DEL ROSARIO v FERRER

FACTS:
-In 1968, Spouses Gonzales executed a
Donation Mortis Causa in favor of their children
and granddaughter covering the former’s house
and lot.

-In the document, it stated that it shall be

revocable and it shall not affect any other
distribution of other properties belonging to any
of donors whether testate or intestate and where
ever situated and that any of the surviving
spouse reserves the right, ownership,
possession and administration of this property
herein donated and accepted and this
Disposition and Donation shall be operative and
effective upon the death of the DONORS

-Although it is considered that a donation mortis

causa, which in law is the equivalent of a will, the
deed had no attestation clause and was
witnessed by only two persons.

-However, when the donor wife died, the

donation was submitted to probate but the
Regional Trial Court ruled that the donation was
made inter vivos due to its irrevocability.

-On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses’ donation to their
children and granddaughter was a donation
mortis causa, as it was denominated, or in fact a
donation inter vivos.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that the donation was

inter vivos. The document in question in this case
was captioned “Donation Mortis Causa” is not
controlling. The Court has held that, if a donation
by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not
altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis
causa.

The intent to make the donation irrevocable

becomes even clearer by the proviso that a
surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of
the donation. Consequently, the donation was in
reality a donation inter vivos. The donors in this
case of course reserved the “right, ownership,
possession, and administration of the property”
and made the donation operative upon their
death.
LEDESMA v MCLACHLIN

FACTS:
-In 1916, Socorro Ledesma lived martially with
Lorenzo Quitco, and had a daughter named Ana.
The marital relationship between Socorro and
Lorenzo ended in 1921, however, the latter
executed a deed acknowledging Ana as his
natural daughter and issued a promissory note in
favor of her.

-Subsequently, Lorenzo married Conchita

Mclachlin, to whom he had 4 children. In 1930,
Lorenzo died and 2 years later, his father
Eusebio died who left real and properties.
Administrations proceedings on the said
properties were instituted and the case was later
known as the INTESTATE OF THE DECEASED
EUSEBIO QUITCO.

-As a result, the Ledesma’s proceeded to collect

the sum of payable on a promissory note which
was then issued in favor of Ana by her father
Lorenzo. The court has then issued an order of
declaration of heirs in the intestate of the
deceased Eusebio Quitco, in which Ana was not
included.

ISSUE:
Whether the Ledesma’s has the right to collect
the sum payable on a promissory note, promised
by her father.

RULING:

No. The properties inherited by the defendants

from their deceased grandfather by
representation are not subject to the payment of
debts and obligations of their deceased father,
who died without leaving any property.

The Supreme Court further said that the Civil

Code provided that the right of representation
under the Civil Code does not make the said
child answerable for the obligations contracted
by his deceased father or mother, because, as
may be seen from the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure which refers to the partition of
inheritances, the inheritance is received with the
benefit of inventory, thus, the heirs only answer
with the properties received from their
predecessor.

Therefore, Mclachlin, et.al are not bound to pay

the indebtedness of their said father from whom
they did not inherit anything.
LORENZO v POSADAS

FACTS:
-In 1922, Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga,
leaving a will and a considerable amount of real
and personal properties. A month later, a probate
proceeding has begun in the Court of First
Instance. The will was admitted to probate.

-The Court of First Instance has considered it

proper for the best interests of the estate to
appoint a trustee to administer the real properties
which, under the will, were to pass to nephew
Matthew ten years after the two executors
named in the will was appointed trustee. Moore
acted as trustee until he resigned and Pablo
Lorenzo was appointed in his stead.

-In 1932, Pablo Lorenzo, as the trustee of the

estate, brought an action with the Court of First f
Instance, against Juan Posadas, Jr. the then
collector of the Internal Revenue for the refund of
the inheritance tax on the estate of the deceased
Hanley which was paid by Lorenzo. The Court of
First Instance ruled in favor Posadas. Hence this
appeal.

ISSUE:
When does the inheritance tax accrue and when
must it be satisfied?
RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that the accrual of the

inheritance tax is distinct from the obligation to
pay the same.

The tax therefore is upon transmission or the

transfer or devolution of property of a decedent,
made effective by his death. It is in reality an
excise or privilege tax imposed on the right to
succeed to, receive, or take property by or under
a will or the intestacy law, or deed, grant, or gift
to become operative at or after death.

According to article 657 of the Civil Code, "the

rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death." The
property belongs to the heirs at the moment of
the death of the ancestor as completely as if the
ancestor had executed and delivered to them a
deed for the same before his death."

Thus, the authentication of a will implies its due

execution but once probated and allowed the
transmission is effective as of the death of the
testator in accordance with article 657 of the Civil
Code. Whatever may be the time when actual
transmission of the inheritance takes place,
succession takes place in any event at the
moment of the decedent's death. The time when
the heirs legally succeed to the inheritance may
differ from the time when the heirs actually
receive such inheritance.

RAMIREZ v BALTAZAR

FACTS:
-In 1959, Victoriana Eguaras, single, made and
executed a real estate mortgage over a parcel of
land, as a security for a loan, in favor of spouses
Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores.

-Upon the death of Victoriana, Baltazar, et.al,

filed a petition with the Court of First Instance for
the intestate proceedings of the former’s estate.
In the said petition, it was alleged that Filemon
and Monica Ramirez are the heirs of Victoriana.
However, the Ramirez’s failed to qualify thus, the
court assigned the clerk of court as the
administrator.

-In 1961, Baltazar, et.al, filed a complaint with

Court of First Instance for foreclosure of the
subject mortgage against the clerk of court. In a
decision, it rendered decreeing the foreclosure of
the mortgaged property and its sale.

-Thereafter, the Ramirez’s filed a complaint “for

the annulment of all proceedings in the
foreclosure of the mortgage” against spouses
Baltazar, et.al. On the other hand, Baltzar, et.al.
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
Ramirez’s do not have a legal capacity to sue.
The Court then dismissed the case. Hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether Ramirez, et.al have a legal capacity to
sue until their status as legal heirs of the
deceased is determined in the Special
Proceeding Case.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that Ramirez, et. al

have legal capacity to sue.

The Court first reiterated that Baltazar, et.al, in

availing their defenses, they have overlooked the
fact that in their petition for intestate proceedings,
they have alleged that the Ramirez’s are the
heirs of the deceased.

It further ruled that here is no question that the

rights to succession are automatically transmitted
to the heirs from the moment of the death of the
decedent. While, as a rule, the formal declaration
or recognition to such successional rights needs
judicial confirmation, the Supreme Court has,
under special circumstances, protected these
rights from encroachments made or attempted
before the judicial declaration.

Moreover, the Supreme Court made mentioned

of its previous ruling in a similar case in which,
inevitably, this case should fall under the
exception, rather than the general rule that
pending proceedings for the settlement of the
estate, the heirs have no right to commence an
action arising out of the rights belonging to the
deceased.

Thus, Ramirez, et.al. has the legal capacity to

sue.