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Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Deutsche Knowledge Services, Pte. LTD., 807 SCRA 90, November 07, 2016
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Deutsche Knowledge Services, Pte. LTD., 807 SCRA 90, November 07, 2016
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* FIRST DIVISION.
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CAGUIOA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Commissioner of Internal Reve-
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The CTA First Division ruled that the petition for
review filed by DKS on June 30, 2009, or barely twelve (12)
days after the filing of its administrative claim for refund,
was clearly premature justifying its dismissal. The CTA
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The CIR filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the
motion was denied for lack of merit by the CTA En Banc in
its Resolution12 dated January 7, 2014.
Hence, this petition.
Issue
The singular issue submitted by the Petition for this
Court’s resolution is whether the CTA En Banc erred in
taking cognizance of the case and holding that DKS’s
petition for review was not prematurely filed with the CTA
First Division.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition lacks merit.
Exception to the mandatory and juris-
dictional nature of the 120-day period
Section 112 of the NIRC provides for the rules on
claiming refunds or tax credits of unutilized input VAT, the
pertinent portions of which read as follows:
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11 Rollo, p. 43.
12 Id., at pp. 47-53.
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may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter
when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit
certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid
attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the
extent that such input tax has not been applied against output
tax: x x x
x x x x
(C) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes
shall be Made.—In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a
refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of
submission of complete documents in support of the
application filed in accordance with Subsection (A) hereof.
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax
credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the
application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer
affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the
decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one
hundred twenty-day period, appeal the decision or the unacted
claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the plain language of the foregoing provision, a
VAT-registered taxpayer claiming for a refund or tax credit
of its excess and unutilized input VAT must file an
administrative claim within two (2) years from the close of
the taxable quarter when the sales are made. After that,
the CIR is given 120 days, from the submission of complete
documents in support of said administrative claim, within
which to grant or deny said claim. Upon receipt of CIR’s
decision, denying the claim in full or partially, or upon the
expiration of the 120-day period without action from the
CIR, the taxpayer has 30 days within which to file a
petition for review with the CTA.
As earlier stated, this Court in Aichi clarified that the
120-day period granted to the CIR is mandatory and
jurisdictional, the nonobservance of which is fatal to the
filing of a judicial claim with the CTA. The Court further
explained that the two (2)-year prescriptive period under
Section 112(A) of the NIRC pertains only to the filing of the
administrative claim with the BIR; while the judicial claim
may be filed with the CTA within 30 days from the receipt
of the decision of the CIR or expiration of 120-day period of
the CIR to act on the claim. Thus:
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to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the
decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the
CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit,
the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the
CIR to CTA within 30 days.
In this case, the administrative and the judicial claims were
simultaneously filed on September 30, 2004. Obviously,
respondent did not wait for the decision of the CIR or the lapse of
the 120-day period. For this reason, we find the filing of the
judicial claim with the CTA premature.
Respondent’s assertion that the nonobservance of the 120-day
period is not fatal to the filing of a judicial claim as long as both
the administrative and the judicial claims are filed within the
two-year prescriptive period has no legal basis.
There is nothing in Section 112 of the NIRC to support
respondent’s view. Subsection (A) of the said provision states that
“any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated may, within two years after the close of the
taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance
of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or
paid attributable to such sales.” The phrase “within two (2) years
x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund”
refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not
to appeals made to the CTA. This is apparent in the first
paragraph of subsection (D) of the same provision, which states
that the CIR has “120 days from the submission of complete
documents in support of the application filed in accordance with
Subsections (A) and (B)” within which to decide on the claim.
In fact, applying the two-year period to judicial claims would
render nugatory Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which already
provides for a specific period within which a taxpayer should
appeal the decision or inaction of the CIR. The second paragraph
of Section 112(D) of the NIRC envisions two scenarios: (1) when a
decision is issued by the CIR before the lapse of the 120-day
period; and (2) when no decision is made after the 120-day period.
In both instances, the tax-
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payer has 30 days within which to file an appeal with the CTA.
As we see it then, the 120-day period is crucial in filing an
appeal with the CTA.
x x x x
In fine, the premature filing of respondent’s claim for
refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA warrants a dismissal
inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA.13
(Emphasis supplied)
Subsequently, in San Roque, while the Court reiterated
the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120+30 day
periods, it recognized as an exception BIR Ruling No. DA-
489-03, issued prior to the promulgation of Aichi, where the
BIR expressly allowed the filing of judicial claims with the
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CTA even before the lapse of the 120-day period. The Court
held that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 furnishes a valid basis
to hold the CIR in estoppel because the CIR had misled
taxpayers into filing judicial claims before the CTA even
before the lapse of the 120-day period:
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Following San Roque, the Court, in a catena of cases,15
has consistently adopted the rule that the 120-day waiting
period does not apply
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Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Toledo Power, Inc., 725 Phil. 66; 714
SCRA 276 (2014); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mindanao II
Geothermal Partnership, 724 Phil. 534; 713 SCRA 645 (2014); Team
Energy Corporation (formerly Mirant Pagbilao Corp.) v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 724 Phil. 127; 713 SCRA 104 (2014); Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Visayas Geothermal Power Company, Inc., 720 Phil.
710; 709 SCRA 89 (2013); Nippon Express (Philippines) Corporation v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 706 Phil. 442; 693 SCRA 456 (2013).
16 Taganito Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
736 Phil. 591, 600; 743 SCRA 130, 140-141 (2014).
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The CIR now claims that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is
invalid because it was merely issued by a Deputy
Commissioner and not by the CIR, who is exclusively
authorized by law to interpret the provisions of the NIRC.
The Court is not persuaded. The Court En Banc’s
Resolution in San Roque dated October 8, 201317 is
instructive:
Finally, the CIR contends that even assuming that BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03 should be considered as an exception
to the 120-day period; it was already repealed and
superseded on November 1, 2005 by Revenue Regulations
No. 16-2005 (RR 16-2005), which echoed the mandatory
and jurisdictional nature of the 120-day waiting period
under Section 112 of the NIRC. Thus, DKS cannot rely on
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 because
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its claim was filed in June 2009 or almost four (4) years
since RR 16-2005 took effect.
In other words, the CIR posits that compliance with the
120-day period should only be considered permissible from
December 10, 2003, when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was
issued, until October 31, 2005, prior to the effectivity of RR
16-2005.
The Court disagrees.
Again, it has already been settled in San Roque that
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule
which all taxpayers may rely upon from the time of its
issuance on December 10, 2003 until its effective reversal
by the Court in Aichi. While RR 16-2005 may have re-
established the necessity of the 120-day period, taxpayers
cannot be faulted for still relying on BIR Ruling DA-489-03
even after the issuance of RR 16-2005 because the issue on
the mandatory compliance of the 120-day period was only
brought before the Court and resolved with finality in
Aichi.
All told, the Court maintains that the 120-day period is
permissible from December 10, 2003, when BIR Ruling No.
DA-489-03 was issued, until October 6, 2010, when Aichi
was promulgated; but before and after said period, the
observance of the 120-day period is mandatory and
jurisdictional.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition for review is hereby DENIED. The Amended
Decision dated July 29, 2013 and the Resolution dated
January 7, 2014 of the CTA En Banc in C.T.A. E.B. No. 815
are hereby AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to
the CTA First Division for the proper determination of the
refundable amount due to respondent, if any.
SO ORDERED.
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