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Atty Zarah Transpo
Atty Zarah Transpo
(Atty. Villanueva-Castro)
REMEMBER:
For transport of goods – extraordinary diligence (Art. 1733)
For carrying passengers – utmost diligence of very cautious persons (Art. 1755)
Maritime commerce
Limited liability rule (Arts, 587, 590, 643, 837, Code of Commerce)
- No vessel, no liability doctrine
- Liability of shipowner is restricted only to shipowner’s interest in the vessel
- In case of total loss, liability of shipowner ends
Charter party
- Shipowner allows a charterer to use the ship for a fee
Bareboat v. Affreightment
Public enemy
- The act of the public enemy must be the proximate and only cause of the loss
Improper packing
- Even if the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods should be caused by the
character of the goods, or the faulty nature of the packing or of the containers, the
common carrier must exercise due diligence to forestall or lessen the loss
- Carrier must had not known the fact of improper packing of goods upon ordinary
observation to be relived of liability
- If the defect is existing upon acceptance, the carrier must receive the goods under protest
and must be duly noted in the bill of lading
Must be in writing
- While contract of carriage is not required in writing because perfection happens upon
agreement, for a carrier’s liability to be limited, however, the stipulation must be reduced
into writing and signed by the parties
- Terms must be fair and reasonable
Subcontracting as a defense
Prescriptive periods
Civil Code
COGSA
Code of Commerce
Notice requirement
If within PH, lack of notice results to dismissal of action under Art 366, CC
Period of claim against airlines:
a. Damage to passenger’s baggage – apply Warsaw Convention (2yrs)
b. Humiliation the passenger suffered from airline’s employees – apply Civil Code on torts
(4yrs)
Under Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages
before
1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;
2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;
3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or
4. the court of the place of destination.
In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation domiciled in London,
United Kingdom with London as its principal place of business. Hence, under the first and
second jurisdictional rules, the petitioner may bring her case before the courts of London in the
United Kingdom. In the passenger ticket and baggage check presented by both the petitioner and
respondent, it appears that the ticket was issued in Rome, Italy. Consequently, under the third
jurisdictional rule, the petitioner has the option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in
Italy. Finally, both the petitioner and respondent aver that the place of destination is Rome, Italy,
which is properly designated given the routing presented in the said passenger ticket and baggage
check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before the courts of Rome, Italy. We thus
find that the RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the case filed
by the petitioner.