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Business & Professional Ethics Journal
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BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL ETHICS JOURNAL, VOL. 22, NO. 2
Anita Ho
Introduction
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52 Business & Professional Ethics Journal
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International Business vs. Globalization 53
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54 Business & Professional Ethics Journal
appeal to our nature as persons and point out that our sentiment of partiality
towards certain individuals is elicited by a variety of relations that one may
bear to those individuals. Many may be moved to help and protect those in
close relationship or vicinity because of their specific relationships. How
ever, they may feel distanced from those needy people who are abroad. For
example, many people often do not feel personally affected by famine or
war in other countries, even when they may feel compelled or inclined to
donate to or volunteer for local charities. In relation to international
business transactions, a focus on internationalism may reinforce the idea
that economic and social problems that arise in other countries are not our
concerns. Even if our actions and products may be exploiting workers,
harming residents, or destroying the natural resources and environment of
the local country, the mere distance or separate national border can help us
to stay aloof and think of these issues as other people's problems. After all,
we are not confronted with their conditions face to face, and these people
are simply distanced foreigners.
This problem of treating people in foreign countries as distant moral
strangers is perpetuated by the inequality of power among nations. Power
disparities may lead to various international actions that continue to benefit
the stronger countries at the expense of poorer nations that do not have the
means to resist. For example, as Donaldson points out, in the late 1980s,
many countries on Africa's west coast received offers from American and
European companies seeking cheap sites for waste dumping, since the
United States and Europe had strict and costly safety measures.3 However,
these companies did not use such strict safety measures as a guideline to
consider the dangerous impact these toxic wastes may have on human
beings. Rather, they tried to find loopholes in import permits to unload the
waste in other LDCs that did not have the sophisticated rules and regulatory
procedures necessary to control high-technology hazards. Since the local
governments were not fully aware of the danger involved with such dump
ing, they agreed to be the dumping grounds for economic reasons. These
rich and powerful MNCs did not feel morally wrong to dump toxic wastes
in poor countries, even when they hid important information from the
government of LDCs about the potential harm of such poisonous sub
stances.
The third problem involving international business relates to the issue
of ethical relativism. Many have argued for the importance of understand
ing and respecting local customs when engaging in international business.
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International Business vs. Globalization 55
They argue against ethical imperialism and promote respect, tolerance, and
sensitivity towards local customs and contexts. They worry that MNCs may
impose their home country's value on developing countries. Certainly,
there are many ethical, practical, and economic reasons to respect local
customs and avoid imperialism. However, for MNCs chartered in devel
oped countries and operating in third-world countries, very often the
concern is not one of violating the local country's customs. In fact, some
MNCs are quick to adopt these LDCs' standards and regulations, which are
often much lower than those of the MNCs' home country. For example,
sometimes MNCs rigorously search for foreign markets to export products
that do not meet the high safety standards in their home country. When the
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission banned the sale of pajamas with
toxic chemicals that had been found to cause kidney cancer in children, or
when the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency forbids the sale of a
cancer-causing weed killer, exporters decided to dump these products on
overseas markets to make profit or at least to avoid financial losses resulting
from having to withdraw a product from the U.S. market.4 Some corpora
tions operate in or sell products to other countries precisely to take advan
tage of the lower standards in the local countries.
While we need to be cautious about imperialism and acknowledge the
need to be sensitive to various economic and social contexts, relativistic
approaches in international business endeavors are problematic. First, adop
tion of lower standards in local countries in some situations may give the
impression that MNCs can simply ignore the regulations when it is con
venient to do so or when there is a legal loophole. Second, disregarding the
higher standard in the host countries creates a double standard and mixed
message for government officials and business associates in LDCs. After
all, developed countries like the United States often impose sanctions on or
refuse business transactions with LDCs unless they would adhere to the
former's much stricter rules. This seems hypocritical, since these powerful
countries and corporations often use their own high standard to exclude
participation from LDCs, but then happily trade and invest in these LDCs
and adopt their "worse" standards when it is convenient and profitable for
the powerful countries and MNCs.
When powerful nations and corporations adopt the lower standard, we
should be careful about their motivation for doing so. Are they adopting the
local standard because they want to respect the local culture or to benefit the
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56 Business & Professional Ethics Journal
citizens of the local country? Or are there other motives involved? For
example, MNCs may use the idea of diversity to mask the fact that they are
adopting local rules and abandoning their home country's regulations
mainly to benefit themselves.
A Shift to Globalization
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International Business vs. Globalization 57
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58 Business & Professional Ethics Journal
to benefit themselves, how can we have an ethical global economy that will
benefit not only those from powerful GCs but all participants? For example,
one may question if GCs are simply economic agents with limited economic
objectives, or whether they have any moral obligations to ensure the welfare
of people in other countries.
It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss in detail the moral status
of corporations. However, it is worth noting that many business ethicists
agree that corporations are not mere economic agents. As Kevin Jackson
points out, corporations often assume significant noneconomic roles.7 For
example, they often contribute to election campaigns and form political
action committees. Even if their political and social involvement are moti
vated by economic interests, that does not absolve them from social respon
sibility. They can still be bound by the idea of social justice.
Moreover, those who argue that corporations have no obligation except
to promote their own economic interests are often in privileged positions.
They usually benefit from various social inequalities, such that their sense
of obligation is perhaps influenced by their own social and economic posi
tions. In the following section I argue that the Rawlsian ideas of original
position and overlapping consensus can help us construct an ethical global
economy that will minimize such bias and promote mutual benefits in a
global community.
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International Business vs. Globalization 59
people's intuitions about what is just and unjust are often influenced by their
social position. He employs the thought experiment of the original position,
which is designed to rid us of our biases based on our privileged position
and to find the most appropriate principles for realizing liberty and equality
in a fair system of cooperation between free and equal citizens.12 As Rawls
says, the idea of the original position "is to set up a fair procedure so that
any principles agreed to will be just."13 Representatives to the social con
tract only know about general facts of society, but they do not know the
natural endowments or social positions of those they represent. They also
do not know their constituents' individual comprehensive religious,
philosophical, or moral doctrines. This "veil of ignorance" helps to
eliminate bargaining advantages that arise within the background institu
tions of any society from cumulative social, historical, and natural
tendency.14
When people do not know of their specific circumstances and have no
way of predicting the probability that they will end up in any particular
situation, Rawls believes that they would "try to acknowledge principles
which advance their system of ends as far as possible."15 In other words,
representatives behind the veil of ignorance are still choosing on the basis
of self-interests. They would only agree to principles that will satisfy fair
terms of cooperation and advance their constituents' benefits.
Given that representatives to the original position are choosing under
uncertainty, they have to consider the possibility that their constituents
would end up being in disadvantaged positions through no fault of their
own. People can be born into a society at any particular position. This is
a natural fact that is beyond their control. To make sure that their constitu
ents would not have to suffer the pains of inequality because of such
morally arbitrary factors, the rational strategy in choosing the basic princi
ples of justice would be the strategy of the maximin, i.e., to maximize the
minimum. Representatives behind the veil of ignorance would direct their
attention "to the worst that can happen under any proposed course of action,
and to decide in the light of that."16 To ensure that the arrangement they
choose will guarantee a satisfactory minimum for their constituents, the
parties behind the veil of ignorance would give more attention to those with
fewer native assets and to those born into the less favorable social
positions.17 They would redress the bias of contingencies in the direction of
equality, and would want to protect their basic rights and insure themselves
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60 Business & Professional Ethics Journal
against the worst eventualities.18 They would want an equal basic structure
that would ensure that various citizens would treat one another not only as
means but as ends in themselves.19
In addition to protecting basic liberties of all citizens, Rawls believes
that representatives behind the veil of ignorance would also want to improve
the long-term expectation of the least advantaged. While equality of basic
liberty is generally important, representatives in the original position would
not insist on social and economic equality at all costs. If allowing disparity
of economic distribution would result in the least advantaged being better
off than it would have been under a strictly equal division, disparity would
be preferred. Representatives would adopt the difference principle and want
a system that benefits all, especially those who are in most vulnerable
situations.
Rawls is mostly concerned with the basic structure of the society and
not global business transactions. However, recognizing that perfect isola
tion is no longer possible, Rawls notes that each society needs to think about
how it ought to relate to other societies and conduct itself with respect to
them. In his later work, The Law of Peoples, Rawls acknowledges that the
constructivist approach of the social contract tradition and the liberal ideas
of justice as extended to the international arena are acceptable to both liberal
and decent non-liberal peoples,20 such that these ideas may be applied to
ongoing cooperative political arrangements and relations between peoples.21
He also believes that his political idea of justice is supported by an
"overlapping consensus" that includes all opposing philosophical and
religious doctrines.22
Some commentators have argued that Rawls's conception of justice
cannot be applied to the realm of business ethics, since Rawls distinguishes
a well-ordered democratic society, to which his theories of justice apply,
from any other "voluntary associations" such as corporations. Robert
Phillips and Joshua Margolis, for example, argue that political theory such
as that of Rawls's cannot adequately address ethical issues that arise in
business organizations.23 Their concern is based on Rawls's contention that
it is necessary to construe the social contract for the basic structure of the
society in a special way that distinguishes it from other agreements.24 First,
membership in our society is given, in the sense that we cannot know what
we would have been like had we not belonged to it. This is different from
voluntary membership of an economic organization. Citizens are not free
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International Business vs. Globalization 61
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62 Business & Professional Ethics Journal
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International Business vs. Globalization 63
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64 Business & Professional Ethics Journal
One may ask, if it is possible for different nations and MNCs to come up
with various agreements that can protect the interests of all parties, is it
really necessary for us to think in terms of globalization? Cannot the
concept of international business promote the same type of international
agreements? After all, there are already different international financial
institutions and treaties that direct business practices. Why do we need to
move to the global ideology?
It is important to note that treaties between competing international
parties may still not protect harmony or guarantee compliance. As men
tioned before, the concept of international business is inadequate in ensuring
that competing economic participants who view each other as moral
strangers would respect each other. Certainly, they can set up a modified
version of modus vivendi, "a treaty between two states whose national aims
and interests put them at odds."40 However, under a similar type of modus
vivendi between competing international economic participants, members
of the cooperative scheme are mainly motivated by their own self-interests
that are narrowly defined.41 While the scheme may satisfy the condition of
prudential equilibrium, such that all participants have reason to participate,
these participants do not necessarily believe that the modus vivendi is an
ideal agreement for all concerned or the most desirable agreement from a
partisan perspective.42 They do not have sincere mutual respect and trust for
each other, and do not believe that the agreement holds any particular
intrinsic value for them, except for its ability to secure short-term stability.
These participants are generally ready to pursue their own goals at the
expense of the other, and, should conditions change, they may do so.43
Cooperation is not guaranteed but is only contingent, depending upon
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International Business vs. Globalization 65
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66 Business & Professional Ethics Journal
Notes
1. For critical and constructive feedback on prior versions of this
paper, I thank Joseph DesJardins, Ronald Duska, Edwin Hartman, Laura
Hartman, Urs Martin Lauchli, Ian Maitland, Patricia Werhane, three
anonymous reviewers, and meeting participants from the Business Ethics in
a Global Society Conference. I also thank the Markkula Center for Applied
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International Business vs. Globalization 67
Ethics for the Young Scholar Award, which enabled me to participate at the
conference.
2. Jeff McMahan, "The Limits of National Partiality," in The Morality
of Nationalism, eds. Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 109.
3. Thomas Donaldson, The Ethics of International Business, (New
York: Oxford University Press), 1989, 67.
4. William Shaw and Vincent Barry, Moral Issues in Business, 8th ed.
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2001), 27-8.
5. Thomas Pogge, for example, argues that respect for domestic dif
ferences does not preclude the possibility of reaching standards that guide
global activities. See Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1989), 273.
6. Pogge also realizes that the difficulty of diversity "is not unique to
the global plane." See Pogge, 270.
7. Kevin Jackson, "Global Distributive Justice and the Corporate Duty
to Aid," Journal of Business Ethics 12 (1993): p. 547.
8. Rawls does discuss briefly how his theory of justice may apply to
foreign policy. However, his focuses there are the rights of each nation to
self-determination and the idea of just war. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 377-9.
9. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1999), 3.
10. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia Univer
sity Press, 1993), 14.
11. John Rawls, "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,"
Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985): p. 225.
12. Rawls, "Justice as Fairness," p. 225.
13. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 136.
14. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 23.
15. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 144.
16. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 154.
17. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 100.
18. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 176.
19. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 179.
20. According to Rawls, decent non-liberal societies are hierarchical
societies that are non-expansionist and respect the political and social order
of other societies. While these societies have a state religion, and that their
political institutions specify a consultation hierarchy as well as a hierarchy
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68 Business & Professional Ethics Journal
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International Business vs. Globalization 69
own interests, he does not think that justice as fairness is an egoistic theory.
After all, the two principles of justice and the principles of obligation and
natural duty require us to consider the rights and claims of others. See
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 147-8.
38. Rawls also acknowledges that stronger ties among people are
possible once they start to cooperate as equals. He says, "as cooperation
between peoples proceeds apace they may come to care about each other,
and affinity between them becomes stronger." See Rawls, The Law of
Peoples, 113.
39. Rawls, "Justice as Fairness," 230.
40. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 147.
41. Pogge, 219.
42. Hayden, 92. Also see Pogge, 219.
43. As the U.S. withdrawal from the greenhouse gas reduction treaty
(Kyoto Treaty of 1997) shows, long-term compliance of international
agreements under the model of modus vivendi can be unstable. While the
treaty was enacted to legally bind industrialized countries to reduce emis
sions of greenhouses gases, which have devastating effects on the global
climate and environment, the U.S. government withdrew its support in 2001,
arguing that the treaty would harm the American economy and workers.
44. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 147.
45. Pogge, 248-9.
46. Hayden, 94-5.
47. One of the companies that has been working hard to treat its
suppliers fairly is Green Mountain Coffee Roasters (GMCR) in Waterbury,
Vermont. One of the best corporate citizens, GMCR pays fair trade prices
for coffee beans grown in Peru, Mexico, and Sumatra. The company does
not pay "the market price of twenty-four to fifty cents per pound, but a
minimum of $1.26 per pound for conventional coffee and $1.41 for
organically grown." GMCR also cuts out some of its middlemen and
purchases about a quarter of its coffee directly from the farmers, thereby
delivering higher prices to farmers. See "The 100 Best Corporate Citizens
for 2003", Business Ethics: Corporate Social Responsibility Report, 20 June
2003 (10 July 2003). <http://ww.business-ethics.com/100best.htm>.
48. Beitz, 155-6.
49. Beitz, 170.
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