REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

COURT OF APPEALS
Manila

JASMIN TELLEZ,
Petitioner,

C.A. G.R. SP No. 123659

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ANGELO PANCHO,

Respondents.
x ----------------------------------- x

COMMENT AND OPPOSITION

TO THE PETITION FOR REVIEW

COMES NOW Respondent, Angelo Pancho, by counsel and unto this

Honorable Court, most respectfully submits his comment and
opposition to the Petition, as follows:

I. Decision/Order subject of the Petition

The Petition seeks to annul the following:

The Order dated January 5, 2022 of the Regional Trial Court of

Manila, Branch 41, denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the petitioner on the Decision dated October 14, 2021, affirming in
toto the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15
dated May 14, 2021, which found Petitioner Jasmin Tellez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Slight Oral Defamation as
defined and penalized under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code,
and liable for the penalty of a fine in the amount of P10,000.00 and
ordered to pay respondent the amount of P5,000.00 as moral
damages.

II. Averments of the Petition

Briefly, the petition raises the following grounds or arguments to set

aside the above-cited Order:

a) The prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Petitioner

Jasmin Tellez beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Slight
Oral Defamation on the ground that the element of publication
is lacking.

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 b) The prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Petitioner
Jasmin Tellez beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Slight
Oral Defamation on the ground that there is no malicious intent
to utter the defamatory remarks, as it falls under qualified
privileged communication.

c) Since the “heat of anger” circumstance is inapplicable to the

instant case, there is no more reason for the court to downgrade
the crime from Grave to Slight Oral Defamation. The court
should acquit the petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt.

II. Comment and Opposition

a) On the issue of publication

The petitioner argues that the alleged defamatory statements were

not made publicly, as they were communicated only to witnesses
Karren Lomeda and Myrea Faculanan, which is a manifestation of the
qualified privileged nature of the conversation.

However, this argument does not hold water.

In Manila Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Domingo 1 it was held that:

There is publication if the material is communicated to a third

person. It is not required that the person defamed has read or heard
about the libelous remark. What is material is that a third person has
read or heard the libelous statement, for "a man's reputation is the
estimate in which others hold him, not the good opinion which he
has of himself."

In the case at bar, the statements were made against the reputation of
private respondent Angelo Pancho, as the petitioner Jasmin Tellez
made it appear that the private respondent uttered defamatory
remarks against Karen Lomeda, such as the alleged sexual
intercourse between him and the latter in exchange for a monetary
consideration. This was communicated in the presence of a third
person other than the subject of the said remarks, such as, Myrea
Faculanan.

It is immaterial that private respondent Angelo Pancho did not hear

the matter directly or in the presence of the petitioner, as long as
third persons were able to hear the defamatory remarks, which
tarnished the reputation of private respondent. Due to the said
statements, the public had an impression him of a vice or defect
which were imputed upon him by the petitioner.
1
G.R. No. 170341, July 5, 2017

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 b) On the issue of malicious intent and qualified privileged
communication

The petitioner argues that the alleged defamatory remarks fall under
qualified privilege communication, to prove the absence of malicious
intent. She posits her argument on the ground that the imputation
was made out of a legal, moral, or social duty.

However, such argument lacks merit.

As a rule, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,

even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown.2 An exception to this rule is when it falls under
privileged communication, which may be absolute or qualified.

In Brillante v. Court of Appeals3, it was held that:

Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communication are those stated

under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

1. A private communication made by a person to another in the

performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments
or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions.

In order to prove that the statement falls within the ambit of a

qualifiedly privileged communication under Article 354, par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, the following requisites must concur:

1. The person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or

social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an
interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the
one to whom it is made.

2. The communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or

superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has
the power to furnish the protection sought;

3. The statements in the communication are made in good faith and

without malice.

2
Article 354, Revised Penal Code
3
G.R. Nos. 118757 and 121571, October 19, 2004

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Furthermore, as cited in the same case, US v. Galeza held that:

“xxx A party will be taken to have acted maliciously if he eagerly

seizes on some slight and frivolous matter, and without any inquiry
into the merits, without even satisfying himself that the account of
the matter that has reached him is correct.”

In the case at bar, the statement made by petitioner is considered to

be malicious, and does not fall under qualified privileged
communication.

Petitioner Jasmin Tellez was not in the performance of a legal, social,

or moral duty to tell to Karren Lomeda about the utterances alleged
to be made by Angelo regarding the alleged sexual intercourse
between Karren and Angelo for a consideration of P2,000.

Legal duty necessitates a provision of law conferring upon the

accused the duty to communicate. If there is no such provision of law,
the accused has no duty to make the communication to another, and
it is not privileged. 4

There is no law which requires petitioner to tell Karren Lomeda about

the remarks alleged to be made by Angelo. Furthermore, there is no
social or moral duty on her part since she is in no way related to
Karren, as they were only neighbors, and she voluntarily told her
about the said defamatory remarks.

Assuming but not conceding, that Karren has an interest sought to be

protected, petitioner still cannot invoke qualified privileged
communication, since the third requisite was not satisfied. The
communication made by Jasmin is malicious. The matter that Jasmin
told to Karren may be considered as merely rumors, the truth of
which, is unconfirmed, and were in fact denied by the private
respondent himself.

In relation to this, petitioner also argues that it was Karren Lomeda

who insisted that the defamatory remarks be uttered, claiming that
due to the insistence of the latter, her remarks cannot be considered
to be malicious. However, as already stated, there is no duty on the
part of petitioner to tell Karren about the matter communicated to
her by private respondent Angelo Pancho.

A perusal of the cross-examination of the witness would reveal that

Karren did not insist, but merely asked petitioner, and as can be
inferred from the Sinumpaang Salayasay ng Pagtetestigo, it was
really petitioner who initiated the conversation regarding the matter

4
People v. Hogan, C.A., 55 O.G. 1597

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between Karren and Angelo, when she said, “eh sayo nga ang dami
niyang sinasabi tungkol sa’yo”.

c) On the issue of downgrading the crime from grave to slight oral

defamation

The petitioner claims that since the “heat of anger” circumstance is

inapplicable to the instant case, there is no more reason for the court
to downgrade the crime from Grave to Slight Oral Defamation. The
court should acquit the petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, there are other factors to be considered

in downgrading a crime from grave to slight oral defamation, and the
“heat of anger” circumstance is only a particular instance in which the
crime will constitute only a light felony.

In De Leon v. People5, the factors to be considered in treating a crime

as serious or slight oral defamation was laid down, to wit:

Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation,

depends not only upon the sense and grammatical meaning of the
utterances but also upon the special circumstances of the case, like the
social standing or the advanced age of the offended party.

"The gravity depends upon:

1) The expressions used;

2) The personal relations of the accused and the offended party; and

3) The special circumstances of the case, the antecedents or

relationship between the offended party and the offender, which may
tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. In particular,
it is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with
some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a
light felony."

In the case at bar, the argument of the petitioner fails for there are
other factors that need to be considered for the Court to downgrade
the crime of grave oral defamation to slight oral defamation.

First, the expressions used by petitioner Jasmin Tellez in imputing to

respondent Angelo Pancho the said act of sexual intercourse with
Karren Lomeda for a consideration of P2,000. As to the words used,
it can be inferred that petitioner ascribed to the private respondent a
vice, which makes the impression that the latter is immoral.

5
G.R. No. 212623, January 11, 2016

5
Second, the personal relations between petitioner Jasmin Tellez and
respondent Angelo Pancho. According to the averments in the
petition were neighbors who had not been in good terms.

Third, the special circumstances, such as, the conflict between

petitioner Jasmin Tellez and respondent Angelo Pancho at the time
when the former told Karren about the defamatory statements. It may
be inferred that when petitioner told Karren about the alleged
utterances of private respondent that she resents the latter since they
were already on bad terms.

The absence of the “heat of anger” circumstance cannot be the basis

for acquittal of the petitioner, since it is not an element of the crime
committed. The crime of oral defamation may be committed if the
following elements were satisfied:

1. There must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or

imaginary, or any act, omission, status or circumstances;

2. Made orally;

3. Publicly;

4. Maliciously;

5. Directed to a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead;

6. Which tends to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person

defamed. Oral defamation may either be simple or grave. It becomes
grave when it is of a serious and insulting nature.6

The said elements of oral defamation were satisfied in this case, as

already discussed in the counter-arguments stated above. Thus, the
lower court’s ruling should be re-affirmed and the petition should be
denied.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed

that, for the reasons above-stated, the petition for certiorari be denied
and the assailed Order/Decision be re-affirmed.

6
De Leon v. People, G.R. No. 212623, January 11, 2016

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 Respectfully submitted.

MANILA; APRIL 13, 2022.

ATTY. MARY ANTONETTE P. IGNA

Counsel for Private Respondent
Department of Justice - Office of the City Prosecutor
Manila
Room 208, Manila City Hall, Padre Burgos Avenue, Manila
PTR No. 1247678; MAY 6, 2017,
MANILA
Roll of Attorney No. 12394758
MCLE Compliance No. 12364477

Copy furnished through personal service:

ATTY. JUAN DELA CRUZ

Counsel for the Petitioner
7th Floor, Kimmee Building, A. Mabini Street, corner T.M. Kalaw
Street,
Ermita, Manila