CHREA vs.CHR
  RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation
G.R. No. 155336
November 25, 2004
FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the
General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special
Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying
Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these special
provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047
adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among
selected positions in the Commission.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR “collapsed”
the vacant positions in the body to provide additional
source of funding for said staffing modification.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and
upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its
approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the request.
In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed
personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital
Region Office, through a memorandum, recommended to
the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be
rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla
reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees
association (CHREA) in representation of the rank and file
employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to
affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a
Resolution and reversedthe recommendation of the CSC-
Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured.
CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-
Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the
pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the
validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification
scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is
within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy.
ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading,
reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla
positions in the Commission without the prior approval of
the Department of Budget and Management?
HELD: the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA and
its are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling CSC-
National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The 3 CHR
Resolutions, without the approval of the DBM are
disallowed.
1.
and Position Classification System in the Government and
For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law,
provides that it is the DBM that shall establish
and administer a unified Compensation and Position
Classification System.
The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the
long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is flawed
considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the
entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.
This power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in
character as erroneously held by the CA. The word to
administer means to control or regulate in behalf of
others; to direct or superintend the execution, application
or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as
to administer the government of the state.
2.  The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of
compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in
jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of PRA v. Buñag,
this Court ruled that compensation, allowances, and other
benefits received by PRA officials and employees without
the requisite approval or authority of the DBM are
unauthorized and irregular
In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the sole
power and discretion to administer the compensation and
position classification system of the national government.
In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter
of the PPC grants it the power to fix the compensation and
benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the
coverage of the rules and regulations of the Compensation
and Position Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system established by
the PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM.
(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of
any PPC resolution affecting the compensation structure of
its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the
DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and
deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather,
the DBM’s function is merely to ensure that the action
taken by the Board of Directors complies with the
requirements of the law, specifically, that PPC’s
compensation system “conforms as closely as possible
with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758.” )
3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential
yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought
prior to implementation of any reclassification or
upgrading of positions in government. This is consonant to
the mandate of the DBM under the RAC of 1987, Section 3,
Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of Budget
and Management shall assist the President in the
preparation of a national resources and expenditures
budget, preparation, execution and control of the National
Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting
systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement
of more economy and efficiency in the management of
government operations, administration of compensation
and position classification systems, assessment of
organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of
legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational
implications.
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to
disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of
additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its
finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.
Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the
DBM to deny or approve the proposed reclassification of
positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM
requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped
from now claiming that the nod of approval it has
previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity
4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the
CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional
commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.
Palpably, the CA’s Decision was based on the mistaken
premise that the CHR belongs to the species of
constitutional commissions. But the Constitution states in
no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the COMELEC, and
the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions
with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.
Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on
Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional
commissions shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC, and
the COA, which are granted independence and fiscal
autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is
silent on the grant of similar powers to the other bodies
including the CHR. Thus:
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The Constitutional
Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional
Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved
annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly
released.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance with
the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a
Commission on Human Rights, and independent central
monetary authority, and a national police commission.
Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may
establish an independent economic and planning agency.
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code,
it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the class
of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-
repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence
excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit
cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an end to what is
implied.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that
the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal
autonomy entails freedom from outside control and
limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the
freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in
accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and
dispatch its needs may require from time to time.22 In
Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,23 it is
understood that it is only the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA,
the COMELEC, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which
enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a
member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group
(CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal
autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by
membership.
We note with interest that the special provision under
Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under the heading of the
CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those
offices to which the special provision to formulate and
implement organizational structures apply, but merely
states its coverage to include Constitutional Commissions
and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy
All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional
creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of
offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or
legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal
autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the grant
of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices
must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization
Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its
standpoint, thus-
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not
vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade,
and create positions without approval of the DBM. While
the members of the Group are authorized to formulate
and implement the organizational structures of their
respective offices and determine the compensation of
their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must
be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position
Classification and Compensation System established under
RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation
Standardization Law.
5. The most lucid argument against the stand of
respondent, however, is the provision of Rep. Act No. 8522
“that the implementation hereof shall be in accordance
with salary rates, allowances and other benefits
authorized under compensation standardization laws.”26
NOTES:
1. Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no
locus standi considering that there exists no official written
record in the Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona
fide organization of its employees nor is there anything in
the records to show that its president has the authority to
sue the CHR.
On petitioner’s personality to bring this suit, we held in a
multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury
as a result of the act complained of. Here, petitioner,
which consists of rank and file employees of respondent
CHR, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of
positions benefited only a select few in the upper level
positions in the Commission resulting to the
demoralization of the rank and file employees. This
sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHR’s
upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails
eating up the Commission’s savings or that portion of its
budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services,
from which the benefits of the employees, including those
in the rank and file, are derived.
upgrading scheme proposed by the CHR lacks legal
rationalization.
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general
provisions of the General Appropriations Act FY 1998,
which the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its
reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that “no
organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be
authorized unless provided by law or directed by the
President.” Here, the DBM discerned that there is no law
authorizing the creation of a Finance Management Office
and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHR’s
proposal to upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI, SG-26
to Director IV, SG-28, and four positions of Director III, SG-
27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the DBM
denied the same as this would change the context from
support to substantive without actual change in functions.
This view of the DBM, as the law’s designated body to
implement and administer a unified compensation system,
is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative
government agency, which is tasked to implement a
statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls
the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board
v. CA, we echoed the basic rule that the courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies.

Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was

recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of the
CHREA’s request to affirm the recommendation of the
CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREA’s personality to
bring the suit was a non-issue in the CA when it passed
upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our
hands be tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled
jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the
complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the
basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.

2. In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind
the Salary Standardization Law of “providing equal pay for
substantially equal work and to base differences in pay
upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities,
and qualification requirements of the positions,” the DBM,
in the case under review, made a determination, after a
thorough evaluation, that the reclassification and