Demo Neg Case Blocks

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April 2021 International Monetary Fund NEG 1
Demo Neg Case DebateUS

Siva and I negate
Contention One is Moral Hazard

McQuillan-20 writes: IMF loans enable countries to pursue reckless domestic policies
knowing that, if needed, the IMF will bail them out. This safety net delays needed
reforms and creates long-term dependency. The IMF also rescues international bankers
who have made bad loans, encouraging them to approve ever riskier international
investments.
Meltzer-99 of Carnegie Mellon University confirms empirically: the existence of

subsidized loans from the IMF modifies a finance minister’s evaluation of the costs he
faces. The large increase in the number of countries experiencing large crises in recent
years proves this.
Meltzer continues: the past fifteen years have seen ninety serious banking crises, most of
them followed by deep recessions. In half of these cases, losses exceeded 25 percent of
GDP.
These recessions decimate social spending and cost millions of jobs, increasing structural
poverty. Thus, Bajoria-08 of CFR terminalizes: a 1 percent decline in developing country
growth traps an additional 20 million people in poverty.
Contention Two is Resource Extraction

Downey-10 of NCBI writes: since the breakup of colonial empires, wealthy nations and
corporations which consume the bulk of the world’s natural resources have relied on debt
and the IMF to ensure their continued access to and control over vital raw materials.
This occurs with two key resource types.

Subpoint A is Water
In order to monopolize and access water from the global south, Halifax-09 writes: the
IMF frequently makes water privatization a requirement of loans and insists on
substantial cuts to legal structures to pave the way for water privatization. These
requirements then become conditions for any other loans.
The WFA-04 explains: IMF water privatization means consumers must pay the full price
for operation and maintenance of water utility, increasing the price of water in developing
countries, and reducing access to clean water.
For example, the WFA writes: In Ghana, IMF policies required a 95 percent raise in
water fees.
Thus, Citizen-01 terminalizes: the IMF’s drive to privatize and extract full cost recovery
from water systems robs low-income communities of access to affordable water. The
immediate impact is that more than five people, mostly children, die every year from
illnesses caused from drinking unsafe water.
Subpoint B is Mineral Extractives

So that Western countries and corporations have a steady supply of cheap minerals, The
IMF forces increased raw material exploitation in three ways.
First, conditionality. Downey writes: structural adjustment programs imposed on

developing nations by the IMF often force them to maintain high levels of raw material
exports, as nations are forced to agree that they will pay out large insurance claims if
mining activities are disrupted in any way.
Second, repayment. Bandhauer-2000 writes: IMF loans are paving the way for natural
resource exploitation on a staggering scale. The focus on export growth for hard currency
to pay back loans means unsustainable liquidation of natural resources.
Third, currency devaluation. Global Exchange writes: SAPs require countries devalue
national currencies to make exports cheaper. For example,Yumeen-20 of Columbia finds:
IMF required devaluation lowered the cost of Sierra Leone’s minerals for other countries,
incentivizing diamond extraction and decreasing the amount of revenue the government
could generate by selling the gems.
This keeps developing nations trapped in poverty, as their cheapened exports generate too
few funds for them to be able to invest in diversification.
For these three reasons, resource dependency has only grown. Roe-16 of the UN writes:
of the 72 countries identified as most dependent on exports, 63 experienced an increase in
dependence on extractives over 16-years. That is no fewer than 88%, with countries
experiencing increases as large as 94 percentage points.
There are two impacts to resource dependency.
First is commodity shocks.
Every few years, resource-cursed nations see the price of their primary commodity
plummet, as new mines or oil fields are discovered, or global demand falls. This
devastates the economy, leading the OCI to conclude: there is a strong negative
correlation between a country’s dependence on mineral exports and GDP. These
countries also suffer from higher rates of poverty, malnutrition, child illiteracy,
corruption, authoritarianism and civil war, collectively known as the resource curse.
Second is civil wars.

Ross-15 of the IE writes: resource extraction creates grievances among the local
population, because of land expropriation, environmental hazards, insufficient job
opportunities, and social disruptions. These in turn lead to civil war.
Civil war is devastating. Beyond directly killing millions, Thayne-12 writes that civil
wars cause floods of refugees fleeing violence, who spread infectious diseases such as
HIV and malaria and raise the risk of civil war contagion. Indeed, experts trace the global
epidemic of HIV to the Ugandan civil war.
Save lives and negate.

Rebuttal Speech Doc Neg

Top level 2 things:
1. Overview - intent,
2. They’ve conceded that countries on average take IMF loans every 5
years - which (1) disproves all of their arguments and (2)
a. They say it flows there way because these countries
wouldn’t come back - the IMF is literally their only options
On the weighing debate, we agree climate change comes first, they’ve
conceded, 4 things:
1. Resource extraction controls the link into greentech - massive
emissions
a. On our civil wars impact - massive emissions emitted through
2. Civil wars create massive refugee crises spreading diseases across
hundreds of countries which prevents them from having any funds for
green technology and pushes hundreds of millions into poverty, short-
circuiting climate with an additional millions of casualties.
3. The IMF subsidizing a few million in green technology is a far smaller
effect size than the CONCEDED 25% DECREASE IN FDI BECAUSE
IMF PROGRAMS ARE KNOWN TO CAUSE CRISES, WHICH
MEANS THEY HAVE ON NET LESS MONEY FOR GREEN
TECHNOLOGY WHICH IS WHY THEY HAVE CONCEDED THAT
EMISSIONS ARE ONLY RISING AND THEIR ARGUMENTS ARE
EMPIRICALLY FALSE.
4. There’s no regulation
5. Also, China and the U.S. are the largest emitters so they have ZERO
uniqueness whereas our arguments are hyper-unique because absent
the IMF countries are able to diversify historically, only loans preclude
them.
On diversification
Extend the argument:
The ONLY response is this Malaysia empiric-- 1 they’ve dropped that across
70 COUNTRIES WITH IMF LOANS 88% GOT DRAMATICALLY MORE
DEPENDENT, don’t buy their single empiric but 2. A RECENT IMF LOAN
IS DESECRATING ALL OF THE PROGRESS
Civil wars create pandemics affecting every countries outweighing their

water turns on scope and killing millions of people.
Frontlining
On c1:
They say countries have liquidity problems:
On their turn about solving crises: Turn: Stubbs-19 reports that IMF loans
often impose deep austerity measures and budget cuts in times of crisis
INCREASING poverty-- our evidence also controls for nonrandom selection.
Prefer it because these countries demand loans on average once every five
years-- if they worked, they wouldn’t have to request so often.
On Water:
Group all of the turns, they’re all about gradual privatization done by states--
the IMF enforces rapid privatization that causes empirical price shocks per
the conceded Ghana empiric, decreasing sanitation and access.
On the aid cross-app, the WFA says health and water aid can solve these
issues, but Stubbs-19 does a meta-analysis and finds that the increases in aid
provided are of budget assistance and debt relief aid.
On the next turn:
On extraction:
They say it creates rampant growth, our evidence agrees and finds most of
the growth due to IMF loans is found in extractive industries that don’t
support high paying jobs which is why poverty empirically INCREASES, and
the resources are never used for diversification because the IMF wants
countries to stay dependent, which is why their loans CUT diversification
subsidies and why dependency has only grown.
They say there’s no link between civil wars - there’s no reason why the
manufacturing sector flees - we say that competition over resources fuels
these wars, along with land expropriation, which are definitely better
warrants- and our evidence is causal.
They say the IMF ensures accountability and good guidance, but they’ve
100% conceded that the IMF doesn’t care about these countries and is
beholden to Western powers which WANT the resources of the Global South
which is WHY they guide them in the opposite of a positive direction.
On Their case, on crypto

4 responses:
1. All their link evidence says the World Bank is also capable of
centralization.
2. Goldsmith 20 finds that the IMF can only regulate crypto in countries
that are signatories - however cryptocurrencies are cross national
which means there’s a huge solvency deficit.
3. Their evidence is talking about NEW, government backed
cryptocurrencies - not about regulating already existing
cryptocurrencies like bitcoin. 3 implications:
a. They have no link because they haven’t proven that these
new currencies will be broadly adopted
b. They have no internal link because current
cryptocurrencies are clearly enough to fuel terrorism
c. They have no solvency because if ANY peer to peer
network is always susceptible to volatility.
On the terorrism impact

1. Poverty shortciruits terrorism because poor economic situations push people to engage in ilicit
avtitie
2. Even without cryptos, money laundering is unstoppable- Kaji-19 reports that the global anti-
money laundering campaign has only seized 0.1% of funds from crime.
On the Poverty impact

1. This is just saying crypto is good - no warrant why it is unique to government backed currencies,
which means bitcoin is solving now
On Contention 2
Group their first two links

1. Jensen 04 finds that countries that sign IMF agreements attract 25
percent less FDI flows, because of their poor reputation for destroying
countries social spending.
2. Turn it: Vienna finds that the IMF gives out loans in the form of
structural adjustment programs. Reuters finds that this is achieved by
attaching conditions to the loans that demand privatization and
massive cuts in government spending. Indeed, the ENDD finds that
over 60 percent of all SAP loans require that countries reduce spending
on social services such as healthcare and education, as a way to reduce
taxes that foreign investors must pay to free up funds for governments
to pay back loans. 3 reasons this is bad:
a. First is healthcare: Ezeonu finds that oftentimes the IMF
forces countries to spend 3 times more on debt servicing than for
healthcare. Reductions in health care negatively impact the
poor, as the World Health Organization find that 100 million
people a year slide into poverty due to higher medical costs
b. Second, Reimers of Harvard University finds that due to
these cuts, enrollment by the poor in schools decreases on
average by 70%. Bonal finds that this lack of access to education
traps individuals and countries in a vicious circle of dependence
on unskilled jobs, trapping individuals in poverty and countries
in poor economic situations. This outweighs
i.On scope, because education affects every person in the
country and every sector of the economy
ii.Because strong education systems are the cleanest link
into long term poverty alleviation as it helps countries
industrialize, engage in higher skilled labor, trade within
the increasingly digitized global economy.
Literally all of our evidence controls for non-random selection as well.

On Aid
1. Turn: IMF Loans massively increase corruption. Stubbs-19 finds that
IMF loans force rapid privatization which causes the selloff of
government land and industries, leading to immense bribery at the
point of sale, as well as hurting government wages, making them more
susceptible to multinational and private sector bribes. This A. short-
circuits aid as corrupt officials siphon it off and B. independently kills
3.6 million people per year by crushing social spending and
government accountability
2. Two turns:
a. First, Malik 18 finds that foreign aid is normally given out in the form
of predatory loans which cripple developing countries in the long run and put
them in the EXACT position where they NEED IMF loans. Prefer this on
time frame because it creates cyclical situations for these countries
b. Second, Kiley ‘18 finds that aid is easily exploited by terrorist
organizations, finding that al-Shabaab is making millions each year exploiting
foreign aid given directly by the UN.
On their COVID depression impact:
1. This just magnifies our turn: Oxfam 20 writes that 84 percent of the
IMF’s loans given out during COVID forced cuts to social spending
and austerity measures, which left millions globally without healthcare
and make recovery impossible.
On their Contention 3
On their first two links

1. None of their arguments have actually materialized - these are just
proposals that have existed for years. The IMF does not have the
capacity to enforce any of these, and larger nations would never get on
board - meaning they have no solvency
On Green Tech
1. Green tech is bad - 2 turns
a. Potts 11 of RMI finds that when energy efficiency rises, people use
more energy, nullifying or making the effects worse. Indeed, Sorrells 07 finds
in a 500 study meta analysis that energy efficiency in heating leads to a
rebound effect of up to 170%, on net turning their argument and making
climate change worse.
b. Second, rapid development of renewables causes e-waste. The AMPT
finds that as more green technologies pour into the market, many past
technologies will be thrown away. This constant replacement causes tons of
waste, and McAllister 18 of the University of Colorado finds that e-waste is
devastating to the environment and to human health because technological
devices possess large quantities of poisonous chemicals such as lead.
On the impact
1. Climate Change is largely non unique -
2. The US and China have the worst carbon footprint - the IMF has no
leverage over these countries which means they have marginal solvency
at best
Case Cards
Allan Meltzer University Professor of Political Economy at Carnegie Mellon University Fall
1999
Leading countries, including the United States, Japan, Britain, and the European Union, allow their currencies to float. Western
Europe now has a common currency and a single central bank in place of fixed but adjustable exchange rates. Many
of the
problems or international
financial crises of recent years arose because there is too much
lending, especially short-term lending, to developing countries, not too little. Recent history gives strong
support to the proposition that if a country adopts market-oriented policies of privatization and deregulation, opens its trade to
competition in foreign markets and by foreigners in domestic markets, and carefully controls its budget, foreign lenders and investors
are willing to finance its development. Yet the international financial system is crisis-prone. Latin America in the 1980s, Mexico in
the mid-1990s, and Asia and Russia most recently present well-known examples of deep, pervasive financial crises that have been
costly to the public in the countries with financial problems, to their trading partners, and, often, to much the rest of the world. The
past fifteen years have seen ninety serious banking crises, most of them followed by
deep recessions. More than twenty of these crises produced direct losses to a developing country exceeding 10 percent of its
GDP. In half of these cases, including several Asian countries now, losses exceed 25 percent of GDP
(Caprio and Klingabiel 1996, 1997; Calomiris 1998). These losses, relative to GDP, are far larger than the cost of the U.S. savings-
and-loan problem to U.S. taxpayers. The frequency and severity of recent international financial problems, and their occurrence in a
period of growth, economic progress, and low inflation should raise a number of questions
Existence of IMF loans changes risk-reward evaluations for policy makers - the large
increase in the number of countries experiencing big crises suggests this is true
1999
Even if he is wrong, a crisis may not occur during his term of office. IMF loans, at subsidized rates, are available. A timely loan may
require some retrenchment, but not all countries that go to the IMF have a crisis. It is sufficient for moral hazard that the
existence of subsidized loans from the IMF modifies [a] the finance minister’s
evaluation of the costs he faces. The large increase in the number of countries
experiencing large crises in recent years [proves] suggests that a change of this kind
has occurred. Perhaps the severity of the crises in Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, and Russia will change future behavior. But even
if so, institutional reform is still desirable. A more problematic defense of IMF procedures compares the IMF’s rescue packages for
international banks to the rescue of some of the passengers on the Titanic. The comparison is inapt. There is no important difference
between individual and social losses when a ship such as the Titanic sinks.
IMF conditionalities are one-size fits all, not tailored to each country’s situation, hurting
economic growth and prolonging financial crises
Lawrence McQuillan Britannica October 2020
The fund also operates the IMF Institute, a department that provides training in macroeconomic analysis and policy formulation for
officials of member countries. Criticism And Debate The impact of IMF loans has been widely debated. Opponents
of the
IMF argue that the loans enable member countries to pursue reckless domestic economic
policies knowing that, if needed, the IMF will bail them out. This safety net, critics charge, delays
needed reforms and creates long-term dependency. Opponents also argue that the IMF
rescues international bankers who have made bad loans, thereby encouraging them to
approve ever riskier international investments. IMF conditionalities have also been widely debated. Critics
contend that IMF policy prescriptions provide uniform remedies that are not adequately
tailored to each country’s unique circumstances. These standard, austere loan conditions
reduce economic growth and deepen and prolong financial crises, creating severe hardships
for the poorest people in borrowing countries and strengthening local opposition to the IMF.
Warrant Cards:
Barro-98: Moral Hazard Turn

Barro, Harvard University, 1998, https://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/files/98_1207_imf_bw.pdf
But no one is willing to blame Congress if the IMF actually works to encourage Brazilian-type financial crises time and again.
Some economists believe that bailouts
increase "moral hazard" by rewarding and encouraging
bad policies by governments and excessive risk-taking by banks. Aware that they
can be bailed out in the crunch, banks will often lend at interest rates that do not
reflect fundamental risks. This, in turn, generates new financial crises and reduces
world economic growth. In Asia, a flood of low-cost capital from Europe, Japan,
and the U.S. wound up financing real estate speculation and overcapacity, thanks in
part to an assumed IMF “guarantee.” But nobody will ever be able to prove that the IMF effectively starts new
fires in this way. Hence, the political forces favor IMF funding and limitless bailouts. CRUTCHES. IMF economists like to argue that
these moral-hazard problems are minimal. But consider the case of the recent $42 billion package for Brazil. How did the Brazilians
qualify for this support? They did so mostly by not exercising sound fiscal policies. If their policies had been better, they would not be
in their current difficulties and would not qualify for IMF money.
Investors may pour tons of money in to a region expecting an IMF bailout if things turn
sour
Ricki Helfer The Brookings Institute August 1998
Moreover, Asian countries were growing so rapidly prior to the crisis that they would naturally attract large inflows of foreign
capital—which could run out much faster than it came in—regardless of the prospect of an IMF rescue. Others sharply disagreed,
asserting that investors
would not have poured so much money into Asia—certainly not at such
relatively low interest rates—if they had not expected some kind of IMF rescue if things
turned sour. Some blamed the IMF’s bailout of Mexico in 1994-95 for leading to the Asian crisis of 1997-98, although most
disagreed with that conclusion. James Tobin offered a third view: while moral hazard is a serious and difficult problem, it was not the
major cause of the Asian currency crisis.
The IMF insulates banking systems against loss, which encourages reckless borrowing and
lending at artificial interest rates
Robert Litan The Brookings Institution October 1998
The criticisms of the Fund extend far beyond issues about exchange rate regimes, of course. As I am about to briefly summarize, some
of these attacks are partly valid. But to paraphrase the Clinton Administration’s approach to affirmative action, the far better course is
to “mend the Fund, not to end it”. Moral Hazard: Let’s begin with the better known “moral hazard” problem: that because IMF
funds recently have been used to stabilize domestic banking systems, IMF rescues have the
effect of insulating creditors of banks in borrowing countries against loss. This distorts the
pricing of loans and encourages too much borrowing and lending at artificially suppressed
interest rates. IMF officials have acknowledged this problem, have urged attention be devoted to solving it, but at the same
time, either have implicitly or explicitly suggested that this is a price that may have to be paid in order to prevent contagion. This view
is far too pessimistic. In the United States, we heard similar objections to curtailing the ability of regulators to protect uninsured
depositors during the 1980s and yet a law was enacted in 1991 (FDICIA) that does precisely that.
IMF loans could possibly enable reckless domestic policies for member countries, as they
know the IMF would bail them out, creating dependency
IMF conditionalities are one-size fits all, not tailored to each country’s situation, hurting
economic growth and prolonging financial crises
Lawrence McQuillan Britannica October 2020
The fund also operates the IMF Institute, a department that provides training in macroeconomic analysis and policy formulation for
officials of member countries. Criticism And Debate The impact of IMF loans has been widely debated. Opponents
of the
IMF argue that the loans enable member countries to pursue reckless domestic economic
policies knowing that, if needed, the IMF will bail them out. This safety net, critics charge, delays
needed reforms and creates long-term dependency. Opponents also argue that the IMF
rescues international bankers who have made bad loans, thereby encouraging them to
approve ever riskier international investments. IMF conditionalities have also been widely debated. Critics
contend that IMF policy prescriptions provide uniform remedies that are not adequately
tailored to each country’s unique circumstances. These standard, austere loan conditions
reduce economic growth and deepen and prolong financial crises, creating severe hardships
for the poorest people in borrowing countries and strengthening local opposition to the IMF.
Verification:
Existence of IMF loans changes risk-reward evaluations for policy makers - the large
increase in the number of countries experiencing big crises suggests this is true
1999
Even if he is wrong, a crisis may not occur during his term of office. IMF loans, at subsidized rates, are available. A timely loan may
require some retrenchment, but not all countries that go to the IMF have a crisis. It is sufficient for moral hazard that the
existence of subsidized loans from the IMF modifies [a] the finance minister’s
evaluation of the costs he faces. The large increase in the number of countries
experiencing large crises in recent years [proves] suggests that a change of this kind
has occurred. Perhaps the severity of the crises in Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, and Russia will change future behavior. But even
if so, institutional reform is still desirable. A more problematic defense of IMF procedures compares the IMF’s rescue packages for
international banks to the rescue of some of the passengers on the Titanic. The comparison is inapt. There is no important difference
between individual and social losses when a ship such as the Titanic sinks.
Impacts:
Too much lending in recent years has contributed to financial crises - there have been 90 in
the past 15 years
1999
Leading countries, including the United States, Japan, Britain, and the European Union, allow their currencies to float. Western
Europe now has a common currency and a single central bank in place of fixed but adjustable exchange rates. Many
of the
problems or international
financial crises of recent years arose because there is too much
lending, especially short-term lending, to developing countries, not too little. Recent history gives strong
support to the proposition that if a country adopts market-oriented policies of privatization and deregulation, opens its trade to
competition in foreign markets and by foreigners in domestic markets, and carefully controls its budget, foreign lenders and investors
are willing to finance its development. Yet the international financial system is crisis-prone. Latin America in the 1980s, Mexico in
the mid-1990s, and Asia and Russia most recently present well-known examples of deep, pervasive financial crises that have been
costly to the public in the countries with financial problems, to their trading partners, and, often, to much the rest of the world. The
past fifteen years have seen ninety serious banking crises, most of them followed by
deep recessions. More than twenty of these crises produced direct losses to a developing country exceeding 10 percent of its
GDP. In half of these cases, including several Asian countries now, losses exceed 25 percent of GDP
(Caprio and Klingabiel 1996, 1997; Calomiris 1998). These losses, relative to GDP, are far larger than the cost of the U.S. savings-
and-loan problem to U.S. taxpayers. The frequency and severity of recent international financial problems, and their occurrence in a
period of growth, economic progress, and low inflation should raise a number of questions
Micheal L. Ross, "Sci-Hub | How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases |
10.2307/3877888", January 2015, https://scihubtw.tw/10.2307/3877888 //RBT
The second possible mechanism-which has been widely cited by policy analysts and journalists-is a "grievance" mechanism. It
resource extraction creates grievances among the local population, because
suggests that
of land expropriation, environmental hazards, insufficient job opportunities, and
the social disruptions caused by labor migration; these grievances, in turn, lead to
civil war. Klare, for example, suggests that "resource wars" are caused in part by logging or
mining firms that are "ravaging the environment" and "driving off the people who
have long inhabited the area or depriving them of any benefits from the
appropriation of their traditional lands." Gedicks and Switzer offer similar arguments; so do many
journalists.
Citizen, "V. IMF and World Bank Push Water Privatization and Full Cost Recovery on Poor Countries", 2001,
https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/migration/imf-wb_promote_privatization.pdf //RBT
The IMF’s and World Bank’s drive to privatize and extract full cost recovery from water
systems is generating concerns worldwide about the potential for such policies to
compromise public health and rob low-income communities (which make up the majority of developing country
populations) of access to affordable water. The most immediate impact of reducing the access to safe and
affordable water will fall on women and children. More than five million people, most of the
children, die every year from illnesses caused from drinking unsafe water. As water
becomes more costly and less accessible, women and children who bear most of the
burden of daily household chores must travel farther and work harder to collect
water -- often resorting to water from polluted streams and rivers. Families are forced to
make trade-offs between water, food, schooling, and health care.
WFA, "IMF and World Bank Water Policies Undermine Public Health ", May 2004, https://www.citizen.org/wp-
content/uploads/imfandworldbankwaterpoliciesunderminepubhealth.pdf //RBT
In developing countries, many people are outside the piped water system or cannot afford treated water. Those who are
outside the piped water system must depend upon costly tanker trucks or streams, rivers and lakes that may be polluted.
Those outside the piped water system already pay exorbitant fees for access to clean water. In
Ghana, after IMF and
World Bank policies required a 95 percent raise in water fees in May 2001, three buckets
of water cost a family almost half of the minimum wage. In India, some poor
households pay as much as 25 percent of their income on water.
WFA, "IMF and World Bank Water Policies Undermine Public Health ", May 2004, https://www.citizen.org/wp-
content/uploads/imfandworldbankwaterpoliciesunderminepubhealth.pdf //RBT
Rather than increasing funds for public water and sanitation services, IMF and World
Bank policies push full cost recovery and water privatization. Many World Bank structural
adjustment loans and water sector restructuring loans now require governments to replace public subsidy with a policy promoting "full
This means that water consumers must pay the full price
cost recovery" or "economic pricing."
for operation and maintenance (and sometimes even expansion) of the water utility.
Increasing the price of water in developing countries, where the majority of the
population makes less than US$2 per day, reduces access to clean water. This is not
responsible public health policy.
Halifax, "Issue Brief: The World Bank and Water Privatization - March 2004 | Halifax Initiative", May 2009,
https://halifaxinitiative.org/content/issue-brief-world-bank-and-water-privatization-march-2004 //RBT
Both the World Bank and IMF
frequently make[s] water privatization a requirement of
structural adjustment loans and insist[s] on substantial reforms to legal, regulatory
and institutional structures to pave the way for water privatization. These
requirements then become conditions for any other loans.
Alan Roe, June 2016, UN "Like it or not, poor countries are increasingly dependent on mining
and oil & gas," https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/it-or-not-poor-countries-are-increasingly-
dependent-mining-and-oil-gas //RBT
Specifically, of
the 72 low- and middle-income countries that we identify as most
dependent on exports, 63 experienced an increase in their dependence on extractives
resources in that 16-year timeframe. That is, no fewer than 88% of these countries became even
more dependent on extractives exports over this period. The average increase was around 18 percentage points (pp), although some
countries experienced increases as large as 94 pp (Chad), 76 pp (Sudan) and 64 pp (Mozambique).
Fifteen of 18 low-income countries experienced an increase in dependence on extractives, and 20 of the 25 lower-middle-income
countries saw an increase over this 16-year period.
Paying back IMF loans requires resource extraction
C. Bandhauer, 3-22-2000, "Re: Top Ten Reasons to Oppose the IMF," No Publication,
https://wsarch.ucr.edu/wsnmail/2000/msg00449.html //RBT
IMF Policies hurt the environment IMF loans and bailout packages are paving the way
for natural resource exploitation on a staggering scale. The IMF does not consider
environmental impacts of lending policies; and environmental ministries and groups are not
included in policy making. The focus on export growth to earn hard currency to pay
back loans means unsustainable liquidation of natural resources. Government cutbacks
inevitably target the environmental ministry as one of the first agencies to come under the budget
axe. This happened with the bailouts of Brazil, Indonesia, and
Russiaócountries that are renowned for their great biodiversity.
“The Price of Oil: Debt & Poverty.” Oil Change International, Oil Change International,
priceofoil.org/thepriceofoil/debt-poverty/. //RBT
One would assume countries that are well endowed with oil, gas and mineral wealth would be economically well off. In fact, just the
reverse seems to be true. In
the mid 1990’s economists Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner found a strong
negative correlation between a country’s dependence on mineral exports – and oil in
particular – and their gross domestic product (GDP). Further research by others also has found that these
countries also suffer from high rates of poverty, malnutrition, child illiteracy,
corruption, authoritarianism, civil war, and even indebtedness. Collectively, these
observations are known as the resource curse. Drilling into Debt, one of Oil Change International’s first
reports, found that countries that produce oil tend to be poorer, more violent, more corrupt, and less productive
economically than they should be. Paradoxically, aid programs designed to ‘help’ poor countries likely exacerbated this
situation: the report also found that World Bank programs designed to increase rich countries’ private investment in
developing country oil production instead drastically increased debt.

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DEBA E !

S efa Ba cha d - C ad Pal -

Demo Neg Case DebateUS

Contention One is Moral Hazard

Meltzer-99 of Carnegie Mellon University confirms empirically: the existence of

Contention Two is Resource Extraction

This occurs with two key resource types.

Subpoint B is Mineral Extractives

First, conditionality. Downey writes: structural adjustment programs imposed on

There are two impacts to resource dependency.

First is commodity shocks.

Second is civil wars.

Save lives and negate.

Rebuttal Speech Doc Neg

Civil wars create pandemics affecting every countries outweighing their

They say countries have liquidity problems:

On the next turn:

On Their case, on crypto

On the terorrism impact

On the Poverty impact

Group their first two links

Literally all of our evidence controls for non-random selection as well.

On their COVID depression impact:

On their first two links

Barro-98: Moral Hazard Turn

Paying back IMF loans requires resource extraction

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