baggage inside the aircraft are put.
Cargo – Property loaded into an aircraft other than mail, stores and
accompanied or mishandled baggage.
Cargo Area – The space designated where inspected cargoes are held
pending transfer into the aircraft.
Cargo Building – The designated place where cargoes are accepted and
inspected.
Check-in – The act of manifesting one’s intention to an airline operator

representative for his acceptance in a specific scheduled flight.
Clear Zone – The outer area immediately adjacent the perimeter fence that
facilitate visual access of any approaching intruder.
Crew Member – An individual appointed by an operator to perform a

particular duty on an aircraft during its flight.
63
Dangerous Goods – Articles or substances carried in the person and luggage
of passengers that are capable of posing significant risk to health, safety or property
when transported by air.
Effectiveness – A measure of the quality of an output. It is determining hoe

the output achieved the desired outcome. When one measures efficiency, he knows
how much it is costing him to achieve a specified output. When he measures
effectiveness, he knows whether his investment is worthwhile. Efficiency is doing the
job right which underlies cost while effectiveness is doing the right job. It underlies
results.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) – The systematic disarming of bombs

and improvised explosive device in order to render them harmless conducted ny
highly trained personnel.
Firearm Facilitator – The ASG security uniformed designated to be

responsible for the safe processing and transfer of passenger authorized turned-in
firearms to the concerned airline for transport.
Frisking / Pat Down – The systematic conduct of physical / bodily search of

airport-users for the purpose of finding prohibited / dangerous objects / substances.
General Aviation - All civil aviation operations other than scheduled air
services and non-scheduled air transport operations for a fee.
Hijacking – The unlawful seizures of a civilian aircraft for whatever purpose

while in flight or on the ground. It includes any act aimed to compel a change in its
course or destination or to seize or usurp its control.
Human Resources – Refers to the CASS, OTS or PNP uniformed and non-
uniformed personnel on the employ of ASG for is administrative and operational
requirements.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) – A UN created

organization that regulates safety and security in civil aviation through its various
Annexes.
International Airport – An airport designated for the entry and departure for
international travel where formalities on customs, immigration, quarantine and similar
procedures are carried out.
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) – Those devices placed or fabricated in

an improvised manner incorporating explosive or destructive, lethal, noxious,
pyrotechnics or incendiary chemicals to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass.
64
Jetway Bridge / Panel – The retractable mechanized panel attached to the
outer paneling of an airport sterile area wall for the convenient embarkation and
disembarkation of passengers.
K-9 Unit – A highly specialized PNP-ASG unit under the Aviation Counter
Terrorism Force (ACT Force) that utilizes trained canine elements dedicated for the
efficient search for explosives in the persons, luggage and airport facilities.
Manifest – The airline maintained list of authorized passengers who reserved

for an accommodation in one of its scheduled flights.
Landside – That area in an airport to which the non traveling public has free
access.
Paneling – The conduct of systematic search for explosives by EOD and K-9
elements.
Passenger Numbered Manifest – An airline generated and maintained list of

persons and offices, telephone numbers and addresses which have made
reservations for each passenger.
Physical Resources – The set of anti-hijacking equipment installed at the

initial and final security screening gates consisting of x-ray machine, metal detector
and hand scanner.
Proactive / Deterrent Security Component – The first layer of TASS

representing the various overlapping passive security measures laid out around the
airport complex for its protection 24 hours daily.
Profiling – The informal interview of pre-defined type of passengers

conducted for the purpose of determining the manner each luggage is packed, its
content and the persons who had access to them prior to check-in.
Prohibited Items – Articles and substances found in the persons and luggage
of passengers during the security process like guns, explosives, pointed / bladed
objects and drugs punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other special laws.
Protective / Defensive Security Component – The second layer of TASS

representing the various overlapping active security measures laid out around the
Ramp Area – The place adjacent to the terminal building designated for the
maneuvering and parking of aircraft for maintenance, embarkation and
disembarkation of passengers and cargoes.
65
Reactive / Crisis Management Security Component – The third layer of
TASS representing the various mutually-exclusive contingency / security operations
established to manage / control the escalation of known airport emergencies in an
Regulated Agent – An agent, freight forwarders or any other entity who

conducts business with an operator and provides security controls that are
accepted or required by the appropriate authority inrespect of cargo, courier
and express parcels or mail.
Restricted Area – Pre-designated areas within the airport complex where

access id controlled or limited to those authorized only.
Retractable Stairway – A motor mounted stairway for the convenient

embarkation and disembarkation of passengers that is detached from an aircraft
when not in use while its door is closed.
Screening – the application of technical or other means which are intended to

detect weapons, explosives and other dangerous devices tat may be used to commit
acts of unlawful interference or terrorism.
Security Inspection – The systematic physical examinations of the persons,

luggage and accoutrements of departing passengers and other airport-users.
Security Screening Checkpoint – The security choke points found at the

initial and final security screening area of each airport where the persons and
luggage of departing passengers and other airport-users into the sterile area and/or
board an aircraft are processed electronically or manually to preempt carriage of
prohibited / dangerous goods / items / substances.
Signage – Explicit directional or instructional signs installed strategically within

an airport complex for the safe and expeditious passage / screening of all airport-
users.
Special Operations Unit (SOU) – The PNP-ASG crisis intervention unit under
the Aviation Counter Terrorism Force (ACT Force) primarily tasked to resolve any
aviation security crisis situation.
Sterile Area – The area between passenger inspection / screening station

and aircraft into which access is strictly controlled.
Technology – The application of science or systematic knowledge of

industrial or technical arts and craftsmanship that insure cost-effectiveness of an
operation.
66
Terrorism – The unlawful interference or disruption of any scheduled activity
of an airline / airport operations for social, religious and political purposes. It includes
usurpation of control of the aircraft, bomb explosion and indiscriminate firing while on
the ground and in flight. It may be undertaken by individuals, cause-driven or state or
individually-sponsored groups and individuals.
Total Aviation Security System (TASS) – The overall aviation security

concept adopted to enable PNP ASG Unit Chiefs to ensure the 24 hours protection of
the airport complexes by blanketing them with layers of security measures.
Total Team Approach – A team building scheme that maximizes the

collaborations among airport-based personnel and employees in providing adequate
security in our airport complexes.
Tourism – The activity or practice of travel or journey for recreation, pleasure

and cultural enhancement.
Visibility Patrol – An aggressive, systematic and sustained patrol of key

airport facilities conducted by PNP-ASG personnel to ferret out and discourage
disruption of airport operations.
Vulnerable Areas – Any airport facility or activity with inherent structural,

operational and design deficiencies that may jeopardize airport security e\when
damaged or subverted.
Vehicle Under Chassis Inspection – The systematic physical examination of

an authorized vehicle under chassis interior compartment (glove, trunk and back
seat) for explosives before access is allowed by the use of an extended mirror.
67
ANNEX A: SOURCES OF LEGAL REGULATION
1. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
a. The Chicago Convention
This convention which was participated in by 52 nations in November 1944 at

Chicago, USA, has paved the way for the information of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), purposely to ensure the safe and orderly growth of
international civil aviation throughout the world.
The ICAO officially came into existence on 04 April 1947 and thus became the
permanent body under the United Nations charged with the administration of the
principles and objectives of the convention.
b. The Tokyo Convention
Also known as the Convention of Offenses and certain other acts committed
on board an aircraft, signed at Tokyo, Japan on 14 September 1963 and came into
force on 04 December 1969. This was ratified by a total of 124 states including the
Philippines.
The convention has defined all acts, which, whether or not offenses may
jeopardize the safety of the aircraft, persons on board or property therein, and such
other cats which may, jeopardize good order and discipline on board. It has also
enumerated and explained the powers of the aircraft commander in an international
flight, as well as, the competence of signatory states to exercise jurisdiction over
offenses committed on board.
c. The Hague Convention
Also known as the Convention for the Suppression of unlawful; seizure of

aircraft. Signed at the Hague, Netherlands on 16 December 1970 and came into
force on 14 December 1971. This was ratified by a total of 129 states including the
Philippines.
Signatory states agreed to make hijacking punishable by severe penalties,

and to include it in the list of extraditable crimes. Hijackers may be tried in the
country where the aircraft is registered.
d. The Montreal Convention

Also known as the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the safety of civil aviation. Signed at Montreal, Canada on 23 September 1971 and
came into force on 26 January 1973. This was ratified by all member states including
the Philippines.
68
Signatory states are obligated to enact laws covering all acts of unlawful
interference to civil aviation and to provide severe penalties for their violence.
2. NATIONAL LEGISLATIONS
a. The Civil Aeronautics Act or Republic Act 776 enacted on 20 June 1952 as
amended by Presidential Decrees 844, 1278, 1462 and Executive Order
546 (E.O. 546). R.A. 776 as amended established the country’s agency
responsible recognizes the need for regulating economic and technical
aspects of civil aeronautics with the creations of the Civil Aeronautics
Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
The Civil Aeronautics Board exercises and performs its powers and duties
under this Act consistent with any obligation assumed by the Republic of
the Philippines in any treaty, convention or agreement on civil aviation
matters.
b. Republic Act 6235 enacted in 19 June 1971 enacting the Hague

Convention. This law makes it “unlawful” for any person to compel a
change in the course or destination of aircraft of Philippine registry;
likewise it shall be unlawful for any person to compel an aircraft of foreign
registry to land in Philippine territory or to seize or usurp the control thereof
while it is within the said territory.
c. Letter of Instruction 399 (LOI 399) issued on 28 April 1976 is the

presidential issuance, which has the effect of law that puts into legal effects
the Philippines commitment to Montreal Convention of 1971 and the
Supplementary Protocol to the said Convention. LOI 399 created The
National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking (NACAH) Executive Order
No. 393 which took effect 24 January 1990 provided for the constitution of
the committee.
d. Execution Order No. 452 – issued on 5 April 1991 provided amendment to
the composition of NACAH with the DILG Secretary as Chairman and the
DND Secretary as Vice-Chairman.
e. The Executive No. 246 – The Executive Order reconstituted the NACAH
into the National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking and Anti-terrorism
(NACAHT). and took effect on 18 May 1995. The NACAHT shal (a)
formulate plans to direct, control, supervise and integrate all measures
aimed at preventing and suppressing hijacking, other threats to civil
aviation, and all other forms of terrorism with bthe end view of protecting
national interests, and (b) adopt measures geared towards the
implementation of the following main objectives: (1) to effectively monitor
69
the activities of suspected terrorists, and (2) to develop the capability of
local law enforcement agencies to contain the threat of terrorism.
f. Executive Order No. 336 – Issued on 05 January 2000, reconstituted the

NACAHT as the National Council for Civil Aviation Security (NCCAS).
g. Executive Order No. 277 – Issued on 30 January 2004 approving and

reconstituting the NCASP, creating the Office for Transportation Security
(OTS) within the Department of Transportation and Communications and
reconstituting the NCCAS as the NCASC.
h. Executive Order No. 311 – Issued on April 26, 2004 designated OTS as
the single authority for all modes of transportation security in the
Philippines, which upgrading the OTS powers and functions.
The President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in by law,

ordered the composition of the Committee as follows:
Secretary of National Defense - - Chairman

Secretary of Foreign Affairs - - Member
Secretary of Finance - - -do-
Secretary of Justice - - -do-
Secretary of Transportation and Commission - -do-
Press Secretary - - -do-
National Security Director - - -do-
Director-General, National
Intelligence Coordinating Agency - - -do-
70
ANNEX B – NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY PROGRAM
71
APPENDIX “B” RECOMMNEDATION FOR CHANGES
Identification of Change/or Date Entered By whom entered

Correction and Reg. (signature, rank, grade or
No. (if any) rate; name of command)
72
PHILIPPINE AIRPPORT SECURITY SYSTEM
PNP- Aviation Security Group 5

Units Geographical Deployment
3rd PCAS 5th PCAS
Subic Bay IA Daet
Macapagal IA 1st PCAS 4th PCAS Naga
Plaridel Terminal 1 Basco Batanes Virac
Terminal 2 Northwing Laoag, Ilocos Sur LegaspiI
2nd PCAS Tuguegarao Masbate
Terminal 2 Southwing Cauayan, Isabela
Domestic San Fernando, La Union
General Aviation Baguio 6th PCAS
Pinamalayan, Romblon Caticlan
Marinduque Kalibo
Mamburao, Romblon Roxas
Tablas, Romblon Iloilo
San Jose, Antique Bacolod
Busuanga, Palawan Antique
Cuyo Island, Palawan
Puerto Princesa, Palawan 7th PCAS
Catarman
10th PCAS Calbayog
Tacloban
Surigao City Ormoc
Butuan City Mactan
Cagayan de Oro Tagbilaran
Iligan City Dumaguete
Ozamis City
8th PCAS
9th PCAS
Tandag
Dipolog Bislig
Pagadian Davao City
Siocon General Santos
Ipil Mati
Zamboanga City Malabang
Jolo Cotabato
Sanga-Sanga
73
APPENDIX “E” ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE TO CIVIL AVIATION IN
THE PHILIPPINES
DTG ACFT ROUTE NR OF ID OF ARMS/ REMARKS

PAX & HJKRS WPNS
CREW
1. Morning DC-3 (PAL) Laoag 10 Ang Tio Chuk a 2-.45 Cal Pistol a. Hijacker shot of &
Dec 1952 RP-C 86 Aparri Chinese youth and killed the 1952 pilot
Lucia Lea CAPT PEDRO
PERLAS & Flight
Steward Eduardo
Tiago.
b. Acft was intercepted

by the Nationalist
Chinese Airforce &
made land in Taiwan
where hijackers
surrendered thinking
he was in.
c. He was surrendered
to the Phil Gov’t by
the ROC Gov’t & was
tried & sentenced to
life imprisonment.
d. He was pardoned in
1960, was rearrested
& re-committed to
the New Bilibid
Prison & still there up
to now.
2. 30 Mar PAL BAC- Manila- 50 a. Daniel Lobinatana, 3-revolver The Hijacking was
1971 111 PIC- Davao 23 yrs old 1-pocket-knife successful, the six (6)
1121 were brought to Canton
& no news has been
heard about them
today.
b. Glenn Michael A pair of

Rosauro, 20 yrs scissors
Old
c. Eructuoso J Chua,
23 yrs old
d. Edgardo Maosisa,
19 yrs old
e. Domingo
Baskinas, 18 yrs
Old
f. Edgardo Tigulo, 20
yrs old
2. 11 Oct PAL BAC- Davao- 56 a. Roger Rica, 21 yrs 1-Cal Pistol The hijackers
1973 111 Bacolod old 3-platik surrendered after
74
revolvers negotiations.
1-hand grenade
1-bladed
weapon
3. 25 Feb PAL DC-3 Pagadian 31 a. Emilio 1-.38 Cal The hijackers
1975 RPC 941 Zambo Abarca Jr, revolver (paltik) surrendered & are
34 yrs old 2-hand- presently in the Youth
granades Rehabilitation Center.
1-AR-15 riflr
b. Cesar Palang, 29 taken fm the Air
yrs old Marshal
4. 7 Oct PAL BAC- Davao- 71 A2C Camilo Morales, 1-45 Cal Pistol Hijacker surrendered
1975 RCP 1182 Manila 25 yrs old of the 1-grenade after negotiation.
(0930) Japan Mindanao Regional
Air Command
5. 5 Jan Japan Manila- 225 a. Prudencio R 1-.22 Cal Pistol Hijackers surrendered
1976 Airlines Osaka, Dono, 24 yrs old (Berreta) after negotiations
(JAL) DC-6 Japan
Jet b. Renato R Dono, 1-.22 Cal
19 yrs old Revolver
(paltik)
Improvised
home made
bomb
6. 7 Apr PAL BAC - Cagayan 78 a. Ex-PC Sgt Jose 2-Pistols, a .45 The hijackers
1970 111 RPC- de Oro- Nurr Madula cal and .38 succeeded in getting to
1187 Davao (possibly 3) Libya using a substitute
Manila DC-8 jet are presently
b. Comdr Zobair 2-hand- there at this time.
Khing grenades
(possibly 3 or
c. Cmdr Vengy more)
7. 21 May PAL BAC- Davao- 103 pax a. Pendatun 2-.45 cal pistol PAL BAC-111 Flt 166
1976 111 RPC Manila 6 crews Domianga aka 1-.22 cal pistol fm Davao was hijacked
1161 Flt diverted Cmdr Zapata 3-hand- six (6) alleged
116 to Zambo Head of Reg’l grenades members of MNLF. The
Airport Comd plane was diverted to
Zamboanga airport
b. Nike Randa were negotiations took
Ibrahim aka Cmdr placed. Negotiations
Cobra failed & the hijackers
shoot it out with the
military
c. Macalindog
Tawarac aka Tuan
El Senawe
Quartermaster,
Supply & Log O.
d. Naser Omar aka

Tuan Senkula
75
Commo
e. Lumentana
Dimatonsing aka
Zaragosa Dist
Comdr
f. Liling Radia aka

9. 21 May PAL BAC Bacolod- 107 & 6 Juan Cleano, a 1-hand-grenade The hijacker was
1982 111 RPC- Manila crews farmer & resident of subdued by CG,
(0755) 1186 Bacon Negros AVSECOM during a
Oriental face to face negotiation
at Mactan International
Airport.
10. 28 May PAL Air Davao- 320 & 8 Trance Chua aka Home-made Chua parachuted using
2000 Bus 300 Manila crews Augusto Lakandula cal.22 magnum an improvised
revolver parachute that caused
his death.
76
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF PASSENGER AND LUGGAGE SCREENING
CURBSIDE
TERMINAL GATE
POSITIVE ID OF PAX, CREWS
AND AIRPORT USER AND
OTHER AUTHORIZED
PERSONNEL
PAX and OPERATIONAL SECURITY

their EQUIPMENT
CHECKED-
IN/CABIN SECURITY SCREENING INITIAL
LUGGAGE PERSONNEL STAFFING SECURITY
CHECKPOINT
PERSONNEL COMPETENCE
CUSTOM
QUARANTINE
SECURITY AIRLINE COUNTER

SCREENING FOR HOLD BAGGAGE
PROHIBITED HOLD SECURITY
/DANGEROUS BAGGAGE CHECKPOINT
ITEMS, HAZMAT, AIRPORT TERMINAL
SRI
FEE
FINAL OPERATIONAL
SECURITY
SECURITY EQUIPMENT
CHECK FOR PAX and
PROHIBITED their CABIN SECURITY SCREENING FINAL SECURITY
/DANGEROUS PERSONNEL STAFFING CHECKPOINT
LUGGAGE
ITEMS, HAZMAT,
SRI PERSONNEL
COMPETENCE
SANITIZED
PRE—DEPARTURE AREA
JETWAY DOOR
77
APPENDIX “H” – SAMPLE OF AFFIDAVIT OF X-RAY OPERATOR
Republic of the Philippines )

1st Police Center for Aviation Security )
Pasay City )
AFFIDAVIT
I, QUIRINA M. DELOS SANTOS, married, resident of 141 Vito Cruz, Manila,

of legal age and an appointed CASS, OTS security personnel and after having been
duly sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby state and depose the following:
1. That I was the duty x-ray operator last March 4, 2006;
2. That about eight in the morning of the same day, I observed an obvious
threat in the x-ray monitor that resembled a firearm;
3. That thereafter, I required the duty baggage inspector, PACITA T. DELA
ROSA, to inspect the said obvious threat in a luggage which later was determined to
belong to ABDUL J. CAKOL, a departing passenger for Dubai on PAL X44 flight with
valid plane ticket number 2345;
4. That PACITA T. DELA ROSA, after physically inspecting the said suspect
luggage belonging to the aforementioned departing passenger, informed me that the
luggage yielded a Colt Caliber .32 pistol, Serial Number 6789 with seven (7) live
ammunitions;
AFFIANTH FURTHER SAYETH NONE:

In truth thereof, I am affixing my signature to attest to the veracity of the
foregoing facts this 4th day of March 2006 in the office of the 1st PCAS, ASG-PNP,
Pasay City.
Quirina Delos Santos

Affiant
SUBCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day of March 2006 in

the office of the 1st PCAS, ASG, PNP, Pasay City.
PEDRO T CHAVEZ
Police Senior Inspector
Administering Officer
78
APPENDIX “I” – SAMPLE AFFIDAVIT OF BAGGAGE INSPECTOR
Pasay City )
AFFIDAVIT
I, PACITA DELOS SANTOS, married, resident of 141 Vito Cruz, Manila, of
legal age and an appointed CASS, OTS security personnel and after having been
duly sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby state and depose the following:
1. That I was the duty baggage inspector last March 4, 2006;
2. That about eight in the morning of the same day, the duty x-ray operator,
Quirina M. delos Santos, summoned me to inspect a luggage whose image indicated
an obvious threat in the x-ray monitor that resembled a firearm;
3. That thereafter, I established the ownership of the said suspect luggage
and found out that it belonged to a certain Mr. ABDUL J. Cakol, a departing
passenger for Dubai on PAL X44 flight based on his valid plane ticket;
4. That thereafter, I conducted a physical inspection of the suspect luggage
particularly on its right lower quadrant in the presence of its owner and that was
witnessed by SPO3 Juan Dela Cruz, the duty Armed Supervisor;
5. That my inspection of the suspect luggage yielded a Colt Caliber .32
pistol, Serial Number 6789 with seven (7) live ammunitions which I turned over to
SPO3 Juan Dela Cruz;
6. when SPO3 Juan Dela Cruz confronted and inquired from the said
departing passenger about the required documents for the said firearm, Mr. CAKOL
was unable to produce them that caused his apprehension.
AFFIATH FURTHER SAYETH NONE:
foregoing facts this 4th day of March 2006 in the office of the 1 st PCAS, ASG-PNP,
Pasay City.
PACITA DELA ROSA
Affiant
SUBCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4 th day of March 2006 in the
office of the 1st PCAS, ASG, PNP, Pasay City.
PEDRO CHAVEZ
79
APPENDIX “I” – SAMPLE AFFIDAVIT OF ARMED SUPERVISOR
Pasay City )
AFFIDAVIT
I, SPO3 Juan Dela Cruz, married, resident of Pildera II, Pasay City, of legal
age and assigned with 1st PCAS, PNP-ASG and after having been duly sworn to in
accordance with the law, do hereby state and depose the following:
1. That I was the duty Armed Supervisor last March 4, 2006;
2. That about eight in the morning of the same day, the duty baggage
inspector, Pacita Dela Rosa, summoned me to witness the inspection of
a luggage whose image indicated an obvious threat in the x-ray monitor
that resembled a firearm;
3. That thereafter, the inspection of the suspect luggage was conducted
by Pacita Dela Rosa in my presence and that of the owner identified as
Abdul Cakol, a departing passenger for Dubai on PAL X44 flight;
4. That the inspection of the suspect luggage yielded a Colt Caliber .32
pistol, Serial Number 6789 with seven (7) live ammunitions which were
turned over to me by Pacita Dela Rosa;
5. After confronting and inquiring from the said departing passenger about
the required documents for the said firearm, I found out that Mr. CAKOL
had no such documents and I subsequently put him under arrest and
read to him the pertinent provisions of RA 7438.
foregoing facts this 4th day of March 2006 in the office of the 1 st PCAS, ASG-PNP,
Pasay City.
PACITA DELA ROSA
Affiant
SUBCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4 th day of March 2006 in the
office of the 1st PCAS, ASG, PNP, Pasay City.
PEDRO CHAVEZ
80
APPENDIX “J” – SAMPLE AFFIDAVIT OF BODY FRISKER

Pasay City )
AFFIDAVIT
I, ELLEN O TOLENTINO, married, resident of 141 Vito Cruz, Manila, of legal age and an appointed
CASS, OTS security personnel and after having been duly sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby state
and depose the following:
1. That I was the duty body frisker last March 4, 2006;
2. That about nine in the morning of the same day, as part of security standard operating
procedure inside airport terminal, I required a certain departing passenger to divest her person of all metal
objects and to place them on the divest container and while said passenger was passing through the Walk Thru
Metal Detector (WTMD), the WTMD sounded alarm;
3. That thereafter, I required the said passenger who later turned out to be EVANGELINE
PASCUAL, a departing passenger for Riyadh on PAL X33 flight with valid plane ticket number 9898, to examine
her person for remaining metal objects in her body and to divest the same and to place them on the divest
container and while the said passenger was passing again thru the WTMD, the WTMD again sounded an alarm;
4. That I, then. required the said passenger to mount the inspection platform to conduct alarm
resolution with the aid of a Handheld Metal Detector(HHMD);
5. That when I proceeded to conduct body search, the HHMD sounded off at the right waistband of the
subject passenger;
6. When the HHMD sounded off, I conducted the necessary body frisking for which I felt a hard object
inside the waistband which turned out to be a five-inch double blade fan knife;
7. That I immediately took control of the said fan knife and called the attention of the duty Armed
Supervisor.
8. In the presence of the owner and the duty Armed Supervisor, I placed said fan knife inside a
transparent plastic and marked the same with “EXHIBIT” “A” and correspondingly affixed my signature therein;
9. Thereafter, in the presence of the owner, I turned over to the duty armed supervisor said fan knife.
In truth thereof, I am affixing my signature to attest to the veracity of the foregoing facts this 4th
day of March 2006 in the office of the 1st PCAS, ASG-PNP, Pasay City.
ELLEN TOLENTINO
Affiant
SUBCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day of March 2006 in the office of the 1st
PCAS, ASG, PNP, Pasay City.
PEDRO CHAVEZ
81
APPENDIX “K” SAMPLE AFFIDAVIT OF ARREST

Pasay City )
AFFIDAVIT OF ARREST
I, PANTALEON M. DE LUNA, married, resident of 141 Vito Cruz, Manila, of legal age and an appointed
NCCAS security personnel and after having been duly sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby state and
depose the following:
1. That I was the duty SPOIC last March 4, 2003;
2. That about eight in the morning of the same day, I required a certain departing passenger to
divest her person of all metal objects and place them on the plastic container and while said passenger was
passing through the said machine, I heard the metal detector beeped;
3. That thereafter, I required the said passenger who turned out to be EVANGELINE PASCUAL,
a departing passenger for Riyadh on PAL X33 flight with valid plane ticket number 9898, to amount the inspection
platform;44 flight with valid plane ticket number 2345;
4. That when I proceed to conduct the body frisk to the said departing
passenger with the aid of a hand scanner, I heard the scanner sound off at the right waistband of the subject
passenger;
5. That on the process of frisking, I felt a hard object inside the waistband which turned out to be a
five-inch double blade fan knife;
6. That I immediately took control of the said fan knife and informed the duty SPOIC who
eventually placed the aforementioned departing passenger under arrest.
In truth thereof, I am affixing my signature to attest to the veracity of the foregoing facts this 4 th
day of March 2003 in the office of the 1st PCAS, ASG-PNP, Pasay City.
ELLEN TOLENTINO
Affiant
SUBCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4 th day of March 2003 in the office of the 1 st
PCAS, ASG, PNP, Pasay City.
PEDRO CHAVEZ
82
APPENDIX “ ” RECOMMENDATION FOR CHANGES
__________________________
__________________________
__________________________
(Originating Agency)
_________________
Date
TO : The Director for Human Resource and Doctrine Development
National Headquarters, PNP
Camp Crame, Quezon City
SUBJECT : Recommendation for Charges
The following recommendations are submitted for improvement of
_________________________________________________________________
(short title)
____________________________________________ _________________
(long title) (page)
____________________________________________ _________________
Article Paragraph Number Line Sentence
_________________________________
Figure Number
Comment:
______________________
(Signature of Office Chief)
Copy for:
83
84
85
86
GLIMPS OF SAGSB
The 9/11 incident triggers the security world of much wary and fear for the
safety and security of the people and establishments alike. So much so to the
window of one’s country the Airport. In effect, PNP-ASG harness and enhance the
Aviation Security knowledge of private security guards deployed in MIAA Complex as
force multipliers. Soon enough, PNP-SAGSD issued Memorandum 58-02 dated 02
December 2002 regarding Security in International and Domestic Airports. However,
to assure fully the security and safety in the airport the NHQ, PNP issued
Memorandum Circular Nr 2005-003 dated 14 February 2005 directing PNP-ASG
Supervision over Private Security Agencies and Security personnel performing
Aviation Security and Aviation Security related Training at International and Domestic
Airports. This is when SAGSB came into existence pursuant to PNP-ASG, OADPRM
G.O.# 2005-214 dated May 12, 2005 though it was officially delegated by SAGSD on
17 May 2005 through a simple turn-over ceremony. This is in furtherance of the 2003
Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 5487, as amended,
otherwise known as “ An Act Governing the Organization and Management of Private
Security Agencies, Company Guard Forces and Government Security Forces”.
MISSION:
To provide administrative services and operational control and supervision

over the management and operations of all organize security detective/watchmen
guard agencies, units operating at international and domestic airports throughout the
country.
FUNCTIONS:
To implement the laws, rules and regulations governing the administration and
general supervision over organization, operations, business and other related
activities of all licensed private detective , watchmen, security guard agencies and
company/government guard forces throughout the country.
To disseminate policies, rules and regulations promulgated by the Chief, PNP
or his authorized representative pertaining to security guards and their agencies
To endorse to the chief, SAGSD the issuance of license for security agencies
and company guard forces.
To conduct inspection of posted guards security agencies, company guards
forces and government guard units.
87
To investigate valid complaints against security agencies, company guard
forces and government guard units
To supervise the training and re-training of security guard being conducted by
PNP offices and other accredited security guards training schools.
To maintain and update nationwide records of security consultants, security
officers, private detective, watchman, security guard, security agencies, company
guard forces and government guard units.
88
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Interior and Local Government
National Police Commission
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
HEADQUARTERS, AVIATION SECURITY GROUP
SECURITY AGENCIES AND GUARDS SUPERVISION
Pildera II, Pasay City
*ANNEXES*
OADO May 17, 2005
STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

NUMBER 2005-01
PROCEDURE IN THE CONDUCT OF INSPECTION

Of private Security Agencies, Company guard Forces, Government Guard Forces and
their Security Personnel Performing Aviation Security, and Training Schools Engaged
in Aviation Security Related Training for Personnel deployed at
International and Domestic Airports
I. REFERENCES :
1. Memorandum Circular Number 2005-003 dtd 14 February 2005.

2. Republic Act 5487 as amended, and its IRR
3. ICAO Annex 17, Standards and Recommended Practices
4. PNP CSG SOP NO. 04-02 dtd 2 December 2002
II. POLICY:
A.) Periodic and non-periodic inspections shall be conducted on all

Security agencies (Private Security/Detective Agency, Company Guard Force, and
Government Security Force), Security Training Schools (Private Security Training
Institutions) and Security and/or Training personnel engaged in civil aviation security.
B.) Inspection shall be connected based on the following:
1) Pre-Licensing Inspection- Periodic inspections conducted to

determine compliance with the provisions of R.A. 5487 prior to issuance of License to
Operated (LTO) a Security Agency and/or Accreditation to operate a Security Training
School that deploys security personnel t the International/domestic Airports, General
89
Aviation Areas and immediate vicinity of the airport complexes directly affecting
Aviation Security
2) Post – Licensing Inspection – Periodic and/or non-periodic

inspections conducted during the operation of Security Agencies and/or Aviation
Security Training Schools to ascertain whether the provisions of R.A. 5487 and its IRR
are complied with, to ensure correction of defects/violations noted, and to recommend to
the operators appropriate measures to improve their operations.
III. AUTHORITY:
1. The Chief, Security Agencies and Guards Supervision

Branch (C, SAGSB), PNP ASG and his personnel shall conduct the inspections.
2. The Director, PNP-ASG may authorized and PNP-ASG

officers and personnel to conduct the inspections.
IV. DEFINITION OF TERMS:
1. Post to Post Inspections – Conducted on detailed/posted security

guards to determine proper compliance of regulations related to uniforms, general
physical appearance, documentation and other requirements in the actual service of
duty.
2. Administrative Inspections (Office, Files and Records Inspections)

– Conducted to determine compliance with records, files and other administrative
requirements for operating a security agency and/or exercising security profession. In
case of Security Training Schools, their inspection will determine compliance with
provisions of the 2003 Revised IRR to RA 5487.
V. PROCEDURES:
A.) Organization for the inspection
1. The inspection team shall be composed of at least three (3)

personnel led by a Police Commissioned Officer.
2. The designation, functions and responsibilities of the inspecting

team shall be organized as follows;
One (1) PCO – Team Leader

One (1) Senior PNCO – Asst Team Leader/inspector – recorder
One (1) PNCO – Driver /inspector – Evidence Custodian
90
3. Members of the inspection team shall be in complete uniform with
proper identification and preferably using a marked uniform vehicle for easy
identification, except howler during covert operation/inspection.
B.) Authority to Conduct Inspection
1. The inspection team shall be covered with the appropriate

letter order duly signed by the Director, PNP ASG. The LO shall indicate the specific
purpose, destination and period of inspection.
C.) Conduct of Inspection
1. Administrative Inspection
a) The inspection team shall introduce themselves to the

operator or to his representative available during the inspection, state the purpose of the
inspection and present appropriate Letter Order (LO).
b) The inspection will be conducted by using the

Inspection Checklist (PNP SAGSD form # 9 and /or PNP SAGSD Training Inspection
Checklist) as guide and may demand other pertinent documents related to the purpose
of the inspection.
c) Administrative defects/violations observed or noted,

shall be reflected on comments/finding portion of the inspection checklist. Separate
inspection report maybe rendered if deemed necessary.
d) Appropriate recommendations shall be likewise

indicated at the portion provided in the checklist.
e) The inspection team shall conduct exit briefing to

ascertain acknowledgement of defects by the operator and to recommend to the
operator to institute appropriate corrective measures.
f) If the inspection is a pre-licensing administrative

inspection conducted within the vicinity of the airport, a transmittal/endorsement shall
be forwarded to C, SAGSD together with the application folder and the inspection
checklist .
g) In the event that the result of inspection may serve as

grounds for disapproval of application or cancellation of LTO/ Accreditation, a formal
investigation shall be conducted by C, SAGSD upon recommendation by D, ASG. If
inspection is initiated at the PCAS level, the Chief, PCAS concerned shall forward the
result of inspection to C, SAGSB prior to endorsement to C, SAGSD
2. Post to Post Inspection
91
a) Upon arrival at the post subject of inspection, the
inspection team shall introduce themselves to the duty guards or detachment
commander, state the purpose of the inspection, and present the appropriate Letter
Order.
b) The conduct of inspection shall be within the purview

of existing rules and regulations.
c) Violations noted be reflected on the Violation Ticket

Report (SAGSD form 13-94) prepared in four (4) copies and distributed as follows:
Original and one copy for PNP SAGSD, one (1) copy for security personnel being
inspected and one (1) copy for the agency.
d) If the violation warrants confiscation of firearms,

justification for its confiscation is under Rule VII, IRR of RA 5487. The serial number,
make and caliber of firearms shall be indicated at the left side portion of Violation
Ticket Report.
e) Issuance of Violation Ticket Report shall be per

guard violation basis.
f) The inspection team shall conduct exit briefing to the

security personnel concerned to ascertain acknowledgement and correction of defects
noted and to recommend appropriate measures to improve their services.
g) Confiscation of License to Exercise Security

Profession may be effected particularly those considered as falsified/faked.
h) Procedures in Section 6, Rule XV (Disposition of

Violations) below shall apply when violations and defects are penalized pursuant to the
IRR to RA 5487 as amended.
D.) Disposition of Confiscated Licenses, Documents and/or Firearms
1. Confiscations (particularly firearms) shall be effected only after

properly informing the concerned (licensee, holder, owner, and /or client) and after their
acknowledgement.
2. All confiscations shall be appropriately documented (i.e.

Inventoried and receipted) and stored by the official office/unit custodian.
3. Likewise, disposition of all items, whether released or confiscated

in favor of the government, shall be appropriately documented.
92
4. Confiscated items shall be released upon presentation of proof of or
upon confirmation of legality of such document (in case of documents or licenses), or of
proof of validity of firearm license, SG license of DDO (in case of firearms), or upon
payment/settling of fines/penalties, as the case may be.
E. Coordinations
1. AS a general rule or whenever feasible prior to the conduct of

inspection, the inspection team shall coordinate with the C, PCAS the inspection to be
conducted by presenting the issued Letter Order , and iff necessary to make
arrangements for appropriate assistance.
2. A corresponding exit/after inspection call should be made to the C,

PCAS.
VI. REPORTS:
A.) After Inspection Reports shall be prepared and submitted upon

completion of the inspection or within one (1) day after the period covering the
inspection.
B) In event that the violation/s committed entail the imposition of

corresponding fines and penalties, the report (VTR) shall be submitted to Chief,
SAGSB, PNP ASG which shall forward same to the C, SAGSD fro approval,
disapproval and/or enforcement.
C) Accomplished inspection checklists of Administrative Inspections

and recommendations thereof, should form part of the application for LTO or
Accreditation.
D) All reports submitted to the C, SAGSB either requiring actions or

for information shall be forwarded to the Director, ASG for subsequent endorsement to
C, SAGSD.
VII. DISPOSITION OF VIOLATIONS:
A.) Administrative Inspection- related violations.
1. In compliance to procedural due process, Private Security

Agencies with pending violations shall be officially notified by C, SAGSD thru registered
mail or personal notice.
93
2. The notice of appearance within seven (7) days as indicated
in the acknowledged Violation Ticket Report issued by the inspecting team shall serve as
first formal notice to the agency.
a) Acknowledging respondent.
(1) If respondent acknowledges violations/defects and

penalties/fines resulting form the inspection, appropriate payment orders shall be
issued by SAGSD. Thereafter, PSA shall furnish the SAGSB a copy of proof of
payments to serve as proof of settlement of penalty/fine.
(2) Copy of proofs of settlements shall form part of the

respondent’s application for LTO/Accreditation.
(3) Summary Report/Consolidated Report of settlement with

reference to the prior After Inspection Report shall be submitted to C, SAGSB for
notation and/or information.
(b) No- response respondent.
(1) In the event that the PSA concerned shall not comply
with first notice of appearance, the Inspection Section, SAGSD shall send a second
notice of appearance and direct the owner or his representatives of said agency to
appear within seven(7) days upon receipt of the notice.
(2) If the PSA concerned failed to comply with the

second notice of appearance, the C, SAGSD shall order the conduct of formal
investigation based on the Inspection Report including all the pieces of evidence
(violation report, confiscated firearms, affidavit executed by the inspecting team
members and other pertinent documents).
(3) At the onset of the investigation at SAGSD, a third

and final notice shall be sent to PSA concerned, with directive to appear within seven (7)
days upon receipt.
(4) Thereafter, Rule XVI and Memorandum SOP on the

Conduct of Investigation shall ensue and be applied.
(c) Contesting Respondent
(1) In the event that a respondent questions the

violations, penalty or fines imposed, and/or any of the circumstances giving rise to such,
and/or refuses to submit under the sanction being imposed, the report shall be submitted
for investigation.
94
(2) Thereafter, Rule XVI (Investigation of Cases) and
Memorandum SOP ON THE Conduct of Investigation shall be applied.
B.) Post-to-post Inspection – related violations
1. Be it a Security agency, Security Training

School, Security or Training Personnel, the procedures set forth in paragraph VII (a)
above shall apply.
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS:
The foregoing procedure/process is without prejudice to the filing of appropriate

case when violation committed is penalized under Republic Act 5487, the Revised Penal
Code and other existing laws.
IX. EFFECTIVITY:
This SOP shall take effect immediately.
ANDRES G CARO II
Police Chief Superintendent
Director
95
Department of the Interior and Local Government
OADO December 28, 2004
STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

NUMBER 2004-17
OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION

OF ELEMENTS OF SOU AND K-9 UNIT
I. OBJECTIVE:
This SOP sets forth the guidelines in the operational control and supervision of
elements of SOU and K-9 Unit detailed at the staging areas of NAIA T-1 and T-2 and
Manila Domestic Airport Terminal (MDAT) to ensure efficient coordination and
immediate/quick response when need arises.
II. SCOPE:
This SOP applies to personnel of 1st and 2nd PCAS, SOU and K-9 Unit.
III. PROCEDURES:
1. Elements of SOU and K-9 Unit on duty/detailed at the staging areas of

NAIA T-1 and T-2 and MDAT shall be attached operationally to the respective Duty
Officers of 1st and 2nd PCAS.
2. Designated Team Leaders of all incoming SOU and K-9 elements shall
report to the Duty Officer for instruction. In case of T-2, report to duty Officer of
Northwing and Southwing, respectively.
3. Duty officers shall establish contact/communication with the Duty SOU and
K-9 Teams by means of any available communication equipment such as: hand held
radio, telephone and/or cellphone of the Team Leader or any of the Team Members.
96
4. Team leaders shall notify their respective Duty Officer of any activity or
change of location being undertaken by the team within the duration of their duty.
5. Outgoing duty SOU and K-9 teams shall leave their respective AOR only
when properly relived by the in-coming teams.
IV. RESPONSIBILITY:
Chiefs, 1st PCAS, 2ND PCAS, SOU and K-9 Unit shall be held responsible for
the strict implementation of this SOP.
V. EFFECTIVITY:
This SOP takes effect upon publication.
ANDRES G CARO II
Director
Comp 1\mydoc\
SOP\OPNL CNTRL & SPRVSN OF SOU AND K-9
97
OADO 26 May 2004

NUMBER 2004-07
AIRSHIPMENT OF EXPLOSIVES, FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION
I. REFERENCE: Philippine National Civil aviation Security Program
II. PURPOSE: To establish and set guidelines for PNP-ASG personnel in the transport
of firearms and ammunition by air carriers.
III. PROCEDURES:
The safe transport of firearm and ammunition by duly authorized passengers is a

primordial concern in the passive measure of aviation security carrier. Coordination between
the air carrier and security status provides an efficient system of checking and transporting the
firearm. The following tasks are given to the security staff:
A) Duties of PNP-ASG Police Center for Aviation Security Chiefs, PCOICs

and PNCOICs:
a. Request from the passengers carrying firearms/ammunition

their authorities to carry said firearms/ammunition together with their mission orders for
personnel authorized to have the same. (i.e., Police, Military) PTCFOR for other persons.
b. Let the concerned passenger check the firearm and account for
the ammunition prior to surrendering said firearm/ammunition for safekeeping at check-in
counter. The firearm should be checked in the designated clearing box.
c. See to it that passenger has the claim tag as his receipt.
d. See to it that firearms and/or ammunition are properly

manifested by the airline for the flight and are loaded to V-Cargo with padlocks. The keys of
the padlock must be handled only by the responsible persons at the point of loading and
unloading.
e. Detailed ASG personnel are required to escort the authorized

airline carrier with the firearm and/or ammunition from the check-in counter up to the loading
98
of the V-Cargo boxes to the aircraft. This procedure shall also hold thru upon unloading of
said firearm.
f. In case of international flights, all firearms/deadly weapons will

be checked-in as belly cargo.
g. Upon arrival at the destination, airline staff shall turn over the
V-Cargo box/Security box to the detailed PNP-ASG firearms coordinator who shall be
responsible in releasing the firearms in a designated area, located at the non-restricted area of
the airport terminal.
h. Firearms shall be released only after the passenger have retrieved

his/her baggages. Let the passenger check again the firearm and account for the ammunition
before finally accepting it.
B) At no instance shall a firearm or ammo be given to a passenger while on

board the aircraft.
C. Any passenger refusing to surrender any firearm or other deadly weapon

shall be denied to board the aircraft.
D. Passengers who posses firearms and/or ammunition but cannot produce any
authority or mission orders to carry said firearms shall be investigated for proper disposition.
E. Grenades, bombs, pyrotechniques and other explosive devices are not

authorized to be loaded in any passenger commercial aircraft unless otherwise chartered for
this purpose.
4. RESPONSIBILITIES:
It is the responsibility of all Chiefs, PCOICs and PNCOICs of PNP ASG Police
Center for Aviation Security and Airport Stations to follow strictly these guidelines.
5. EFFECTIVITY:
This SOP takes effect upon publication.
6. RESCESSION:
This SOP rescinds SOP Nr 99-01 dated 07 May 1999 and all other publications in
conflict hereof.
ANDRES G CARO II
99
Director
100
OADO 15 June 2005

NUMBER 2005-05
AIRPORT SECURITY MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES
I. PURPOSE:
To establish management procedures/guidance for the level of preparedness of

all unit at certain “risk or the condition”.
II. SCOPE:
This SOP applies to the Command Headquarters and other PNP ASG units
throughout the country.
III. DEFINITION:
1. SECCO – a security condition which represents a level of preparedness to

respond to specific threats.
2. AOR – the area of responsibility of an operating units.
IV. PROCEDURES:
The primary determinants of a security condition are:
- The unit’s perceptions of what security measures is necessary.
- The unit’s capability
- The warning status in effect
- The Commander’s assessment of the situation.
1. The following are the measures to be undertaken/implemented

during the different security condition.
101
a) SECCO – Normal
- Vital facilities and other resources are to be protected

and secured through normal aviation and airport duration.
b) SECCO 1
- All intelligence data collection effort must be fully

utilized.
- All available data will be reviewed and reassessed in

the light of new information.
- Security measures will remain normal and

guards/sentinel will be inspected more often.
- All personnel will be service firearms .
c) SECCO II:
- (Increased Security Measures) – Units level take steps

more than the normal security measures against possible hostile action and will provide
increased level of intelligence watch.
- Implement appropriate area security plan.
- Additional outposts will be designated secured.

Guards at critical posts will be augmented.
- Special strike force will be equipped ready for

deployment.
- Gate guards will conduct rigid check personnel ID,
vehicle passes and packages entering into the area.
- Maximum utilization of individual and organizational

equipment including government resources of the NAIA.
- Emphasis on Public Info and Police Relations

Operations.
- Command Incident Management Staff is organized
and GOC is secured.
102
d) SECCO III:
- (Maximum Deployment) – a security posture for

maximum readiness normality taken in anticipation of an impending or imminent hostile
action. It means, full preparedness to secure vital facilities and persons in the area. i.e.
passengers, airport employee.
- Intelligence activities will be concentrated on data
collection by field teams for new information.
- Number of guards sentinel will be doubled and roving
patrol will be organized.
- All entry points to MIAA Complex/any airport
complex are totally closed/barricaded.
- Implementation of area security and contingency plan
is continuing.
- All personnel are ready to secure and defend the AOR.
- Mobile strike force and tactical units/teams ready for
deployment.
V. RESPONSIBILITY:
1. The Regional Chief are held responsible for the determination of security
conditions in their respective area. Immediate reports must be submitted to Headquarters,
ASC for increased security threat condition.
2. The Group Operations Center, ASG will disseminate information on

increased security conditions to all concerned units/offices.
VI. EFFECTIVITY:
This SOP effect upon publication.
BY ORDER OF POLICE CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT CARO II:
OFFICIAL: EFREN D UBANA

Police Senior Superintendent
Chief, Directorial Staff
ELIAS A ABAD JR
Police Superintendent
Asst Director for Operations
My doc\sop, airport security mgment

Comptr1
103
OADO 15 June 2005

NUMBER 2005-04
BOMB THREATS
I. PURPOSE:
To establish security guidelines and procedures for bomb threat response

within the area of responsibility of ASG.
II. REFERENCES:
1. Security and Fraud Prevention Manual, International Air Transportation

Association (IATA).
2. Security Manual for the Prevention of Unlawful Acts against Civil Aviation
(DOC 8973/2) International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
3. Philippine National Civil Aviation Security Program.
III. SCOPE:
This SOP applies to all ASG operating units throughout the country to include
the Group Operation Center.
IV. DEFINITION:
Bomb Threat is an information or warning claiming knowledge that a

dangerous device, such as a bomb or similar type of explosive has been or will be placed in an
aircraft or airline/airport facilities.
V. PROCEDURES:
General:
104
a. Each threat received through any means of communication should be
treated as real and must be thoroughly evaluated to safeguard life and property. The
following procedures apply to recipients of the threat:
1. Telephone Calls:
a) A checklist of guidelines should be readily accessible.

(Annex “A”)
b) In case of telephone call, repeat the message to the caller
whenever possible and ask for confirmation. The receiving party should remain calm and
courteous. He should listen carefully and write down accurately the information the caller
provides. (Accomplish the checklist if possible)
c) If possible, refer the caller to a ranking officer/supervisor to
extract more information.
d) Apply delaying tactics and engage the caller in prolonged
conversation by:
1) Pretending to have difficulty in hearing;
2) Give the caller reason to believe that the flight
information quoted is incorrect and erroneous.
2. Other means:
a) Hand-written or typed notes:
1) Documents and other materials received should be

carefully handled to preserve marks, fingerprints etc., for examination by competent
authorities. Unnecessary handling or other careless acts will only make the task of tracing the
origin more difficult, if not impossible.
2) These items should be forwarded immediately to the
supervisor for analysis and evaluation.
b) Person-to-person or direct:
1) Notify your supervisor immediately.

2) Keep the person making the threat or indicating
knowledge of a threat under surveillance until relieved by your supervisor.
3) Take not of the age, height, weight, sex, color of
eyes/hair/skin, clothing, unusual characteristics such as lameness, twitching or any
peculiarities of the person under surveillance. Observe other personal contact, if any.
4) If the person leaves the scene, take note of the
transportation used, such as bus, taxi or car; note the make, model, color
b. Pinpointing the exact location of the bomb should be a primary concern.

The following procedures apply when specific information about the bomb is known.
1. Aircraft on the ground before boarding:
105
a) Recipient of the threat shall inform immediately the
supervisor or officer.
b) The supervisor or duty officer informs the Operations
Branch/ Section of affected PCAS/Airport Stations, which in turn coordinates the information
with all agencies concerned.
c) Notify Director, ASG and GOC, ASG by radio or phone.
d) Tow aircraft to the designated clearing area. Each airport
should have a designated site (End of TWY 06 for 1PCAS) for the purpose. The site should
be 100 meters or 320 feet away from any aircraft parking position, taxiway, runway,
buildings, public areas, fuel farm, storage tank storage area for explosives or incendiary
materials and far from gas pipelines, refueling hydrant and electric power cables. For small
airports, the site should be as practical as possible.
e) K-9 team conducts bomb detection operations in
coordination with EOD teams.
f) Rigid inspection of passengers, baggage and positive
baggage ID matching during the check-in process.
2. Baggage and cargo not yet loaded in the aircraft:
a) Recipient of the threat shall inform immediately the

supervisor or duty officer.
b) The supervisor or officer inform the Operations Section of
affected PCAS/Airport Stations which in turn coordinates the information to all agencies
concerned.
c) Notify Director, ASG and GOC, ASG.
d) Tow the aircraft and the container vans containing the
checked-in baggage and cargoes to the designated site (end of TWY 06 for 1PCAS) for the
purpose. The site should be 100 meters 0r 320 feet away from any aircraft parking position,
taxiway, runway, buildings, public areas, fuel farm/storage tank, storage area for explosives or
incendiary materials and far from gas pipelines, refueling hydrant and electric power cables.
For small airports, the site should be as practical as possible.
e) Baggage and cargo should be cordoned and secured from
unauthorized persons.
f) EOD personnel and K-9 teams will conduct bomb detection
procedures on the aircraft, baggage and cargo.
g) Passengers and crew will identify their baggage before
loading into the aircraft.
h) If a bomb is found, or if a baggage is suspected to contain a
bomb, EOD personnel shall immediately employ Render Safe Procedure Techniques (RSPT).
The findings will be relayed to GOC, ASG and the affected unit, which in turn will inform the
airline station manager or his representative.
i) In any case, whether the threat turns out to be positive or
negative, the team leader of the EOD shall inform the GOC, ASG and all other agencies
concerned about the status of the threat.
106
3. Aircraft on the ground with passengers and baggage.
a) Recipient of the threat shall immediately inform the

supervisor or duty officer.
b) The Supervisor or duty officer inform the Operations
Branch/Station of the affected PCAS/Airport Station, which is turn coordinates the
information with all agencies concerned.
c) Notify Director, ASG and GOC, ASG by radio or phone.
d) Disembark passengers and crew with their hand carried
baggage in coordination with the airline concern.
e) Tow aircraft to the designated clearing area. Each airport
should have a designated site (End of TWY 06 for 1PCAS) for the purpose. The site should
be 100 meters or 320 feet away from any aircraft parking position, taxiway, runway,
buildings, public areas, fuel farm/ storage tank, storage area for explosives or incendiary
materials and far from gas pipelines, refueling hydrant and electric power cables. For small
airports, the site should be as practical as possible.
f) At the designated isolation area, baggage and cargoes are
off-loaded, arranged systematically (for ease in paneling) while the aircraft is being
searched/inspected.
g) Passengers shall identify their baggage.
h) If a bomb is found, only EOD personnel shall render bomb
disposal procedures.
i) If no bomb or explosive is found, OIC of EOD team shall
inform concerned unit, which in turn advises the Airline Station Manager or his representative
that the flight is cleared.
j) Passengers and crew, together with their hand-carried
baggage, will undergo redundancy security inspection before reboarding.
k) Unclaimed baggage will be isolated to undergo rigid
examination/inspection, in coordination with the concerned airline before turning it over to
them for final disposition.
l) Chief, PCAS will render post operations report regarding the
bomb threat to Director, ASG.
4. Aircraft ready for take-off:
a) Recipient of the threat shall inform immediate supervisor or

duty officer.
b) The officer or supervisor informs the Operations Section of
affected PCAS/Airport Stations which in turn informs the Control tower and other agencies
concerned.
c) The Control tower advises the pilot-in-command of the
aircraft under threat, and directs the same to park at the designated area if the aircraft is no
longer attached to the tube as in the IPT, NAIA or if the aircraft is already taxiing or being
towed away from the terminal.
107
d) The Pilot-In-Command submits the aircraft for bomb search
operations upon arrival at the designated area.
e) All passengers and crew shall disembark with their hand-
carried baggage.
f) At the designated area, baggage and cargoes are off-loaded
and arranged systematically (for ease in paneling) while the aircraft is being
searched/inspected.
g) Passengers shall identify their baggage.
h) If a bomb is found, only EOD personnel shall render bomb
disposal procedures.
i) If no bomb or explosive is found, OIC of EOD team shall
inform concerned unit, which in turn advises the Airline Station Manager or his representative
that the flight is cleared.
j) Passengers and crew, together with their hand-carried
k) Unclaimed baggage will be isolated to undergo rigid
l) Chief, PCAS will render post operations report regarding the
5. Aircraft on Flight:
a) Recipient of the threat shall notify the immediate supervisor

or officer, who shall inform the Operations Section of affected PCAS/Airport Stations which
in turn coordinates the information to the Control Tower, and all concerned agencies.
b) The Control Tower advises the pilot-in-command regarding
the bomb threat. Upon landing, pilot-in-command shall be directed to park the aircraft at the
designated isolation area.
c) All passengers and crew shall disembark with their hand-
carried baggage and are conveyed to the passenger holding area.
d) At the designated isolation area, baggage and cargoes are
off-loaded, then arranged systematically (for ease in paneling) while the aircraft is being
searched/inspected.
e) Passengers shall identify their baggage. Only identified
baggage are reloaded.
f) If no bomb is found, OIC of EOD Team informs the
concerned unit, which in turn advises the Airline Station Manager or his representative that
the aircraft is cleared.
g) If a bomb is found, EOD personnel render bomb disposal
procedures.
h) Passengers and crew, together with their hand-carried
108
i) Unclaimed baggage will be isolated to undergo rigid
j) Chief, PCAS will render post operation report regarding the
6. Airport facilities and other buildings within ASG area of

responsibility:
a) Recipient of the threat shall notify the immediate supervisor

or officer who shall inform the Operations Section of affected PCAS/Airport Stations, which
in turn will disseminate the information to all concerned agencies.
b) Heads of offices/occupying the affected building shall effect
an evacuation plan.
c) K-9 and EOD teams will conduct appropriate bomb clearing
operations to sanitize the building/facility.
d) If no bomb is found, OIC of EOD informs concerned
agencies, which in turn advises the Head of Office or representative that the building is
cleared.
6. Clearance for Bomb Threats will be declared by OIC, EOD or his

authorized representative.
VI. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:
a. For NAIA Complex, the Airport Security Center (ASC) is the central
emergency control authority to where all bomb threat information shall be relayed. (ANNEX
“B”)
b. The PCAS Operations Branch or Airport Station Operations Section is the
emergency control authority where all bomb threat information in a specific area will be
referred to. The Operations Center/Station will be the office/center responsible for relaying
all information to all concerned agencies at the airport and the Group Operation Center, ASG.
c. Chiefs, PCAS/Airport Stations shall initially take the following actions:
1) Request availability of EOD and K-9 personnel from territorial

PNP/AFP units, enter into an agreement and maintain coordination for the purpose.
2) In case of bomb threat situation, notify the following immediately:
a) Director, ASG (by any fastest possible means of

communication).
b) GOC, ASG (by any fastest possible means of
communication).
c) Airport Manager
d) Airline/ owner of concerned aircraft.
109
e) EOD and K-9 personnel from territorial PNP/AFP units
coordinated in advance for immediate dispatch.
3) Duty Officers/Supervisors will take immediate control of the

activities and will act as Ground Incident Commander in coordination with the affected
airline.
d. GOC, ASG upon receipt of information shall immediately notify the

following:
1. Director, ASG
2. Chief, Directorial Staff, ASG
3. AD for Operations, ASG
4. AD for Intelligence, ASG
5. Chief, SOU
6. Chief, K-9 Unit
e. AD for Operations/GDO ASG, upon receipt of information, shall:
1. Alert SOU, (EOD and K-9 Teams) and dispatch the same on orders.
2. Coordinate movement and transportation of teams to the affected
area.
3. Monitor the coordination with airline/owner of the aircraft for other
requirements.
4. Monitor all activities at the affected site and relay the same to
Director, ASG.
5. Prepare formal report to the Chairman, NCCAS and Chief, PNP for
their information and reference. Included in the report are pertinent information about the
incident such as:
a) Source of information.
b) Time threat was received/time of paneling by K-9/EOD.
c) Names of personnel involved in threat response.
f. AD for Intel shall:
1. Advise operatives/agents in the area to intensify the conduct of

surveillance in their AOR for any unusual activity.
2. Keep continuous watch on the concerned target and report all
information to Director, ASG.
g. AD for Logistics – shall provide logistical support for any movement of

EOD, K-9 and other personnel responding/on dispatch to the threat.
h. Chiefs, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 PCAS and Station Chiefs shall:
110
1. Coordinate with the airline manager for support requirements such
as tow trucks, firefighting and illumination facilities and other emergency response services.
2. Shall provide an Officer/Senior PNCO/Supervisor to position
himself at the Cockpit of the Aircraft as escort and guide in towing the aircraft in the
designated isolation area.
3. Provide security cordon to the aircraft under bomb threat.
4. Publish an Operating Instruction on the mechanics for
implementation of this SOP.
5. Perform other tasks as maybe directed.
i. Special Operations Unit shall:
1. Maintain a 24-hour alert of EOD team for immediate deployment

upon orders.
2. Organize qualified personnel to conduct search procedures as
necessary.
3. OIC/Team Leader of the responding team will report to the PCAS
Duty Officer/Supervisor for briefing prior to accepting responsibility for the clearing
operations of the aircraft, baggages and cargoes.
4. Publish an Operating Instruction on the mechanics of EOD
operations.
j. Chief, K-9 Unit shall:
1. Maintain a 24-hour alert of K-9 team for immediate deployment on

orders.
2. Organize the search/inspection, in coordination with EOD team.
3 OIC/Team Leader of responding team will report to PCAS Duty
Officer/Supervisor for briefing prior to accepting clearing operation.
4. Publish an Operating Instruction on the mechanics of K-9 bomb
detection.
VII. POLICIES:
1. There is no simple way to differentiate between hoax threat and one which
may cause disaster. Specific recommendations cannot be laid down but the following
guidelines have been developed in the hope that it may assist in reducing the treat.
a) The greatest safeguard against the effect of bomb threat is to prevent

entry of unauthorized persons into the area of responsibility, whenever possible. Restricted
entry and positive identification of staff and visitors can be a significant factor in assessing the
seriousness of any given threat.
b) Taking into consideration that most bomb threats are hoaxes and
made only to gain publicity, it is of utmost importance that bomb threats of any kind are
handled with as much confidentiality as possible and coverage by the press should be avoided.
111
c) Any foreign object found during the search should not be touched,
but should be made as the subject of an immediate report to the EOD teams. Only qualified
EOD personnel shall deal with the situation.
d) Bomb Threat whether hoax or not shall always be treated as real.
VIII. RESPONSIBILITY:
The AD for Operations shall be responsible for the proper and strict
implementation of this SOP.
IX. RESCISSION:
This SOP rescinds SOP Nr 2004-06A dated 22 July 2004 and all other
publications in conflict with this SOP.
ANDRES G CARO II
Director
My doc\SOP. BOMB THREATS
Computer 1
112
BOMB THREAT CHECKLIST
Date/Time/Called
Name of Caller (If possible)
Address of Caller:
Origin of Call: Local ( ) Long Distance ( )
Caller’s identity:
Voice Characteristics: Loud ( ) Soft ( ) High pitch ( )

Deep ( ) Pleasant ( ) Others
Accent: Local ( ) Foreign ( ) Others
Manner: Calm ( ) Angry ( ) Emotional ( )

Laughing ( ) Joking ( ) Threatening ( )
Hurried ( ) Natural ( ) Coherent ( )
Incoherent ( ) Others
Background noises:
Office Machines ( ) Factory noises ( ) Party ( )

Voices ( ) Quiet ( ) Airplanes ( )
Street Traffic ( ) Animals ( ) Others
Attempt to obtain following information from caller:
Where is it (Flight No. / building involved: ___________________________________________________

When will it explode: __________________________________________________________________
Type of device and Lime of explosion: _________________________________________________________
Timed ( ) Explosives ( ) Incendiary ( ) BOOBY Trapped ( )
Is the caller familiar with the:
Aircraft or Building: _______________________________________________________________

Flight Number: __________________________________________________________________
Origin and destination of flight: ______________________________________________________
Flight Schedule: __________________________________________________________________
Names of pilots/crew and passengers: _________________________________________________
Reasons why he is doing the bomb threat: ______________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
Quote threat is its entirety as received: ________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Receiver of BOMB THREAT: Name : __________________________________________________________

Date/time called: ____________________________________________
Locations: _________________________________________________
THREAT CLASSIFICATION: ( ) Specific

( ) Non-Specific
113
THREAT ASSESSMENT TEAM ORGANIZATION
CHIEF, PCAS
INTEL OPNS OPNS OPNS GM REP/AIRLINE

REP/ATO REP
114
CHIEF, SAGSB
DEPUTY
Chief
Clerk
PRIVATE SECURITY
OPERATIONS/ENFORCEMENT
TRAINING MANAGEMENT
MANAGEMENT
SECTION SECTON
(PSTMS)
Operations, Policies&and
Authorization
Complaint
Doctrines&Development
Investigation
Intelligence
Supervision & Inspection
Inspection
PSTMS
OEMSFUNCTIONS:
FUNCTIONS:
1. To assist the C, SAGSB in
the
To assist thesupervision
C, SAGSB in the &
formulation
implementation
of policiesof pertaining
SAGSB
to operational
training, development
& enforcement &
research.
functions in all airports.
2. To conduct inspections to all
PSTC/S
2. To supervise
conducting the AVSEC
conduct of &
related
administrative
trainings/ seminars.
& post–to-post
3. inspections
To implement & actrules on and the
regulations
complaint pertaining
filed before to SAGSBthe
conduct
againstof PSAs AVSEC & & Securityrelated
trainings/seminars
Guards at the airports.of security
guards.
To Toadminister
conduct the intelligence/
General
Knowledge
surveillance
Examination
to PSAs &(GKE)security
for
private
personnel
security for personnelmore to
evaluate
comprehensive
the quality of securityAVSEC
related
supervision/monitoring
training. of
operations,
To conduct intelligence/ as
surveillance
directed/required
to PSTC/S conducting in
AVSEC
coordination
& with
otherotherrelated
PSAs
trainings/seminars
and authorized authority.
as directed/
required in coordination with other
PSAs4. and
To authorized
perform other authority.
task as
6. To
maybe
perform
directed
other task as maybe
directed.
115

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CHAPTER I

This revised edition of Aviation Security (AVSEC) Operations Manual is

1.2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY

The next instrument is the Hague Convention known as the Convention

This was followed by the Montreal Convention of 1971, known as the

Its vital convention features were further strengthened by the Montreal

This was followed by the Convention on the Marking of Plastic

An unnamed American airline passenger on a domestic flight from Portland to

Today, aviation security is an avowed national concern of democratic

1.3 EVOLUTION OF PNP-AVIATION SECURITY GROUP

In compliance with the Montreal Convention of 1971 and the Supplementary

EO 336 was issued on January 5, 2000, reconstituted the NACAHT as the

1.4 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY

A mid-air explosion happened on December 11, 1994 on PAL flight 434

All of these cases transpired when the present state-of-the-art anti-

2.1 TOTAL AVIATION SECURITY SYSTEM

Airport complexes are vital security installations crucial to our continued

2.2 PROACTIVE / DETERRENT SECURITY MEASURES

Complementation among the various security measures is a recognized

The known nature of organized international aviation terrorism consisting of

The following are the duties and responsibilities of an Intelligence Offices:

a. Coordinate and collaborate with other aviation security-related agencies for

b. Coordinate with PNP/AFP intelligence community;

c. Conduct counter intelligence operations to prevent unwitting and witting

d. Launch case operations against identified airport security threat

e. Monitor through matrix system the interceptions of prohibited/ dangerous

g. Prepare appropriate Aviation Security Advisory and Current Threat

h. Comply with all information requirements from the Directorate for

i. Conduct continuing Security Education and Awareness Program among

j. Submit Daily/Weekly/Monthly Intelligence Briefs/Summaries to the Director,

k. Maintain Rogue Gallery of identified local and international terrorist

l. Develop Watch / Target List and conduct background investigation of

m. Perform such other duties and responsibilities as required.

The following are the duties and responsibilities of an Investigation Offices:

b. Inform immediately the Director, PNP-ASG (Attn: ADII) about each

c. Interview or interrogate separately and individually each witness and

d. Conduct follow-up investigations against identified cohorts of arrested

e. Establish the positive identifications of each suspect/arrested persons, take

h. Perform such other duties and responsibilities as directed.

2.2.3 LANDSIDE PATROL

This is conducted regularly to preempt any activities prejudicial to

The following are the duties and responsibilities of a Landside patrol

a. Conduct daily systematic visibility patrols within vital airport facilities;

d. Verify and act as first responder on unattended baggage;

f. Perform such other duties and responsibilities as directed.

2.2.4 ACCESS CONTROL

The airport authority/management, based on its Airport Security

2.2.5 VEHICLE INSPECTION

The number of vehicle permits, as far as is practicable, shall be kept to a

a. Contained in each vehicle permit are the following;

 Registration number of the vehicle;

c. The following guidelines should be observed in the movement of

 Drivers of authorized vehicles must have undergone

 During upgraded security conditions, the only vehicles

 Those vehicles allowed movement in the AMA shall obtain

 Airline operators’ service vehicles/equipment intended to be

 Service vehicles shall display a checkered black and yellow

 A rotating/alternating beacon light shall be placed on top of