(IN) O P Malhotra: The Law of Industrial Disputes, 7e 2015 sa The Law of Industrial Di ‘0 P Malhotra: The Law of Industrial Disputes, 7e 2015 > O P Malhotra: The Law of Industrial Disputes, 7e 2015 > Volume 1 > CHAPTER I Preliminary The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act 14 of 1947) CHAPTER I Preliminary Executive ‘The body to which the management of the affairs of a trade union is entrusted is the “executive’ in relation to that trade union, whether on is relevant in the context of s 36(1) of the s called as an “executive or by any other name. This defini Act, forthe purpose of representation of the works (Clause (b): FEDERAL RAILWAY Federal Railway Clause (h), which defined “federal rilway’, was deleted by the Adaptation of Laws Orders 1950 (Clause (i): INDEPENDENT ‘This clause is based on s (4) of the repealed Trade Disputes Act 1929. The proviso was added by s 2 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act 1952. ‘For the puspose of his appointment” as the chairman or a member of a board, court or tribunal, a person must be unconnected with (©The industrial dispute refered to it; or (Gd) Any industry directly affected by such dispute. ‘This clause was clumsily drafted. The words “Tor the purpose of his appointment’ indicate that the chairman or other member of a board, court or tribunal, should be unconnected with ‘the industrial dispute’ referred to such board, court or tribunal of with ‘any industry to be affected by such dispute’, atthe time of his appointment. The qualification of being an ‘independent person’ is prescribed by ¢ 7C, fox being appointed to, oF continue in the office of the presiding officer of a labour court tribunal or national tribunal. The real intention of the legislature seems to be that a person who is connected With an ‘industrial dispute’ or with any industry directly affected by such dispute, should not deal with or adjudicate upon such a dispute as chairman, a member or a presiding officer of a board, court of inquiry, labour cour, tribunal or national tribunal, to whom such a dispute is referred. This intention has hardly been brought out by the lang bbe appointed to or to continue in an office is one thing and 10 in into or adjudicate upon a particular dispute is altogether a different one. Then the det tribunal. Further, this clause as well as s 7C do not x tage of this clause. To se, ingui not refer to a labour court and the national 1o conciliation officers, who also need be independent persons, ia ‘as much as the chairman or a member of a board is required to be an ‘independent person’. This definition as well ass 7C require recasting, clesely bringing out the intention of the legislature. Proviso (0) OP Malhotra: The Law of Industrial Disputes, 7e 2015 ‘This proviso is in the nature of an explanation, whereby itis clarified that merely on account of the fact that a person is a share-holder in an incorporated company, which is connected with, at is likely to be affected by, such an industrial dispute, hhe shall not cease to be “independent”. He is, however, required to disclose to the “appropriate government", the nature and extent of the shares held by him in the incorporated company as soon as he receives the order of reference of the industrial dispute, which is connected with or likely to affect such company. jause (j): INDUSTRY Legislation There was no definition of “industry” in the Trade Disputes Act 1929. The present definition continues to be as or enacted in the IDA. Though this definition has not undergone any amendment, it has undergone variegated judicial interpretations. ‘This definition is based on s 4 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-25 of Australia, which reads thus © Any busines, trade, manufacture, undertaking or calling of employers of land or water: (G) any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation oravocation of employees on land or water, and (ii) a branch of an industry and a group of industries. Hence, in construing the definition and opinion-making, the courts have been influenced by the Australian decisions,t Which have been sub rosa all the time. Difficulty. however, in using Australian cases with a text book approach is pethaps not noticed, as in a great body of those cases, the problem presented in its many facets and the approach was pragmatic ‘The Amending Act 46 of 1982, which also- amended the definition of ‘industry’, has been substantially brought into Force Wer 21 August 1984. But the definition of ‘industry has not been brought into force so far. In Des Raj, speaking for the t. RN Mishra J, lamented: “Though almost six years have elapsed since the amendment came on the statute book, it has not heen enforced yet. Bare Acts and commentaries on the Industral Disputes Act have, however, brought in the new definition by deleting the old one, with a note that the new provision has yet to come int foree. This situation bas futher added tothe confusion. In the language of Krishna Tyer J, a definition “is ordinarily, the crystallization of a legal concep, promoting precision and rounding off blurred edges but, alas, the Aefinition ins 2), viewed in retrospect, has achieved the opposite? Industry ‘The definition of ‘industry’ in this clause is both exhaustive and inclusive and is ambivalently comprehensive in scope. It is in tWo pasts. The fest part says thal it means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture of ealling of employees’ and