Asian Philosophy

The Indian context prof. Pelissero

The Vedic corpus = Veda = the secret science of Indian priestly tradition
Veda = the term means “to know, to understand” properly “to know with the eyes” → it means to see and it has
something to do with direct experience. The structure of the vedic corpus is made of four collections of literary
material = SAMHITA – made of 4 levels: the first is the SAMHITA itself + three more levels

• Collections SAMHITA
• Priestly teachings BRAHMANA
• Forest teachings ARANYAKA
• Secret teachings UPANISAD – it is well known (often misunderstood)

Samhita
The 4 collections (the first three known as the Triple science = TRAYI VIDYA – a sort of holistic corpus)

1) RGVEDA – collection of hymns = poetical compositions celebrating some sort of personal (?); the
Rgvedasamhita is something more than 1028 hymns in 10 circles (mandala) – the last and the first of these
mandalas contain more recent material compared to the central corpus – ancient not only from the point of
view of the content but even of the language. The main priest of these kind of Samhita is a priest whose name
means “the oblator” (hotar) – he is the one who recite the hymns.
2) SAMAVEDA – collection of melodies, music parts – it contains nothing original because it simply takes
stanzas (made in metrical form, they are verses) from hymns and puts these stanzas in musical form. It is the
first known example of musical notation in Indian civilization. The musical scale in India is made of seven
notes, quite similar to our musical scale because it is based on the number seven. The Samavedasamhita
contains material from Rgveda with its musical notation. The specialist of this Samhita is a chanter (udgatar)
who sings this material.
3) YAJURVEDA – The secret science of the Yajur = the sacrificial ritual formulas meant to be used during the
sacrificial ritual session. It is usually divided in two parts: white (Suklayajurveda – a smaller section) and
black (Krsnayajurveda – a much bigger section) Yajurveda; the first one is the plain text, with no sort of
commentary or notes vs. the second called black because the plain text is blackened by notes of comment.
The special is called “adhvaryu”, the sacrificer: the difference between him and the hotar = the first one is a
priest who materially does all the operations necessary during the sacrificial section, it is a maker, not just a
singer or a reciter!
4) ATHARVAVEDA – something different form the sort of holistic corpus above (made by the other three
vedas) = the secret science of magic formulas → “magic” is a category not well renowned in the
anthropological context because it is a quite old mean od interpretation, but we continue to call them
“magical formulas” in absence of other proper terms -> They don’t have to do with ritual but with some sort
of “magic”. The Atharvavedasamhita is divided in two main practices: santa = peacemaker + ghora = terrible
→ santa practices supposed to contribute to the wellness of the object of the magical rite vs. ghora practices
are supposed to harm someone or even kill someone (black magic). There are specific typologies of hymns:
medical (bhesaja) – the first examples of medical practices from a magical point of view within the vedic
corpus and within the Indian civilization, imprecatory (abhicarika) – black magic – hymns containing harsh
words for the receiver, increasing prosperity (paustika).

Brahmana (Priestly teachings)

Brahmana = a term difficult to translate because it is a polysemic word:

• originally it means “priest and priestly teachings” – it comes from “brahman” nr (divine word) = something
like sacred word, sacred teaching, a sacred force → its root is br(m)h = means something like to make fact, to
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 make something prosper – in some traditions brahman means simply “food”, because it is the substance
which makes the body strong and healthy. It could also come from the word “Brahma” m (divine demiurge,
the responsible of the manifestation of the universe) – all from the same root.
• Withing the brahmana we can probably detect the well-known dichotomy between a ritual part (action) of the
teaching and the knowledge part of the teaching: karmakanda = the part of the teaching which has do to with
ritual procedures and with practice/ vs. jnanakanda = the part of the teaching you have to know, to understand
(object of knowledge).
• Another important feature of the brahmana text is the connection (bandhu) between macrocosm and
microcosm – the world outside us and within us. This very same connection between these two different
levels of being will be further developed in Tantrism.
• The brahmana teaches a lot of rules and prescriptions to be observed during rituals; this obsession with rules
makes a lot of problem within the hermeneutical structure of the brahmana because very often these rules are
not so clear in their meaning. An ancient master called Kautsa was so disturbed by this feature of
contradictory rules, that he said these formulas are literally without meaning. This extreme statement has
been used by a contemporary scholar, Frits Staal, in one of his studies where he tries to take Kautsa’s
formulation seriously, in opposition to other scholars who believe he wanted to provoke some sort of
“wonder” in the hearer.

Forest teachings
Aranyaka means that these teachings are so secret that they have to be taught not within the village, but outside -> one
must go to the forest to say and hear these teachings. At this level of the veda we start to find elements which will be
very important for the next phase of Indian religious life: the four stages of life = student (brahmacarin) – he follows
the brahman, he is young and leaves his father’s home to go to the guru’s/master’s in order to obtain knowledge and
teachings – after that he comes back home and could become an householder -> to become an householder he must
marry; householder (grhastha) = the one who stays at home – marriage is the basic condition; forest-dweller
(vanaprastha) – when he sees the face of his children or his hair turning grey, he may choose to leave his life as an
householder and become a forestdweller -> no more engaged in economic activities, he stops working and goes to the
forest to return to the same doctrine acquired during his young age, but with different eyes because he has
experienced the hard work of the householder and now he may understand the doctrine much better; renouncer
(samnyasin) = a much more radical choice, the individual renounce (samnyasa = renounce, sacrifice) to all the
worldly values: no more private property, no more links with his family and he dedicates only to the individual goal
of liberating himself from the cycle of rebirth -> All these stages of life refers to male people.
The 4 social groups are called varna, “colours”, because each one of them is bound to a symbolic colour: the brahmin
(brahmana) is linked to the white = purity – the goal is to receive and teach knowledge; the warrior (ksatriya) to the
red = blood – his social mission is to protect society from internal and external enemies; the producer (vaisya), it a
composite group which comprehends people bound to agriculture and every activity having to do with profit, money
– the symbolic colour is yellow = gold; servant (sudra), linked to black = to serve the members of the former three
groups.

Secret teachings
Upanisad = etymologically it means “the sit at the side of the master, but in a lower position” – secret, veneration
(rahasya, upasana). This is the last part of the vedic corpus, which has to do with what we call philosophy. Within the
Indian context it isn’t often easy to distinguish between mystic/religious attitude and philosophy. Upanisad are very
diversified in their structure: most ancient in prose (Brhadaranyaka, Chandogya, Taittiriya, Aitareya, Kausitaki,
Kena); ancient, but not so ancient as the first group, in verse (Isa, Katha, Svetasvatara, Mundaka); a middle group in
prose + verses (Prasna, Maitrayaniya, Mandukya = it is very brief, only 12 stanzas). Then there is a recent group
classified according to doctrine:

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 • Common to Vedanta = end of the veda, with a double meaning: the end because it is the last part + the goal of
the veda -> according to the vedanta’s followers it is the goal to which the veda aims (samanyavedanta);
• Yoga = having to do with psychophysical balancing;
• Renounce;
• 3 groups having to do with personal deities = Siva (saiva = related to Siva), Visnu (vaisnava), the Goddess
(sakta = the deity referred to as sakti “power”)
Obviously, there are more upanisad than those mentioned so far -> there is a canon of 108 (symbolic numer)
unpanisads – this canon is fixed in the Muktika, a canonical list: 10 from Rgveda, 19 from white Yajurveda, 32 from
black Yajurveda, 16 from Samaveda, 31 from Atharvaveda.
First scholars from the XVIII-XIX century defined the upanisads as a pre-philosophical or proto-philosophical level
of doctrine in the sense that there is no particular philosophical content, but mostly philosophical interest; the very
core of upanisad has to do with a philosophical attitude -> there is a critical attitude. The main doctrine is the
equivalence between atman (“to blow” – a sort of vital spirit) and brahman (a sort of force that supports the world and
the living human body) → an internal force + an external force = equivalence between microcosm and macrocosm.
This raises a problem: the problem of the vedantic interpretation of the upanisads -> the vedanda takes care of the
upanisads and creates the upanisads’ doctrinal building, so that nowadays we are no more able to divide the upanisads
from their vedantic interpretation -> to consider the upanisads in their own light. The very nature of this brahman is
its unspeakableness – it is not possible to say something meaningful about it because it is “neti neti” (not so, not so)
→ words are not an useful tool to understand what brahman is: “From which words go away having been unable to
grasp it, together with the mind” (Taittiriya-upanisad 2,4) = neither the words, nor the mind are able to detect the deep
reality of brahman. “Thou art that” (tat tvam asi, Chandogya-upanisad 6, 8, 7) – this contraposition between “you”
and “that” (pronouns): in this context you = atman vs. that = brahman. Different interpretations related to three main
trends of the vedantic thought: 1) Sankara, absolute dualism = perfect equivalence; Ramanuja, qualified non-dualism
= similarity, atman and brahman are similar in many different ways; Madhva, dualism (the more radical position) =
difference, there is no identity between atman and brahman. There is a sort of critical proto-rationalistic attitude in the
upanisad. Some examples: Satyakama = desirer for truth – an 8-year old boy who goes to a master to become his
disciple. At the master’s first question “who is your father?”, he replies “I don’t know, because my mother is a
prostitute”. The master is so startled with this example of absolute truthfulness that he says “You are a real desirer for
truth, you are really in search for it so, from this day on you will be known as Satyakama Jabala” = Satyakama son of
Jabala -> instead of a patronymic name, the master choses to give him a matronymic name. This is not an accepted
way of behaviour in the Indian tradition which is strongly patriarchal → A classic example of upanisads’ critical
attitude with respect to the normal trend of priestly tradition. There are also women who are considered teachers –
obviously even this is against the priestly tradition which is a gender-oriented tradition + the belief that the doctrine
must be a male heritage. The king Janaka considers warriors as teachers –> again against tradition. There is the
possibility of a direct confrontation between a part of the upanisads’ thought and the Buddhistic doctrines.
Ancillary sciences the members of the Veda (Vedanga): phonetics, metrics, grammar and philosophy of language,
etymology, astronomy, ritual = sciences instrumental to the knowledge of Veda. Out of these six, al least four have to
do with language -> a clear signal that linguistic science is a great focus of interest within Indian tradition. Frits Staal;
the scientific model for western thought is geometry (Euclidean), while the one for Indian thought is language –
grammar is the very core of Indian tradition. Important for the literature of the philosophical school is the so-called
stratification of texts from aphorism to gloss: sutra = aphorisms – root text; then karika =mnemonic stanza; varttika =
explanatory gloss; bhasya = commentary; tika = elucidatory note → it starts from a base level represented by the sutra
(very brief, few words to express a concept), than we have a gradual increase in the use of words to explain doctrines;
the most important is the commentary: it makes clearer and explicit what in the sutra was implicit. In the upanisads
we find the dialectical method which will be further developed in the philosophical text of the darsanas. It presents
three different positions: sisya (preliminary stage) = disciple, subject of the teaching; acaryadesiya (a middle-way
stage) = the advanced disciple on his way to become himself a master; acarya (the achme of the doctrine) = the
authoritative master, who is generally renowned as a source of valid knowledge. Within philosophical literature, these
three positions are codified in three different points of view: purvapaksa = preliminary point of view – a position to
be confuted; uttarapaksa = further point of view – a position better than the preliminary, but not conclusive; siddhanta
= definitive conclusion – the final goal of the exposition of the doctrine → these are the three main features of Indian
dialectical attitude of exposing any subject matter.
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The Rigveda
RV 1,164,20-22 – Hymn, a sort of riddle.
The two birds have been variously interpreted as the waxing/waning moon, the moon and the sun, the sun and the
gharma pot or the two seekers of knowledge. The first reference is a well-known dichotomy between two different
ways of facing the world: the active (embracing the world, its rules and values) the inactive method (escaping the
world) – perhaps the bird which stares and doesn’t eat is the expression of an inactive attitude, while the other one
corresponds to the active attitude to embrace worldly values = the most reliable interpretation. This passage gives the
idea of the unclear nature of the upanisad corpus; there’s plenty of these enigmas.
The cosmogonic hymn has to do with the origin of the world – X, 90 -> the celebration of the dismemberment of a
giant man, a cosmic giant, so that the world could manifest itself – it is created from his limbs. The first four lines:
numerical symbology in the Indian tradition = to divide every argument into four parts or, more properly, into 3 + 1.
“What eats and what not eats” = human being and vegetables, plants etc. Viraj = splendour/brightness. Spring,
summer and autumn are the three main seasons and they correspond to three different ingredients of the rite. Sadhyas
= a class of deities – etymologically “those who have reached perfection or are supposed to be on its way” + the seers
= a class of mythical figures half human and half god, much more than humans and a little inferior to gods. Another
important distinction between wild and domestic animals. Here there is an explicit equation between sacrificial
components and the components od the vedic corpus: verses and chants, meters, sacrificial formulas. Four animals =
animals as food: horses, cows, goats and sheep. The division of the social body into four varnas – here each varna is
symbolically referred to a part of the body: brahmin = mouth -> speaking the truth and spread knowledge; ruler = his
two arms -> force and army forces; freeman = two legs -> the vasia, the peasant = the economic side of the social
body: servant = two feet -> the activity of (civil) service. Indra = the King of the Gods + Agni = the god of fire +
Vayu = the god of wind; the four directions are the four cardinal points. The giant is explicitly equated with a
sacrificial victim → a human victim, the man is the sacrificial victim of this cosmogonic sacrifice.
The Ka (who?) Hymn 10, 121 from mandala X
Emphatic repetition of the same formula – the object of the formula repetition is the God to whom we should do
homage with our oblation (?). Prajapati = Lord Praja, the Lord of the those who are subjected to be born/ of born
beings. Prajapati is the probably the name of this primordial giant whose dismemberment generates the world as we
know it.
Six classical philosophical schools
These schools are called Darsana, coming from the root -drs- “to see” and has two main meanings: (both) vision/point
of view. The classification of priestly philosophical schools has been generated within a specific philosophical
domain, that of the Vedanta -> vedantic doxography – it is not a neutral definition, but a definition being born in a
specific philosophical milieu. Each one is based upon a doctrine of salvation/liberation (moksasastra = the doctrinal
apparatus aiming to liberation). Liberation means liberation from the cycle of rebirth (samsara). According to this
division, we may see the main interest of each one of the six darsanas -> each of them has peculiar features, but all of
the them share a common one, the interest in soteriology.

• Samkhya school: cosmology – the structure and the world, the physical and mental world (external and
internal);
• Yoga: ascetic doctrine – psychophysical disciplines and practices;
• Vaisesika: physics – hypothesis about the physical nature of the world, particularly it is an atomistic doctrine
considering the world as an aggregation of atoms;
• Nyaya: logic, dialectics – the possibility to build a well-constructed system of reasoning which may conduct
to a certain knowledge of the world. Nyaya believes that the external world is real and cognizable by using
some gnoseological tools (instruments of knowledge)
• Purva(first)mimamsa(exegesis): exegesis – practical feature of the vedic corpus, sacrifice and rites;
• Uttara(further, second)mimamsa, aka vedanta: mysticism – theoretical aspects of the vedic corpus, content of
a particular knowledge which conducts to liberation –> an intellectual not a devotional type of mysticism.

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Traditionally we study these schools as three couples: 1) Samkhya & yoga; 2) Vaisesika & nyaya; 3) Purvamimamsa
& uttaramimamsa. Particularly the central couple is a good example of solidarity between two schools -> at a certain
moment of their internal evolution they merge into a single school. From that moment on, we have no more
distinction between them -> they become a combination of elements from both schools, called nyaya-vaisesika. These
three couples have common features: the first school is usually the more ancient of the two and is an atheistic school
(no interest in the figure of a personal deity).
Cosmology / Samkhya: probably the most ancient of all schools. Some believe that Samkhya is the Indian only
philosophical school, the original one. The root text of this school is the Samkhyakarika, “the mnemonic stanzas” by
Isvarakrsna (IV-V CE); there are precedent sources, but they are only traces, full texts have been lost. This is a realist
school, and also a dualistic school because it believes that the world is divided in two main principles: the male
(purusa – inactive and conscious) and the female (prakrti – active and unconscious) principle. Prakrti is
etymologically the combination of three qualities: sattva – white, it is the luminous principle tending to knowledge –
it movers upwards, from the inferior to the superior; rajas – red, a dynamic principle tending to action, it moves
horizontally; tamas – black, it is an inertial principle, a principle of weight, gravity, it moves downwards. From the
male and the female principles descends the division of the world into two forces. All the other principles of this
school proceed from prakrti. Samkhya means “enumeration, list”, it is so called because the school itself presents a
list of 25 principles (tattvas): the first two are the male and female principles, while the remaining 23 all derive from
prakrti = the evolutionary products of prakrti -> it generates all the other principles because it is an active principle.

• Tattvas from 3 to 5 all have to do with mental/interior life = 3) manas – the common sense, an intellectual
faculty which collects and coordinates sensory experiences, in order to have a complex perception of the
world as a single entity; 4) buddhi – the intellect, it has to consider all the possible alternatives we have in life
and choose one of them -> “should I turn left or right?” practical and ethical choices; 5) ahamkara – the ego
sense, that particular force thanks to which everyone perceive him/herself as an ego “I am..” = the whole of
mental dimension;
• Tattvas from 6 to 10 are the cognitive senses, the buddhendriya (buddhi = intellect, hendriya = senses): smell,
taste, view, tact, hearing -> the sensory perception;
• Tattvas from 11 to 15 are the conative senses, the karmendriya, having to do with action: speech, hand
(faculty to grasp objects, etc), motion, excretion (to eliminate bodily waste), enjoyment (mainly sexual
enjoyment). In the distinction between cognitive and conative senses we have the same dichotomy already
seen in the “knowledge/action” parts of the veda;
• Tattvas from 16 to 20 are the subtle senses, the tanmatra: sound, tact, form, taste, smell -> no more than the
objects of cognitive senses;
• Tattvas from 21 to 25 are the gross elements, the mahabhuta: space, wind, fire, water, earth (this specific
order in correspondence to subtle senses).
Yoga / Ascetic Doctrine: this doctrine’s main content are practical methods to increase concentration and mental
abilities and physical health. The root text is the Yogasutra by Patanjali (II BCE – I CE?). It is been commented many
times but the most important comments are: comments by Vyasa (VII-IX CE), Vacaspati Misra (IX CE), King Bhoja
(XI CE), Vijnanabhiksu (XVI CE), Ramananda Sarasvati (XVI CE), plus a very discussed one = the commentary by
Sankara (VI-VIII CE?) -> some say it is apocryphal, it is not an authentic production. The author doesn’t comment
the sutra directly, but Vyasa’s commentary (Bhashya -> yogasutra Bhashyavivarana = the extended gloss about the
yogasutra’s commentary).
The Yogasutra is made of 195 aphorisms devided into 4 books (pada): attention (samadhi), ascetic practice (sadhana),
supernatural powers (siddhi), isolation (kaivalya – a synonymic term for moksha “liberation”). The Yogasutra is a
very stimulating and interesting text because it shows strong ties to the Buddhistic doctrine with a lot of intertextual
links – what influenced what? A very debated question.
Rajayoga, “royal discipline”, is an ancient term used to distinguish between the classical yoga doctrine and the late
medieval tantric yoga doctrine; this discipline is also called astangayoga, “eight-member discipline” because it is
divided into 8 members (limbs referring to the body): abstentions (yama), obligations (niyama), postures (asana),
breath control (pranayama), sense withdraw (pratyahara), concentration (dharana), meditation (Dhyana), attention
(samadhi). Yama and niyama are two different kinds of ethical norms: something you must not do vs. something you
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must do – there are 5 yama: no violence, truth, abstention from stealing, abstention from improper sexual behaviour,
no attachment to worldly possessions; there is an interesting relation between the first two, because sometimes they
could conflict: no violence vs. no lies -> in some cases, one is requested to lie to avoid violence = this is the only
circumstance in which lying is allowed – the duty to avoid violence prevails. Both in Patanja and Vyasa, postures of
the bodies aren’t very detailed in their description, while in the medieval yoga postures are described in very detail.
The control of the vital blow + withdrawal of the senses (the ability to inhibit/interrupt your senses keeping your
perception “open” -> e.g. the ability not to see keeping your eyes open). Last three limbs have to do with internal
concentration - they are the three steps of meditation: concentration, meditation and then attention.
Vaisesika /Physics: the root text is the Vaisesikasutra by Kanada (200 BCE – 100 CE?), where 6 categories
(padartha) are listed: substance (dravya), quality (guna), activity (karman), generality (samanya), specificity (visesa –
from which the school itself takes its name), inherence (samavaya) + a seventh category added later = non-existence
(abhava) -> it is in contrast with the Vaisesika’s scientific attitude → to accept the existence of this category is to
accept the existence of “non-existence” ( and its real correspondence in the external world). This is very hard to
accept for many vaisesika masters. Vaisesika school is much more famous for its physical side rather than for its
epistemological one. It believes that the world is made of atoms: 5 atomic elements = earth, water, fire, wind, space
(it is different from the other four because it has no atomic structure). When we talk about atoms, we refer to the
ancient atomistic tradition of Democritus and Epicurus, while the Indian term we translate as “atom” has nothing to
do with a particle impossible to cut up (see the etymology); in this particular context, Indian atom = a very little
particle, the smallest particle possible → so little that it can’t be seen: we can postulate its existence, but we are not
able to see it (paramanu – too little to be seen, invisible). A combination of “anus” can be seen instead. Dvyanuka = a
combination of two anu, still too little to be seen; tryanuka = a group of three dvyanukas = the smallest visible
particle.
Mahat “big, great” = the sum of the three main mental faculties (manas, buddhi, ahamkara) considered as a whole, a
complex unity. Mahat is considered as a sort of collective mind vs. buddhi as the individual intellect in the Buddhistic
tradition more than in the priestly tradition. This kind of reference to mahat will be developed further in the
Buddhistic school of the Great Vehicle (Mahayana Buddhism) in the key concept of Alaya-vijnana (repository
consciousness) → an unconscious mind shared by a community of individuals.
Nyaya/Logic: its root text is the Nyayasutra by Gautama Aksapada (200 CE?). Its main interest is in gnoseology not
in cosmology -> it is not interested in the structure of the external world, but in those techniques of reasoning useful
to reach a deep understanding of it. It is a realistic school because it believes that the outside world is real and that it
is possible for us to gain knowledge of this reality by means of certain devices. This school theorizes 16 categories
(padartha) – most of them are logical categories:

1) means of valid knowledge (pramana) – within Indian philosophy, there is a heated debate on what means of
knowledge are means of valid knowledge. Most of Indian philosophical schools share a group of at least three
means of knowledge: perception = knowledge acquired through senses; inference = it comes after perception
and represents a more subtle and indirect way of knowing (deduction); authoritative verbal knowledge =
knowledge coming from an authoritative source. In the context of priestly school, the veda is the main source
of valid knowledge through verbal expression. There is just one school that refuses to recognize this group of
three as means of valid knowledge: Carvaka (those whose speech is sweet) / Lokayata (followers of the
worldly doctrine) = the materialist school. It believes that perception is the only source of valid knowledge
(knowledge acquired through senses), while both inference and verbal knowledge are dubious and uncertain;
2) Knowable (prameya) – all that is object of knowledge, all that we can know;
3) Doubt (sansaya) – in the Indian context, it isn’t a source of knowledge, but it interferes with knowledge ->
unless we defeat it, we can’t acquire more knowledge;
4) Goal (prayojana) – the goal for the philosophical apprentice to accomplish;
5) Example (drstanta) – used to reinforce an argument;
6) Definitive conclusion (siddhanta) – it is the conclusion of a process of reasoning;
7) Members of inference (avayava) – the constituent parts of inferential reasoning (of a deduction). Inference in
the Nyaya doctrine = the example of the smoke on the hill -> smoke is the object of my direct perception.

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 Even if I don’t see any fire on the hill, I may assume there is fire too because my previous experience has
proved me that fire causes smoke → “there is fire on the hill, because there is smoke on it”.
8) Reduction to absurd (tarka) – some define it as hypothetical reasoning. Tarka is less strong than anumana/
pramana (valid knowledge), because it only leads to the formulation of hypothesis that must be proved with
facts;
9) Decisive knowledge (nirnaya)

10) Debate (vada) → from this category to number 15, we get into the field of logical and dialectical debate. The
difference among these categories is just a matter of degree from major to minor: the tenth category is the
most valid and “honest” kind of logical debate. In a vada there’s no lying on both sides – there are two
debaters and an arbiter, but none of the three takes sides. Each one wants to gain knowledge to be shared with
the other part;
11) Eristic (jalpa) – in Jalpa there’s no such truthfulness of the debaters. It is not important to acquire real
knowledge but rather to prevail over the other;
12) Quibble (vitanda)
13) Fallacious logic reason (hetvabhasa)
14) Deliberate misinterpretation (chala) – the parts are perfectly aware of their distorting reality and they
deliberately misunderstand the opponent’s argument in order to defeat him (no interest in getting to the truth);
15) Futile objection (jati) – when replies to the opponent’s questions are totally vain, because both sides’ aim is
to defeat the other part → the less honest kind of logical debate;
16) Point of paralysis (nigrahastana) – this term comes from the lexicon of wrestlers and refers to a movement by
which the wrestler tries to paralyze his opponent; the term must be translated into the context of our debate ->
the point when one part puts the other with his back against the wall.
All Nyaya categories are relevant to the actual practice of logic = “the science of debate”, the practice of logical
debate as a sort of public performance -> it is not supposed to be held in private, but in public in front of large
audiences, as a sort of “dialectical show”.
This school is the only one to be divided in two phases: old logic (pracinanyaya) and new logic (navyanyaya). In this
later phase the it joins the previous school and gives birth to a syncretic one: nyayavaisesika.
Purvamimamsa/Exegesis: its root text is the Mimamsasutra by Jaimini (200 BCE-200 CE?). It is based on Veda’s
ritual section (karmakanda). The Veda is not divided into parts, but ritual and philosophical contents are mixed up in
the text. This school aims at demonstrating that there’s no contradiction in vedic prescriptions. The Veda could seem
contradictory on a superficial level. There are two main trends, each one taking its name from a master: Prabhakara –
its followers believe in karyatajnana = “knowledge of what has to be done” (a sort of categoric imperative - Kant) ->
we must follow some ritual prescriptions as a duty; Bhatta – its followers believe in istasadhanatajnana = “knowledge
of what one needs in order to accomplish what one desires” (a sort of hypothetical imperative) -> it is not a matter of
duty but of convenience → we will make profit out of a certain conduct.
Purvamimamsa is important for the philosophy of language and for ritual hermeneutics (the interpretation of texts
having to do with rites), because it provides technical tools for the interpretation of normative texts. That’s because its
main object of interest is the vedic corpus, which is a written record of verbal utterances (it comes from oral
teaching). An apparent paradox in the conclusion of Purvamimamsa’s thought: its main goal excludes the possibility
to believe in the existence of gods. It sounds very strange because in the Veda there are many references to deities.
This conclusion is only apparently paradoxical: gods don’t exist because they don’t have physical bodies and they
don’t have any of human limitations (diseases, old age, shadows, sweat) -> Purvamimamsa asserts the non-existence
of gods because they refuse to assert that they can somehow influence the efficacy of rites. Conclusion: given the fact
that in the Veda gods are named, the reality of gods lies only in their names – their body is made of sounds and
syllables, their reality is a verbal not a material reality.
Example of Purvamimamsa’s interest in “philosophy of language” = the heated debate between Prabhakara and Bhatta
about the source of meaning of sentences -> both agree that sentences are meaningful, but they disagree on the origins
of their meaning -> two main positions: 1) it is the sum of word’s individual meaning; 2) it lies in the sentence as a
complex entity (as a whole) -> meaning is an holistic entity.
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Uttaramimamsa aka Vedanta/Mysticism: its canon consists in three texts = first level: the Brahmasutra by
Badarayana (first century CE?); second level: the Upanisads; third level: the Bhagavadgita (IV BCE-IV CE?).
Bhagavadgita = a devotional text contained in one of the two great epic poems of Indian literary tradition; these are:
1) Mahabharata = The great poem of the descendants of Bharata (India) – an eponym hero who gives the name to the
land, he is the common ancestor of all Indian people; 2) Ramayana = The journey of Rama. Bhagavadgita is in
Mahabharata’s sixth book and it is a religious/philosophical dialogue between two symbolic characters, Anjuna and
Krsna -> white and black – they are opposite but cooperating. Anjuna is the apparently human character and receives
the teaching from the god Krsna. Those three levels of teaching are called “the triple canon” of this school. The
second corresponds to revelation, sruti – “hearing”= from the mouth of the master to the ears of disciples = oral
transmission doesn’t imply human effort or will, it happens mindlessly; the third to tradition, smrti = memory, a
faculty which implies human effort -> there is a conscious attempt to transmit knowledge through tradition (human
will); the first to logical arguments/reasoning, nyaya = only after having heard the teaching and committed it to
memory, we can start reflecting.
Utteramimamsa is not a single school, but rather a group of schools. Three main schools are: absolute nondualism
(kevaladvaita), qualified nondualism (visistadvaita) and dualism (dvaita) + there are at least three more positions
within Vedanta: Nimbarka (dvaitadvaita), Vallabha (suddhadvaita), Caitanya (acintyabhedabheda) -> all of them held
an intermediate position, just as Ramanuja (qualified nondualism).
(Non)dualism: it has to do with God and the soul. If we suppose that God and the individual atman are one and the
same, then we are in the field of nondualism; the dual position states the opposite. Ramanuja is oriented in between
these two: he believes that even God has a body, just as every human being, and his body is the world itself. Since we
are part of the world, we are part of the body of God.
Utteramimamsa in important for philosophy of language too, for example the interpretation of the “great sayings”
(very brief formulations mainly in upanisads) and for the doctrine of cosmic illusion and nescience (cosmic
ignorance). The production of this school extends much more in time than any other; some believe it runs until today.
From XIX century on, the vehicular language has changed gradually from Sanskrit to English.

Introduction to Indian perspectives on practices and anthropotechnics by prof. Pellegrini

Although majority of philosophical texts are mainly concerned with theoretical issues, we can easily affirm that
exercises, practices and anthropotechnics are not less intriguing and fascinating subjects. Sloterdijk wrote his study
“You must change your life! On anthropotechnics” in German in 2009. It was translated into English in 2013. He
neologized the compound anthropo-technics (after that a proliferation of publications on the subject) in this study,
where he reflects of practices, techniques and anthropotechnics from a wide prospective and from a theoretical point
of view. The imperative in the title is a quotation from a sonnet of the Czech poet Rainer Maria Rilke: “Archaic Torso
of Apollo” in New Poems: The Other Part (1908). Taking the last two lines out of their context, Sloterdijk built up an
entire theory on them. The torso is without head, arms and legs, but the poet still looks at it with great admiration.
The torso of Apollo seems to shine just as wild beasts glitter in the night after the rain in the rainy season. Last two
lines:
For there is no place that does not see you.
You must change your life.
The sonnet has to do with the archaic and classical concept of perfection - the fragment of Apollo’s torso is associated
with perfection despite its mutilations; it has the power to appeal and it comes from within -> it articulates an entire
principle of being. The poem has to perceive the principle of being and adapt it to its own existence, with the aim of
becoming a construct with an equal power to convey a message. Rilke carries out an operation that one could
philosophically describe as the “transformation of being into message” = “linguistic turn”. Heidegger stated “Being
that can be understood is language” -> this implies that language abandoned by being becomes mere chatter. A strong
message needs a strong structure, that is a strong being. Peter Sloterdijk commented the last two lines in the
introduction of his book. They usually captivate readers because they are somehow abstracted from the entire sonnet.
One does not need to be an enthusiast to understand why those closing lines, being the climax of the sonnet,

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developed a life of their own. In their dignified brevity and archaic simplicity, they radiate a unique force, that – says
Sloterdijk “can scarcely be found in any other passage from recent language art”. “You must change your life” is the
imperative that exceeds the option of hypothetical and categorical – the quintessential metanoietic command. It
provides a keyword for a revolution in second person singular: YOU. It defines life as a slope, from its higher to its
lower form. I am living but something is telling me with unchallengeable authority that I’m not living properly. The
numinous authority of form enjoys the prerogative of telling me “YOU MUST”. Rilke’s imperative addresses every
human being, because everyone of us is YOU. YOU MUST is the authority of a different life. This author touches a
subtle insufficiency within us: the innermost not yet. In my most conscious moment I am affected by the absolute
abjection to my status quo. My metanoia is the one thing that is necessary, I need to change. If you succeed in
changing your life, what you do is no different from what you desire with your whole will. As Sloterdijk himself says
the presence of the athletic mana (force, glittering) in the torso, still shining and licenced to teach (because it tells us
something about ourselves and our past), contains an element of orientational energy that he terms “trainer authority”.
In his book Sloterdijk repeats many times that anthropotechnics is associated to several different meanings, one of
those is “training”. The first paragraph is a summary of the entire first part of his book. “You must change your life
can now be heard as the refrain of a language of getting in shape” -> in many yoga/fitness studios you may hear this
kind of expressions “get back in shape, remain in shape”; this very formula has been very important also for our
ancient classical authors. The result of the yoga method is to lie down in our original shape/form. The problem of
even contemporary anthropotechnics is to get back in shape. “Give up you attachment.. + gymnasium (gymnos =
naked) = the connection between ascetism and nudity – the gymnasium is the place where individuals manage to
measure themselves both physically and intellectually. “Customary state”: habitus (Latin) = our usual and bestial life
which is completely different from the life we would like to live. Sloterdijk: don’t be satisfied with what you are
living, go on trying to push your limits. This is the voice of the stone, a call to get back to your original shape, not the
one the world has given to you -> your naked shape. Try to be trained in the same way in which Apollo was trained.
Sloterdijk’s prose is so vigorous that it manages to address to the mind/heart of all of us. Everyone who has a life
should want to change his own. Rilke and Sloterdijk are both in debt to Nietzsche. Rilke understood and poetically
represented Nietzsche’s Antiquity project in this very sonnet. Sloterdijk takes into consideration practices and
anthropotechnics tout-court, apart from their origins. He pointed out that all cultures and peoples are attached by same
problems, grieves, anxieties, etc.; the reactional solutions are somehow the same as well. That is why his prospective
is a transcultural one. He also investigates exercises, practices and anthropotechnics from several viewpoints (textual,
philosophical, ritualistic, anthropological, sociological, political, psychological, physiological, medical, cultural,
cosmological, etc.).
During this course, practices and anthropo-technics are seen from an Indo-philosophical view, rather than a religious
and anthropological one. Although almost all schools (orthodox and heterodox – vedic or not – vedic and antivedic)
resort to practices and anthropotechnics to realize any theory, they have different approaches to them and developed
different definitions of the same. In Sanskrit, of course, there isn’t the term “anthropotechnics”, but in all schools, in
their different Indian languages there is this common transversal term “Yoga”. The human being is the main
objective, the aim of practices and anthropotechnics. They usually have precise targets, organs and senses on which
they exert their influence: the physical body, the sensorial faculties, the entire cognitive complex. In Asian thought
and, in specific, in South Asian thought there are not practices which are not solidly based on theories, while there are
purely theoretical positions → theory for theory’s sake = without a directly experiential aim. But these may be used to
refute and/or defend specific theories, so they also indirectly have experiential aims → although some theories seem
to proceed exclusively on intellectual pursuits, they are surely connected to an experiential aim of some sort. In South
Asian thought there is no theory for the sake of theory: despite what has been said before, although there are some
direct, appearances of theories which are for the sake of theory, they are dealing with their theoretical issues in order
to prove/defend some other theories, which usually have a direct experiential miring (?). This means that in classical
India usually any theoretical position has its practical counterpart, a kind of transcendence/dichotomy between theory
and practice. In most cases, those which seem merely theoretical texts are used to defend certain positions and
conversely to reject others -> Their practical relevance isn’t immediately evident. There are several practices where
theory and practices are not a matter od dichotomy (theory is practice and vice versa).
Prakto-gnosis a term by the contemporary French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty = practical and theorical
perspectives are seen as two sides of the same coin. This is the process of prakto-gnosis and it is called Yoga by
Patanjali and his contemporaries, earlier authors and later authors -> a conceptual term which suggests that

9
consciousness, cognition and practice are inextricably related and reciprocally constitutive. For example, in the
Vātsyāyana’s commentary on Gautama’s Nyāyasūtra, the application/practice is said to be dependent on sastra = a
way to express textual theory, which doesn’t mean just bookish theories but those orally expressed by the living
tradition (ancient instructors, gurus etc.). Theory finds its sublimation in direct experience -> as expressed in the
Brahma sutra Bhasya by Sankara (the leading master of non-dual metaphysics) “jñānasya anubhāvāvasānah” =
knowledge has its sublimation in experience = a direct realization of our theories. There can be any practices without
theories? This is directly connected to all Indian (and of course non-Indian anthropotechnics) and, in specific with
Yoga, not only in its classical shape, but also in its contemporary facets. Understanding through practice not only
represents a bottom-up understanding easier for contemporary practitioners, but it also seems to be the final
teaching/aim of Indian masters. What does “theory” mean here? Sanskrit is an incredibly rich language but it is
difficult to find a parallel world for our “pure theory” -> several hypothesis: śravaṇa literally “hearing, audition”, the
action done with our ears. This term can be applied to individual reading but also to textual study with authoritative
teachers. They are not only learned, but they are supposed to have direct experience of what they talk about. Sravana
means also hearing any kind of instruction of the instructor, who aims at guiding the practitioner towards successful
practice, towards the final goal of practice. In all traditional civilizations, theory doesn’t mean “reading books”, is not
a bookish notional knowledge, but it means to be prepared to experience/directly put into practice something which
we have previously received instructions about. What does “successful practice” mean? Textually based
anthropotechnics has “motivation, purpose, cause” (prayojana): “Why am I practicing?” is a fundamental concept
which presuppose the reaching of a specific goal. For example, the many varieties of Yoga are different because they
have different purposes, so they address various types of individuals. A sort of investigation “Why am I doing
something while I’m doing it?” -> Looking me looking → You can be in the world without being victim of the world.
How can be theory realized in practice? Three strategies are open: 1. to provide practical precepts with theoretical
foundations; • 2. to deduce practice from a coherent theory; • 3. to apply theory to life, that is to embody it.
Traditional Indians were not different from other human beings at other latitudes. Their internal/external
constitutions, their vital problems, and the troubles they daily had to overcome are the same for all human beings ->
this point is important to look at anthropotechnics from a transcultural point of view. At any time, everywhere in the
world human beings have resorted to system of practices and devices to better their life, to find a new dimension of
serenity and satisfaction, trying so to avoid external as well as interior troubles. We must de-exoticise practices and
anthropotechnics, placing them in a wider and global field. Because all the human beings are affected by the same
problems, practices under the label of anthropotechnics are the only possible reply to the question “how should
human live?” → In all civilizations a fundamental question behind practices and anthropo-technics, which lies at the
heart of philosophy is: How should I live? This question presupposes the specific human capacity to understand and
distinguish between the way in which we live and the alternative way of living, with the latter supposed to be a better
way of life. In South Asian milieu this kind of discriminating attitude is a crucial step towards any stable and useful
change in life. It is expressed in Sanskrit with the term “viveka”, in Greek with “diacrisis” and in Latin with
“discretio” → all of them played a pivotal role in their own world. Ordinary life is a burden because we are
condemned to be slaves of the world, objects and concepts, of their meta-representation and the consequences/effects
of it. Most humans have the constant impression that they should change something in their daily routine, in their
behaviour, etc. Despite their limits, they feel their weaknesses, difficulties and inadequacy and reflect on these
primary questions. The question “how should I live?” can take several shapes, expressing the same fundamental need.
In its simple form, this question becomes a kind of commitment to ourselves (I should begin to.. I should stop doing..
I should do it in a different way.. From tomorrow I will..). Anyway, we know how difficult is to fill the gap between
our intentions and their realization, because every day they are hampered and contradicted as soon as we try to put
them into practice. The main difficulty lies in our habits, which impel us to keep on following the usually covered
routes avoiding any deviations from them. In order to counter-act this stream/flux, a good deal of perseverance at
practicing a counter-current attitude is needed → to go against the stream/flux = a salmon-like-attitude. This kind of
contrasting effort should be stronger than habitual habits. At first it has to be so strong to refrain and stop usual
tendencies and consequently to provoke a total inversion (metanoia in Greek). The next step is the will to keep on
practicing and reproducing the same attitude that brought about the change. A kind of constant exercise of repetition
which will shape all our newly transformed life. This a continuous attentive practice expressed in Sanskrit by the term
abhyasa (repetition, repeated exercise, to be committed again and again to the same thought of practice-practise
thought). This tendency is pivotal in every anthropotechnics, and specifically abhyasa is fundamental in Yoga.
Practices and anthropotechnics are resorted by humans to change their present condition. The will to change a given
10
state is rooted in a specific presupposition: the present condition is unsatisfactory, unhappy, sorrowful -> human
beings have to constantly deal with illnesses, pain, old age and death (Buddha), but even more with feelings and
concepts caused by them (sorrows, grieves, sufferings, anguish, agonies, etc.) which stuck to human consciousness.
Human beings try to find some solutions to eradicate sorrow -> methods of release are widely known as practices and
anthropotechnics. Moreover > the importance of this pivotal question is not simply on individual basis. There are
written and unwritten norms, laws, philosophical views, medical and dietetic prescriptions, moral precepts,
educational systems seen as collective/political attempts to answer it, and consequently to make people feel better. Of
course, seen in a collective perspective, these solutions or relieves from habitual way of life, could seem unchosen or
partially (or even erroneously) chosen, or even imposed. Anyway, the imperative needs criteria to distinguish being
from having to be, in order to trace a direction to follow. What we need is to clearly separate between two elements:
before vs. after, animal-life vs. methodical life. This means to make a field-choice, that is nothing but to embody in a
human being the first step of discrimination, the ultimate and absolute choice. On this issue develops several
questions:

• Where to find them?

• How to find right criteria?
• How to choose?
• Then, which exercises are needed to operate the change?
• How and how long to practice?
These questions are elaborated by those who choose to involve in any anthropo-technics whatsoever, those who are
trying to answer the pivotal question. From ancient times to nowadays manifestations, the Sanskrit term Yoga can
summarize the entire history of practice-systems → surely it widely used to identify Indian anthropo-technics.
Indian prospective on exercises, practices and anthropotechnics
The most ancient technical term to convey the neologism “anthropotechnics” is Yoga. This Sanskrit term is perfectly
congruent with the compound term anthropotechnics in its complex semantic range. Yoga is far from being
semantically understandable in its canonical translation, which is “union, practice, or even posture” = improbable or,
at least, partial translations. The meaning and finalities of Yoga are still nowadays an issue, with many different
layers blending into each other: the textual and contextual philological, philosophical, historical, anthropological,
political, religious. An “exotic” word as Yoga is, is nowadays widely used in our world, in several environments,
from the gym studios to executive direction of multinationals. Whoever desires to make the imperative “You must
change your life” his/her own, needs some criteria to distinguish and operate a discrimination and consequently a
choice between a non-methodical life and an anthropotechnic oriented life -> before what was before and what will
be after → animal-life vs. methodical life. We must take into consideration the questions raised above. As we have
already said, the range of words like practice and anthropo-technic can be extremely wide and widened further.
Everyone who follows the practice trying to reach a certain objective, rightly interprets the discipline as a technic for
self-transformation = gnoseo-therapy = a word earlier used by Sloterdijk himself to refer to all the self-transformation
technics before coining “anthropotechnics” → all those tools, means, strategies and devices operated by human to
transform the embodied self. “Transformation” = a continuous effort of certain human being to make their entire
psychophysical apparatus different, their whole life status. It is a different choice to concentrate on secular objectives,
such as curing backpain, reduce stress, etc. This is quite different from any form of traditional anthropotechnics such
as the original forms of Yoga or any other techné at any latitude, being it Chinese, Indian, Greek, Latin. Among the
several forms of Yoga mentioned in ancient documents, we mainly deal with the method elaborated by Patañjali, who
probably, as the latest researches point out, on the base of pre-existing and heterogeneous material wrote an aphoristic
manual on anthropotechnics in III-IV cent. AD. It consists in a concise description of a method to emancipate from
the overwhelming intrusiveness of the sensorial objects and worldly situations on the inner domain of the subject. Of
course, the diversity of scopes (proyojana) determines differences in the philosophy of practice. The scope of
traditional anthropotechnics is not simply that or curing pain and body fitness, but it aims at developing a sharp gaze
towards the world, a penetrating sight = a king of in-sight to look at the reality in a different way, a vision able to
operate a clear discrimination (viveka), a capability to see how things really are = a crystal clear sophia (vidya). Often
philosophy is seen as a mere discourse of theory; therefore, a putative path is certainly intended to transform the
discoursive philosophical knowledge into a non-discoursive intuitive knowledge, or better, into an experience
immediately perceivable. Philosophy must have a direct impact in life -> it is postulated in order to make our life
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better, as ancient philosophers taught us (Seneca, Plato, Buddha, etc.). In order to concentrate even theoretically on
anthropotechnics, it is not a mere philosophy of practice, but it represents a first step to a philosophy in practice = to
bring theory in our daily actions and thoughts. In the same way the Greek word “teoria” was used to give rise to what
Aristotle called “fronesis” = practical wisdom for which no specific rule can be advanced. Slide 4, Power Point 2: in
the first part of Sloterdijk we can find example of this fundamental statement = 1) the violinist Carl Hermann Uthan,
born in the Prussian empire in the mid XIX; he was born with no arms, but he amazed his audience by playing the
violin wonderfully with his feet; 2) the child who learns to walk or any old man learning any new way of walking
supported by someone or something. While he/she keeps on practicing walking, a child unable to walk produces a
walking child or an old man hardly able to walk without support, learns a new way of walking by using a stick. These
simple examples show what Sloterdijk meant: how the man genuinely reduces man. A practice can be seen as a
means to redefine the sphere of our possibilities by means of structured systems of repeated actions capable to
produce the agent and to reshape the subject. The same point is conveyed by Fichte in his Doctrine of Science: action
and the product of the action are one and the same thing → I am is the product of an action which has impact on the
subject. Modifying the patterns of our sensorial contact with the objects around us, we can modify ourselves, because
we become what we are by means of contacts and our relationship with the world and within the world. This is what
is called from a psychological point of view “exteroception” = the sensitivity to stimuli originating outside the body;
as a consequence, it generates an “interoception” = the sensitivity of the internal state of the body, which can be
conscious or unconscious. The consequent arousal of percept and concepts = the residual form of perception, namely
what remains of a perception + the residual form of cognition. Interoception proceeds from exteroception and
determines the action we are able to perform. In fact, while we make something, we are made by that something and,
being made we keep on making something else ad infinitum → these percept and concepts generate new kinds of
actions (exteroceptions) etc. etc. The subject is searching for the object of perception – this object makes him/her a
subject in search for objects. The affordance of the object = the impact of the world on the subject (brutal because
sometimes unnoticed) = it makes the subject the doer of a certain act and the enjoyer of its result, because the subject
becomes identifiable with what he/she’s doing → mutual dependence between the subject and the object and vice
versa. • See Bhagavadgītā 2.54-72 (slide 7): two characters = the desperate Arjuna who is relieved by Lord Krishna’s
teachings. Sanskrit texts are written by men using masculine (a tendency common to the most part of ancient texts).
These selected actions (to speak, to sit, to move) are just methonimious in order to understand how this non-human
being behave in the wold without being in the world. 59) what it really means is that once the sensorial faculties are
withdrawn from their objects (e.g. the sight is withdrawn from the form of the object) they remain without fuel, and
that fuel is represented by the object itself. Anyway, the interior traces of these objects remain, just like traces of any
food we taste remains in our mouth even when food is eventually consumed. Only once the final goal is reached, even
the internal cognitive domain is eventually pacified. Verses 59, 62 and 63 clearly show how sensorial objects impact
over the perceiver in a crucial way. The loss of understanding is the loss of human discriminating intellect (buddhi) ->
this faculty is able to silently guide human beings in every choice and act and to distinguish mankind from any other
being on earth; without it, humans are ruined. In verse 68 there the first discernment of the perfect human being is
mentioned. Despite the use of masculine genre, here we are talking about humankind as a whole. 69) it summarizes
poetically what has been said in the text till now.
Through education and practice we cannot only modify our perceptions, but also our relations with the external world.
This process represents a prakto-gnosis, what Patañjali calls yoga. This term already existed in Sanskrit = it was a
conceptual term suggesting that consciousness, cognition and praxis (as a motor experience > loco-motor-cognition)
are inextricably related and reciprocally constitutive. In his Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty (who
coined “prakto-gnosis”) states that consciousness does not manifest itself as an “I think that..” but as “I can”, since
primarily is “inhering to the thing through the body”. This is a sort of potentiality to totally penetrate the objects. This
means that I get (or loose) consciousness of what I am on the basis of what I do and on the basis of how I move in the
world experiencing what I can do and/or what things can make me do, or just make me! → how objects can shape the
subject. This shows that not only the subject experiences objects continuously, but also that objects continuously
impact over the subject, making him/her what he/she is, or better what he/she believe to be. Any practice is not
simply an auto-transformation to improve our qualifications but also a basic aid to keep them → in this case we
define it as a counter-transformation = it contrasts the changes occurring without it. Every autotransformation can be
seen also as a counter-transformation. Sloterdijk states that the most effective forms of anthropotechnics come from
yesterday’s world. He intends anthropo-technics as practice-systems which allow humans an auto-transformation
intensifying their own actions on themselves and on the world. The author with the neologism anthropo-technics
12
(2013, 10) intends: By this I mean the methods of mental and physical practicing by which humans from the most
diverse cultures have attempted to optimize their cosmic and immunological status in the face of vague risks of living
and acute certainties of death. (commentare). Immunological status → the author comes back to this expression
defining the man as homo immunologicus = humans continue to biologically evolve, but also socially and culturally.
This causes an upgrading of their immune systems. According to Sloterdijk, the human real contains no less than
three immune systems: 1) bio-immunological; 2) socio-immunological; 3) psycho-immunological. They work in
close interaction in a sort of constant semantic increase. Humans evolve mentally and socio-culturally and their
physical apparatus develop a bio-immunological and a physical-immunological system → all these develop pre-
emptive measured against injuries. Stoterdijk quote p.9: here the author is mainly concerned with those system
usually functioning to prevent or cope with multiform external factors -> to limit the object’s affordance on the
subject. What Sloterdijk calls anthropotechnics has been called “spiritual exercises” (a more widely used expression)
by the French philosopher Pierre Hadot, and “technologies of the self” by Micheal Foucault. There has been a
philosophical debate between the two on this issue. What is remarkable for a global philosophical view is the
transcultural perspective adopted by these scholars (they focus their researches on the same material = humankind).
Philosophies of exercise/ anthropo-technics investigate analogous domains in every culture, epoch and place → it is a
holistic reflection extended and extendable to every culture. Therefore, as a logical consequence, by analysing one
anthropo-technic we can generally (despite geographical, historical temporal differences) and totally understand
unclear/hidden sides of any other. This could help us neutralizing illusory boundaries between research areas and
eradicating dangerous cultural and ethnic fictitious borders. • Comparison between philosophies of exercise
developed in different space and time does not try to superimpose them one on the other, or to make them lose their
specificity. The problem is different: the question “How should I live?” concerns not only Latin and Greek texts, but
also ancient yoga texts → Humans are everywhere the same with the same problems, so they find similar solutions.
Such comparison between analogous worries could help in better understanding specific points of complex systems.
Hadot in his “What is ancient philosophy?” cites s G. Bugault, R.-P. Droit, M. Hulin, J.-L. Solère, who are important
sanskritists. Usually, the starting point of traditional workbooks is a strong need to change life. What are the criteria
involved in this kind of transformation? The Plato and Diogenes example: when Plato arrived in Sicily, he guided
Diogenes to become master of himself/self-controlled. Analogy with medicine → the medical paradigm plays a
central role in argumentations and methodologies in South-Asian context. Within South-Asian schools there are
several points of disagreement, not only between the so called heterodox and orthodox schools, but also within the
same milieu (within the vedic/non-vedic milieus themselves). Among all these philosophical questions at all latitudes,
there are those questions concerning the person/personal identity with their corollaries: What is a person? What are
the conditions determining the persistence of people? Is this persistence real or false? Is there really something that
persists? If yes, what does persist? The answers to these questions lay also in the field of eschatology = the
philosophical doctrine concerning the final destiny of the human being. Most non-philosophers seem to commonly
believe that each person has a non-physical soul which continue to exist after the death of the body, perhaps in
Heaven, Hell, Purgatory or whatever. But this view is not widely held by contemporary or several classical
philosophers, because the existence of a non-physical soul is thought to be problematic to postulate and, even more,
to prove. Therefore, mainly contemporary bio-philosophical tendencies are towards a denial of the soul beyond the
body. The thought that we are fundamentally and essentially human animals = the biological view. There is also an
“antagonist” view = the thought that we are essentially psychological entities = the psychological view. In the first
case, our persistence should mirror the persisting condition of other biological organisms -> other animals and non-
animals (trees, plants, insects, and even minerals); on the contrary, according to the second view, our persistence is
determined by psychological relations and connections, and we only seem to go out of existence after our biological
death -> but actually, that incorporeal entity (the soul or the self) persists after the fall of our flesh. In South-Asian
milieu, some schools defend the view that we continue to exist after death in other forms/times/spaces. Indologists
and SouthAsian philosophy scholars prefer to label them as substantialists/eternalists: it is possible to survive to
death, by acquiring a metaphysical position, denying that we merely are psycho-physical complexes; there is a self
(ātman) which strongly persist when the solid shell, as well as psychic elements, dissolve = Veda-oriented schools.
Others object this view, believing that all views about what happens when we die are beset with problems = non-
substantialists/ non-eternalists: after death there is nothing; we are destroyable and impermanent psycho-physical
aggregates -> there is no atman. The self is the ultimate illusion of the ego, which is attached to the world by nature.
These schools are anti-vedic in their orientations = non-brahmanical schools (several Buddhistic schools, Jainism and
materialists). Despite several differences among these macro-tendencies, it is also possible to detect common features
transversally characterizing Indian philosophical views:
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 1) vyāvahārika-uddeśa > “practical aim” > the constant effort to effectively realize the doctrine in everyday life,
to embody it. Philosophy is not just and intellectual exercise; there should be a real and final objective -> not
just notional knowledge for knowledge’s sake. This is evident in the widely used term to define systems of
thought = > darśana (lit. ‘view, vision’, dṛś “to see, to examine, to look at”). This word is analogous to the
term “philosophy” in general. In English “I see”, means “I understand” – it suggests the idea of right vision;
in the same way in the word darsana lies a strong emphasis on direct personal experience (above all a
transformative experience). Moreover, this word does not convey only the meaning of “vision”, but also the
instrument of vision itself, by which we investigate the reality, what lies beyond the appearance of things →
it may also intend an insight, an intuition or even the vision of the truth. So, it can also mean “viewpoint”,
“view of the world”, “doctrine” and even “philosophical system” or, in a broader prospective, “argumentation
based on a view” → very similar to the Greek term ὁράω = to see > οἶδα = to know (after completely and
totally seeing something);
2) duḥkhanāśa > total elimination of sorrow + possible attainment of an unchanging joy. The phenomenal
existence of humans is soaked in sorrows (duhkha), and sukhāvāpti “getting of happiness”, a sort of
everlasting beatitude, is the positive side of the elimination of sorrow. Not all schools agree on this positive
side, but their position does not depend on their vedic affiliation. They usually believe that release from
sorrow is the ultimate goal, and it does not include the reach of any kind of bliss (e.g. Nyaya school);
3) karman > action and all the process of acting + the final destination of the action = the fruit. It is a concept
elaborated in the earliest textual layers of Sanskrit literature and the doctrines concerning karma are widely
discussed in the philosophical literature and by many schools. It defines also the unavoidable law which
connects acts with their fruits, denoted as retribution of acts: to any act performed by any individual (be it a
human or unhuman animal, etc.) corresponds a result/fruit which necessarily brings about some consequences
for its agent. It is impossible that these consequences are applied to someone else. It has obviously something
to do with anthropotechnics, because the results of any anthropotechnical method surely manifest and fall on
the one who is involved in those specific practices;
4) avidyā, ajñāna > vidyā is the capacity to look at reality and see/know it as it is, while avidyā is its contrary =
ignorance, incapability of seeing reality as it is = primary cause of sorrows of the phenomenal existence, and
it is metaphysically identified with the primordial nescience. In Yoga sutra it is defined as a sort of confusion,
generating any kind of sorrow, disease, unease and so on = inability to distinguish between impermanent,
sorrowful, inessential, and permanent, peaceful, essential;
5) mukti/mokṣa > it has to do with liberation from illness. It means “liberation”, “untie”, “release”. Is it possible
to be freed from ignorance and attain the summum bonum (the final release, a sort of immutable, permanent
condition)? = a fundamental question;
6) mokṣopāya > if it is possible to get rid of ignorance, there must be a path to follow = to adopt a series of
means to reach the final goal. In the last two point, we can find several common features, developed from an
earlier fourfold methodology grounded in the medical paradigm. They are shared by all South-Asian
anthropotechnics:
• roga > it literally means “disease, illness”, “to identify a disease” = diagnosis concerning the nature of
disease;
• rogahetu > to investigate the causes of diseases = etiology;
• Arogya > “wellness, health”, is it possible to remove the illness and regain our original healthy condition >
prognosis?
• bhaiṣaja > the cure, the medicine > therapy
Philosophical schools borrow the medical paradigm, semanticizing it with their own contents:

• Samsara > “becoming” = phenomenal existence is the illness to remove;

• Samsarahetu > investigation on the cause of the existence > avidya;
• Moksa > release;
• Moksopaya > means to be released, not only from the disease, but also from the very cause of the disease –
the final goal is not just to cure the symptoms, but to eradicate the cause.

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In Buddhist milieu the 4 Noble Truths follow this paradigm, These Truths are expressed in a different way by the
Yogasūtra (2.16-26):

• Heya > what should be removed;

• Heyahetu > the cause of what should be removed;
• Hana > getting rid of;
• Hanopaya > means for getting rid of.
Summarizing, philosophical schools mainly deal with 8 main subjects:

1) means of knowledge (pramāṇa) -> knowledge of the outside and the inside;
2) truth/validity (prāmāṇya) and error/invalidity (aprāmāṇya) -> of knowledge and cognition – how can we get
the final judgement that what we cognize is valid or not? Maybe one of toughest subjects of Indian
philosophical texts; the first and the second points are under the label of epistemology;
3) individuals (jīva) -> human living beings are the main subjects of anthropotechnics;
4) physical universe (jagat);
5) ultimates (īśvara/ātman/brahman …) -> supreme realities. The last three points are a sort of
metaphysical/ontological enquiry - metaphysics/ontology;
6) bondage or relationship (bandha) -> e.g. what is the relation between me and myself, me and other
individuals, me and the world? Anthropotechnics operates for the release from bondage and habitual
relationships;
7) liberation/release (mokṣa/nirvāṇa);
8) means to release (mokṣasādhana/mārga). These are nothing more than practices and anthropotechnics. The
last three points are a sort of value system enquiry – soteriology.
The influence of anthropotechnics pervades all these fields.
According to Indian philosophical methodology, in order to know and establish any doctrine we must name it at first,
and then we must define that named entity. After defying it, we must examine and verify whether that definition is
valid or not. In the debate between opposite schools, the establishment of any object, theory or concept follows a
precise pattern described by Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin, the commentary to Nyāyasūtra from the IV-V century AD. It
establishes a general logical/methodological/argumentative strategy for presenting/ascertaining any issue or theory in
order to furnish a common terminology to textual and oral debates → to offer a common field for dialectics. These
strategies are borrowed by all schools from Nyaya (a locus classicus of this important methodology). Threefold is the
tendency of this science: denotation, definition and test = 1) to name the mere entity with an appellation; 2) to express
a specific property of what has been denoted, so to distinguish its nature from that of other entities; 3) to ascertain
through the means of valid knowledge if the definition of what has been defined is correct or not. Mainly later texts
developed the definition and its test producing similar defining positions. The definition of definition (?): what is
called
“definition”? How should definition be built up and structured? In Sanskrit, the definition is the expression of a
specific property not common to other entities, characterized by the absence of three flaws: excessive extent,
insufficient extent and impossibility. So, to know any entity, its name must be cleared up and then its peculiar form
and characteristics must be defined. The three flaws are detected and discussed during the verification: the excessive
extent (ativyāpti) = the example of the cow identified as the horned animal -> horns are not an exclusive attribute of
cows, so that definition is too wide, excessively pervasive to precisely identify the semantic field of that entity named
“cow”, so that it takes within the definition of cows a wide range of entities which are not cows at all; the insufficient
extent (avyāpti) = cow is the white animal -> this definition is too restrictively appliable, because it is not enough
pervasive of the semantic field occupied by the word “cow”, because there are not only white cows;
inapplicability/impossibility (asaṃbhava) = the cow is the flying animal -> this definition is clearly impossible to
apply to this semantic field.
Philosophical schools concern themselves with how, what and why to know. According to perspectives, philosophy
can either find metaphysics upon epistemological grounds or epistemology on metaphysical grounds. Their material
is interdependent. In the Veda oriented philosophy, the general trend has been to base epistemology upon

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metaphysics, because the Veda is the textual wisdom which embodies a direct experience of reality. Originally
epistemological theories were developed to intellectually safeguard the validity of the Vedic lore from the attack of
sceptical schools. Anyway, epistemological doctrines have taken a life of their own, gradually separating from the
religious and ritual context and developing their own literature. The nature of reality and the possibility of knowing
are revealed by the textual heritage (the Veda and those texts which have Veda has primary source). The task of
epistemology was to denote the various sources of knowledge, the validity and truth of knowledge, and the problem
of validity and error of certain kinds of cognition; epistemology can show the proper method by which reality may be
known. It was thought to be the right method to investigate the empirical reality and to get validly acquainted with it.
What is the nature, the origins and the instruments of knowledge? Since ancient times, theories arose to ensure the
possibility of knowing perceptual, non-perceptual, and transcendental entities in Sanskrit and non-Sanskrit texts
within South-Asian milieu. Every system of Indian philosophy developed its own theory of knowledge and
metaphysics. It is not often clear which of these two is prior. According to Nyaya sutra, we should expose the theory
of knowledge first, and then the metaphysical and ontological theories. The very first word of the Nyaya sutra refers
to the category presented as pramāna: the means through which getting acquainted of the surrounding of reality. The
second category listed is prameya = the knowable entites = the ontological and metaphysical enquiries → anyway,
they involve and refer to each other. Epistemological concerns were explicitly central in classical Indian philosophy –
this is because the declared goal of most Indian philosophies was release, liberation. The usual philosophical strategy
to find a road to liberation from suffering involved isolation (?). Avidya is the cause = incapacity of the sight, a sort
of ophthalmic cognitive disease -> we are caught in the cycle of suffering due to our incapacity to see what we are
and what things are and what is the true relation between us and things. The only way to release = elimination of
avidya through knowledge. All these presuppositions generate a number of technical epistemological questions: what
is knowledge, what are its sources and its objects, how do we fall into error? These questions deeply engaged Indian
philosophers -> pramāṇavāda = that part of Indian philosophy concerned with the nature and sources of knowledge.
Despite soteriological motivations, Indian epistemology proceeds independently. In Sanskrit there are several words
to identify what in English is defined as “knowledge, cognition”: in the earlier pre-philosophical discourse, especially
in Upanisads, two words are used = cit and jnana, both usually translated as “knowledge” – but taken into account
their different contexts of use, cit can be mainly rendered as “consciousness”, while jnana as “cognition, cognitive
event” or even simply knowledge, both epistemological or metaphysical. Since cognition may be either true or false,
and only cognition should be called knowledge, the term to define valid or true knowledge is pramajnana, or simply
prama = valid cognition vs. invalid, untrue cognition = aprama. Each of these categories is divided by authors into
carious subclasses. Whether cit and jnana are the same is an open question, not only for western philosophers,
Indologists, etc., but even for ancient authors. According to some theories (such as those formulated by Vedanta),
they are different, or better, cognition is the reflection of consciousness (primacy). In those theories not based on
Veda, e.g. those proposed by Nyaya, cit and jnana are the same. The central point = classical Indian theory of
knowledge are centred on Pramanas. In Indian epistemology, the Pramanas (means of knowledge) provide knowledge
through various modes: perception (direct, sensorial), inference (deductive or inductive) and authoritative testimony
(the basic textual testimony). The term Pramana means “that by which true cognition is arrived at”, also “cause of
true cognition”, or “means for achieving true cognition”. It is a peculiar feature of Indian epistemology that this
causal meaning of pramana also implies a legitimating sense, so that a cognition is true (prama) if it is brought about
in the right way = caused by a pramana. A classification of prama involves also a classification of the causes of true
cognition. A classification of prama involve a classification of the causes of true cognition. Premeyas “knowable,
cognizable entities” > entire world; Prama = a valid knowledge episode. A knower/knowing subject (pramatr)
through the means of knowledge (pramanas) truly knows (prama = the result of this process) a knowable object
(prameya). A pramana provides both an authoritative source to make a knowledge claim, and a means of knowledge.
It has a dual character, both evidential and causal; this means that it becomes both a theory of epistemic justification
and a metaphysical theory of the causal requirements necessary to the validity of this justification. Pramana is not
simply a justification procedure, but also a method that matches the causal chains with the justification chains, in
order to validate knowledge claims. Different pramanas used in different times and texts by different authors from
different systems of philosophy: e.g. materialists believe only in what they can touch and see, so they believe only in
the existence of direct perception; Buddhists and the physics oriented schools believe in perception and inference;
realist metaphysics + Jainists + Samkya accept three different means of knowledge = direct perception, inference and
testimony/word. Other positions slide 3.29. However, most authors agreed that the most important pramanas are
perception and inference, hence they elaborate rival theories on perceptual error concerning their definitions and
patterns, as well as theories on inference. All school accept perception as a cause of true cognition. However, not all
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of them agree on the nature of perception and, also, other pramanas. One major difference among schools consists in
the relation between cognition and its causal cognition. Schools such as Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mimamsa, sharply
separate the causal process brought about by the pramana and its result = the cognition itself. Others, such as
Buddhists (and within it), consider cognition as both the mean and the result. Vātsyāyana’s commentary on the first
aphorism of Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1: a relevant causal chain showing that knowledge leads to desire, desire to effort, effort
to action, action to success or failure. From knowledge comes action, from theory comes practice = this is the main
point. This causal chain is recognised by all schools of thought and has a certain bearing on the issue we’re trying to
investigate from the anthropotechnical point of view, that is theory vs. practice.
On the human being and its constitution = a crucial notion to understand anthropotechnics in South Asian thought.
Anthropotechnics is made of two words: man (from the Greek Anthropos) + technics = a techne, a device directed
explicitly to humans. They are made of physical and subtle components -> practices and anthropotechnics have
specific targets/organs on which they exert their influence (the physical body, sensorial faculties, the mental
complex).
The human being: in earlier Vedic texts, the focus is on the connections between ritual and cosmic spheres. The main
focus of Upanisadic thinkers shifts to the human person → connections are between parts of the human organism and
cosmic realities, but the main focus of theoretical speculation becomes the man. In Classical India human beings has
a pivotal position, although it could seem bizarre at first: the human being is the most central offspring of the entire
manifestation of the Creation lying on Earth, but simultaneously it is a simple individual, whose ontic status is
identical to that of other entities and creatures. Among Sanskrit words to denote humans, there are:
• manuṣya > human being, in his/her psycho-physical complex;
• manava > human being, belonging to the human species;
• puruṣa > human being, person, personality or interior element (even spiritual) belonging to all living
beings = the Self;
• nara > man, masculine = gender-oriented nuance.
There is a twofold attitude about human beings, two apparently not reconcilable positions, but with points of contact.

1. Metaphysical perspective: in his corporeal reality, the human being has nothing different/superior from
other beings -> from the Creator to the simplest blade of grass, all living beings are prisoners of their psycho-
physical aggregate, and are tied by it to a fictitious separation from their own essence/nature > the purusa,
identified with the atman in the Upanisads and Vedic schools. Atman is the first principle, the true self of
living beings (living and not-living, it doesn’t matter). It is necessary for the human being to acquire self-
knowledge to reach liberation -> according to some schools of thought, self-realization = that one’s true self
and the ultimate reality are identical. This identity is maintained by metaphysical non-dualism; for other
Vedantic metaphysical perspectives, the inner self and the ultimate reality are separated in their status and
nature, despite points of contact. Dualists and non-dualists together simultaneously believe that these two
realities are different and not different. Difference between eternalists and substancialists + non-eternalists
and non-substancialists: the Six Orthodox believe that there is an atman in every living being which is
his/her/its core and indestructible essence. This is a major point of difference with Buddhist and Jainist
doctrine of anatta = there is no soul in living beings. The analogy is made of two layers: a) a superior
levelling = all living being are believed to be identical one from the other; congruence of the atman, which
animates both (human and non-human beings); b) an inferior levelling = Sankara writes in his commentary
that there isn’t any difference between human beings and animals: same instinctive reactions to certain
stimuli -> same behaviour in same situations. As a consequence, the impartial eye of metaphysics does not
recognize dogmatic pre-eminence to human beings, but it simply expresses a unifying analogy to other living
beings; this can be connected with the second perspective.
2. Epistemological perspective: or the socio-ritual perspective. Texts individuated in humans a quid pluris,
something additional = the intellect, his/her unquestionable predisposition to reflect, discriminate, infer
unperceivable events from perceivable signs, to plan the future. It is for this reason that one of the most
widely used terms to define human beings is manuṣya = Sanskrit root “man” = to think, to reflect -> thinking
beings capable of solving problems and conceiving abstractions. This position considers humans as the
central being, the most skilled among creatures. In a very important ancient text written probably between X-
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 VIII century BC, “Brahmana”, the man is seen as a domestic biped animal bearing special features = he
/she’s capable of showing his/her excellence over other beings, e.g. to perform sacrificial acts, whose effects
will be reaped in a distant future. Such a ritual nuance is not secondary, but it included the early hints of a
much more complex ritual analysis and linguistic speculation, later known as Pūrva Mīmāṃsā = the ritualistic
exegesis which linguistically and epistemologically analyses the prescriptive section of Vedas. The human
being is the only living being able to neglect the plain and temporary satisfaction coming from desire, in
order to project his/her aspiration to a broader timeframe and to gain a better or long-lasting future reward.
Aitareya Āraṇyaka: living beings = pranin -> prana corresponds to the Greek pneuma and it means “living
breath”, so that those who are endowed with breathing capacities are living beings. The innermost spiritual
principle is present in all living beings, but in humans it seems more clearly perceivable because of the
discriminating intellect. Humans are the only offspring capable of contemplating metaphysical principle ->
brahmāvalokanadhī, a dhi (Intellect) capable of contemplating the brahma
(the ultimate principle) + exert viveka = discriminate between true and false, permanent and impermanent, to
distinguish between the best and the convenient (temporary). From a ritualistic as well as ethic perspective,
these tendencies can be resumed in the human capacity to practice and follow the dharma = the right thing,
the universal norm, both individual and collective; it must be in conformity with the universal order.
Hitopadeśa, an ethical treatise: the common characteristics among humans and animals = to feed, to sleep, to
be afraid and to mate, while dharma is the added value and the distinctive factor of humans -> without
dharma humans are like animals. Although this concept is not deepened in philosophical works, it represents
a sort of background on which darsanas discuss; they analyse the exclusive eligibility of humans to penetrate
the most hidden parts of their nature through unceasing reflection. The important concept of adhikāra,
“qualification, eligibility”: it not only denotes the scrutiny done by a guide to see if certain required qualities
are effectively present in those who want to change their through anthropotechnics, but it also intends that
once the possess of specific qualities has been verified, than the adhikara represents also the burden = to
follow certain rules (those of the method) and a new way of life.
Ancient Indians begin their examination into humans from birth, embodied life in its development, sickness and death
-> they have to do with the body = the part of one’s own individuality which ordinary man knows best and
recognizes as real. Old age, sickness and death are the episodes in front of which the young Siddharta found himself
by chance, while he was conducting his happy life. He came into contact with these embodiments of sorrow, that
became primary causes of his change in life. The body is also the starting and basic element of any anthropotechnics,
but also of many fitness practices and sports > the first attempt is to transform the physical body. Human structure is
complex > schematically considered threefold = union of three distinct inter-penetrated elements:

1) Physical compound > gross body (sthūlaśarīra);

2) Psychic compound (manas/antaḥkaraṇa/buddhi/citta) > subtle body (sūkṣmaśarīra);
3) Trans-empirical/ trans-psychic principle > Spiritual or innermost element (ātmatattva), that principle which
the other two elements are based on and found their raison d’etre.
This is an extreme generalization, but it could be very useful to better understand the main objectives of methodical
anthropotechnics, starting from human body and constitution and those theories based on them.
The most visible element is the gross body, named also sarira “destructible” or deha “burnable” and so on. The
majority of Indian schools think that it is an aggregate of elements – the number of elements goes from 1 to 5,
depending on the school → Vedānta/Mīmāṃsā/Sāṃkhya-Yoga = 5: earth, water, fire, air and ether (from the most
solid to the most rarefied or vice versa in some cases) vs. Nyāya/Vaiśeṣika = 1: earth, the grossest element.
The physical compound is guided by subtle components: the 5 subtle breaths (prana), the 5 cognitive sensefaculties
(jñānendriya), the 5 active sense-faculties (karmendriya). The first two components have a sort of coordinating
function = the psychic ensemble. The subtle components together with the mental ensemble constitute the subtle body
(sūkṣmaśarīra, liṅgaśarīra). According to some theories, the subtle aggregate penetrates the gross aggregate, but not
literary; it is more properly a sort of correspondence, because the frame of the physical body is not completely
congruent to that of the subtle one. In fact, the extensions of the subtle body are wider and more long-lasting than
those of the gross body -> it is widely believed in the Indian milieu that after death, when the physical body falls, it is
the subtle body that passes from the past condition to a new unpredictable future condition – it transmigrates from one
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body to another. Before the above listed five-threes, there are more specific cognitive faculties called mind, manas,
intellect, buddhi, internal organ/instrument and, also, plexus of cognition, and so on – the same concept is named
differently in different schools, times and Indian languages (Sanskrit + vernacular languages dealing with
philosophical issues). According to the philosophy of mind and the latest neuroscientific researches, the word mind
does not topologically detect a specific organ or a seat or site of cognition. What we usually call mind is the label of a
complex multifunctional ensemble, which is an internal sensorial faculty distinguished from external ones. This
internal faculty can perform various functions with specific names and characteristics: 1) the rational thought or the
analytical faculty (manas) evaluating among several options (e.g. proposed by the senses); 2) the ego or “I”-SENSE
(ahaṃkāra), the individual consciousness shaped with a specific name and form – it is responsible for the idea of
being a precise individual in a specific physical, psychical and social role; 3) the intellect, the synthetic thought, or
the ascertaining faculty (buddhi), responsible for the final decision after the mana has pondered over several option,
and for the discriminating choice; 4) a tricky term difficult to translate = “the cognitive complex” (citta) or “the
recollection capacity, storage of memories” – it is especially used in Yoga texts, but it has been borrowed from
Buddhist texts which, on their turn, took it from the Upanisads. It can be found at the beginning of Patanjali’s Yoga
Sutra in the definition of “Yoga” = “the method consists in the total erasing of the fluctuation of the cognitive
complex”.
According to Advaita Vedanta there’s a third kind of body = the causal body (kāraṇaśarīra) produced out by the cause
of other bodies = ignorance (avidyā) → we suffer because of our bodies. Both bodies, the subtle and the physical one,
have a cause which is ignorance, whose shape is symbolically thought to be that of a causal and ultimate body:
kāraṇaśarīra = the body made of ignorance. This theory presupposes that all bodies are a burden able to tie individuals
to their instincts and needs and to bewilder them about their true priorities while they’re living their precious life (and
wasting it in some way). According to non-dualistic Vedanda the human being is made of different envelopes/shells
(kosa), with the Self residing in the centre = the witness of every psycho-physical movement/trembling. In the
Taittirīya Upaniṣad is elaborated the theory of the 5 shells covering the atman, to which the individual identifies
himself in different circumstances of the phenomenal existence: • annamayakośa, the envelope made of food = made
out of food and beverages of our parents and ancestors – it shapes our physical body; • prāṇamayakośa, the envelope
made of breath (the pneumatic and subtle life) = a word far from being easy to interpret -> no less than 10 entries in
Sanskrit dictionaries (respiration, sensorial faculties, principle of life, energy, self, soul, essence), It can be used in the
singular to indicate the universal principle, or in the plural to indicate its five varieties. We have references to prana in
early texts as well as in contemporary India and Western practices; • manomayakośa, the envelope made of mind (or
better thought) = it indicates an analytical way of thinking, which oscillates between different options and analyse
them without making any final choice; • vijñānamayakośa, the envelope made of intellect = vijnana is a synonym of
buddhi, the intellectual and synthetic faculty which operates the final choice among the several options analysed by
manas. It is the most subtle and penetrating faculty of the so called psychic complex, responsible for individual
consciousness (principio individuationi); • ānandamayakośa, the envelope made of beatitude = this kind of pleasure is
epistemologically identified with the contentless dreamless sleep – in fact in dreamless sleep the only experience can
be recollected after the awakening -> we have no idea of what happened while we were asleep, we have no specific
experiences during deep (dreamless) sleep, but we have an after-sleep recollection – according to this after cognition,
we understand that during deep sleep something was awake cognizing my pleasure → the eye that I usually use
during the waking state isn’t active during deep sleep, but there is something different, a principle witnessing at least
three different elements: my pleasure, the pleasure experienced during that very domain, and myself (my ego). In
Adveta Vedanta the pure Self (the atman) is capable of witnessing also individual ignorance, because in that specific
moment I’m also able to perceive my ignorance and this perception is witnessed by the sentence “I slept well” – well
= with pleasure, I did not know anything = I was ignorant.
According to Adveta Vedanta (metaphysical non-duality), the Self is essentially without attributes/qualities – you
cannot attribute to it any qualification (unqualified). On the this Self are superimposed several properties and
faculties, such as psychical and physical ones: 1) the physical body made of gross elements (sthūlaśarīra); 2) the 17
elements (sūkṣmaśarīra)= 5 faculties of sensation or cognition, 5 faculties of action, 5 breaths, mind and intellect; 3)
sthūlaśarīra, a germinal causal body made out of the root ignorance.
3 bodies + 5 envelops = they shape the self-involved in becoming and the empirical experience = the individual self
(jīvātman). In these bodies are the seeds of rebirth = the main cause of disease. Humans resorting to anthropotechnics
want to barren those seeds mainly deposited in the psychic aggregate. The will to act for gaining results brings about
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an inflexible law: law produces reactions, reactions produce new consequences, new fruits, these fruits produce new
seeds and so on ad infinitum (from birth to death, to rebirth). Performed actions invariably give results; they produce
two kinds of results: merits (puṇya) and demerits (papa). From prescribed actions -> merits -> pleasure (sukha) vs.
from prohibited actions -> demerits -> sorrow (duḥkha). Humans cannot help acting, action is unstoppable; thinking
and involuntary movements are actions as well.
The Self = the innermost nature of living beings, the immortal and unchanging principle, the witness of becoming
established in the immutability of Being. For all the Vedic darsanas, the Self is the utmost core of humans and even
non-humans – its description is primarily found in Upanisads, to which Vedanta metaphysics is closely connected ->
The Self is humans’ intrinsic nature = svarūpa = their own inner form. The impassive atman is the impassive internal
controller, which sets into motion any other component like a magnet – purusa is used in the sense of atman as the
contentless consciousness, especially with reference to Samkhya-Yoga and Vedanta).
Despite their different tendencies and axiology, all schools in the South-Asian system of thought perform a through
analysis of reality. Once they have analysed the world, they come to a similar conclusion (apart from Materialists and
Hedonists): the phenomenal world and the human condition is ultimately full of suffering and sorrow →
Consequently all schools of thought try to find a path for releasing humans from the chains of sorrow and to reach the
final goal. Every darsana maintains different conception concerning release and ways for attending it. They all try to
develop specific anthropotechnics, different yogas, in order to change life and transform human gaze over reality.
Even nowadays in contemporary practices, we usually find an adjective qualifying the ever-present term Yoga
(specification + the general label). The same pattern was followed even by ancient, classical, pre-modern and modern
Indians.
From another perspective, human beings tries to work on two sides: 1) to remove sorrow = anarthanivṛtti; 2) to search
from an indelible beatitude = niratiśayasukhāvapti = the obtainment of pleasure, a pleasure not given by a single
human experience, but the utmost experience of pleasure. Indian authors have investigated every possible solution to
reach their aims. They restricted all possibilities to three options based on humans’ individual nature: 1) searching for
beatitude through action = a typical attitude of ritualistic Mimamsa (faith in actions); 2) searching for beatitude
through renunciation = typical of non-dualistic Vedanta (faith in knowledge); 3) happy medium between a total
refusal of the active world and the total adherence to ritual action = typical of the majority of darsanas (e.g. Nyāya,
Vaiśeṣika, Yoga and the theistic Vedāntas).
The first step of anthropotechnics is Viveka (discrimination). Nowadays, the great diffusion of Sanskrit worlds
usually does not correspond to true comprehension of their meaning -> even the literal meaning of these words is
usually ignored, but what is more worrying is the total lack of interest in the theoretical notion lying behind those
exotic words.
What does Viveka mean from a linguistic as well as theoretical point of view? Patanjali Yoga Sutra’s main user is a
human type defined with the Sanskrit word yogin = the one who has the method (Yoga) – who is involved and whose
life is conformed to an anthropotechnical method. This human type is opposed to the bhogin = the one who has the
enjoyment – who pursuits just the enjoyment of his/her immediate needs and instincts. The aim of Patanjali is to draw
a path in order to transform a human from bhogin to yogin = the main pattern of his Yoga Sutra’s anthropotechnical
method. The most relevant characteristic which differentiates yogin from bhigin (the general human) is the
application of Viveka. The texts we are taking into consideration are not mere books, but tools (enchiridion) = true
practo-gnosis’ manuals = transformation devices, which are meant to inoculate into humans a path to make theory
alive and change their lives. Yogin develops out of the Sanskrit root yuj (to connect, to relate, to discipline, to unite)
– from it also the word yoga is formed -> In itself yoga conveys a general meaning = gamma of various
anthropotechnics qualified and specified by adjectives (pātañjalayoga, bhaktiyoga, sāṃkhyayoga, karmayoga,
jñānayoga, etc.). The suffix -in in yogin indicates possession. On the other hand, bhogin comes from the root
bhug-/bhoga (to enjoy, to protect) + -in (conformation) → a slave of worldly objects, percept and concepts and their
consequent metarepresentational effects.
The word viveka is a key word in all South-Asian anthropotechnics – the focus on the Yoga Sutra and its commentary
tradition is necessary. Linguistically speaking, in Sanskrit viveka is a masculine noun deriving from the root vic- (to
separate, to discern, to discriminate /to clear up, to give order/ to examine, to investigate, to resolve); before we there
is the prefix vi- with an intensive and iterative meaning indicating repetitiveness, habituality. Viveka has its Greek
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correspondence in the word Diákrisis /discretio (dia- = di = vi-). A possible definition of the word = an intensive and
iterative distinctive, diversifying and differentiating operation performed between two or more
areas/phenomena/objects/events/cases. It identifies a sharp epistemic tool through which two or more domains are
analysed, separated and distinguished. These operations are performed for various reasons. What is clear is that
before exerting the illuminating force of viveka we were unable to distinguish. Viveka is a powerful tool which
guarantees clear knowledge dispelling doubts and clearing up ambiguities. It could be said that these tools are
constantly used by all living beings because it is an intrinsic characteristic of our buddhi (whose inner characteristic is
viveka) -> this discriminating intellect can be used knowingly/thoughtfully and unknowingly/unthoughtfully: e.g.
animals exert viveka instinctively, while humans can used it in both ways. Such a discrimination usually operates a
positive distinction between two parts, the right and convenient vs. the wrong and dangerous part (right part chosen).
The textual philosophical and mythological (the earlies texts used this word inserted in a symbolical and allegrorical
language) background of viveka. Its very first occurrence is in Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.9.2-3 (VII BC). It shows the
use of this word in relation to bees and a natural event = the production of honey -> a dialogue between a son and a
father, who is also his teacher. “na vivekaṃ labhante” = it does not reach differentiation. Of course, the Upanisad is
here working to establish its non-dualistic position; in fact, viveka is a faculty which can be used within the empirical
duality realm, where names and forms are clearly cognizable. Where there is no more plurality or multiplicity even
viveka cannot be applied and exert its own force, because the two parts on which it is called to discriminate are
indistinguishable entities. It must be noticed that in early texts, the word does not occur in its usual form; although
there is a verbal form used with the same meaning = e.g. in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (fundamental also for early uses of
the word yoga + the doctrine of death): the finite verb vṛṇīte = it shows the final part of the connective process later
on labelled with the word viveka. In the text good means summum bonum vs. gratifying means convenient. The main
character is a young brahmin boy who was sent to Death by his enraged father; he goes to visit the personification of
Death but without dying. He arrives at the palace of Dead, but the landlord is not there, so he is not invited to enter =
an important Indian custom; he remains outside the palace without eating or drinking for three days/nights. Once
informed of the young and prestigious priestly guest, Death comes back and begs pardon to the boy. He gives him
three gifts, one for each day he has been disrespected as a guest. As the last one, the boy asks for the secret of death;
at first Death tries to dissuade him with several temptations, but he is so wise and firm in his determination, that
Death is conquered and starts to teach him about death. An important point, which can be generally applied to all
Indian scholastic traditions, is the necessity of a guru/gurvi – he/she fulfils a precise function = he/she is the border
which divides the previous disordered life and the later disciplined life of disciples. The background of this quest,
apart from the sincere aspiration for a deeper knowledge, is a definite awareness that our gaze upon reality is not
enough to truly understand how things really are and to stop suffering. Other examples of the verbal form of viveka in
the text (slide 10): vivinakti = note the difference, discriminate. Another relevant synonym comes from a more recent,
but relevant Upanisadic text = Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 2.1.12 (III-II .BC): a brahmin here is not simply a man belonging
to the higher social group, but the one who is able to discriminate; this verse is very important because it identifies the
inner work of any individual who comprehends by him/herself that the usual empirical animal life should be
definitely changed – this human is somehow burnt by the sufferings intrinsic to phenomenal existence -> he/she can’t
stand it anymore. In order to arrive at such an inner urge for transformation, he/she scrutinizes his own past life,
opportunities and future developments. Such an investigation concerns not only the social empirical life, but also the
individual’s interior connections. In a Vedic context, this individual also examines the after-life rewards predicated by
the Vedas, which are acquirable through several deeds (sacrificial, ritual deeds). Nevertheless, despite this inner
search, such an individual is unable to find out any sensible reason to pursue his/her aimless habitual life, developing
a sort of disgust (nirvedam). Unfortunately, humans are not able to proceed alone, so they ask for the help of someone
curing their existential illness (a kind of inner physician). On this issue there are some outstanding considerations by
Sloterdijk, who suggests, using para-medical language, a relevant distinction between the ways through which
humans take care and cure themselves after recognizing their own illnesses. There are basically two ways: 1) self-
operation = a kind of autopsy, a self-conducted enquire by a subject on himself/herself in order to recover = make a
change in life; 2) having-oneself-operated-on (a Sloterdijk’s expression) = to be cured by someone else (see the verse
at stake, or the treatment given by Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna in the Bhagavadgītā) -> in the first case the subject shape
him/herself, while in the second someone else’s competence gives him/her his/her shape. The interaction between
self-operation and having-oneselfoperated-on shows the care of the self; this conveys also the will of getting rid of
sorrows for a new condition of stability. The “Auto-operative curvature of the modern subject” is exactly a happy
interaction between self-operation and the having-oneself-operated -> e.g. Arjuna in the Bhagavadgita → the subject
becomes aware of his illness and consequently tries to figure out some reasons for such a self-care; unfortunately he
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is unable to take care of himself by himself, so he abandons to someone else capable of treating him → He is doing
something for himself by means of someone else. In this prospect, there is a fundamental need for a guru.
In Nyaya Sutra Bhashya there a derivative of viveka is used = vivecana – it identifies a process of discrimination
through viveka (the instrument) -> the persistent practice of discriminating. Being it a nonphysical faculty, the
discriminating intellect needs some means to exert its power = the sensorial faculties as well as the inner faculties →
these are the means leading to right cognition/knowledge/judgements. By using our instruments of cognition with
critical acumen, we can discriminate among the things coming under our perception. This tendency must be applied
to all facets of human life (relationships with humans, animals, objects, events).
The word viveka conveys a kind of impartiality/neutrality suspending any adhesion = we can reach a pause and
become able to examine what we are dealing with and finally ponder over it -> a sort of epochè (the act of suspending
the assent). Hence, while practicing viveka, we operate a distinction brought about by discrimination – we reach a
new field different from the previous pitiful condition (full of doubts and uncertainties). Viveka is mainly a tool not a
true condition; therefore, as happens to all tools, also viveka needs a constant and persistent use/reuse (abhyāsa –
constant repetitive practice) to be effective; it is a sharp instrument to comprehend a specific context: a new
glance/sight vision over reality. Darśana = vision/perspective → it comes from the root drs- “to see” -> “vision, point
of view” or “knowing-attitude”, or even a “system of thought”. Its Sanskrit definition: darsana means that instrument
through which the reality is seen, known and investigated upon. An important feature of darsana = tendency to reset
dichotomies between praxis and theory = prakto-gnotic attitude. This attitude reverberates on scholastic schools; in
fact, many schools of Sanskrit intellectual tradition call themselves darsanas. Among the so-called “spiritual
systems”, this label is attached to all those schools where the transformative aim predominates (> such as Sāṃkhya,
Yoga, Vedānta, Jainism and Buddhism). These schools are restlessly involved in debates strengthening their
discursive and logical arguments in order to provide an increasingly solid structure to their axiology and to secure the
doctrinal foundation. Debate skills and doctrinal strength are not developed on their own (just for the sake of debating
or for any self-satisfaction), but these schools have a prominent experiential and transformative aim. In these schools
are layed down several realization paths (reflection, meditation, contemplation, etc.), which allegedly transform the
pure discursive understanding into intuitive realization. These theoretical presuppositions are accompanied by
analogous linguistic structures based on the vast Sanskrit linguistic tradition. As much as in the Western scientific
reasoning we base our speculation on mathematics and geometry, Indian speculation is solidly base on the linguistic
tradition (vyakarana); in fact, the strength of any argument is based on the validity of its linguistic analysis and on
linguistic force. That is why, especially at the beginning, all schools expressed themselves through sutras -> synthetic
texts made of synthetic expressions, which usually are translated as aphorisms. This literary genre originated in the
ritualistic milieu between VIII cent. BCE and IV AD. The philosophical type of sutra (at the beginning it was a ritual
composition only) started from the III-II centuries BCE. Patanjali Yoga Sutra was dated to the III-II BCE until fifteen
years ago but nowadays, after its 2016 critical edition, it is dated to the III-IV AD. Several sutratexts begins with the
modal adverb atha (hence, so thus, therefore, from that, how else, now, from now, ergo, then, thereupon, and more →
Sanskrit adverbs’ precise sense emerges from the context). This issue is perceived as crucial by our authors, -> it will
be deeply debated within the exegetical and commentarial tradition. Examples of transversal use in root-texts in
several sciences (slide 24). A similar structure can be noticed; all sentences open with the same word, atha – it
presents two semantic nuances: A) it indicates a beginning = a new domain/jurisdiction different from the previous
eventually eclipsed/separated due to the strong contextual separation produced by the insertion of the adverb – it is a
sort of border which solidly separates two different contexts and inaugurates a new one; B) direct continuation or
immediate succession = what happens immediately after a certain phenomenon -> a conjunction with a preceding
contiguous (but simultaneously totally different) domain → the first is the cause while the second is the effect. The
commentarial tradition distinguishes four senses of atha: 1. ānantarya > immediate succession; 2. adhikāra >
beginning of competence/jurisdiction; 3. maṅgala > auspiciousness – by reading and pronouncing the word atha, the
author of a text/ the performer of a deed will be blessed during his/her performance (“heritage” from ancient times);
4. pūrva-prakṛta-apekṣā > need of what was at stake before – what was previously at stake must be completely
understood in order to understand also the next contiguous section. In commentarial tradition, the first and the fourth
points are believed to be two faces of the same concept and both these are referred to the first tendency. The
Śābarabhāṣya (commentary on the Mimamsa Sutra, aphorisms on the ritualistic investigation) and the
Śārīrakamīmāṃsā (commentary on the Vedanta Sutra, aphorisms on the Ultimate) of course comment on two
different Sutras, but both of them open with the word atha – for this very reason both commentaries discuss at length

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the meaning of this word. Among the four meanings listed by earlier tradition, both commentaries accept the first
sense of atha: immediate succession, rejecting the other three; in fact, according to both it is not possible to
voluntarily “begin” any desire -> To have a desire, not to begin a desire → when I see something, a desire/aspiration
to obtain it arises instinctively in me (but I cannot voluntarily “begin” it). That is the case also of the desire to know
entities like the Ultimate and the social and cosmic order. Śābarabhāṣya (slide 28) underlines one specific feature of
the word atha: it precisely divides two different sections, the second coming immediately after and contiguously to
the first. Śārīrakamīmāṃsā: reading the Veda is the prerequisite to the emergence of the desire to know the dharma in
us. Sankara highlighted the sense of atha just as Sabara did = “immediate succession” clearly stating that there are
two phases of a process represented by the divisional element atha (before and after). Since the axiological
perspective of these two authors is different, also the sense respectively given to the word is completely different. In
fact, while the Sabara’s exegesis has to do with the prescriptive and ritualistic part of the Vedic text, Sankara’s
hermeneutics focuses on the descriptive and gnostic part of the Veda. The Vedantasara is a much later text (XV sec.)
= “the essence of Vedanta” composed by Sadānanda Kaśmīraka. It is an interesting primer which all tradition
students in India are compelled to go through, At the beginning of the text there is a sort of resumé of its content. The
author shows the requirement referred to by Sankara while commenting the word atha (slide 30) -> they are precisely
what humans need in order to start the Vedantic enquiry. The person eligible for these anthropotechnical teachings is
an epistemic subject equipped with the four-fold requirements (needed to assess a permanent change in life). Atha
indicates something that is starting but in immediate succession to a former Viveka and other requirements:
discrimination between permanent and impermanent entities, detachment from any enjoyment here and hereafter,
acquisition of the group of six and the desire for release. The first among them is the discrimination between two
specific domains (permanent and impermanent – being and becoming) → and it is fundamental to start the Vedantic
path = an act of discerning/understanding that brahman alone is permanent and the rest in impermanent → First and
fundamental to produce a true change in life according to Vedantic school. The second requirement is denoted by the
word virāgaḥ = a synonym of the word vairāgya (detachment). There is a sort of universal concomitance -> whatever
is an effect (of actions) it is ultimately evanescent, it is not permanent; on the contrary, whoever resorts to any
anthropotechnics is searching for something not relative or temporary, but permanent. I must be noticed that even
though the Yoga Sutra doesn’t mention viveka till 2.26, this discrimination lies on the background of the entire text.
The path traced by Vedantic tradition throughout at least fifteen centuries is analogous also to that describing the
Yoga Sutra; in fact, both Yoga and Vedanta and several others are primarily anthropotechnics or practognostical
methods meant to radically change their users’ lives.
On changing life in Yogasutra.
Even Patanjali’s Yogasutra opens with the word atha: atha yogānuśasanam = “and now the instruction on the
method” (Yoga, Yogic anthropotechnics). The earliest interpreter (Viasa) reads the word atha in a different
perspective from the above-mentioned authors. In fact, they accept the second meaning (the beginning of a new
competence). YSbh ad YS 1.1 – the explanation of the first aphorism of the first YS book: according to Viasa the
modal adverb atha identifies a clear landmark of separation between what happened before and what will happen
from atha onwards. We should never forget that these texts are not simply books, but they are teachings as antidots to
insentient life inoculated in humans’ flesh and bones who try to resort to them and change their lives. In this very
sutra atha is directly connected with the word anuśāsana (instruction, teaching, direction); it is a recurrent term which
indicates a specific process, where only after (anu) a long reflection on the nature, the meaning of an element X,
there’s exposition with new increments = final result of a this long process → the beginning of the YS conveys the
idea of a new result determined by a previous long discussion which distinguishes (viveka) YS’s instructions from
other methods (Patanjali’s method vs. other methods already presented in the anthropotechnical arena). Several types
of anthropotechnics deal with analogous problems, reflections and terminologies, but their difference lies in their
method and its application. In fact, authors, schools and associated texts propose their own solutions to get rid of
suffering. Therefore, Patanjali embraces on several layers (from a philosophical, doctrinal and even lexical point of
view) various kinds of Buddhist technical terms and ideologies. Once embraced this multifarious doctrinal arena, also
Patanjali offers his own anthropotechnical model in the YS. Along with his specific strategies and application, the YS
is nothing but the result of a very through investigation into several models and other scholastic anthropotechnics
with precise ideas of what is effective and what is not on humans. One among the YS most important sentences
portraits a peculiar individual who has gone through the Patanjali’s Yogic path. This human type is someone who
exerts viveka. YS 2.15 =”..to whom do discriminate everything is definitely unease”: this sentence dispels a deeply

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inspecting exam performed by the vivekin = that kind human who, by looking into his/her own life, relationships and
the world in toto, has finally discovered the obtrusiveness of sufferings and grieves. In YS such a disease is
represented by a technical word = kleśa (afflictions) - those which restlessly afflict individuals → Patanjali’s method
not only aims at leading to a new meta-cognition, but it is also engaged in eradicating the disease in the form of
affliction. This is witnessed by the second sutra of the second book of Patanjali’s YS: “the scope of this method (that
proposed by Patanjali) is to put into being the samadhi along with the relief from afflictions”. Samadhi
= a fundamental technical term, not only in Patanjali’s YS, but throughout all anthropotechnical literature; it is very
difficult to translate into other languages because of the vastness of its semantic field; it is formed by the prefix sam
which conveys the idea of completeness, correctness, perfection, very close to the Greek prefix μετά + the other
prefix ā meaning “totality, centripetal motion, from, all over” + the suffix dhi, a mutation of the verbal root dha “to
place, to pose, to establish, to put” → the word samadhi has a long textual history scattered throughout several
semantic fields and different times, texts, authors and disciplines – the meaning of this word should be given even
according to the context of use. According to several schools, it indicates a sort of conscious contemplating condition,
a meditative absorption attained through concentration and breath practices. It is translated in various ways =
“concentration, absorption, isolation” + “enclosure, internment, hostage, arrest, retreat, withdrawal” + “cessation,
solitary internment, imprisonment cell, internment, burial, dissolution, elimination, retraction”. Since Sanskrit and
Indian studies have been developed in Europe since the end of XVIII century, several translators and scholars have
tried to provide the final translation of the term samadhi. During the XIX century (and even before) the most
accredited translation of the term was “ec-stasis”; Mircea Eliade proposed a different one = “en-stasis” = “to stay
inside”, which seems to be closed to the original etymological meaning. A provocation by prof. Pellegrini = metà-
stasis = meta “beyond” + stasis “still/firm and permanent condition” → to understand the real meaning of this word,
our focus should not be on ec- (out) or en- (interior) – the core of the questions lies in a radical change of disposition,
a transposition of level and a total transformation of our cognitive status. A valid translation: total absorption,
compact merging/immersion in the status of things. Of course, there are several types of meta-cognition, not only in
the YS (at least 8 kinds of samadhi) but scattered throughout the entire South-Asian and anthropotechnical literature.
Having a look at some anthropotechnical texts earlier than YS, we can find several methods dealing with klesa. This
is the reason why Patanjali himself offers a list of afflictions, to which he adds definitions based on the basis of their
semantic ascent – from the fundamental cause to its outer symptoms; they are: ignorance, the sense of I-am, the
couple made up of attraction and aversion, and obstinate clinging to their continuation -> according to the
argumentative methodology of Sanskrit philosophical texts, there are three steps to fully present and comprehend a
theory: denotation + definition + test. Patanjali specifically defines these afflictions from YS 2.4 onwards (slide 9):
ignorance avidyā is the very root cause of all other afflictions and of phenomenal existence full of sorrow; it is
metaphysically identified with primordial nescience, and epistemologically identified with the incapacity of seeing
what things really are. In YS 2.4 clears that this ignorance is a kind of confusion, the inability to distinguish between
what is permanent and what is impermanent. This confusion causes every kind of suffering. The first “daughter” of
avidya is asmitā (both feminine words in Sanskrit) – asmita is translated literally as “the sense of I-am”, but also
“egoity” or “subjectivity” + there is a far better expression from a contemporary philosopher “egosumitas” = the
property of affirming one’s own being; consulting Hegel’s encyclopaedia of philosophical science under the title
“low” and the subtitles “property” on the entry “the person and the thing” (which is the possession), there’s maybe
the best translation (ad sensum) of the word asmita ever found. It is an inextricable intermingling of the subject with
objects, which are the final destinations of the visual act. When the perceiver fills his/her tabula rasa with the contents
of the objects, he/she are shaped according to the shape given by those objects -> he/she conceives “I am” in contrast
to the “this/that is” → he/she affirms his/her subjectivity on those external objects. Once the differentiation is
produced, individuals are subjected to the impact of objects, bot pleasant or unpleasant); after having experienced
them, the subjects develops attraction towards objects, perceiving pleasure or aversion depending on the nature of
objects – attraction and aversion must be considered on the same level, as an inseparable couple: attraction is the
affliction consequent to the experience of pleasure, while aversion comes from the experience of unease. The final
disease is the ambition to continuation = it is an obstinate clinging to the continuous experience of pleasure and
avoidance of sorrow. Of course, in both cases it concerns sensorial objects of the empirical world; the constant
thinking on them influences every human thought causing an almost escapable vicious circle, which at last develops
on its own because of the inexhaustible fuel coming from worldly objects. But Patanjali proposes a solution:
afflictions are so subtle and deeply rooted in the subject that they seem quite impossible to eradicate; but the author
believes that they can be uprooted just by going backwards the path to their very origin = to remount upstream in the
opposite direction = salmon-like-attitude. These series of sutras demonstrate that humans are intrinsically troubled
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and ill in their life and visions -> detecting these diseases distinguishes the bhogin from the yogin → the yogin/yogini
finds his/her own scope going against the stream to dissolve the knots which bind his/her vision. Throughout the YS
there are several evidences related to the change of route; this is witnessed by a specific lexical recurrence =
recurrence of words prefixed by prati- “against, anti-“ = contrary motion/tendency, counter-current, against the
current, upriver/upstream > an antidote (pratipakṣa – used also in medical literature). The most effective antidote is
the method, and viveka is the trigger of the antidote; while exerting viveka, any human becomes a yogin deeply
changing his/her life and turning away from the current. The main obstacle to finalize a real change in life lies in our
habitus = our habitual everyday practices. These habits impel us to keep on following usual routes, avoiding any
deviation. In order to counteract this pre-ordered stream, a good deal of perseverance is needed = a counter-current
attitude. This practical method was developed also by Buddhism and it consists in four main stages: I see my body in
the body, I see cognition in my cognition, I see my properties in my properties -> a sort of constant attention and
conscious presence which allows to investigate several layers of our implications into the world -> a penetrating and
conscious gaze into every aspect of life. YS itself starts proposing solutions to eradicate diseases; from sutra 2.16
until 2.26 we find that medical paradigm we’ve referred to before. The yogin individuates practices and devices to
develop a discriminating gaze (opposed to the habitual one), a process anticipated by the YS 1,1-18 and developed
withing the entire YS.
The incipit of YS: general philosophical texts argumentative structure (the three methodological steps) -> At the
opening of the YS we have perfectly the same scheme, where atha yogānuśāsanam expresses the denotation of the
subject treated throughout the entire text. YS has simply 195 sutras (aphorisms). The second sutra shows a functional
definition of the word yoga as intended by Patanjali himself; then the third one is an operative result of the method as
defined by the previous sutra = it describes what happens following the method prescribed by the author. The final
step is the test, which is developed throughout the entire text from 1.4 to the last and final aphorism 4.34 (which
proposes the sutra 1.3 again, but in a refined form finally shaped by the several discussions hinted throughout the
text). The second sutra is the most widely known because whoever is engaged in practicing yoga, asana, etc., knows
the second aphorism of the text by heart. The denotation sutra (= presentation of the subject) is a sort of initial
“identity card” -> opening it, the readers will immediately understand what the main subject is. The second sutra is a
general and functional definition that simultaneously shows the peculiarity of the methodical recipe prescribed by
Patanjali and presents also its main aim: “the method consists in a total cessation of the vortices of the fluctuations of
the cognitive plexus” -> the total cessation of cognitive meta-representations and their effects too = samadhi. Then
we have the third sutra, which is a functional definition of yoga’s final goal, the final condition which the yogin is
immersed in at the end of the anthropotechnical path = isolation. Here there is a hint of the apotheosis of the text,
which will be seen in the last sutra with some increments. Sutra 1.3 describes the outcome condition resulting from
total cessation; this sort of isolation totally and permanently preserves humans from the disturbances intrinsic to the
world. How is this possible to archive? Patanjali presents a path to follow to reach this goal. YOGA: from earliest
Vedic texts to nowadays, this word developed countless nuances; anyway, focusing on the meaning deriving from
Sanskrit, we must consider three important roots, two of them used in the first two sutras: yuj in the sense of
discipline (YS 1.1) + yuj in the sense of samādhi (YS 1.2). The third is not used in the beginning of the YS = yuj in
the sense of relation, connection, application, union. The combination of the two sutra shows that the term yoga
means both a means and an end -> it is that methodical process that brings about the result of meta-cognition. This
definitive stationing of the seer of his/her own shape. If the condition described in YS 1.3 does not take place, what
happens? Here the text starts to describe the habitual condition of human beings affected by the impact of the external
world + it hints at the meta-representative effects generated by this impact. From here to
3.43 there is a long text on the definition presented in YS 1.2 and 1.3 – a long exam of this complex definition which
finds its sublimation in the last sutra (4.34); throughout the body of the text we finds descriptions of various types of
samadhi and ways to reach them (used in the anthropotechnical arena probably in the norther regions of India from
the II-III to the V century AD). If humans are not in the metacognitive condition of samadhi, where are they? YS 1.4
gives an answer to this fundamental question, opening to the treatment of the rest of the text → vṛttisarūpyam
itaratra = otherwise, is determined a conformation with fluctuations (vṛtti) -> a form superimposed by the world. If
human cognition is not stable, then it completely conforms to objects and is shaped by them; this means that our
cognition and reactions are shaped according to the impact of objects on it, we lose contact with our own form, taking
the form of what is alien. The first domain on which the anthropotechnical method should investigate is that of
thought = fluctuations of cognition and their effects -> our way of thinking of reality directly impact on how we
engage with the world, other humans and objects. This domain is called vṛtti = a transformation of the cognition
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which takes the form of the cognitive content; it is a sort of vortex, a fluctuation of the volatile psychic material.
Several South Asian intellectual traditions diffusedly used this them giving different “lists of vṛttis”. Patanjali himself
enumerates and defines 5 of them (YS 1.5 a 1.11) = they can be both afflictive and non-afflictive = these vrttis can
cause the decline of afflictions or can be unhelpful causing an increase in meta-representation. These five are: means
of knowledge: direct perception, inference and authoritative testimony; the perceptual error: an erroneous cognition
based on a form which is not that of the object effectively cognized; pure conceptualization: it derives from the mere
verbal cognition deprived of a concrete content; sleep: a fluctuation which lies on the cognitive condition of absence;
recollection: the non-fading of objects previously perceived. The real problem is how to stop these vrittis and silence
their effect. An earlier model borrowed from Patanjali himself can be found in the BG 6.35 -> this stanza is almost
identical to YS 1.12 where the two sharpest instruments to dominate citta and its vrttis are presented for the first time:
continuous exercise and detachment (decolorization). One viveka has exerted its force, then a clear gaze is produced
and the second step of the method starts, represented by a single coin with two faces (exercise and detachment). Only
when a field is precisely distinguished and identified you can develop a choice and detach from something. Abhyāsa
is the first word of YS 1.12 – it comes from the root as = to stay, to lie, to dwell, to keep on, the persist, to set up +
two prefixes abhi- = above, on, continuity, repetition, and ā- = totally, proximity, attraction → abhyāsa = a
continuous and repeated totalizing permanence on something/ a deep, constant and reiterated application on a single
specific objective ➔ a very clear correspondence with the etymological meaning – this is exactly what Patanjali
expresses in his definition of the word; he not only explains what “abhyasa” (repetition) is, but tries to help us make
this exercise steady, Vairāgya = “decolorization” (the translation proposed by professor Pellegrini) seems to be more
coherent with the linguistic units building up the term -> YS 1.15-16. The first of these two sutras shows the
definition of vairagya = a kind of control over our thoughts and the consequent actions, while the second shows a
superior form of vairagya acting directly on causes (the gunas). Remember the 4 requirements to get instruction into
Advaita Vedanta -> Vedantasara = viveka in the first position, viraga in the second -> in the YS vairagya = the
abstract condition of who is viraga “without raga, attraction”- to simply we can treat those two words are mere
synonyms. For Patanjali raga is the affliction consequent to the experience of pleasure. In the word vairagya there is
the prefix vai- = vi- = absence, separation – it negates the term which it is attached to. Moreover, this word comes
from the Sanskrit root rañj = to be coloured, tinged, dyed + to red, to blush, to flush → in a sort of figurative sense =
to be attached, to fall in love, to feel affection or passion. From rañj also come the word rajas = the passion intrinsic
to every human as incarnated in one of the three gunas (the constituents of the natura naturas = prakṛti in Samkhya) ->
the noun raga indicates in general the act of being coloured, tinged, in specific the most penetrating among colours,
the colour of most pervasive feelings = red, the blush – figuratively raga conveys emotions and flushing feelings
(love, passion, libido, concupiscence). That is why one of the most precise translation of the term vairagya is
“colourlessness = decolorization, fading”. Reference to effects of objects on subjects in the Bhāmatī (Vācaspati
Miśra) and the Bhagavadgītā (2.62, 3.37) – slides 26 and 27. Due to rajas (the guna responsible for passion) humans
fix their thoughts on objects, which bind humans and dye their intellect, imposing alien colours-shapes. Vairagya
represents a contrary act = a contrastive motion opposed to the tinging imposed by objects = decolorization and
fading from the tint superimposed on our intellect; such a vairagya is the prolonged effort to decolorize from the
redness imposed by passion, a flush derived from the relationship with objects. In a figurative sense it means the
absence of bondage, disenchantment, detachment = coming off from a surface on which something was clung. An
interesting passage from Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations – according to him, representations are mental images of
objects, which ting the soul making it coloured (very close to Patanjali’s sense): The world loses its colour and
consistency as much as to generate a peculiar disaffection leading to the end of afflictions. Such an increasing
disaffection is what Patanjali calls vairagya (+ abhyasa) = the point of existential difference between yogin and non-
yogin. If protracted throughout the methodical path, it guarantees final success. YSBh ad YS 1.12: we found the long
compound word vivekadarśanābhyāsena, which includes three words = viveka, darsana, abhyasa = the constant
exercise of the discriminating gaze – it conveys the idea that the yogin, by means of constant exercise, brings and
everlasting discrimination in his/her own vision, through which he/she evaluates every life experience. Viveka
operates on several layers, but here, in this very contest, it indicates a general chance of route, a radical
transformation from the instinctive/animal life to the stable and methodical experience. This transformation is
precisely applied to the 8 limbs (aṣṭāṅga) of Patanjali’s method, described from YS 2.28-3.3. In his iter we are in
front of a particular recipe: the viveka displayed by our intellect can transform our life, so to lead us toward the
attendance of the method; once the methodical path is started, viveka should be reiterated and exerted also while
practicing the various steps of the 8 limbed Yoga → this generates an utter viveka, the utmost degree of viveka,

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which directly leads to the final goal of the anthropotechnical path = absorptive meta-cognition/meta-cognitive
absorption = nirbījasamādhi = kaivalya. This discriminative climax is mentioned and treated in several YS
aphorisms (YS 2.26, 28, 3.54, 4.29). The conclusion of the method was determined since the beginning of the pat! In
fact, there is a preliminary sutra which glues viveka and the specific practice of the methodical path together -> 2.28
= in this sutra the limbs of the method are mentioned for the first time. By practicing the 8 limbs, the final
discrimination/the final viveka is brought about. Since the limbs were never mentioned before by Patanjali, they
should be clearly displayed in the text. In fact, the sutra coming immediately after, the 2.29 enumerates them:
abstentions, prescriptions, postures, breath-control, sensorial withdrawal, focalizing concentration, contemplation and
total absorption. The first step of Patanjali’s method is the 5 folded abstentions, yama in Sanskrit. Adhering to yama
we abstain from what we habitually do, and we have an overall glace through the entire methodical path. Yama’s
literal meaning = in equitation indicates bridles to which our reins are attached to control horses’ movements – to
control = to stop horses’ galop in front of an obstacle + to invert/ direct their movement towards a safe path. In this
context, yama is the inaugural and strong effort to chance direction from a life modelled on habitus, to a life modelled
on method. The adhesion to yama discolours humans from colours imposed by objects; at first it stops our
movements, but then it provokes an inversion (epochè). In YS the analysis of yama can be found in several sutras
(2.29-30, 2.32-39): 1) five abstentions are listed = non-harming, truthfulness, not stealing, celibacy, not keeping
(anything for ourselves); 2) these abstentions constitute the great vow – it intends that the two commitments with
ourselves to change our lives are represented by yama -> not doing what I used t; moreover the sutra specify that in
the Indian cultural milieu it is possible that some yamas are already resorted to by indigenous individuals because of
their birth, provenance, temporal circumstances and customs. Only when yamas do not derive from these factors, they
are definitely universal because they proceed from a completely new conscious attitude -> they are no more limited
but every human can resort to them at any time and space; 3) it clearly deals with one side of the socalled salmon-like
attitude: to counteract their inner habitual tendencies (=obstacles), humans should cultivate a sort of antidote-like
attitude.
Vijñāna Bhikṣu is the author of Yogasārasaṃgraha, which displays a crucial distinction between abstentions and
prescriptions; he says that abstentions are not limited by space or time -> that is why they are called the great vow (a
label used by Patanjali). Yamas are regressive and inversive in nature so, apart from the individual will, they do not
need any specific time, space, custom or support to be exerted; on the contrary, prescriptions are of progressive
nature, so they are spatially as well as temporally limited, therefore they are not a form of great vow. Inversive vs.
progressive in nature = in this passage two words must be highlighted: • pravṛtti > niyama and nivṛtti > yama. These
two words are connected and antinomic. Pravrtti can be roughly translated as “action”, because it is a sort of tendency
to realize the aim of life through several ritualistic actions – it is formed by the prefix pra- = “pro-, towards” = it
indicates a movement towards something (or utmost degree) + the root vrt “to be, to stay, to move, to turn”; in its
complete form it literally mean “a bent over, a progression, to turn towards”, and it can convey a sort of sympathy in
the Greek sense of the world = an inclination entirely dedicated to acts or objects/ a tendency to conform to a stream,
a flux; it is the epistemic condescendence to brute existence, VS. nivrtti can be translated as “renunciation, cessation”
= a search for the ultimate goal through an imperturbable detachment; it literally means “antipathy” > prefix ni-
“certainly, surely, down” indicating negation, inversion and interruption + the root vrt – the entire semantic range of
the word embraces several nuances = retraction, withdrawal, inversion, cancellation, conveying the meaning of
“resistance”, a withdrawal from acts and objects and the very tendency to act and enjoy; it is a motion contrary to the
stream and can be seen as a distinguishing landmark separating a life dominated by objects, and they consequent
meta-representations, and the congruence with an anthropotechnical method able to counteractive objects’ obtrusive
force.
Kaṭha Upaniṣad 2.1.1: The Self-existent One pierced the apertures outward, therefore, one looks out and not into
oneself. A certain wise human searching for immortality, turned his/her sight inward and saw the self within.

An introduction to East Asian Religions: Prof. Matteo Cestari

The question of East Asian religious practices through the lenses of Adam Chau’s book “Religion in China”.
“Connected practices”: in order to get in touch with East Asian religions we need to change not only the way of
approaching these religions, but more radically the way of defining ourselves and our approach to these religions and
to our religious life. Connectedness is an important step in this direction. We are used to a theological and theoretical
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approach to religion, and we usually think that all aspects of our religions can be defined accordingly, but this is not
possible with Chinese religions and not only with them. If we consider such an impossibility from a methodological
and critical perspective, it bounces back to us and can become a possibility to approach religion in a very different
way -> a way which should be practice-centred rather than doctrine-centred and lead to consider the process of
connections between religions and within religions central, instead of isolating religious groups. We should not
consider religions as abstract dominations and move from an isolation to a connected paradigm. The classical way to
approach religion is through simple questions (how many religions, which religion is the most widely spread, what do
Chinese people believe in?). The first one is based on the idea that religions are countable, as if they have always
been clearly distinguishable one from the others -> we think that their credos, names, books, hierarchy are all clearly
definable – we count on self-identities of religions. However, beyond the world of Abrahamic religions and even
within it this question is not so simple. Chau starts by underlining that these questions are unable to shed light upon
Chinese religions -> even Indian and Japanese. We should change our habitual approach and stop searching for a
substantive approach to religions, as if religions were clearly definable objects; starting from this approach, we could
be induced to ask ourselves “the classical questions” – it comes from centuries of philosophical and theological
approaches (e.g. Socrates) and from a large amount of presuppositions. The first one is the “identity presupposition”
= we think that there can be a series of clearly defined, isolated and discrete objects that can be quantified and
denominated; the core of these objects lays in the teachings of founders or peculiar figures associated with specific
religious groups. We can say that another important presupposition is the doctrinal centrality = the idea that the
doctrine, the words of the founder, his/her writings and their exegesis, the theological effort to rationalize the core of
the religions are the most important part of religions themselves → we tend to identify East Asian religions as a kind
of “Oriental wisdom”, in some way related to the question of orientalism and self-orientalism. These mechanisms
usually hinder our approaches to East Asian religions, in a way which makes it almost impossible to understand them.
The third presupposition is the idea of religions as exclusive practices – to believe in just one God, one faith, on
philosophy, one Church, etc. → we think that others do the same as well, but this is hardly so and probably we could
discover it has never been so simple even for us. The fourth presupposition is the idea that religions is a matter of
interiority and privacy; in fact, a modern idea of religion relegates it to the private space, living the public space to
politics and the state -> religion are the result of a private choice, but this disposition is far from being the same all
over the world (maybe it is so in the protestant world, but in catholic countries it is not so simple, as well as for East
Asian ones). The fifth one is the social and ethical presupposition = true religion must be socially and ethically
responsible and engaged in the public good -> all the cults that do not comply with these traits are judged as
egocentric, superstitious and magical (Max Weber); this idea too comes from the protestant conception and can be
hardly extended to the entire world; on the contrary, it appears to be relevant only to a small portion of mankind. The
sixth one Is the moral superiority: true religion is morally superior to “false ones”, since the latter is based upon lower
needs. In general we can find two problems in this substantive approach: some traits are apparently telling of the
situation with Abrahamic religions; this seems to be a more prescriptive than descriptive situation → there is the need
of imposing orthodoxy and from this need the very description of what religion is comes from. Outside of the
Abrahamic field, this model doesn’t work at all, or it does work in a very constraint way, except when and where
cults have been strongly influenced by Abrahamic religions. The Japanese case is an example of this way of adapting
or imposing models of religions not belonging to original East Asian practices. The discussion about Kamakura
period Buddhism (1185-1333) – for a long time, many scholars have produce a kind of narrative underlying the
newness of the message developed by Buddhist groups formed during that period -> “New Buddhism” was said to be
formed as a reformation against corruption of previous Buddhist groups; the problem however is that such a rhetoric
did not exist in Japan at that time, and the so called New Schools quickly adapted and formed a single religious
system, which included the previous schools = “system of exoteric and esoteric Buddhism”. Those groups that
appeared during this period for the first time were grouped and highlighted for their peculiar doctrines by modern
(mainly) Japanese scholars; therefore, their interpreted them and the religious situation using presuppositions directly
drawn from European religious history. These presuppositions can be interpreted as examples of what Chau defines
as substantive approach to religion -> in particular, the centrality of doctrine and the moral superiority of the
reformers started from the idea that a different doctrine invariably means a different group/subgroup. Then we
interpret this doctrine on the basis of an European protestant model – this one is based on some core ideas different
from the traditions of New (closer to common people, more religious democracy, morally superior); however, this
model does not define what happened in Japan at that time, so it introduced a lot of anachronistic elements. Chau’s
work underlines a kind of approach to religions that shifts our attention from a substantive approach to a relational
and processual one -> he points on “how” instead of “what” – “Why is that, which difference is there?”. This subtle
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passage is important because talking about what religion is we tend to emphasize its identity and substance; on the
contrary, the “how” points to processes rather than substances, and it is much more useful for understanding the
situation of East Asian religions. How do Chinese people practice religion? Connectedness and practices are key
concepts. C himself underline the importance of relationships and connections -> the term religion come from the
Latin “religare” (to bind together) – for the Chinese religious life this is no exception. Considering every religious
activity as “a way of doing religion”, it is practice and not theology or theory to be the core of religions. This
approach can be used also to understand our own religious landscape. Relations = 关系 (ZHO)/関係 (JP – kankei) –
they lie at the core of every aspect of Chinese social life, and it includes religion as well; the idea is that there is no
dramatic difference in China society between relations with family and the spirits -> it is only a matter of
differentiating types of relationships → the rules and orientations observed in Chinese social and political life could
be extended to cover relationships with spirits and gods, with religious masters, among religious groups, an so on;
these relations can be temporary or lasting, local or trans-local, vertical or horizontal, etc. – anyway, they are the main
point of Chinese religious life ➔ Chau’s definition of religion: any form of interaction with spirits, be they God,
gods, ancestors, ghosts or evil spirits”. This way of defining religion is based on the idea of relations and it changes
the common categories used by many theologians and scholars to define religion. It clearly overcomes the
juxtaposition between religion and magic/superstition. We may say that defining religion as any form of interaction
with the supernatural goes against at least 500 years of theological reflection in Europe, because true religion and the
false one are juxtaposed. A sense of moral superiority can be found in the common distinction between religion and
magic: historically in the middle-ages the Roman church was often accused to be corrupted and immoral and many
reformation movements arose with the aim to overcome such a poor ethical consciousness. Luther reformation too
was an example of such a reaction to simony = the bargain of spiritual salvation of the Roman church which
organized the market of indulgences for the souls of deaths or dying people; he published his 99 thesis giving rise to
the protestant reformation → the right moral indignation for simony was one of the many phenomena of a theological
reasoning oriented toward a specific idea of religion which had to differentiate itself from superstition. True religion
= a question of faith that shines from the inside to the outside, so that interiority could manifest itself in exteriority vs.
False religion = exteriority was the sole dimension involved -> exterior words and deeds remain external and did not
reach the heart of people. Accordingly, the magical approach considers religious practice as a simple tool to obtain
wordily benefits, not as an expression of inner faith –> the only aim of false believers were bodily, earthly and selfish
advantages, instead of the salvation of the soul. This idea of juxtaposing instrumental and expressive ideas of religion
(here it is just the same of faith) was used in many contexts, even outside Europe and the temporal context which the
original controversy was developed in. E.g. in Japan the American protestant conception of religion was the
foundation upon which the government in the period of modernization (Meiji era 1868-1911) built up the religious
system of the new country. This led to a deep change in the Japanese religious landscape: many popular cults were
prohibited, Buddhism was briefly but intensely persecuted, because considered part of the ancien regime -> it was
split from the local cult of deities which was internally reorganized under the banner of the newly established Shinto
(= a civil cult, but it actually it was a religion to all extents). Even today in the Japanese religious context, both
academics or clergy from the establishment cast doubts and distain upon getting earthly advantages = the notorious
gensei riyaku – they cannot derive from spiritual practices -> they use the idea earthly profit as an argument to prove
that certain religious movement are not pure and spiritual enough; hence, certain periods of religious history in which
Buddhism refers to earthly gains, and today’s idea of many new religions (e.g. Soka Gakkai clearly inspired by it) are
irremediably condemned and defined as “false religions”. This historical condition marks the difference between
China and Japan in the process of modernization and adaptation to new religious models. If we go back to Chau’s
statement, does this mean that we must believe in the existence of spirits? What are the presuppositions at the core of
the last question? Probably believing is the central point of religions all over the world and taking part in a ritual
implies that participants all believe in the theology implied. Faith is paramount in Abrahamic religions but, in East
Asian religions isn’t equally important or, probably, not in the same way. The second presupposition is assuming that
gods or spirits and supernatural existence are fundamental for religion. In fact, believers are defined also according to
their belief in the existence or no existence of supernatural beings. The third one is the idea that adhesion in a certain
religion is not simply a matter of trust in the founder of that religion, in the effectiveness of his/her message, etc.
More fundamentally, centuries of theological discussion have affirmed that following a religion means to adhere to an
orthodoxy, faith as a content which is not based on pure reasoning or observation of certain events, but it is based
exclusively on the words of more o less qualified mediators -> they supposedly can be direct witnesses of
supernatural events, members of the ecclesiastic structure or authoritative figures. This factor indicates the

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importance of orthodox doctrine, texts and exegesis in Christianity, where the debate on the existence of God was a
theological classic. This is not the case in East Asian religions, in which the real question is neither the existence or
not of spirits, nor the content of faith -> faith is an affective disposition that has no doctrine. Rather in East Asian
religions a much more important part is assigned to the involvement in religious practices together with relationships
deriving from such practices, no matter what one’s believes are. Chau’s position on the question about the existence
of spirits clearly depends on the anthropological imprint of his approach -> the starting point is not asking if the belief
in spirits is true or false, but it is realizing how these people and societies look at the world and operate in it. We can
condense this problem in the distinction between emic and etic: it comes from linguistics – K. Pyke drew the
distinction between phonemics and phonetics, with the former implying the internal perspective of social actors and
the latter linked to the external scholar perspective of researchers; etic describes a practice or an idea that belongs to
the observer; cognitive transfer is possible and scientific neutrality is needed for a good observation of the subjects.
On the contrary, emic describes an idea or a practice significant for social and cultural actors → Chau adopts an emic
approach = he speaks about people’ s believes accepting them in the context of their approach. Moreover, we cannot
take for granted that practicing a certain ritual always implies that practitioners feel it right with the meaning implied
or induced by the hierarchy. The ritual can have an effect by itself in terms of social relationships which is not
necessarily what is wanted by the clergy. Moreover, there is a distinction between what Robert Redfield defines as
“Greater Tradition” (the tradition developed by cultural literates) eland “Little Tradition” (traditions of peasant
cultures); what can be defined in a certain way in the Greater T. is often transformed once adopted by the Little one.
Are these presuppositions we have been discussing only western or not? A clear-cut distinction between Westerners
who do not know (anything about Asian religion) and the others (e.g. Asiatic people) who really know is fallacious:
we have lots of historical cases demonstrating parallel or similar interpretations between colonizers and colonized
populations -> in colonial or semi-colonial relationship, subalterns are prone to think according to models and
paradigms received by the dominants. Even in the case of Japan, which was not colonized, neither economically nor
politically, and the government was entirely in the hands of Japanese elites, we find a strong tendency to think
according to the paradigms received by dominant western cultures. In the religious field, this approach reached the
point of altering significantly the general meaning of many ideas and practices. This complicates a lot the question of
the historical accuracy of many modern reconstructions, and religion is no exception → this is because
representation is a kind of power and Japanese scholars accepted and developed representational tools as they were
created in Europe. Very often, even when Japanese intellectuals tried to elaborate their own approached, they were so
depended on Euro-American models that seldom they efforts were that of constructing a real alternative to that way
of thinking. Anyway, in most cases they accepted the juxtaposition developed in Western thought that polarized West
and East, only to chose the opposite side of the coin: the characteristics disdained in the dominant western culture;
therefore, when the western culture appreciate rationality, they approved irrationality -> In the context of cultural
studies, this phenomenon is at the foundation of the so-called self-orientalism (or reverse orientalism). This
discussion clearly indicates the need for a deep reflection on our very intellectual tools, the disciplines we use in order
to define concepts, apply paradigms, organize discourses, imagine representations – reflecting on pros and cons of
these disciplines is useful to problematize our approach to East Asian religion: statistics, religious studies (exegesis,
philosophy), history of religions, sociology of religions, political sciences, anthropology, etc →
Statistics = it is based on a large use of data – etymologically speaking, the aim of this collection of data was to better
manage the state. Is the type of data collected always in line with the type of religiosity which can be found in China,
India or Japan? In our context of discussion, the quantitative approach to religion in China appears problematic,
because religiosity in China is not confessional and it is not based on the nominational model (founded on exclusive
affiliation to certain clearly defined religious groups). Since statistics is based upon data having these assumptions, it
is highly implausible that statistical data can picture correctly the Chinese religious situation.
Religious studies = it is interested in deepening the doctrinal content of religions. The central point here is the
question of texts, especially canonical ones. The very existence of Canons in East Asian religion is a debated
question, because it can depend on some native elites as in the case of Chinese religions, or directly on some Western
scholars who developed certain canons according to certain specific patterns. Such an approach is less interested in
the social and institutional aspects, the question is much more connected to theological, philosophical or exegetical
points. Therefore, we can say that this discipline is clearly connected to the development of European theological and
hermeneutical tradition which has created the so-called category “World’s religions” elaborating them as coherent
systems of thought -> we moderns/westerners have built categories such as Buddhism and Hinduism as if they were

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analogous to Christianity. It is important to remember that these very words (in Japan, India, etc.) are substantially
modern constructs – they did not exist before Modern era. We moderns think that all these religions or philosophies
have their own propositions -> We ask e.g. “What does Buddhism say about this problem, what are the main
Buddhist idea, or which are the key concepts in this sacred text?” etc. The problem with all these questions is that
they take for granted that these “World Religions” are analogous to Christianity, Islam or Judaism in this respect =
importance of doctrine. In many cases this systematic and theoretical approach is the backbone of university courses
as well; sometimes, this is done by most important specialists (not all) → there is a kind of discrepancies between this
discipline and the religious life in East Asia. Recently, Religious Studies have begun to concentrate on “the living
religion”, intensifying their relationship with anthropology + to start a discussion about the history of critical
interpretation of those religions, approaching to concerns close to those of history of religions and cultural studies.
Sociology of religions = it is interest in grand themes, such as Max Weber’s question of secularization and its impact
over religions in secularized countries = many though that with the development of rationalism religion would have
been reduced or even superseded, but this did not happened; on the contrary, religion has proved to be an attractive
force both in global and local contexts. The main interest of sociologists is predicting certain results using
quantitative data; they are more interested in institutional aspects rather than in religious questions per se. The
problem, however, is that these data are used in quantitative way as parameters to those religious models valid mainly
for Abrahamic religions, taking these parameters in China where the population is not affiliated to specific religions
in an exclusive way -> this problem also reverberates in official statistics, also in Chinese statistics in the way the
Chinese government thinks at the question of religions.
Political science: recently there is strong interest in the connection between politics and religion = a quite new
interest, mainly because political sciences in advanced countries are generally secularized → there is a strong
tendency to exclude religion from political institutions. This exclusion is due to the clear-cut distinction between
private and public spheres. There is a strong attention to institutional factors which are public -> this leaves religion
aside because it is considered private. The problem is that religious movements has increasing importance in politics -
> e.g. religious radicalism and its effects (all over the world); religious affiliation and its influence on vote (US), the
relationship between religion and the State (Italy); the stabilizing/destabilizing effect of religion on society (especially
in countries where there is strong social control) → in China there is strong attention to this question especially in
relation to Christianity and Islam. But this phenomenon concerns not only religions coming from outside China, but
also new religions (e.g. Falun Gong). Scholars of political sciences tend to take for granted the affiliation to certain
religious groups and are not interested in defining the nature of religious practices.
Five modalities of doing religions in China: there are some important differences among disciplines studying religion.
Those discussed in the previous lecture can be grouped in two categories: 1) political science, statistics and sociology,
that discuss religion on the basis of a more o less massive use of quantitative data; 2) Religious Studies, theology,
philosophy and exegesis, whose approach is limited to texts and doctrines – their main focus +specific orientations
peculiar to each one. Obviously single scholars can be interested in other disciplines as well; anyway, there is a strong
tendency to limit one’s approach to doctrines and texts -> through such a limitation researchers clearly define and
specialize, and this is appreciated especially in nowadays academia, because it allows to reach a certain degree of
thoroughness although at the expenses of wits; however, for our discourse this limitation is a problem because it acts
as a hindrance to our possibilities to get in touch with an entire dimension of Chinese religion and, at the same time,
of religion in general. This dimension has been compressed by the centrality of doctrine in Abrahamic traditions,
which is somehow misleading if we look at East Asian religions.
History of Religions: religions are analysed as historical phenomena subject to historical changes. It starts from the
idea that religions are not always the same in the long run -> their ideas and practices change throughout history so,
compared to religious studies, History of Religions focuses on changes and temporal developments of religions. A
typical question of this approach could be “How did religions develop in East Asia, how did deities change in the
course of time, how did the word zongjiao (religion) come to China from Japan? Historians of religion massively use
texts, documents and evidences, from dynastic chronicles to inscriptions and wall painting, from offerings in tombs to
poetries and public registers.
Anthropology of religions: it comes from the encounter between colonial powers and colonized peoples during
colonialism. Anthropologists worked as advisors of colonial governments, in order to make the government of natives
more efficient. Many of those natives were illiterate = “people without writing” and the colonial rulers needed to
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understand them to avoid riots and organize a better government of territories. Since, those natives did not organize
their knowledge and way of life in scriptures, anthropologists had to live among them, learn their language, customs
and understand their “primitive and bizarre” practices. This is the so-called “participant observation” according to
which, in order to gather qualitative date, researchers had to familiarize with group of individual and their practices
and believes through and intense involvement in the cultural environment object of their studies. Although its origins
are clearly linked to colonialism, anthropology has moved towards a confrontation with complex social and cultural
phenomena, which requires higher interdisciplinarity to discuss about changes in cultures and societies. At the core of
Chau’s approach there is a scheme he elaborated to define how religion is done in China. This scheme should be
considered as alternative to the denominational way to interpret religions. Instead of speaking of e.g. Buddhism,
Taoism, Christianity and so on, to give a clear picture of religion in China it is much better to speak about different
ways of practicing religion; Chinese religiosity is much more a question of practice and effectiveness, of
instrumentality and opportunity, rather than of orthodoxy and beliefs. It is not so strange to think about religions in
China as a kind of religious service providers instead of moral authority or keepers of the correctness of teaching. The
five modalities: 1) the discursive/scriptural modality = it has to do with all practices related to texts; 2)
personal/cultivational = it indicates practices connected to self-transformation and taking care of oneself; 3) liturgical
= it is connected to procedures elaborated by specialists; 4) immediatepractical = it indicates all those simple ritual
practices aiming at immediate results (e.g. the so-called magic); 5) relational = it underlines relationships with deities,
human beings and spirits. All these ideas are conceptualizations and abstractions, yet they are much closer to Chinese
real life than conceptual fetishes, such as Buddhism or Taoism -> people in China engage a lot in real practices; on
the contrary, almost no one has ever being engaged in the so-called Buddhism e.g., which has a conceptual not
practical consistency; there is much less attention to coherence from the institutional/cognitive/conceptual point of
view; instead of worrying about orthodoxy, denomination or affiliation, common people chose their religious practice
according to local customs, historical memories, social environment, personal character, types of religions available
in the local ritual market, etc. (the use of the metaphor of consumer society to discuss religion in China). It is
important to know that these modalities are ideal types which means that in real life they overlap, mix and influence
each other in a way depending on the many different context they are in.

1) Discursive/scriptural: it would appear familiar to those who think in terms of Great traditions
(Buddhism, Taoism, etc.) and Great texts (canons – the Classics in Confucianism and Sutra in Buddhist
canon) -> Great traditions in the sense defined by Robert Redfield, compared to little traditions. Of course,
this type of practices needs a high level of interest in culture and in philosophical and theological reasoning;
typical practices of this type are for instance compiling texts, elaborating discourses (on the Dao e.g.)
predication, reading, discussing, debating, translating and commenting texts (from the Daodejing to
koan/gong’an). Typical products of this practices are texts, from one single treatise to entire canons, e.g. the
thousands of texts associated to Buddhism → in China Buddhist canon, at first written in Sanskrit, has been
translated many times in the course of Chinese history; all important dynasties created their own team in
order to proceed to systematic translation of all the sutras and scriptures in the canon. These translations were
considered particularly praiseworthy actions able to create merit for the salvation of the patrons. In Tibetan
Buddhism (culturally different from China) there was a particular figure, that of “the searcher of treasures”,
who found texts in some cases in the high mountains of Himalaya or in the deepest recesses of their own
human mind -> this brings scriptural practices closer to cultivational ones. Texts are at the foundation of the
academical approach to religious studies; on the basis of European religions, scholars were trying to find
something similar in other continents as well; for a long time in Europe there has been a prejudice according
to which Chinese religions could be identified with esoteric teachings transmitted through texts. These texts
became the repository of “Oriental Wisdom” that had strong impact on orientalism -> e.g. the idea of the
Chinese sage comes from this way of considering Chinese religiosity. What Chau is trying to say here is not
that texts and doctrines are not important in Chinese religion, but that their presence is just one of the many
aspects which were largely overrated by European/modern Chinese interpreters as if they were in European
contexts. Moreover, in East Asia these texts and doctrines were considered as practices, not theories, and so
they were valid as far as they were useful for salvation or the transformational process.
2) Personal/cultivational: this type of practices presupposes a long-lasting interest in taking care and
transforming oneself -> self-cultivational. We can find them in almost all traditions all over the world (not
only Chinese ones). In the case of East Asian religiosity, we can find them in Confucianism, Buddhism,
Taoism and sectarian traditions -> e.g. meditation, qikong (the work on the qi = the energy/fluid that
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 permeates everything in the world according to traditional medicine), external and internal alchemy in
physical exercises (martial arts, the recitational act of sutras, etc.). The meaning of these practices varies
according to the traditions involved: for Taoists the aim is to become immortal and perfect oneself; for
Buddhists it is the cessation of suffering (Nirvana) /better life (rebirth in the Land of Amitabha); for
Confucians it is to become a sage (junzi) -> they all have in common the interest in bettering one’s
ontological status and destiny → from such a perspective, Michel Foucault discussed about the technologies
of the self and Pierre Hadot of spiritual exercises. Taking care of oneself, doing some operations upon oneself
is at the heart of these practices, which are possible not only for the population, but also for elites: for normal
people, even illiterates, it is possible to obtain personal advantages or care for oneself even without esoteric
knowledge or high culture, or any particular religious background. There can also be a kind of self-
improvement not linked to spirits and gods (can be linked to them only afterwards, as in the case of martial
arts). The simplest time of technology of the self in East Asia is the repetition of the darani (the secret
formula) Namo Amituofo (JP Namu Amida Butsu) = honor to the Buddha Amitabha – repeated thousands of
times per day.
3) Liturgical: this way includes operating elaborated rituals (Imperial state rites, Confucian and Taoist rites,
funerals, exorcisms + something similar in Brahmins’ rituals in Indian Vedic culture). The high symbolism
and complexity of those rituals require high-level specialists, which are consequently provided with great
power and social respect, often holding esoteric secret knowledge = Buddhist and Taoist monks, fengshui
masters, Confucian masters of ceremony, mediums for exorcisms, dancers for exorcisms, shamans, etc.
4) Immediate-practical: includes all those rituals that, compared to the elaborate procedures of the previous way,
has minimum ritual elaboration. In these practices procedures are simple and aim at immediate results ->
Divination, use of talismans, offering of food and incense, begging for the rain.
5) Relational: it emphasizes the relationship between humankind and deities, ancestors or between fellow
worshipers – we find practices such as the construction of temples and other religious buildings, offerings,
vows, the celebration of deities, the organization of religious festivals, pilgrimages, etc. Festival dedicated to
patron deities or saints, ritual and collective events are all part of these practices. They are extremely popular
in East Asia but can be found all over the world. The main point of this specific kind of practices is that they
are particularly relevant for sociality, relations and collectiveness in general.
Instead of concentrating on religious doctrines this approach concentrates on practices. The five ways of doing
religion in China are the main structures for all religious practices to be conceived; they allow people to express their
religious needs through words, images, artistic and architectural structural forms, procedures, bodily transformation
→ they allow people to represent religious needs; these representations depend on possibilities – many factors can
influence this aspect: gender, class, level of schooling, social status, personal character and local customs. The first
three are more widely used among high classes = those who hold more political and representational power;
historically elites tended to adopt practices more linked to the discursive/scriptural approach because of their
educational background; they were also interested in the personal/cultivational approach because they had plenty of
time to take care of themselves and they were more inclined to develop individualization (level and type of
education); it was also normal to them to seek help from liturgical specialists, because they had money to pay for their
service. On the other hand, peasants and low status classes tended to resort to practices easier for them (= easily
understandable without high culture and little time available) and affordable practices → tendency to use mainly the
fourth and the fifth way; sometimes they used also the liturgical one and, in some cases, the personal/cultivational,
depending on the type of practice involved. It was much more difficult for them to adopt the first modality, but also
the second was quite difficult because they lacked time and had less general disposition toward working on
themselves; however, this last one was somehow practiced, at least in simple ways. The first, second and third ways
can be said to be part of the so-called Great tradition, while the fourth and the fifth of little tradition. It is interesting
to note how these different ways can be easily combined, adapted and changed according to a wide spectrum of
situations. The Gt is stricter (orthodoxy, orthopraxis, control exerted, etc.), while Lt is more open to differences. All
the things involved in this scheme depict not only the situation in China, but it is useful to define the religious
situation in many countries all over the world. Of course, adaptations are necessary to reflect the specific context of
use. It is an important hermeneutical/interpretational tool, which can be a valid alternative to approaches based on
doctrines and texts or those based on quantitative data (academical approaches). There are few modalities of doing
religion that permeate Chinese religious world, but they allow a great variety of concrete combinations and
possibilities. It is important to underline that religious rivalries are not base on doctrinal or denominational
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differences (as the case of Europe) –> a strong difference between the context of our discourse and those countries
where the representational religious power was/is controlled by a clear institution; on the contrary, in China the
conflicts between religions are generally competitions among different ways of doing religion and within a specific
way of doing religion -> the liturgical and the immediate practical modalities are such case. Religious differences in
China are based upon coexistence or competition among various provides of religious services, much more than upon
coexistence of different denominations and doctrines. Someone could object “do not Chinese people know their own
culture better than any other, so that we should follow what they say? → A naïve idea = it is based on the idea that
people of a country know one’s culture better than anyone else – this is not always true! We must consider that
cultural and historical connections are complicated and operate in a twisted way, changing in a dramatic way our
perception of the world. In fact, in general epistemological sense we do not simply perceive the world, but we
perceive it through certain lenses (acquired through education, drilling, culture, etc.). We must be aware of the ways
in which these lenses have been created. The ways of thinking of many experts and common people in East Asia are
influenced by categories often developed in colonial and modern times -> the “legacy” coming from a sort of
Stockholm syndrome of subalterns who think like their enslavers. Many traditions defined as “old” are modern
adaptations, reinventions and selections. In modern times the development of national states in East Asia/Europe/US
has radically altered the past in a way often decisive. In China religious and political elites had at the same time
interest in constructing a specific image of Chinese religions in denominational and clear way. This construction is
not oriented toward abroad but is much more interested in controlling people within China. Defining religions in
denomination and doctrinal way makes them easier to control and to define than the fluid scenario appeared in Chau’s
fivefold scheme. This idea of denominating religions does not happen only within totalitarian regimes but also within
democratic ones, connected as it is to the very structure of modern states -> the case of Edo in Japan: the process of
concentrating religions in denominational sense started in this period, between 1603-1868, way before the foundation
of the modern Japanese national state; it was decided by the Shogun (the military government) of pre-modern Japan
for reasons of public order -> the temple was often the epicentre of riots, rebellions and military conflicts with other
temples or with the central authority. Defining and controlling temples was necessary for the Tokugawa Shogun to
keep control over Japan. This was also the first step toward different denominations among Japanese Buddhist
schools, and this is a trait that marks a difference with Chinese Buddhism (where this denomination is not present).
Religious diversity in China – Is our common idea of pluralism enough to understand the Chinese religious situation?
Is religious pluralism “the way” to speak in a more inclusive way about religions? This question is not limited to
China, but it can be related also to the Western world in general. There is also a difference between religious
denominations but also within single religions → E.g. instead of Christianity we should discuss about Christianities
(we are not referring to the sole distinction between different credos, but also to the way in which different types of
religion coexist and compete with each other within one country or in different countries. The very idea of diversity is
based upon historical, socio-cultural and philosophical conditions. Pluralism applied to religion is determined by the
history of religions’ denominations in Abrahamic religions = strong religious identity and stressed differences among
denominations. Pluralism itself does not help us avoiding preconceptions because it presupposes them. Now it is time
to rethink these presuppositions: religious pluralism is based on the assumptions that prevents us from realizing how
religions are in China (not only there). The ideas of religious pluralism and interreligious dialogue are modalities born
in Europe after centuries of religious conflicts between clearly defined denominations. They favour a discursive
modality of practicing religions and reduce the relevance of those types of religion based on different modalities.
Resorting to these approaches in order to explain religions in China implies to silence many people that do not
approach religion in that way -> their own way of practicing religion is called “superstition” or “counter revolutionary
sectarianism”. Political control over China is such that it prefers to isolate five denomination (Buddhism, Taoism,
Protestantism, Catholicism and Islam) instead of having to do with a fluid and extremely localized situation. Since the
focus is denomination, the discursive textual modality is largely advantaged over the other modalities -> those
traditions in which the discursive modality is strong are favoured compared to the other ones. E.g. the Taoist monastic
school Quanzhen is far more represented within Taoist association than the ritualists of Zhengyi, while in the national
context Buddhism is far stronger than Taoism, also thanks to the doctrinal dimension of their religion. It sounds
curious that Confucianism is not considered as a religion and, it is not no coincidence that Xi Jinping has transformed
it into the new moral and civic ideology of China in this millennium. This approach reminds what was done at the
beginning of Meiji period, when Buddhism was associated to the ancient regime and the government needed to create
a religious space in order to control the population better → the beginning of the so-called Kokka Shinto = State
Shinto, the very first type of centralized Shinto ever appeared. In that case too, the government declared that that was
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not a religion, but a civil cult -> compulsory to all people despite their religion or political beliefs. Defining a cult
“religion” is a matter of politics and control much more than a doctrinal question. In China + many other parts of the
world, religious diversity is challenging for our idea of pluralism: there are no defined leaders, no clearly defined
organization or system of thought → A much messier idea of religion.
In Japan the situation of religions is quite different from China because strengthening the denomination of different
religious schools as a way of controlling them started already in the Tokugawa period with a topdown modality long
before the modernization era. Moreover, in Meiji period from late XIX century the government reorganized with a to-
down modality the entire Japanese religious life -> Japan started with premises similar to Chinese ones, yet it started
to diverge from China during Edo period and especially in Meiji period, when an aggressive process of top-down
transformation changed the religious landscape completely. Nowadays Japan is half-denominational (conforming to
Abrahamic ideas of religion especially at official levels) and half-practical (especially at unofficial level, where
relationship with past practices is still stronger). It is difficult for some scholars and politicians to realize the situation
because the dominant paradigm both inside religion and among political decision makers follows cognitivist and
institutional paradigms of religion; a religion is defined for what is its message/doctrine on one hand, and its church
on the other. However, this approach does not work or works only partially in East Asia (as well as even in Europe).
The challenge which is represented by Chinese religion is political and philosophical since the practical way of
thinking of religion questions the modern ways of constructing national states both in democratic and totalitarian
countries. The entire range of religious practices should be acknowledged in all societies, yet it would cause lots of
difficulties in defining them philosophically, juridically, economically and politically – they are often to vague to
define according to modern standards. Despite these difficulties it is important that we as humankind address at
ourselves, our societies, cultures and religions in a manner less dependent on the strong idea of identity -> self-
identity, cultural identity, religious identity, cultural identity.
Mentimeter activities -> Chau believes that there is something wrong with the question “How many religions are
there in China?” – The distinction between religion and philosophy is a tricky one especially in Asia. Can religions be
considered a countable thing having a specific identity? The religions identity is something extremely important in
our world, and in certain situations religious identity could be a problem to detect. The quantitative nature of the
question misconstrues the general approach to religion in China, which emphasizes practices and not belief claims.
Value judgement means that we think that something is positive or negative. At the beginning Japanese Buddhism
was thought to be a repetition of Chinese Buddhism, while only in the Kamakura period it became peculiarly
Japanese. The meaning of descripting and prescriptive: description is something that has to do with looking at things
as they are/we think they are vs. prescription is connected to the idea that we should think in a way instead of another
one. Sometimes prescriptions are hidden behind description → the idea of representational things – we often believe
that things are as we think they are, so we tend to describe them in that way. A description is sometimes what is valid
for us (for a small group of people or just for ourselves); the described entity can imply a much stronger idea and can
change with its own description the situation → it is not a question of simply describing things. In Japan as well as in
many other countries after the modernization, religion and ethics became quite different things: religiosity has
become something private, having to do with what is done in one’s private sphere vs. ethics has to do with the social
and public sphere – the author here is implying that in Japan those two spheres can be considered more or less the
same → historical period = totalitarianism just before the Pacific War – religiosity was used to. The main point in
discussing about Kamakura as New Buddhism is the very distinction between old and new, because there are lots of
implications -> the idea of new Buddhism is not valid: Kamakura Buddhism cannot be considered new, not because it
wasn’t new enough or because it was allied with old Buddhism in some way, but because it is a wrongly posited
question and highly problematic if applied to Japanese premodern Buddhism. The problem is the use of categories
familiar to our wester system of thought. Moral reformation + doctrinal differences = characters closer to the idea of
newness (for the interviewed people). All these ideas are aspect always at stake when we speak about Kamakura
period. From the first to the fourth there is a strong connection to newness. These Buddhists were new because they
were doctrinally different from old ones; they created a kind of moral reformation movement compared to the
corrupted old generation of Buddhists; they had a strong identity compared to previous schools and had exclusive
ideas so that their practitioners and followers couldn’t mix with practitioners of other movements. The last two are
ideas generally connected to the old Buddhism. Kamakura newness is completely faked, it has no historical
significance and the idea of some doctrinal differences should be considered within the context of the importance of
doctrine (within that historical peculiar period and religion). Doctrinal difference was not so important; moral
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reformation was something that occurred for specific people but not for a specific “age” (the age of reformation e.g.);
strong identity is not connected to what Kuroda Toshio defines as the system of esoteric and exoteric -> a system
combining together all the schools of Buddhism’s/religion’s different trend in Japan, exclusive ideas and practices
started to occur in Kamakura period but not specifically for that period (they are not a monopoly of Kamakura
Buddhism); on the contrary we find a kind of connection with the transmission lineages developed in Kamakura
period; there was no so much aristocratic orientation, but that was a long term movement found in the course of many
centuries starting before Kamakura and much after it -> it has not so much to this type of Buddhism directly. The
problem is the use of certain intellectual categories which are familiar to our idea of religion in a different historical,
cultural (etc.) context. Are different doctrines the benchmark for different religions/denominations? -> this would
mean that we consider doctrine of great importance; actually, this is very important in European history of religion ->
e.g. wars and schisms caused by differences in doctrines (heresies and persecutions from the development of
Christianity on). Still this question is something that we should consider anytime we refer to different contexts;
nowadays Europe and USA are starting to consider doctrine less important than before. The main point is advancing a
doubt; the fact that religious groups are identified by doctrines + are religious denominations or identities central to
define people’s religious life (earlier discussed).
Distinction between Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhism – how this problem impact on the way in which we look at
Buddhism. Buddhism started in the Gange’s Valley in the V century BC (ca.); it spread all over Asia. Nowadays in
India there almost no active Buddhist centre, while there are of course lots of temples, but India has been regained by
pre-Buddhist or no-Buddhist religions. Buddhism moved not only in India, but also to Central Asia, Mongolia, Tibet,
China, Korea, Japan, South-East Asia and so on. At Buddhism’s peak in India, there were lots of kingdoms that were
Buddhist. In Indonesia there were many Buddhist traces before the affirmation of Islam as well. In nowadays Pakistan
and Afghanistan there were reigns very important for their connection with Greece. Buddhism spread from this area
across Central Asia, to China, Korea and Japan. Compared to other parts of Asia, Japan received Buddhism quite late.
Among terms used to define different kind of Buddhism, we don’t find “Hinayana” = it is quite an offensive or, at
least, a discriminatory word, and it should not be used if not in a critical sense. Buddhism appears as a kind of
criticism on Vedic ritualistic approach -> it generally criticises and rejects the Veda. It is divided into many schools,
sects, viewpoints. Nowadays lots of scholars tend to define them as “ancient Buddhism”, “Mahayana Buddhism” etc.
/ Hinayana = Little Vehicle vs. Mahayana = Large Vehicle (Vehicle = method). The first definition refers to a method
for those who have restricted minds. Early Buddhist schools generally developed and remained inside India; then we
had a first development of Buddhism outside India especially Mahayana Buddhism + Theravada – quite the same
period of Mahayana but in the South of India (Sri Lanka) and South Est Asia + Vajrayana (Tantric Buddhism) which
is spread meanly in Tibet, Mongolia and Japan, which China being just a passthrough, it did not remain so strong. We
can’t find references to Hinayana because it is no longer accepted as a critical term. Gautama Buddha was the founder
of Buddhism and he was extremely critical against the Veda. In the V century BC ca. Buddhism was one of the
different types of message that contested the Vedic cultural and religious hegemony + other non-Vedic approaches
(e.g. Jainism). The main problem with Buddhism is that there are many types/schools/sects/viewpoints/currents – how
to define Buddhism as a religion? = a difficult question especially from an internal perspective, because Buddhism
has not placed much value upon orthodoxy and on the differences in the interpretation of certain texts. Central
Buddhist ideas can be summed up (at least at the beginning) by the Four Noble Truths, which can be definable
through a sort of medical scheme – Ayurveda medicine was used by religious groups in ancient India in order to show
how their idea of spiritual practice was like; the medical scheme was a tool used to describe the problem they had to
solve + what was its cause + the prognosis + the cure; in Buddhism this scheme is crystallized as follows: 1) life is
suffering (nothing is permanent and yet we cling to it and let it stay -> a problem which makes us suffer); 2) this
suffering depends on many causes (e.g. bad ideas and interpretations of the word + craving and aversion); 3) it is
possible to overcome it; 4) the tools = a group of practices = the Noble Eightfold Path – the very idea of connecting
Buddhist message to a medical scheme, makes Buddhism a practical orientation, in the philosophical sense of the
term – it is not so speculative, but it is much more connected with practices → Practice of wisdom: right views +
right intent; practice of morality: right speech, right conduct and right livelihood; practice of meditation: right effort,
right mindfulness and right concentration. There is much stress on the idea of the rightfulness of practices, because it
is not just a matter of what to do, but also of how to do it -> it will determine a new way to be in the world. There are
lots of interesting connections between Buddhism and non-Buddhist approaches. Practice is something personal
because it changes the subject completely. Comparing Buddhism with our idea of religion, a main point is wisdom:
while we usually consider it in the prospective of intellectual knowledge, here it is considered a kind of practice ->
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everything (even mental faculties) must concretely take part in individuals’ life → centrality of practice means that
morality, wisdom and meditation are “different kinds” of the same thing. Ideas are just the content of wisdom, but in
truth it is a form of practical mental disposition = the way in which our mind moves and does its own job. E.g. “right
view” means to understand the nature and the cause of suffering, as well as the methods to release from suffering;
here understanding does not simply mean to have something in mind but to perceive it with the entire body → to
become a mental disposition (ponder = to feel the weight of something, to bodily perceive what influence decisions
will have in our life). “Right disposition” must be desireless, friendly and compassionate. From this perspective
wisdom and compassion always go together. We tend to distinguish between wisdom (something closer to
understanding = more intellectual) and compassion (something closed to affection/feeling) – actually they are both
orientations and dispositions of mind (the use of this word does not imply only thinking, but the entire inner
dimension of individuals). We usually use our mind poorly = distractions and bad orientations – but, according to
Buddhism the mind can be amended through wisdom, morality and meditation.
At a certain point in history, there were some scholars insisting on the distinction between Mahayana (Buddhist
orientation appeared at the beginning of Common Era ca.) and Hinayana, which should have been a kind of
opposition to the latter = by opposing to it, Mahayana had to reveal itself and shine. However, Hinayana cannot be
used anymore in a neutral way, because it contains a value judgement = it is bad and something not Buddhist
according to Buddhists. Some say that we should use “conservative Buddhism” or “Pre-Mahayana Buddhism” instead
of Hinayana – these two alternatives are problematic too, because the first would mean that Hinayana is more
progressive and open to the world → much better (a value judgement as well) vs. the second would mean that
Mahayana is the point from which history of Buddhism has been divided -> it is just not fair with respect to other
types of Buddhism. Other people say that we should consider Buddhism as Sectarian or Nikaya (= volume/group)
Buddhism, or simply Ancient Buddhism. Max Weber’s idea of sects = a kind of small group which opposes to bigger
and more widespread church – here the term Sectarian does not imply this meaning, but “a certain group following
certain rituals”. Theravada Buddhism is not the same as Ancient Buddhism, because it is a different type of Buddhism
coming from Ancient one just as Mahayana did → Theravada and Mahayana originated from a common matrix.
Jonathan Silk problematized Mahayana in an article published in 2002: the problem to define Mahayana in opposition
to Hinayana is based on a kind of biased rhetoric -> some monks at a certain point in the history of Buddhism were
very conservative and they wanted to be as close as possible to the original message; however, this prevented them
from looking at the world that was changing (need for open minds). They emphasized liberation and release only for
themselves, so they were mainly worried to liberate themselves -> these monks were defined as Hinayana = they were
limited to they own salvation. Other monks opposed to this kind approach a reformed Buddhism by moving beyond
the decayed and stagnant parts of tradition, in favour of new, positive innovations, even more in tune with the
authentic spirit of Sakyamuni’s intentions → that was the beginning of Mahayana. This is the narrative we are
discussing, and absolutely it is not true. This very dichotomy between Mahayana and Hinayana is based on a clearly
definable opposition: conservative vs. reformist; clericalist (only monks had to be the main point of religion) vs. lay
(open to common people); sexist male attitude vs. more gender-conscious; restricted attitude toward sacred texts
(stagnant orthodoxy) vs. open attitude toward sacred texts; two different ideas of Saints = Arhat – selfishness – focus
on one’s own salvation vs. Bodhisattva – generosity – focus on others’ salvation; difficult path: use of one’s own
strength to reach attainment vs. easy path: rely on Buddha’s aid to reach attainment; imperfect wisdom: attachment to
wisdom (my idea of wisdom is the only possible, while yours is bad) vs. perfect wisdom: true freedom (to be free
from wisdom itself after using it) → there is a kind of dichotomic approach, which actually is absolutely ill-posited
– it seems to be an ideological rhetoric. Louis de La Valée Poussin in 1993 stated that on all the groups subject to a
certain archaic set of monastic rules there were adherence of the two schools (Hinayana and Mahayana), which are
further subdivided into other schools. This complicates a lot the situation → it shows that there were no clear-cut
differences between the two schools because of the adherence to both in all sects. La Vallée Poussin makes a
distinction between two types of gathering of monks -> in that period they could be gathered according to two
different criteria: 1) a practical one (e.g. defined by monastic rules – the way in which they live) = sect -> nikaya,
meaning both “volume” and “group”; 2) a doctrinal one = schools -> vada = association of followers of common
teachings and of the same intellectual methods + no institutional existence = members of different nikayas could be
interested in a specific teaching, idea or intellectual method). All Buddhist monks belonged to a sect (an institutional
group) and they were identified by the liturgy of ordination. Each sect has its own way of ordinating monks. On the
contrary, in the case of Mahayana Buddhism it was not a kind of sect, it was only a doctrinal group; it was not
autonomous and its lineages (nikayas) appeared only in East Asia (Korea, China, Japan, Vietnam) → not autonomous
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in India. The difficulty is to define Mahayana in a positive way, while it’s easier to define it by saying what Hinayana
is not. According to Silk we should think at three different phases: in the first one, at the beginning, there were many
texts and ideas -> there were different proto-Mahayana groups originated from the doctrinal interest in certain texts
and ideas. By doctrine here we refer to something closer to the idea of wisdom. These texts and ideas together formed
some groups; then we have another phase in which we found some unified groups – in their texts and ideas we start
thinking at just one group/orientation (still doctrinal at least in India) that we define Mahayana thanks to important
thinkers. E.g. Nagarjuna: one of the most important religious philosophers for Indian Mahayana Buddhism.
Mahayana had a sort of doctrinal interest and it has meaning only in opposition to Hinayana; but Hinayana was never
an existent institution or organization: no one at the time ever defined his own group as “Hinayana”. It was Mahayana
followers who defined individuals and ideas as Hinayana. This is a label created by Mahayana monks not to indicate
a specific institution or organization, but it only has a rhetorical and ideological meaning = the idea of Hinayana is not
to be descriptive, but it is more a prescriptive one → “small minded”. It was like saying “heretics” – heretics are those
who do not follow the message of the founder correctly, but they have never used this term to define themselves (it
was given to them). Mahayana was not a clearly defined group at the beginning, rather was “the product of groups
which doctrinally opposed other groups, quite possibly within one and the same community or group of
communities” (Silk). The value judgement in the word Hinayana reveals a kind of modernist ideology/approach,
while there was no such an opposition in Mahayana Indian groups = stagnancy vs. dynamism; social disengagement
vs. social engagement; conservativism vs. reformism; narrowmindedness vs. true religious spirit -> the problem is on
the side of the interpreters of this history more than in the real history of Buddhism. These ideas do not come from
historical Mahayana, but they come from its interpreters.
Birth of the Myth of “Pure Buddhism”: such a “false/biased” reconstruction occurred only from the beginning of the
XIX century. In on of his important studies, Fredrich Schlegel (one of the first philologists in the history of the subject)
stated that Sanskrit could have been defined as the origin of all European languages; from this idea started a kind of
myth of India and along with it, that of Pure Buddhism. This tendency can be found until the end of XIX century
(Victorian age). During Victorian age there was a vogue for all things Indian (soon passed) and keen interest in
Buddhism that still somehow remained (interest in Buddha as “the greatest philosopher of India’s Aryan past”)--> this
ideas were at the foundation of the so-called Aryanism in Europe, which created so many disasters especially in Nazi
Germany. The idea of the Aryan culture as the beginning and the very source of European languages and cultures came
to Nazism thanks to the interest in Indian things – of course there’s no direct connection between the two phenomena,
but it was a matter of picking up an idea and making it into an ideology. D. Lopez, Curators of the Buddha (1995,
pg.6): Buddha was believed to be a sort of classical philosopher of the past -> Buddhist philosophical and
psychological system based on reason and restraint opposed to ritual, superstition and sacerdotalism. The was the need
from a lot of European intellectuals to find a kind of substitute for Victorian Britain. This Buddhism they were
imagining had to be different from “what was in front of them” at that time, especially in the context of modern India =
the place of spiritual and sensual exoticism – they didn’t want this but something philosophical and based on restrain +
opposed to superstition -> the basic idea had been found in India actually, but it had to be connected to “the missing
piece”, which they created ad hoc = something good to create the idea of the “classical” to go hand in hand with
ancient Greece, Rome and Egypt. Pure Buddhism had to be original = not one of its derivative form; primitive = closed
to the source, the original inspiration (the philosopher Buddha); pure = not a degenerated version of it Classica
Buddhism, which could be accessed through ancient Sanskrit texts; they were the key, and from here we can highlight
the connection with philology, Schlegel and the discovery of Sanskrit: starting from ancient texts you can reconstruct
the original idea of Classical Original Buddhism. Such a Buddhism degenerated in history, but Buddhist ideas seemed
to have a transcendent truth, that was valid all over history and could be restored thought texts (they always tell the
truth) and not through the mediation of monks of the time; they were not following original texts, especially
Mahayana. This means that Buddhist transcendent truth could be a general standard to judge all present forms of
Buddhism. This invention of an authentic Buddhism in Europe was then naturalized into a temporal element of a
historical progression by the designation “classical”; this hypostatized object called “Buddhism” had been created by
Europe and could also be controlled by it = a sort of epistemic weapon to downgrade modern Oriental forms of
Buddhism - it was against this Buddhism that all of them were to be judged and to be found lacking among these
Buddhist currents, Tibetan one was seen as most degenerate and inauthentic, deserving not even to be called (Tibetan)
Buddhism but, instead, “Lamaism”. Then something happened: the modernization of Japan in late XIX (1868 – Meiji
era). From that moment on everything changed, because Japan was the first country outside Europe to modernize itself
and this led to a dramatic change (in 20/30 years) -> modern army, navy, industry, education, parliament, laws,
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everything became modern; it was something astonishing in world’s history, especially compared to European
situation, e.g. Italy (where all this has been achieved much more slowly). The reason lies also in Japan’s fear to
become the next European colony; they felt to be menaced by the Western world – e.g. American battleships imposing
to open the country to the West, they did it and this changed the internal situation of Japan -> the Shogun was not able
to resist anymore and the emperor of Japan was restated thanks to important Japanese families. All this changes in
Japanese modernization had not only to do with infrastructures or economy and the army, there were also lots of
changes in the way of thinking and organizing e.g. education, university and the content of what was said -> in that
period, a little bit later actually, the Japanese language was formed; before 1868 there was no idea or no word for
religion in Japan. The word shukyo was a modern invention modelled after Christian protestant idea of religion.
Christianity became the model in order to normalize Japanese religious life. 宗教 already existed before but it had a
different meaning: “the lineage of teaching” = this concept was chosen by the Japanese to translate religion because, at
that time, the idea of it in Japan had to match specific distinctive characteristics: 1) individual, private adhesion to a
doctrine; 2) religions studied mainly as doctrinal systems; 3) Philosophy of religions, focused on the inner space of the
individual – from Kant on, religions is considered as a private approach to reality, not a public one (ethics, politics); 4)
distinction between true religion and magic – e.g. a lot of important cults in Japan before the modernization completely
disappeared in the span of few years or even months = fertility cults, all those having to do with sex, shamans, etc. ->
that was because the Japanese constantly felt the need to show the world that they were civilized and modernized -->
neither magic nor personal profit associated to religion = a religion is considered “true” only when interested in
supernatural (not worldly) things; 5) expressivist ideas = a religious act is considered valid only when it results in an
expression of inner faith -> something out of faith = true religion vs. something out of interest = magic; 6) other-
worldly orientation = “nobility” = the lack of interest in worldly matters and its other worldly characters – worldly
benefit was judged irreconcilable with true religion. This often implied a kind of universalist approach = all religions
had to be this way. There was also another important change: it was mainly a question of reforming the idea and the
space of religion completely in Japan, which means that they had to reconsider also the distinction between what was
called Buddhism and what was called Shintoism. The very words Bukkyo (Buddhism) and Shinto were modern
inventions. The firs character is that of Buddha + the second is teaching = very oriented toward a doctrinal approach to
religions. This very idea of Buddhism was created in 1868, because in was in that year that these concepts of
Buddhism on one hand and Shintoism on the other were formed through an act that distinguished them (before there
was no distinction between the cult of Buddha and that of the Gods – considered as one cult = Shinto-Buddhism).
Starting from 1868, through a regulation by the government Buddhism became a full-fledged religion (a private faith
of the teachings of the Buddha); on the contrary, Shinto became a civil rite, at least officially meant to be a public
rituality linked to morality and political orders. This means that Shinto had to be considered part of the public sphere,
while Buddhism was part of the private sphere. In reality, Shinto too was a kind of religion, having to do with the
Emperor and the general structure of society → the problem was that, if the government had defined Shintoism as a
full-fledged religion, Japan would have appeared a theocracy in the eyes of the West → Japan wanted to emerge as a
modern country, so they invented this idea that Shinto was just a civil right, which was not actually. Ironically, the
world religion Shukyo has never been used by common people until the end of World War II – it sounded very
artificial and was used at first almost only among intellectuals.
We started with the idea that Mahayana was considered superior to the so-called Hinayana. However, this was not the
idea of those who were discussing “Pure Buddhism”; they considered Buddhism as a transcendent truth having
nothing to do with historical aspects and types of Buddhism. They believed that also Mahayana was a sort of
degenerated Buddhism because of its cults, ceremonies and strange/exotic ideas. Japan was a Mahayana-centric
country (98% of people’s confession) – Japanese Buddhists were in the difficult position of being considered a “good
part” of modern world. How could Mahayana play its part in modern world? Some of them tried to present Buddhism
as a “scientific religion” = a religion coming closer to science (e.g. Suzuki Daisetsu = one of the most important
intellectuals for Japanese Buddhism because he exported the idea of Zen Buddhism and was not so far from
considering it a kind of scientific religion). They felt the need to reinvent Buddhism and, in doing so, they went
against the European romantic idea (theosophy) of considering Buddhism as a pure form of religion to redefine
through ancient Indian texts. This approach pushed Japanese Buddhism to find a new narrative for Mahayana
defining it as superior to the original Buddhism itself (stagnant, social disengaged, etc.) → Japanese modernist
approach = in the end, only Mahayana was as advanced as to fit modern world.

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Mentimeter Questions

• How is wisdom considered in Buddhism? = wisdom in Buddhism is not only a theory which serves for
practical purposes, it is a kind of practice itself.
• How can we call the Buddhism before Mahayana instead of Hinayana? = Conservative Buddhism implies a
value judgement -> it is not neutral (= incorrect); Theravada is a different kind of Buddhism – it came from
ancient Buddhism as much as Mahayana did (= incorrect) → Nikaya (sectarian) Buddhism is the one which
fits better.
• Where does the rhetoric Hinayana-as-conservative and the Mahayana-as-progressive come from? = from
western/modern influenced Japanese scholars during the 20 th + from the application of modernist ideology by
modern Japanese scholars.
• How does La Vallée Poussin define Sect and School Buddhisms? = all monks were affiliated to sects (groups
with specific monastic rules). No institutional school was present. Sects had to do with monastic rules, and
they were institutional (at the beginning) vs. schools were not, had no monastic rules and were not
institutional -> differences had nothing to do with doctrine, they were mainly practical/institutional not linked
to theory.
• Where did Mahayana lineages first appear? = Mahayana lineages absolutely were not something coming
from India – Mahayana started not as a lineage (= institution more or less); it first occurred in China, but not
only there, it appeared in all East-Asian area. In India Mahayana Buddhists were only “scholars” interested in
ideas and texts, they were not creating a specific institutionalized group.
• What is the real meaning of “Hinayana” in Mahayana original texts? = a name to define rhetorically those
who have “small minds”. Not connected to real group of monks → in these texts they were not defining a
specific group, but generally those who had small minds.
• What is “Pure Buddhism”? = A myth invented by Europeans that became a standard upon which to judge all
types of Buddhism in the present era – from a critical perspective.
• Why can we say that there was no “religion” in Japan before modernization? = the idea of “religion” was
imported from the “West” together with technology.
Practices in Kamakura Buddhism: Kamakura period was a period of Japanese history (1185-1333) – it marked the
start of the Shogun ) government at the expenses of the court = a kind of general, the most important among landlords
in Japan -> he became the supreme political (not only military) figure, and he was backed by the samurai class ->
they became the most powerful class of Japan at the expenses of nobles. Kamakura was a period of political
instability because of its threefold power = emperor = which was not completely dethroned; samurai = they were
more or less the official rulers of Japan; temples = due to the high level of instability and social turmoil of that period,
they created armies to defend themselves and impose themselves over other temples and other political and military
forces. This was an interesting period even for the history of Buddhism, because many Buddhist schools were
established. We have many religious founders, e.g. founders of the Zen schools = Eisai (Rinzai Zen) + Dogen (Soto
Zen); founder of the Nichiren School = Nichiren – Soka Gakkai claims to be the descendant of Nichiren; Amidism or
Pure Land Buddhism = Amida = the Japanese version of Chinese Amituo and of Sanskrit Amitabha – it is a Buddha
having the power of creating “Pure Lands”, which are not Paradises, but places where people can practice Buddhist
practices with no problems or difficulties. There are at least three important religious founders = Honen (Pure Land
schools), Shinran (True School of Pure Land) and Ippen (Pure Land Buddhism). There is an important narrative
related to Kamakura and these schools developed in this period. According to certain scholars, these ones were all
having certain specific characteristics; Kamakura Buddhism was defined as “New Buddhism” compared to the “Old”
one: shinbukkio vs. kyubukkio. When it arrived, it almost overthrew what came before. In their attitude toward
Laymen, NB were democratic vs. aristocratic OB; institutionally speaking, NB were prosperous gaining a lot of
support from the population vs. decadent OB; NB were spiritual vs. material OB; as far as morality is concerned, NB
were moral vs. decadent OB; In regards to connections to lineages, NB reformed them, while OB kept a traditional
approach. The problem is that this narrative is totally false and biased. Many biases are at the foundation of this
construction: 1) influence from the Protestant idea of religion = Japan rethinks its own past through European lenses –
from the Protestant belief that only them were authentically spiritual compared to the Roman Church; 2) influence
from the historical rhetoric of the Samurai vs. aristocracy = Samurais came to power and minimized the aristocracy’s
political force and, from that period on, a new narrative was established depicting aristocracy as weak and decadent
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→ Only Samurais could keep the pace with the real country; 3) moral “decadence” is a value judgement (especially
when connected with morality); 4) the definition of the different Japanese schools is relatively recent (Edo period:
1600-1868) = when we refer to “new and old schools”, we are insisting on a problem which wasn’t there actually at
that time. We know that the question of Buddhist lineages and tradition was much more complicated than we
generally think today; 5) no democratization = those who were supporting NB were mainly low-level samurais and
landowners (= small nobility, not big aristocrats + not the people -> there was no middle class) – there was no process
of democratization at all; 6) no newness: all the founders referred to pre-existing lineages – they started from Buddha,
then the important ancient saints and sages, they came to China masters and then to Japan – all these schools refer to
the general existing lineages – a clear-cut defined definition of these lineages arose only in Edo period (from the XVI
century on); 7) the idea of “new” (break with the past) is modern -> nothing comparable to this idea ever occurred in
pre-modern Japan; 8) no special communality between “new” schools = they were not communicating one other and,
if they were, it was not because of their being new, they did not feel this kind of connection; 9) anachronism: the
importance in the future is mistaken for the importance in the past = they were not important in that time, but they
would have become so in about 200 year/ in 300 year they had become extremely important. Some interpreters think
that being them important now should imply that they were so even in the past → it is not correct! 10) the importance
of doctrine is misplaced: practices, rituals, places were far more important – it is connected to the previous idea – it
refers to the belief that when these texts were written, they were already important and considered as “a doctrine”. A
text can be important not only as a doctrine but also for other reasons: practical uses, being part of a ritual, for places
and sanctuaries where it is kept. There is a discontinuity school about Kamakura: the modernists -> e.g. Ienaga
Saburo discussed mainly about ideas and texts of NB schools and underlined similarities in theories = e.g. use of
single religious practices, simple and accessible practices, popular approach. Many of these scholars define Kamakura
schools as original Japanese = It has to do with the process of definition of a national idea of Buddhism -> it started
from the modern period on. Kamakura period is the moment in which Japanese Buddhism became “really” Japanese;
previously, Buddhist influences came especially from China → all of this is completely wrong because even before
the Kamakura period Buddhism was adapted and transformed in order to become originally Japanese thanks to local
religious figures – this is connected to the nationalization of thinking in the period of modernization. There is an
additional way of looking at Kamakura period from a discontinuous perspective = that of Kyoto School – Watsuji
Tetsuro was the person who discovered Dogen’s Zen texts and interpreted them as a philosopher. Modern academic
idea of philosophy came to Japan only with the modernization; however, W. Tetsuro put a retrospective on Dogen’s
texts -> he interpreted Dogen’s Shobogenzo as a philosophy and believed that it was one of the most important traces
of philosophical thinking in Japan even before the arrival of Western philosophy to Japan; the problem was that the
author did not write anything philosophical -> he said something associated to “wisdom” in a “Buddhist way”, but he
also spoke about rules as standards for his own temple and community of monks. Dogen’s texts are complex and
difficult to understand, and its philosophical interpretation is very problematic: his texts were not so important in the
beginning (they have been almost forgotten) or not as doctrine at least, but they were rather used for important
aspects of rituals or to justify the importance of a temple keeping “this relic”. The continuity school about Kamakura
goes again the biased idea of Kamakura as something new: e.g. Kuroda Toshio concentrated more on historical,
economic and social data; he said that “New” schools were peripheral in that period. Some schools (e.g. Rinzai Zen
and Jishu, and later Soto Zen) were deeply connected to “old” Buddhism forming the “system of esoteric and exoteric
Buddhism” (kenmitsu taisei); there was just one religious system in Japan at that time and in that context there was no
idea of doctrinal differences between groups/temples + the connection between different groups was not linked to
them being “new” or “old”. There were reasons for alliances and rivalries among different schools/temples/lineages,
but they were contingent not ideological.
The definition of different schools is generally something which is not found in China, even nowadays. If you go to a
Buddhist temple there, you will find that monks are more or less “the same”; there are some temples specialized in
certain ideas, texts or practices but, within the same temple, you can find monks with totally different interests.
Buddhism is Buddhism and affiliation to a specific school or lineage is not so important; what is important is the
existence of lineages, but they can come from different sides → in Buddhism they are so important but, if you have
received a lineage from your master, and your master from his and so on, this is enough; you can also feel free to
“embrace” completely different texts and ideas. This is something occurred in Japan as well, at least until the
beginning of Edo (the old name of Tokyo, the seat of the Shogunate)/ Tokugawa (the name of the family holding the
power) period. There is an important difference between Edo and the other periods of Japanese history = in other
periods Japan was a badly unified country, it was a feudal one; important landlord held power, but only on a local
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level. Tokugawa made a difference in that sense because it created a kind of unification (not complete) through a
quite complex system of control, preventing Daymios (Lords) from standing up against the Emperor/Shogun. In
addition, Buddhist temples were extremely powerful from an economic and military point of view = they need to be
hold off → the quarrels among them undermined the stability of the country, so Tokugawa needed them to define
their “branch” (defining their doctrines, texts, institutions, people, etc.) ➔ that is how the definition of Japanese
schools began – it started for political reasons. This also helped the Shogunate to control Christians = they were a
problem because conquerors could come after Christian missionaries → the government forced people to be
registered and listed in Buddhist temples, which became a sort of “Registry Office” – those affiliated with a certain
temple were certified as “No Christian”.
Setsuwa = is an East Asian literary genre. It consists of myths, legends, folktales, and anecdotes. Setsuwa means
"spoken story". The problem with the Setsuwa of Jishu is the question of nembutsu (= invocation) to the name of
Amida. It is a simple means to an aim or an expression of inner faith. At the beginning there is the priest who tries to
give the fuda (paper talisman). Salvation does not depend on what one does, but the rebirth of all being would be
decided by the invocation to Amida – “do not distinguish between the pure and the impure, distribute your talisman”.
This is the message that the manifestation of Amida gave to Ippen. There are two interpretations of the story, both by
two Japanese scholars: the first one says that all beings are awakened for the oracle, the sole possession even without
consciousness of the paper talisman is enough to allow this world to be pure and all humanity to be saved → faith is
not important; the second one says that the fuda is not a salvific tool, but it is the name of Amida that saves. The
nembutsu is not instrumental because salvation is already there ➔ this leads us to the difference between practice as
an instrument and practice as an expression of faith; however, both these stories seem to forget one point; according
to James Foard, this story is quite anomalous if we take the distinction between magic and religion into account – the
name of Amida + the fuda have a strong magical meaning, and yet this magic is not bound to anything material, but
to salvation = the most religious aim. The categories of instrumentality and expression are there in the story, but they
are not enough to understand the story. Foard’s evaluation: truly ultimate things cannot refer to or cause things greater
than themselves; the story presents the nembutsu as a ritual done for itself and which expresses itself and, in this
sense only, it is instrumental and expressive, there is no other end or reference → apparently it sounds strange: the
fuda (which has the invocation to the name of Amida on it) is not valid because it is an instrument of salvation – in
this case we would have the instrument on one hand and salvation on the other; it is neither a question of expression
of inner faith, because it would contrapose the expressive mean and the heart (faith). According to Foard, the point is
that the invocation of Amida is just what it is, and it has no other end or reference -> it is exclusively ultimate → it is
not for the salvation, but it is salvation itself = the story presents a ritual done for itself and that expresses itself. The
example of the mass: it is not an absolute, it is a means, an instrument to obtain or express something. The way of
presenting nembutsu here gives us a completely different approach: a certain practice is done because of itself (the
rejection of both expressive and instrumental interpretations), because it is an ultimate, everything is contained in this
idea and there’s nothing greater. A similar phenomenon occurs in Dogen’s idea of practice: Zazen is not aimed at
gaining or expressing something, but it is done for its own sake -> the very act of doing it is practice, but it is
extremely difficult to find something without a second purpose, because we generally do things to get something else.
Something similar can be found also in Honen idea at the beginning.
The problem of practices in Foucault, Hadot, Bourdieu and Nishida: these four thinkers are very different from one
another not only in what they say, but also from a disciplinary perspective.
Michel Foucault (1926-1984) is interested mainly in the question of power. According to him, it is not simply
repressive, but it should be considered a “productive web” which goes through the entire social body; “it does not
just weigh on us as a power that says no, but that actually goes through the bodies, produces things, induces pleasure,
forms knowledge, creates discourses” (it does not simply mean talking, but creating a kind of theory). Power is not
something top-down, a negative instance whose function is that of restraining. It is much more dialectical. Power is
not just in institutions, it is scattered all over society, all of us have a sort of power -> It is almost everywhere, and it
is deeply connected with knowledge (which is a part of power too). This idea was developed in Foucault’s approach
starting from the analysis of the modern state and especially the institutions of mental hospitals and prisons as places
where the modern state exerts its power – it is not simply a negative instance; it does something positive as well,
helping people to recover and reintegrate into society. In his last seminar at Amherst just few months before of his
death, he draws a distinction between four types of technologies: Technologies of productions = to produce,
transform, or manipulate things; of sign systems = to use signs, meanings, symbols or signification -> all types of
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languages (written and oral, mathematic, etc.); of power and control over the others = they determine the conduct of
individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject (politics); of the self
(individualizing practices = the idea that a certain person can operate some practices on him/herself to become a
better person). Each type of technologies is a matrix of practical reason. While in the previous part of his life he was
mainly interested in technologies of power, in the last part he focused more on those of the self as a kind of resistance
against the idea of being controlled by the state. These technologies permit to effect by their own means or with the
help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being, so
as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality.
Many religious can be considered technologies of the self but only if they are done by the self itself, otherwise these
religions could be simply kinds of technologies of control/power → consciousness turns operation on oneself into
self-consciousness. These technologies are linked to one another; each of them is associated with a specific form of
power. Technologies of the self ha been commonly spread since classic era: self-cultivation (= taking care for
oneself) was one of these ideas. This is something that in classical culture was extremely important, but especially in
Greece before the beginning of Hellenistic period it was limited to upper-classes -> commoners were not full-fledged
citizens of the polis. Later the situation changed e.g. the stoic philosopher Epictetus was formerly a stave -> in that
period being a slave was not that degrading as before. It is important to remember that there is no clear distinction
between disciplines and self-disciplines -> technologies of control can become technologies of the self = discipline
exerted from the outside can become ways in which self-definition is possible. This kind of dialectic is difficult to
define: to distinguish between cases in which the control comes from the outside and those in which the subject
his/herself is in control, because human beings tend to interiorize education and ways of thinking –> even if these
ideas come from the outside they become a second nature for us. Where does social control end and our control
begin? The influence of Freud’s Superego. It is difficult to be oneself in a context where technologies of control are
mistaken for those of the self and vice versa.
Pierre Hadot (1922-2010): he was an important historian of philosophy specialized in ancient thought. His idea of
philosophy as a way of life: according to him, we tend to confuse the philosophical discourse and philosophy itself ->
In teaching philosophy we need to present theories (e.g. Stoics’ theories), which are simply philosophical discourse;
the philosophical activity is not a question of theory, it is not discussing, writing or learning theories, but rather the
application of theory to everyday life. According to Hadot, ancient philosophy (the entire philosophy starting from
Socrates) was nothing more than a problem of practice. Theory is “ancilla vitae” = it is for the sake of philosophical
life → ancient philosophy suggests to human beings an “art of life”, while modern one appears primarily as a
construction of technical language restricted to specialists only. The raison d'être of philosophy is living
philosophically; of course, there’s no philosophy without discourse; still, all philosophers define themselves as such
not because they have developed a philosophical discourse, but because they have made philosophy their way of life.
In general, human beings can live perfectly without discussing about “abstract things”, but they cannot live without
learning how “to live a human life”. According to Hadot, today the one who lives according to what he/she teaches is
taken for a fanatic -> the idea that objects of studying should remain as such is widespread today.
Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002): Habitus = if we think about ways of learning languages, memorization is definitely a
possible way alongside with “living grammar” -> dependency, repetition, stiffness, consciousness needed and
mediated (it does not come naturally) vs. autonomy, invention, adaptability, consciousness preferable but not needed.
L2: Memorization + living grammar; L1: living grammar + memorization. Our mother tongue is something
eradicated in our environment (relationships with people), so it is acquired through life and perception. Native
speakers do not need to study grammar to express themselves, because certain grammatic paradigms are part of their
“self” – it is possible with L2 as well, but everything is more mediated. HABITUS = a living grammar for actions and
practices = a form acquired with socialization. When we act or do/learn certain practices, this occurs because of the
so-called HABITUS which transmits a kind of know-how to the brain = it is not only the specific way of doing
things, but rather a practical sense allowing to face situations impossible to sort out only by memorizing procedures -
> unknown situations which makes you able to do it in a creative way. Definition of habitus: it is produced by the
conditionings associated with a class of conditions of existence = it is acquirable only through relationships – it is
defined as systems of durable, transposable dispositions, “structured structures predisposed to function as structuring
structures” = there are some ways of doing that we have passively acquired at the beginning, which, however, are
meant to make us independent in the end. Structuring structures allow to generate things, to organize practices and
representations and face unknown situations –> to go beyond what has been acquired and to become creative; they

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can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends (to generate new
answers without being completely conscious) or an express mastery of the operations in order to attain them (it is the
first time we meet that situation). Structuring structures are objectively regulated and regular without being in any
way the product of obedience to rules = at the beginning rules are needed to acquire structured structures; then the
acquiring subject becomes “the rules” -> he starts to understand the reason of those rules put forward in the first place
= to become more conscious. At the end of the process those rules are not conscious anymore and the subject does
things simply because those rules are the way in which he thinks and acts; rules are not there, they are part of the
subject -> they can also be changed according to the situation – It is necessary to understand them fully to go beyond
them → independency from rules. Habitus is the source of action and thought of individuals provided that this
disposition becomes a system in which the subject is involved. Conditionings are durable = not immutable and
unchanging, but flexible – their structure is necessary at the beginning. It is difficult to say where society ends and the
individual starts, and vice versa, because everything is tightly connected, and society makes the individuals what they
are; the autonomy of the individual in society is part of the social system as well: the individual and social dimensions
are intermingled.
Zen and the art of inventing traditions: “Zen in the Art of Archery” (Germany, 1948) by Eugen Herrigel. As Yamada
recalls, in Japan archery is practiced mainly for fun, while in Europe people practice it because of its supposed
spiritual value and its link to Japanese culture; this book took advantage from orientalism and greatly contributed to
reinforce it. The relationship between Zen and archery is a genuine hoax, yet it is an example of invented tradition in
modern times. It only exerted its influence on European mass culture: it has been translated in many languages and
can be a chance to discuss some aspects of the question of practices in modern cross-cultural relationships. The
problem appeared in this book raised by Yamada: 1) History of ideas (Cultural studies, postcolonial studies, etc.) –
the role of colonialism and orientalism in the development of many assumptions laying at the foundation of the book
+ the implications of martial arts in the modernity + the importance of post-Nietzschean Viennese culture (commonly
spread in Vienna between the two World Wars) → central in developing some fundamental ideas emerged in the
book. From the article it appears as if it was a sort of game = certain ideas and practices developed in a place A, then
moved to a place B, the go back to A and return to B again, in a kind of never-ending cultural bustle. This explains a
lot of modern culture, even if the mechanism isn’t too different from what happened in pre-modern times -> the
nationalist propaganda changed people’s perception much faster; 2) the epistemological theme = Yamada tries to
focus the attention on the reason why the author imagined those meanings in the events happened in front of him; he
recalls the need for filling the empty space in communication with meaning; this gives us some hints on how the
human mind and certain mechanisms (e.g. orientalism) work; 3) Historiography = the question of tradition in modern
times.
Post-Nietzschean Viennese culture: according to Massimo Cacciari an important trend of philosophical culture after
Nietzsche in the German speaking world, the Viennese interwar/crisis culture, was particularly attracted by the entire
systematic approach offered by Chinese and Japanese Buddhism, which was perceived different from the systematic
approach of e.g. Schopenhauer and his interest in Hinduism and Indian Buddhism. The latter was fed by the
revaluation of Mahayana. Many of Viennese intellectuals looked for a way to overcome the dualism between thinking
and its object in East-Asian Buddhism. According to Cacciari, Nihilism in Ludwig Wittgenstein was that original
separation that emerges in the “tension toward” = the intension that presupposes a desiring ego –> the tension
between the desiring ego and the purpose. Herrigel in tries to show that in the process of releasing the harrow,
whenever there is intention there is ego; hence, the act is ruined by its very premise -> this is not very different from
the paradox of intentionality “try not to try” = we should get rid of ourselves to overcome dualism, and yet this very
act is done by our will (conscious intention). From such a perspective, Herrigel’s book aroused interest in these
intellectuals because it exactly seemed to face the same problem they were facing. One of the main ingredients of
Herrigel’s approach is Orientalism = a vision of the world based on the dichotomy between the West (centre) and the
East (periphery). In this context the West is destabilized by the East – in this approach, such a distinction is
considered valid from the historical, epistemological and cultural point of view on the questionable basis of allegedly
essential traits connoting cultures -> Dualism and essentialism come together = a perspective not based on historical
identities; these identities lead us to use paradigmatic chains of ideas whose aim is to classify and identify parts of the
world. Ferdinand De Saussure made a distinction between syntagmatic and paradigmatic structures: syntagmatic
structures = the relationship in which words combine to create grammatically acceptable phrases vs. paradigmatic
structures = substitutional relationship that a linguistic unit has with other units. The first one is a development in

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continuity, all elements must be present; on the contrary the second is developed out of an association of ideas, and it
occurs in the absence of objects, it is only mental -> not all the elements part of a paradigmatic chain are visible (at
least in the same place and at the same time). Orientalism leads us to think according to a paradigmatic chain = the
mind association chains which most of the time have nothing to do with real history, geography and so on.
Paradigmatic chains activate when we deal with Western and Eastern cultures, thinkers, religions, practices and
institutions. When a paradigmatic chain is active the tendency is to think that these traits are implicit in the cultures,
nations and peoples we refer to, as if they were objective geographical and historical traits. This dichotomy is not
solely negative but can have positive implications – e.g. the belief that in the East wisdom is still present, while the
West has lost it in exchange for comforts, money and reason (a list of polarized traits in the slides). In all cases, the
East is considered as essentially, originally and irremediably different from the West – no possible interconnection
between the two poles. This isolationist idea lays at the bottom of the orientalistic approach. On the contrary, global
historians as well as post-colonial studies have an entirely different approach, underlining that contacts, approaches,
exchanges, interconnections and mutual influences are the norm among human groups. Conceptions found in the
slide’s tables are much more than mere prejudices, they are expression of a precise interpretation of the world. Such
an interpretation can be found in Herrigel’s book as well. In the passage about archery, the author insists on the
collective noun “the Japanese”, expressed as a masculine “he”, just as if the Japanese were a single compact
undifferentiated entity. Here the paradigmatic chains of Orientalism is at work: the Japanese are oriental -> Orientals
have immediate access to the spiritual dimension of human beings -> everything Japanese is permeated with
spirituality and mysticism -> martial arts too must be so -> Us westerners have not/maybe have never had/ have lost
access to spirituality because of our devotion to science and rationality -> to gain access to spirituality, we need to
refer to Eastern thousand-year-old wisdom. This is why the author defines martial art as a spiritual exercise that aims
at hitting a spiritual goal (self-cultivation); unfortunately, as Yamada points out the connection between Zen and
archery was not an historical accurate account and (as we saw in Hadot’s idea) this is neither specifically Eastern, nor
a Japanese idea. We can suppose that this belief in the connection between everything Japanese and Zen came to
Herrigel from Suzuki Daisetsu’s approach to Zen: he was probably the greatest disseminator of the Zen in the West,
influencing the beat generation. Among his publications, the title that is closer to Herrigel’s is “Zen and Japanese
culture” published in English much later in 1958; however, its Japanese version appeared in 1938, immediately after
the outbreak of the Pacific War. There is no direct link between these two authors, Herrigel did not speak Japanese
and did a work parallel to Suzuki’s in which, by the way, the connection between Zen and archery is not even
mentioned (he rather discussed about the its supposed connection with swordsmanship). Herrigel seems to have
worked even beyond Suzuki’s own expectations -> a kind of habitus – a way of doing things autonomously and
independently from the input starting from an interiorized system of thought. Of course, Suzuki seemed to have been
pleased by Herrigel’s book, since he wrote the introduction to it using praising words. In his work the author indicates
that Zen has exerted big influence on the art of the sword; in order to establish a link, he uses abundant references to
medieval and pre-modern sources. In the passage 132-133 we can find many ingredients of Suzuki’s classical
approach to Zen: 1) his untied intellectualism, the criticism toward book-reading and thinking, which is linked to the
classical self-rhetoric of Chan-Zen itself in the Platform Sutra (Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch) = in here there is a verse
defining Cha-Zen as “a special tradition outside of the scriptures, independent of words and letters”, which implies a
focus on intuition and practice more than intellect and theory -> partially, this is what we have already seen in Chau’s
model, yet Suzuki’s approach is clearly bound to connote and mark East Asian, especially Zen culture, as something
completely different from what happens outside Asia/Japan Zen here is presented in an apologetic and partisan way;
2) his untied subjectivism - going beyond rationality means to go beyond conscious self, which opens human being
to the unknown. This unconscious is defined as the reign of nonduality, going beyond the position of subject and
object; 3) the self-orientalist or reverse orientalist tendency to mix together all East wisdom within one single thought
= Lao-tzuan, Sun-tzu and Zen are put together in a way that could be defined “philologically terrifying” – this
approach is dubious because the first two have very little in common: the former rejected violence and war, while the
latter presupposes a great amount of violence to be exerted because war was his scenario. The theme of the relation
between practice and intentionality here is comparable with the idea of wu wei “try not to try” -> however, it is
interpreted by Suzuki in a still dualistic way based on the distinction between conscious/unconscious,
reason/irrationality, very different from Lao tzuan’s integrating approach. In the second passage (133-134) we can
highlight the use of the two Buddhist Japanese words mushin and munen (ZH wuxin and wunian, SK acitta and
avitarka) -> generally they are also connected to the Japanese word muga (ZH wuwo, SK anatman), which indicates
one central Buddhist idea – it goes against the Vedic culture and the idea of atman -> in the Vedas it is the individual
principle, identical to brahman or “cosmic principle; Buddhism goes against the idea of the immutable essence of the
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self because it is thought to be a source of attachment: believing that after death an immortal soul still exists is the
ideal condition for egoistic craving to flourish, which are the basic factor of suffering and internal conflicts.
Buddhism does not negate the existence of an everyday psychological self; however, such self has two main traits: 1)
it is always changing (we are not the same of years ago and will not be the same in the future); 2) it disappears after
death --> according to Buddhism we cannot think that our self is immortal. The idea of Vedic atman became slightly
different once arrived in China and Japan and was applied to certain Buddhist approaches – e.g. Chan-Zen
meditation. In fact, wunian/wuxin, munen/muxin are the present condition of the mind that does not cling to things,
ideas and circumstances both in everyday life and meditation. This has to do with the non-substantial nature of the
mind, hence, the Sanskrit notion of atman; at the same time, it is linked to the practitioner’s mind, who is not attached
to thoughts: he/she lets them flow and, therefore, he/she is free from them. This approach to thoughts and mind is
fundamentally based upon practice and is a kind of mental training important in every meditation (at least in Buddhist
world). When Suzuki speaks about munen and muxin he refers to the application of this Buddhist idea to samurai
culture; however, here there is an important chance to be accounted: in samurai culture munen and muxin become
strategic principles, so the in order to be effective, the samurai must fight without being burden by fear, doubts or any
kind of emotion. Suzuki interprets such a training as something spiritual and unconscious; he writes that the sword
must be an instrument to kill the ego = the primary source of all quarrels and fights -> the samurai becomes egoless,
pure and is considered an enlightened mind by the author. Anyway, it is misplaced to say samurais were like this no
matter what they did and to consider them kinds of mystics; this is a total misunderstanding of Japan’s cultural
history, but it has been done on purpose. Suzuki’s position was not only imprecise and inaccurate, but most of all
politically dangerous and tragically misleading, especially if we read his words in the light of the historical period in
which they were originally written = 1938, the Pacific War had already broke out and the ultra-militarist regime was
operating and intense propaganda in order to transform docile citizens into war machines. What was accomplished
during this period had its roots in the process started during the modernization phase (from 1868 on); since then,
Japanese government had operated an important rhetorical and ideological shift toward the so-called “samurization of
society”; in this historical scenario Suzuki’s words converged with the regime’s propaganda. There is another
question involved in Herrigel and Suzuki’s publications: cultural history of martial art in Japan = in modern times,
martial arts have often been considered a kind of spiritual practice -> this connection did not emerged systematically
in pre-modern times; although they are defined as “traditional spiritual practices”, they are much more recent and
developed after the beginning of modern era. There were some individual practitioners who developed certain ideas,
but the great systematic transformation of martial arts from arts of war (bujutsu = martial techniques) to spiritual
practices (budo =martial spiritual techniques)/technologies of the self/ technologies of political and social control was
accomplished in modern times. In Japane it occurred in the first period of modernization (Meiji) and it ended after the
end of the Pacific War (1945). The word budo contains “do” (the Chinese dao) = moral and spiritual relevance. Also
the famous bushido (the honour code of samurai, 1900) was an invention by a scholar, Nitobe Inazo: he was not a
samurai but a diplomat and educator and tried to dignify Japanese culture in the eyes of British audience during
certain conferences held in England at the beginning of XX century. This book established the myth of the samurai in
the West – the heavy essentialist idea emerging from the tile “the soul of Japan”. It was written in English for an
English audience and then it bounced back to Japan. But there were some kinds of bushido even before this one, e.g.
Yamamoto no Tsunetomo’s Hagakure – the author was an Edo’s period samurai -> it was written for the sole benefit
of the writer’s clan, so it has remained secret and unknown until 1906. This book has been subsequently distorted and
exploited by ultra-nationalists who used it as a way of controlling the population through indoctrination. At the
beginning of modern era, Japan had to modernize even its military life, and it is quite ironic that the idea of samurai
was so clearly opposed during the first phase of modernization; martial arts and the entire world of samurai were
defined as démodé being the symbol of feudal Japan = the revenants of a world that had to change. This was
particularly clear during the Boshin Wars (1868-1869): an army of trained samurai confronted the imperial army (the
conscription army) whose soldiers were armed and trained with Western guns and cannons. The result was not only
the total defeat from of samurai’s side, but also the defeat of an entire world. Since that period, it became clear that all
the war class had no chance against the modern army. In few years this consciousness affected the entire flourishing
world of schools of martial arts as well: many academies had to closed because they had no pupils anymore. The
knowledge of the past and of past techniques seemed to be useless, but some people tried to change the approach to
these practices ->despite their very different perspectives, they all moved in a similar direction: to transform a
practice whose goal was military/combat-oriented into spiritual/moral teachings. This happened to almost to all
martial arts (karate, judo, aikido, kendo, kyudo); archery too was part of such a trend which transformed the juzu (a
technic) into a do (a way). The change was truly remarkable because those technics were no more oriented toward the
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acquisition of martial proficiency, but they became inner disciplines -> They had to demonstrate to be useful and
meaningful in the modern world they became “technologies of inner fight” = technologies originally meant to be
instruments of combat which keep the typical character of physical confrontation, but with a fundamental change: all
these weapons and techniques were adapted, ritualized, sublimated and oriented toward the inner part of human
beings, aiming at (trans)forming, elevating and empowering them. These new martial arts had five possible
orientations (they are not exclusive but can overlap): 1) Personal defence; 2) Aesthetics = some technologies have an
aesthetic value like in a dance – e.g. capoeira, aikido; 3) Sport = e.g. judo and modern wushu; 4) Heath = some of
these can become methods of preserving and strengthening health, e.g. Chinese Taijiquan, transformed in a method of
health at the beginning of XX century; 5) Spiritual exercises, e.g. aikido + potentially many martial arts can be
endowed with such a spiritual character = Karate do, Taijiquan as a martial art for the defence of the inner world.
How can we clearly define and distinguish between technologies of the self and technologies of control + their
relation to power? In Foucault’s scheme practices that enslave and control human beings are different from those that
make them free -> a dualistic approach clearly diving political control from subjectivity is already undermined by the
fact that Foucault approaches to power in a very peculiar way considering power as a micro-physics = something
happening not just in institutions but more in everyday life. According to this idea, power does not always proceed to-
down but circulates in much closer and intimate relationships as well. The four technologies have deep connections to
one another. Far from opposing each other, technologies of control can easily slip into technologies of the self or the
other way around. In fact, to be oneself is impossible without the dialectical relationship with society and its other
members. Freedom and control are not logically contradictory terms, they cannot be without the other term, they
imply each other -> contiguous and sometimes operating at the same time. If we consider Bourdieu and his habitus,
we should conclude that autonomy and social patterns are tightly linked.
The epistemological aspect inherent to Herrigel’s approach. The doctrine of “it shoots” exemplifies an important
aspect of what many German intellectuals were in search for at the time (the Viennese culture): to be able to
overcome the subjects of the action and the action itself -> a complicated matter since the very force to be disposed of
is at the basis of the one who should dispose it; therefore, Yamada demonstrates that this doctrine by Herrigel’s
master (Kenzo Awa) was nothing but a complete misunderstanding, if not a Herrigel’s fabrication; but the author
indicates that this was not a conscious act = it is not exactly a fraud, but it seems to be deeply linked to our
unconscious desires -> here we have a glimpse of the unconfessed desire of an intellectual who was in strong need of
finding something to hold on to. Why is it that a certain meaning has been forcefully inserted in the blank space of a
mistake? Here there must be some unspoken words and unclear thoughts to be expressed, some unconfessed
mechanisms of the mind to uncover → this mechanism is clearly expressed by Yamada who says that the “it shoots”
doctrine “was born from the momentary slippage of meaning caused by the mistranslation of Japanese into German,
which created an empty space that needed to be imbued with some kind of meaning”: this passage reveals the inner
mechanism behind the arbitrary creation of meaning of the idea of “it shoots” – it was activated by the presence of an
empty space = when there is no meaning at all, or it is difficult to find any meaning, the situation is unbearable for us
and we perceive it as a fracture in the order of the world -> we need to fill in the gap with any meaning. It is
unsufferable to accept “pure chance”, “pure informational noise”, there must always be a kind of meaning. Non-sense
vs. order – to transform pure chaos into something meaningful, understandable or, at least, recognizable as an identity
of sort. We could also extend this to a large series of events linked to the perceptual interpretation of phenomena
around us e.g. -> Pareidolia = a mechanism quite common in everyday life, when we see recognizable forms when
there are not (faces in the shades of cloud, eyes looking at us in the architecture of a building, etc). It is more than
“working with fantasy” = it is the function of identifying eyes and mouths, a function essential for our ancestors
living in forests and having to hunt or try to avoid dangerous predators –> this function now is still important for our
intellectual and psychological growth, since it is the first form of recognition that we implement in the development
of our relationships with the world – e.g. a new-born recognizing the faces of those who are near. However, it can
generate many false positive cases as well; although pareidolia is a question of perception, it indicates that our
interpretation of casual stimuli can create some short circuits in our perception – such a sort circuit goes in certain
directions and not others. Something similar happens in the interpretation of more complex phenomena than simple
perception: when we experience a series of bad or good events, we tend to hypostatize them as misfortune or good
fortune, or being us religious, we can interpret them as sings of God’s will. Religions are good receptacles of those
emphatic interpretations and this does not occur by change -> in almost all societies religions are the social
institutions specifically dedicated to deal with inexplicable forces (= all those forces with no clear definition in
common knowledge). Epistemologically speaking, death is an interesting objects since its perception and
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interpretation is strongly dependent on the personal perspective we have on this event: although we can experience
other people’s death, we cannot experience our own; moreover in front of the death of someone dear, we try to find
meaning in what happened, even a surrogate one (= religious, ethical, philosophical, whatever). Not to find meaning
at all is extremely uncomfortable -> it reveals a condition of extreme epistemological uncertainty that maximizes the
limitation of those political, cultural, epistemic structures and institutions we use as remedies to avoid the contact
with death, so as to keep our fears at pace → All of this suggests that the human way in the world is intimately linked
to meaning = we are meaning-seeking animals/ meaning-hunting animals.

• How are power and the body related in Foucault? = power uses the body, it tames and educates it – of
course, the body is not negated by the power, otherwise it would be impossible to follow only the power.
• According to Foucault, does power exert a top-down or a bottom-up influence? = it has not just one direction
-> according to him, power is not a linear line of force, it spreads more like a wave. Many scholars analyse
power based on institutions: these are just the phenomena, what appears to the eye – power also goes
unnoticed. It is important not to think power only in the perspective of an institution exerting power top-
down.
• Why does Foucault speak about a microphysics of power? = Power reveals itself in the most normal
behaviour – it is not a question of a great manifestation of power. Microphysics of power is not a scientific
inquiry about power at a micro-social level; it is rather a way to define how power behaves in the most
normal situations and relations.
• Is power always saying no, or is it productive? = Yes, it is productive, and it is not always a destructive
relationship.
• What are technologies of the self in Foucault? = They are some technologies allowing to modify oneself in
order to reach a desired physical, psychological and spiritual state. It is not a question of health, but rather of
controlling oneself and reaching a certain level/state.
• What was ancient philosophy in Classical era, according to Hadot? = Ancient philosophy was a practice.
Theory was not philosophy. The definition of philosophy in its ancient sense had much to do with practice: it
was not a theory that had to become practice; in order to understand the kind of practice we needed some
theory, but that was not philosophy.
• Was ancient philosophy a question of creating a proper technical language? = it was not. This does not mean
that a proper technical language was not important, yet philosophical discourse was important but only at the
beginning: the exercise of philosophy was much more important than the creation of a proper technical
language. These two ideas must be distinguished.
• Through habitus, is the subject more active or more passive? = Habitus is more active we you’re practicing
habitus. It’s like learning a language/learning how to express yourself.
• Through habitus is the subject conscious or not conscious of her/his actions? = Consciousness is not
necessary – to be conscious means to be able to control our own ideas and aims in order to reach a certain
idea.
• Is the subject of habitus obeying some conscious rules, when he/she is following habitus? = No. These rules
are not necessarily consciously obeyed, they can be totally unconscious.
• Is the subject of habitus, more autonomous or less autonomous? = More autonomous -> habitus makes the
subject much more autonomous than when there’s no habitus. He/she is much more able to make decisions
by his/her own without even following rules.
• Does habitus remain unchanged during time? = No, it adapts, although it is durable. There are durable
dispositions, therefore it changes even if there is a kind of structure. Habitus is not a conscious rule, it is a
kind of flexible disposition we have received, and which makes us more autonomous in our judgement and
actions.
The problem of Practice in Nishida = Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945) – his life covered almost the entire first period of
modernization in Japan. He is still considered the most important philosopher in Japan (from the modern academic
perspective): he is certainly the most important Japanese academic modern philosopher. His ideas of Poiesis and
Praxis: these two words come from the Greek and have a direct connection with the work of Aristotle -> his
distinction between 1) theoria = contemplation – something that has his own aim in itself; this contemplation has to
do with classical Greek conception of philosophy or, at least, with paideia = working on oneself/taking care of
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ourselves → theory has to do with time people spend without being materially productive or applying wisdom to
anything specific, 2) poiesis = the production of objects and 3) praxis = practical wisdom – means that we have to
discuss and ponder over something in order to reach a certain conduct/idea/moral act. In The Nicomachean Ethics:
“every art concerns generation and searches for the technical and theoretical instruments to produce one thing which
could or could not be and whose principle lays in the one who produces it and not in the object produced” = the
principle is in the subject, not in the object. We have to consider carefully Aristotle’s position on the general matter –
his ideas are particularly teleological = they consider the final cause extremely important.
Aristotle’s teleology: “the purpose of a theoretical discipline is the pursuit of truth through contemplation; its telos is
the attainment of knowledge for its own sake. The purpose of the productive sciences is to make something, their
telos is the production of some artifact, the practical disciplines are those sciences which deal with ethical and
political life; their telos is practical wisdom and knowledge”. So here it is 3 different teleology in Aristotele’s
thought: teoria is pursuing truth for its own sake, practical knowledge is not a knowledge that has a certain specific
end, the end of knowledge is knowledge itself. Productive sciences, which means poesis, have the purpose of making
something specific, and then we have practical disciplines, which are ethics or morality and also politics, and their
telos is practical wisdom and knowledge; wisdom, something that must be apply to specific objects. On the contrary,
in the idea of Nishida we find something different: poiesis in Nishida is still a production of objects by human beings,
a craftsmanship and artistic creation. A production in the sense of being creative, on the contrary Nishida thinks a
production similar to a craftmanship, still production is a way of creating objects, in this context there is not much
different from Aristotele position. The differences: human being that makes something through a tool, on the contrary
on the praxis according to Nishida we have the meaning of praxis: to Nishida is to produce oneself, I produce myself
and this is praxis, a self-production done by human beings, human beings actually are part of a society so they are
connected with other human beings. So the different between poesis and praxis is the fact that poiesis has to do as a
relationship between human subject and object, while praxis has a human selfproduction that has something to do
with human beings, they can be other human beings or the same that direct made his own production toward oneself.
This, however, doesn’t mean that there is no connection between the two side of production; in Aristotele there is in
general an idea that contemplation is more noble than doing something. On the contrary, when we said the nishida
praxis is a kind of self-production, something quite different from aristotele because in aristotele we find the primacy
of theoretical approach, in nishida we find the primacy of the active approach, nishida in much closer to vita active
than contemplative, they are radically dialectical (from the created to the creating).
Nishida is mainly concerned about the approach to the world but generally speaking there is a kind of reflections,
inter-relation. Poiesis and praxis actually are always together. Generally, it is thought that poiesis is creating things in
biological-bodily sense. But I do not think that poiesis is only this and I do not think that praxis is poiesis. (NKZ
X:105). So aristotele was defining poiesis as a production of objects but is not simply the production of objects
because there is a connection between poiesis and proxis, the production of oneself.
It could be possible to think praxis as an action in which the human being aims at human being. It could be possible to
say that thanks to it, it is an action in which the self becomes itself (so the self-identity is formed thanks to these kind
of actions, I cannot know myself if I do not change myself through actions). In this, our self is constituted, it is born. It
is possible to say that (praxis) is a poiesis in which (we) produce our very self. (NKZ X:142). So, praxis is a poiesis in
which we become objects to ourself, in which we produce our very self and, doing so, we are changed, is a reflective
praxis.
Poiesis and praxis in Nishida
“there is absolutely neither a poiesis, which is not praxis, nor a praxis, which is not poiesis. Praxis is not simply a
conscious activity. It is praxis through poiesis in the sense of technology. Poiesis becomes itself through praxis.
Otherwise, it is simply by chance”. (NKZ X:152). Technology is part of what we are.
An interpretation of the dialectics poiesis praxis: they are always together, there is a kind of circular relationship
between them, poiesis without praxis is blind, praxis without poiesis is empty, this means that poiesis need praxis as a
guiding principle, praxis needs poiesis, as a connection to the dialectics of the world (world of production).

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Cestari 17
About invented traditions, connected subjectivity and practices, is important the paradox of traditions in Modern
Japan, this country maintain a deep relationship with the past, this implies a cultivation of many of what has often
been presented as practices of world, so cultural traditions. Japanese cultural traditions are said to predate Japanese
modernization, are also considered as the key of economic success, a sort of positive mix of cultural condition unique
to Japan and closely connected to its tradition, past. The paradox, however, is that this traditions are for the most part
modern, so they developed after and not before modernization, this appears also to China which often presents itself
as a traditional country, for examples two cases of the idea of China as traditional country are particular emphasized,
“Gongfu at Mount Wudang” and “gonfu at Shaolin Temple”. Is important to know the Meiji period (1868-1911) of
Japanese history, this has to do with proses modernization. This period, therefore, is crucial, Japan appears to be a
country that is at the same time traditional, clearly linked to his own past, but also modern; this connection between
ultra- modernity and ultra-traditional makes Japan just like a kind of impossible place, where completely
contradictory thinks seems to get a get a point of balance, actually Japan presents itself in this way, so it is a self-
identity that goes in this direction (like expo in 2015, Japan presents itself with geisha wear kimono). Is Japan a land
of ancient traditions or modern technology? Or of both? For example, in a lot of presentation of Japanese religion,
Shinto is often defined as “the original, traditional religion of Japan” compares to Buddhism that came later (in the 6
century C.E). Shinto is considered as the way of the Gods and Buddhism considered as the way of the buddha that
derives from India and China. Is also said that the samurai where all following the Asian honor code, called Bushido.
Often Archery is depicted as path to spiritual enlightenment, deeply connected to zen. Is due to work of a german
intellectual close to Nazism who wrote in German a book about zen and the art of archery and became the 4 father of
the connection between zen and something else etc.
What do historians say about these traditions? They find a strange paradox, something unexpected and apparently
unusual, these traditions are almost all modern inventions, Japanese language itself is modern because is the result of
a creation of a recreation, re-adaptation of language that started after the beginning of the proses of modernization of
the country, it started from 1868 and it was particular intense in 1902 to 1917, by the 20s of last century, Japan fixed
his own language but not before, so it is modern and is quite difficult to defined literature, because Japanese literature
is that literature that has been written in Japanese and yet Japanese is modern so how to distinguished these things?
they say classical Japanese, but it is an unified language, classical Japanese has something quite different from a
language that we considered nowadays.
So, there is a kind of paradox in that China and Japan considered themselves as closely connected to the traditions and
yet many of these traditions are modern, so how is it possible? How is it that all these and other traditions as well are
said to be very old and yet they are not? Is there a liar? How to explain it? Some researchers have tried to explain this
paradox, some historians had some ideas; 3 important sources used:

1) Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, 1983: The Invention of Traditions

2) Steven Vlastos, ed., 1998: Mirror of Modernity. Invented Traditions of Modern Japan

3) Yamada Shoji, 2009: Shots in the Dark. Japan, Zen and the West (or. 2005)

The first 2 books present a convincing theory about this paradox. We can start asking how to think a tradition? In
Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger book, 1983, the debate on invented traditions problematized the idea of traditions,
which are defined as artificial often developed for the reason of creating deeper social and political bonds, there are 2
common ideas of traditions, the first one is a temporal idea: traditions are defined as what’s opposes to modernity,
this idea creates an impressure of an anthological security that creates the moral boundedness of life in traditional
social structure, in other words they create cultural and historical identity; the second idea of tradition is a kind of
practice of old still active today, these ideas are actually normative, they are required to society in order to avoid the
integration, both these type of ideas are not historical, are detent to reproduce just a position of modern premodern.
Hobsawm and Ranger’s think that tradition and costumes must be distinguished as 1) invariable/variable (costumes
derives from the people and are variable) and 2) invented/genuine (all traditions are invented), “invented” doesn’t
mean not true or not authentic.
Japanese balance between modernity and traditions is clearly a cultural propaganda, it is meant as a way to define
Japanese culture in particularistic way, a common position that could be summarized as follows where Japanese are
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specials compared to all other countries in the world and this approaches is very common and known as (niangirò
ahahaha) the literature that answers to the demand of cultural identity by a large group, so the balance between
traditional and modernity is a rhetoric that contributes to define Japanese identity and maintain and stabilized the
most important modern inventive tradition which is the national state itself, so the self-imagine of Japan largely
depends on its opposition to the west; for example Sakai Naoki wrote: «What gives the majority of Japanese the
characteristic image of Japanese culture, is still its distinction from the so-called West. [...] the loss of the distinction
between the West and Japan would result in the loss of Japanese identity in general. » (Sakai Naoki, “The West”, in
S. Buckley (ed.), Encyclopedia of Contemporary Japanese Culture, Routledge, 2002, pp. 563-564.). this means that
Japanese identity in itself is something built, this is however hardly problem of Japan related to all national states in
the world.
What does invention mean? Invention could be found as a process of artificial change of previous discourses and
practices, this term means: transformation, adaptation, homogenization, systematization, rationalization, alteration,
identification and all the processes that radically change the content of previous practices. In order to understand it, is
important to consider what the big picture is; these processes of invention occurred during the formation and
consolidation of nation states. So, it happened starting from the second part of 18 century and went on after 2 world
war, so why are these processes of invention happening? Because traditions create deep social and political bonds
among people (especially among imagined communities as nations). They are essential for establishing and
maintaining the nation state’s selfimage. From such a perspective, Japan is no exception to these general tendencies
of national states to create their own cultural identity and in this cultural identity national states formed traditions as
well, even more, we could say that tradition is a prescriptive representation of ideas and practices, such a prescription
is oriented to mobilize individual in manners that were unthinkable before the construction of the national states. The
question of traditions and its links must be considered in connection to at least 2 things: on one hand we have national
state that mobilizes individuals, both are institutions that characterized modern, social and political configurations.
National state needs to mobilize people at the high level of engagement, this is why the individual needs to be
formed. Contrary to a general thought, this mobilization can be done only thanks to the formation of individuals. We
could say, through Antony Giddens’ words, that Modernity must be understood on an institutional level; yet the
transmutation introduced by modern institutions interlace in a direct way with individual life and therefore with the
self. One of the distinctive features of modernity, in fact, is an increasing interconnection between the two ‘extremes’
of extensionality and intentionality: globalizing influence on one hand and personal disposition on the other.” (A.
Giddens, Modernity and SelfIdentity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991, p. 1).
We could say that individuals are essential for the national state that is not against the individual, is not trying to limit
the possibilities of the individual to grow, an individual, in fact, is a specific political and social configuration in that
its formation allows a deeper interrelation between citizens and the states. Individuals are formed through the
intervention of social institutions for example educational system, productive and market system, these social
institutions take care of them and so human beings are studied by sciences, psychologies, sociologies etc. in order to
promote their emptiness. At the same time, however, this political and scientific interest allows more control over the
individuals and, at the same time, it allows more self-management by the individuals themselves, at least
theoretically. Therefore, we could say that individualism is on way to provide deeper axcess to human beings and
mobilize them for the society in the state. national state and individuals don’t stay in opposition. An example of the
relationship between national state and the individuals is the coronavirus crisis, the democratic state needs to reach
the level of citizens conscious in order to make them stop, stay home, without a connection to the deepest level of
citizens interiority, this mobilization of all social forces would never be possible. Although we do not know how long
to be possible to stop all social life, in certain countries it is quite difficult to ask people to do them and yet even the
most liberalist countries such as United Kingdom or USa which are traditionally reluctant to impose control on the
people, these countries are somehow forced to change the policy in order to preserves public health, despite these
limitations, however, the individuals generally have reacted with what we call “city sense? citizens?”, a sense of
responsibility and have accepted these limitations and this is possible thanks to at least 2 reasons: the first one is the
sophisticated apparatus of technological and bureaucratic devices that allow capillary communication, control and
management of a vast territories and this apparatus was unthinkable in the past, some technologies come from a very
recent past, so, it was a situation unbelievable even 15 years ago and the other reason for such possibility is the
technologies of political control in Facault, this control is may possible and is more efficient to the extend in the
individual society and physical constitution is discovered. In this context, therefore, knowledge is fundamentally in
political decisions and possibility of reaching that level of effectiveness. The construction of the individual is so
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accomplished also thanks to the involvement of physical and emotional parts. How it is possible? Thanks to the
learning of bodily practices, for example exercises, memories, somatic memories such as smelling, tasting, touching,
seeing and hearing, different habitas and emotionally learning to love your country or your God or your company,
your own family. The individuals are built according to the nation, religion, societies, general orientation.
Chakrabarty has said “Individuals, Ideas, Bodies and Memories “Ideas acquire materiality through the history of
bodily practices. They work not simply because they persuade through their logic; they are also capable, through a
long and heterogeneous history of the cultural training of the senses, of making connections with our glands and
muscles and neuronal networks. This is the work of memory, if we do not reduce the meaning of that word to the
simple and conscious mental act of remembering” (Chakrabarty1998, 295). This has deep consequences, although
invented, the practices we were discussing before, determine bodily memories, emotional effects, they cannot be
simply dismissed as irrelevant or as just invented. Following Facault, we could say that the invention of traditions in
modernity implies the invention of the inner spatially individuals that must be colonized by disciplines that create
some specific bodily sensations, that shape the body and encore the individuals to a set of specific sensations; these
sensations become a kind of safe arbore for the individuals and an act tradition in the very body and life of
individuals. Therefore, the individuals link to traditions is not abstract or ideological, we cannot simply dismiss it as
irrelevant, it is physical and practical, is a question of practice more than ideas. Power is not limited to institutional
level but involves the very life of people, and we understand how through the body, through a conditioning of the
body. In Chakrabarty’s approach, this is called “the history of Embodied Subject”, this history is closely connected
with the history of a national state as it is the moment in which the national state changes to flesh and blood of the
people, still Chakrabarty insists in this history one history exceed the other, he said that subject has much longer
history than capitalism and the nation state and yet, even if the subject is so deeply connected with capitalism and
national state, actually it is much more than this. “the subject that negotiates capitalism and the nationstate has a much
longer history than those of the latter two, much more datable, global formations. This is not to deny the many and
profound ways in which both capital and the state mold us as subjects—this volume [edited by Vlastos] in fact bears
ample testimony to those processes. It is to argue that the subject of a historically situated modernity is always in
excess of the universal teleologies imputed to capital and the state by the languages and methods of the social
sciences.” In other words, the bodily subject is always much more than capitalism and national state condition, and
this is an important point because from there we can probably limits the possibilities of other and alternative
developments.
An important work is that of Roger Ames on Ancient Chinese Rituality and Bodies, this essay is quite useful even if
Roger Ames is still using a kind of approach that reminds a sort of orientalism, a sort of dichotomy such as China and
the West, ancient and modern. This approach by Roger Ames seems to be referred to classical Chinese thought which
means it is pre Buddhism thought, that is in the 1 century BCE, still there are many aspects that could be extended to
other situations as well, both outside of China and probably not only limited to ancient period, of course different
religions, different philosophies mean to have different sensibilities on this meter, but many things describe on this
essay are also valid outside of Confucian and Tawi traditions. 2 characters important are:
Actually the 2 characters are quite contiguous, and we can see it because the right half of the 2 characters is exactly
the same and this is called the phonetic part. The part of the character ti is referred to flesh, the part of the character li
formalized human actions received by traditions. From the perspective of Ames, body and ritual are seen as organic
types of order, of sequence or arrangement: “these rituals can be more elaborately described as an inherited tradition
of formalized human actions that evidence both a cumulative investment of meaning by one’s precursors in a cultural
tradition, and an openness to reformulation and innovation within the framework of the tradition.” So, there is the
idea of tradition, on the one hand we see the precursors that have invested a lot of meaning in such a cultural
tradition, generally the fathers, like Confucian tradition and, at the same time, this tradition is open to reformulated,
innovated within the framework. According to Ames: “The notion of formal li action overlaps with ti, body, in that a
li action is an embodiment or formalization of meaning and value that accumulates to constitute a cultural tradition.
This ritual action, like body, is of variable “shape,” appropriating much of its definition from its context. It is
morphological rather than schematic in that changing participants and environments result in an altered disposition of
the ritual. Ritual action, invested with the accumulated meaning of the tradition, is a formalized structure on which
the continuity of the tradition depends and through which a person in the tradition pursues cultural refinement.”
(Ames 1993, 169, italic in the original)

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"Like the human body, [rite] is a profoundly organic entity which must be nurtured and cultivated to preserve its
integrity, and which must be constantly revitalized and adapted to prevailing circumstances in order to retain its
influence. It is at once the fruit of the past and the ground out of which the future will grow. Significant in the
correlation between ritual action and body is the polar rather than dualistic relationship between form and matter,
action and body. Any particular ritual action can be understood only by reference to a formalized body of actions, a
cultural tradition; meaning and value can be enacted only by embodiment in ritual actions". (Ames 1993, 170
Few considerations on Ames’ essay: Not specific of ancient China, Forms present in many practices, Teaching the
“grammar of action” which means how a certain style of martial arts interprets actions, Bourdieu’s habitus.

Questions about Agency in Action: the question of agency is on the background of everything that we had said about
the problem of action and practice, how is that the subject and which subject, by the way, does an action? Is it her or
him that decides what to do? Is that decision the result of an independent chain of actions and thoughts? Or does it
depend on other factors and how many factors? Which factors? And if I decide what I do, which part of me is decided
this? All part of me or some parts?
On the question of agency, there are many answers, for example 1) the first one of the ancient Foucault, that thinks
there is a kind of program inside our head, that has been implanted in our behavior and which takes control of our
actions, 2) According to Chakrabarty, this program is based upon bodilies sensorial and emotional memories, 3)
according to Bourdieu, this program unable us to become even more independent in our decisions and nonetheless
this makes a received structure to continue, so it’s certainly more independents but at the same time to be linked to
previous tradition, 4) Roger Ames speaks about an action that flows naturally outside of ourselves as a result of a
ritual education which resembles a lot of product even Chakrabarty approaches, another approach is that of 5)
Nishida, who is particularly interested in this method, he defines a type of knowledge that makes us one with the
object and the actions and a type of practice that makes us able to produce things and ourselves at the same time in a
kind of circular relationship poiesis and praxis, this knowledge and praxis by Nishida are always seen as a movement
of the world in which we live and this world produces itself through my actions. Who is the agency here? Is a single
person who practices something or is it the world that trough that person practices and changes itself?
Cestari ultima lezione
Aristotele’s conceptions of poiesis and praxis are: poiesis the production of objects through tools, praxis is practical
wisdom.
What is self-production in Nishida’s thought? All productions are interrelated. Hence, production of an object is at the
same time self-production of the producer. So, when I produce something, at the same time I modify myself and the
object changes myself.
Why is Nishida speaking about “from the created to the creating”? it underlines the dialectical relationship between
subject and object a circular dialectical relationship (action and feedback)
Why Japan defines itself as traditional and yet modern country? Because it has reached a point of balance between
tradition and modernity.
According to Chakrabarty, are ideas effective because of their rational persuasiveness? Or because of their control by
the state? NO, ideas are effective whenever they become part of the sensorial and somatic structure of the individuals.
According to Chakrabarty, does the relationship with the subject’s body make state and the capital control more
effective and the grip on it stronger? Yes and no. the connection is powerful and cannot be easily eliminated. Yet, the
body always exceeds control.
What do “body” and “ritual” have in common in ancient Chinese thought, according to Ames?
What do you think about agency in action? Who decides what? Is that decision the result of an independent chain of
actions and thoughts?

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